Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
- v. -
:
SAEED TALEBI,
a/k/a “Al,”
a/k/a “Allen Talebi,”
Defendant.
:
S1 12 Cr. 295 (LTS)
:
:
----------------------------------------x
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney
Southern District of New York
Attorney for United States of
America
Shane T. Stansbury
Assistant United States Attorney
- Of Counsel –
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 2 of 20
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Government submits this memorandum in advance of the
defendant’s sentencing scheduled for February 13, 2013, and in
response to the defendant’s sentencing memorandum dated February
1, 2013 (“Def. Mem.”).
For the reasons set forth below, the
Government
submits
respectfully
that
a
sentence
within
the
applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or
“Guidelines”) range of 46 to 51 months’ imprisonment would be
sufficient
but
not
sentencing
objectives
greater
than
enumerated
necessary
in
Title
to
18,
achieve
United
the
States
Code, Section 3553(a).
BACKGROUND
A.
The Sanctions Against Iran
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)
gives the President broad authority to regulate international
transactions in times of national emergency.
§ 1702(a)(1).
IEEPA
controls
are
triggered
See
by
an
50 U.S.C.
executive
order declaring a national emergency based on an “unusual and
extraordinary
substantial
threat
part
which
outside
has
the
its
United
source
States,
to
in
the
whole
or
national
security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”
50
U.S.C. § 1701.
In
series
1995
of
and
three
again
in
Executive
1997,
Orders
2
President
Clinton
prohibiting,
issued
among
a
other
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
things,
the
exportation,
Filed 02/11/13 Page 3 of 20
reexportation,
sale,
or
supply,
directly or indirectly, to Iran of any goods, technology, or
services from the United States or by a United States person.
See Exec. Orders 13059 (Aug. 19, 1997), 12959 (May 6, 1995), and
12957
(Mar.
President
15,
1995)
Clinton’s
(collectively
Executive
the
Orders
“Executive
directly
Orders’).
referenced
the
“unusual and extraordinary threat” posed by Iran and directly
targeted, among other things, petroleum development in Iran. See
60 Fed. Reg. 14615 (Mar. 17, 1995).
By their terms, these
Executive
are
Orders
applying
to
Iran
broad
encompassing, with extremely narrow exceptions.
and
all-
The Executive
Orders authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate
rules
Executive Orders.1
the
Treasury
(“ITR”),
Orders.2
and
regulations
to
carry
out
the
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of
promulgated
implementing
Thus,
necessary
the
the
IEEPA
Iranian
sanctions
and
the
ITR
Transaction
imposed
—
by
which
Regulations
the
Executive
the
defendant
1
At all times relevant to this case, the President has continued
the national emergency with respect to Iran and Executive Orders
13059, 12959, and 12957, given that the actions and policies of
Iran continue to threaten the national security and foreign
policy and economy of the United States.
The most recent
continuation of this national emergency was on August 15, 2012.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 49699 (Aug. 16, 2012).
2
In 2012, the ITR were replaced by the Iranian Transactions and
Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”). See 31 C.F.R. Part 560.
3
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
acknowledges
he
conspired
to
Filed 02/11/13 Page 4 of 20
violate
—
constitute
national
security controls of vital importance to the United States.
B.
The Defendant’s Procurement Of Supplies For Iranian
Petrochemical Companies
Over a period of several years, the defendant worked with
others to ship industrial parts and goods from United Statesbased
firms
to
the
United
Arab
Emirates
(UAE)
and
other
locations, acting through a company that was identified in the
Superseding Information as “Company-1.”
These items were then
to
companies
be
sent
to
various
petrochemical
in
Iran
—
including petrochemical companies owned and controlled by the
Iranian government.
The defendant’s blatant violation of United States export
laws extended to a variety of products for use in some of the
most important petrochemical companies in Iran.
indicated
in
submission,
an
in
attachment
early
2010,
to
the
the
For example, as
defendant’s
defendant
sought
sentencing
to
obtain
approximately $390,000 worth of various electrical components
and
industrial
hardware,
including
a
sophisticated
digital
turbine control system for use in the petrochemical industry.
(Def.
Mem.,
Ex.
K,
at
1;
see
also
United
States
Probation
Office’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 9).
As the
defendant admitted at his guilty plea allocution, one of the
companies
that
the
defendant
4
sought
to
supply
was
Fajr
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 5 of 20
Petrochemical Company, a subsidiary of Iran’s state-run National
Petrochemical Company (“NPC”).3
(Sept. 26, 2012 Plea Tr., at
22).
The defendant’s conduct was no aberration and extended well
beyond
one
transaction.
As
indicated
in
the
PSR,
within
a
relatively narrow timeframe of April through October 2011, the
defendant
(who
frequently
used
aliases
and
multiple
e-mail
accounts) sought similar industrial parts and components from at
least three additional suppliers — again all for the purpose of
supplying various Iranian petrochemical companies, in violation
of explicit United States export laws.4
C.
(PSR ¶¶ 10-13).
The Defendant’s Guilty Plea And The Guidelines Calculation
The
defendant
pleaded
guilty
on
September
26,
2012,
pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiring, from at least in or
about 2008 through in or about December 2011, to violate IEEPA
and
the
regulations
promulgated
thereunder,
Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.
in
violation
of
Under the terms of
the plea agreement, the defendant and the Government agreed that
3
NPC, a subsidiary of the Iranian Petroleum Ministry, is whollyowned by the Government of Iran.
NPC is responsible for the
development and operation of Iran’s petrochemical sector and is
the second-largest producer and exporter of petrochemicals in
the Middle East. See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg747.aspx (last visited February 9, 2013).
4
Among the other parts the defendant conspired to ship to Iran
from the United States (many of which were actually shipped)
were
gas-liquid
separators,
pressure
transmitters,
turbocompressors, and other petrochemical hardware.
5
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
the
applicable
imprisonment.
Probation
Guidelines
Filed 02/11/13 Page 6 of 20
range
is
46
to
51
months’
Consistent with the parties’ calculations, the
Office
has
determined
that,
pursuant
to
Section
2M5.1(a)(1)(B) of the Guidelines, because the offense involved
financial transactions with a country supporting international
terrorism,
¶ 18).
the
defendant’s
Based
responsibility,
on
the
the
offense
defendant’s
Probation
offense level of 23.
and (b)).
base
level
timely
Office
has
is
26.5
(PSR
acceptance
calculated
a
of
total
(PSR ¶ 26; see also U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a)
Based on a total offense level of 23 and a Criminal
History Category of I, the Probation Office has calculated an
applicable Guidelines range of 46 to 51 months’ imprisonment.
(PSR ¶ 53).
ARGUMENT
An
U.S.C.
analysis
§ 3553(a)
applicable
sentence
of
sentencing
demonstrate
Guidelines
would
the
be
range
that
would
reasonable
factors
a
be
given
enunciated
sentence
within
appropriate.
(1)
the
in
18
the
Such
nature
a
and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant; and (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A)
5
Section 2M5.1 of the Guidelines, which applies to IEEPA
offenses, provides that an offense level of 26 applies “if (A)
national security controls . . . were evaded; or (B) the offense
involved a financial transaction with a country supporting
international terrorism.” U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1(a)(1). As discussed
below, under either provision — only one of which need apply —
the correct base offense level is 26.
6
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 7 of 20
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; and
(B)
to
afford
adequate
deterrence
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B).
to
criminal
conduct.
18
A Guidelines sentence would
also be appropriate given the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities.
A.
Id. at § 3553(a)(6).
The Nature and Circumstances Of The Offense Weigh In Favor
Of A Guidelines Sentence
The Sentencing Commission has acknowledged the seriousness
of
arms
offense
export
level
and
of
26
embargo
to
all
violations
export
by
assigning
offenses
that
a
base
implicate
national security concerns — and by not differentiating among
those offenses according to the nature of the goods involved.
See U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1.
immaterial
in
“inherently”
United
States
that
involves
v.
The nature of the goods being exported is
any
the
Hanna,
violation
United
661
F.3d
of
the
States’
271,
Iranian
national
294
(6th
embargo
security.
Cir.
2011)
(emphasis added) (defendant’s shipment of telecommunications and
navigation equipment to Iraq in violation of the IEEPA warranted
a base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1).
See also
United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding
export of computer equipment to Libya was evasion of national
security controls and that “[S]ection 2M5.1(a)(1) applies to any
offense that involves a shipment (or proposed shipment) that
7
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 8 of 20
offends the embargo, whether or not the goods shipped actually
are intended for some innocent use.”).6
The
national
current
security
Guidelines
for
interests
export
crimes
appropriately
implicating
reflect
the
Government’s enhanced efforts in recent years to enforce the
sanctions and embargos against countries such as Iran that pose
serious threats to the national security of the United States.
The Executive Branch has determined as a matter of foreign and
national security policy that the threat posed by the government
of Iran is so severe that only a complete trade embargo is
adequate to protect the interests of the United States. Congress
has acted in kind.
Prior to March 2006, IEEPA carried a maximum
sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for individuals and a fine of
$10,000 (or twice the pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the
offense) for each violation.
6
On March 9, 2006, the President
As the Second Circuit recently observed:
By design . . . the [Iranian] embargo is deliberately
overinclusive. Thus, for example, the ITR prohibit the
exportation of not only advice on developing Iranian
chemical weapons but also advice on developing Iranian
petroleum resources, see § 560.209; not only services to
the Iranian government but also services to Iranian
businesses, see § 560.204; and not only bombs but also
beer, see § 560.204. In other words, to reform the actions
of the government of Iran, Executive Order 12,959 and the
ITR adopt a blunt instrument: broad economic sanctions
intended to isolate Iran.
United States v. Banki,
(citations omitted).
685
F.3d
8
99,
108
(2d
Cir.
2012)
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
signed
into
law
Reauthorization
the
Act
of
Filed 02/11/13 Page 9 of 20
USA
Patriot
2005,
which
Act
Improvement
increased
the
and
criminal
penalties under the IEEPA to a maximum sentence of 20 years’
imprisonment
violation.
even
for
individuals
and
a
fine
of
$50,000
per
On October 16, 2007, the penalties were increased
further
as
the
President
signed
into
law
the
IEEPA
Enhancement Act, which called for up to 20 years’ imprisonment
and a $1,000,000 for each violation.
These enhanced penalties — which apply regardless of the
nature of the products involved — are a direct response to the
elevated
threat
that
security
interests,
Iran
and
poses
are
to
United
consistent
with
steps taken by the President and Congress.
States
other
national
aggressive
For example, in
2010, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
of 2010, which further strengthened United States sanctions for
a variety of transactions involving Iran.
Pub. L. No. 111–195,
124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified in part at 50 U.S.C § 1701
(note)).
Among other things, the Act codified the prohibitions
on the exportation of goods, services, and technology to Iran
that
had
already
been
in
promulgated pursuant to IEEPA.
effect
Id.
under
executive
orders
Significantly, the Act also
imposed broad and far-reaching sanctions upon individuals and
entities that seek to aid Iran’s petroleum sector — precisely
9
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 10 of 20
the sector that stood to benefit from the defendant’s actions in
this case.7
Id.
Against this backdrop, the defendant’s argument for a timeserved sentence because the materials he conspired to sell to
Iran’s
petrochemical
unpersuasive.
industry
were
(Def. Mem. at 16).
not
“military”
items
is
In support of his argument,
the defendant cites Application Note 2 to Section 2M5.1 of the
Guidelines, which provides:
In determining the sentence within the applicable guideline
range, the court may consider the degree to which the
violation threatened a security interest of the United
States, the volume of commerce involved, the extent of
planning or sophistication, and whether there were multiple
occurrences. Where such factors are present in an extreme
form, a departure from the guidelines may be warranted.
7
The 2010 Act is the latest incarnation of a longstanding effort
by the United States to target Iran’s energy industry. In 1996,
for example, Congress passed the Iran Sanctions Act, Pub.L. No.
104–172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified in part at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (note)), which mandated the imposition of specified
sanctions against foreign firms that reached threshold levels of
involvement with Iran’s energy sector. See id. at § 3 (“The
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to
deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism
and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the
development of Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine,
or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of Iran.”).
Indeed, this longstanding recognition that there is a direct
link between Iran’s petroleum industry and U.S. security
interests (including Iran’s ability to support acts of terrorism
and/or to fund the development of weapons of mass destruction)
demonstrates that the defendant is misguided in his lengthy
attempt to detach his conduct from the core conduct contemplated
in U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. 28-36).
10
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
U.S.S.G.
§ 2M5.1,
cmt.,
App.
n.
Filed 02/11/13 Page 11 of 20
2
(emphasis
added).
But
contrary to the defendant’s argument, Application Note 2 bears
directly on his conduct and counsels in favor of a Guidelines
sentence.
the
The plain language of the Application Note shows that
Sentencing
Commission
contemplated
a
departure
from
the
Guidelines only if the enumerated factors were present “in an
extreme form.”
That directive is just as instructive here,
where the defendant seeks a variance pursuant to the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Nothing about the defendant’s conduct places him outside
the mainstream of cases contemplated by Section 2M5.1.
The
defendant,
the
who
concedes
he
of
U.S.S.G.
§ 2M5.1(a)(1),
application
alternative
requirements
meets
for
the
the
requirements
in
fact
for
meets
applicability
of
both
that
provision, in that “national security controls” were evaded, see
§ 2M5.1(a)(1)(A),
and
the
“offense
involved
a
financial
transaction with a country supporting international terrorism,”
namely Iran.
See § 2M5.1(a)(1)(B).
That is, the defendant
plainly, and knowingly, evaded the strict embargo prohibiting
the types of industrial equipment that the defendant and his coconspirators sought to supply petrochemical companies in Iran.8
8
All courts that have reached the issue have made clear that a
trade embargo against a state sponsor of terrorism “is intended
as a national security control” for the purposes of Section
2M5.1(a)(1)(A). See McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 14 (addressing embargo
11
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 12 of 20
In doing so, the defendant also committed an offense involving a
financial transaction with petrochemical companies controlled by
the Iranian government, as both the Probation Office observed
and as the defendant acknowledged in his plea allocution.
PSR ¶ 18; Plea Tr., at 22).9
2M5.1(a)(1)
is
not
in
(See
Although the application of Section
dispute
here,
the
seriousness
of
his
offense is underscored by the fact that the defendant’s conduct
falls
squarely
within
the
scope
of
both
types
of
offenses
contemplated under that provision.
The defendant claims that his conduct implicates none of
the
factors
that
the
Sentencing
Commission
has
stated,
in
against Libya); accord United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480,
508-09 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Every court to consider the issue has
held that the evasion of sanctions against state sponsors of
terrorism are ‘national security controls.’”); United States v.
Sevilla, No. 04 CR 0171, 2006 WL 3486872, at *2 ( N.D. Ill. Nov.
29, 2006) (addressing Iran embargo); United States v. Min, No.
99 Cr. 875 (KTD), 2000 WL 1576890 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2000) *66
(Duffy, J.) (North Korea). This is so even if the offending
transactions are otherwise “innocent.” See, e.g., McKeeve, 131
F.3d at 14 (“[S]ection 2M5.1(a)(1) applies to any offense that
involves a shipment (or proposed shipment) that offends the
embargo, whether or not the goods shipped actually are intended
for some innocent use.”); Min, 2000 WL 1576890, at *2
(defendant's “assertion that the goods in question do not
threaten ‘national security’ is misplaced.”).
9
Thus, the defendant’s argument that U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1(a)(1)(B)
does not apply (Def. Mem. at 36) is simply incorrect. In fact,
the defendant’s conduct involved transactions involving a number
of other state-controlled oil companies in Iran other than the
company mentioned in his plea, including, among others, Jam
Petrochemical Company and Khorasan Petrochemical Company.
The
Government is prepared to provide more information in this
regard should the Court determine it is necessary.
12
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 13 of 20
Application Note 2, that a court “may” consider in determining
the sentence “within the applicable Guidelines range.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2M5.1, cmt., App. n. 2. (See
Def. Mem. at 16).
But, as
discussed, the defendant’s conduct plainly threatened a security
interest of the United States through the evasion of a set of
export laws that have been carefully constructed to combat a
threat
posed
“unusual
and
by
a
country
that
extraordinary
the
threat
President
to
the
has
national
deemed
an
security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” Exec. Order
No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995).
And
while the defendant dismisses the gravity of his actions by
making comparisons to such trade violations as the “trading of
ballpoint
Iranian
pens”
carpet
(Def.
while
Mem.
on
at
16
n.37)
vacation”
(Def.
and
Mem.
“purchasing
at
26),
an
the
defendant’s actions involved the supply of critical components
to the petrochemical industry in Iran — an industry with obvious
implications for the national security of the United States.
Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s characterizations of
his conduct as an “aberration” or a “lapse in judgment” (Def.
Mem.
at
15,
occurrences”
26),
and,
sophistication.
his
offense
necessarily,
U.S.S.G.
§ 2M5.1,
plainly
a
level
cmt.,
involved
of
App.
“multiple
planning
and
n.
The
2.
conspiracy to which the defendant pleaded guilty spanned from
2008 through 2011; and in a mere one-and-a-half-year period,
13
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
from
approximately
April
2010
Filed 02/11/13 Page 14 of 20
through
approximately
October
2011, the defendant arranged transactions with at least three
U.S.-based suppliers for the shipment of parts and equipment
destined
¶¶ 9-13).
for
multiple
Iranian
petrochemical
companies.
(PSR
The defendant, admittedly aware of U.S. export laws
prohibiting such transactions, worked with others to carry out
these transactions by, among other means, falsifying the endusers
on
official
documentation,
shipping
the
goods
through
intermediate destinations (e.g., the UAE) to avoid detection,
and using a variety of aliases.10
an
individual
who
has
made
a
These are not the actions of
one-time
lapse
in
judgment.
Rather, they show that the defendant was fully aware of the
export laws that the United States has imposed with respect to
Iran’s petrochemical industry and that he deliberately chose to
violate those laws on repeated occasions.
In short, the defendant’s criminal conduct in this case was
serious:
he
hundreds
of
deliberately
thousands
of
facilitated
dollars’
the
worth
transmission
of
critical
of
and
sophisticated industrial equipment to state-owned petrochemical
companies in Iran, in obvious defiance of this country’s export
10
The defendant’s conduct was also brazen, as evident in his
communications with customers and co-conspirators.
In one email highlighted in the PSR, for example, the defendant
addressed a customer’s concerns about a delay by requesting
additional time because of the “problems . . . for shipment to
Iran as per U.S. Embargo [sic].” (PSR ¶ 12).
14
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
laws.
Filed 02/11/13 Page 15 of 20
Even if the intended purposes of the transfers were, as
the defendant claims, completely legitimate, the end result was
that the equipment was to be used to strengthen a critical part
of
the
Iranian
economy
and
a
sector
targeted by recent U.S. sanctions.
that
has
been
directly
These actions are exactly
what the Iranian embargo was designed to avoid.
See United
States v. Homa International Trading Corp., 387 F. 3d 144, 146
(2d Cir. 2004) (“The obvious purpose of the order is to isolate
Iran from trade with the United States. . . . This broad export
ban reflected the President’s appraisal of the nation’s interest
in
its
sanctioning Iran’s sponsorship of international terrorism,
frustration
of
the
Middle
East
peace
process,
and
its
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.”) (quoting United States
v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1998)).
B.
A Sentence Promoting Respect For The Law And Serving As A
Deterrent For Future Violations Of The Export Laws Is
Appropriate
As the Probation Office has observed, it is difficult to
assess
the
defendant’s
risk
of
recitivism.
(PSR
at
16).
Nevertheless, in light of the nature and seriousness of the
defendant’s crime, the sentence imposed should reflect the need
for general deterrence the promotion of respect for the rule of
law. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B).
uniquely
in
demonstrable
that
Guidelines
deterrent
effect
Export cases are situated
sentences
on
15
other
can
have
a
like-minded
real
and
conduct.
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 16 of 20
That deterrent effect is particularly warranted in cases such as
this, involving the petrochemical industry, which has been the
subject of increasingly stringent sanctions by the United States
and has serious ramifications for U.S. security interests.
A
sentence reflecting the serious nature of the crime will serve
as a warning to others seeking to bypass the Iranian embargo.
By contrast, a variance of the type urged by the defendant will
send precisely the wrong message: that such conduct, whatever
its implications for the United States, may indeed be worth the
risk.
C.
A Guidelines Sentence Would Avoid
Disparities
Unwarranted Sentencing
The defendant seeks to distinguish his circumstances from
the mainstream of cases in which courts have imposed significant
sentences.
Most strikingly, the defendant attempts to create a
bright line at 24 months’ imprisonment by
asserting
that “a
sentence of 24 months is reserved for cases where the export has
explicit military applications . . . .”
The
numerous
defendant’s
cases
in
the
manufactured
which
goods
courts
were
(Def. Mem. at 17-18).
standard
have
imposed
explicitly
the
significant
sentences
where
nature.11
See, e.g., United States v. Hajian, 12 Cr. 177 (M.D.
11
not
disregards
military
in
The defendant also brushes over the wide array of facts and
circumstances at issue in the cases that he cites, many of which
do not have published sentencing decisions or a complete set of
16
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Fl.
2012)
months’
equipment
(defendant
imprisonment
to
Iran
received
for
over
a
Filed 02/11/13 Page 17 of 20
Guidelines
exporting
several
sentence
computers
years);
and
United
of
48
related
States
v.
Amirnazmi, 08 Cr. 429 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (defendant received 48
months’ imprisonment after marketing software program to Iranian
actors, including a state-owned chemical company, to facilitate
the construction of multiple chemical plants);12 United States v.
Dawn Hanna, 07 Cr. 20355 (E.D. Mich.) (defendant sentenced to a
facts publicly available. For example, in at least one case the
defendant cites, where the defendant received a term of
probation, United States v. Khan, 04 Cr. 00441 (E.D.N.Y.), the
defendant cooperated with the Government and received a Section
5K1.1 letter prior to sentencing.
12
The defendant seeks to distance his case from Hajian and
Amirnazmi, but the defendant’s conduct is not materially
different from the offenses in those cases.
In Amirnazmi, the
defendant marketed a software program to various Iranian
entities, including the NPC – the parent company of one of the
petrochemical companies the defendant sought to supply in the
instant case. Although Amirzazmi took substantial steps such as
meeting with state officials to further his venture, the nature
and value of the products involved were not materially different
from the products at issue here.
See United States v.
Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 567-570 (3d Cir. 2011).
Likewise,
Hajian exported computers and related equipment (including, but
not limited to, a “server” and “array”) over a period of several
years. Although the defendant claims that the offense involved
goods worth more than $10 million (Def. Mem. 17), that sum
represents the money judgment sought by the Government with
respect to four defendants, including three corporations.
(12
Cr. 177 (M.D. Fl. 2012, Dkt. No. 38). In any event, as in that
case, the defendant here conducted numerous transactions over a
period of years involving “non-military” equipment worth
hundreds
of
thousands
of
dollars.
Nothing
about
the
distinguishing facts in these cases raises a concern about
“unwarranted sentencing disparities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
17
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 18 of 20
total of 72 months’ imprisonment for IEEPA violations, money
laundering, and false statements in connection with provision of
approximately
$1
million
in
telecommunications
equipment
to
Iraq); United States v. Hossein Esfahani, 05 Cr. 00255 (N.D.
Ill.) (defendant, who caused approximately $3.9 million to be
transferred from the United States to Iran without a license,
received
a
Guidelines
sentence
of
46
months’
imprisonment);
United States v. Laura Wang-Woodford, 03 Cr. 0070 (E.D.N.Y.)
(defendant sentenced to top-of-Guidelines sentence of 46 months’
imprisonment
aircraft
for
conspiring
component
parts
to
to
violate
Iran
IEEPA
through
by
other
shipping
countries);
McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 1 (51-month sentence imposed in IEEPA case
involving shipment of computer products to Libya).13
The defendant also likens his case to those in which courts
have
imposed
departures
under
defendant does not seek here).
not so extreme.
Cr.
420,
2008
defendant’s
the
Guidelines
(which
the
But the defendant’s situation is
For example, in United States v. Groos, No. 06
WL
conduct
5387852
(N.D.
involved,
in
Ill.
its
Dec.
16,
entirety,
$25,000 worth of fire sprinklers to Iran.
2008),
one
Id. at *4.
sale
the
of
Likewise,
in United States v. Sevilla, No. 04 Cr. 0171, 2006 WL 3486872
13
Significantly, the McKeeve court used the pre-2001 version of
U.S.S.G. § 2M5.1(a)(1) and § 2M5.2(a)(1), which had a base
offense level of 22.
The sentences would likely be higher
today, with the higher base offense level of 26.
18
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
(N.D.
Ill.
attempted
Floor
Nov.
to
Model
29,
export
2006),
one
Testing
the
United
Machine
Filed 02/11/13 Page 19 of 20
defendant
Computer
valued
Inclusive
at
corresponding software valued at $3,800.
defendant’s
conduct
seemingly
legitimate
nevertheless
was
involved
procuring
business
responsible
for
unsuccessfully
$47,500
Here,
the
export
and
the
even if the
equipment
purpose,
Hydraulic
meant
the
of
for
a
defendant
hundreds
of
thousands of dollars’ worth of equipment to Iran’s petrochemical
industry over a period of years.
transactions
with
multiple
The defendant conducted these
suppliers,
for
the
purpose
of
supplying several state-owned petrochemical companies, and did
so with full knowledge that his actions were illegal.
While it is apparent from the above discussion that it is
impossible, even dangerous, to attempt to extrapolate from cases
about which the parties and the Court known precious little, it
is equally apparent that a sentence within the Guidelines range
would
not
raise
the
specter
of
“unwarranted
disparities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
within
the
necessarily
Guidelines
be
disparate
sentencing
with
sentencing
Accordingly, a sentence
range
those
here
imposed
would
on
not
similarly
situated defendants. In any event, the defense’s unscientific
conclusion with respect to the length of the “average” IEEPA
sentence is entitled to no consideration.
19
Case 1:12-cr-00295-LTS Document 18
Filed 02/11/13 Page 20 of 20
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
the
Government
respectfully requests that the Court impose a sentence within
the applicable Guidelines range, as such a sentencing would be
sufficient
but
not
greater
than
necessary
to
serve
the
legitimate purposes of sentencing.
Dated:
New York, New York
February 11, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney
By:
20
_______________________________
Shane T. Stansbury
Assistant United States Attorney
Tel.: (212) 637-2641