Kent Political Almanac
‘Europe in the World’
Special Issue
ABOUT THE KENT
POLITICAL ALMANAC
The Kent Political Almanac was
created to provide a platform for
academic debate and peerreviewed publication opportunities for students in Politics and
International Relations. This
journal’s purpose is to showcase
the School’s best undergraduate
and postgraduate essays.
The initiative came from students of the School of Politics
and International Relations,
which led to the journal being
launched in November 2013.
All articles are peer-reviewed by
both students and members of
the School’s academic staff. We
are proud to be an entirely student-led publication, supported
from our School of Politics and
IR at the University of Kent.
MANAGING EDITOR
ACADEMIC ADVISORS
Léo Wilkinson
Dr Ruth Blakeley
EDITORIAL BOARD
Noémie Battini
Afroditi-Maria Koulaxi
Eugenie Megally
Maëlle Poulin
Erik Lindner-Olsson
Professor Elena Korosteleva
Dr Ersun Kurtulus
Professor Donna Lee
Dr Neophytos Loizides
Professor Richard Sakwa
Dr Harmonie Toros
Rebecca Walker
LAYOUT & DESIGN
April Yeung
Mehdi Abakarim
Robert Small
ABOUT THE GLOBAL EUROPE CENTRE
The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is a new interdisciplinary research centre, focusing on Europe, its member states, and its place in a changing
world.
The Centre brings together leading international academics from politics and
Global
Europe
Centre
order to explore the contemporary policy challenges to Europe and its nation
states.
Get in touch
The GEC team has a strong track record of engagement with policy makers
W: www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
and informing decision making in London and in Brussels. Research is also
E: [email protected]
widely disseminated through publications, knowledge transfer workshops,
F: Global Europe Centre - University of Kent
T: @GlobalEuropeCen
YOUR LOGO
HERE
2
international relations, economics, law, business, and European culture in
conferences and events. The Centre has a strong commitment to the creation of the next generation of ideas innovators and policy makers. The Centre also has a strong student voice, working across all levels and disciplines.
Kent Political Almanac
School of Politics and International Relations
Rutherford College
University of Kent
Canterbury
Kent, CT2 7NX
United Kingdom
Blog: http://blogs.kent.ac.u k/kentpoliticalalm anac/
E-mail: ken tpoliticalalm an ac@gm ail.com
Kent Political Almanac
Kent Political Almanac
Spring 2014
Issue 1
‘Europe in the World’
Special Issue
WELCOME TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
This Spring issue of the of the Kent Political Almanac is special for two
reasons: it is not only the journal’s first publication, but we also have
been privileged to launch it jointly with the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent. We therefore decided to make this special issue focused
on the theme of “Europe in the World”, in its first printed edition.
The articles in this issue were submitted for publication by students in
response to our call for papers in February 2014. We were delighted to
have submissions from both undergraduate and postgraduate students,
with authors representing different countries of Europe and beyond. Similarly, our editorial team was just as international: even though we all
study at the University of Kent, we had editors originally from Sweden,
Greece and France, but also from Hong Kong and Malta.
We would like to thank all of the authors who contributed to this first
issue. All articles were then reviewed by members of staff from the
School of Politics and International Relations, to whom we are very
grateful to. Our special thanks go to the Global Europe Centre,
and particularly to Professor Elena Korosteleva, whose support has been
pivotal to the journal’s launch. We also would like to acknowledge the
support of the European Parliament office in London, for helping us to
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The English School of
Thought ………………………….4
Europe in the financial
turmoil………………………….16
Peace-building ‘from below’
in Kosovo………………………26
Power-Sharing, Minority
Rights and Equal Citizenship
in Nigeria and Mali…....…..38
publish this first edition.
We hope that you will enjoy reading this very special issue of the Kent
Political Almanac.
The EU’s International Role:
A Normative Power in Theory or in Practice?...............50
Léo Wilkinson
Managing Editor
Issue 1
3
BY JOHANNA HANS
This paper provides a critical
assessment of the English
School of Thought, also known
as the International Society
Approach.
The English School is commonly associated with a group of
British academics and political
practitioners during the second
half of the 20th century. Building upon the two dominant
mainstream approaches of IR
theory, the English school tries
to harmonize both the theoretical axioms of realism as well as
those of the liberal schools of
thought. Despite its appeal as a
via media between the two
grand schools of IR, the English School finds itself on the
periphery of International Relations theory and is lacking
the wider recognition of the
international academic community.
Critically engaging with the
English School, this paper portrays how the International
Society Approach synthesizes
the mainstream IR theories
into a single approach and discusses the potency and conceptual weaknesses of such an
approach.
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
Introduction
The international society approach, also referred to as
the English School (ES) or Liberal Realism, is a particular strand
of International Relations theory and is commonly associated
with a group of academics of the British Committee and the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics during the second half of the 20th century. 1 Among its
most prominent figures are the founding fathers Martin Wight
and Charles Manning, as well as Wight’s student Hedley Bull but
also contemporary theorists like Richard Little and Barry Buzan.
The English School introduced the idea of an international society, a society of states, that, driven by shared values and interests, exists despite the condition of anarchy in the international
arena.2 On this basis, the international society approach tries to
harmonize both the theoretical axioms of realism as well as
those of the liberal schools of thought. Despite its appeal as a
via media between the two grand schools of IR, the English
School finds itself on the periphery of International Relations
theory and is not given much attention by scholars outside the
United Kingdom.3 The missing recognition of the international
academic community necessitates a critical engagement with the
theoretical positions of the writers of the English School as well
as their critics.
It is the aim of this paper to discuss whether the international society approach is an adequate third way between realism and liberalism. In order to do so it must be asked to what
extent the English School depicts the international society approach as a via media and whether it is convincing.
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part this paper
presents the core features of the international society approach
and examines how attempts are made to synthesise the main
“In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School scholars
agree that institutions and norms matter and that the interdependence
between states can create pacifying effects.”
1
Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or
Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire.
2
Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.pp.75-76
3
Totten, p.1
4
Kent Political Almanac
theoretical traditions of IR, realism, liberalism and rationalism,
into one single approach.4 The second part will consider the potency and merits of the English School that are articulated by its
advocates such as Robert Jackson.5 The last part will explore and
evaluate the most dominant criticism, most prominently put forward by Roy Jones.6
This paper will conclude with a rather pessimistic view
about the international society approach. It will be shown that
the School’s greatest strength, the harmonization of all three IR
traditions into one theory, is also its biggest weakness. By incorporating pluralistic theoretical stances, the English school looses
its coherence and plausibility which ultimately calls into question the school‘s stand as an independent theory of International
Relations.
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will
mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin Wight and Hedley
Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society
approach.
“In the rationalist belief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the condition of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another which enable the development of principles of how to control the use of force.”
The English School as a Via Media
The English School accommodates the theoretical stances
of more than one world view. In his influential work International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991) Martin Wight identified
three strands of international political thought and categorized
them into Machiavellian realism, Grotian rationalism and Kantian revolutionism.7
Wight considers the realist tradition as a theory of conflict, war and power politics.8 Ascribing the realist school great
explanatory strength in terms of accounting for power constellations in international politics, Wight adopts many of its core features. He agrees with realists that states are the key actors in the
international state system which is characterized by the absence
of a central authority.9 Although Wight and other English scholars accept the realist perception of an anarchical state system,
the implications they attribute to it, are rather different. Instead
of concluding a war of all against all in the Hobbesian sense,
they rather agree with the Lockean idea that despite the lack of a
common authority to enforce the law, human beings are able to
4
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin
Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach.
5
Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]:
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6
Jones, Roy E. (1981): The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. In: Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
7
Wight, Martin (1991): International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester University Press,
Leicester.
8
Totten, p.5
9
Wight, Martin (1986): Power Politics. Penguin, London. P.105
Issue 1
5
behave reasonably towards one another due to a common set of
interests.10
In this sense, the English School rather approximates the
Kantian liberal vision of the international state system in which
all communities, bound together by the same values and ideologies, can coexist peacefully without having to fear the use of
force.11 In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School
scholars agree that institutions and norms matter and that the
interdependence between states can create pacifying effects. 12
However, Wight and his followers abstain from the cosmopolitan
idea of a world-state or even a Kantian federation and are highly
sceptical that democratic ideas and institutions ultimately lead
to a perpetual peace, as depicted by liberal peace scholars.13 Although the English School holds the view that anarchy and society can coexist, they do not disregard the hostilities between
states.
As could be seen, the English School takes into account
the core presumptions of both realism and liberalism and presents them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
In addition to harmonizing the realist and liberalist tradition,
the English school also draws heavily upon rationalist theory
and incorporates its main assumptions into its own approach.
The rationalist tradition has its origin in the writings of Hugo
Grotius (1583 - 1645) on international law. In the rationalist belief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the condition
of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another
which enable the development of principles of how to control
the use of force.14 This way, the rationalist tradition captures the
sociological axioms of realism as well as the normative stance of
liberalism.15
Since rationalism recognises the respective strengths of
realism and liberalism without directly challenging any of their
core propositions, Wight views the rationalist tradition as a middle way between the two.16 This appeal of rationalism as a via
media between realism and liberalism became the basis for
Wight’s concept of an international society.
The international society approach is the central focus of
the English School. ES scholars believe that there exists an international society among states that is more civilized and organized than realists suggest, but less idealistic and utopian than
liberals would hope.17
In his work The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World
10
Wight(1991), p.13
11
Linklater, Andrew (2010): The English School Conception of International Society. Reflections on
Western and non-Western Perspectives. In: Ritsumaiken Annual Review of International Studies,
No. 9, p.2. International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto.
12
Jordan, Richard (2011): A Brief Case the English School. In: The Monitor, Special Edition 16, pp.
23. AIM Media Texas, McAllen.
13
Ibid, p.23
14
Suganami, Hidemi (2011): The English School, History and Theory. In: Ritsumeikan International
Affairs, Vol. 9, p.34 Ritsumeikan University, Tokyo.
15
Totten, p.6
16
Ibid, p.1
17
Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. p.85
6
Kent Political Almanac
Politics, (1995) Hedley Bull defines the international society as
follows:
“Whereas a system of states emerges when two or more states
have sufficient contact between them and exert enough impact
upon one another so that their behaviour necessitates the calculation of the other, a society of states, on the other hand is ‚a
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share on the working of common
institutions.”18
Since life, truth and property - according to the international society approach - are the primary goals of each society,19
states have agreed that they should work together to better secure the survival of the members of their society, to mutually
respect sovereignty and property and to ensure that treaties and
agreements are kept.20
“States have agreed that they should work together to better secure the
survival of the members of their society, to mutually respect sovereignty
and property and to ensure that treaties and agreements are kept.”
The concept of the international society is a prime example of how the three traditions blend into each other. From a
methodological point of view this synthesizing is seen by the
pluralistic ‘levels of analysis’ that English School writers operate
with. Advocates of the international society approach take account of the structural coercions of the international system at
the systemic level while at the same time recognizing the impact
of agents and processes within the society and analysing the importance of individuals and transnational groups at an individual level.21 This way the English School employs the units of analysis of each IR tradition.22
With regard to its epistemology, meaning the question
how we know what we know, the international society approach
is primarily interpretative.23 That is to say, it understands reality
as it is perceived and experienced and sees everything and everyone as interconnected.24
However, due to the English School’s close links to realism and liberalism it also adopts a positivist approach towards
18
Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 2nd Edition. Columbia University Press, New York.p.3
19
Ibid, p.5
20
Linklater, p.13
21
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English School, International Relations, and Progress. In: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No.2, p.184 The International Studies
Association, Tucson.
22
Neo-realism concentrates especially on the systemic level and holds the view that the distribution
of capabilities of states within the international system shapes international relations (see Waltz
1979: 90). Liberalism on the other hand emphasizes the superiority of individual human beings thus
focusing on the individual level (see Badie 2011: 1434). Rationalists point to the societal relations
between states and employ therefore meso-level analyses.
23
Totten, p.15
24
Israel, Roger R. (2005) Three Styles of Social Inquiry: Positivist, Interpretative and Critical Research. Metropolitan State University, Minnesota, USA.p,2
Issue 1
7
science, which is especially apparent in the neo-versions of both
realism and liberalism. Like neo-realist and neo-liberalists, ES
scholars believe that an international society exists independently from the observer’s perception of it and that theories can be
formulated and reviewed against the backdrop of physical observations from the political world.25
At the same time the international society approach also
incorporates the ethical, normative dimension of classical liberalism by depicting a society of states where common norms and
identity are regarded as two of the primary components. 26 Hence
the ES features a multi-facetted epistemological nature.
Also with regard to its ontology, that is the question of
what is there that can be known about, the English School retains a rather pluralistic understanding of international relations. Although war is seen as an inevitable feature in international relations, it is claimed that it would be too one-sided to
suppose that statesmen discard all ethical concerns and are exclusively preoccupied with power and conflict.27 Since states are
constantly embedded into interactions and cooperation to
achieve mutual interests, they have developed a form of international social consciousness.28 Hence, the international society
'thickens‘ where cooperation is greatest such as in the realm of
international commerce or the agreements on basic human
rights.29
“The most commonly cited criticism that has been targeted against ES
writers is that of the lack of a common epistemology.”
In the ES vision the order of this society is maintained
through five institutions: diplomacy, international law, balance
of power mechanisms, international institutions and commerce.30 The role of justice in the maintenance of the international society became one of the central and most disputed questions within the English School. Influenced by E.H. Carr’s question “order for whom?“.31 Bull concluded that justice ultimately
contributes to order and hence to the maintenance of the international society.32 Other ES writers, however, hold the view that
pursuing justice entails the danger of increasing conflict and
violence (e.g. Robert Jackson). This tension between order and
justice formed a starting point of an inner split of the English
25
Whyte, Alexander (2012): Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism: Born of the same approach? (Online) URL: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalismborn-of-the-same-approach/.
26
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.183
27
Ibid, p.183
28
Dunne, Timothy (1995): The Social Construction of International Society. In: European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 379. Sage Publication, New York.
29
Totten, p10
30
Ibid, p.9
31
Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Macmillan, London.
32
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.187
8
Kent Political Almanac
School into a pluralists and solidarist camp, who differ the most
in their opinion on humanitarian interventions.33
To recapitulate, the international society approach features a methodological, epistemological and ontological plurality. By retaining close ties to the rationalist tradition, Wight and
Bull therefore asserted that the international society approach
stands between the realist and revolutionist thought.34 Andrew
Linklater describes the international society approach as ‘more
to international relations than the realist admits but less than
the cosmopolitan desires’.35
Potency of the International Society Approach
After having pointed out the key features of the English
school, it is now imperative to critically assess the international
society approach. According to Scott Burchill ‘the English School
can claim to have passed the test of a good theory’ by successfully avoiding ‘the sterility of realism and the naivety of idealism‘.36 By incorporating elements of all three traditions of International Relations theory, the international society approach
provides certain advantages: As a via media the English School
enables a dialogue between the two opposite theories of realism
and liberalism which would otherwise lack the ability to communicate with one another effectively.37 Apart from that, synthesizing the grand traditions into one approach provides for more
explanatory variables, many of which one tradition - realism, liberalism or rationalism - taken by its own, would potentially turn
a blind eye on. The English School thus enables theorists to employ a perspective from across the IR spectrum.38
Another central strength of the approach is that it is not
exclusively concerned with theories of conflict but rather requires a twofold analysis of both war and peace and has a better
account of change in international relations than other theories.
While change in the realist tradition for instance only evolves
through shifts in the distribution of capabilities 39 or the rise and
fall of hegemonic powers,40 Wight and Bull believe that the
course of international relations is primarily determined by the
dynamics of the international society.41 Interaction and cooperation in international relations is according to ES scholars essentially shaped by common interests which are subject to change.
The international society approach thus has greater explanatory
power for dynamic phenomena such as globalisation or regional
developments and provides an ideal framework for explaining
33
Unfortunately, a detailed examination of these two distinctive conceptions of the international
society is beyond the scope and space of this paper. For further discussion see e.g. Wheeler 2000.
34
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.175
35
Linklater, p108
36
Burchill, p.108
37
Little, Richard (2000): The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations.
In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 396. Sage Publications, New York.
38
Totten, p.5
39
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theories of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, Boton.p.90
40
Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in International Politics. Cambridge University Press, New
York.
41
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.183
Issue 1
9
progressive alliances of states.42
The persistence of war and conflict in international relations as well the existence of common rules and values (for example why else do we have international law and universally accepted legal principles like jus cogens?) and functioning common institutions (e.g. the regular exchange of diplomats) alongside with international and regional organizations (e.g. the European Union) and alliances (e.g. the War on Terror alliance), all
give merit to the international society approach. By taking into
account macro-, meso- and micro-linkages, the English School
brings together the benefits of diversity for understanding IR as
a whole.43
Conceptual Weaknesses and Lack of Plausibility
As appealing as the synthesizing of the three IR traditions may sound, as much does it expose the international society approach at risk of becoming a ‘catch-all theory“. As Richard
Little pointed out ‚the English School can look like a perfidious
Albion, the balancer, ever willing to shift ground in order to be
on the winning side of the argument‘.44 Having spent too much
energy on trying to reconcile the apparently incompatible theoretical stances of the grand IR theories, the English School now
lacks a clear and coherent stand as an academic enterprise of IR
theory.
The most commonly cited criticism that has been targeted against ES writers is that of the lack of a common epistemology. Wights’s proximity to historical and philosophical analysis in
IR and Bull’s obvious rejection of behavioralism,45 compound
with the retaining to positivism by most contemporary ES theorists,46 give credit to the claim that the English School lacks epistemological consistency.
Apart from this, one of the principle ontological criticisms is that the essential question of what constitutes an international society, is far from being clear. Instead, there exist diverse and often incompatible perceptions within the School itself. Whereas Wight claimed that there must be at least some
degree of cultural unity for states to form a society, 47 Buzan and
Butterflied are rather doubtful whether a common culture is a
necessary precondition for the development of an international
society.48 Also Bull is careful enough to not speak of a common
culture but rather of the existence of common interests which
cause states to adopt norms, values and institutions which in
42
Ibid
Totten, p.7
Little, p.396
45
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.185
46
Totten, p.15
47
Wight, Martin (1977): System of States. Leicester University, Leicester. p.33
48
Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society. Structural Realism and
Regime Theory Meet the English School. In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, p.333 MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
43
44
10
Kent Political Almanac
turn lead to the creation of an international society. 49 Hence,
with regard to the question of which requirements have to be
fulfilled to form a society, the English School yet lacks a coherent answer.
Another point of contestation centres on the importance
of norms. Since norms play a significant role within the international society approach, it is almost surprising that the school
devotes so little attention to how these norms are being formed.
As constructivists have convincingly shown, all norms are socially constructed.50 Since societies differ deeply in their belief of
individual liberties or entitlements, it is hard to imagine a society in which all members share the same norms and values. For
example it is questionable whether Hungary and the Netherlands
really do form a European international society, as proposed by
Wight,51 because of their rather diverging emphasis on the basic
right to freedom of speech.52
This point automatically leads to another central question, which has yet to be addressed by the English School. Although one central theme in the international society approach is
that of membership it is rather unclear what full membership
actually means. Who decides who belongs to the society and who
does not? What are the requirements for becoming a member? In
his critical pamphlet on the English School, Roy Jones almost
sarcastically asked whether Nazi Germany and Great Britain belonged to the same international society: Both countries obviously engaged in the institution of war and even Nazi Germany did
follow some of the rules of international law during its regime. 53
Therefore, strictly speaking, Nazi Germany and Great Britain
would have both belonged to an international society according
to the international society approach.54 Since English School
scholars are seemingly unable to agree upon what constitutes an
international society, one cannot hope for being able to determine who belongs to an international society and who is out.
Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I presented the core features of
the international society approach as a via media, alluded to the
potential merits of such a synthesizing approach and exposed
the central criticism towards the English School. As the critical
assessment has shown, the international society approach’s
greatest strength is also its Achilles heel.
The English School draws its explanatory power from the
49
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, 183
Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy and What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics. In: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 395. The IP Foundation, Cambridge (UK).
51
Ibid, p183
52
While Hungary passed a controversial media law which seriously restricted the freedom of press
in Hungary in 2010, Holland highly values the right to freedom of speech which is portrayed in its
high scores on the freedom of press index (see Reporters without Borders 2013).
53
Jones,p.4
54
Ibid
50
Issue 1
11
interplay amongst the three IR traditions within one approach.
This way the English school is able to capture and explain complex processes in international relations from different perspectives. The English School thus avoids the narrowness and reductionism to international relations which one theory, taken by its
own, inevitably entails.
However, by accommodating multi-theoretical stances,
the English school suffers from an epistemological inconsistency
and lacks a coherent point of view. As long as central presuppositions like the questions as to what constitutes an international
society, how membership is defined and whether norms (as a
central component of the international society) are endogenously or exogenously formed, are disputed within the English School
itself, the English School cannot be considered as an adequate
third way between realism and liberalism.
As a consequence, the theoretically inconsistent and often conflicting conceptions of the international society undermine the English School’s stand as an independent discipline of
International Relations theory and explain the lack of attention
by the greater academic research community. Although recognising the potential of the ES as a middle way between the conflictcentric realism and idealistic liberalism, the English School has
yet to develop greater ontological and epistemological clarity to
keep its promise as a successful third alternative to understanding International Relations.
12
Kent Political Almanac
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Badie, Bertrand [et al.] (2011): Liberalism in International Relations. In:
Badie [et al.]: International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Sage, Los
Angeles.
Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World
Politics. 2nd Edition. Columbia University Press, New York.
Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society.
Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 327-352. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations. Macmillan, London.
Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English
School, International Relations, and Progress. In: International Studies
Review, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 171-197. The International Studies Association,
Tucson.
Dunne, Timothy (1995): The Social Construction of International Society. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 379.
Sage Publication, New York.
Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in International Politics. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Israel, Roger R. (2005) Three Styles of Social Inquiry: Positivist, Interpretative and Critical Research. Metropolitan State University, Minnesota,
USA.
Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In:
Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]: International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jones, Roy E. (1981): The English School of International Relations: A
Case for Closure. In: Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jordan, Richard (2011): A Brief Case the English School. In: The Monitor,
Special Edition 16, pp. 22-31. AIM Media Texas, McAllen.
Linklater, Andrew (2010): The English School Conception of International Society. Reflections on Western and non-Western Perspectives. In:
Ritsumaiken Annual Review of International Studies, No. 9, pp. 1-13.
International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto.
Little, Richard (2000): The English School’s Contribution to the Study of
International Relations. In: European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 395-422. Sage Publications, New York.
Issue 1
13
Reports without Borders (2013): Freedom of Press Index 2013. (Online)
URL: http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/ranglisten/rangliste-2013/
(Accessed January 14, 2014).
Suganami, Hidemi (2011): The English School, History and Theory. In:
Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol. 9, pp. 27-50. Ritsumeikan University, Tokyo.
Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations
Theory: Heir Apparent or Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, Wiltshire.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theories of International Politics. AddisonWesley, Boston.
Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy and What States Make of it: The
Social Construction of Power Politics. In: International Organization,
Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391 - 425. The IP Foundation, Cambridge (UK).
Whyte, Alexander (2012): Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism:
Born of the same approach? (Online) URL: http://www.eir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalism-born-ofthe-same-approach/ (Accessed January 10, 2014).
Wight, Martin (1977): System of States. Leicester University, Leicester.
Wight, Martin (1986): Power Politics. Penguin, London.
Wight, Martin (1991): International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
14
Kent Political Almanac
Issue 1
15
BY PAULINE CHETAIL
The global financial turmoil
that started in 2008 has affected the European Union (EU)’s
economy like never before. The
common currency, the rules to
coordinate European budgetary, and the economic policies
have therefore been questioned
and put under deep scrutiny.
Nevertheless, such periods of
doubt were far from a novelty
for the Member States of the
EU. The past global crises have
always proved crucial for reshaping European integration.
The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, to analyse
the Member States’ direct response to the crisis in order to
understand the choices that
were made to react to global
financial challenges. Second,
this paper envisages different
scenarios for the future of the
EU, in the light of classic European integration theories.
EUROPE IN THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL:
WHAT LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES
FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?
The European integration process has never been linear
or steady. It has been fraught with periods of stagnation and
questioning since the foundations of the European Communities. However, sudden developments and rapid progress have
always followed the stages of inertia, often in a drastically shifting way. Scholars who have looked into this peculiar phenomenon have noted a correlation between crises of an economic nature and further advancements in the European integration. The
1980s are the prime example. The aftermath of the oil shocks
was followed by the Single European Act (SEA), and the completion of the single market through the ‘1992 programme’, which
eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the
European Union (EU). This may suggest that the difficult context
of the 1980s’ crisis triggered reforms of the European Communities after having stagnated for nearly a decade.
The past experience of the EU can thus shed light on the
multifaceted crisis that the EU is facing today. Since the global
financial crash of 2008, the EU and its twenty-eight Member
States have been experiencing gloomy days. In 2009, the EU
banks’ losses were estimated at £16,3 trillion, whereas the EU
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to €12,5 trillion.1 These figures highlight the gigantic scope of the 2008 financial turmoil. Generated by the US subprime crunch, the crisis
started with the collapse of the financial sector, the
‘decapitalisation’ and the illiquidity of the banking system.2 The
European economy shrank from then on, leading to what the
European Commission labelled the worst recession in European
history since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 3 The EU itself
was not hit by the crisis initially. Nonetheless, the Greek sovereign debt crisis, which started in the spring of 2010, sent the EU
into a tailspin. Although the crisis first began in the US and concerned only the Member States’ national economies, it formed
“The crisis painfully and remarkably shed light on the interdependence of
the European economies.”
1
Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or
Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire.
2
Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.pp.75-76
3
Totten, p.1
16
Kent Political Almanac
into a far-reaching crisis for the EU common market and its common currency. It painfully and remarkably shed light on the interdependence of the European economies, the imperfections of
the economic governance in the EU, and the flaws of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, the numerous breaches of the
Stability and Growth Pact, the inconsiderate debts contracted by
the Member States, as well as the lack of convergence of the national economies were in the commentators’ sights. For instance,
Paul Krugman, famous for having always claimed the inherent
contradictions of the single currency, wrote in 2011 that:
“the architects of the euro, caught up in their project’s sweep and
romance, chose to ignore the mundane difficulties a shared currency would predictably encounter — to ignore warnings, which
were issued right from the beginning, that Europe lacked the institutions needed to make a common currency workable”.4
It is therefore legitimate to wonder how the crisis might
change the EU, as it rattled the very foundations of the European
“The EU Member States sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures
through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate their
national responses.”
integration. Commentators argue that the EU may not survive
the crisis. This pessimistic scenario does not necessarily apply
to the EU, for it has gone ‘too far to fail’. And as we will see, the
EU response to the crisis did not make the integration backpedal. However, as the crisis catalysed the issues and contradictions of EU integration, there is an urgent need for reform that
requires further discussion. There has been indeed a series of
‘mitigated meetings’ including Nice, the Laeken Conference, and
the failed Constitution Treaty) followed by the difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. . As Jürgen Habermas pointed
out, “the experts seem to be in agreement on the diagnosis of
the deeper reasons for the crisis: the European Union lacks the
competences to bring about the necessary harmonisation of national economies whose levels of competitiveness are drifting
drastically apart.”5
We will thus see to what extent the crisis spurred a rethinking of the EU, its institutions and its governance. First, we
will briefly assess how the global financial crisis has changed the
EU’s economic governance so far. Only then will we be able to
draw out the meaning of possible changes for Europe’s future,
through the prism of the main European integration theories.
4
Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin
Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach.
5
Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]:
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Issue 1
17
Lessons from the financial crisis: conjectural and
structural reforms
This first section of this study does not seek to analyse
the consequences of the crisis for European integration as this
will be carefully examined in a second phase. It only aims at observing the changes that have occurred so far, as well as the way
they were instigated, in order to understand the framework in
which the EU and its Member States are able to handle the
storm.
First of all, it is necessary to study the procedures that
were put in place in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis,
before heading towards the structural measures negotiated between the EU institutions and the Member States to overcome
the sovereign debt crisis.
Against all odds, there was a surprising co-operation between the European Member States to counter the expansion of
the crisis, which just burst out in 2008, as they jointly sought
solutions at the European level rather than withdrawing into
themselves. The detractors of the EU, as well as the media, condemned the EU for being slow to react to the crisis, but it is necessary to rehabilitate the reality of the situation. Indeed, the Union lacked apparatus to deal with the immense shock experienced by the European economies. It was therefore predictable
that the EU would not be able to take action quickly. Nonetheless, even without any provisions, the Member States indeed regrouped within the Eurogroup as off the Autumn 2008.
They first sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures
through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate
their national responses. As Hodson and Quaglia pointed out,
“this spirit of co-operation carried over (…). The heads of state
and government agreed on a ‘line to take’ on international financial issues (…) and EU members of the G20 (…) joined by representatives of the Council Presidency and the ECB worked closely
together to co-ordinate their positions”.6 The first real change
coming out of the Member States’ co-ordination was the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) implemented in June 2010,
so as to ensure the Member States in difficulties’ financial stability, as well as reassuring financial markets. Financed by the
members of the Eurozone, the EFSF would be able to raise funds
on the financial markets and provide affordable loans to the indebted Member States.
6
Dermot Hodson, and Lucia Quaglia, “European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: Introduction”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 942-943.
18
Kent Political Almanac
In the second half of 2010, structural responses started
to come from the EU. This delay was largely due to the institutional sluggishness, which is inherent to the EU’s decisionmaking process, based on negotiation and compromise. The limits of the EFSF were quickly pointed out, and the need for further and deeper reforms of the EMU identified by the European
Council. Therefore, a task force was created under the presidency of Herman van Rompuy. The purpose of this task force was to
reflect on the economic governance of the EU. It presented its
first reform proposals at the end of 2010.7
These proposals came down to three fundamental changes for the economic governance of the EU. First, the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) was amended with the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a consolidated and institutionalised version of the EFSF. Second, a set of
regulations and directives called ‘Six-pack’ deepened and
strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, the most
“The crisis spurred the reinforcement of an integrated and coherent economic policy at the European level.”
emblematic reform was the signature of a new treaty, the Treaty
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). The core proposal made in December 2011 was intensively negotiated in the
European Council, and after no less than six revisions, which
considerably weakened its original provisions, the TSCG was
signed in March 2012.8 The idea behind the TSCG was to “foster
7
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 186-187, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI:
10.3917/eufor.358.0173.
8
Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 232-233.
Issue 1
19
budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the
co-ordination of their [the Member States] economic policies and
to improve the governance of the euro area”.9 We can summarise
the core provisions of the TSCG with two main evolutions for the
EU and its Member States: a balanced-budget rule and an enhanced correction mechanism against the Member States in
breach of the obligations underlying the TSCG.10
It is necessary to mention one last main ‘change’ provoked by the financial turmoil of 2008 and the widespread sov-
“The genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures, and, later on, behind the EU structural reform, were the Member States.”
ereign debt crisis. The perception of the role of the European
Central Bank (ECB), until then confined to the maintenance of
price stability, was reconsidered and enhanced. As Jean-Claude
Trichet put it, the ECB “has confirmed its capacity to take bold
action to foster financing conditions and enhance its credit support to the euro area economy, while remaining fully aligned
with its primary mandate of safeguarding medium-term price
stability”.11
Looking towards the future through European integration theories: perspectives for the EU
Now that the changes spurred by the financial crisis have
been outlined, it is time to assess the potential implications
these could have for the future of Europe. However, by adopting
9
Ibid., 233.
Ibid., 235.
Jean-Claude Trichet, “State of the Union: The Financial Crisis and the ECB’s Response between
2007 and 2009”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7.
10
11
20
Kent Political Almanac
such a prospective position, one has to be aware of the prism
through which European integration is regarded, as such an
analysis is inevitably subjective. Hence, the most satisfactory
way to prospect the aftermath of the EU reforms seems to fall
within the different theories on the European integration. That is
why we will assess the meaning of the changes first through the
neo-functionalist lenses, then through the liberal intergovernmental ones, and finally from a broader governance standpoint.
The signature of the TSCG and the set of ancillary
measures represent a major step towards more integration in
the EU. Hence, we can argue that the crisis spurred the reinforcement of an integrated and coherent economic policy at the European level, and that there is every reason to believe further reforms will keep going on this track. This echoes the neofunctional approach of the European integration, first envisaged
by Jean Monnet and theorised by Ernst Haas through the socalled ‘spill-over’ effect of sectorial integration. 12 Just like gears,
the economic integration spurred the monetary integration in
the 1990s. With the current crisis and the orientation taken by
the reforms to overcome the crisis, the EU is heading towards
fiscal and budgetary federalism, more integrated and convergent
economic policies and eventually a greater role to play in supervising the Member States. So as to claim that the EU and its institutions will hold greater responsibilities and that the national
budgetary policies will homogenise, we can rely on three major
orientations of the anti-crisis measures.
First, the national economic policies will most likely head
towards more convergence and co-ordination. The crisis indeed
provoked a raise of awareness of the interdependency of Member States’ economies, and spurred financial solidarity between
the members of the Eurozone. As debated as it was, the creation
of the ESM has been accepted like a necessity by all twenty-seven
Member States. It is also likely to increase the bailed out Member
States’ liability.
Moreover, with the reinforced provisions of the TFEU and
the TSCG, the Member States will be constrained to co-operate
with each other and with the EU institutions. The correction
mechanism clause of the TSCG, and the fact it will be enforced
through the European Court of Justice, is very likely to be much
more dissuasive than the previous Stability and Growth Pact. It
will increase the EU’s power to oversee Member States’ policies,
and thus increase Member States’ liability before the EU – something that was hardly imaginable before the crisis.
12
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 189, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.
Issue 1
21
Lastly, it seems likely that the importance of the typically
supranational European institutions will drastically increase.
Taking the example of the European Parliament, often depicted
as powerless in the EU decision-making compared to the European Council or the Council of the EU, we can argue that it was
granted with more attention than before. First, it played a central role in creating three supervising financial agencies in
2010.13 Second, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, urged the
MEPs to back the euro by addressing the Parliament for the first
time in 2012, thus acknowledging its potential decisive role for
the future of the EU.14
In sum, whether it is illustrated by the renewed interest
of Member States for key-institutions of the EU, by the increase
of liability of Member States before the EU, or by new provisions
enhancing the EU’s competence, everything leads to think that
the Union will be more integrated and prominent than ever before in the years to come.
However, these prospects can be put into perspective if
we have a close look at the competing approach of the European
integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism. Andrew Moravcsik built on earlier realist conceptions of the international relations that were applied to the European integration process. He
places the Member States and their interests at the centre of his
analysis, and claims that any progress in the integration process
will come at the mercy of the Member State’s preferences. Moreover, he argues that despite the influence of the Community
method developed in the EU decision-making, the intergovernmental method prevailed. Indeed, to some extent, if we consider
how the reforms have been achieved, one must recognise the
active role of Member States in the decision-making process. As
Moravcsik stated, “today, European states retain far more control than Brussels”.15
First, as Lépine acknowledges and as it was shown in the
first section, the genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures,
and, later on, behind the EU structural reform, were the Member
States. Typically, the intergovernmental institutions of the EU,
such as the Eurogroup or the European Council, became the privileged EU apparatus for decision-making during the crisis and
even after it was about reforming the EU.16
Second, the intergovernmental premise has been verified
that the strongest Member States’ preferences have been decisive in shaping the future of Europe. As a matter of fact, the
commentators have been underlining the crucial role of Germa13
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 187, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.
14
“Debate with Angela Merkel”, BBC News, November 7th, 2012, accessed January 13th, 2013,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/newsid_9766000/9766850.stm.
15
Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs
Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 68
16
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 190, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.
22
Kent Political Almanac
ny in influencing decision-making during the crisis. As Moravcsik points out, “Germany benefits greatly from the current system”,17 and its preferences and interests have been prominent in
the establishment of budgetary discipline rules and the reject of
certain measures enhancing the role of the ECB or mutualising
the European debt, which shaped the reform of the EU.
To a certain extent, the measures intending to reform the
EU economic governance did not transfer sufficient power to the
EU institutions. Taking the example of the ESM, one has to admit
it has an intergovernmental character: it operates outside of the
European budget and the decision-making procedure is unanimity. Furthermore, the financial help is guaranteed by the Member
States individually and not jointly, and the ESM management will
not be subject to any form of control by EU institutions.18
In light of the examples provided, it is necessary to consider the scenario forecasted by those who believe that the Member States are ‘obstinate’ and that they will be the central players
in the future European integration. As Renaud Dehousse stated
recently, this “raises the question whether the current
strengthening of intergovernmentalism is a temporary situation or a structural
change”.19 However, a third
scenario can be envisaged for
the future of the EU in the
light of the recent changes in
the economic governance of
the Eurozone – that is, the
development of new forms of
governance in the Union.
First, one can predict
the incremental institutionalisation of a multi-speed Europe. Indeed, the signature of the TSCG and the treaty of Lisbon
amendment to integrate the ESM in the Union’s provisions are
prime examples of this evolution for the EU. As the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic refused to be part of the TSCG provisions as they were being drawn out, the Union found a way to
accommodate all Member States preferences by allowing the UK
and the Czech Republic not to be part of the TSCG. As straightforward as it may seem, this development has consequences for
the EU, which is starting to legally build a two-speed Europe. As
Jean-Claude Piris sums it up, a two-speed Europe “would consist
17
Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs
Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 64.
18
Eulalia Rubio, “Quel budget Européen pour l’Après-Crise”, Regards croisés sur l’économie n°11
(2012): 145, accessed January 13, 2012, DOI: 10.3917/rce.011.0139.
19
Andrea Jancsó, “The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the economic crisis management of
EU: Professor Renaud Dehousse's presentation at the Central European University”, South-East
Europe International Relations Quarterly Vol.1 n°3 (2012): 1.
Issue 1
23
in permitting some Member States, those that are willing and
able, to cooperate at a faster pace than the other Member
States”.20
Moreover, the TSCG, as it was signed, represents an overhaul of European integration as we know it. As it is distinct from
Lisbon and did not use the enhanced cooperation provisions prescribed by the consolidated version of the Treaty, 21 we can forecast a genuine rethinking on the legitimacy of change in the EU.
As Paul Craig justly mentions, “even though it has not been possible to attain unanimity, and even though the rules on enhanced co-operation have not been used, it is legitimate to attain
the desired ends by a different route and EU institutions can be
integral to such a project”.22 It is also justified to imagine that, in
the light of the latest changes of the EU economic governance
with the TSCG, a recasting of the EU institutions is around the
corner. Indeed, the conferral of additional supervision, implementation and steering functions for the EU institutions might
provoke a rethinking on the compatibility of those with the current powers and functions of the EU.
Conclusion
In the light of the changes brought about to the EU in
relation to the crisis, one could assert that European integration
is experiencing a major turning point. Whether we believe the
crisis urged more integration on a supranational level, brought
the Member States back at the negotiations table, or provoked a
rethinking of the EU’s current balance of powers and functions,
no sufficient time has passed to tell with certainty to which extent the crisis will change the EU. Given that the EU is still grappling with the crisis, and the reforms that have been put in place
may not have yielded necessary results, predicating the future
proves hard and ungratifying in these circumstances.
Overall, we cannot emphasise enough the overriding lesson of the crisis, which demonstrates the EU and its Member
States’ political will to proceed with integration.23 Whatever
shape the future Europe will eventually take, the crisis exhibited
the capacity of the EU to ensure its co-ordination.
20
Jean-Claude Piris, “Fourth option: legally binding a two-speed Europe”, In The Future of Europe:
Towards a Two-Speed EU? (New-York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121.
Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 238.
22
Ibid., 238.
23
Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance
économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 193, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.
21
24
Kent Political Almanac
BIBLOGRAPHY
Begg, Iain. “Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in
the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 1107-1128.
Craig, Paul. “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47
(2012): 231-247.
“Debate with Angela Merkel”. BBC News, November 7th, 2012. Accessed
January 13th, 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/
newsid_9766000/9766850.stm
European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs. Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses.
Edited by Paul van den Noord. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Crisis of the European Union, A Response. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
Hodson, Dermot, and Quaglia, Lucia. “European Perspectives on the
Global Financial Crisis: Introduction”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 939-953.
Hosli, Madeleine O., van Demen, Adrian M. A., Widgrén, Mika, ed. Institutional Challenges in the European Union. London: Routledge, 2002.
Jancsó, Andrea. “The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the economic crisis management of European Union: Professor Renaud
Dehousse's presentation at the Central European University”. South-East
Europe International Relations Quarterly Vol.1 n°3 (2012).
Krugman, Paul. “Can Europe be Saved?”. New York Times, January 12,
2011. Accessed January 13, 2013. http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
Lépine, Frédéric. “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”. L’Europe en formation n°358
(2010): 173-193. Accessed January 13, 2013. DOI: 10.3917/
eufor.358.0173.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common
Currency”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 53-68.
Piris, Jean-Claude. “Fourth option: legally binding a two-speed Europe”.
In The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?, 121-142. New-York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Quaglia, Lucia, Eastwood, Robert, and Holmes, Peter. “The Financial Turmoil and EU Policy Co-operation in 2008”. Journal of Common Market
Studies Vol.47 Annual Review (2009): 63-87.
Rubio, Eulalia. “Quel budget Européen pour l’Après-Crise”. Regards croisés sur l’économie n°11 (2012): 139-149. Accessed January 13, 2012.
DOI: 10.3917/rce.011.0139.
Trichet, Jean-Claude. “State of the Union: The Financial Crisis and the
ECB’s Response between 2007 and 2009”. Journal of Common Market
Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7-19.
Issue 1
25
BY DELPHINE GIRMA
This paper argues that a community-based or ‘bottom-up’
approach to peacebuilding offers a more legitimate and effective alternative to the stalemate in Kosovo, characterized
by a protracted underlying
culture of mistrust and hatred
between the Kosovo-Serb and
the Kosovo-Albanian communities.
A bottom-up approach comes
to offset the shortcomings of
the United Nations Interim
Administrative Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) technocratic
top-down peace model. The
theoretical framework used in
this analysis will rely essentially on John-Paul Lederach’s
transformation orientated approach to societal reconciliation, a fundamental aspect of
peace-building which has been
hitherto overlooked by the UNMIK. While institutional consolidation, as part of the broader peace process, is by all
means necessary in Kosovo, it
is here argued that democratization of Kosovo by way of institutional consolidation alone
fails to address the culture of
mistrust still persistent in the
country.
Both the necessity of and the
obstacles to local initiatives of
building inter-communal trust
as the foundation to sustainable peace are explored in this
argument.
PEACE-BUILDING ‘FROM BELOW’ IN
KOSOVO: HOW A COMMUNITY-BASED
APPROACH CAN ENHANCE THE UNMIK
EXECUTIVE PEACE-BUILDING MODEL
Introduction
This paper explores societal reconciliation as a bottomup alternative to the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) offsets in dealing with the protracted
culture of conflict in Kosovar civil society. The theoretical framework used in this analysis will rely essentially on John-Paul
Lederach’s transformation orientated approach to societal reconciliation which places particular emphasis on the unique role of
NGOs as ‘middle range actors’ in promoting local ownership of
the peace process.1 This particular aspect of peace-building is
firstly discussed through a critical analysis of the relationship
between international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
and local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) under the
UNMIK. Successful examples of initiatives at inter-communal reconciliation from both INGOs and LNGOs working in this domain
in Kosovo will then be explored, by looking at current efforts
made towards creating cross-ethnic networks and opportunities
for direct contact from both sides. As Lederach argues, it is only
via direct contact that sustained relationships can be formed
and misperceptions corrected, addressing the issue of intercommunal mistrust.
Conceptualising societal
building from below
reconciliation:
peace-
Kosovo provides an ideal example of a deeply divided
society that can be analysed both on the horizontal and the vertical level. On the vertical level, the literature reveals a general
“As priority was given to top-down institutionalization under the UNMIK,
within a specific model of peace based on democratic institutions and a market
-driven economy, the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked. ”
1
John-Paul Lederach, Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)
26
Kent Political Almanac
consensus that the democratization process failed and that
there is no solid democratic culture.2 A key factor of division in
Kosovo is the sustained politicization of civil society. There are
two civil societies, with the majority of Kosovo Serbs relying on
parallel Serbian institutions, pursuing a policy of noncooperation with the new Kosovar institutions implemented under the UNMIK. The political scene continues to reflect the underlying ethnic divide of both communities, with Kosovo Serbs
largely refusing to participate in Kosovar elections, and remains
split between mono-ethnic parties.3 In addition to territorial and
political divide, Kosovo is fragmented socially and psychologically. The UNMIK liberal peace model, widely equated with extensive state-building, effectively attempted to create a new Kosovar state without any strong basis of civic trust or democratic
culture of peace.4 A fundamental reason behind the failed democratization of Kosovo is the absence of an inclusive notion of
Kosovar citizenship. As priority was given to top-down institutionalization under the UNMIK, within a specific model of peace
“Temporal dilemmas deal with the underlying issue of peace-building,
asking this vital question: should peace be a pre-condition for democracy, or democracy a pre-condition for peace? ”
based on democratic institutions and a market-driven economy,
the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked.5 There is
very little cross-community interaction in Kosovo as the protracted culture of conflict and mistrust persist, reinforced by
segregated education and healthcare systems and very few
mixed communities.6
John-Paul Lederach’s transformation orientated approach
towards conflict resolution defines peace-building as ‘a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable,
peaceful relations and outcomes'.7 Lederach’s understanding of
reconciliation within peace-building can be extended by the societal argument put forward by theorist David Beetham that democracy relies upon a democratic culture of tolerance and
peace.8 In Beetham’s broader definition of democracy, institutions are derived from the creation of social norms and values.
This theoretical approach to peace-building, with regards to Kosovo, falls under a larger central debate, best identified by Anna
2
Osin Tansey, Regime-Building:Democratization and International Administration: Democratization
and International Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Roberto Belloni, "Civil
society in war-to-democracy transitions" in From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding, ed.
Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182-210 ; Roland Paris, “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice ’”, Review of international studies, 28 (2002)
3
Tansey, Regime-Building, 147-48.
4
Franks, Jason, and Oliver P. Richmond, "Coopting liberal peace-building untying the Gordian knot
in Kosovo." Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 82.
5
Ibid, 92.
6
Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo”, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy
Paper Series (2012/03): 10.
7
Lederach, Building peace, 14.
8
Beetham, Democracy and human rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)
Issue 1
27
K. Jarstad as the temporal and horizontal dilemmas of war-todemocracy transition.9 Temporal dilemmas deal with the underlying issue of peace-building, asking this vital question: should
peace be a pre-condition for democracy, or democracy a precondition for peace? Democratic institutions in Kosovo were
introduced not merely before any agreement on the country’s
legal status was reached, but, more importantly,
without any societal reconciliation. The horizontal dilemma concerns the actors of the peace
process and which groups of society it should
include. In view of the bottom-up approach to
peace-building, the reconciliation process should
be essentially driven by local actors.10 The UN
advocates national ownership and capacity
building as necessary to the creation of sustainable peace with short-term, limited external assistance (Agenda for Peace 1992). Timothy Donais
asserts that the UN defends a liberal vision of
local ownership. In such vision local actors implement a global, predefined model of peacebuilding, as opposed to a communitarian understanding of local ownership in which the peacebuilding process must be defined and carried
out by these same local actors. 11 Likewise, Severine Autesserre points out that the concept of
‘local ownership’ is now a ‘buzzword’ in international organizations, referring to ownership by
the central government rather than such actors.
It is asserted here that the local ownership within civil society was undermined under the UNMIK in terms of the unequal relationship between INGOs and LGOs.
Civil society under the UNMIK: A critical analysis
The end of the 1999 NATO military intervention in Kosovo and
the establishment of UNMIK saw the proliferation of LNGOs as
sub-divisions of larger INGOs. It is in fact the ‘largest contingent
of INGOs in the shortest time ever seen in a post-war setting’.12
In an insightful consideration of the international and local limits of peace-building in Kosovo, Ana Devic speaks of an ‘unequal’
and ‘instrumental’ partnership initiated from the very beginning
of the UNMIK, not only between LNGOs and international actors
9
Jarstad and Sisk, From war to democracy, 23-5.
Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change, 34 (2009): 6.
11
Severine Autesserre, The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of
international peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43.
12
By the end of 1999, just six months after the ending of armed conflict, there were 285 INGOs
registered with the UN in Kosovo, compared with around a dozen two years previously and possibly
50 or so immediately prior to the NATO bombings of 1999 (Scott-Flynn 2000 cited in Bill Sterland,
“Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies: The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo”, International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Praxis Paper 9, (2006):
25.
10
28
Kent Political Almanac
but also between LNGOs and the local political elite (i.e. the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)). She reproves
this imposition of a pre-defined peace model, led with disregard
of local dynamics of interethnic cooperation prior to the military
intervention, and criticizes the ethnic ‘un- mixing’ and outmigration trends following the intervention, and the striking neglect in the area of refugee return.13 Part of the UNMIK policy of
decentralization was to encourage lobbying from LNGOs against
the PISG, but this remains rare and little pressure is put on political elites on issues of multi-ethnic cooperation, minority returns
and reintegration.14 Indeed, INGOs have reinforced legacies of
the post-war Kosovo political culture which influenced the functioning of LNGOs characterized by mistrust of governmental and
state structures, lack of inter-ethnic cooperation and fear of controversial advocacy, while failing to exploit its positive network
of human resources.15
Concerning this uneven relationship between INGOs and
LNGOs, a temporal dilemma of the peace-building process especially relevant to Kosovo, characterizing the pre-defined peace
model condemned by Devic, is the institutional pressure put by
international organizations to achieve short-term results. Such a
trend is coupled with the lack of underlying structural projects
and comprehensive understanding of how to ensure peace sustainability.16 Missions in postwar Kosovo are often limited to rather superficial, single events, including training workshops, lectures and seminars.17 The local NGO Me Dorë Në Zemër (MDNZ)
insisted on the lack of sustainable projects which it attributed to
both the critical economic situation and continued political instability. The challenge faced by LNGOs to achieve concrete
short-term results with limited resources constraints them to
accept this model of peace, leaving little space for alterative visions of peace and multi-ethnic cooperation for fear of political
controversy or absence of funding. As a result, the majority of
LNGOs focus on the same areas and employ the same methods.
Priority is placed, for instance, on working with the Kosovar
Youth through conversation workshops one of the mains areas
of work of MDNZ. In fact, only 5% of NGOs registered in Kosovo
put forward ethnic reconciliation as their defining goal. 18 Civil
society has progressively been dominated by the agendas of INOGs, reflecting the lack of local cooperation and ownership. 19
Additionally, there is a danger of financial dependency where
LNGOs become more accountable to INGOs than to the real recipients of aid in local communities. 20 International donors, although crucial, can thus limit local ownership.
13
Ana Devic, “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: International and local limits of peace
and multiculturalism”, Ethnopolitics, 5 (2006): 261.
Ibid, 34.
15
Monica Llamazares and Laina Reynolds Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, (University of
Bradford :Department of Peace Studies; 2003), 25.
16
Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 184.
17
Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26.
18
Ibid, 25.
19
Anne Holohan, Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005): 160.
20
Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 203.
14
Issue 1
29
Similarly, Milja Kurki critically examines the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aiming at
promoting democracy ‘from below’ through the strengthening of
civil society. Kurki analyses EIDHR’s work in light of the Foucauldian theoretical concept of neoliberal governmentality, describing the subtle exercise of control over the functioning of
society disguised behind the normative ideal of freedom. 21 Although the EU democratic promotion is depoliticized, as to avoid
normative and ideological debate over what kind of democracy
should be promoted, it nonetheless promotes the model of a
particular understanding of freedom and prosperity, based on
the functioning of the liberal free market. The ultimate form of
control manifests itself when the functioning of civil society is
shaped by the rules of the liberal market, and when such rules
are extended into all areas of society as a model of living. 22
The EIDHR’s emphasis on local ownership is thus paradoxical, as
the idea of responsibility and independence is already conditioned by the EU’s governmental rationality. NGOs are expected
to function as homo economicus and to follow the laws of competitions of the market to compete with other civil society actors
for funding, in order to implement their ‘self-designed’ projects.23 Yet, as we have seen in the unequal relationships between
INGOs and LNGOs, local initiatives are conditioned by the necessity of funding and therefore tend to prioritize short-term projects rather than longer-term structural changes. As Kurki high-
“The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the focus on alternative identities by giving people a new purpose and a new role within their community, where shared interests can be created.”
lights, ‘capacity to democratize becomes, even if rather unintentionally, equated with capacity to obtain and manage funding’.24
This offers a reflection of the systematic issues of external peace
-building in terms of the imposition of a particular vision of
peace, which persists under the European Union Rule of Law
Mission in Kosovo (EUR-Lex).
Another systematic issue of peace-building is the rushed
aspect of the ‘transition phase’ when INGOs withdraw from a
post-war society.25 In Kosovo, the superficial handover of INGOs
to LNGOs and lack of training were especially salient in the
‘emergency phase’ of the UNMIK, where international and local
structures focused on providing post-war relief and social services. While INGOs relied on LNGOs from a practical point of
21
Milja Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies." International Political Sociology 5 (2011): 325.
22
Ibid, 353.
23
Ibid, 359.
24
Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion”, 361.
25
Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 184.
30
Kent Political Almanac
view, not enough emphasis was put on the transferring of expertise and management skills.26 Consequently, there is still a lack
of competent local staff within many local branches of INGOs as
top management positions were essentially monopolized by international staff.27 In the second phase, priorities shifted to introducing municipal governing structures, civil society services,
and large-scale infrastructure projects.28 This phase embodies
the Western technocratic models of democratization via institution-building according to the liberal internationalist paradigm,
overlooking social mechanisms for reconciliation.29 Indeed, the
majority of external peace-building interventions “follow a do-
“One of the interviewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important
to have in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albanians and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together; no matter
what, in order to receive adequate funding.”
nor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that conjures into
existence a social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of
institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of society
and social change.”30 The consolidation phase was thus undermined because there was arguably nothing to consolidate in
terms of civic reconciliation. Success was measured by concrete
achievements, such as rehabilitated infrastructures or return of
refugees, but rarely expanded to the sustainability of these
achievements.
Civil society nowadays is greatly weakened in Kosovo,
which is paradoxical considering the vast deployment of INGOs
following the end of the conflict. It is weak for a large part be26
Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 13.
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 18.
Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 14.
29
Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?”, 8.
30
Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, “Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments,” Security Dialogue, (2005): 459 cited in Donais, Empowerment or Imposition?”, 9.
27
28
Issue 1
31
cause of this unequal and artificial relationship with INGOs,
which made it unsustainable once international structures under
the UNMIK began to withdraw. While approximately 3, 000 NGOs
are registered in Kosovo, only 500 of them are realistically operative. They remain predominantly small, single-donor and singleproject organisations, with an average staff size of around five. 31
The vast number of INGOs under the UNMIK and
their established implementing partners are unevenly spread, clustered in large urban areas, and
create competition for local stakeholders. This is
the case not only between LNGOs, but mostly between INGOs and LNGOs. With the end of the UNMIK, a majority of LNGOs find themselves completely dependent on increasingly scarce shortterm funding. Youth and women’s groups comprise between 40% and 50% of all NGOs.32 A pragmatic approach to peace-building, dealing with
everyday issues shared by both communities could
be a way to render the peace process less exogenous, while directly involving the local population.
The following section analyses successful examples of this community-based, bottom-up approach of inter-communal reconciliation.
Promoting social capital: beyond the ‘ethnic’ categorisation
The developing of social capital within communities requires the identification of mutual interests outside ethnicity
and politics. The case of Kosovo is the perfect example of how
ethnic categorization can lead to such a political and social impasse. The ‘ethnic explanation’ is broken down if we understand
it as a result of the basic human need for psychological security,
stemming from the political and security realities of Kosovo. 33
The identification with one ethnic group can be seen as a reaction rather than a generalized determinant of individual behaviour. In light of this reasoning, it becomes clear that there will be
no sustainable peace in Kosovo, or in any other deeply divided
societies, as long other ethnic groups are perceived as a threat.
The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the focus on alternative identities by giving people a new purpose and
a new role within their community, where shared interests can
be created.34 Arguably, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy further
externalized the peace process. This is essentially because UN31
Sterland, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies”, 32.
Ibid, 26
Aidan, Hehir, “Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of
UNMIK” , International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 205-6 ; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing
ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases." Security Dialogue 36 (2005): 299.
34
Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 306.
32
33
32
Kent Political Almanac
MIK aimed to build a ‘multi-ethnic Kosovo’ rather than facilitate
the creation of a shared Kosovar identity. Although we lack the
space to delve deeply into UNMIK’s policies, we must consider
their influence in shaping how the Kosovo conflict came to be
perceived by both the international community and the people
of Kosovo. The notion of ‘multi-ethnicity’ in Kosovo has not
been integrated within society, nor did it encourage the emergence of ‘a civic culture of ethnic tolerance and the rule of law’. 35
Rather, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy arguably institutionalized
ethnicity within the post-war Kosovo political system and further reinforced divisions, to the extent that ethnic identity became the defining social characteristic and the underling factor
in the appropriation of power in politics. In the current Kosovar
electoral system, for instance, any party must pre-register as an
ethnically Serb or other minority party in order to benefit from
overrepresentation.36
Furthermore, in a report analysing grassroots approaches
to inter-ethnic reconciliation in northern Kosovo, it was underlined that too much pressure was put on LNGOs for ethnic cooperation by means of imposing ethnic quotas. One of the interviewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important to have
in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albanians and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together;
no matter what, in order to receive adequate funding. 37 The creation of shared identities is a lengthy process which must take
place at the grassroots level in order to be internalized. It is not
realistic, therefore, to hold UNMIK entirely responsible for the
lack of Kosovar citizenship. The mission can be criticized, however, for perpetuating what could be called an ‘ethnicity filter’
over the conflict, entrenching ethnicity as the main determinant
of identity and indirectly undermining the civil reconciliation in
both the short and the longer term. The need to ‘de-ethicise’ politics should apply to civil society.38 Assimilating ethnic identity
with quotas in civil society can in fact further ingrain existing
tensions.
Successful initiatives of societal reconciliation in
Kosovo
The identification of common interests will enable Kosovar citizens from both communities to realize that individual
interests are not homogenous within each of the communities
and may contradict with one another, while some interests can
be shared across ethnic division.39 The poor economic situation
35
Jens Narten, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External–Local
Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration.", Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2 (2008): 273.
37
Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 302.
37
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26.
38
Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 299.
39
Ibid, 306.
Issue 1
33
and high level of unemployment in Kosovo, which is the overall
concern for both sides, can be used as the basis for finding common interest and developing “bridging social capital” between
both communities.40 In line with Robert Putnam’s assertion that
bridging social capital can engender human and financial capital,
economic projects create direct contact and opportunities for
building relationships during and after work.41 However, they
tend to remain in the private sphere and have not yet had a significant impact on society or politics. Ashutosh Varshney has
demonstrated the importance of every day forms of engagement
and building cross-communal networks.42 Varshney’s work, centred on India, shows that some cities are more likely to experience ethnic riots than others. In Kosovo, there was interestingly
an increase of ethnic violence in areas where the return process
was overlooked.43 Business is traditionally an arena of interethnic cooperation in Kosovo but suffered from conflict, years of
distrust and violence, and displacement of population.44
‘Building Peace by Business’ is a central theme to the work of the
INGO Mercy Corps, which benefits from a long experience in Ko40
Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon and
Schuster, 2000): 23.
42
Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic conflict and civil society" World Politics 53 (2001).
43
Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 15.
44
“Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experience” Mercy Corps Discussion Paper, 2007, 8.
41
34
Kent Political Almanac
sovo, being implemented there since 1993 (prior to the war).
Mercy Corps has successfully encouraged inter-ethnic cooperation through business in the dairy industry. The creation of inter
-ethnic business relations, combined with assistance towards
helping Kosovars develop individual businesses or micro enterprises45 from a range of NGOs following a similar approach to
that of Mercy Corps has considerably improved the reintegration
of returnees, enhancing relational stability on a more personal
level.46 This combined approach reflects a creative and yet practical way of addressing this salient issue in Kosovo, engaging
local communities directly in the process. Another interesting
example is the local NGO Community Building Mitrovica (CBM),
which describes itself as an ‘interethnic grassroots organization
that identifies, encourages and facilitates joint actions of citizens in the Mitrovica region in order to promote cooperation, coexistence and democratic values’.47 CBM, in an inclusive grassroots approach in line with Lederach’s psychological understanding of reconciliation, initiated a trust-building process between returning refugees and the local communities, via a series
of meetings, counselling events and encouraged dialogues. This
fruitful mediation process was in fact taken as an example by
UNMIK officials, who asked CBM to present their work to them.
NGOs have a key role in encouraging direct contact, eliminating
the psychological barriers of mistrust and progressively help
citizens from conflicting sides to identify common interests to
the mixed-community as a whole. An effective way of achieving
this is the creation of networks which will reinforce trust and
provide space for sustained relationships.
Conclusion
This paper has criticized the inherent paradox of the UNMIK: a model based on the diffusion of liberal democratic
norms, but which prioritizes short-term institution building in a
technocratic manner and which, in the end, remains superficial
and lacks legitimacy among the local population. In line with
Beetham’s assertion that democratic norms cannot be transplanted, nor peace can be imposed from above, it is argued that
sustainable peace can only be created locally through socialization. The implementation of a democratic culture of peace
should be combined with concrete social cohesion by bridging
divisions and building ties between conflicting groups through
shared interests.
45
See example of The Agency for Finance in Kosovo (AfK)
Based on reports of Gauron (2004) and Schlemmer (2005) evaluation refugee return assistance
programs in Kosovo in “Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition”, 8.
47
See Mission Statement on CBM Webpage in bibliography: 23.
46
Issue 1
35
BIBLOGRAPHY
Autesserre, Severine. The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the
failure of international peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
Beetham, David. Democracy and human rights, Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999.
Devic, Ana. “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: International and local limits of peace and multiculturalism. Ethnopolitics, 5
(2006): 257-273.
Donais, Timothy. “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local
Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change,
34 (2009): 3-26.
Hehir, Aidan. “Autonomous province building: identification theory and
the failure of UNMIK”. International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 200-213.
Holohan, Anne. Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Jarstad, Anna K. and Sisk,Timothy. From war to democracy: Dilemmas
of peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Jason, Franks, and Richmond P. Oliver. "Coopting liberal peace-building
untying the Gordian knot in Kosovo." Cooperation and Conflict 43
(2008): 81-103.
Kurki, Milja. "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies." International Political Sociology 5
(2011): 349-366.
Lederach, John-Paul. Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,
1997.
Narten, Jens. "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External–Local Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations
Administration..” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2 (2008):
369-390.
Paris, Roland. “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’
”. Review of international studies, 28 (2002): 637-656.
Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community, Simon and Schuster, 2000.
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar . "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict
institution-building: Lessons from recent cases." Security Dialogue 36
(2005): 297-318.
Tansey, Osin. Regime-Building:Democratization and International Administration: Democratization and International Administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic conflict and civil society" World Politics 53
(2001): 362-398.
36
Kent Political Almanac
Online Documents
Kursani, Shpend and Deda, Ilir, “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic
Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo”,
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy
Paper Series (2012/03)
available online on:
http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/65788_Grassroots_approac
hes_to_inter-ethnic_reconciliation_in_northern_Kosovo.pdf [Last accessed March 2014]
Llamazares,Monica and Reynolds Levy, Laino, NGOs and peacebuilding
in Kosovo, (University of Bradford : Department of Peace Studies; 2003).
Available online on:
http://www.centreforconflictresolution.org.uk. [Last accessed March
2014]
Sterland, Bill, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies:
The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo”, International
NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Praxis Paper 9, (2006).
available online on:
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/21691 [Last accessed March 2014]
“Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experience” Mercy Corps Discussion Paper, 2007, 8.
available online on:
http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/files/file1170359339.pdf
[Last accessed March 2014]
NGO Websites
Community Building Mitrovica
http://www.cbmitrovica.org/en/ [Last accessed March 2014]
Mercy Corps Kosovo
http://www.mercycorps.org/kosovo [Last accessed March 2014]
Issue 1
37
BY DIANA FACCIO
The principle of the right to self
-determination has been restricted
via
the
UN
“Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples” (1960) and granted solely to peoples living in
colonised countries, disregarding their heterogeneity and the
existence of diverse national
groups within state boundaries.
The absence of international
norms of group-specific rights
during the decolonisation period hindered the ability of Nigerian politicians to construct a
federation providing equal
representation, and equal citizenship to all individuals in the
region. Analysis of two African
countries in the immediate
post-independence
period,
reveals how decolonisation,
pursued according to European
concepts of national selfdetermination and characterised by the absence of a discourse on minority rights, hindered the political and cultural
rights of minorities.
The case studies of Mali and
Nigeria underline how powersharing was avoided both
where the minority was numerous and united - the Tuareg,
and where some minorities
were represented within a federal structure- the Ibo and Yoruba. Although indigenous
factors contributed to the disregard for the role of minorities
in the political structure: the
use of clientilism, the impact of
international norms concerning the application of principles of self-determination and
state inviolability, enshrined in
the Organisation of African
Unity Charter, severely limited
the adoption of power-sharing
agreements.
38
POWER-SHARING, MINORITY RIGHTS
AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA
AND MALI
The self-determination of colonial countries and
the pursuit of national unity by African leaders
The right to self-determination: “All peoples have the
right to self-determination”,1 enshrined in the UN Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966), is a collective right expressed by
a national group. Nonetheless the UN Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) reveals a
shift in the interpretation of ‘self-determination’ from a right
claimed by a people, forming a more or less homogenous nation,
to a principle applicable to all colonial countries and the people
who inhabit them,2 thus disregarding the issue of minorities in
ethnically diverse societies. Moreover, the notions of state sovereignty and inviolability which are part of the international law of
states, further entrenched the colonial boundaries as the sole
form of national self-determination in order for African states to
be accepted on the international stage.3 In the attempt to create
legitimacy for the postcolonial state in the eyes of their constituency, nationalist leaders underlined the need for cohesiveness
and unity often based on the predominance of one ethnic group.
In Mali, this took the form of a one-party state, Union Soudanaise- Rassemblement démocratique africaine (US-RDA),4
while in Nigeria the political strength of the Hausa-Fulani in the
North persisted via the unequal federal structure inherited by
colonialism.5 The attempt to create state legitimacy via national
consciousness failed due to the imposition of unnatural boundaries, the absence of norms concerning minority rights and the
mobilisation of political support via ethnic or regional loyalties
on behalf of politicians.
“All peoples have the right to selfdetermination”
1
‘UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 19 December 1966 <http://
www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> [accessed 1 December 2013]
2
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 75.
3
Cristopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival
(Cambridge, 1996), p. 34.
4
Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali’ in The Journal of Modern African
Studies 7 (1969), p. 458
5
Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 (London, 1973),
p. 41.
Kent Political Almanac
The decolonisation of most African states, between 1957
and 1966, excluding the subsequent armed struggles in the Portuguese and settler colonies, was strongly influenced by the declining relevance of European states in the new post WWII international context and by a redefinition of the principle of selfdetermination whereby statehood could be achieved without the
“The attempt to create state legitimacy via national consciousness
failed due to the imposition of unnatural boundaries, the absence of
norms concerning minority rights and the mobilisation of political support”
empirical prerequisites of “capable and
civilised government”.6 The application
of ‘self-determination’ to people living
in colonial states overlooked the heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural groups
within them, revealing the rejection of
minority rights in human rights discourse. This, coupled with the support
for the model of the nation-state by
most African leaders,7 led to discriminatory policies targeting minorities.
The federal structure of Nigeria in the
immediate post-independence period,
failed to secure equal representation
and participation of minorities either
via creation of states that coincided
with an ethnic group or via their representation at the federal level in parliament.8 The unequal status of Nigerian
citizens was particularly evident when
an individual belonging to a certain ethnic group lived outside his region of
origin, in this case his local citizenship
rights were trumped.9 The unitary nation constructed in Mali by the US-RDA,
after the failure of the federation with
Senegal, sustained an assimilationist
“The application of ‘self-determination’ to people living in colonial
states overlooked the heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural groups within them, revealing the rejection of minority rights in human rights discourse.”
6
Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 60.
Solomon A. Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in the post-colonial
African state’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 569.
8
Ali D. Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil. The political transformation of Nigeria,
ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 207.
9
Said Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and Federal Studies 14
(2004), p. 220.
7
Issue 1
39
policy via the modernisation of socio-economic relations which
was resisted by the Tuaregs.10 The absence of a federal structure
or of Tuareg participation in government spurred the First Tuareg Rebellion (1963), also known as ‘Alfellaga’. The Tuareg attempt to obtain self-determination was not acknowledged as
such also because of the inability to relate the concept to national groups living within a state, moreover support for colonial
boundaries was expressed in the Charter of the Organisation of
African Unity: “to defend their sovereignty, [i.e. of the African
states] their territorial integrity and independence”.11
Applying the European tradition
of
national
self determination to multi-ethnic
African states
The principle of selfdetermination, advocated as the basis
and legitimacy of states, is intrinsically
linked to the historical development of
the nation-state in Europe whereby the
state represented the nation by expressing the “will of the people.”12 The support for self-determination by Woodrow
Wilson in his Fourteen Points, later to
form the foundation of the League of
Nations, justified also on theoretical
grounds the demise of Europe’s last
multi-national empires and the creation
of nation-states. Nonetheless, the recognition that peoples’ self-determination
arises from a common national aspiration was absent in the decolonisation
era. The collective right to selfdetermination was perceived by the UN
General Assembly in 1952 as “a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights”,13 which are an
“the UN supported the creation of multination states without
advocating equal representation and participation of minorities in the political structure.”
10
Baz Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara: the ‘Teshumara’ Nationalist Movement and
the Revolutions in Tuareg Society’ in International Review of Social History 49, (2004), p. 88.
OAU Charter, 25 May 1963 <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf >
[accessed 26 November 2013]
12
Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on
Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 568.
13
Jackson, Quasi-states (Cambridge, 1990), p. 70.
11
40
Kent Political Almanac
individual’s prerogatives. The denial of independence was thus
portrayed as a violation of individuals’ human rights. By applying the notion of self-determination to colonial peoples who
lacked a shared national conscience and by describing its fulfilment as a moral necessity, the UN supported the creation of
multination states without advocating equal representation and
participation of minorities in the political structure. This underlined the legitimacy of ethnically based parties who advocated
national unity by monopolising political power like the US-RDA
in Mali (1960-1968) and to a lesser extent the NPC in Nigeria
(1960-1966). While some scholars such as Basil Davidson and
Makau wa Mutua propose modifying colonial borders to reflect
national groups,14 others, like Solomon A. Dersso, interpret power-sharing mechanisms as a safeguard for minorities.15
“Nigerian federalism, by maintaining the colonial tripartite division,
perpetrated the domination of the three major ethnic groups, the HausaFulani in particular, the Ibo and the Yoruba ”
The independence obtained by African states often
lacked the empirical attributes previously considered prerequisites to statehood, this was underlined in the UN Declaration Granting Independence: “Inadequacy of political, economic,
social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”16 Robert H. Jackson defines the
sovereignty achieved by postcolonial African states as ‘negative’,
because of their inability to deter a threat while being entitled to
the right to non-intervention.17 Their legitimacy thus derived by
a changing international perspective on the viability of colonies
and the realisation that independence had to be fostered by legal
recognition of the right of colonial territorial jurisdictions to self
-determination,18 this insulated initially nationalist leaders from
their electorate since independence had been negotiated with
the former colonial powers rather than won by the people.
The right to self-determination which is affirmed collectively is an expression of the will of the majority which relegates
the role of minorities within the state. In order to ensure equality for minorities within ‘multinational states’, Will Kymlicka suggests granting group specific rights. These take the form of: selfgovernment rights, granting autonomy to regionally defined
communities, polyethnic rights, adopting policies that enable
minorities to express their culture and special representation
rights, reserving a number of seats in parliament for minorities
14
Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge, 1996), p. 34, Basil Davidson, The
black man’s burden. Africa and the curse of the nation-state (London, 1992), p. 206 and Dersso,
‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights
24 (2008), p. 583.
15
Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on
Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 586.
16
UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, 14 December
1960 <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml> [accessed 29 November 2013]
17
Jackson, Quasi-states (Cambridge, 1990), p. 11.
18
Ibid., p. 5.
Issue 1
41
or adopting proportional representation. 19 Kymlicka’s theory of
minority rights reveals the compatibility of cultural rights with
liberalism and the requirement of cultural autonomy for an individual’s right to freedom of expression and choice. 20 The recognition of the role of minority rights within plural societies developed gradually and was absent during the period of decolonisation, one of its first pronouncements was the Helsinki Final Act
(1975) by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
which underlined the right to ‘internal’ self-determination for
minorities “all peoples always have the right…to determine…
their internal and external political status”.21 Although the right
to secession via internal self-determination is rejected by international law,22 since the mid-1970s an ethnic group’s right to
autonomy was acknowledged. The recognition of rights to minorities was fully acknowledged in the 1990s and only gradually
applied by African states, where the dominant discourse portrayed national unity as a prerequisite for development. This is
particularly evident in one-party states like in the case of Mali.
On the other hand, Nigerian federalism, by maintaining the colonial tripartite division, perpetrated the domination of the three
major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in particular, the Ibo and
the Yoruba to the detriment of weaker minorities. 23
Nigerian independence: disregard of minorities’ political claims and domination of the Hausa-Fulani
The decision to maintain the colonial federal structure on
the eve of Nigerian independence was dictated by administrative
convenience rather than from a belief in the equality of the representation mechanism. The requests by minority groups for
further creation of states was strongly rejected by the Wilink
Commission in 1954 during the negotiations between Britain
and Nigerian politicians which ended with the granting of independence. The basis for the rejection of minorities’ claims was
the need for a simple administrative system, in the words of Sir
James Robertson, the last British Governor General: “it seemed
quite ridiculous to think of having separate states for some 200
tribal units both small and big”24 and the belief that minorities
were safeguarded by “constitutional guarantees of individual
rights”.25 This is revealing of the disregard for the role of cultural autonomy and expression as the basis for individual rights.
The federal division of the country into three regions
supported the rise of regionally based parties which led to oneparty dominance in regional government.26 The Northern Peo19
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995), p. 28.
Ibid., p. 7.
Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on
Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 586.
22
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, 1995), p. 27.
23
Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 40 and Senator F. J. Ellah,
Nigeria and states creation. Based on the ‘Unfinished Motion’ (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 3.
24
Ellah, Nigeria and states creation (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 3.
25
Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p.
202.
26
Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 43.
20
21
42
Kent Political Almanac
ple’s Congress (NPC) governed in the North, where the HausaFulani were the dominant ethnic group, the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the East where the Ibo
were a majority, while in the West, the Action Group (AG) did
not obtain support from all Yorubas, indicating how class divisions challenged ethnic allegiance as the only basis for political
loyalty.27 The upheavals in the Western region after the rigged
1965 elections which led to the 1966 military coup, were an attack against the corrupt political elite, Southerners supported
the military viewed as a nationalist body able to rein ethnic particularism28. Although Nigerian ethnic cleavages were cross cut
by class differences, the federal system supported mobilisation
along ethnic lines in order for parties to obtain political control
of a region, but this did not necessarily translate in power at the
federal level. The coalition government was dictated by the NPC
which would govern adopting a divide and rule policy in relation
to the NCNC and the AG, this system antagonised supporters of
the excluded political party.29 The coalition government led by
the NPC and the NCNC, due to the weak mutual veto enshrined
in the constitution, had the power to create a new state, the MidWest region, in 1963. This weakened the hold of the AG in the
West, thus ending the possibility for political parties, such as the
AG, to style as national representatives in order to build consensus via class rather than ethnic divisions. 30
The disregard of ethnicity as a principle for state creation during military rule in 1967 and later in 1976 denied minority groups ‘self-government rights’ thus excluding them from
political decision-making. The proliferation of states was resented and resisted by the dominant ethnic groups who feared losing their political power, especially by the NPC in the North,
“One North, One People, One Destiny”, who viewed its political
predominance as a safeguard against the socially and economically more developed Southerners.31 The absence of selfgovernment as well as special representation rights in Nigeria
was supposedly counter-balanced by the individual guarantees,
concerning political, social and cultural rights, spelled out in the
1960 Nigerian constitution,32 nonetheless, the state is not a neutral institution and according to Kymlicka the guarantee provided by the judiciary is insufficient because legislation that affects
the cultural freedom and autonomy of minorities is defined by
the will of the majority in parliament.33 Moreover, the policies
adopted to overcome the disadvantaged position of some
27
Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 221.
Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure: A theoretical interpretation of some socio-political processes in Southern Nigeria’ in Journal of Peace Research 6
(1969), p. 92.
29
L. Adele Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the
journal of federalism 15 (1985), p. 76.
30
Ibid., p. 75 and Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure’ in
Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), p. 92.
31
Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria’ in Publius: the journal of
federalism 4 (1991), p. 128.
32
Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 202
and Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal
of federalism 15 (1985), p. 78.
33
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, 1995), p. 5.
28
Issue 1
43
groups in society led to redistributive mechanisms favouring
one ethnic group, the Hausa-Fulani over the others.34 Although
section 27 of the Nigerian 1960 Constitution, ‘Freedom from discrimination’, rejects negative or positive discrimination policies
“A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, tribe, place of
origin, religion or political opinion shall not…be subjected …to
disabilities or restrictions…or be accorded…any privilege or advantage”35 it is later retracted in the following clause. Thus the
consociation and federal mechanisms were weakened in the Nigerian constitution; segmental autonomy, the delegation of power to minorities,36 was unequal due to the affirmative action policies favouring the Hausa-Fulani to whom proportional representation was granted and easier access to federal posts and higher
education, while the mutual veto for state creation was undermined by the requirement of a 2/3 majority. This, according to
L. Adele Jinadu, favoured elites who manipulated and profited
from these redistributive mechanisms.37
Federal mechanisms entrench regional-ethnic divisions without political representation: citizenship
rights
The granting of local citizenship rights via segmental autonomy created unequal status for the members of a certain ethnic group living outside their area of origin. This was caused by
the application of local citizenship rights on the basis of lineage
“Ibos who were economically successful were denied their status by Yorubas who saw them as ethnically inferior.”
34
Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of
federalism 15 (1985), p. 74.
35
‘The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria’ 1 October 1960 <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/
nigeria_const1960.pdf> [accessed 29 November 2013]
36
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, 1977), p. 41.
37
Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria’, Publius: the journal
of federalism 15 (1985), p. 74.
44
Kent Political Almanac
ties to a specific ethnic group rather than on residence in a region.38 The Ibos living in the Western region, where the majority
of the population is Yoruba, encountered obstacles to social mobility. Ibos who were economically successful were denied their
status by Yorubas who saw them as ethnically inferior.39 The attempt by the Ibos to overcome this form of discrimination,
which was a colonial legacy, was pursued either via support for
an overarching national identity, by enhancing the social mobility of the group or via aggressive behaviour.40 This case of culturally specific rights reveals the dangers of applying them to citizenship, whereby an individuals’ claim to membership in a community can be delegitimised due to his cultural heritage. Minority rights are concerned with political representation and participation while membership in a state, in Africa, is based upon the
common colonial legacy.
“We fight for our independence. We don’t want any of this Mali.
The leaders…throw us in prison for no reason…”
Rejection of the principle of national autonomy by
the Malian US-RDA hinders power-sharing agreements
The denial of minority rights to the Tuaregs in Mali was
enhanced by the need to underline national unity via allegiance
to the party. The US-RDA promoted socialist modernising policies aimed at creating equality while ensuring development, in
their vision the Tuareg had to participate in the modernisation
of the country and in this way assimilate with the rest of the nation,41 this is emphasised in Article 1 of the 1960 Constitution of
the Republic of Mali: “One people, one purpose, one faith”. 42 This
was strongly resisted by the Tuareg who viewed the government
as representing the Mande nation, the ethnic group of southern
Mali, and thus alien to their society and culture. The numerous
uprisings of the Tuareg minority, the first motivated by the desire to achieve independence, the latter to obtain autonomy, 43
represent, from their historical and cultural standpoint, a continuous resistance to forms of colonisation which hinder their autonomy. Although the Tuareg resisted interference by the Malian
government in their affairs, the socialist ideology supported by
the US-RDA and the government attempt to delegitimise hierar-
38
Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and Federal Studies 14, (2004), p.
220.
39
Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure’ in Journal of Peace
Research 6 (1969), p. 84.
40
Ibid., p. 86.
41
Lecocq, Disputed desert decolonisation, competing nationalisms and Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali (Leiden, 2010), p. 366.
42
Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on
Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 570.
43
Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara : the Teshumara Nationalist Movement’ in International Review of Social History 49 (2004), p. 89.
Issue 1
45
chical clan structures by portraying chiefs as ‘feudal lords’, influenced a new wave of Tuareg intellectuals in the 1970s. 44 The
‘évolués’, who had received a Western education and the
‘ishumar’, who had experienced labour migration to North Africa, promoted equality and the diversification of the economy
against the position of traditional leaders. 45 The absence of a
federal structure or of adequate representation of the Tuareg hindered the possibility
of political dialogue and identification of
common beliefs between the new Tuareg
intellectuals and the Malian socialist state. 46
‘Alfellaga’, the Tuareg rebellion of
1963, whose political objective was independence, reflected the incompatibility of
Tuareg cultural values with the Malian government dominated by the Mande ethnic
group: “We fight for our independence. We
don’t want any of this Mali. The leaders…
throw us in prison for no reason…There is
also the marriage act that does not conform
to Muslim custom…We are against all the
principles of the Party and the Government”.47 In the 1960s the proponents of independence articulated their demand without advocating statehood as the end result,
thus revealing their desire for a large degree
of autonomy via which their cultural distinctiveness could be maintained and promoted.48 Their articulation of self-government rights failed to muster
foreign support, which the rebels themselves identified as a necessary condition for success. The unofficial aid obtained by
French officials in Algeria and by some members of the Algerian
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) never translated into an official alliance with the French or Algerian government.49 The Tuareg inability to portray their cause as a request for greater autonomy within a federal structure or for special representation
rights safeguarding minorities hindered foreign support for the
uprising. Nonetheless the claims of minority groups in postcolonial African states was not the major preoccupation of international organisations during the 1960s, as reflected in the UN
Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples; on the other hand, African leaders were concerned with
maintaining the integrity of colonial territorial boundaries of the
newly independent states and refused to devolve power to minorities for fear of state disaggregation.
44
Ibid., p. 105.
Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara : the Teshumara Nationalist Movement’ in International Review of Social History 49 (2004), p. 92.
46
Ibid., p. 105.
47
Lecocq, Disputed decolonisation Tuareg rebellions (Leiden, 2010), p. 187.
48
Ibid., p. 189-190.
49
Ibid., p. 191.
45
46
Kent Political Almanac
The decolonisation process and the absence of minorities
The disregard for the role of minorities living in multination states in the international human rights paradigm, when the
colonial powers relinquished their hold of African states, hindered the ability of minorities to channel their claims in a nondivisive fashion, as the 1963 Tuareg rebellion demonstrates.
When claims were voiced within a federal framework, like in Nigeria, the recognition of cultural specificity was overlooked in
state creation, on the basis of ‘administrative convenience’ and
the predominance of the major ethnic groups perpetuated. 50 In
both Mali and Nigeria, the need to maintain national unity in the
precarious post-independence period together with the reliance
on clientilistic relationships based on ethnic loyalties motivated
nationalist leaders to downplay the relevance of ethnic differences by addressing them as forms of ‘tribalism’ which had to
be eliminated in order to create a modern nation-state.51 The
emphasis on colonial boundaries, which constrained minorities’
rights to self-determination, in the 1963 OAU Charter reflected
the failure of the pan-Africanist ideology that
envisioned a united Africa and the fear that
postcolonial states might disintegrate. 52 The
concomitant absence of cultural rights for minorities in the human rights discourse of the
time inhibited an appreciation of the contradictions of applying the notion of selfdetermination to culturally diverse peoples
and the realisation of the difficulties faced by
postcolonial African states.
50
Ellah, Nigeria and states creation (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 13.
Lecocq, Disputed decolonisation Tuareg rebellions (Leiden, 2010), p. 15.
Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: challenges of globalization, security and governance (London, 2008), p. 12.
51
52
Issue 1
47
BIBLOGRAPHY
Said Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and
Federal Studies 14 (2004), pp. 211-231.
Cristopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of
State Survival (Cambridge, 1996)
‘The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria’ 1 October 1960 <http://
www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf> [accessed 29 November 2013]
Basil Davidson, The black man’s burden. Africa and the curse of the
nation-state (London, 1992)
Solomon A. Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural
diversity in the post-colonial African state’ in South African Journal on
Human Rights 24 (2008), pp. 565-592.
Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria’ in
Publius: the journal of federalism 4 (1991), pp. 125-144.
Senator F. J. Ellah, Nigeria and states creation. Based on the ‘Unfinished
Motion’ (Port Harcourt, 1983)
Ulf Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social
Structure: A theoretical interpretation of some socio-political processes
in Southern Nigeria’ in Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), pp. 81-103.
Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali’ in The
Journal of Modern African Studies 7 (1969), pp. 457-467.
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations
and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990)
L. Adele Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), pp. 71-100.
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (Oxford, 1995)
Will Kymlicka, ‘National Cultural Autonomy and International Minority
Rights Norms’ in Ethnopolitics 6 (2007), pp. 379-393.
Baz Lecocq, Disputed desert decolonisation, competing nationalisms
and Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali (Leiden, 2010)
Baz Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara: the ‘Teshumara’
Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society’ in International Review of Social History 49, (2004), pp. 87-109.
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, 1977)
Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: challenges of globalization, security and governance (London, 2008)
OAU Charter, 25 May 1963 <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/
OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf > [accessed 26 November 2013]
Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria
1960-1966 (London, 1973)
‘UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples’, 14 December 1960 <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/
48
Kent Political Almanac
declaration.shtml> [accessed 29 November 2013]
‘UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 19 December
1966 <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> [accessed 1 December
2013]
Ali D. Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil. The political
transformation of Nigeria, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), pp.
202-221.
Issue 1
49
BY
REBECCA DENNIS
This paper engages with the
debate surrounding the nature
of the European Union’s role in
international politics by presenting a systematic analysis of
Ian Manners’ theory of Normative Power Europe.
In order to evaluate whether
one can truly conceptualise the
EU as a normative power, this
paper utilises Manners’ tripartite method of analysis, which,
inspired by the three approaches to normative ethics, assesses
the European Union’s principles, actions, and impacts.
The analysis in this paper focuses on three policy areas: EU
trade policy; the EU’s relations
with its neighbours; and finally, the Common Security and
Defence Policy. Using this
method of analysis, it is possible ascertain a disconnect between what the EU says and
what it does.
THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE: A
NORMATIVE POWER IN THEORY OR
PRACTICE?
Introduction
One of the most widely debated topics in European Politics is the discussion over the European Union’s (EU) role in international politics. Earlier debates centred around a distinction
between civilian (see Duchene 1972, 1973) and military (see Bull
1982) power, but Ian Manners’ seminal 2002 article ‘Normative
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ 1 offered a new perspective. Manners focused on the EU’s “ideational impact” 2 in its
role as a global norm setter. Since 2002, the theory of Normative
Power Europe (NPE) has been debated and critiqued by countless
scholars, including Manners himself.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the claims made
by Manners in the NPE theory through its application to a number of EU foreign policy areas. As the scope of this paper does
not allow for an analysis of all policy areas, as would be ideal,
three cases will be selected: trade policy, enlargement and the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP). These cases have been chosen because they are simultaneously three of the most important and
impactful areas of EU foreign policy and also because they offer
different insights into the EU’s normative power.
Europe as a Normative Power
Before the theory of Normative Power Europe can be
used critically, it is important to fully understand the theory’s
arguments and its evolution over the past 11 years. As aforementioned, the theory NPE centres around the EU’s “ideational
impact” in international politics, or its “power over opinion”3.
In terms of the European Union, there are two key aspects of the EU’s normative power: first, that the EU is a normative power purely by existing as a different type of actor in an
international system of states, and secondly, that the EU is a
normative power because it acts in a normative way, that is to
say an ‘ethically good’ way.4 With reference to the first aspect,
Manners explores what he calls the EU’s “normative difference”
1
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market
Studies 40:2 (2002)
2
Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 283
3
Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 239
4
Ian Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union,” International Affairs 84:1 (2008): 45
50
Kent Political Almanac
in setting it apart from other global powers. Historical context,
its nature as a hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution
are identified as the key factors of EU normative difference. Historical context refers to the post-war situation in Europe that
lead to a group of states committed to pooling their resources
for mutual gain, while hybrid polity emphasises the hybrid of
supranational and international forms of governance present in
the EU which transcend the traditional Westphalian norm and
the EU’s political-legal constitution describes an elite-driven,
treaty-based legal order which explicitly states the values and
principles of the Union.5 Manners argues that it is this normative
difference which predisposes the EU to act in a normative way, 6
thereby identifying a causal link between the two aspects of normative power.
If one accepts the conceptualisation of the EU as a normative power, the next question is- which norms? In his original
2002 article, Manners determined five core norms and four minor norms which constitute the EU’s “normative basis”; these
are: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human
rights, followed by social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.7 Each of these norms is
expressed in a variety of EU treaties or documentation, such as
the Copenhagen membership criteria. Manners later developed
these norms into nine substantive normative principles: sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, supranational
rule of law, associative human rights, inclusive equality, social
solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance.8 Each
of these normative principles is explicitly expressed in the 2007
Reform Treaty.
How, then, might one go about evaluating the EU’s normative power in international politics? Manners himself proposed a tripartite method of analysis which assesses the EU’s
principles, actions and impact in terms of three approaches to
normative ethics, bringing together the EU’s existential normative status and its ethical concerns.9 These three approaches to
normative ethics are virtue ethics (i.e. emphasising virtues or
character traits); deontological ethics (i.e. emphasising rules and
actions); and finally, consequentialist ethics (i.e. emphasising the
consequences and impact of actions). By taking into account all
three aspects of normative power, one can effectively evaluate
the EU’s normative power, from the principles that constitute it
to the impact it has on world politics.
5
Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 240-1
Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 242
Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 242-3
8
Manners, “Normative Ethics,” 47-55
9
Manners, “Normative Ethics,” 55-9.
6
7
Issue 1
51
A Critical Analysis of Europe’s Normative Power
The next section of this paper will apply Ian Manners’
tripartite method of analysis to three important areas of the European Union’s foreign policy – trade, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Common Security and Defence Policy – in
order to evaluate the theory of Normative Power Europe in practice.
The EU as a Normative Power In Trade?
What, then, are the principles of EU trade policy? Kerremans and Orbie discuss the idea of “distributive justice” whereby Europeans believe that “all human beings are entitled to a
minimum level of prosperity and economic security, irrespective
of the outcomes of market-driven processes”.10 Manners refers
to the promotion of the International Labour Organisation’s
(ILO) Core Labour Standards (CLS) as a key aspect of normative
trade policy in the EU11 (and as a legitimising force for EU
power12). The principles of the CLS include “elimination of exploitative child labour, the prohibition on forced labour, nondiscrimination in employment, the freedom of association, and
the right of collective bargaining”.13 Kerremans and Orbie do
however emphasise that it is difficult to separate fairness concerns from those of self-interest.14 The expressed focus, though,
is on fairness, labour standards, multilateralism and legitimacy.
In terms of actions, the general consensus within EU
trade policy literature is that the EU emphasises the use of positive conditionality over negative sanctions to achieve its normative aims, that there exists a network of institutionalised dialogue, and that the EU follows an incentive-based approach.15
Meunier and Nicolaïdis describe the EU as a ‘normative power
through trade’ in reference to the way in which the EU uses trade
“there is no strong underlying pattern in terms of the motives for imposing sanctions; and finally, there are cases of so-called ‘intentional inconsistencies’ (that is to say, exemptions) where security and welfare interests are at stake .“
as a way to export standards and norms to its partners; bilaterally, on a region-to-region basis, and multilaterally.16
However, there are a number of conflicts and inconsistencies to be found in this policy area. Klaus Brummer, for example, examines the EU’s policy on economic sanctions and finds
three important inconsistencies: first, a comparison of potential
10
Bart Kerremans and Jan Orbie, “The Social Dimension of European Union Trade Policies,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 638.
11
Ian Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative Power
Perspective,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 790.
12
Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 792.
13
Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 639.
14
Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 634.
15
Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 793.
16
Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power,”
Journal of European Public Policy 13:6 (2006): 912-5.
52
Kent Political Almanac
and actual targets of sanctions highlights a strong degree of
‘selectivity’ in EU practice; secondly, there is no strong underlying pattern in terms of the motives for imposing sanctions; and
finally, there are cases of so-called ‘intentional inconsistencies’ (that is to say, exemptions) where security and welfare
interests are at stake.17 Another example can be found in Orbie
and Tortell’s examination into the beneficiaries of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP): participation in the GSP+
programme requires the “ratification and effective implementation” of the fundamental conventions of the ILO, and yet Orbie
and Tortell’s analysis illustrates the lack of correlation between
inclusion in the GSP+ and a country’s convention implementation record.18 Although the EU’s use of sanctions against GSP
countries is consistent with ILO assessments and follows the
EU’s commitment to incentive-based approaches, GSP+ incentives have been granted to many countries who have been heavily criticised by the ILO for not sufficiently implementing the conventions, thereby reflecting an inconsistent ‘follow through’ of
its conditionality criteria and suggesting that other more selfinterest factors are likely at play.19
Meunier and Nicolaïdis identify a number of ways the
EU’s professed principles conflict with each other in practice and
result in inconsistencies and double-standards. For example,
while the EU vows its commitment to international trade law, it
maintains preferential trading relationships with particular
countries, such as the ACP countries. 20 Another conflict arises
between the EU’s “language of shared norms” and its use of
‘carrots and sticks’ to enforce these norms on its trading part-
17
Klaus Brummer, “Imposing Sanctions: The Not So ‘Normative Power Europe’,” European Foreign
Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 192-3.
18
Jan Orbie and Lisa Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries: Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent
with ILO Findings?” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 664.
19
Orbie and Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries,” 680.
20
Meunier and Nicolaidis, “Conflicted Trade Power,” 917.
Issue 1
53
ners, highlighting the inherent issues with the idea of
‘conditionality’.21 Kerremans and Orbie summarise that “despite
its normative ambitions, there seem to be clear limits in what
the EU is able (and willing) to do”.22
“there have also been some inconsistencies in the application of the conditionality principle, most notably in the EU’s inability to suspend Tunisia from the ENP despite human rights violations.”
The final part of the tripartite analysis requires an assessment of the impact of the EU’s trade policy. Generally speaking, this impact is extremely mixed in terms of its normative
promotion.23 Kerremans and Orbie suggest that one way of
measuring this impact is through the ratification and implementation of the ILO’s core conventions24 – indeed this research has
been done by Orbie and Tortell, who concluded that the EU’s
GSP+ scheme, although arguably encouraging the ratification of
these conventions, has not led to an overall improvement in labour standards implementation in the GSP countries.25 Aside
from labour standards, one could also consider the impact of
the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as Andy Storey has done (studying Africa in particular): Storey concludes
that the programme of EPA appears guided by self-interest,
could be accused of enforcing a neoliberal economic model on
African states, and that this process could ultimately be harmful
to the “developmental needs” of Africa.26
To conclude this section on trade policy, it can be seen
that while the EU clearly fulfils its existential conceptualisation
as a normative power, through its expressed trade principles
and the methods it uses to diffuse them, there are a number of
inconsistencies and negative impacts which serve to undermine
its legitimacy as a normative actor.
“It is undeniable that, overall, EU enlargement has had numerous positive consequences for its new members. Entry to the European Union is
credited as a major reason for the survival of a newly-established democracy in Southern and Eastern European states.”
Normative Power Europe in the Neighbourhood?
Enlargement is often seen as the crux of European normative power; indeed Haukkala calls enlargement the EU’s “main
instrument of normative power”.27 However, with enlargement
having slowed down considerably since the last big enlargement
21
Meunier and Nicolaidis, “Conflicted Trade Power,” 920.
Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 639.
Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 796.
24
Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 641.
25
Orbie and Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries,” 678.
26
Andy Storey, “Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa,” Journal
of Contemporary African Studies 24:3 (2006): 340-3.
27
Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European
Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 60:9 (2008): 1602.
22
23
54
Kent Political Almanac
in 2004-7, it would be instructive to see how the NPE logic applies to the neighbourhood under the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP), which aims to bring “partners” closer to the EU
through “greater co-operation”.28 The two processes will be considered in turn here as examples of the EU’s relations with its
neighbours.
In the case of enlargement, the normative discourse surrounding it has always been strong. The European Commission’s
Enlargement Strategy 2012-2013 refers to enlargement’s contribution to peace, security and prosperity and emphasises the importance of the rule of law and democratic governance. 29 However, Thomas Diez, one of the most vocal critics of the normative
power theory, has explored the tension between the expressed
values of democracy and justice in enlargement policy, with specific regard to the accession of Turkey. 30 With reference to the
actual operating of the enlargement policy, it is important to
note that both enlargement and the ENP are built on the principle of ‘conditionality’ which, as discussed above in relation to
trade policy, comes with several normative problems; Hyde-Price
has even argued that the EU’s use of conditionality in its neighbourhood constitutes “collectively exercising hegemonic pow28
European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper COM(2004)
373,” (2004).
European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013 COM(2012)
600,” (2012).
30
Thomas Diez, “Not Quite Sui Generis Enough: Interrogating European Values,” European Societies 14:4 (2012).
29
Issue 1
55
er”.31 It is undeniable that, overall, EU enlargement has had numerous positive consequences for its new members. Entry to the
European Union is credited as a major reason for the survival of
a newly-established democracy in Southern and Eastern European states.32 However, there are also arguments to be made that
“Bailes draws an important distinction between ‘being good’ and ‘doing
good’; the EU arguably fulfils the former (through the achievement of enduring European peace and its humanitarian objectives), while the latter is far more complex. “
the EU’s inflexible imposition of
its own rules and structures can
have a negative effect on new
members; for example the import
of Western capitalism in central
and eastern Europe led in some
cases (i.e. Hungary) to increased
inequality.33
In the case of the normative principles of the ENP, the
Commission based the policy on
a “mutual commitment to common values”, including rule of
law, good governance, and respect for human rights.34 While
the EU has often faced accusations of acting in strategic selfinterest with regard to its relationships with its neighbours, rather than on normative concerns, Diez notes that the dichotomous distinction between interests and norms is false; the presence of interests does not preclude normative considerations. 35
Others have accused the EU of using normative discourse in relations with its neighbours in order to legitimise the use of imperial policies.36 As with enlargement above, the use of conditionality in the ENP poses the same normative concerns. Furthermore,
there have also been some inconsistencies in the application of
the conditionality principle, most notably in the EU’s inability to
suspend Tunisia from the ENP despite human rights violations. 37
The ENP has been praised for its differentiated approach towards individual partners38 and the generosity of its material
assistance39, and yet it suffers from one key problem when trying to ‘impose’ its values on its partners: legitimacy. Haukkala
argues that normative power in the enlargement process is de31
Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal of European Public
Policy 13:2 (2006): 226.
32
Haukkala, “The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon,” 1603.
33
Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions: the EU’s Normative Power Discourse,” Journal
of Political Ideologies 18:1 (2013): 48.
34
European Commission, “COM(2004)373,” 3.
35
Diez, “Not Quite Sui Generis Enough,” 525.
36
Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions.”
37
Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 45.
38
Michelle Pace, “Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20:4 (2007): 666.
39
Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’?: the
European Neighbourhood Policy,” International Affairs 84:1 (2008), 81.
56
Kent Political Almanac
pendent on the prospect of membership for its legitimacy, thus
the ENP, with its lack of membership prospects, is inherently
normatively problematic.40 Similarly, Zielonka comments that the
difference in membership prospect between, for example, central and eastern European countries previously and the Arab
world today undermines the EU’s normative leverage over these
Arab nations.41 Moreover, Zielonka argues that the EU’s normative agenda is not sufficiently universal in Arab states- particularly Islamist ones- and is thus often actively resisted.42 Due to
this lack of legitimacy, the ENP’s success in projecting its normative power is limited, and comments about its ineffectiveness are
“Ultimately, it is hard to argue that the EU does not act under the best
of intentions, and that it strongly sees itself as a normative and ethical
actor .”
common. For example, NGOs in many ENP partners do not believe the ENP contributes to democratisation in their country. 43
There are also some examples of negative impacts of ENP, such
as the damaging effect of the restrictive EU visa regime in Georgia.44
Overall, the EU’s relations with its neighbours are expressly guided by its normative principles of peace and community, and while enlargement has been largely successful in promoting these ideals, the ENP has suffered from a lack of legitimacy which severely limited its normative power.
CSDP: Europe Beyond Normative Power?
The existence of the CSDP is the most controversial aspect of EU foreign policy, from a normative perspective. Although the presence of military capabilities in the Union might
suggest a move away from normative power, the expressed principles of the EU’s defence policy contradict the idea; “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter” (TEU Article 42).45 These underlying principles of humanitarian action and respect for international law are developed into an explicit set of ‘suitable’ tasks, known as the Petersberg Tasks: humanitarian tasks, military assistance, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, crisis management and peace-making
(TEU Article 43).46 Manners also identifies a further principle of
the CSDP found in other EU statements, that of sustainable
peace.47 Interestingly, the idea of sustainable peace and its em40
Haukkala, “The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon,” 1606-8.
Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 47.
Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 47.
43
Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’?” 91.
44
Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’? 90.
45
EUR-Lex, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” Official Journal of the European Union (2012)
46
EUR-Lex, “Treaty on European Union.”
47
Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads,” Journal of European Public Policy 13:2 (2006): 186.
41
42
Issue 1
57
phasis on long-term structural conflict prevention led to the EU’s
use of conditionality in policies including trade and neighbourhood, as discussed above.48
The important question is whether these principles are
adhered to in practice or whether we see inconsistencies similar
to those in trade and neighbourhood policies. It is true that the
majority of CSDP missions are civilian in nature – only three of
ten completed missions and four of fourteen ongoing missions
are military (EEAS 2013) – although Manners argues that the prioritisation of military structures and success undermines the
normative power of these missions. 49 One can also question the
selection of CSDP missions as a key normative evaluation: Bailes
argues that missions were chosen due to factors such as limited
risk, ease of consensus, strategic self-interest (e.g. the Balkans)
and colonial heritage (e.g. the Congo) rather than pure normative
concerns, while cases with the strongest humanitarian claims
were not undertaken (Darfur, for example).50 This selectivity
deeply undermines the EU’s normative claims. This lends weight
to Hyde-Price’s argument, in his neo-realist critique of the CSDP,
that the EU is merely a cache for the member states’ ‘secondorder concerns’ and thus an ethical foreign policy would only
occur when it does not conflict with “core national interests”.51
48
Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 187.
Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 190.
Alyson J. K. Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?” International Affairs 84:1 (2008): 123-4.
51
Hyde-Price, “A Realist Critique,” 222-3.
49
50
58
Kent Political Almanac
In terms of on-the-ground capacity, CSDP missions have suffered
from a lack of resources and capability shortfalls.52
Finally, one must evaluate the normative consequences
of CSDP missions. Bickerton et al state that “most” CSDP missions have had a “beneficial impact”, citing the large number of
requests for EU interventions and the absence of explicit failure
as indicators.53 However, ‘most’ is not ‘all’ and examples of the
negative consequences of CSDP missions can be found, such as
the EUFOR Althea mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it
was suggested that the EU’s prioritisation of military goals over
local capacity-building led to “dependency, helplessness and disillusionment”.54 One could also argue that the extremely limited
scope of the majority of CSDP missions ensures short-term tangible ‘success’ at the expense of long-term impact.55
Overall, it is possible to conclude that the EU does not
quite live up to its own normative goals for the CSDP. Bailes
draws an important distinction between ‘being good’ 56 and
‘doing good’; the EU arguably fulfils the former (through the
achievement of enduring European peace and its humanitarian
objectives), while the latter is far more complex.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to diverge from the general
practice of evaluating theories of the European Union’s role in
international politics against each other, instead focusing on a
systematic analysis of the EU’s normative power in practice,
based on Manners’ own tripartite method. A common theme
arises in all three policy areas studied; while the EU’s foreign
policy objectives are clearly normative in character, when acting
on these policies the EU’s normative power is characterised by
inconsistency and selectivity, and the impact of NPE is mixed at
best. In terms of further research, this analysis should be expanded to cover all areas of EU foreign policy in order to construct a fuller picture.
The theory of Normative Power Europe remains a strong
one, and should be commended at least for overcoming the false
dichotomy of soft-hard civilian-military power. Ultimately, it is
hard to argue that the EU does not act under the best of intentions, and that it strongly sees itself as a normative and ethical
actor. Unfortunately, these good intentions do not always produce ‘good’ behaviour or outcomes.
52
Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle and Anand Menon, “Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies
49:1 (2011): 5.
53
Bickerton et al, “Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State,” 5.
54
Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 191.
55
Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 190.
56
Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’,” 121.
Issue 1
59
BIBLOGRAPHY
Bailes, Alyson J. K. 2008. The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the
European Security and Defence Policy? International Affairs 84:1 115130.
Barbé, Esther and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués. 2008. The EU as a Modest ‘Force For Good’?: the European Neighbourhood Policy. International
Affairs 84:1 81-96.
Bickerton, Chris J., Bastien Irondelle and Anand Menon. 2011. Security
Co-operation Beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies 49:1 1-21.
Brummer, Klaus. 2009. Imposing Sanctions: The Not So ‘Normative Power Europe’. European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 191-207.
Diez, Thomas. 2012. Not Quite Sui Generis Enough: Interrogating European Values. European Societies 14:4 522-539.
European Commission. 2004. European Neighbourhood Policy strategy
paper COM(2004)373. Brussels.
European Commission. 2012. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013 COM(2012)600. Brussels.
European External Action Service. 2013. Missions and Operations.
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-andoperations/index_en.htm (Accessed 25 November 2013).
EUR-Lex. 2012. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union.
Official Journal of the European Union C326. http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:SOM:EN:HTML (Accessed
25 November 2013).
Haukkala, Hiski. 2008. The European Union as a Regional Normative
Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia
Studies 60:9 1601-1622.
Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. ‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique.
Journal of European Public Policy 13:2 217-234.
Kerremans, Bart and Jan Orbie. 2009. The Social Dimension of European
Union Trade Policies. European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 629-641.
Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in
Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40:2 235-258.
Manners, Ian. 2006. Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the
Crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy 13:2 182-199.
Manners, Ian. 2008. The Normative Ethics of the European Union. International Affairs 84:1 45-60.
Manners, Ian. 2009. The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections From a Normative Power Perspective. European Foreign Affairs
Review 14:5 785-803.
Manners, Ian. 2013. Assessing the Decennial, Reassessing the Global:
Understanding European Union Normative Power in Global Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 48:2 304-329.
Meunier, Sophie and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. 2006. The European Union as a
60
Kent Political Almanac
Conflicted Trade Power. Journal of European Public Policy 13:6 906-925.
Orbie, Jan and Lisa Tortell. 2009. The New GP+ Beneficiaries: Ticking the
Box or Truly Consistent with ILO Findings? European Foreign Affairs
Review 14:5 663-681.
Pace, Michelle. 2007. Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm
Entrepreneur in the South? Cambridge Review of International Affairs
20:4 659-675.
Storey, Andy. 2006. Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership
Agreements and Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:3
331-346.
Zielonka, Jan. 2013. Europe’s New Civilising Missions: the EU’s Normative Power Discourse. Journal of Political Ideologies 18:1 35-55.
Issue 1
61
Kent Political Almanac
‘Europe in the World’
Special Issue