TH E BIG FOU R
A n d O th e r s
o f th e
P e a ce C o nfe re n ce
B!
ROBERT LANSING
BOSTON AND NEW ! OR!
fib z
M
a
me !Brunt diamb rinn z
19 2 1
PORTRA ITS OF THE BIG FO UR
CLEMENCEAU
IMP RESSIONS OF OTHERS
ILLUSTRATIONS
N R ORLAND MR LL D
GE RGE M CLEM EN EAU AND MR WIL N
W ITH
H E ITA LIAN
BRI I H AND FREN H
SECRETAR E
F m Ph t g ph b y t h Unit d St t
Sig l C p
GE RGE CLEMEN EAU
W DR W WI N
D A I D LLO D GE RGE
V T ORIO E ORLAND
TH E BIG FOUR : SIG
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BIG
An d Ot her s of the Peace C on ferenc e
THE BIG FOUR
A n d Ot h e r s
o f t he
Pea ce Co nfere nce
INTRODUCTION
IT
is by no means an easy task to analyze and
compare the characteristics of the four statesmen
wh o were the leading figures in the Peace Con
ference at Paris or to state without reservation
the part which ea ch played in t h e negotiations
t he motives which inspired his actions and the
success o r failure o f his efforts It is there fore
with a meas ure of hesi tation th at I atte mpt t o
judge the per sonalit ies o f the Big Four an d to
give to each his pro pe r plac e ofpro minence in the
proc eedings of that great as se mbly ofthe masters
of po litical thought
It is manifes tly diffic ult t o treat the subject
impe rs onally and to avoid the petty influences
whic h o ught n o t t o but so Often do warp in
dividual opinion and a just appraisement o f
public men Yet it cannot be denied that traits
of character are as frequently shown by trivial
incidents as by those o f greater moment though
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Int ro d u ct io n
it is on the latter that popular reputations are
founded It is essential to a true estimate of a
man s character to give a right valuation to the
small as well as the great acts which go to make
up his life With a lively appreciation o f the
dan gers of error I enter upon t h e consideration
o f the characters o f t h e Big Four
Until the President had been in Paris t e n days
after his retu rn from the United Sta tes in the
middle of March 1 9 19 the direc ting bod y Of the
Peace Conference
or more corre ctly t he Con
ference o n the Preliminaries o f Peace
was t he
so called Council of Ten which like the Supreme
War Council was compo se d of the hea ds o fstates
and the se creta ries and minis t ers of Fore ign
A ffairs of the United States Great Britain
France and Italy together with t wo Japa nese
statesmen of ambassadorial rank After that
time the Council of Ten was divided into t wo
councils
the Coun cil o f the Heads of States
known also as the Council of Four the Big Four
and by some as The Olympians ! and the Council
o fForeign Ministers common ly called the Co u n
cil of Five o r the Little Five
five because
o n e of the Japanese ambassadors was included
The la t ter Council was subo r dinate to and sub
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Int ro du c t i o n
j ec t to the direction of the Council of the Heads
of Sta tes
The Council of Ten consisted of Mr Ll oyd
George and Mr Balfour M Clemenceau an d
M Pichon Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino
Baron Makino and Baron Matsu i
o r Visco unt
Chinda
and Mr Wilso n and myself The
Supreme War Council had the same membership
but had to do with the a rmistice and other
matters of a milita ry a n d naval charact er
Prior to the Pres ident s departure for the
United States on February 1 4 1 9 1 9 the Supreme
War Council and the Counc il o f Ten met thirty
five times During the month that the President
was absent there were eighte en meetings M Tar
dieu attending four of them in place of M Cle
m e n c ea u while the latter was recovering from
the wound which he received from an anarchist s
bullet Lord Milner also had a seat in the Coun
cil when Mr Lloyd George was absent ! and Mr
Henry White o r Colonel Ed ward M House sat
as the second American member in the Council
when the President was in the United Sta t es
After the President s return the Council o f Ten
met regularly seven times until on March 24 t h
it was divided into two councils as I have stated
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Int ro du ct i o n
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Between that date and the President s final de
parture o n June 28 t h there were six meetings of
the Council of Ten ! and up to my departure o n
Jul y 1 2t h ten other meetings I was therefore
prese nt at seventy six meetings o f the Council o f
Ten or oh the same b ody sitting as the Supreme
War Co unci l This gave m e opportunity to
become ac quainted with the four hea ds of sta tes
and to gain so me clear impressions as to their
pe rsonal characte ristics their inte llec tual force
an d their methods
Without disparaging the powers of observation
o f some who have undertaken to analyze o r t o
delineate the characters o fthe Big Four I can n ot
but feel amazement at their emphatic state
ments which so far as actual knowledge is con
cern ed are based upo n three o r four casual
interviews with these statesmen and not upon
frequent intercourse with them Evidently such
writers build their Opinions chiefly o n hear
say and very little on actual kn owledge It
is manifest that their appreciation is super
fic ial and should be so recognized by tho se
who are critical in their study Of personality If
the knowledge of these authors were equal
to the positiven ess o f their assertions their
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Int ro du ct io n
word portraits would b e almost priceless The
danger lies in the possibility that future genera
tion s assuming that their judgments are drawn
from sufficient personal observations may ac
cept their writings as true and accurate like
nesses o f those whom they purport t o describe
when in fac t the prejudice an d fancy of common
gos sip ha ve muc h t o do with their to ne and
color In truth the des criptions of these leaders
at Paris which have appeared from time t o time
have be en a chie f inducement fo r me to writ e
t hese ske t ch es
In order t ha t the co mme nts upo n the n e go t ia
tions at Paris whic h appear in the succeeding
pages may n o t be misc onstrued o r relied upon
t o justify those who have opposed a speedy
ratification o f the Treaty of Versailles it may be
proper to say that defective as the treaty is in
certain particul ars nevertheless considering that
it had gone as far as it had and that the supreme
need Of the world was an immediate restoration
o fa state o fpeace the situation demanded in my
judgment its signature and should have secured
its prompt ratification by the United States To
have declined to sign the treaty and by doing
so to have delayed the peace woul d as it seemed
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In t ro du c t i o n
the time have jeopardized the po litica l an d
social o rder in many European cou ntries an d
the s ame p eril seemed t o arise fro m the with
holding of senatorial co ns ent t o the ratifica tion
of the treaty
Whate ver criticisms m a y be j us tly m ade of
the co nduct ofthe nego tia tions at Paris an d ho w
ev er so und may be s ome of the o bj ect io ns rai sed
as to t h e te rms o f the Trea ty o f V ers a illes they
the summer of 1 9 1 9 insufficient
app eared in
gro unds t o warrant the refu sal t o s ign o r ratify
the document In 1 9 1 9 there was an almost
u ni versal belief that a restoration o f p eace was
imperative It was then paramo unt t o every
Even if American interests
o ther c o nsideration
were a dversely a ffected the Constitution of the
United Sta tes seemed to give a mple p ro tection
fro m the treaty obligations which were con
sidered to be contrary t o America s trad itional
policies As P re sident Wilson had definitel y
made up his mind not t o accept an y actual
modifications of the articles in the treaty relating
t o t h e League o f Nations the only expedient
course seemed to be t o obtain ratification witho ut
cha nge of the articles if peace was t o be res tored
p rior t o 1 920
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Int ro du ct i o n
When however the Senate declined to give
its consent to ratification without substantial
reservations and when President Wil son de
c l a re d that the covenant of the League o f Na
tions should be made an issue in the presidential
campaign o f 1 9 20 and that the election should be
considered a solemn referendum of the people of
the United States as to its acceptance the chief
argument for urging ratification without change
disappeared If peace was t o be postponed u ntil
the popular will was expressed at the polls in
November 1 9 20 then it was proper and ad vis
able to consider the rejection of the covenant or
amendments and reservations to it which would
cure its fundamental defects With an immediate
peace o u t of the question revision of the articles
seemed wise as before their acceptance without
revision had seemed wise an d for the best in
t erest s of the nations
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I
CLEMENCEAU
OF the four heads of states M Clemenceau the
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president of the Peace Conference was in my
judgment the dominant figure and the strongest
man of the many strong men wh o participate d
in the negotiations at Paris Possibly his age
which in no way impaired his ke enness Of wit o r
vigor of address hi s long and turb ul ent political
career and the courage and firmness which he
had shown during the perils of the German
o ffensive in May June and July 1 9 18 h ad much
to do wi th the impression which he made upon
me But without the background o f accomplish
ment M Clemenceau possessed a strength of
character and a forcefulness which wo ul d have
raised him above his colleagues Persistent
though patient he was always ready when the
momen t arrived to use all his skill and cleverness
in debate to obtain a decision which woul d be in
the interest of his country Every question was
viewed by him in the light of how it would a ffec t
France He was su premely nationalistic and
interpreted international adjustment s in to na
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C le m e nceau
t io n
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terms To advance French interests was
h l S dominant purpose
When President Wilson arri ved in France
about the middle of December 19 1 8 and was
ev erywhere received with unparalleled e n t h u
si a s m by the people who believed him to be the
apostle of human rights and the uncompromising
champion ofa just peace M Clemenceau doubt
less witnessed the ovations accorded the Presi
dent with a measure of uncertainty as t o the man
who was thus idolized and who so manifestly had
the confidence o f the French people Essentially
practical he looked forward I imagine to the
time when these first outbursts of enthusiasm
would subside and the popular mind woul d b e
come more normal The shrewd old statesman
familiar fro m flong experience with every phase
o fthe emotional French nature and knowing the
impatience an d in s tability o fpopular favor must
have reali z ed that the American lead er could not
unless he was indeed the superman many thought
him to be continue to hold the high place in
public confidence which he had attained by his
declarations as to the fundamentals of peace a n d
by his spectacular arrival in Paris with the u n
doubted purpose offorcing their acceptance
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C lem e nceau
! udging from the course of events it is not
improbable that M Clemenceau deliberately
delayed organizing the work of the Con ference
until he had an Opportunity to learn more o f the
character and ability of Mr Wilson He knew
Mr Lloyd George and Signor O rlando but the
President was practically unknown to him except
through his public utterances Possibly t o o he
did not wish to have the Conference meet until
the Supreme War Council met o n January 1 1 t h
to extend the armistice as it would form an easy
stepping stone for him to assume a general dirce
tion o f the proceedings
It was not difficult to cause this delay because
the machinery for arranging the preliminaries
was entirely in the hands of the French as the
meeting place was Paris It was a foregone con
c lu s ion and in accord with international custom
that the Secreta ry General and most of his active
assistants would be French and that M Clemen
ce a u would be able through them t o control the
proceedings after the Conference was organized
The customary practice would have been for a
Frenchman to preside over the Conference but
the presence of President Wilson as a delegate
raised a question as to the propriety Of any
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Clem e nceau
other than the President of the French Republic
presidin g and under the system of responsible
government in France M Poincar é was not ac
cept ab l e as a delegate since he was not full y in
harmony with the policies of the Clemenceau
ministry I have an impression that Mr Wilson
had the idea that he W o ul d be asked to preside
over the Conference and act ea: oflic io as chairman
of the committee commission or council which
would direct the proceedings But if he was
disappointed when this honor went to another
he never showed that he was accepting the
situation with perfect equanimity and in fact
nominating M Clemenceau for the presidency
M Clemenceau had at the outset perceived
that if the President did not sit as a delegate he
would exercise a dominant influence over the
negotiations and be in a measure the final arbiter
The natu ral step there
o f disputed qu e stions
fore was to deprive the President of this superior
position by inducing him to sit at the peace table
as on e Of the American delegation thereby
putting him on the same level as the other heads
For two or
o f states present at the Co n ference
three weeks after the Americans arrived in Paris
M Clemenceau aided by his colleagues exerted
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C le m e nce au
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powers ofpersuasion to obtain the Preside nt s
consent to act as a delegate I do not know the
arguments used o r inducements o ffered but
whatever they were they succeeded although
the President remained long undecided and ac
ceded I believe with hesitation if n o t with re
l u c t a n ce to their wishes
Having persuaded the President t o assume a
position which placed him o n a level with the
premiers of the Entente Powers and entitled him
to no greater consideration than they received in
the conduct of the proceedings M Clemenceau
could according to international usage become
the President o f the Conference This he did
with the same tac t and shrewdness that he had
shown in inducing the President t o become a
delegate
When it became necessary t o arrange the term s
for extending the armistice with Germany whi ch
expired in January the Supreme War Council
was summoned t o meet with the Military Coun
cil on the 12t h Of the month at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs O ver this body M Clemenceau
had in the past presided and he assumed the
chair as a matter o f course When the terms of
renewing the armistice were settled questions
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C le m e nce au
pertaining to the Con ference were ta ken up and
the number of delegates to be allotte d t o each
country represented was determined as well as
the continued control o f the proceedings by the
Council Thus without an interruption in the
session except by the withdrawal of the military
Chieftains the Supreme War Counc il was convert
ed into the Council of Ten and M Clemenceau
continued to preside without any question being
raised as t o the propriety of his doing so In fact
no opportunity was Offered to Object had t here
been a disposition to make the subject an issue
But besides giving M Clemenceau a superior
pl ace in directing the proceedings this trans
formation of the War Council into the Counc il of
Ten established the policy that the five principal
Powers were to have directing control over the
Conference and its deliberations Thus the
French Premier gained three points especially
advantageous to his country : the oligarchy o f
the Five Powers in which France woul d be in
flu en t ial on account o f her military strength ! a
dominant voice in the Council o f Ten thro ugh
the chairmanship ! and direction of t h e pro
gramme and proceedings o f the Conference and
Council by means of the Secretariat General
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C le m e nce au
The calmness and eas e with which M Clemen
carried through the plan t o hold the
c ea u
management ofthe negotiations in his own hands
and his skillful utilization of a unique state of
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a fl a irs to that end suggest the movements of a
well oiled piece o fmachinery Without noise and
without apparent friction he assumed the chair
manship and subordinated the other he ads Of
delegations t o less prominent positions and this
in spite of the popular Opinion as to the superior
qualities o f Pres ident Wilson and as t o the plac e
he should have in the ass embled congress of
the nations
O nce in the saddl e Clemenceau contrary to
the public estimate o f his nature did not ride
roughshod over his colleagues As the presidi ng
officer of the Council of Ten his conduct was
urbane and cons iderate although I ca nnot say
the same o f him when he presided over the Con
ference on the Pre liminarie s of Peace a position
which he assumed with the same assurance with
whi ch he had assumed the presidency of the
Council In dealing with t h e great body o f
delegates which met usually in the Salle de
l Horlo ge of the Palace ofthe Min istry o fForeign
A ffairs he lived up to his reputa tion He was
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Cle m e nceau
voice but with no hes ita tion or b reak in the even
flow Of his words As he p roceeded he became
mo re and more emphatic while the rapidity of
his utterance increa se d until it sugge sted the
drumming of a machine gun He had none of the
arts o f oratory but his distinct and inc isive
delivery compelled attention if not applause
He seeme d t o hurl his words at his list eners
Onl y oc casionally did he employ a gesture but
when he did it w as vigorous and wholly French
Having fini shed a forceful address he either
san k bac k panting into his grea t golden chair o r
if he des i red t o check further debate he would
sta te the resolution o r decision agreed upon by
the Co unc il o f Ten before the session and with
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A dopté
He
o u t a moment s delay exclaim
woul d then before any o n e could interrupt ta ke
up the next item o n the agenda o r else add
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Free debate and actual voting by the delegates
had no place in the proc eedings with M Clemen
The re was an occ asional
c ea u in the chair
attempt at disc ussion but the Clemence au
method discouraged it Afte r listening wi th a
tolerant manner and with hi s half closed eyes
turned toward the ceiling the old French auto
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C le m e nceau
would slowly ri se from his chair glare
fiercely about the room as if t o say
We have
had enough of this and a sk whet he r an y o n e
else des ired to speak ! and then be fo re ano ther
de legate could collec t his wits and ge t t o his fe et
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he wo ul d snap out t he inevi ta ble Ado pté
That always end ed it
This proc edu re was the easier be cause the
assembled delega t e s kn ew th at the pro posed
mea sures which appeared on the a ge n da or were
read by the President of the Co nference o r the
Sec re tary General had been cons idered and ap
proved by the Coun cil Oi Ten befo re being sub
m it t e d In t he face o fthis united appro val of the
Five Great Powers oppositio n crumbled The
possib ility of offen d ing the ruling ol igarchy or the
futili t y of attempting to reverse their decisions
caused most of the delegates to remain silent A
few more co ur ageous than their fellows such as
Hymans Of Belgium Bra t ian o of Rumania and
Hughes of Australia dared to speak their minds
until the Old Tiger showed his teeth a n d growled
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out A dopté Then the y t o o succumbed
Altogether a plena ry ses sion of the Con ferenc e
on the Preli minaries of Peace was a farce It was
never a deliberative assembly which re ached an
c ra t
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C le m e nce au
agree ment by a frank exchange of views The
delegates were called together to lis t en n ot to
criticize or object to the programme of the Coun
cil of Ten They were there to go through the
formality o f registering their approval whatever
their rea l opinions might be It was medieval
rather than modern ! despotic rather than demo
cratic It was in on e sense a farce but in another
it was a tragedy
To c arry through a pro ceeding o f this sort
required a masterful man like M Clemenceau
President Wil son co ul d never ha ve done it Even
his nature which res ents opposi t ion woul d have
found such methods repugnant t o his sense of
right an d fair play I doubt if Mr Lloyd George
But M Clemenceau su ffered
co ul d ha ve done it
from no qualms of indecision His fixed deter
mination and drivi ng force were j u st the qualities
needful t o crush Opposition and t o compel sub
mission He drove to ward t h e goal heedl ess
o f the Obsta cle s in the way and supremely con
fid e n t in his ability te attain the objec t sought
These were t he characteris t ics which m ade hi m
t he great War Ministe r Of France even when the
Germ an hos ts flushed with succes ses were
These were thc charac
s we eping toward Paris
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Clem e nceau
which gained him the applause of the
world and the adoration of the French people
It is no exaggeration to say that in the dark days
o f 1 918 the indomitable courage and stem will
Clemenceau were the greatest assets o f
of M
France for the fire o f his spirit ran through the
nation inspiring confidence and determination
Bu t these characteristics o fso great value during
the war were the ones which he unfortunately
employed as President o f the Conference They
succeeded but the success was at a sacrifice
which was far too great
M Clemenceau the believer in the primacy of
the Great Powers which he succeeded in putting
into practical operation in the Council of Ten
and even more c ompletely in the Council of Four
saw with satisfaction the same Idea perpetuat ed
in the Council of the League of Nations To
be the executive of such an oligarchy in the Peace
Conference he was specially equipped by e xpe ri
ence by temperament and by resourceful ness
His nature was that o f a despot
I imagine that he viewed the sessions of the
Con ference as expedient in order to satisfy the
sentimental idea that every nation which had
actually participated in the war against G ermany
t e rist ic s
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Clem e nceau
should haVe a voice in making peace but he de
t e rm in e d that the voices of the small belligerents
should be merely echoes of the expressed wil l of
the Great Powers He manifestly believed that
those who possessed the superior military and
naval strength had the sole right to make peace
with the Central Alliance He did not propose to
hazard the interests o f France by submitting
the treaty terms to the body o f delegates for
decision Having won the war he did not intend
to have France lose the peace
Skeptical as M Clemenceau seemed to be of
the actual force of moral obligation and of ah
stract justice in international relations b e con
c e ive d that the practical way was for the five
principal Powers to take and keep entire con
trol of the negotiations and to perpetuate their
control by means of a concert of the Great
Powers o r if it made any o n e happier by a
Council of a League o f Nations which was the
same thing if it recognized the primacy of the
Five Powers In my judgment that is what
M Clemenceau sought from the beginning and
that is what he obtained Less far seeing than he
and less appreciative of the great advantages to
France of the creation of such an oligarchy the
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Cle m e nceau
military element in France led by Marshal Foch
and his political friends were insistent o n making
the Rhine the boundary with Germany the Mar
shal even going so far as to denounce the treaty
in a plenary session because this provision was
not included But M Clemenceau knew that the
unity of the Great Powers was a stronger pro t e c
tion to his country than the military occupation
of t erritory whose inhabitants would remain
hostile and seek the first opportunity t o throw o ff
the yoke of French sovereignty He knew that
if he insisted on the Foch programme it would
result in the loss Of the unity which he desired
and would greatly weaken the influence o fFrance
in the Council o f the Powers Wisdom and ex
pe die n c y from t h e French point of view endorsed
the course taken by the French Premier He
endeavored nevertheless to remove all popular
opposition aroused by the militarists by nego
t iat in g treaties of protective alliance with the
United States and Great Britain but in this he
was only partially successful as the extreme
militari sts continued their demand for the cession
of the territory west o f the Rhine in spite o f the
treaties
It is not my purpose to repeat the Opinions o f
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23
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C lem e nceau
the delegates of small nations concerning the
o rganization and procedure o f the Peace Con
ference an d the way M Clemenceau conduct ed
the plenary sessions It is enough t o say tha t
they were astonished indignant an d depress ed
at their treatment but da red not p ublicly co m
p lain of their wrongs though in pri vate their
bitte rn ess was expressed in stro ng terms The
invectives were chiefly directed agains t M Cle
bruta l and unheard
m en c e au because o f his
as Pres ident o f the Con ference
of conduct
tho ugh they must have known that he was onl y
the instrument o f the arbitrary power which had
bee n taken over by the Councils The resentment
o f the delegates increased as weeks lengthened
into months while they sat idly cooling their heels
and awaiting the decrees of the Great Powers
Having no alternative they assented when they
were told t o assent and they also signed when
they were directed t o sign the Chines e delegates
alone ref using to place t heir si gnatures t o the
treaty of peace It was a succes sion of humil ia
tions for the independent sta tes whose delegates
sat at th e peace table presumably t o register the
sovereign wills of their resp ective nations but
in fac t t o obey t h e commands of the G rea t Po w
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24
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Clem e nceau
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M Pichon s room was practically sound proof
The coun cil chamber was approximate ly thirty
feet from eas t t o west and over twenty feet wide
Near t h e west ern end and severa l feet from a
handsome fireplace in which a wood fire blaz ed
on cold days was M Pichon s o rnate desk o r
At this sat M Clemenceau in a low
ra ther ta ble
bac ked armchair Behind him Professor Man
toux the gifted interpreter o f the Conference
sat at a small ta ble Nea r Professor Mantoux
and toward the south side o f the room sat
M Pichon in a high backed armchair Along the
south side o f the room were the other members
o f the Council wi th their backs to the wi ndows
arranged in the follo wi ng order
the Americans
the British t h e Italians and the Japanese
They sat in great chairs similar t o that occupied
by M Pichon and had in front of them small
tables fo r their papers and maps Behind the
members o f the Council in the embrasures ofthe
windows and also along the east side o ft h e roo m
were their secretaries a n d the expe rt ad visers
whom the y h ad asked t o attend the session On
th e north side near the western end of the ro om
sat M D u t as t a the Secretary General and three
Also on the north side
o r four French assistants
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26
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Clem e nceau
close to the entrance doors were chairs for
delegates commissioners and other persons who
might be summoned to present their cases or
make their reports to the Coun cil As a rule from
twenty to th irty five people were present at each
session though o n occa sions all retired except
the ten members
This is a rude picture of the place of meeting
o fthe Council o fTen over which M Clemenceau
presided But as I said he was a different man
from the man who directed the proceedings of a
plenary session Within the council chamber his
domineering manner his brusqueness of speech
and his drivi ng method s of conducting business
disappeared He showed patienc e and considera
tion toward his collea gues and seldom spoke until
the others had expressed their views It was only
o n rare occas ions that he abando ned his suavi ty
o f addre ss and allowed his emotions to affect hi s
utterances It was then on l y that one caught a
glimpse of the ferocity of The Tiger But these
inc idents were very unusual as M Clemenceau
was genera lly conciliatory and disposed t o find
some common ground for compromise His
manifest purpose was to obtain unanim i ty by
mutua l concessions
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27
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Clem e nceau
After a long debate in which several members
of the Co uncil had ta ken par t M Clemence au
would turn t o the o n e who had o ffere d the
o riginal proposal and ask expecta ntly in English
“
If the propose r sho wed tha t
Do yo u agree !
he was not satisfie d M Clemenceau would gaz e
at the ceiling and patiently liste n t o furt her dis
c u ssio n
If it beca me apparent tha t n o agree
ment cou ld be reac hed he would ask fo r su gges
tions as t o the course t o be ta ken If however
the author of the propos al w as satisfi ed with the
cha nges offered in deba te M Clemencea u would
put the same question t o others who had ta ken
p art in the di scu ssion and if n o o bjec tion was
raised his face would light up an d he woul d
“
exclaim Bi en ! C est adopté
It was then the
d uty of the Secretary Genera l and the secreta ries
of the delegations t o re duc e the final decision to
writing by no means an eas y task if it was a
patchwork of debate
The pro ceedings of the Council of Ten were
ficial age nd a was
very inform al although an of
prepa red for each ses sion nomina lly by the
secretaries acting t oge ther though in fac t it was
done by M Du t a s t a in consultation with offici als
fice Thus M Clemen
of the French Foreign Of
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.
Cle m e nceau
and his advisers substantially regul ated
the subjects di scussed by the Council of Ten
The truth is that the agenda se ldom reached the
members o f the Co u ncil long enough before the
session for them t o study thoroughl y or in detail
the subjects lis t ed for discussion Natu rally this
gave a de cided advanta ge t o the French wh o
included in the agenda only subjec ts which they
were fully prepared t o discuss It was prac t icall y
impossible t o ha ve placed o n the agenda a sub
j ec t which officia ls of t h e French Foreign Office
were not rea dy t o c onsi der o r which they believed
it would be fo r the interests o fFrance t o postpone
u ntil ce rtain other matters h ad been deci ded
Of course M Clemenceau alive t o everything
whi ch worked t o the advantage of France and
skillful in handling si tuation s o f all so rts
s u c m ded in carryi ng thro ugh the French pro
gramme ! and he did it without excitin g oppo si
tion amon g his co ll eagues They might and in a
few cases did grumble and complain outside the
Council as t o the way ma tters we re being
handled but in M Pichon s room t h e suavity
good na ture an d un failing courtes y o fThe Tig er
silenc e d those who were dissatisfied In the
e ndeavor t o m a tch the shrewd old sta tesm a n in
ce au
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29
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Cle m e nceau
politeness and geniality they failed t o use these
qualities in the way tha t he did He used them
t o disarm hi s opponents and p re vent vigorous
Objection His coll eague s use d them t o soften
the blows which t hey in tended t o deliver
M Clemencea u wo n
As a master of the fine art of flattery none
coul d equal the French Premier It was interest
ing t o see ho w ac curately he estimated the per
sonal pec uliarities o f his collea gues and how
tactfully he regu lated his int ercour se accordingly
With Pres ident Wilson he was at least in the
Coun cil of Te n politely deferential but never
sub se rvient ! with Mr Lloyd Geo rge he showed
his wit and sometim es hi s sarcasm ! with the
Ita lia ns he was cynica l and caustic and n o t in
frequentl y vehement ! a n d with the Japanese
indiffe rent o r patientl y tolerant He had rea d
wi t h remarkab le keenness t he tempe rament and
the characterist ic s Of each an d seemed t o under
stand the best way te dea l wi th each one
The personality o f M Cle menc eau was dis
His genial fri endliness his
t in c t ly attractive
menta l alertness and his spa rkling wit made him
always an agreeable companion and an inte res t
in g conversat ion alist It is true that his wit was
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30
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C le m e nce a u
sometimes biting and cruel He did not check
his fondness for utt e ring clever sayings be cause
they conveyed unpleasant truths o r woun d ed
t he sensibilities o f tho se at whom they were
direc t ed But he was always caref ul t o avoid
’
o fl en din g o n e whose power he recognized o r
who se favor he sought President Wilson for
example was never in my pres ence a target fo r
his sarc astic remarks while his own officials an d
mil itary advisers e ven Ma rshal Foch were often
the s ubject s of j e sts and reb ukes which delivered
before the Counci l caused them exc eedin g
m o rt ific a t ion and invi ted in some cases angry
retorts He was at times so harsh and sarcastic
in his language t hat his listeners felt incensed
that he took an o ccasion when they were pres ent
t o humilia te his subordinates
Yet in spite of these exhibitions o f temper
embarrassing as they were o n e coul d n o t but
admire t h e sturdy o ld veteran whose political
life had been o n e of continual tum ult and strife
No public man in France had h ad so stormy a
career as he He had not won his high place by
maki ng friends wi th politicians ! he had won it
by trampling down hi s enemies He did not owe
his success to a political p arty o r to a faction ! he
I 31 l
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C le m e nceau
owed it t o co mpelling rec ognition ofhis p erso nal
strength and ability He si mply reve led in the
struggles in which he was cons ta ntl y engage d t o
mainta in his pos ition He never hesita ted t o pick
up a gage of battle and h e entered the conflic t
with all the vigor o f youth and a ll the sagacity
o f age
Whatever may b e th ought of M Clem encea u s
po licies and methods it is impo ssible t o de ny
tribute t o his indom i ta ble will and his u n wave r
ing optimism as he stood alone and defia nt during
many of the crises whi ch he as Premier was ca lled
upo n t o f ac e Eve n those who disliked him in
tense ly coul d not refuse him unwilling praise for
hi s devotion and service t o France wh ile the
enthusiastic shouts Of Clemenceau ! Clemen
whenever he appe ared in public testified
c ean !
to a popul arity which silenced his enemies and
mad e his premiership secure
I cannot better describe M Clemenceau s
personal appearance than t o say that he sug
ge sted in fac e and figure a Chinese mandarin o f
the o ld empire I say this with all respec t for the
man whom I would describe He had t he sallow
complexion the promin ent high cheek bones the
massive forehead with protuberant bro ws the
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32
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Cle m e nceau
not interfere wi t h t h e material interes ts of t heir
countrie s He tole rate d these idea ls beca use it
w as t h e expe dient t hing t o do
He showe d in
what he sought and in what he ac complis hed
rather than in wha t he sa id tha t he b elieve d th a t
selfis hnes s was the supreme impulse with nat ions
as wit h individua ls an d that it was the on l y rea l
fac tor t o be rec ko ned with Altruism was well
enoug h t o ta lk about bec aus e it was pleas ing to
some peo ple b u t t o co nstruct inte rnational so
c iet y on suc h a fo undation w as t o deny human
nature He was in n o sense a v isionary
The League of Na tions to M Cleme nc ea u
if
I read his mind co rre ctly
was a Ut opian dream
o f impractica l th e o rists
until a concert of the
Grea t Powers was inc o rporat ed in the covenant
and t h e United Sta te s an d Grea t B rita in agree d
t o enter into trea ties t o c ome to t he aid of France
in the e vent tha t Germa ny should again atta ck
her Fro m t he time that these treaties of pro t eo
tion we re arran ge d and his country had n o
longer t o de pend for it s security upon t h e n u
certa in guaranty o f the covenant M Cleme n
c ea u s u pport e d
or ra ther did n o t oppose t h e
League of Na ti ons He p ro b ably thought that it
m ight have some prac tic al use s in ca rrying o u t
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34
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Clem e nceau
the terms of the treaty If the authors and
sponso rs wished to try out their theory he had
no obj e ctions provide d there was nothing in the
covenant which weakened or les sened the ma
te ria l advantages obta ine d for France in the terms
o f the peace
He watched calmly and with little c omment
the formulation of t h e League by t he Commission
o n the Le ague of Nations over which President
Wilson presided but I imagine that he did so
wi t h a scorn ful cyni cism fo r the work of those
who he doubtless tho ught we re wasting their
time on a dream Had the aut hors of the cov
e n an t attempted
however to modify his pur
poses there can b e little doubt that there would
have b e en an explosion and the covenant would
have had a difficult road t o travel before it was
accepted
His fixit y of purpose his practicality his
tolerance of harmless altruism his mental vital
ity and keenness of perception together with
the other t raits o f charact er to which I have re
ferred made M Clemenceau the most influential
personality in the Paris Conference He suc
c e e d e d in nearly every t hing that he undertook
When it made no di fference to France o r to
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35
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finally give up the po int ! but if t he real in t erests
o f France as he sa w them were in the sligh te s t
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36
1
II
WILSO N
t
o b viou s
rea sons it is harder for me t o analyze
the c lfirac t e r of Pres ident Wilson as manifested
in his conduct at Paris than it is the character
of any one of his colleagues in the Council o f the
Heads of States It was only as I reviewed the
results of the negotiations tha t I came to a
realization of the difficulty if not the im po ssib il
ity Of harmoni zing his avowed intentions with
what seeme d t o satisfy him As a consequence in
a charac ter study of this sort the fac ts do n o t
always seem to justify the conclusions Then
too opinion is Often based on dedu ctions which
depend more upon impressions than o n direct
evidence I may have drawn erroneous conclu
sions and may therefore be wrong in my judg
ments ! that I am willing to admit ! but it is my
earnest purpose to be entirely impartial and to
avoid any personal bias in the discussion of a
man with whom I was so long and so closely
associated
A real di fficulty in po rt rayin g President Wilson
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Wilso n
he was in Paris is that certa in traits of his
charac te r which h ad been so prominent in his
public ca reer prior t o that time seem t o have
be en suppres sed or submerged in the new
envi ronment Wheth er thi s was inte ntio nal or
involunta ry I d o not know ! and real ly it makes
no di fference The fac t is that t he Pres ident
appea red change d after he landed in France
Clea rly it is difficul t not t o be unco n sciously
infl uence d by impressions gained prior to the
Paris da ys and not to wea ve those memories
into an estimat e of Mr Wil so n when he was
engaged in the task of negotiating the terms of
the treaty o f peace with Germany
It is n o t my purpo se t o discu ss the wisdom of
the President s attending the Peace Co nference
and of co nducting in person the negotiations As
to that there wi ll always be I presume a diver
gence of opinion There are valid argumen ts on
both sides of the question I can on l y say that
the day after the armistice was signed I h ad a
con ference with the President in his study at the
White House during which I took oc casion t o
tell him that in my judgme nt it would be a
serious mistake for him to sit at the peace table
and I went fully into my rea sons for so advising
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38
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m
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d Ewi no
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W
s hi n
o
gt n
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D C
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Wilso n
tudes delirious with enthusiasm cheered him a
welcome as he drove through the b eflagged
streets of the French capital in company wi t h
President Poincaré who met him at the Gare du
Bois de Boulogne It was a reception which
might have turned t he head o f a man far les s
responsive than the President was t o public ap
plau se and have given him an exal t ed Opinion
o f his own po wer of accomplishment and of his
indivi dual responsibility t o man kind It is fair
I think t o assume that this was the effe ct on
the President It was the natural one
This convincing evi dence ofhis personal po pu
larit y which was vastly increa sed by his sub
sequent vi sits to Lo ndon and Rome doubtless
con firmed him in the belief tha t with the pe ople
of the three princip al All ied Powers so unani
the statesmen o f those
m o u sly behind him
countries would hardly dare to oppose his idea s
as to the terms o f peace I think that there were
a mple grounds for this belie f
The trouble was that the Pre sident was not
prepared to seize the opportunity and t o capital
ize this general popular support He ca me to
Pari s without so far as I know a defini te outline
He did have a draft
o f a treaty with Germany
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40
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Wilso n
of
a covenant of a league of nations but it was
a crude and undigested plan as is evident by a
co mpari son of it with the document finally re
ported to the Conference on the Preliminaries of
Pea ce He of course had his famous Fourteen
Points and the declarations appearing in his
subsequent addresses as bases of the peace but
they were little more than a se ries of principles
and policies to guide in the drafting of actual
terms As to a complete proj et or even an o u t
line of terms which could be laid before the
delegates for consideration he apparently had
none ! in fact when this lack was felt by members
o f the American Commission they undertook
t o have their legal advisers prepare a skeleton
treaty but had to abandon the work after it was
well under way because the President resented
the idea asserting emphatica lly that he did not
intend to allow lawyers to draw the treaty a
declaration that discouraged those o f the pro
fe ss io n from volunteering suggestions as t o the
The
co venant and other articles o f the treaty
Pres ident not having done the preliminary work
himself and unwilling to have others do it was
wholly unprepared to submit anything in con
crete form to the European states men unless
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41
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Wilso n
it was his imperfect plan fo r a league of nations
The consequence was that the general scheme of
the trea ty and many of the importa nt articles
were prepared and worked out by the British
and French delegations Thus the exceptional
opportunity which the President h ad to impress
his ideas on the Con ference and t o lea d in the
negotiations was lost and he failed t o main tain
his controlling position among the statesmen who
were as it turned ou t to dicta te the terms of
peace ! while his utterances which had been the
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foundation of his popularity su fl ere d in a meas
ure the same fate
If the President h ad adopted the customary
method of negotiation through commissioners
instead of pursuing the unusual and in fact u n
tried method of personal participation the
situation would have been very di fferent With
o u t the President pres ent in Paris detailed i n
which
s t ru c t io n s would have been prepared
could have been mod ified during the negotiations
only by reference t o him at Washington In
s t ru c t io n s o f that sort would o f necessity have
been definite There would have been no u n cer
ta inty as to the objec t s sought But with the
President on the gro und written ins truction s
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Wilso n
seemed to him and possibly were superfluous
He was there to decide the attitude ofthe United
States an d t o give oral directions concerning the
minutest detail of the negotiations as the que s
tio n s arose ! and since diplomatic c ommissioners
a re in any event only agents of the P resident and
sub j ect a lways t o his instructions t he American
commis sioners at Paris po ssessed n o right t o act
indep en dently o r t o do other than foll ow the
directions which they received whi ch in this case
were given by word o f mouth As these dirce
tion s were meager and indefinite and as they
did not include a general plan the situation was
unsatisfactory and embarra ssing for the Pres i
dent s American colleagues
I doubt if Mr Wilso n had worked ou t even
tentatively the application of the principles and
p recepts which he had de clared while th e war
was in progres s and which had be en ge nerall y
accepted at the time of the armistice as the bases
The consequence was that he must
o f pe ace
have had a very va gue and nebul ous scheme for
th eir introduction into the treaty because ma ny
of his declarations required accurate definition
before they could be prac tically applied to t h e
p roblems which awaited solution by th e Con
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Wilso n
ference Naturally there was an atmosphere
o f uncertainty and a feeling of helpl e ssness in
approaching the trea ty terms which p revented
the American commissioners from pressing for
definite objects
The whole delegation the
Presid ent included lost prestige and influence
with the foreign delegates by this lack of a
programme
Here is sho wn o n e of the inherent weaknesses
o fMr Wilson which impai red his ca p a city as the
head o f a diplomatic commission to negotiate
‘
so intricate a settlement as the treaty wi th
Germany He was inclined to let matters drift
relying apparently on his own quickn ess of
perception and his own sagacity to defeat o r
amend terms proposed by members o f other
delegations From first to last there was no
teamwork no common counse l and n o c oncerted
action It was discouraging t o witnes s this utter
lack of system when system w as so ess ential
The reason was manifest There was no directing
hea d to the American Commission to formulate
a plan to organize the work and to is sue definite
instructions
It is my belief that this fault in the conduct of
the negotiations so far as the United Sta tes is
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Wilso n
concerned was re sponsible in no small degree for
some of the more undesirab le settlements which
were incorporated in the treaty of peace The
other heads o f states held long daily conferences
with their fellow commissioners and principal
expert advisers at which pending ques tions were
debated at length and opinions were free ly ex
pressed as to the attitude which should be as
sumed in View of the national interests involved
Not so the President He seldom met the Ameri
can commis sioners as a body
in fact only nine
times prior t o hi s fir st return to the United States
on February N t h — and then except in regard to
the covenant the discussions were desul tory and
o f a general character except on two o r three
occasions The President at these meetings did
most of the talki ng seldom asking advi ce They
left an impressio n o fdoubt as to just what he was
seeking t o obtain They might have been but
were n o t usefu l During the entire peri od of the
negotiations President Wils on sum moned the
. experts to meet as a body with the American
Com m i ssion only once on June 3d when the
German and Austrian treaties were completed
The President s method of utilizing the knowl
edge of others was this : If he wished advice he
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45
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Wi ls o n
called
individual whom he thought e spe
though he so met imes
ci ally qualified to give it
erred in his choice
and discussed the subject
wi th him in a private interview o r else he as ked
the expert t o prepare for him a co n fidentia l
memorandum The resul t Of the inte r vi ew the
President di d not di sc los e but the co mmiss ioners
s ometimes o btain e d from the advi se r an
o ral
a cco unt o f what to ok pla ce or a co py of the
memora ndum which he had furnis h ed There
was t he refore no consensu s of opini on by the
a n d no gene ral discussion
co m mission
of a
ques tion The Pres id ent in fact constituted
himself an exclusive repo sito ry of all inf orma tion
opinions and spec ulations to which no on e else
had acc ess It was entirely a personal matt er
with him It se ems t o me to be a fair assumptio n
t hat he a rgued that as he alone had the respo n
o r hi m to
s ib ilit y under the Constitution it was f
m ake up his mi nd independently as t o the co urse
which should be ta ken an d tha t it was time
enough t o tell the other American co mmissioners
wha t tha t co ur se would be a fter he had deter
mined it U nfortunate ly he did n ot al ways
disclose his dec ision even when he re ached on e
t hough o n more t han o n e occ a si on he see med
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Wilso n
advice o fCo lonel Hou se at least during the early
sta ges o f the negotiations he remained a solita ry
and secluded man preferring to bear his burdens
alone
The consequences were those which might
have been expected M Clemenceau an d in a
les se r degree Mr Lloyd Ge orge too k the in i tia
tive on prac tica lly all subjec ts requi ri ng settle
ment except as to those before commissions of the
Con ference and even in the case o f t he Com
mis s ion o n the Le a gue of Nations of which the
Pre sident was the presiding o fficer the initiative
apparently passed from him to General Smuts
Thus the United States
a n d Lo rd Rob ert Cecil
was forc ed into the position o f following instead
o fleading in the dra fting of the terms formulated
in the Council of Four a position whi ch was as
unnec essary as it was un fortunate
There can be little doubt that Pres ident
Wils on e xpec ted to fin d in the p rincipal sta tes
men of Euro pe at least in a measure the same
philanthropic and altruistic motives which he
possesse d to so high a degree In the co rres pond
ence durin g the war the Allies ha d re sponded to
his appe al s and declara t ions in a tone o f lofty
ide al is m simil ar to tha t which he had u sed I
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believe that he assumed that moral right would
be the controll ing factor in the settlements at
Paris and that even the enemy would be treated
fairly if not generously in order that the peace
might be erected on permanent fou ndations
Entertaining idealistic motives and u n fort u
nate ly la cking practical experience in international
negotiations the President did not appear to
apprec iate at the first that the aims of his foreign
colleagues were essentiall y material or t o realize
that their expression s of high principle were
merely an assent to a moral standard which they
thought basicly right but at present im prac t ic a
ble The re sul t was that he assented to certa in
arrangements be fore he bec ame aware of the
selfishn ess if n o t the greed which was so e vi
d en t ly a frequent impuls e o f many of the Euro
pean delegates in formulating their demands or
supporting those of others Having once passed
his word in regard to a decision his high sense o f
honor or po ssibly an unwillin gnes s to admit his
error prevented him from withdrawing it
Obsesse d wi th the idea that the organi zation
o f a league of nations was the supreme objec t to
be attained at the Paris Con ference the Presi
dent devote d his time his effort and his infl uence
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Wi lso n
to drafting its charte r and removing or n eu t raliz
ing the objections which stood in the way of its
acceptance At the first he conferred with the
other American commissioners in regard to the
covenant but on finding them except possibly
Colonel House more o r less skeptical as t o the
practical operation of the organization which he
had planned in collaboration with Lord Robert
Cecil and General Smuts and disposed to offer
suggestions materia lly modifying the plan he
showed that he preferred onl y t he cooperation o f
those who unreservedly believed in his draft It
was very apparent that he did n o t desi re counsel
an d criticism but approval and commendation
It was unfortunate for the
o f the covenant
P re sident and for the League that he too k this
attitude as subsequent events proved
As t h e leaders of the Allied Powers with their
practical ideas came to a realization of the situ
a tion and saw that the President was willing to
conced e much in exchange for suppo rt of the
covenant they u t ilized his supreme desire t o oh
tain by barter material advanta ges for their own
nations From the results of the negotiations it
may be deduced that by clever representations
they gained concession after concession The
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Wi ls o n
apparent suppo rt ofthe idealism of the Presid ent
by these sta tes men was in my opinion chiefly for
a purpose and not out ofco nviction They loudly
applauded the Pre sident s declarations of prin
c iple as the just bases of peace but they never
once attempted to apply them unless their o wn
national inte res ts were advance d They p rais ed
the covenant as a wonderful document as the
Magna Charta of the world as an eternal
memori al t o it s author and they subtl y flattered
the President by c on fidin g to the Le a gue every
ques tion which co ul d n o t be immed iately s olved
ostens ibly t o show their faith in the proposed
organ i za ti on but reall y t o postpone the settle
ment of dangerous disputes
M Clemence au who had frankly declared in
favor o fthe doc trine of the balance of power was
satisfied with either General Sm u t s s plan o r th at
o f Lo rd Robert Cecil since both provided for the
perpetuation of the Supreme War Council as the
Council of the Lea gue and for the reco gnition of
the primacy o f t h e Great Powers over all in
fai rs for the future Mr Ll oyd
t e rn a t ion a l a f
George provided the colonial ambitions and
commercial interests of the British Empire were
satisfied before the guaranty o f the covenant
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Wilso n
bec ame o perative complacent ly ga ve his suppo rt
t o the document as a means of making more
permanent B rit is h posse s sion of the ceded ter
Signor Orlando assured Of the dis
rit o ries
mem berment of t he Austro Hu ngaria n Empire
an d the res ul ti n g delivery into the ha nds o f Ita ly
of the e conomic life of German Austria an d hope
ful of being given substa nt ial control of the
Ad riatic and con fident o f obta in i ng s overeignty
o ver the Tyro l by insis ting o n the fulfillment of
the Pac t ofLondon rejoic ed in a guaranty whi ch
s eemed t o ens ure for a time at leas t t he widened
boundaries of Ita ly The Japanes e were equally
willing t o uni t e in a mutual guaranty on con
dition that their country obta ined and was
protecte d in the posses sion of the Ge rman rights
in Shantung an d in its sovereignty o ver the
G erman islands in the Pacific Oc ean nort h of
the equat o r though I am con vinced tha t ! a pan
woul d never ha ve withdrawn from the Confer
ence or abandoned her position as on e of the Five
Grea t Powers wh at ever di spo sition had be en
made of her claims
While selfish inte res t undoubte dly impe ll ed
t h e p rincipal Allied Powers t o adhere t o the
c ov enan t an d t o become members o f the Lea gue
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Wilso n
of
Nations the United States was free from
such influences It had no territorial or trade
ambitions t o advance The American people
desired a just p e ace because it would remove
ca uses for war ! they desired the crea tion :of
an international organization which woul d at
least hinder if it co uld not ac tually p revent
future wars
The ideas of the President when he left the
United States in Dec ember 1 9 1 8 were undoubt
general acco rd with the thought and
e d ly in
desire of the majority o f his countrym en as to
the terms o f peace I do n o t mean that h is plan
for a leagu e of nations which he carried with
him but which he h ad not then made public was
in acco rd with that thought and desire It may
have been or it may n o t have bee n No on e can
But I be lieve that nearly all
te ll as to that
Americans hope d and expec ted that some sort
o f an association o f nations would be created at
Paris As to the form and functions of the asso
public opinion in the United States had
c iat io n
n o t then crystalli ze d
It was not until the covenant as finally re
ported was found to co nta in a mutual guaranty
together wi th
o f territory and independence
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Wilso n
other features which were claimed t o be contrary
to Ameri can interests and to the traditional
policies of the United States if they were not
actually vi olative of the Constitution that the
President s interpreta tion of the popular will was
seriously ques tione d When in ad dition t o this
opp osition to the covenant
which was seized
upon with avidity by Mr Wilson s personal and
po litical enemie s as an opportunity to discredit
him at home and abroad
th e injustice o f
certa in settlements in the treaties was manifest
the opposition to a guara nty which might require
coercive measures t o enforce such settlement s
increased and greatly strengthened the oppo
n en t s Of the covenant
and in fact had much
to do with preventing the ratifica tion of the
treaty in the Senate of the United States
If the President had in fle xib ly demanded that
no terms should be written into t h e treaty which
were not wholly just he would have gone far
towa rd ac co mplishing the purpose of his mission
t o Europe And if he had also advocated a plan
for a league of nations which w as not open t o the
charge of esta blishing a supernational authority
vested to all intents in an oligarchy of the Great
Powers he would have been ac cla imed the great
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Wilso n
was invariably considerate o f the exp ressed
Opinions o f others and manifest ed an open min d
in valuing those opinions
While these quali t ies are as a general rule use
ful and admirable in a negotiator there come
times when firmness and fra nkness are necessary
The failure t o insist in certain cases when the
conditions ofa debate re qui red insistenc e lost the
President an advanta ge which I am sure he
would have otherwise had Pro n e to po stpone a
decisio n to the last po s sible moment he puzzled
his co llea gues in the Co uncil who could not
understand how so alert a mind nee ded more
time to form an opinion after listening to three
hours of discussion This peculiarity o f the
President s mental m ake u p was frequently
commente d upon by his foreign associates in
term s by no means complimentary
After a subjec t had been threshed o u t by the
Council o f Ten Often to the point o f weariness
M Clemenceau would often turn to the President
and ask his opinion as to the action which ought
to be taken The President woul d reply without
hesitation in precise English though he usually
evaded a decision by a general review o f the
points made by both sides during the argument
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W i l so n
This he did with clearness an d conciseness show
ing how carefully he had listened to the deba te
While I t hink that the President s presentation
showe d in a way why he was not prepared to o ffer
a solution to the question it did not advance the
work o f th e Council
When the President ceased speaking M Cle
m e n c e au would ask my opinion then that o f Mr
Lloyd George then that of Mr Balfour and so
He would then
o n down the line o f members
turn b ac k t o the President and ask Well what
shall we do !
Perha ps
The Pre sident frequently answered
it would be well to refer the matter to a com
“
May I ask if an y o n e
or
m it t e e of experts
has prepare d a resolution !
If the last question was asked it was apt to
bring a response from Mr Lloyd George whose
secretaries had drafted a resolution while the
discussion was in progress A resolution laid
before the Council after a question had been
debated was as a rule adopted at least in
principle though often modified in language It
was therefore a decided advanta ge to introduce
a resolution The President put aside this a d
vantage by failing t o sugges t that the same
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Wi lso n
course be taken by his expert advisers wh o were
naturally n o t disposed to follow the practice
unless it was at his request Apparently he felt
an independent personal judgment by him was
essential and that it would not be in dependent if
b e adopted the Opinion of others The consa
q u e n c e was that Mr Lloyd G eorge who seldom
hesitated to accept the views of his exp erts in
t ro d u c e d most of the resolutions other than those
prepared by the French which were generally
annexed to the agenda
Occasionally however M Clemenceau after
a discussion in which the President had expressed
definite views would ask the latter to draft a
resolution embodying his opinion Mr Wil son
would at once take a pencil and without hesita
tion and without erasures write o u t in his small
plain hand a resolution couched with exceptional
brevity in unambiguous terms In a proposed
measure of this sort the exactness of his thought
and his command of language were clearly exhib
it e d Possessing this ability far surpassin g that
o fany other person attending the Council of Ten
it is all the more deplorable that he did not use
i t constantly I do not recall that he prepared a
resolution excep t at the suggestion of M Cle
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Wilso n
one of the British delegates If he
prepared one voluntarily I d o n o t remember the
occasion If he had done so frequently it wou ld
have been he rather than the French or British
who initiate d action by the Council and his
infl uence over their d ecisions would have been
marked which in fact it was not except in a few
instances
Mr Wilson during the sessions of the Council
Of Ten spoke in a low pleasant voice and without
rhetorical effort As no o n e rose in speaking he
woul d lean forward resting on the arms of his
chair and address his remarks first to o n e and
then t o another of his confreres With fluency and
wi th perfect diction he would present his views
in sentences so well rounded th a t they suggested
copper plate perfection His ac curacy of lan
guage and his positiveness o f assertion not in
frequently reminded one o f a lecturer imparting
knowledge to a class and gave the impression
that he felt that what he said left nothing els e
t o be said He exhibited the traits of a philo so
pher rather than those o f an advocate He pre
ferred to deal in generalities rather than with
facts His discours es though essentially aca
demic were clear and logical
m en
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Wilso n
The on e thing th at to my mind marred the
President s diction wa s a sort of little ch u ckle or
half laugh which frequently inte rru pted his flow
Of language I never Obse rved this mannerism
p rior t o the fi rst meeting o f the head s of sta tes
an d fore i gn m inisters except on on e or two o cc a
sio ns It see me d t o be an in voluntary ac t caused
by nervousness o r embarrassment It sounded
almost apologe tic
Probably t hose who ha d n ot
come in frequent contact with the President prior
t o the Peace Conference never notic ed it To those
long acquainted with him it seemed to indicate a
loss of some of the assurance and self con fiden ce
which had always been distinguishing charac
t erist ics of his public career
After the division o f the Council of Ten into
the C o uncil of the Heads of States the Big
Fo ur and the Council of Foreign Ministers
during the last we ek in March 1 9 1 9 an d ap
p ro ximately five weeks before the treaty with
Germa ny was completed I h ad little opportunity
to see the President s work in co nference That
he labo red wi th great ind ustry and took little
time for rest an d recreation everybo dy knows
He sho wed in his face the effect of these u n re
He looked fatigued an d worn
m itting efforts
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Wilso n
Nevertheless he p ersisted with his ch aracteristic
determin ation
The con ferences of the Big Four were usually
held in the p alati al residence on the Pl ac e des
Etats Unis whi ch h ad been provided fo r the
President s use by t he French G overnment The
Four generally met in the li brary on the ground
floor but if th ey had several persons present to
give them advice on some technical matter they
a ssembled in the la rge salon o n the second floor
At fir st the four statesmen met al one Signor
O rlando did n ot understa nd English and Presi
dent Wilson and Mr Lloyd Geo rge had but an
imperfect knowledge of French M Clemenceau
was therefore the onl y o n e thoroughly familiar
with both languages and h ad to ac t as in t e rpre
ter Thi s was found to be unsatisfac tory ! so
Profes sor Ma nto ux was adm itted and later for
so me reason Sir Maurice H an key the secretary
a n d also Count
o f the British War Mission
Ald ro v an di of the Ita lian Mission were per
m it t ed to be present Sir Maurice prepared the
decision s and the minutes of the meetings Thus
the Presiden t with n o s ecretary present had t o
depend o n t he notes o f Hankey if an y question
aro se as t o the p roc eedings
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Manifestly this was not a safe method of pro
c ed u re in a negotiation which involved the n a
t ion al interests o f di f
ferent countries and dealt
with many complex questions I do not thi nk
that American interes ts su ffered mat erially
in
f act knowing the honorable character o f Sir
Maurice I am sure that they did not — but
certai n l y the President took a needless risk in n ot
having an American secretary present t o chron
It was either a failure
icle the proceedings
to appreciate the importance o f having his own
record o r else it was his in herent tendency t o
work alone and unaided that induc ed him to
though possibly both in flu
a dopt this course
e n c ed him
President Wilson entered upon the n egot ia
tions with a high sense of honor with al truistic
purposes and with a supreme confidence that
his ideals would be written into the treaty of
peace His sense of honor and his al truism he
maintained to the very end in spite of the dis
appointments and discouragements resulting
from the spirit o f national selfishness which
was so controlling in the Conference at Paris
Against this prevailing spirit the President
To an extent he was suc
s truggled m anfully
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of
the
decisions important as they were he
would have had leisure to recuperate ! but he
was not willing O n the contrary he in sisted
that everything must be dec ided by him that
all the thr eads of the treaty fabric must be in his
hands O thers might help him untangle some of
the kn ots and arrange the threads in order but
it was his business alone t o W eave them into t he
treaty He seemed in fact to resent any in flu
ence exerted upon him to decide a matter in a
certain way He relied on his o wn judgment
and indicated that suggestion o r advice unless
he requested it was an interference with hi s
freedom of decision and was not acceptable
Whether this attitude was the result of an ab
normal conception o f his constitutional re spon
s ib ilit y for t h e conduct of international relations
or of an exaggerated belief in his superior men
t ality I do not pretend to say
With t h e m u lt it u de of decisions which had to
be rendered many of which were not only com
plex but required technical knowledge of a hi gh
order the attempt of a sin gle individual h owever
gifted to be the sole arbiter as t o the proper
American position in regard to them all was at
the le ast perilous Yet that is what the President
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Wilso n
tried to be As he is entitled to credit for many
excellent provisions in the treaty because of his
steadfastness so he cannot avoid the blame for
the questionable settlements which were in
sert e d because he failed to object to them or else
conceded them thr ough insufficient knowledge
o r by way of compromise
From this general comment I must exclude
the financial and economic terms of the treaty
In the adjustment of these difficult qu estions
the American experts took a leading part It
was not an e a sy matter to fin d formulae which
would harmonize the differences between govern
ments eac h o f whi ch had its own financial and
economic interests to conserve and its o wn idea
That an agree
a s to how this could be done
ment was re ac hed which was accepted by if
not ac ceptable to the interested parties was a
notable accomplishm ent the credit for which is
due in large measure to the Americans on the
comm issions charged with the discussion an d
adjustment o f these con fl icting interests
Wh at actually occurred at the meetin gs of
the Council o f Four was unkn own t o the Con
ference as a whole Nevertheless rumors and
reports from time t o time sifted through the veil
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Wi lso n
secrecy W hich enveloped the p roceedings It
is not my p urpose t o discuss here t he secretive
ness of the Council or the impression which it
m ade on the delegates to the Conference an d on
the public at large Suffice it for the present
t o say that the secre cy was well pres erved con
s iderin g the daily conferen ces which M Clemen
ce au Mr L loyd G eorge and Signo r Orl an d o h ad
with their advi sers The f ac t is th at the Am eri
commissioners g ained pr ac tic ally all their
c an
knowledge of the progres s o f the work of the
C o uncil from the gossip of the staffs of other
d eleg ations as the President I am informed
declin ed t o let S ir Maurice Han key furnish an y
o f the American Comm ission with a c o py of h is
or when an American expert or gro up
m in utes
of exp ert s was reques ted by the Pres ident t o be
p resent t o discuss techn ical question s In view
o f this igno rance it would be pres umptuous f
or
me t o attempt to comment on the tr ai ts of
ch ar ac ter exhi bite d by the he ad s ofstates as they
s at in co ncl ave at the President s res iden ce on
the Plac e des Etats Unis
That the meetings of the Coun cil ofFour were
n o t entirely h arm onious may be stated with sub
O n o n e occ as ion soon after
s t an t ial cert ainty
of
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the Council w as formed so it w as c re dib lv re
ported the President and M Clemencea u lost
their tempers and the session broke up with a
considerable exhibition o f feeling This episode
w as unple a sant but it was decidedly human
The wonder is that there were not more incidents
o f the sort because some of the members of the
Council possessed qualities which were by no
means patient u nder the strain of prolonged
deliberations
It is my belief that President Wilson s in flu
ence had much to do with preserving peace in
the Council of Four Placid and dignified in
m anner he impressed upon others a disposition
to be calm in expression and to avoid giving way
to emotion al impulses In this particular his
influence was undoubtedly superior to that ofany
other man in the Coun cils or the Conference and
contributed greatly to the amicable settlements
of many vexatious disputes which caused per
sonal ir ritation and which but fo r his considerate
and temperate attit ude might have ripen ed into
person al quarrels
The President s foreign colleagues recognized
that he was honestly seekin g for firm bases for
the future peace of the world Though they
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doubtless thought many of his proposals were
impracticable and therefore o f doubtful value
they respected their author because of his
motives and each of them in his own way eu
d e avore d to conform his ideas to those o f the
President in order t o gain his moral support
This was a concession to idealism by the selfish
materialism which was so potent in formulating
the terms o fpeace It bore witness to the gener al
feeling among the delegates to the Con ference
that Mr Wilson stood for international mor ality
and justice
If the President failed in the full realization of
his purposes it was not out of lack ofgood in t en
tions but rather because of inexperience in
negotiation o f desire to exercise an independent
judgment of exaggeration of t he importance of
ad opt ing the covenant an d of o ve rcon fiden ce in
the motives o f o thers It was only after the
Council of Four had been in session for some
time and after he had committed himself to
certain compromises the justice of which ap
to
many
to
be
doubtful
that
the
Presi
e
a
r
e
d
p
dent seemed to awake to the fact t hat he had
overestimated the potency o f altruism and of
From the
abstract j ustice in the negotiati ons
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Wilso n
time th at he seemed t o come to a reali z ation of
the true state o f affairs the statesmen of the
Allied Powers found him less pliable and ap
paren t ly less credulous o f their an n oun ced in te n
tions Up to the end however he p reserved the
geni al ity of m ann er and the co nsider ate attitude
which h ad from the first marked his intercourse
with t h e le ad ers at Paris
It w as in the plenary sessions of the Confer
ence on the Preliminar ies of Pe ace that the
President s person al gifts showed t o the greatest
a dvantage
In the presence of the W hole body
of delegates his ab ility as a speaker his attrae
tive an d convincing style of expression and his
dignity of manner made a profound impression
He was more at home in ad
on his listen er s
dressing a large audience such as he had at a
plen ary session than he w a s sitting at the council
table un der the cross fire of debate He of all
those who ad dresse d the full assembly of dele
gates was listened to with the greatest atten
tion ! an d his words c arried the gre ates t weight
To the delegations from the smaller co untries
he was the uncompromising supporter of the
ide al s which he h ad dec lared the advoc ate
of equ al j usti ce for al l the sturdy defender o f
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their ri ghts In him they placed their confidence
and hope
It is true th at a s the terms of peace ap
pro ac h e d final settlement and as rumors o f what
the terms were to be spread among the delegates
in spite of the secrecy which surrounded them
there grew up in some minds particul arly of
those whose national aspirations were reported
to be unsatisfied doubt as to the potential in flu
ence which the Presiden t had been able to exert
over his European colleagues At first however
the faith of the delegates in h im was unbounded
and he was received by them with enthusiasm
almost with veneration But after months of
waiting in idleness and ignorance of the status of
their own national rights it became noticeable
that with the representatives of the smaller n a
tions the President s popularity waned more and
more ! and though he addressed them with the
same excellence o f language and proclaimed the
same d evotion t o lofty prin ciples the reaction
upon his hearers was different from what it had
been in the earlier sessions and there was an
evident disposition to accept his statements with
mental reservations and not at their f ac e value
In fact it may be said that t h e disappoin ted
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the gre at d omin ating figures ofthe C on ference
who re ached the z enith of his power o ver the
p ublic mind of Europe over the del eg ates and
over the nego ti ations at the first plen ary session
The reasons for his decline in
of the Con ference
p ower a f act wh ich can hardly be ques tioned
may be on e or more of many First the loss of
his superior po sition by intim ate p erson al inter
course with the E u ropean statesmen which
could have been avoided if he h ad remained in
the United States or if h e had declined to sit as
a delegate at Paris Second his evident l ac k of
experience as a nego ti ator an d his f ail ure to
s ystemati z e the w ork of t h e American Com
mission an d to formulate a programme Third
his seclusiveness and apparent determination to
conduct personally almost every phase of the
negotiatio ns and t o decide every question al on e
and independently Fourth his willingness t o
arr ange all settlements behind close d doors
with the three other heads of states p resent at
the C on ference Fifth his un avo idable lack of
knowledge of the details o f some of the simple
as well as the in tricate problems t o be s olved
Sixth his insistence o n the adopti on ofthe cove
nant of the L e ague of Nati ons as dr afted an d
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the o verco m ing of opposition b y concessions to
national aspirations the justice of which was at
least disputable Seventh his loss of the initia
tive in the formulation o f the provisions of the
treaties Eighth his apparent abandonment of
the smaller nations and his tacit denial of the
equality of nations by consenting to the creation
o f an oligarchy of the Great Powers at the Co n
ference and in a modified form in the covenan t
And ninth the im pression which greatly in
cre a sed after his return from the United States
in March that the American people were not a
un it in support o f his aim s as to a league of
nations as those aims were disclosed by the
report made to the Peace Conference
This list might be extended but the re asons
stated are sufficient to explain much that o c
cu rred at Paris and also many of the features of
the treaty of peace with Germany which have
been the subject of debate censure and de
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It is not to be wondered at when the pro
c e e d in gs o f the Con ference are carefully con
that the Old Tiger of France with his
s idered
materialistic motives his intense patriotism and
his cynical view of transcendental intern at ion al
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ism , became , as he was the d ominant person ality
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in the Peace Conference and the most potent
member of t h e Council of Four His shrewd and
pr actical methods of negotiation su cceeded bet
ter than the President s ideali sm Yet the latter s
p ersonal influence upon the delegates and his
success in incorporating in the treaty of peace the
covenant of the League of Nations whatever
may be thought o f its provisions entitle h im
to a place second only to M Clemenceau among
the statesmen who directed affairs at Paris
The conclusion should not be drawn from the
comments which have been made as to the faul ts
in the Treaty o f Versailles that the treaty as a
wh ole should be condemned As a definitive
treaty of peace exclusive of the articles relatin g
to the League of Nations negotiated in the way
and at the time that it was it would have been
d ifficult to have obtained a better o n e consider
in g the numerous conflicting interests and the
intemperate spirit of vengeance which then pre
v ailed The treaty has defec ts many defects ! it
has bad provisions which should not have been
included ! but the wonder is that in the circum
stances they are not more general and more
glaring
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The chief objections raised again st the tre aty
in the United States have been to those articles
comprising the covenant of the League of Na
tions and to th ose de al ing with Shantu ng The
o ther settlements t hough some are admittedly
open t o criticism appear to be gener ally ao
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c ept ab le .
The interweavin g of t h e Leagu e of Nations
into various pro visions of the tre aty a scheme
which raises a question as t o the scruples of t h e
author h as in the Opinion o f many tainted the
whole document with evil This is manifestly
unjust an d evidences a prejudice which results
from ign orance or what is more deplorable fro m
an un r easonable mental attitude
The truth is as some saw it in Paris an d as
others have seen it since the negotiation and
signature of the treaty there should have been
dr afted a preliminary treaty of peace avoiding
as far as possible al l c ontroversi al and complex
questions an d restoring a stat e of peace with little
delay When the great need of the world h ad
been thus satisfied the negotiation of t h e defin i
tive treaty and the pl an for an organization of
the nations coul d have been t aken up sep arate ly
with the c are and deliberation t o which they
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Wilso n
were entitled and under conditions more favor
able to the form ul ation of just and wise settle
ments
If this course had been adopted President
Wilson would have been spared the vexations
and entanglements which surrounded him in
P aris and which were in large measure respon
sible for his failure to hold the first pl ac e in the
P eace Conference The draftin g of a definitive
treaty in cludin g a detailed covenant for the
L eague of Nations seriously impair ed his in flu
ence his prestig e and his reputat ion His
in sistence upon the incorporation of the cove
nant in the treaty lost h im the world le ad e r
s hip wh ich was in his gr as p
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III
LLO YD GEORGE
IN Mr
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Lloyd Geo rge who in my judgment
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was third in prominence and influence among the
Big Four on e finds a very differen t type of man
from either ofthe two who have been considered
While M Clemenceau and Mr Wilson entered
u pon the negotiations with gener al objects to be
attained the o n e nation al and materi al the other
internation al and ideal Mr Lloyd George if he
had a prepared programme which I assume he
did from my acquaintance with his learned and
able advisers did not follow it persist ently His
cour se was erratic an d he so often shifted his
ground that o n e felt that he h ad ab an doned his
plan or at least that he did not care to follow it
rigidly preferring to depe nd on his o wn s ag ac ity
to t ake advantage of a situation As questions
fected by chan ging
a rose particularly those af
political and military conditions he decided the
British attitude with char ac teristic quickness of
judgment and with a po sitiveness which im
pressed o n e with the alertness rather than the
depth ofhis mind and with the confidence which
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ability to grasp a sub j ect and
decide it in the most expedient way even though
h e had not given it the study and thought which
other men felt were necessary for a wise decision
Ready as Mr Lloyd George was t o declare a
p osition on an y subject he seemed to be equally
ready to change that p o sition on obtaining fur
ther information or on the ad vice of his expert
coun selors He did this with an avow al that he
had n o t previously been in possession of the
f ac ts or else with an explan ation intended t o
show that his new attitude was not contr ad ictory
His explan ations were always
o f the former o n e
clever and well presented but they were not
always convincing The Br itish Premier thus
p ut aside that which had gone before and pro
c e e d e d to handle the question under discussion
as if nothing h a d occurred t o change the course
Inconsistency never seemed to
o f the debate
disturb him or to cause him to hesitate If he
took the trouble to exp lain a ch ange of attitude
it was o u t of no sense of oblig ation to justify
himself but r ather in deference to the opin ion of
others and to prevent complain t It apparently
was a trivi al matter to him to change his min d
o nce or twic e o n a p roposed settlement
h e felt in his
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Wh ile Mr Lloyd George was vagu e
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as
to
general pr inciples which accounted largely for
the fluid state of his judgments he had made
certain promises during the parliamentary elec
t ions of December 1 9 1 8 which he considered
binding upon him in the negotiations at Paris
Of these Germany s payment of the costs of the
war and the public trial of the Kaiser by an inter
national tribun al of justice attracted the most
attention He was very insistent that the treaty
sh ould make these promises good al though he
m u st have known that the first was impossib le
and the second unwise as well as in defiance of
all legal precepts In addition to his politic al
commitments he was determined to obtain the
cession of the pr incipal German colonies in
Africa and the German islands in the P ac ific
south o f the equator control of Mesopotamia a
protectorate over Egypt a pr ac t ical protectorate
over Persia in the event that Persian aff airs came
before the Con ference the destruction of the
German n aval power and the elimin ation of the
German merchant marine as a rival of Great
Britain in the carrying trade of the world To
these well d e fin e d national policies which were
essentially selfish and mat erial the British Prime
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Llo yd G e o rge
Minister clung tenaciously and was ab le t o ob tain
nearly all of them by skillful maneuvering His
idea seemed to be that if these objects were
attained the decisions as to other matters were
o f relatively little importance unless British in
t e re s t s were directly affe c ted and that t o study
them thoroughl y was a needless expenditure of
time and energy It was very evident to any one
who was familiar wit h the subjects that he
counted on his skill as a ready debater an d o n
the promptings of his experts to handle the ques
tions satisf ac torily when they were presented t o
the Council of Four or Coun cil of Ten
Mr Lloyd George had a ple as ing pe rsonality
an d a hearty manner o f address which won h im
friends even among those wh o were disposed to
charge him with vacillation O f him it may be
said that he possessed personal m agnetism He
was short iii stature and rather thickset His
complexion which was ruddy and almost as clear
as a child s was set off by an ab un dance of
silvery white hair brus hed b ack from his bro ad
forehead an d by a short white must ac he which
curved over his lips His eyes were keen an d
twinkling an d when he smiled t h e wrinkles at
the corners were very marked He would enter
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the coun cil chamber at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs generally late with a quick st ep which
o n account o fits length made it a bit sw aggering
and greet his colleagues with a genial smile and
a bluff heartiness which were attractive
O n taking his seat in the great broc aded arm
chair betwee n Mr Balfour an d me he would
usuall y lean b ack an d ask h is secretary in an
audible un dert one if there were any notes on the
If any were h anded to h im he wo ul d
agenda
put on his eyeglasses examin e the pa pers in a
hasty offh and way ask a few questions of the
secretary leaning over the back of his chair an d
then putting the papers down o n the table i n
front of him lean back with his weight on his
right arm and wait composedly the opening of
the session His manner conveyed the impression
o f a man who was satisfied that he had obtain ed
all the in formation that he needed to deal with
the several subjects to be discussed by the Coun
cil One could not but admire the complacency
which he showed as to his o wn abili ty In the
con ferences of the Council Mr Lloyd George
disclosed that his training w as that of a parli a
He
m en t a ri an rather than t hat of a diplomat
did not speak in the calm deliberate an d precise
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manner in which President Wilson spoke nor in
the an alytical and closely re asoned style of
Sign or O rlando when arguin g a po int The
British statesman was very much of a rough and
tumble deb ater quick t o seize upon the weak
points of an opponent an d to attack them vigor
ou sly sometimes with sarcasm and ridicul e and
often with flat denials of fact His logic if one
co uld so c all it was that of an opportunist and
He was better in
n o t at all sound or convincing
attack than in defense as the latter required
detailed knowledge of every phase of the ques
tion while in attacking he could choose his own
groun d He did not hesitate to interrupt a
spe aker with a hasty question or co mment an d
sometimes if he seemed to be gettin g the worse
fin g and even a
o f an argument he assumed a s c of
blustering manner which did not harmoniz e with
t h e sedaten ess of the Coun cil o f Ten though it
did seem to fit into the p ortrait of the f am ous
Welsh politician
While during a debate he was thus prone to
int erfere with others Mr Lloyd George showed
displeasure or annoyance if he was interrupted
when speaking or if his statements were chal
lenged He had held his place in the British
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House o f Commons by constant forensic b attles
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He had used all the arts of a popular polit ical
leader to maintain his position and he had suc
c ee d e d more by reason of his dynamic personality
and by fearlessly defying hi s enemies than by
the superiority of his learnin g or the strength of
his position All people admire fearle s sness and
instinctively follow a leader who takes the offen
sive instead of standing o n the defensive They
seem to care far more for this trait than they
do for depth of knowledge or soundness of logic
His appreciation of this quality of human nature
and his con stant exploitation of it in his politic al
career made Lloyd George the Prime Minister
Nothin g daunted h im No
o f Great Britain
a nt agonist was too strongly entrenched to dis
courage him His q uick wit his ready tongue
and his self c o n fiden c e made him what he was
a great parliamentary leader In so me ways his
attainments as a politician were not dissimilar
to those of M Clemenceau though the latter
to use
appeared to be more constant and
a vulgar term
less shifty than his British
colleague
In the Council s at Paris these qualities of mind
were by no means so effective as in the House of
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Commons or on the political platfo rm M Cle
m en c e au sag aciously cast them aside but Mr
L loyd George could not They were his heavy
a rtillery
He would have been lost without them
In the negotiations conduct ed by the heads of
states an d foreign ministers of the Fi ve Great
P owers accurate knowledge coun ted and intel
lectual ability claimed first pl ace Withou t Mr
B alfour s aid and withou t the constant advice
of his subordinates Mr Lloyd George would I
fe ar have been decidedly outclassed As it w as
his truculence o f manner when hard pressed in
debate his attempts to ignore sub stantial argu
ments which he was not prepared to answer and
his frequent efforts to enhance the im portance of
a fact by emphatic declaration were methods
that certainly did not carry conviction
Yet n obody could come into intimate as socia
tion with Mr Lloyd George without falling under
O ne might dis
t h e spell of his personal cha rm
like his methods as those of a politician ! on e
might even feel a measure o f contemptuous
surprise that he dared to discuss a question of
territory without knowin g exa c tly where the
territory was ! and there might be a feeling of
irritation that he changed his mind whenever it
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Not that it was the sole reason but that it was
the pr incipal one seems to be the fact T h at the
idea of splitting the Council of Ten into two
bodies originated with Mr Lloyd George I
believe but do not positively know The at
tempt to make President Wilson responsible for
it and to assign as a reason certain attempted
ac tions by the Council of Ten d u r ing his brief
Visit to the United States in February is absurd
as no action was attempted contrary t o his
wishes while he w as absent As I have said my
belief is that Mr Lloyd George was the orig i
nator o f t he plan and pr obably the author of the
announced reason which was that two councils
could cover more ground than a single council a
reason which though to an extent true was not
the real o n e
The British Premier throughout his so j ourn
in France was in daily touch with the state of
fairs in Parliament as well as in Great Britain
af
Never fo r a moment did he take his
at large
hand from the political pulse at home Though
he had been victorious in the December elections
his position was none the less precarious de
pendent as it was on a coalition of parties which
is always more or les s unstable Constantly fac
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Llo yd Geo rge
in g the possibil ity
crisis in his government
Mr Lloyd George s attitude on various ques
tions arising in t h e n e go t iat io n s was undoubtedly
affected if not determ ined by British popular
sentiment as it was disclosed from day to day
an d by the advices which he received from his
political lieutenants in London
While there is a natural disposition to criticize
him for his attempts to follow the fluctuations
o f public opinion rather than to foll owa rigid
policy it should be remembered that the tenure
fice of a British cabinet is dependent on the
o f Of
will of t h e House of Commons and that unless
a majority supports the Government they are
forced to resign M Clemenceau and Signor
Orlan do though less openly responsive to public
opinion than their British colleague and more
successful than he in disguising their motives
were nevertheless constrained to consider the
wishes of their respective Chambers of Deputies
President Wilson alone was un trammeled by do
m e st ic considerations of that nature He alone
w as free to act without fear o f being deprived of
h is authority Unless the three E u ropean states
men watched vigilantly the trend of politi
cal Op in ion in their respective coun tries an d
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trimmed their s ails to meet the shiftin g winds of
that opin i on which in the months following the
armistice were tempestuous an d uncertain any
o n e o f them w as liable to be dep rived o f his
premiership and t o be recalled from P aris This
ac tually happ ene d later when the It al ian Min
is t ry was defe at e d an d Signor Orl ando was
supersede d in the Peace Con ference by Signor
Tit t o n i as the he ad o f the Italian delegation
Not only d id this watchfuln ess of public
t h ought at home affect the points of View of the
Europe an leaders on many o f the pending ques
tions but it in duced a desire for secrecy as to the
p rogress of the negotiations If the proceedin gs
were not published there wo uld not be a con
stant heckling of the negot iators by their politi
cal enemies At le a st so they re asoned al th ough
they ran the risk Of a ctin g co ntr ary t o an in
te lligen t public Opinion and of deferring popular
j udgment until it was t oo late t o reverse their
a ction
It is evident th at so far as the Europeans were
concerned there wa s a reason for their favoring
se cret negoti ations ! but when they went to the
extent o f depriving the delegat es from the small
coun tries who were vitally int ereste d in the
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were kept secret so far as was po ssible until
the treaty was finally drafted
There is no doubt that the metho d adopted
was essential to the practical control of the pro
c ee d in g s by the Great Powers and that it also
expedited the negotiations but in my opinion
the sacrifice of the principle of the equality of
nations and of the fundamental right of every
independent state the little a s well as the large
the weak as well as the powerful to have a voice
in the determination o f its own destiny was too
great a price to pay for the advantages gained
The basic principle recognized in international
intercourse prior to the war was t hat before th e
law all indep endent nations are equal That
prin ciple has been seriously impaired if not
entirely discredited by the proceedings at Paris
and this revival of the old doctrine that even in
times o f peace the strong shall rule has been so
woven into the structure Of the League of Na
tions that it will be a difficult task to resurrect
the doctrine of equality and restore it to its plac e
as the first maxim of international law the fun da
mental principle Of international relations The
hope fo r such restoration lies in giving first place
to legal j ustice applied through the medium of
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international courts independent of any political
o r diplomatic international body which may be
formed
It cannot be doubted that President Wilson
in agreeing to if he did not advocate the primacy
o f the Great Powers at Paris lost an advantage
whi ch he could easil y have held had he Opposed
it Supported as he was by most if n o t all of the
smaller states represented in the Con ference
at least at the fir st since they looked upon him as
their firm friend — h e could have maintained his
superior position if he had held strictly to the
rule of equ al ity and insisted that if the terms of
peace were to be definitive they should be con
s id ere d and drafted by general comm issions
whose reports should be discussed an d pas sed
upon in full sessions of the Con ference Even
when that normal an d customary way was
abandoned he lost another opportunity Sup
ported as he was by the people of nearly every
coun try he could have brought tremendous
pressure upon his th ree principal coll eagu es if he
had resisted t h e policy of extreme secrecy which
was followed He fail ed to perceive or else he
feared to seize these chances and therefore must
share the blame with his associates
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I h ave stated that Mr Lloyd George in my
opinion was pr incipally responsible for the se
crecy of t he proceedings of the Coun cils I know
that he showed the gre atest pert urbation over
publicity and most strenuou sly demanded that
the discussions and settlements should be held
strictly secret Though the meetin gs of the
Council Of Ten were considered con fidential
only an Official com m u n i qu é bein g given out after
a meeting there frequently appeared in the
Parisian press reports of the proceedin gs which
were no doubt embarr as sin g to t h e British GOV
since they became the subject of in
e rn m e n t
t erpe ll at io n and discussion in Parliament As
nearly a ll the cases of these unauthorized reports
seemed to be in a measure helpful to the French
C abinet in the Chamber of Deputies it was
presumed not without reason that the informa
tion came from the official group who in depen d
ently of the Minister of Foreign Affair s control
in large me a sure the acts of the Foreign Office in
Paris and who were in constant touch wit h the
proceedings of the Peace Conference
These published statements greatly annoyed
Mr Lloyd George and caused him to use some
very pl ain and vigorous language about the way
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Llo yd G eo rge
h is
Govern m ent and invited the attac ks
of
h is
enemies in the Chamber of Depu ties Mr Lloyd
George blustered about th is insinuation that his
people were doing the very thin g of which he
complained and declared that this improper
publicity was the result of havin g so many per
sons present at the sessions Of the Council and
that the only way to check it was t o reduce the
In truth M Clemenceau and Mr
n umber
L loyd George were equally desirous for political
reasons to have cert ain matters made public
but each of them wished to decide what those
matters should be
The result o f these conditions was the organ
iz at ion o f the Council of t h e Heads of States
There is no question but that the new method of
conducting business was in t h e main effective as
to secrecy O nly t h e most fragmentary in forma
tion c a me through the closed doors of the Presi
dent s resi dence where the Big Four sat in
conclave Not only the public but the delegates
to the Conference as well remained in ignorance of
the proceedings Thou gh the general discontent
in creased and the mutterings
particularly
of the representatives o f the press assembled
grew louder and more bitter against
in Paris
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Llo yd G eorge
this p olicy of silence and mystery Mr L loyd
George did not appear to be disturbed On the
contrary he was even more insistent that the
s e al o f secrecy shoul d remain unbroken
The climax of this dislike
or p ossibly I
should say this fear
Of publicity on the p art of
the British statesman came at a meetin g Of the
Council of Ten held at the Pre sident s house
abou t the middle of April whi ch ac co rding t o
the notice was summ oned to co nsider the pub
licit y to be given t o the terms Of peace be fore
the treaty was deli vered to the Germans but
which was in fact summoned to devise means
to preven t the terms from becoming public
The meeting was o n e of the most extraordinary
ever held in connection with a great intern ational
congress most extraordinary a s to subject dis
and result
c u ssion
I do n ot feel th at I can give a detailed account
o f what occurred at this meeting but it may be
said th at Mr Lloyd Ge orge held the opinion
an opinion which he freely expressed outside t h e
Council that in order t o keep secret t he terms
o f t h e t reaty as long as p ossible the delegate s o f
the lesser c O—bell igerent states who h ad bee n
excluded from all participat ion in the dr afting of
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Llo yd Geo rge
t he
document o ught not even t o see the full text
before the Germ ans saw it and tha t all delegates
friends and foes alike should simply be directed
“
to sign here
Thi s opinion
whi ch w as evi ~
d en t ly based on the assume d right of the Great
Powers t o dictate to the Conference was ap
pare n t ly m a de with the idea that it would b e
too late t o propose changes in the treaty after
the terms h ad been imposed on the G erm an s and
that the term s could not become the subject of
poli tical attack or public cr iticism at home while
the Germans were considering them an d form u
lating objections to them
The result of the meeting was a decree or order
by the Council Of Four that a sum mary and not
the text of the treaty should be laid before the
delegates on the afternoon preced ing the delivery
o f the docum ent t o the German representa tives
and that no delegate should be permitted to de
bate the term s un less it was in a perfuncto ry
manner an d in no event t o attempt to amend
them The conduct Of the proce edings being
in the hands of M Clem ence au the programme
was ce rtain t o go thr ough Altogether this w as
the most amaz ing and most indefensible e xh ib i
tion of the desp otis m of the Five Po wers that
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Llo yd G eo rge
statesmanship of which a cardinal prin ciple is
and always had been secretiveness as to dis
e ussio n s agreements and alliances nation al and
international His trainin g and experience in
government made his approval certain With
the Japanese secretiveness is a racial charac
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Yet in my opinion Mr L loyd G eorge went
further than any of his colleagues would have
gone in advocating the suppression of in forma
tion and he urged it with a frankness which
showed an utter lack of regard for or possibly
lack of appreciation of the attributes of sov
Had there been a trained legal mind
e re ign t y
among the Big Four other than that of Signor
Orlando it might have been different Un for
t u n at e ly the three pr incipal statesmen of that
powerful group were without such training
although both Mr Wilson and Mr Lloyd
George had begun life as members o f the legal
profession They were unable t o thin k in terms
o f int ernational law o r to model the ir procedure
t o conform t o the custom and usage of nations
The rights and liberties of independent states
were in peril They needed a jealous guardian to
p rotect them from invasion There was none
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Llo yd G eo rge
It was a serious defect in the constitution Of the
Council which was reflected in other phases Of
its proceedings
The insistenc e of the British Prime Min ister
on secrecy at Paris was one Of t h e man ifestations
o f that opportun ism which has distinguished
his public career Expediency controlled in a
marked degree his actions dur ing the negotiations
as it had done his policies and acts as leader ofthe
Government in Parliament He did not accept
a principle o r at least showed no disposition to
apply it unless it appeared to lead to some prae
tical advantage to his Government and if he
foun d that his anticipation as to the result w as
wrong he unhesitatingly abandoned the prin
c iple and a ss u fn e d another
When one reviews the unusual political career
Of Mr Lloyd George and sees how successfully
he managed to hold his own with the conserva
tive element of the British people an d to placate
the radicals — even those of the more advanced
type — b y me eting them p art way or by appearing
to acquiesce in their extreme views his shr ewd
ness and sagacity in the m an agement of contend
in g political factions arouse admiration for hi s
ability though it does not follow that they
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99
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Llo yd G e o rge
xcite the same emotion as to his devotion t o
principle or to his constancy of purpose
More than once while the negotiations were
in progress at Paris Mr Lloyd George returned
to London and appea red in the House of Com
mons for the purpose of leading the Governm ent
in repelling a n attack by the O pposition On
those occ as ions he so adroitly explained the
Govern m ent s policies and so brilliantly pictured
the satisfactory progress of the work of the
Peace Con ference that the attempted criticisms
which followed were feeble and futile Aggres
sive sanguine and cheerfully willing to face his
opponents he successfully combated their crit i 03
Having ro u ted his antagonists at home 0
c is m s
he returned to Paris u nquestionably stronger in 0
his o wn eyes as well as in the eyes of others 00
because Of his evident mastery of the parlia
mentary situation
While opinions may differ as to whether Mr
L loyd George is a great statesman no on e can
truthfully deny that he is a great politician who
shows a remarkable insight into human nature
an d a skill in the manipulation of political forces
which have enabled him to hold his place in the
most difficult c ircum stances Through the crit i
e
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100
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Llo yd Ge o rge
suspected and a hidden purpose was frequently
p resumed when doubtless there was none
But Mr Lloyd George always looking at a
q uestion from the point of View o f expediency
would have been seriously handicapped in the
council chamber had he not relied on the e xperi
ence and knowledge of Mr Balfour Lord Milner
and Sir Eyre Crowe who foresaw whither the
expedient might lead him He accepted the
judgment of others unless their judgment came
in direct conflict with his political programme
for the day and even then he was willing to
modify his views to meet at least p artially the
course which they advised
Mr Lloyd George posse ssed a wonderfully
mind which fairly bubbled over with
al ert
restless energy He made decisions rapidly and
with little regard for details o r fundamental
principles If he fell into error through in co m
ple t e knowledge or wrong deductions h e picked
himself up with a la ugh or a witticism and went
ahead as if nothin g had happened In debate
he was vi gorous and Often impetuous If it were
shown that his argument was based on false
premises he unblushingly changed his premises
but not his argum ent The audacity with which
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102
L lo yd G eo rge
he ignored logic was a subject of frequent com
ment He in my opinion had the quickest mind
o f the Big Four but it seemed to l ack stability
He gave the impression of a man who through
force of circumstances had been compelled to
jump at conclusions instead Of reaching them
through the surer but slower processes of reason
By many he was credited with superficial knowl
edge and careless judgment This Op inion was
a natural result of the way in which he pressed
forward sh owing imp atience that others were not
willing to render decisions on evidence whi ch he
deemed entirely sufficient but which his col
le agues considered questionable
Vivacious good tempered and possessing a
strong sen se Of humor Mr Lloyd George was
sociall y an attractive person while in debate his
cleverness in findin g the weak spots in an Op
po n e n t s armor and his utter in d ifl eren ce to his
own errors made h im a dangerous antagonist
He attacked with vigor and he defended by
attacking But this un usual man possessed none
He was not by nature
o f the arts of diplomacy
a negotiator His successes at Paris an d they
were not a few
were largely due to the ex
c e llen t advice which was given him and which
he wisely received
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IV
O RLAND O
SIGNOR ORLA NDO posses sed physical and mental
characteristics which have left pleasant m emories
Short and rotund in
of intercourse with him
person with thick white hair worn pompadour
a n d a white mustache partially cover ing his
rather full lips he was not in personal appear
ance typical of Italy His shortness Of statur e
which was about that of Mr Lloyd George was
emphasized by his us ual custom of wearing a
close fit t in g sack coat which he gener ally kept
tightly buttoned With a friendly eye and a
smile which dimpled his cheeks one knew at a
glance that he was of a kindly nature and not
disposed to quarrel without a sufficient provoca
tion His clear complexion and unwrinkled face
indicated good health and a capacity to enjoy
life
The mentality Of Signor O rlando was moulded
on different lines from those of any other member
It had
o f the Council of the Heads o f States
been trained and developed in the field of juris
prudence and p ossessed the precision ofthought
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104
1
Orlando
an
d cle arness Of expression which are the
i
att r
butes of a mind accustomed to the exactness
In some ways it was harder
o f leg al expressions
to judge accurately the mental qu alities of the
Italian statesman than those of his co nfr eres
because his inability t o speak or to understan d
English debarred him in a measu re from the
in formal discussions of the C ouncil which were
generally conducted in that langu age out of co n
sideration for Pres ident Wilson and Mr Lloyd
George With the aid ofProfessor Mantoux how
ever he was able to participate more t h an m igh t
have seemed possible in the circumstances
It is fitting t o digress for a moment and to say
a word ofProfessor Mantoux who wore a French
captain s uniform an d was in her ited by t h e
Coun cil of Ten from the Supreme War Council
NO interpreter could h ave performed his onerous
task with greater skil l than he Possessin g an
unusu al memory for thought and phr ase he did
n o t interpret sentence by sente nce but wh ile an
address or statement was being made he listened
in ten tly oc cas ionally jotting down a not e with
the stub of a lead penci l Wh en the speaker h ad
finished this remarkable linguist would translate
his rem arks in to English or into French as the
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1 05
Orlando
s might b e without the least hesitation an d
with a fluency an d complet eness which were
almost
unc anny Even if the speaker had
consumed ten fift een o r twenty min utes the
address w as accu r a te ly repe ated in
the other
language while Professor Manto ux would em
p loy inflection and emphasis with an oratorical
skill that adde d greatly to the perfectness of the
interpretation NO statement was t oo dry to
make him i n attentive or t oo techn ical for his
vocabulary Elo quence careful re asoning an d
unusual style in expression were app ar ently
easily rendere d into idiomatic English from the
French o r vi ce vers a He seemed a lmost t o take
o ver the ch ar acter of the individu al whose words
he transl ated an d to reproduce his emotions
His extr ao rdin ary at
as well as his thoughts
t a in m e n t s were reco gnized b y e very o n e who
benefited by them and his services comm an ded
general admiration and praise
In addition t o the in fo rm ation Obtain ed
throug h the excellent interpretations Of Pro
fe ssor Manto ux Signor Orlando h ad the aid of
B aron So nnino the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs who spoke English witho ut an accent
The Baron white
an d understoo d it p erf ec tly
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1 06
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Orlan do
cle arly in evidence at Paris I think th at it is n ot
going too far to say th at no member ofthe Coun
cil of Four o r of the Council of Ten for th at
m atter was his supe ri or in pre senting a clear
concise an d comprehensive ar gument du ring the
co u r se of an extemp o raneous debate
Signor Orlando s mind seemed t o work auto
m at ic ally in an alyz in g classifying an d arr an ging
the points in a controversy Having sto red away
eac h essential fact o r re a son in the proper com
part m en t of hi s brain he called it f orth at jus t
the right plac e in his argum en t and impressed it
wi th j ust the right value He did n ot exaggerate
the im p ortance o f a f act or ignore the strength of
an
adverse ar gument When he h ad finished
debating a question on e had to admit whether
he agreed with him or not that he had made as
lo gical a presentation Of his side of the c as e as it
w as possible to make and that there was nothing
As for the effectiveness Of Signor Or
to add
lando s argum ents that is an other matter in
View of the preconceived ideas and natural bias
o f his listeners but no one heard hi m without
re al izing his strength as an advocate The fact
is ho wever that the way to succeed in the Coun
cil was t o o ffer some form of compromis e which
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108
1
Orlando
wo ul d
h armon i ze confl icting positio ns When he
attempted this he showed to less advantage
I b e lieve that the excellent character of the
arguments made by Signor Orlando was in a
measur e due t o his expe rience as a jurist and to
the analytical method of thin king which he h ad
a cqu ired
His colleagues in th e Coun cil of Four
were n o t so wel l equippe d as he for discussin g a
legal question or preparin g a legal formul a This
is an impo rtan t attainm ent in a negotiator when
o n e considers that a t re aty is essentially a law
and that its preparation requ ires tec hn ical legal
knowledge and experience As was to o Often
manifest the value of logic and evidence w as not
so fully a ppreciated by M Clemenc eau Presi
dent Wil son and Mr Lloyd Georg e as it was by
the learned Ital ian jurisconsult With him no
tim e was wasted on side issues or in announ cin g
generalities which sounded well but could not be
concretely appli ed In speakin g he did n ot grope
ab o ut for something to say He knew where lay
t he strength an d where the weakn ess of hi s cas e
He pressed the former with vigor and a ssuran ce
and he defended the latter with skil l
O ccasion al ly in the heat of debate especially
if in terrupted by M Clemenc eau with some
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1 09
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Orla ndo
c austic comment as happened more than once
Signor O rlando s Latin tempe r would flame His
eyes would flash ! his voice would rise as if su r
ch arged with emotion ! his hands would add
emphasis to his words ! and his sentences would
pour forth like a torrent Yet even un der the
spur of indignation or anger the logical trend Of
his argument was never interrupted or di vert
ed His intellect functioned normally however
strongly he was stirred by his emotions An d t he
O ld Tiger whose ferocity of manner was I am
sure often as sumed from the mere love of bait
in g an opponent would lean b ac k in his chair
with half closed eyes and im mobile countenance
watching the effect ofhis words doubtless hopin g
that he had disconcerted the speaker If he did
cherish that hope in the case of his Italian
colleague he cherished it in vain
Signor Orlando enjoyed a joke and relished a
good story p articularly if it was illustrative of a
matter under discussion or was concerning some
well known charac ter li ving or dead He was
always jovial and seemingly in a goo d humor
When an afternoon session of the Coun cil of Ten
was e nded and the attendants brought a l ar ge
t e a table into t h e chamber from an adjoin ing
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1 10
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Orla n do
pression
th at Signor Orl ando came to P aris
with the definite purpose of obtain ing so far as
the Adriatic was concerned the territorial con
cessions laid down in the Pact of London and
that the inclusion of the city of Fiume in the
Italian claims was originally advanced for the
purpose of bargaining with the ! ugo Slavs who
were putting forw a rd excessive claim s for por
tions of the territory conceded to Italy by the
London Agreement But the reason for the
in clusion Of Fiume in the Italian demands is of
little importance compared with the reason for
the subsequent insistence with which the demand
was press ed Introduced as something with
which to barter in the event that the Italian
cla ims along the Dalm atian coast were curtailed
in the interest of the Jugo Slavs an argum ent in
favor of annexation to Italy was built up on the
principle ofself determination that phrase which
has aroused so many false hopes and caused so
much despair since it was coined and whi ch is a
continuing source of discontent and t urmoil in
the world He especially emphasized the prepon
derance of Italians in the population of Fium e
because he was led to believe that the President
would supp ort this principle
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1 12
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Orla ndo
Orlando so on aft er his arrival in Paris
fo un d the situation such that he came t o the
con clusion that if he rem ain ed firm in his claim
for t he port h e would succeed in obtain ing it for
Ital y This cour se naturall y appealed to him
since success would strengthen his political posi
tion at Rome whi ch was endangered by the
probability that the full grant un der the Pact of
London could not be attained Thus the claim
was converted from on e put forward t o surrender
in a compromise if I am correct in my surmise
to one which it was possible t o secure
Convinced of the substantial certain ty that
the Pres ide n t would in the end consent to the
cession and feeling assured that the Britis h and
French would not Object a propaganda in favor
o f Fiu me for Italy was begun at Rome so that
when the annexation actually took place the
Ita lian people would acclaim Signor O rlando and
hi s sta tesmanship and he wou ld reap the full
political benefit of the achievement Possibly
t o o it was thought that a strong manifestation
of national feeling would make certain the Presi
dent s favorable decision
The trouble was that the policy adopted was
based on a false belief as to the President s
Signor
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113 ]
Orlando
ltimate agreement that the city sh ould come
under Italia n sovereignty When Signor O rlando
and Baron Sonnino awoke to the fact that they
had been misled and that the President was
adamant in refusing t o admit Ita ly s claim t o
Fiume in spite of the rule as to self determina
tion they were in a sad predicament They had
started a fire of sentiment among the Italian
people which had spread beyond their control
They had no alt ernative but t o contin ue t o
s truggle fo r Italian control over the little city
hoping that they might through some compro
mise succeed in obtaining what all Italy was
clamoring fo r because failure meant the over
throw ofthe O rlando Ministry O ne can im agine
the feelings Of the Italian delegation toward
those who had encouraged them to assume a
position from whi ch there had been left n o way
to retreat
The negotiations had continued through con
fide n t ial chan nels and in the Council Of Fou r
until the time approached when the Germans
were to receive the treaty of peace As a last
resort Signor Orlando let it be understood that
unless the Council conceded Italy s right to
Fiume the Italian delegation had no o ther course
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1 14
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Orlando
h idden fro m
thers that his popularity with t he
p eoples of Europe was rapidly reced ing and that
they were no longer willing to accept his declara
tions as the utterances Of the inspired leader
of in ternational tho ught t h e ap o stle o f a new
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Signor Orlando was very an gry at this attempt
to rouse Italian public opin ion against his Fiume
p olicy for so he interpreted Mr Wilson s state
ment He issu ed a counter—statement and on
the 24t h dep arted from Pa ris for Ro me as did
Baron Sonn ino However the Ital ian sta tesmen
afte r their anger had cooled and af ter they had
had time to consider the possible consequences
upon Italian interests o f their continued absence
from the C onference swallowed their pride and
returned t o Paris Convinced that Italy was
solidly behind him and that the President had
failed in his ap pea l and was no longer in favor
with the Itali a n p eople Signor Orlando resum ed
his seat in the Co un cil giving no evi dence that
anything had happened to mar the cordial
relations which existed between him and hi s
a ssociates
This incident showed the volatil e tempera
m ent of t h e It al i a n Premier more clearly than
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Orlan do
anythin g else that occurred at Paris Possessed
o fthe emotional intensity o f hi s race the sudden
and ext raordinary action o fthe President which
he construed as a personal a ffront made hi m
furious as it might have done a man o f a more
phlegmatic nature O n the impul se Of the mo
ment he left Paris inten ding undoubtedly n o t
to return Then as hi s rage subsided un der the
soothing influence o fpopul ar approval and as he
reviewed more calml y the situation he decided
that it woul d be impolitic to remain away from
the council table where the terms of peace wi th
Austria were to be drafted o r to be absent when
the treaty was delivered t o the German ple n i
potentiaries It is said that added pre ssure was
exerted o n the Ita lians by a threat to abandon
entirely the terms o f the Pact of London un l e ss
they returned immediately to Paris I have no
doubt however that Signor Orlando inwardly
burned wi th in dignation at the President and at
those who had durin g the early days of the
negotiation encouraged the belief that the Presi
dent woul d assent to the cession of Fiume
All the clandestine interviews and intrigues
had come to naught ! and when the Italian del
e ga t es returned t o Paris they were not resumed
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1 17
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Orlando
Orland o an d Baron Sonnino were t o o sa
gac iou s t o p u rsue a gain a course which had ended
so disastro us ly
As an eminent Itali a n diploma t
on e of the Premier s close friends said t o me
We kno w now that we dealt fro m the fir st with
t h e wrong p eople
They hel d o u t false hopes
They did n ot tell us the truth We relied on their
advice an d n ow see where we are ! We won t
make th at mistake again
However the damage h ad b ee n done an d
could n ot be undo ne The public min d in Italy
h ad been so infla med that no thing but Italian
co ntro l of Fi ume would satisfy the nation With
that practically impossible in View of the un
compromising attitude of the President the
o verthrow of the Orlando Government was only
a question o f time unless something un foreseen
O ccurred t o af
fect the situation But by neither
word nor manner did Sign or Orlando show his
feelings E ven up to the time when t he defeat
o f his Go v ernment was cert ain t o take place
within a few d ays and it was substantially
settled that Signo r Tit t on i would succeed him
a t Paris as the h e ad o f the Itali a n d elegation
the chee rf ulness an d good hum o r of the retiring
Premier never forsook him H e a cc ep ted his ap
Signor
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1 18
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Orla ndo
What h as b een said o f Baron S onnino is
not by way o f criticism Of him a s a man but of
the school Of diplomacy to which he belonged
The pity is that all the intrigues and secretive
ness from which the Peace Con ference suffered
so grievously did not end as the Fiume affair
ended If the Con ference had done nothing else
than discredit diplomacy of that sort it woul d
have been well worth while Unfortunately
others who practiced similar methods were able
to form combinations and make bargains to the
mutual and material advantage of their coun
tries Baron Son n in o s reputation as a clever
diplomat and negotiator who was credited I
think unjustly — with hiding his real objects did
not help him while other statesmen less known
in diplomacy and possibly less frank in purpose
engaged in the same practices that he did with
impunity and with frequent success
The fact is when o n e who kn ows what went on
in Paris outside the rec orded proceedin gs con
siders the months during which the Con ference
was in session he cannot deny th at there was a
lot o fhypocrisy practiced a lot ofpretense about
doing things open l y and stating things candidly
when secrecy and intrigue were onl y t o o evident
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Orlando
One might n ot like Baron Son n in o s policies and
might feel that they flou t ed the conscience Of the
nations and were out o f harmony wi th the spirit
o f the times but n o o n e co u ld charge him with
being a hypocrite He was in fact far less blame
worthy t han some who cri ticized him Wh atever
may have been thought o f the Italian Min i ster
o fForeign Af
fairs by these self righteo us n ego t ia
tors he was a more reliable man than they a
better man wi th whom to deal He was without
question an able diplomat possessing poise and
sagacity while as a companion he was all that
could be desired
Neither Signor O rlando nor Baron Sonn ino
took as active a part in the debates on general
questions which came before the Council o f Ten
as did the repres enta tives of the United Sta tes
France and Great Britain Signor Orlando was
always ready to give his Opinion o n such subjec ts
when asked and he did it with the clearness of
statement and logical presentation of reasons
Of which he was master When however the
question was on e whi ch had to do with the
national interests o f Italy he appeared to be
eager to express hi s views and seized the first
opportun i ty to address the Council It was also
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1 121 1
Orlan do
observable th at in any discussion which touched
his government or people even so remotely as
the establishment of a precedent o r policy which
might be later invoked against them Signor
Orlando spoke with greater earnestness and much
more emphatically than he did on other occa
sions
This was evidence ofa fact already mentioned
that the Italian statesmen co ncentrated their
entire effort o n the advancement o f the materi al
welfare Of their country It is impossible to deny
that Italy however favorably o r sympathetica lly
her cours e may be vi ewed entered the war on
conditions which in the event o f victory by the
Allies ensured her future territorial and economic
expan sion She sought a good bargain and Great
Britain and France in view of the conditions
existing in April 1 9 15 were forced to accede to
her terms That same dominant purpose was
apparent thr oughout the negotiations at Paris
H a ving se cured to a large extent the rewards
promised a month before Italy declared war
agains t Austria Hungary which were embodied
in the Pact ofLondon the Italian representatives
at the Peace Conference sought further a dvan
tages by a dvancing new claims Of course t hese
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1 1 22 1
Orlan do
impe lled by selfi sh motives was an O f
fense t o
those wh o proclaimed their own altruism what
ever their true motives might have been It was
not playing the game according to the rul es
The truth is there was at Paris t oo much lip
virtue and t oo little heart virtue in the settle
ments that were reached
The Italian as pirations conflicted more with
those of Franc e than with those o f any other of
the Great Powers In the Balkans and t o an
extent in Asia Minor they came into direct con
fliot in the endeavor of each country to ext end
its sphere o f commercial influence in those re
gions It was when these questions were being
considered that M Clemenceau and Signor
O rlando crossed swords in debate While I
think that The Tiger s dominee ring manner and
sarcastic comments had a subduing effect on the
Italian he replied with vigor and defended his
position wi th skillful parry and counter thrust in
spite o f the interruptions of the Older statesman
who was or pretended to be very much o ut of
temper
As a rule the impression made by the debate
was that for logic and force of reasoning Signor
Orland o had the better of the argument He
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Orla ndo
eem ed t o kn ow his case more thoro ugh ly an d t o
p resent it more convincingly t han did his French
advers ary In fact if the latter had not been
t h e great personality that he was he would oft en
have been force d to ackn owled ge defeat But he
never did Clemenceau defeated was un think
a ble t o Cleme n c eau and that attitude h ad n u
questionably a potent influence o n his ass ociates
As a consequence Signor Orlando did not triumph
as frequen tly as he otherwis e m ight have done
in his word combats with the fierce Old ch am
p ion of France who treated him I believe
in t entionally with far less consideration than
he did Mr Wilson and Mr Lloyd George
Though Si gnor Orlando possessed admirable
traits of character and exhibited a skil l in debate
which none of hi s con freres excelled he was
nevertheless the lea st i n fl uential of the Big Four
and had
terms Of p
los s due in
naval and fina ncia l strength ofthe Great Powers
Comparison
re pres ented in the Co un cil o f Four
by this sta ndard
whi ch it is t o be regretted
was the principal standard in weighing in fl u
ence at the Peace Con ference
tended t o place
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1 25
1
Orla ndo
Italy in the background and t o subordinate the
v iews o f her statesmen I know also that some
felt that the Ita lian Government had driven too
sharp a bargain with the Entente in 1 9 15 and
was now demanding more than it s pound of
flesh in spite of the small part whi ch the more
critica l in Europe assert e d Italy h ad taken in
the later months of the struggle There seemed
t o be a dispos ition to repudiate the Italian claims
o r at least t o reject many of them
It was with
evi den t reluctance that France and Great Britain
conceded their treaty Obligatio ns Neither of
them vigorously supported Italy when her
claims were urged The attitude seemed to be
that of tolerance for a nation which had not won
by arms a right t o a voice in the decisions but
was by agreement entitled to it It was therefore
especially fortunate fo r the Ita lian people that
they had in Signo r O rlando so well trained a
statesman so talented an advocate and so keen
a logician to rep resent them at the Con ference
He could not b e and was not ignored Another
repres entative less able might have been
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A revie w o f the foregoing estimate of the
p ersonalities of the four statesmen comp osing
12 6
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Orlando
which are necessary for wise statesmanship
Careless in thought he was equally careless in
speech Accuracy o f expression so essential in
the final settlement of an international question
was not o n e o fhis attainments M Clemenceau
never bothered himself with the actual wording
The general principle was all that
o f a d ecision
interested him The techn ical phraseology he
left to the Secretariat Gener al direc ting them t o
send the decisions of the Council of Ten t o the
drafting committee A more unsystematic and
loose way o f conducting business o f such mo
ment can hardl y be imagined To term it in
expert is a mild char acterization
To other delegates appreciative from previous
experience of the im portance o fex act an d definite
expression this lax and haphazard procedur e
caused grave concern though it did not seem to
disturb any members of the Coun cil of Four
Fortun ately the drafting comm ittee included
such trained in ternational jurists as Dr J am es
Brown Scott for the United States ! Mr
now
Sir
C e cil J B Hurst of the British Foreign
Office ! and M Henr i From agéo t of the French
Ministry of Foreign Affair s
To their legal
knowledge carefulness and industry are due the
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1 l 2a 1
Orlando
ph ras eo logy of the majority of the articles of
the treaty and their orderly arrangement O ne
dreads to thin k what the document would have
looked li ke if it had not passed thr ough their
experienced hands
If I were asked to state the strongest motives
infl uencing the conduct Of e ach member of the
Coun cil Of Four dur ing the Pe ace Conference I
would state them as follows : M Clemenceau
protection of France from future German
attac k indemnification for her war l osses and
the perpetuation of her international power in
the world ! President Wilson
the creation of a
league of nations to make permanent the terms
o f peac e t o prevent war and to supervi se inter
nation al relat ions in the future ! Mr Lloyd
Geo rge
the satisf ac tion ofBritish public Opin
io n measu red in terms o f political success and
commercial advantage ! and Signor Orlando
the exp ansion of Italy s territori al sovereignty
and economic power
Of these controlling motives that Of President
Wilson was o n a higher ethical plane than that
He un ques tionably
o f a n y of h is coll e agues
felt th at a great moral duty rested on the V ic t ori
ou s nations t o make great wars im possible for
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Orlan do
future He believed that this could be done
by organizin g the peop les o f the world into a
leag u e of nations It was an idea which appealed
t o his intellectual conception that he w as devoted
to the welf are of mankind and to his firm c on vic
tion that he was destin ed to be the lea der of the
nations the commandin g figure in this feder
a tion of t he world
The theory Of the proposed
organization was an appealing on e There was
little that could be urged against t h e general
principle of union for the sake of pe a e It was
in the application Oft he principle an d in attempt
ing to make the theory workable in practice that
the d ifli c u lt y lay The President should have
realized
possibly he did
that unless the
Gre at Powers subordin ated their selfish and
materialistic inte rests to the altruistic purposes
which impelled h im to concentrate his efforts
o n the dr afting and adoption o f the covenant
their support o f the League would be merely the
expression of a moral sentiment provided it did
not constitute a practical agency to protect them
in settlem ents which satisfied their selfish desires
Consider and answer these questions which
are significant as to the spirit which prevailed
a mong the Great Powers : Why did the French
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1 1 30 1
Orla n do
detriment al t o their material interests From t he
theoretical standpoint o f the moral philosopher
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good faith and a sense of justice are irresistible
forces in the rel ations between n ations but
practica lly
an d we mus t look t o the p ractica l
in the world of the present
s elfi shnes s is and I
fear will co ntinue t o be the sup reme impulse of
nations in their dealings with on e a no ther until
man kind is mo rally regenerated
If the tre aty of peace wi th Germany i s eriti
cally anal yzed in order to determine the motives
which found expression in the settlements con
t ain e d in its hundreds o f article s I d o not th ink
the brief statement ofthese motives which I have
made will appear to be prej udiced or unjust
From the treaty terms there is much that can be
learned of t h e p sychology Of the states men who
were most influential in formul atin g them Such
a study if it is m ade careq y and imp artially
wi ll I believe supplement and co nfi rm this re
view of the characters the aims t he successes
and the failures of the Big Fo ur of the Peace
Conference a t Paris In later ye ars when the
results of their labors find actual expres sion
historians m ay render a di fferent verdict as t o
these men b ut fro m the viewpoin t oft hez
presen t
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1 1 32 1
Orlando
I can reach no other than that which it h a s b een
my endeavor to state without favor an d with
entire candor
The negotiations at Paris may be described as
a con flict between altruism and selfishness b e
tween the ideal and the material between t h e
theoretical and the practical between principle
and expediency ! a conflict in which President
Wilson representing the higher standards was
outmaneuvered by the forces of self in terest
and opportunism The consequence was a treaty
in which national rather than international
interests are emphasized and through which are
scattered seeds of dissatisfaction and discord
NO o n e imbued with the lon ging for a peace
founded on justice can study the treaty of pea ce
with Germany without a keen sens e of disap
pointment as to certain of the terms of settle
ment or without a feeling of apprehension as t o
the future The treaty restored a legal state of
peace among the nations ! in that was its virtue
for it responded to the supreme longin g and need
As for the League of Nations
o f the world
which is to be an instrument of performance as
well as the guardian Of this great international
c ompact it is charged with gi ving p erm anency
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1 1 33 1
ettlements which in view of t he n ature of
s ome of them invite modification o r annulment
Unless these defects are remed ied unless the
principle ofthe equality of nations is recogn ized
an d u n l ess legal justice is emphasi z ed the Peace
o f Versailles will be in many of it s p rov is ion s
tempora ry an d n ot p erm anent
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1 1 34 1
IMPRESSIONS
A MA N who has taken a prominent part in public
affairs is naturally subjected to critical observa
tion by those who come in cont act with him
There exists a popul ar belief gained from various
sources as to his character and attain m ents
which one is curious to test by personal ao
quaintance What is it that has given this man
a reputation for greatness for shrewdness for
wisdom ! Wherein lie his powers o f leadership !
Has he the traits and qualities with which he is
credited ! Does he possess weaknesses of which
the man in the street knows nothing ! Is the
popular judgment concerning him accurate !
What is his real personality !
It is with such questions that one approaches a
leader in the world of thought or action Almost
invariably on first acquaintance an impression
is formed Ofthe man which may be strengthened
o r weakened by subsequent intercourse or by
personally acquired knowledge of his purposes
his motives his mentality and his mode of
action Such impressions are o f value because
un consciously they are critical unless personal
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1 37
Im pressio ns
likes
of
d dislikes and the sentimentality
the
Observer are permitted to control hi s judgment
Impressions therefore seem to be worth record
ing since they wil l co n firm modify o r deny the
p opul ar estimate Of a man by one wh o at least
has had the Opportun ity of perso nal contact
through which the little things whic h enter into
character are frequently disclosed those little
things whi ch the general public cannot know
an d so miss an importa nt f actor in the v aluation
of a m an s qualities o f mind
And yet it ought to be remembered that
records of this sor t are records of impressions
rather than of reasoned opinions They are not
based on intimate association with the subject or
They are n ot
on lo ng an d careful observation
convictions gained by comparison o fknown facts
They spring fro m t he
an d p ersonal experiences
b rain without going through the slow process of
Personal sent iment t o
a nalysis and deduction
an extent is mingled with Observation and knowl
edge t o produce an impression and the latter
is as fallible as sentiment always is when it forms
the basis of o pinion In a sense therefore an
impression is a psychological phenomenon rather
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t han the p r o duct o f the reason It is a snap
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1 1 38 1
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Im pre ssi o ns
it is ve ry human and much more satisfying than
the careful weighing of facts which are generally
known Reputations in any event are based not
so much upon what men think and do as upon
what the world b elie ves that they think and do !
and since a public estimate of a man is founded
o n belief it is more easily over thrown by a per
sonal impression than if it rested on proven facts
In many cases the personality ofa man t o whom
public opinion imputes greatness assumes heroic
proportions as the myth is increasingly accepted
so that a first impression which does not con
form to the public belief is a distinct shock
and disposes the observer to reject all the evi
d e n c e s o f greatnes s when in fact only certa in
ones are contradicted This is a danger which
should be recogniz ed and guarded against in
valuing the recorded imp ressions of men It
would be folly to place them o n the same plane
as estimates Of character founded on an analysis
They may be contributions
o f established fac ts
t o the general kn owledge but their worth is
frequently a ffected by circum s ta nce and the
temper of the observer
With these comments concerning the nature
a n d value o f p ersonal impressions it is my pur
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1 140 1
j
determinin g the con formity o r disag reement o f
of
which we
[
14 1
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VENIZ ELO S
N 0 man who attended the Peace Co n ference
aroused more general interest because of the
part that he had pla yed in the war or won
more friends because o f his perso nality than did
Eleft h e rios Veniz elos the Greek Premier and the
actual rul er of the G reek nation I found that
nearly every on e was anxious t o m ee t this leader
whose personal infl uence had been persistently
exerted until it had turned the scales in Greece
against the Germans and in favor of the All ies
There was a natural curiosity to see a man who
had been able to accomplish so much in spite of
the difli cul t ies that he had to overcome Success
such as his ha d been in the field of international
politics confers a d is tinction which even the more
cynical cannot ignore
The career of M Veniz elos from his majority
to his fift y fift h yea r in which he was when
he attended the Peace Conferen ce h ad bee n a
stormy on e He had b een for a thi rd of a century
engaged in on e rebellion af t er another against
the O ttoman Empire which had possessed su
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1 1 42 1
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Ve nizelo s
powers over his nat ive island of Cre te
He had more than once retired to the mo u nta ins
and from their fastne sses defied the imperial
authorities He had shown a boldness in u rging
his demands and an i n flexible spirit in the face
o f disappointments which made him preeminent
as a patriot and as a revolutionist Revolution
with him was a creed as well as a profe ssion Al l
his energies an d ta lents had been devoted to
winning the politi ca l freedom o f his countrymen
an d the unificatio n of the Greek people
With the begin n i ng of the World War his
sympathies were enlisted on the side o f the
Whether this was due to far seeing
Allies
s t atesmanship or to the fact that the O ttoman
Empire against which he had been so long in
conflict was allied to the Central Powers I do
not know but I believe that his inveterate hatred
o fthe Tur k was the chief influence which in d uced
him to become open l y active in the endeavor to
persuade hi s country to ente r the war on the side
o f the Allies
If they were defeated his hope Of a
Greater Greece would van i sh His success in thi s
endeavor which he obtain ed only by revolt
against hi s own Govern m ent gained for him
personall y the favor Of t h e statesmen of the
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1 1 43 1
V e n iz élos
Allied Powers so that he was able to count with
substantial certainty on their support ofhis aims
at the Peace Con ference and to have an in
fl u en t ial voice in the inner co uncils at Paris
The views o f M Venizelos were I believe given
greater weight by the Big Four than those
o f any other single delegate at Paris while the
confidence which he inspired made less difficult
his task o f obtaining the term s which he desired
t o have inserted in the treaties with Turkey and
with Bulgari a
In spite o f the vicissitudes and hard ships
which M Veniz elos had endured during his
turbulent public life he did not look the part
His appearance was
o f a revolutionary le a der
He
o n the contrary that o f a sensitive student
might have been a professor in some great
European university spending his days in in ter
pre t in g the unearthed treasures of Crete s pre
historic civil ization or in poring over faded
manuscripts containing the Hell enic philosophies
Of medium height and with
o f ancient days
little superfluous flesh with hair and beard whi t e
and thin suggesting premature o ld age M Veni
z elos was n o t distinguished in form feature o r
bearing His c omplexion was ruddy his eyes
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1 144 1
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Ve niz elo s
Though these pronoun ce d characteri stics in
Spired good will an d invited symp athy and sup
p ort o n e could n ot forget wh at his life had
been The general impression created by hi s
perso na lity undo ubtedl y was that here was a
man t o be truste d implicitl y a man whose s im
plic it y o fmind an d nobility o f purpose wo ul d n ot
p ermit him t o resort t o intrigue To on e how
ever familiar with the shrewdness sh own by
M Venizelos as Premier of Greece during the
B alka n Wars an d la ter as the hea d of a revo
lu t io n ary go vernment during the Wo rld War
there was the fe eling that beneath his apparent
innocence of craftiness existe d a keen perception
o f strategic a dv antages and a readiness t o seize
political o pportunities which were n o t entirely
compatible with the thoughts aro use d by per
s onal conta ct with him
It seemed t o me during tho se d ays at Paris
that it was alm o st heret ical t o ha ve thi s fe el
ing o f uncertainty as to the real character Of
M Venizelos in vi ew of the univers al esteem and
confiden ce in which he was held The truth is
that I tried t o reason mysel f o u t of it for it
seemed to b e inconceivable that o thers coul d be
mis ta ken in their estimate of his qualities The
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1 146 1
Ve niz e lo s
im pression nevertheless persisted His appear
ance and manner seemed to deny the facts of
his career while the knowledge of the facts
would not be denied in forming an impression
o fthe man
In a social way intercourse with him
was a pleasure but when it came to discussing
with him questions affecting Greece and to con
s id e rin g the state ments o n which he b ased his
arguments there was a suspicion to say the
least of the plausible and mild mannered Greek
sta tesman which remained in spite ofhis personal
attraction and the apparent genuineness of his
altruism
It is very Obvi ous from an examination of the
terms of the Treaty of Neuilly and the Treaty
of Sevres that M Venizelos was successful in
winnin g n o t on l y the confidence but also the
active cooperation of th e negotiators who repre
sented the Allied Governments in the formula
tion o f those documents The settlements were
wholly favorable to the Venizelos policy of
Greek unity and t o the desires of the Greek
expansionists favorable to the point Of e xt rava
gance It is not my purpose t o discuss the exten
sive territorial acquisitions Obtained by Greece
under the treaties except to point ou t that in
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14 7
Ve niz e lo s
much ofthe territory the Greek populations were
in the minority particularly in Eastern Thrace
and Northern Macedonia and that there were
no compensating economic or geographic reas ons
for the settl ements During the general dis
c u s s ion
o f the Turkish and Bulgarian peace
terms in which the American Commissioners at
Paris took part though the United States had
not been at war with either country the Ameri
can position was fran kly adverse t o the Greek
claims not because o f any unfriendliness for
Greece or of friendliness for her enemies but
because the cession o f areas inhabited by large
hostile populations creates condition s which
threaten the future peace of the world That
p osition was sound as time will demonstrate
Except for the personal influence of M
Veniz elos I am convi nced that the extension of
Greek sovereignty would not have been so great
What he asked was
a s it was under the treaties
granted because he asked it His personal ity and
the reliance placed o n his judgment dominated
the negotiations and were sufficient to overcome
the practical arguments urged against compli
ance with his wishes The consequence was the
creation of a new an d greater Greece embracing
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1 148 1
Ve niz elo s
materially we akened unless it b ec am e a naval
p ower which appeared to be substantiall y im
p ossible It seemed to be casting fresh fuel into
the B al kan furnace where the fires of war are
always smo uldering beneath the as hes o f past
co nflicts
What was the reason that M Ven iz elos seem
in gly a sagacio us an d wise statesm an who was
keenly aliv e to the dangers o f p erpetuating the
hatred s and j ealou sie s o f ambitio us n ationalities
a dopted this p o licy o f over exp a ns ion o f Greek
terri tory hich even t o the superficial student
Of world p olitics appeared to threaten the fu
ture peace of So utheastern Europ e and the
sovereignty of Greece ! I do not know It is a
question which Offers a field for specul ation as
t o the motives an d intelle ctu al attainments of
M Ven iz élos upo n which on e m ay well hes ita te
t o enter
Apostle of the unification of Greece as he
had always been an d an active a gent in thr owin g
of
f the yoke of alien authority fro m his compa
t rio t s Of the island o f Crete he m ay have been
obsessed with the idea th at G reeks everywhere
shoul d b e joined t o the mo ther country by
unitin g under G ree k sovereignty t h e territories
1 150 1
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where they dwell even though they are a minority
The memories of Macedon
o f the popul ation
and Byzantium may have inspired the hope of
a new Greek Empire clothed with power an d
des tined to revive the ancient glories of the
Greek race
It may have been that he h ad made promises
and ann ounced policies of an all inclusive Greek
Sta te which he could not revoke or modify with
ou t losing prestige and political power at home
and that to retain these he was will ing to risk the
consequences of a course the wisdom Of which
was contradicted by the logic of recent events in
the history o f the Balkans
I am loath to accept this latter reas on because
it is open t o the interpretation that M Veniz elos
was will ing to adopt an unwise policy in order to
perpetuate his political control by satis fyi ng the
ambitions of the peo ple of Old Greece and by
gain ing the support of the Greek inhabitants of
the annexed territories O n the other hand
political promises made under the stress of im
pe ll ing circumstance frequently bind men to a
course of action which they wou ld under other
conditions prefer to avoid but which they feel
in honor bound to continue It is one Of the evil s
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Ve niz elo s
ppo rtunism which an honorable m an find s
hard t o avoid
If however the motive fo r t h e Greek Pre
m ier s urgent appe al at Paris fo r the uni o n t o
Greec e pro per ofthe Gre ek inhabite d areas abo ut
the E gea n Se a and in Mac edon i a was his co n
vict io n th a t unification was fo r the welfare of his
nation the conclusion is that he was les s wise an d
more visionary than he was reputed t o be
In fact when o n e analyzes the rec ord ofevents
there seems t o be on l y o n e o f two co nclusion s
either M Venizelos was an u nwise statesman or
he was a politician who endeavo red t o preserve
his p olitical life by responding to the imp ul ses of
the national pride of his countrymen and of the
racial afii n it y of those of Greek bloo d In either
case the pop ular estimate of his character is
of o
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Th e
p art played by M Veni z elos in bringing
.
G reece into the war was made possible by the
presence of Allied forces in the Saloniki regio n
The Greek Go vernment had prior t o that time
maintained neutrality in the war an d even went
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in avo idi ng con fl ict as to permit Bulgari an
occup ation o f Greek terri t ory without resistance
To wh at exte nt the influence o fKing C onsta ntine
so
far
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1 152 1
V e n iz élo s
by an utterly ruthless foe It would seem th at in
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the circumstanc es even if the King had n o t been
a b ro ther in law o f the German Emp ero r t h e
policy adopted was in the best interests of the
G re ek nation ! and apparently the majority of
the people favored this policy of neutrality
The Allies were deeply though I thin k n u
reasona bly incensed a t this attitude ofthe Ro yal
Government and sought Opportunity t o force
G reece t o take up arms against the Central
Powers Finding that M Ven iz el os an d his
adh erents
who were deeply interested in t h e
Greeks outside of Old Greece were in favor of
the country abandoning neutrality an d taking
up arms against the Central Powers t h e All ied
Go vernments finally sent forces to Saloniki an d
p ractically took possession of the p ort an d
neighboring terri to ry in co njunction with the
Greeks who favored uniting with them in the
war This action on the part of the All ies resulted
in the esta blishment under the leadershi p o f M
r
Ven iz élo s of an in dependent Pro visional Govern
m ent for the Saloniki region which increa sed it s
territorial control with the northward and east
ward advance of t h e All ied lin es The su ccesses
o f the Allies on the vario u s battle fronts and the
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154
Ve nizelo s
arrival of reenforcements in Greece seemed to
prove the wisdom of the Venizelos policy of
revolution which was confirme d by his final
return to political power at Athens and the
departure of the royal family from Greece
As far as o n e is able to judge from the progres s
Of events and from the subsequent restoration
of Constantine t o the throne the people o f O ld
Greece who had wi tnessed with apprehension
the terrible sufferings of the Serbian nation were
never favorable to their country s abandonin g it s
neutrality and bec oming a participant in the war
The majority seemed to be Opposed to the
Venizelos party whi ch held its power by grace
o f the Allied Govern ments rather than by will
o f the Greek nation
However the defeat of the
Bulgars Turks and Austrians was so complete
that the Venizelos policy was vindicated and his
leadership was again accepted by the nation
at least it was ass u med to be accepted
and he
came to the Paris Conference as the recogni zed
master of the situation
While the Cretan statesman thus in control
of t he policies of his country through the defeat
o f the Central Powers entered upon his duties as
a negotiator holding the confidence and friend
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1 1 55 1
Ve nizelo s
ship ofthe Allies because of his d e votion t o their
cause under doubtful if not adverse conditions
he co uld n ot have been b lind t o the fact th at
goo d fo rtune rather tha n p opula r favo r h ad been
the means of his success and tha t there s m ou l
dered a fire Of resentment in Old G reec e
be ca use t o a ttain his en ds he had dep en ded on
fore ign troops rather than on the will of the
G ree k p eople To ta ke a conspicuo us p lac e in the
deliberations at Pa ris and t o employ the goo d
w ill Of the Allies for t h e extensi on Of the terri
t orial p o ssessions of Greece must h ave seemed to
him a wi se course to pursue as there was reason
t o believe that attainment of his o bject woul d
sa tisfy the national aspirations and win the favor
o f many who h ad opposed the abandonment of
neutrality an d who h ad resented his revolu
t io n ary ac t in forcing King Cons ta ntine t o
ab and o n hi s t hro ne
The knowledge Of M Veniz elos s career do ub t
les s affe cted the im pression that he made upon
m e although that impres sion was decidedly at
varia nce with the sort of man who m I had ex
pec t ed t o meet In spite o f the fac t that he had
b een in repeated revolts a gainst constituted
autho rity and had lived as an outl a w in the
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1 56
,
Ve niz elo s
ppearance the progress o f the negotiations was
prepared to take advantage o f every Opportunity
to serve the cause of
Greater Greece of
which he sought t o be the creator as he was the
apostle
It is not agreeable to a d mit this impression
of the great Cretan because it is at variance
with the popular judgment of the nobility of his
character and the u n s elfish n ess of his purpose
In spite of my liking for M Veniz elos a liking
which I am sure was shared by every delegate to
the Peace Co n ference whose national interests
did not clash with those of Greec e I could not
avoid the impression that in the endeavor to
accomplish his aims for his nation and fo r his
o wn political future
he was disposed t o adopt
the methods o f Balkan diplomacy in which he
had proven himself an adept and which are
supposed to be by no means as scrupulous and
free from deception as the highest s ta ndard of
s tatesmanship required o f a negoti ator
Yet in stating this impression ofthe character
and personal qualities of Eleft h e rios Venizelos I
cannot deny that it is done with hesitation and
with a measure of uncertainty The sentimental
a n d ration al points o f V iew are strangely a n
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1 58
Ve niz elo s
My impression may be wrong It
would be a real gratification to find that it was
because I would like to feel that the attractive
personality of the Venizelos whom I knew was
the personality of the real Venizelos and that
there was nothin g beneath the surface nothing
hidden in his thought and purpose which con
t rad ic t e d the openness o f his manner and the
candor ofhis words It is n o t easy with a man of
such personal charm to doubt his sincerity of
conduct or to question the ideals which seemed
to influence him To do so is t o deny the evidence
o f personal feelings
a denial which a man is
loath t o make Fo r that reason it has been a
hard task t o give my actual impression o f the
Greek Premier whose career as a delegate to the
Peace Conference was bril liant and successful
and whose personal atta inments and achieve
ments have won for him universal praise through
out the nations opposed to the Central Powers
While subsequent events have caused amazement
and aroused queries as to how far M Venizelos
truly represented the Greek people the impres
sion which I gained of him d uring o u r sojourn in
Paris has not been materially affec ted though
his rejec tion in the elections of 1 9 2 1 made me
t a gon ist ic
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1 1 59 1
Ve niz e lo s
feel less doubtful of the correctness of my own
thoughts regarding him which I could not sup
press while I was in Paris o r later when the
Treaty of Sevres was being negotiated
In a way the personality o f M Venizelos re
mains an enigma which cannot be solved until
yea rs have passed and one can look b ack over the
history of this period una ffected by the present
chaotic state of Southeastern Europe and by the
passions unloosed in this World War O nl y with
these events as a background can the actors
stand o u t in their true perspective Tod ay the
impression is vivid but its accuracy o r inac
curacy will only be disclosed by time when the
critical historian and biographer are u n in flu e n c e d
b y the little things which are so potent in the
forming of co ntemp orary op inion s of character
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1 160 1
E m i r Fe isu l
Nevertheless the influence ofvisual sensatio ns
c annot be ignored in the attempt t o analyz e an
impressi o n Of a man s personality Those sens a
tions even when denied by p revio us knowledge
o r by re a s o n are apt t o persist and t o affect t o a
degree an opinion founded o n more substa nt ial
grounds If the impression subsequently ac
qu ired thro ugh mental processes con firm s the
verdi ct of the senses t h e impression beco mes
d eep er an d more certa in When the physical an d
intellectual qu alities seem to be entirely in h ar
m o ny an Observer feels that his fi rst imp ressi on
is a true estimate o fcharacter an estimate which
o nly the most convincing evidence can change
This attempt to look back to the sources Of
impressi ons an d t o determine the sta ndard Of
relative value to be applied to them is induced
b y the thought o f the Emir Feisu l the P rince of
the Hed j az The vivid picture of thi s distin
gu ish ed Arabia n that aro se in my mind as I
tho ught of him caus ed me t o rea li z e that an
unerasable im p res sion h a d been ma de upo n me
b y his physical characteristics his bea rin g an d
his d re ss as well as t h e impression made by his
menta l qual ities Fro m which did I gain the
most ! Di d on e impression modify the o t h er ! It
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1 1 62 1
ar
H
m
k
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EWSM ,
a
W
sh i n
g t on
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EMH! FEISUL
Em i r Fe isu l
beard were black and slightly curling His lips
which were part ially hidden by a small mus
tache were red and full but did not indicate
grossness o r sensuality His complexion was
sallow and slightly mottled like the majority of
those o f pure Semitic blood His face was thin
and though with few lines and wrin kles was
strong and earnest in expression His dark eyes
were serene and kindly but one could easily
imagine that they would flash fire under the
excitement of conflict or the imp u lse Of violent
emotion Candor and truth were in the straight
forward look from his eyes He had none of that
subtlety of expression that ill concealed c raft i
ness which is so Often characteristic of the facial
lines Of the natives of Southwestern Asia
The movements o f the Emir Feisu l were al
ways unh urried and stately He moved an d
spoke with deliberation and dignity One fel t
his reserve power and his strength of charac te r
whil e there was the feeling that he possessed a
ro fu n dit y o f thought which raised him above
p
f
He suggested the calmn es s
th e common man
and peace of the desert the meditation of on e
who lives in the wide spaces of the earth the
s olemnity of thought of o n e who often communes
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1 164 1
E m ir Feisu l
lone with nature Everything about the Emir
commanded respect In him on e seemed to see
nobil ity of character and nobility o f purpose
That was the impression that he made upon me
when I first saw the picturesque Chieftain Of the
He dj az and that is the impression that remained
unchanged when I came to know him better
and to appreciate the intellectual fo rce which
harm onized so entirely with his physical char
a
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ac t eris t ics
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Though Prince Fe isu l was comparatively
young in years he showed a maturity of judg
ment and a self restraint which o n e does not
usuall y associate with youth at least not with
the youth of o u r Western World In appear
ance and address he might have been one of the
p rophets of ancient days with his burden of
foreknowledge and with his divin ely i mposed
task to proclaim it to his fellow men There was
also about him though not o u t of accord wi th his
prophetic type the suggestion of the chivalry o f
the days when the wealth and cul ture o f the
world were gathered in the cities ofBaghdad and
Cordova and when the Saracen Caliphs were
the great patrons of art and learning He
s eemed to belong to the age when Islam had
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1 1 65 1
E m i r Fe isu l
attained the zenith of its power and m agn ifi
cence as well as to the age of the Israelite kings
Yet with the dual suggestion of an ancient seer
and a Moslem paladin this Arabian was not
wanting in modern thought and ways He had led
his army of one hundred thousand men north
ward from Mecca and Medina and employing
all the enginery and art of modern warfare had
c o ti pe ra t e d successful ly with the British against
the Turkish forces He had proven himself a
skillful general a strategist o f no mean ability
and above all a master in the control o f the rude
Bedouin tribes who fought under his banner and
to whom the discipline of modern troops was
normally distasteful However wild and u n
trained the nomad bands who flocked to his
s tandard he was able to weld them into a figh t
ing m ac hine which was of material aid to his
British allies in driving o u t ofPalestine and Syria
the veteran forces of the O ttoman Empire whose
excellence as soldiers has long been proverbial
His military record is an enviable o n e and in
dealing with civilian s he exhibited the same
forcefulness and sagacity that characterized his
career as a martial leader
But the achievements of the Arab Prince were
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16 6
Em i r Fe isu l
northward from the desert wastes o f the Arabian
Peninsula to the Taurus Mountains and the
borders of Old Armenia and from the Euphrates
to the Mediterranean The vast majori ty of the
inhabitants of this region were of Arabian and
Aramean stocks and with few exceptions b e
lieve rs in the Koran The capital o f this new
state was t o be Damascus the royal city of the
ancient Kingdom of Syria which was so power
ful and important in the time when Samaria was
the capital of Israel The Emir s desire seems to
have been to include Palestine within the bound
aries of the proposed state a not unreasonable
desire in View Of the fact that nearly nine tenths
o f the population o f that territory are t o day of
Arab blood though I think that he could n ot
have been sanguine o f achievi ng thi s wish in
view o f the Z ionist Movement which had re
c e ived the unqualified support o f the British
Government
He presented the Arab claim and the aspira
tions o f the Mahommedans of Syria before the
Council of Ten o f the Peace Co n ference Um
questionably he impressed his hearers strongly
with the soundness o f his arguments and with
the calm and j udicial way in which he gave h is
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1 68
E m i r Feisu l
reasons for the rebirth o fSyria as an indepen dent
state Without gestures and without evidence
of emotion yet with an earnestness which gave
great weight to his words the unfamiliar Arabic
fell from his lips to be caught up by his skilled
interpreters and converted into English and
French phrases The Prince spoke wi th solemn
dignity perhaps it would be more accurate to
say with stateliness and with an ease Of utter
ance which denoted familiarity in addressing
public assemblages One longed to be able to
understand the language which he used for
there is no doubt that his sentences lost much
thr ough translation particul arly in the vividness
of expression where the Arabic idiom found
no direct counterpart in the European tongues
But even with this handicap to a perfect sub
mission o fhis case his manner of address and the
tones Of voice seemed to breathe the perfume
o f frankincense and to suggest the presence of
richl y colored divans green turbans and the
glitter o f gold and jewels
As the slender Arab stood before the Council
in his flowing robe and curiously wrought head
dress with his fine features and serene exp ression
he looked the O riental monarch that he aspired
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1 1 69 1
E m i r Fe isu l
b e O ne could easily imagine him
be t he
reinc arnation o f Haroun a l Raschid on e fitted
t o be the Caliph Of the new Caliphate of Damas
who person i fied the un i on Of o u r p resent
c us
civilization with the traditions an d splen dors o f
a thousand years ago
But the Emir Feis ul met in Pa ri s forces m o re
po werful and les s eas y t o overc ome tha n the
Tur kish armies against which he had b attled s o
succ essfully There had existe d for ge nerations
througho ut t h e Christi an world an antip athy
toward the Mahommedan faith which h ad
found evil expression in the tyranny of Turkish
rule an d in the unspeakable atro cities pe rpe
t rat ed by the Tartars of Asia and the fanatical
tri besmen of the Soudan The savagery and
depravi ty of modern Islam had become in t oler
The Christian nations only so ught Op
ab le
po rt u n it y to free the Christians o f those regio ns
from the degraded state to whi ch they h ad fallen
through c enturies Of Moslem oppre ssio n The
collapse of the O ttoman Empire Offered this
o ppo rt u n it y and the European delegates to the
Paris Confere nce were generally determined t o
prevent a restoration o fthe power ofthe Mus su l
man in the territories which had been sub j ect to
to
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1 1 70 1
E m i r Fe isu l
world and breaking down the movement of Pan
Islamism which was a growing menace to the
peace o f Asia So appealin g was this policy from
a political point of view especiall y when it was
urged by Prince Fe is u l whose personality w on
him fri ends on every hand that it might have
succeeded in overcoming the common sentiment
against the erection of a Moslem ruled Syria if
it had not been for other forces exerte d against
it s adoption
These other forces were less worthy than the
desire t o free the Christians of Syria and the
Jews of Palestine from the tyranny and Oppre s
sion of Moslem governors They were the ambi
tions of some o f the Great Powers and the j eal
o u s ies which exi sted between them as to their
respective influence and commercial advanta ges
in the Near East France the hi stori c champion
o f the Christians o f The Le banon had looked
forward to obtaining control Of Syria when the
Turkish Empire was broken up French senti
ment as well as the prospect o f material benefit
d emanded Syria ! and this had been agreed to
by Great Britain while Fra nce had agreed that
the British share of the spoils should be the
rich valleys o f Mes opotamia and also Palestine
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1 72
E m ir Feisu l
the propo sed national home for the ! ews The
ac ceptance of the idea Of a n independent Syri a
under Arab sovereignty would destro y this
agreement and turn the coveted territo ries over
t o a go vernment whi ch mi ght p re vent the ex
ploitat ion of their resou rces by the po wers which
had long re alized their economic possibilities
While the Britis h Government might have
li sten ed with a friendly ear t o the propo sals of
the Em ir except th ose in conflict wi t h the
promises made t o the Z ioni sts co ncerning Pal es
tine the French Government was un equivocally
opposed t o Arab contro l The suggestion Of such
a dis position o f Syria seemed t o arouse their in
dign ation They declared that it could not be
for a moment considered that the division of that
portion of dismembered Turkey had been defi
n it ely arranged during the progress of the war
an d that they did n o t propose t o compel the
freed Christians to subm it again t o the fan at i
cal oppres sion and cruelty o f Moslem rul er s
Though the sentimental reason of pro tect ing
Christi an s was u rged with frequency an d vigor
it was almost impo ssible t o avoid the sus pici on
that material interests had a decided effect o n
the French position Probably t oo the fact
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1 1 73 1
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E m ir Fe isu l
the Arabs had cooperated with the B ritish
forces in the Near East caused the belief that
Syria as an independent Arab state would be
subject chiefly to Britis h infl uence and open a
field for British enterprise and investment a
field which the French had the anticipation of
dominating A possible conflict of interests im
pairing a possible benefit app arently in duced
France to repudiate the thought of a new King
dom of Syria
The emissary o f the Arabia n people t h e
spokesman o f the Moslems wh o so vastly ou t
numbered the Syrian s o f other creed s co uld d o
nothing against these influences He failed in his
mission to Paris and his failure has passed into
history Great Britain and France denied inde
pe n d en c e to the Syrian Arabs and when Prince
Fe isu l later attempted to assume the thr one of
Syria they compelled hi m by force o r the menace
o f force to abandon the adventure whi le they
took over the government and nominated t hem
selves as mandatories un der the League of Na
tions in accordance with the Sykes Picot Agree
ment
O ne cannot look forward to the future o f
Syria without apprehension o r without question
t h at
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1 1 74 1
E m i r Fe isu l
Peace Con ference which was so u n favorable
,
to
the cause which he represented The manner of
the man in the circumstances was so admirable
that his dignity and poise were emphasized and
made a deeper impression because he was s t riv
ing against irresistible forces It was a test o f
character and of temperament which enhanced
the high regard in which he was held by the
delegates to the Conference
Prince Feisu l made the impression of one who
combined the best and finest traits of O rienta l
character Nobility and dignit y hone sty and
candor reserve and wisdom were manifest in his
conduct and words Whatever may have been
the merits of his claims and purposes — and as
to those merits there may be from the stand
’
points of principle and policy sincere d ifl e re n c e s
—
no o n e who came into personal
o f Opinion
contact with the Arabian leader co uld feel aught
but regret for him personally in the fail ure of
his mission He seemed so eminently fitted for
success even though he was of a religion that has
been a curse rather than a blessing in so many
lands O ne could not but wonder if Pan Isla m
with its perils to international peace would not
have been swept away had an independent
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1 1 76 1
Kingdom of Syria been erected with a ruler
hostile t o the Turks and friendly if not grate
ful to the Christian Powers With Feisu l on the
throne would not the peace of the Near East
have been more secure and the menace o f the
Ottomans been forever ended !
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in e t h f re g ing im pressi n w w itten t h
er Me s p t m i
Brit sh G ern m e t h ld ng the m n d te
d ire t d trib l referend m
the sele ti n f king er
th t ter i t ry with the res l t th t F i l w
erwhelm ingly
ele ted H w im m edi tely pr l im e d ! ing f Ir k d
f rm lly re gni ed
s h b y Gre t Brit in t
f
w Ar b s t te
B ghd d t h
pit l f t h
NOTE
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1 77
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G ENERAL B OT HA
ANO THER delegate t o the Peac e Conferen ce who
m ade a strong impression upon me was General
Lo uis Botha the Premier of the South African
Union who with General Jan C Smuts repre
sented the united colonies in the large gro up of
delega tes which participate d in the proceed ings
a t Pari s on beh alf of the British Empire
Un
fortunately fo r South Africa and for the Imp erial
Government General Botha died soon after his
return t o his country It is deplorable that he
was not sp ared to carry o n the work of racial
unity which he had so effectively champio ned for
o ver a d ecade and which promises so much f
or
the future pro sperity Of t h e white pop ulati o n of
S outh Af rica
No on e coul d talk wi th G eneral B o tha wit hout
being immediately struck by t he fact th at his
o uts tanding mental quality was practic al and
una lloyed co mmon sense He w as n o t la ckin g in
imaginatio n o r in ideals
his whole public ca
reer denied such a lack
but he mea sured his
ideals an d c on str uctive purposes b y t he standard
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1 78
Ge n eral B o t h a
f practicability and valued them accordin gly
O
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I
am sure that he viewed untried political theories
with suspicion and had t o be convinced that they
coul d be reduced to working form ul ae before he
gave to them h is actual support In fact he to ld
me so He was essentially logi cal an d unemo
t ion al in whatever he said and whatever he di d
The enthus iasm o f the vis ionary made n o hea d
way with him Reas on and facts were what
appealed to him
His knowledge of human nature gain ed
through twenty years o f conflict and in readjust
ment of the relations between nationalities in
South Africa was a great asset to him in the
determination of the wise and politic course to
pursue He seemed to know what the effect of
adopting this or that policy would be He looked
forward to the final judgment o f men and not t o
the temporary pop ul arity which a policy might
gain under t h e stress Of existing conditions or the
passing emotions of an arouse d public opinion
He possessed that fores ight which sees t h e end at
the beginnin g and pre vents the adoption of a
course which may be dis astrous o r unwi se or of
doubtful expediency
I think the impression that most p ersons
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1 1 79 1
G e neral Bo t h a
gained of G eneral Botha o n first a cquaintance
with him unless familiar with his career was that
his mind worked slowly and that he was slow
in grasping the essential features of a subject
under discussion It took howe ver b ut a brief
time to remove this impression Any o n e at all
observant soon realized that his mind was e xc ep
t io n a lly keen though he was deliberate in form
ing his conclusions and cautious in givin g his
opinions to others He thought out a problem to
the end before he spoke ! and when he did speak
his words were carefully chosen and expressed
his views with exactness
Throughout a discourse on a serious subject
General Botha exhibited his regard for practical
ity There was an entire absence of emotion and
He was positive but never vehement
o f lev ity
in speaking He avoided sentimental appeals
but he did not ignore o r underv alue the psycho
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logical e fl e c t o f a proposed policy upon others
He appreciated the importance of sentiment as
a force in public affairs but he never apparently
permitted his o wn emotions to be so stirred
that they interfered with his forming an Opinion
based solely upon reason The impassioned
eloquence of an orator did not in my j udgment
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1 180 1
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G e ne r al B o t h a
agreeable undertaking for he had to persuade
the fierce Old chieftain of the O range Free State
General De Wet to submit to the inevitable
That he succeeded was due to the cogency o f
his arguments as to the hopelessness and there
fore the folly o f continuing the struggle against
the superior might Of the British Empire Gen
eral De Wet and the crippled but indomitable
Steyne the President of the southern Boer Re
p ublic sullenly consented to the peace which de
prive d their country o f its national life though
in their retirement following the war they cher
is h e d the hope that the future would O ffer o p
po rt u n it y to regain their national independence
General Botha o n the other hand had a
di fferent vision and a di fferent h Ope fo r South
Africa Realizing that it was for the interests
of his o wn people t o live in amity with their
neighbors o f British blood and that the re s t o ra
tion o f Boer independence was practically im
possible even if desirable he determined to
weld the white populations o f South Africa into
though
o n e people indep endent to all intents
acknowledging the sovereignty Of the British
Crown How well he and those who aided him
in this endeavor succeeded is a fact of history
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1 82
G e n e ral B o t h a
A less broad minded and far seeing statesman
than the Tran svaal general would have kept
alive a spirit of revenge among his countrymen
and counseled passive resistance to the British
authorities thus making amalgamation between
the two nationalities a long and painful process
That would have been a very natural course to
take It would have conformed with the common
conception of patriotism and the usual sentime nt
Of the vanquished toward the victors but it
did not conform with General Botha s views as
to what was wise and practical He may have
regretted and doubtless did regret the outcome
o f the war in which he had been a prominent
military figure but he did not permit vain re
gret s or false hopes to cloud his vision as to the
future or to impair his sound common sense in
dealing with new conditions resulting from the
British vi ctory He knew that the South Afri
can Republic and the O range Free State could
never regain their independence He accepted
the fact o f defeat with philosophic calmness
and exerted a ll his i n fluence as a popular co m
mander in reconciling his fellow countrymen to
their new allegiance
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His e fl ort s did not cease with inducing t h e
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G e ne ral B o t h a
majority of the Boers to ad j ust them selves t o
the idea ofB ritish rule for in seeking the welfa re
O f the inhabitants o f the conquered rep ublics
he began at once the movement for u nion of all
the South African colonies into a self go verning
dominion of the British Empire In this he was
aided by the statesmen of Great B ritain who
reali z ed the tremendous a dvanta ge t o be ga ined
by a p olitical union creating common inter es ts
an d m aking possible common ac tio n by t he
white r ace in South Africa The succ es sful
o rganization o f the Union was l a rgely due to
G eneral B otha and his elevation t o the p remier
ship was a recognition of his wise statesman ship
H e was engaged in breaking down the last
barriers of hostile feeling between the t wo n a
t ion alit ie s an d in working o u t an ambiti o u s
p rogramme of development and expansio n for
the Union when the European War broke ou t
The situation put to the test his loyalty and
wisdom and the strength Of the unity fo r which
he had labored The milita ry dem a nds u pon
G reat Britain in Belgium and Northern France
an d the presence o f Germ an troops in Southwest
Africa seemed to offer a favorable o ppo rtunity
t o the unreconc iled Boers to reco v er their in
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1 1 84 1
G e n e ral B o t h a
hatred toward t h e British and t o dream of a
return to their former state of independence To
this dissa tisfied group the occupied energies o f
the Empire in the life and death struggle in
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Flanders Ofl e re d a temptation to cast off th eir
enforced al legiance As a consequence of this
spirit and these conditions an insurrec tion broke
o u t in t h e United Colonies the insurrectionis ts
undertakin g to seize t h e local govern ments at
various points The colonial forces which
General Botha had organized were sent against
the rebels and they were wit h little bloodshed
overcome and dispersed At the head of the
movement was the veteran commander in chief
of the O range Free State General De Wet who
had never favored the Botha policy of un ion an d
wh o was an inveterate hater o f the British His
capture i n the deserts of Bechuanaland by loy al
troops brough t the rebellion to an end while the
amnesty granted the rebels prevented them from
becomin g m artyrs in the eyes of their country
men an d destroyed t h e possibility of a revival of
the movement for independence
As soon as the rebels at home had been sup
pressed General Botha led his colonial forces into
German So uthwest Africa overcomin g the g arri
of
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1 86
General Bo t ha
sons in that territory and raisin g over the colony
the Union Jack of the British Empire in plac e of
the Bl ac k Eagle of Prussia
General Jan C Smuts saw the situation as
General Botha saw it He was the latter s
faithful lieutenan t in the field as he had been in
the movement for union and in the politi cal
administration Of the coun try It was the sound
judgment and prompt ac tion of these t wo Boer
statesmen and generals which saved South
Africa from a civil war which would have caused
much suffering and loss to t h e colonists and re
awakened all the antipathy and bitterness b e
tween the nationalities which had been rapidly
disappearing un der the leadership of Louis
Botha But their statesmanship went fur ther
than that They looked beyond the boundaries
and coasts Of South Africa and without hesita
tion showed that they preferr ed to stand side
by side with the men wh o but a few years before
had conquered them a n d ann exed their coun try
but had given them political liberty rather than
to stand against them and support the Prussians
in their designs of world empire It was a big
hearted a large minded a noble d ecision It is
an example of the highest type of statesmanship
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G e n e r al B o t h a
It makes f amous the names of Louis Both a and
Jan C Smuts in the annals of the World War
The conduct o f these two great Boers in this
critical time should n o t be forgotten when we
recall the ac ts which exci t e our admiration and
p raise an d which are worthy t o be remembered
by posterity How eminently proper it was that
they should represent South Africa at Paris
Both General Both a and General Smuts im
pressed me as belonging to the class Of men
popularly termed
sound and substanti al
There was a sim plicity of mann er an absence of
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a frankness of speech an intellect ual
afl ec t at io n
honesty about them that appealed strongly to
one who came in cont ac t with them You
trusted them because yo u knew instinctively
that they were worthy o f your trust They
seemed to lack the art of dissimulation so that
they were distin guished from the many adepts in
that art to be found among the delegates t o the
Peace Conference They spoke their minds
freely without attempting to soften the tr uth or
to make it more palatable an d yet their attitude
was one o fkindliness and consideration General
Botha
and I am disposed to add General
Smuts though with less certainty — belonged t o
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1 188 1
G e n e r al B o t h a
sented a plan like that proposed by G ener al
Smuts He possessed foresight rather than an
adventurous imagination He had his ideals
but he was not an idealist H e had vision but he
was not a visionary It is hard to explain just
the distinction that I would convey between his
mentality and that of his co lleague Perhaps it
may be stated to be the difference between a
theory which is certai n ly pr ac ticable an d a theory
which is pos si b ly practicable Perhaps it c an be
expressed by the difference between the assertion
that two and two make four if pas t experience
applies and the a ssertion that t wo and two may
if an unusual theory is accepted m ake five In
any event the attempt to define the distinction
between the intellectual processes of these t wo
men involves a sub t lety of thought which is
difficult t o put into exact terms
In comparing the im pressions made upon me
by the two Boer statesmen I realiz e that that
made by Gener al Both a was much more posi
tive and much stronger than that made by
General Smuts Wh ile th is was due in no small
degree to the f act that I saw General Both a fre
quently and h ad little in tercourse with General
Smuts I th ink that it was influen ced by the
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G e ne ral Bo t ha
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belief that General Botha s char ac t er seemed to
me the stronger of the two He did not h ave the
vivacity of mind which comes with a restless
imagination He kept his feet on the ground and
dealt with certainties rather th an with possi
b ilit ie s He did not st umble because he was not
constantly gazing at the stars Some would have
called h im commonplace Doubtless many did
call him so in thought if not in word I think
that those who so judged him mistook the com
m o n pl ac e for a plainness born o f comm on sense
From his experience o f men and things and
from his discerning kn owledge of that un defin
able but all—pervading quality which we term
human nature Gener al Botha Obtain ed his con
and on these conclusions he built his
e lusions
judgments or by them guided his course Of ac
tion His sentiments never diverted the current
Of his reason It was a steady uninterrupted flow
which w as well nigh irresistible His logic was
cold ex ac t and unemot ional The soun dness
an d clarit y of his thought carried conviction
An example Of the way in which General
Botha s pr ac tical com mon sense dominated his
feelin gs was furnished by his attitude toward the
articles in the Treaty of Versailles providin g for
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G e ne ral B o t h a
the po litical trial o fthe former German Em p ero r
an d his of
ficers upon charges of responsibility for
b eginning the war and for the atrocious an d in
human ac ts perpetrated by the G erm an so ldiery
durin g the invasion of Belgium and France
Though he frankly stated his lo ath ing for these
men and his indignation at the ab o minable
wro ngs comm itted by their orders or wi th their
app arent app roval
he stron gly o p po sed their
punish ment by the Allies because he was con
vin ce d that if th ey were pun i shed the G erm an
peo ple would canon ize them as natio nal m artyrs
an d cherish in their hearts a spirit Of h atred an d
revenge toward their judges which would ulti
m ately bring about another war The astute
So uth African statesman who knew from per
sonal experience the spirit and temper of a van
q u ishe d p eop le was willing an d in f ac t inte ns ely
anxious to ab andon the infliction of just p en altie s
on these viol ators o finternation al pe ac e an d the
l aws of hum anity because he knew that ab an
do n m en t of punishments would m ak e the peac e
more en d uring by removing the in ce nti ve t o
retal i ate So strongly was he convinced of this
c ourse that he said t o me o n e day when we were
lun ching together that his conscience an d reas on
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G e n e ra l B o t h a
reasons and of the French ou t of a very natu
ral spirit Of retaliation had forced the articles
on
penalties to be written in to the Treaty of
Versailles
Physically General Botha was a large strongly
built man with a tendency toward heaviness
which made him rather slow an d clu msy in his
movements He had a decidedly Dutch cast of
cou ntenance with roundness o f face high cheek
bones and few wr in kles His h air mustache
and imperial were dark as were his eyes His
mouth was wide with thick lips His teeth which
were neither white nor even were large and very
much in evidence when he smiled or talked His
simplicity Of dress and manner was conspicuous
In conversation he always spoke in a straight
forward way with little em phasis There was
nothin g in his voice which distin gu ished it from
that o f the average m an H e used a sim ple vo
speak in g however
c ab u l ary and used it well
with a slight accent He possessed humor rather
than wit He w as an excellent talker having a
fund of anecdotes Of South African life and
personal experiences which he related in an
entertaining manner Wh en he ventured to
sp ecul ate o n the fu ture and it s p roblems
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Ge ne ral Bo t ha
listener could not but feel that his foundation
was laid in facts and that he based his deductions
sound premises There w as a pr ac ticality
on
about his utte rances an avoidance o f extremes
an d an ac cur ac y of re as oning which made his
deductions of unu sual value
Louis Botha impres sed me as a soldier who
hate d war an d abhorred mil itarism and as a
statesman without vanity or personal ambition
whose principal char ac te ristics were honesty of
purpose un affec ted simplicity o f man n er and
candor of address For him t o engage in intrigue
or t o ac t u njustly was unthinkable His patri
o t is m was not o f the emotional type which acted
o n impul se and bubbled over with un controll ed
enthusi as m It was deeper and more earnest and
more useful t o his country than the frothy type
for it w as foun ded on an abiding faith in his
fell ow men and in a love of humanity which
tempered justice wit h mercy and a sense of
person al wrong with a spirit of forgiveness His
long an d ac tive public career with it s re cord of
ac h ievement is ample justification for any e n
that may be paid to hi s memory
co m ium
Through his death the Union ofSouth Africa lost
its greatest statesman and the British Empir e
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1 1 95 1
G e n e ra l B o t h a
one ofits wi sest coun selors and most loyal lead ers
at a time when his cool a n d sober judgment were
especially needed and when the un iversal con
fid en ce and respect in which he was held by his
people would have exerted a powerful in fluenc e
in bringing into complete un ity t h e two nation
alit ie s in South Afric a t o ac complish which h ad
been t he am bition of his l ife
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Pade re wski
parallel in the annals of the past four hundred
years
In spite however Of the submergence o f the
Poles as a nation for a century an d the persistent
efforts of their conquerors t o break their spirit of
national entity they tr ansmitted from genera
tion to generation the hope that they would
again be a sovereign people and th at the broken
pi eces of their coun try would be reunited so th at
Poland might again take her pl ac e as a member
of the family ofnations With this hope a living
force in binding the Polish people together they
tenaciously clung to their language their creed
their traditions and above all to their hatred of
the domination Of those who had deprived them
of their national existence
The result of the World War made possible
the realization of this constant hope The o ppo r
With this
t u n it y had come t o consummate it
supreme end in view Poland sent to Paris
Ignace Paderewski and Roman Dm owski to
negotiate the terms to be incorporated in the
pe ac e treaties and in a treaty o f Pol and with
the principal Powers Their task in spite Of
the sympathetic attitude of the Allies and the
United States was not an easy one There were
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1 1 98 1
o r
C py
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F
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H
ar oo
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Padere wski
distinct and to an ex t ent contradictory
im pressions made upon me by Mr Paderewski
The first impression was that which I gained in
the United States while the war was in progress
an impression which was superseded and sub
s t an t i ally extinguished by a later im pression
which resulted from a more intimate a cquaint
ance with the Polish statesman and which was
confirmed by his record at Warsaw and at Paris
My original impress ion was not o n e o f a
complimentary nature in V iew of the task which
he had undertaken in beha lf o f his co u ntry It
was due undoubtedly to the f ac t that he was a
great pianist the greatest I believe o f his
generation I felt that his artistic temperament
his passionate devotion to music his intense
emotions and his reputed eccentricities in dicated
a lack of the qual ities o f m ind which made it
possible for him t o deal with the intricate po
l it ic a l problems which it would be nec ess a ry to
solve in the rest oration of Polish independence
an d the revival of Polish sovereignty
When the famous musician came to see me in
my office at t he Department o f State as he did
o n many occasions after the United States had
entered the war for the purpose of ple adin g the
t wo
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200
Pade re wski
cause of his country and of obtaining consent t o
the recruitin g o f a Polish army in the United
States I could not avoid the thought that his
emotions were leading him into a path which he
was wholly unsuited to follow With his long
flaxen hair sprin kled with gray and brushe d b ac k
like a mane from his broad white forehead with
his extremely low collar and danglin g black
necktie ac centuating the length of his neck with
his peculiarly narrow eyes and his small mus
tac he and goatee that looked so foreign he ap
peare d to be a man absorbed in the aesthetic
things o f life rather than in practical world
politics My feeling was that I h ad to deal with
one given over to extravagant ideals to the
visions and fantasies of a person controlled by
his emotional impulses rather than by his reason
and the ac tualities of life I was impressed by
his fervid patriotism and by his intense devotion
to the cause of Poland but it was not unnatural
t o think that so temperamental a nature would
be swayed by sentimentality in the advocac y of
a course of ac tion and would give passionate
support t o h is ideas with little regard to logic
or practical consi derations
Holding this impression of Mr Paderewski an
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1 201 1
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Pade re wski
impression which I believe was sh ared b y m any
of those with whom he came in contact in those
early days of his ac tive work for his country I
con fess that I wa s n o t disposed t o give the weight
t o his op inions that I did la ter I liked him
p erson ally I was glad t o see him en ter my office
fo r I always fo un d p leasure in t al kin g with him
I admired the in tensity of his advoc acy o f
P olish independence and the p at riotism which
h a d induce d h im to abandon his music al career
so th at he might devote his life t o the cause Of
his country His cordiality o f m an ner an d ad
dress was very attr ac tive He was a likable I
think I m ay say a lo vable man in every sense of
the term Yet at t he time of which I am speakin g
there was the e ver present sense th at he lived
in the re al m of musical harm onies an d that he
could n o t come d own t o m ateria l things an d
grapp le with the h ard fac ts of life It seemed as
if he could n ot re alize the d ifi cu lt ies Of t h e p art
which he h ad chosen to play in the tr agical dram a
o f world af
fair s In truth ,I th o ught that he was
making a m ist ake
This was m y early impression ofMr Padere w
It was o nly with time an d wi t h a fuller
ski
kn owledge of the m an th at I learn ed h o w wro ng
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1 202 1
Padere wski
cqu aintance sink deep into t h e mind an d
are n o t easy t o change or er ad ic ate
I fo und at least that this was true in the c ase
For a musici an ofh is genius
ofMr P aderewski
whic h nece ss arily imp lie d a n at u re se nsitive an d
an d t o t he
respons ive t o e motion al in fluences
aesthet ic beautie s o f art to be tran sform ed as
it were o vern ight into a co ol hard head ed states
m an de al ing wise ly wi t h ro ugh an d ugly fac ts
see med t o deny all co mm on experience It was
h ard t o b elieve that such a comp lete ch an ge
But as
o f th o ught a n d o bject in life w as re al
the Po lish hope o f independence develo ped into
a certainty an d as Mr P ad e rewski b ec ame more
and more prominent in mouldin g t h e policies
and directing the activities Of the Polish o rg an
iz at ion s in th is and oth er co untries I was com
pe lled hes itatingly b u t very glad ly t o re vis e my
j udgment an d recogniz e that my first impres sion
was wro ng ! I think that I may say t h at it was
unj ust tho ugh excusable
My second impression
and it is the im
p ression th at I still hold was th at Ign ac e
Pad erewski was a greater s tate sman t h an he was
a musici an th at he was an able and tac tful
le ader of his co untry men and a s ag acious di p~
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Paderewski
lomat and that his emotional te mperament
while it intensified his patriotic zeal and his
spirit of self s ac rifice never controlled or ad
ve rs e ly affected the soun dness o fhis judgment or
his pr actical po int o f view
The first direct evidenc e of his cap ac ity as
a leade r which impres sed me was his succ e s sful
ef
fort to unite the jealous and bickering Poli sh
fac tions in the United Sta tes and to obtain their
commo n acceptance of the authority of the
National Polis h Coun cil in Paris O thers had
attempted the task and failed Factionalism h a d
been the vice and weakness of the old Kin gdom
o fPoland
With t h e brightening hope of a Polis h
republic this national evil seemed t o revive I
am co nvi n ced that Mr P aderewski was the only
Pole who could h ave overcome this men ac e to
the caus e of Poland a menace since it seriously
impaired the possibility of t h e recognition of
the National Council at Paris by the Allies His
powers of persuasion which seemed t o spring at
once in to bein g with his ent ry upon a political
career his enthusiastic confidence in the resur
rection of Polan d as an independent state and
his entire freedom from personal ambition m ad e
him the one man about whom the Poles regard
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P ade re wski
less offac tion appeared to b e willing to r ally It
was a great achieve ment a triumph o f person
ality a tribute to as well as an evidence of the
faith of a people in the unselfish p atriotism of a
national leader which they confirmed later by
choosing him t o be the premier of the new gov
e rn m en t
What others certainly more e xperi
en c e d th an he in public af
fairs and credit ed with
greater political shrewdness failed t o ac complish
Mr Paderewski acco mplished His suc cess in
thus harmo niz ing the Polish factions gave him at
o nce a preeminence in the councils o f his nation
which other governments were quick t o perceive
and to respect
Fro m the time that Mr Paderewski assumed
a commanding position in the affairs of Poland
my early impression of him began to change I
realized that I had failed to apprec iate hi s innate
genius for political leadership which proved to
be so effective in circumstances that wo ul d have
tried the sagacity o f a man long in public life
Raw amateur though he was in politics — and I
mean no disrespect in so characterizin g him
nearly everything that he said and nearly every
thing that he did see med to be the right thing
He made few mistakes and he never seemed to
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2 06
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Pad ere wski
which t o build the career of a statesman It
appeared incongruous almost fanta stic t o co n
sider it as a possibility O ne faced with the
amazing fact would not without reason declare
it to be impossible for a man W hose years up to
middle age h ad b een devoted t o the developing
and perfecting of his ability as a musician t o b e
come without other preparation a public official
who could effectively take part in the affairs of
state That was I know a common judgment
concerning Mr Pa d e re ws ki s sudden entrance
into public life It was declared openly and
frequently But the j udgment was wrong He
abandoned his music which ha d been his very
life and threw himself into the work of politi cs
with the same ardor and devotion that he had
shown in following the impulses of his in c o m par
able genius As thousands h ad applauded his
mastery of harmony so thousands came to a p
plaud the intensity of his p atriotism and the
sacrificial spirit with which he laid down his
beloved music fo r the cause of his co un try
How fitting it was that Mr Paderewski should
be the one to sign in behalf of Poland the treaty
that broke the shackles which she had worn so
long an d which proclaimed to all the world that
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Paderewski
Polish independence was an accomplished fact
Imagine if you can the thoughts and emotions
of the eminent Pole as he advanced to the table
in the center of the Hall o f Mirrors at Versailles
and affixed his signature to the document that
bo re witness t o the triumph of the ca use t o whi ch
he had given his all The 28 t h o fJune 19 19 was
a great day t o the delegates o f the assembled
nations but it was the greatest in t h e life o f
Ignac e Paderewski
What Mr Paderewski has done for Poland
will cause eternal gratitude What he gave up
for Poland will cause widespread regret His re
ferin g in the
s pon s e to the cry o f hi s country su f
throes ofit s rebirth is one of the finest examples
of true patriotism that an historian has ever had
the privilege to chr onicle His career is one which
deserves t o be remembered not only by his coun
t rym en fo r whom he did so much but by every
man to whom love of country and loyalty to a
great cause stand forth as the noblest attributes
of human character
As I review in my mind all the circumstances
I think that it was natural that my first impres
sion of Mr Paderewski was that which I have
attempted to describe and that this impression
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Padere wski
faded and disa ppeared as time and events dis
clo sed in place of Paderewski the great artist
Paderewski the great statesman o f Poland It is
this second impression that lives The first is an
almost forgotten memory I can to d ay think o f
Mr Paderewski only as the zealous advocate o f
Polish independence as the sagac ious statesman
as the ta ctful negotiator and as the uns elfis h
p ublic servant who sought only the welfare ofhis
c ountry and o f its people It is a fortunate nation
indeed which can claim such a man among its
sons and he is a fortunate man wh o can leave t o
p osterity such a memory of generous service
In giving one s impressions of a personality
s uch as I have endeavored t o portray
it is
difficul t n o t to speak in superlatives Every
thing about Mr Pad erewski and his career
invites the superlative form of expression The
beauty o f his character the fineness of his
sentiments the loftiness of his ideals and the
sensitiveness and modesty of his nature con
s t it u t e the highest impul ses that co ntrol h u m a n
conduct A man possessing these qualities
an d Mr Paderewski has shown that he possesses
them
exercises a deep influence o n his fellow
men deep er than he himself can ever re aliz e
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Pade re wski
d iplo m at who would
resort t o deceit o r
intrigue in seeking to obtain his ends ho wever
l audable those ends might be o r however strong
the temptation to use any means t o attain them
Honesty of means as well as honesty of p ur pose
was e vident in his conduct as a negotiat or If he
miss ta te d a f act on e felt instinctively that it was
the result of incomplete knowledge or erroneo us
in form ation an d was not an int entional sup
p ressio n or perversion o f the truth Confidence
in his integrity was the n at u ral consequence ofac
qu aintance an d inte rcourse with Mr Paderewski
an d it w as the universality o f this con fidence
th at m ade him so infl u ential with the delegates
t o the Pe ac e Conference
What I h ave written is the impression which
the Prime Minister o f the Polish Republic m a de
upon me du ring ou r association at P aris and the
way that that imp res sion grew and developed in
sp ite of vie ws b a sed on preconceive d ideas of hi s
cap acity an d talents It has n ot been as diffic ult
t o analyz e this change o f thought as it h as been
t o account for the radical change in the lif e an d
activities of Ignac e Jan Paderewski him se lf So
u nn atur a l a conversion o f aesthetic geni us in to
a genius for sta t ecraft without goin g through a
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Pade re wski
gradual process of transformation seems to be an
anomaly which defies a satisf ac tory explanation
That it took plac e is a fac t an extraordinary
fact that must be ac cepted for the simple reason
that it is f ac t In history as in memory there
will always live two Pad e re wskis Paderewski
the master of music and Paderewski
man o f Poland
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