Factsheet:
Understanding Lebanese Confessionalism
Factsheet Series No. 26, Created: May, 2007, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East
Lebanon is extremely diverse religiously, culturally and politically. This diversity has complicated the
development of a stable political arrangement, and impeded the development of a single national identity.
As for diversity, 1 there are six different Muslim sects (in numeric order: Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ili,
Alawite or Nusayri), and twelve different Christian sects (in numeric order: Maronite Catholic, Greek
Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox,
Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, Protestant.) These sects are largely geographically defined.
This mosaic of peoples and politics has led the Lebanese to historically seek a balance of power through a
political arrangement known as confessionalism.
What is Confessionalism?
Confessionalism is a type of consociationalism. Political scientists describe a consociational state as a
state which functions durably despite major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines in
which no sub-group commands a majority. Common examples of consociational states include Belgium,
Switzerland, India, Spain, Lebanon and the Netherlands. Confessionalism is a system of consociational
government which distributes political and institutional power proportionally among religious subcommunities. Lebanon is a confessional state where, for example, positions in cabinet, parliament, the
civil service and other institutions are apportioned according to the relative religious populations.
What is the History of Confessionalism in Lebanon?
Most scholars agree that various forms of confessionalism existed in Lebanon as early as the 13th century,
and later in various forms under Ottoman rule.2 “
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established in August 1920 by the French colonial regime governing Lebanon and modern-day Syria.
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province of Lebanon (i.e. Mont-Liban, largely Maronite) with the coastal regions of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre
and Tripoli, as well as the Bekaa Valley (largely Muslim.) The Lebanese Muslims and Syria, however,
opposed this, and demanded that the additional territories remain under Syrian control. The Maronite
community and the French disagreed, asserting t
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natural frontiers of Lebanon.3 The resulting stalemate triggered over twenty years of confrontations and
turmoil.
It was the common interest to throw off the French colonial presence in 1943 which led to the first
conciliatory power-sharing breakthrough between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. In what became
known as the National Pact, 1) the Muslim leadership agreed to cease pushing to incorporate Lebanon
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Christian leadership agreed to cease looking to France or other Western nations for protection or military
pacts. This initial confessional arrangement fixed confessional representation in political positions, public
offices, and public funding, among other agreements. Christians and Muslims were represented in
parliament according to a 6:5 population ratio, a ratio that was determined according to a 1932 census
under the French mandate.4
The National Pact of 1943 functioned passably for three decades until its collapse in 1975 with the
outbreak of civil war. From 1975 through 1989, Lebanon reeled under a civil war characterized by
shifting sectarian alliances and divisions. This war was finally brought to a close when conditions among
the warring parties in Lebanon and in the broader region converged to permit a cessation of conflict. The
Taif Accord, negotiated with the help of international leaders and signed by Lebanese parliamentarians in
Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989, ultimately perpetuated Lebanon’
sc
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tweaked the previous power formula to a 50-50 balance between Le
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communities, and pointed toward a non-c
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How does Confessionalism contribute to Lebanon’
si
nst
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l
i
t
y?
The intent of the confessional system in Lebanon is that, in theory, it enables the peaceful co-existence of
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extremely sensitive to internal changes and external forces. Minor changes in the political, diplomatic or
demographic environment in Lebanon can trigger mass uncertainty and instability. Examples include:
 Demographic Change. The influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon in the early 1970s was
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ns–largely
Sunni –as a boost to their demographic weight. Other groups were threatened by this influx.
 Political and Demographic Manipulation. In the 1950s,Le
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Chamoun accorded Palestinian Christians the right to apply for Lebanese citizenship, thus
seeking to boost the number of Lebanese Christians. A similar event took place in 1994, with a
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 Foreign Intervention. Israel sought to tip the scales of power in Lebanon in 1982, when it
established an agreement with Lebanese Maronite leaders to install them in power in parallel with
its invasion of Lebanon. Syria, Iran, the US and other foreign interests have also interfered.
 Military Balance. Following the Taif Accord, for various reasons, Hezbollah was the one militia
which did not disarm as stipulated in the Accord. Naturally, this was a catalyst for instability.
How hasConf
essi
onal
i
sm i
nhi
bi
t
edLebanon’
spolitical evolution?
The Taif Accord articulated what most Lebanese will a
dmi
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”Wh
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oabolish confessionalism in 1989, the Taif Accord
proposed reforms to diminish sectarianism: suggesting that posts in the civil service be merit-based;
instituting educational changes to promote national unity; removing sectarian labels from identity cards;
etc. Underlying this new direction was an understanding of some of the drawbacks of the confessional
arrangement:
 The institutionalization and deepening of sectarian differences. Confessional emphases tended to
e
nc
ou
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a
g
eg
r
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instead of the state. Confessional emphases
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pe
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de
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hi
none
’
se
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r
oup, e.g. religious institutions exercise direct control
over many facets of daily life (e.g. marriage, divorce, inheritance.) Indirect control also abounds,
as preferred jobs, housing and education are often obtained through appeals to confessional
6
political representatives. Such institutions undermine the value ofo
ne
’
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t
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ona
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z
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ns
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p.
 An undermining of horizontal developmental forces. A modern, secular state depends on the
development of common, cross-cutting interests, e.g. economic cooperation and social and
cultural development. The Lebanese confessional system creates an opposing incentive for
7
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.
 Demographic and social need is unaccomodated in political representation. There has not been
an official census in Lebanon since 1932 as it represents a threat to the status quo. Nevertheless,
readjustments in the political and social balance are essential in order to reflect the cumulative
effects of emigration, birth rates, social need and social disparities. In a confessional system
without such readjustments, social discontent between confessions will inevitably explode.
1
All demographic and political facts reflect 2006 data taken from the US State Department country summary information for
Lebanon, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm, accessed April, 2007
2
Harb, Imad, Le
ba
no
n’
sCo
nf
e
s
s
i
ona
l
i
s
m:Pr
o
bl
e
msan
dPr
os
pe
c
t
s
, March, 2006,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0330_lebanon_confessionalism.html
3
Kisirwani, Maroun, The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Lebanon,
http://almashriq.hiof.no/ddc/projects/pspa/kisirwani.html
4
Ben Jalloun, Mohammed, What
’
sCons
oc
i
at
i
on
alPat
r
i
ot
i
s
m, http://www.swans.com/library/art11/jelloun2.html
5
El Khazen, Farid, Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 10,
No. 3, 1997
6
Makdisi, Ussama, Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Secularism in Lebanon, March, 2006,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0330_lebanon_confessionalism.html
7
Harb, Imad, Le
ba
no
n’
sCo
nf
e
s
s
i
ona
l
i
s
m:Problems and Prospects, March, 2006,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0330_lebanon_confessionalism.html
[email protected]
© Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, reuse or reproduction prohibited without express written permission
www.cjpme.org