Trade Credit and the Supply Chain
Daniela Fabbri
Cass Business School
City University London
London EC1Y 8TZ, UK
[email protected]
Leora F. Klapper*
The World Bank
Development Research Group
Washington, DC 20433
1-202-473-8738
[email protected]
October 2011
Abstract: This paper studies supply chain financing. We investigate why a firm extends trade credit to
its customers and how this decision relates to its own financing. We use a novel firm-level database of
Chinese firms with unique information on market power in both output and input markets and on the
amount, terms, and payment history of trade credit simultaneously extended to customers (accounts
receivable) and received from suppliers (accounts payable). We find that suppliers with relatively weaker
market power are more likely to extend trade credit and have a larger share of goods sold on credit. We
also examine the importance of financial constraints. Access to bank financing and profitability are not
significantly related to trade credit supply. Rather, firms that receive trade credit from their own suppliers
are more likely to extend trade credit to their customers, and to “match maturity” between the contract
terms of payables and receivables. This matching practice is more likely used when firms face strong
competition in the product market (relative to their customers), and enjoy strong market power in the
input market (relative to their suppliers). Similarly, firms lacking internal resources or external bank
credit, are more dependent on the receipt of supplier financing in order to extend credit to their customers.
* Corresponding author. We thank Mariassunta Giannetti, Vicente Cunat, Arturo Bris, Luc Laeven, Inessa Love,
Max Macsimovic, Robert Marquez, Rohan Williamson, Chris Woodruff, and participants at the 2009 Financial
Intermediation Research Society (FIRS) Conference on Banking, Corporate Finance and Intermediation in Prague,
the “Small Business Finance–What Works, What Doesn‟t?” Conference in Washington, DC, the Second Joint CAFFIC-SIFR Conference on Emerging Market Finance in Stockholm, and the 4 th Csef-Igier Symposium on Economics
and Institutions in Capri for valuable comments, and Taras Chemsky for excellent research assistance. The opinions
expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they
represent.
“Large, creditworthy buyers force longer payment terms on less creditworthy suppliers. Large
creditworthy suppliers incent less credit worthy SME buyers to pay more quickly”
CFO Magazine, April 2007
1. Introduction
Supply chain financing (inter-firm financing) is an important source of funds for both
small and large firms in developed and emerging markets around the world (e.g. Petersen and
Rajan, 1997, Fishman and Love, 2003, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). An interesting
characteristic of supply chain financing is that many firms use trade credit both to finance their
input purchases (accounts payable) and to offer financing to their customers (accounts
receivable). This pattern is widespread among both large public companies and small creditconstrained firms (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Marotta, 2005).
These earlier results raise several questions related to capital structure decisions of the
firm: For instance, why do listed firms with access to both private and public financial markets
make large use of trade credit, if trade credit is presumed to be more expensive than bank
finance? Alternatively, why do small credit-constrained firms decide to offer trade credit to their
customers and how do they finance this extension of credit?
Related literature has mainly focused on one-side of the trade credit relationship in
isolation and has therefore been unable to fully address these questions. We take a new step in
this direction, by looking at trade credit along the supply chain, i.e. we consider both sides of
firm business – the relation between a firm, its customers (product market) and its suppliers
(input market). This unique perspective is crucial to highlight a novel link between the supply
and the demand of trade credit.
We use a large firm-level survey of Chinese firms, which is a unique source of data for at
least two reasons. To our knowledge, this is the first firm-level data set providing detailed and
1
rich information on both the market environment and contract features of supplier and customer
“supply-chain” financing. For example, it contains information on the amount, terms, and
payment history of both trade credit extended by firms to their customers (accounts receivable),
as well as the receipt of trade credit by firms from their own suppliers (accounts payable).
Moreover, since only about 30% of firms in our sample have a line of credit, our data allows us
to test the role of credit constraints in the firm decision to offer trade credit.
Our empirical analysis provides a number of intriguing results. First, we document the
importance of trade credit as a competitive gesture. Specifically, firms with weak bargaining
power towards their customers – measured as the percentage of sales to the largest customer or
the number of suppliers of the firm‟s most important customer – are more likely to extend trade
credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit and offer a longer payment period before
imposing penalties. Similarly, firms facing stronger competition in the product market –
measured by the degree of sales concentration in the domestic market and the introduction of
new products or lowered prices in the past year - are more likely to offer trade credit and provide
better credit terms.
These results hold after controlling for industry and firm characteristics including size,
ownership, geographical location, market destination of the products and access to internal and
external funds. Moreover, when investigating how firms finance the provision of trade credit, we
find support for a supply-chain „matching‟ story: Firms are likely to depend on their own receipt
of trade credit to finance the extension of trade credit and to match maturity between contract
terms of payables and receivables. Specifically, we find very large and significant relationships
between the decision to offer and the use of trade credit; the percentage of inputs and the
percentage of sales financed by trade credit; the number of days extended to customers and the
2
maturity received from suppliers. This novel empirical result is robust to the inclusion of several
product and market characteristics that proxy for the suitability of a product to receive trade
credit in the up-stream and down-stream markets, and could provide an alternative explanation
for the correlation between trade credit extended and received.
Finally, we investigate in which circumstances firms are more likely to adopt a matching
strategy. We identify two distinct patterns: First, this matching practice seems to be affected by
the availability of internal and external funds. Firms with positive retained earnings and bank
credit are less likely to rely on accounts payable. Second, this matching practice changes along
the supply chain, i.e. it is more likely among firms that face stronger competition in the output
market (firms that may need to offer trade credit as a competitive gesture) and enjoy stronger
market power in the input market (firms that can demand favorable credit terms). This is a new
finding that suggests a symbiotic relationship between a firm, its customers and its suppliers.
Our paper contributes to the literature on trade credit along several dimensions. First, it
provides an empirical test of theories that predict a relationship between the relative bargaining
power between buyers and sellers and trade credit decisions. More specifically, our evidence
provides support to the Wilner‟s (2000) argument that a customer obtains more trade credit if he
generates a large percentage of the supplier‟s profits (i.e. the supplier‟s bargaining power is low).
Our evidence is also in line with the prediction of Fisman and Raturi (2004) that trade credit is
larger when the market of input suppliers is more competitive. Finally, Cunat (2007) provides an
alternative hypothesis that trade credit is higher when suppliers and customers are in a sort of
bilateral monopoly because of the high switching costs. In line with the bargaining power
hypothesis, we find evidence that suppliers are less likely to offer trade credit when the good
sold is tailored to the buyer specific needs.
3
Our analysis also complements and extends existing evidence. While empirical literature
mainly focuses on the decision to extend trade credit and the links with the degree of competition
in output markets (see among others McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fisman and Raturi, 2004,
and Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen, 2011), we test the effect of competition on specific credit
terms offered to customers, such as net days and early payment discounts and we document the
relevance of competition also in the input markets for supply chain finance.
Second, our matching story links our paper to the literature on working capital and risk
management. The positive correlation between the decision to offer receivables and the decision
to use payables is consistent with the recent focus of analysts on cash holdings, which may offer
incentive to mangers to extend payment terms in order to maintain higher cash balances in
working capital management (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2008).1 At the same time, our evidence of
a matching maturity strategy between the contract terms of payables and receivables supports the
theoretical literature (Diamond, 1991 and Hart and Moore, 1991) and the empirical evidence
(Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999) on
firm‟s matching maturity of assets and liabilities. We bring forward the idea that firms with no
or limited access to internal resources and formal external financing match the maturity of assets
and liabilities by using account payables as a risk management tool, i.e. to hedge their short-term
receivables risk.
Some suggestive evidence of a relationship between payables and receivables has been
documented in other papers, but the lack of data on trade credit contracts simultaneously
received and extended precluded a compelling analysis. Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that
small and medium sized U.S. firms whose assets consist mainly of current assets demand
1
Furthermore, changes in inventory practices have led to firms holding more inventory (short-term assets), which
would increase the demand for payables (short-term liabilities).
4
significantly more trade credit. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and Boissay and Gropp
(2007) document that firms pass the delay of payments from customers to their suppliers. 2 We
extend the previous literature by documenting that firms offer to their customers credit amounts
and terms (e.g. number of days) that are similar to the ones they have been offered from their
suppliers.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature analyzing the role of trade credit in
developing economies (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Fisman and Love, 2003; Johnson
McMillan and Woodruff, 2004; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005, Cull, Xu and Zhu, 2007). The
general idea in this literature is that trade credit can offer a viable substitute for formal bank
credit in countries with low levels of financial development and/or in the early stages of
transitioning towards a market based economy. For instance, Cull, Xu and Zhu (2007) test
whether Chinese firms have indeed used trade credit as a substitute for the lack of formal
institutions to stimulate growth, but they do not find supporting evidence.3 Rather, they argue
that the high growth rate in China is fueled by a growing private sector with increasing
competitive pressure, which is likely to be an important motivation for the use of trade credit.
This is in line with our results. Given that widespread competitive pressures across sectors is also
a common feature of developed and market-based economies, our findings are likely not specific
to China, but have more general implications.
2
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) find that in European transition economies firms with a larger proportion
of invoices paid by customers after delivery tend also to pay their suppliers late. Similarly, Boissay and Gropp
(2007) document that French firms with defaulting customers are more likely to default on their suppliers.
3
They focus on differences in ownership structures, since in China it is not so much the lack of a formal financial
system but rather its institutional bias in favor of state-owned enterprises that could give rise to trade credit among
viable firms with restricted or no access to credit from state-owned banks.
5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical
background and derives our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
empirical results. Section 5 discusses some related issues and concludes.
2. Motivation and Hypotheses
This section presents a conceptual framework and economic intuition for our hypotheses.
Our reference unit is a firm buying input from its supplier (in the up-stream market) to produce
goods to be sold to its customers (in the down-stream market). Our focus is on the firm‟s
decision to offer trade credit to its customers (accounts receivable), having in mind that the same
firm can itself take trade credit from its suppliers (accounts payable).
2.1 The “Bargaining Power” Hypothesis
This hypothesis is motivated by previous theoretical literature showing that the decision
to offer trade credit and the amount offered depend on the firm‟s relative bargaining power vis-àvis its customer. If a buyer depends too much on a seller, the seller is in a better position to force
immediate payment. On the other hand, if a seller depends too much on a buyer, the buyer may
be allowed to delay payment. For example, Wilner (2000) predicts higher trade credit when the
customer‟s purchases count for a larger share of the firm‟s profits (i.e. the selling firm‟s
bargaining power is low). The customer‟s relative bargaining power also depends on the degree
of competition in the firm‟s product market. When the market is very competitive (and profit
margins are low), the selling firm is in a weaker position to enforce payments and is therefore
more willing to allow delayed repayments to attract new customers or to prevent existing
customers from switching to a different supplier. The opposite is true when the supplier is a
monopolist. A similar theory provided by Fisman and Raturi (2004) argues that when a market is
6
concentrated, customers have less incentive to take specific up-front investments to establish
their creditworthiness, since they anticipate holdup problems in the future. It follows that trade
credit is lower than in competitive markets where alternative suppliers are available.
Another theory, related to the bargaining power hypothesis, but with an opposite
prediction, is Cunat (2007). Motivated by high substitution costs, his model predicts higher
levels of trade credit when competition is low (buyers and suppliers are in a sort of bilateral
monopoly). According to Cunat (2007), intermediate goods tailored to the specific needs of the
buyer make both suppliers and customers difficult to substitute. This theory has two implications
for our analysis: First, it shows that product characteristics, like standardization, can affect the
degree of effective competition faced by the supplier and, more generally, the bargaining power
of the supplier vis-à-vis the customer. Second, in contrast to Wilner (2000) and Fisman and
Raturi (2004), this theory predicts lower trade credit when competition is higher.
Our empirical strategy aims to identify the effect of the firm‟s relative bargaining power
on the decision to extend trade credit, the amount of trade credit offered and trade credit terms,
by distinguishing between product sources of bargaining power, e.g. Cunat (2007), and market
sources, e.g. Wilner (2000) and Fisman and Raturi (2004). We proceed by testing the following
model:
Account Receivable (AR) indicators = f {Firm characteristics, Bargaining Power
(BP) indicators}
(1)
2.2 The “Supply Chain” and “Matching Maturity” Hypotheses
By offering credit to its customers, the firm postpones its receipt of cash payments and
therefore needs to finance its own provision of credit. The firm can use internal resources, like
retained earnings, or alternatively bank credit, if they have access to external finance. According
7
to previous literature (Frank and Maksimovic 2005, Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen, 2011),
firms that are bank credit constrained should extend less trade credit. As an extension of this
argument, credit constrained firms should extend shorter terms, as well as firms dependent on
more costly financing, such as family and informal loans.
Borrowing from the literature on the matching maturity of firm‟s asset and liabilities
(Diamond, 1991 and Hart and Moore, 1991), we provide as an additional source of financing the
"Supply Chain" hypothesis: Firms can finance their extension of trade credit (accounts
receivables) with trade credit from their own suppliers (accounts payables). Trade credit can be
an attractive source of funds for several reasons. First, trade credit is simple and convenient to
use because it has low transaction costs. For example, in general no additional paperwork is
required, as would be the case for a bank loan. Moreover, it is a flexible source of funds and can
be used as needed. For instance, firms can pre-pay outstanding payables to suppliers if its
customers remit early.
An extension of the "Supply Chain" argument is that firms aim to match the maturity of
their trade credit assets and liabilities (the “Matching Maturity” hypothesis). Once a firm has
decided to use payables to finance its receivables, the firm must set specific credit terms. In
principle, firms could try to extend the delay of payment of their inputs as far as possible.
However this strategy can be expensive for the firm if a large discount for early payments has
been offered or it can endanger the firm‟s supply chain if this request puts the supplier in
financial distress. In both cases, a firm might have incentive to negotiate credit terms just long
enough to finance its own credit extension, or equal to the maturity of its receivables. This would
also allow the firm to eliminate the financial risk due to future changes in interest rates. This
strategy implies that accounts payable can be used to optimally hedge receivables risk. We
8
empirically test the "Supply Chain" and “Matching Maturity” hypotheses, by estimating the
following model:
AR indicators = f {Firm characteristics, Financial characteristics, BP indicators,
AP indicators}
(2)
2.3 Interactive Effects
2.3.1 Financial Constraints
The availability of internal or external sources of funds is likely to affect the need to rely
on the matching strategy. As an extreme case, payables might be the only source of funds
available to a firm. We thus include the interaction between access to various sources of internal
and external financing and accounts payable to test whether credit constrained firms or firms
with less access to internal or external financing depend more on matching the terms of payables
and receivables:
AR indicators = f {Firm characteristics, Financial Characteristics, BP indicators,
AP indicators, Interaction of Financial and AP indicators}
(3)
2.3.2. Bargaining Power
As for the down-stream market, the ability of a firm to receive the desired amount and
maturity of payables increases when its bargaining power vis-a-vis its supplier (up-steam market)
is stronger. It follows that firms are more likely to match the terms of receivables with payables
when they are in a strong position in the firm/supplier bargaining relationship, which again is
more likely when the up-stream market is competitive. We therefore include the interaction
terms of market structure and accounts payable to test whether firms operating in more
competitive markets are more likely to match payables and receivables:
AR indicators = f {Firm characteristics, BP indicators, AP indicators,
Interaction of BP and AP indicators}
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(4)
3. Data and Summary Statistics
We use firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms, which was collected as part of the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank with partners in 76 developed and
developing countries.4 The dataset includes a large, randomly selected sample of firms across 12
two-digit manufacturing and service sectors. The surveys include both quantitative and
qualitative information on barriers to growth, including sources of finance, regulatory burdens,
innovations, access to infrastructure services, legal difficulties, and corruption. One limitation of
the database is that only limited accounting (balance sheet) data is surveyed. In addition, in
many countries (including China) the survey excludes firms with less than four years of age, in
order to complete questions on firm performance and behavior relative to three-years earlier.
We use the 2003 World Bank Enterprise Survey for China5, which is the only country
survey to include detailed questions on supply chain terms, as well as additional questions on the
market environment, such as the number and importance of supplier and customer relationships.
For the purpose of our analysis, the key questions regard the extension and terms of trade credit.
Importantly, the survey asks both (i) whether firms offer trade credit to customers and (ii)
whether customers accept trade credit from the firm. From our sample of 2,400 firms, 2,295
firms report whether or not they extend trade credit to their customers.6
Table 1 shows variable names, definitions, and means for all variables. We include
measures of trade credit, general firm characteristics, indicators of market power of the firm
(relative to its customers and to its suppliers), financial characteristics, and indicators of the
4
The survey instrument and data are available at: www.enterprisesurveys.org.
For additional information on the World Bank Enterprise Survey for China see Ayyagari, et al. (2010).
6
We also exclude from our sample 157 firms that provide financial services.
5
10
collateral value of goods sold and customer creditworthiness. Detailed summary statistics are
shown in Table 2 (the full sample) and Table 3 (disaggregated by firms that do and do not offer
trade credit). Table 4 shows a correlation matrix of our explanatory variables.
3.1 Trade credit variables
Our main dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm offers trade
credit (accounts receivable), and zero otherwise (AR_d). We find that 39% of firms in our
sample offer trade credit, and that the average percentage of goods sold on credit is 14%
(AR_per); within the subsample of firms that offer trade credit, the average volume of credit
extended represents about 35% of sales.
On average, firms that extend trade credit offer
customers about one month to pay: AR_days is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm offers a
payment period equal or larger than 30 days, and zero otherwise. Finally, we find that 20% of
firms that offer trade credit offer a prepayment discount on credit to their customers
(AR_discount).
Next, we examine firms‟ use of trade credit from their own suppliers, accounts payable
(AP). We find that 45% of firms use AP (AP_d), and the average percentage of supplies
financed with credit is about 10% (AP_per); within the sample of firms that use AP, credit used
equals about 20% of input purchases.7 Similar to accounts receivable, the median term of
payables is approximately one month (AP_days). We also find that about 7% of firms that use
trade credit are offered a prepayment discount on credit from their suppliers (AP_discount).
Table 3 shows that 62% of firms that extend trade credit to their customers receive credit from
their suppliers, while only 34% of firms that do not extend credit use payables; this difference is
7
For the sample of firms with available balance sheet information, we confirm that firms using supplier financing
report positive accounts payable and viceversa. We corrected AP_d in one case where the firm reported not
purchasing inputs on credit but it had a positive value for accounts payable.
11
significant at 1%. Furthermore, a first glance at the data also shows significant differences in
payment terms. For example, 36% of firms that extend trade credit to their customers are offered
a payment period longer than 30 days before their own suppliers imposes penalties, while firms
that do not extend credit receive shorter payment periods; this difference is significant at 1%.
3.1.1 Sample comparisons
We perform a number of robustness tests to verify that our sample is nationally
representative of China and we compare the use of trade credit in China with the one in
developing and developed economies. First, we compare our sample to Cull et al. (2008), who
use a large panel datasets of over 100,000 industrial Chinese firms and find that the average
percentage of sales financed by accounts receivable in their sample of domestic private firms in
2003 is 18% (their dataset does not include additional contract information or information on
accounts payables). This compares to 22% in our sample of firms (AR_per), which indicates that
our random sample of Chinese firms is nationally representative.
We also find that the use of trade credit in China is comparable to other countries. For
example, using the complete World Bank Enterprise Survey database of over 100 developed and
developing countries, we find that the average number of firms using trade credit for working
capital or investment purposes (the only comparative variable available across countries) is 45%
in China, and 51% for the complete sample. In addition, the average percentage of trade credit
used for working capital purposes (averaged across firms that use trade credit) is 48% of total
working capital financing in China, versus 44% for the complete sample.
However, the use of trade credit in the U.S. is about two times the use in China.
According to the Federal Reserve Survey of Small Business Financing (SSBF) database of U.S.
12
firms, about 65% of firms use trade credit to finance supplier purchases (20% more than in our
sample of Chinese firms). In addition, the percentage of purchases made using trade credit is
20% among U.S. SMEs that use trade credit from suppliers (versus 10% in our sample of
Chinese firms) and only 20% of firms that use trade credit are offered an early payment discount
from their suppliers (in comparison to 7% in our sample of Chinese firms).8 It is interesting to
note that even in the U.S., about 80% of trade credit contracts do not include a pre-payment
discount – which suggests that trade credit might in fact be a relatively cheap source of financing
across both developed and developing countries.
We believe that our results shed light on trade credit behavior more broadly than the
Chinese market. Unique features of the Chinese economy – such as the bias towards stateowned banks and state-owned firms – have been decreasing since 2001 (two years before our
survey takes place) and we carefully address related potential biases. Moreover, there are no
country-specific regulations on inter-firm financing. Finally, when we replicate our main results
using data for Brazil, we find additional support for both the market power and the matching
story found in China.9
3.2 Firm and industry characteristics
We include in all regressions some general firm characteristics, which are likely to be
associated with trade credit. First, the log number of years since the firm was established (Age).
Second, we use as a proxy for firm size the log number of total employees (including contractual
employees) (Emp). All our empirical results are robust to using alternative measures of firm size,
such as dummies indicating small, medium, and large firms. Likewise, we get similar results if
8
All U.S. data is cited from Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2009.
Results available upon request. Unfortunately data for Brazil does not include as detailed information on supply
chain contracts; therefore, we use data for Brazil as only a further robustness check for the evidence found in China.
9
13
we replace the log of total employment with the log of total sales, although we are less
comfortable using accounting data because of the large number of missing observations and
unaudited firms in our sample. Third, we include the log of the number of customers in the
firm‟s main business line (N_customers), to control for any intrinsic relationship component of
trade credit. This component would imply a mechanical relation between trade credit and number
of customers that, if omitted, could bias our results Forth, we include a dummy variable equal to
one if the percentage of the firm owned by foreign individuals, foreign investors, foreign firms,
and foreign banks is greater than 50%, and equal to zero otherwise (Foreign). Fifth, we include a
dummy variable equal to one if the percentage of the firm owned by the government (national,
state, and local, and cooperative/collective enterprises) is greater than 50% (State). We include
these ownership dummy variables to control for possible preferential access to financing from
foreign and state-owned banks, respectively. It might also be the case that foreign and stateowned firms have preferential foreign and government product markets, respectively, and are not
as sensitive to market competition. In our sample, 7% of firms are foreign owned, while 23% are
state owned. All results are robust to using a 30% cutoff to identify foreign and state ownership.
Sixth, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm sells its products abroad, and equal
to zero otherwise (Export). We include this variable to control for possible differences in trade
credit use among national and foreign customers. In our sample, 9% of firms are identified as
exporters. We also include in all regressions 17 city dummies.
Finally, we are concerned that trade credit patterns within supply chains might be driven
by industry characteristics. For instance, there might be “industry standards” which set the
percentage and terms of trade credit. If these standards are similar for the up-stream and
downstream market or if firms have customers and suppliers in the same industry, then it is
14
likely that trade credit given and taken are correlated. To control for that, all regressions include
12 “industry” dummies that correspond to 2-digit NACE codes, which is the finest level of
available sector classification.10
Additional detailed information is available on the firm‟s “main business” line. However,
this information is difficult to use in our regression analysis since it includes 1,818 descriptions
and 99% of these classifications describe only one firm. Nevertheless, we studied the trade
credit patters of firms within a few classifications with more than 10 firms – and found no
“systematic” patterns. For instance, 33 firms are classified as “dress manufacturing.” On
average, 31% of firms extend trade credit and 53% of firms receive trade credit. For the 11 firms
that extend trade credit to their customers, the percentage of sales offered ranges from 10% to
100% (the median is 20%); terms offered include 3, 4, 10, 30, 40, and 90 days; and three firms
offer a discount. Examinations of additional narrow industry classifications found similar
disparities across firms.11 This exercise suggests that trade credit use and terms are not driven
solely by product characteristics and further motivates our search for additional explanations.
3.3 Bargaining Power in the input and output markets
Our next set of variables measures the bargaining power of the firm with respect to its
customers. We distinguish between market and product sources of bargaining power. First, we
measure the importance of the firm‟s largest customer with the percent of total sales that
normally goes to the firm‟s largest customer (Sales_largest_cust). A higher value suggests that
the firm‟s largest customer is important to its overall revenue and that the firm‟s bargaining
power is weak, relative to its customers.
10
11
Similarly, Giannetti, et al. (2009) use 2-digit industry classifications to identify product specificity.
Additional industries available upon request.
15
Second, we measure the importance of the firm for its largest customer with the number
of suppliers used by the firm‟s largest customer (No_supl_cust). If the customer uses many
suppliers, it is less dependent on the firm – i.e. ending the relationship poses less of a risk of a
holdup problem – and consequently less market power for the firm, relative to its customers.
Third, we construct a Herfindal Index to measure the degree of competition in the domestic
market for the main business line. Specifically, for the main business line we know the
percentage of total sales in the domestic market supplied by the firm and by its main competitor
and the total number of competitors in this market. Unfortunately this information is only
available for a sub-sample of firms. Given that we do not know the market shares of all the
competitors (but the main one), we assume that they are all equal. 12 This assumption implies that
our continuous variable is an imprecise measure of domestic market concentration. As a result,
we use a dummy equal to one if the Herfindal Index is larger than the median value and zero
otherwise (Herfindal). A positive Herfindal implies a more concentrated market and therefore
less competition.
As a measure of bargaining power, we also include a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm has introduced a new product (or service) or business line in the past year, assuming that
this would require the firm to compete with a new product (New_product). Moreover, we proxy
for broader changes in the competitive landscape with a dummy equal to one if on average, and
relative to the average of the last year, the firm has lowered prices on its main business line,
which we assume was done in response to greater competitive pressures in the market
(Lowered_price). As shown in Table 3, in bivariate tests, firms operating in more competitive
12
The Herfindal Index (HI) is calculated as follows: HI =(x/100)2+(y/100)2+(Ncomp -1)*((100-x-y)/(100*(Ncomp1)))2, where x and y are the firm and the main competitor market shares, respectively, and` Ncomp is the total
number of competitors.
16
environments – using all measures of market power – are more likely to extend trade credit to
customers.
The relative bargaining power of the firm might also depend on the strength of the sellerbuyer relationship, which in turn can be related to product characteristics. n line with Cunat
(2007), we measure the strength of the seller-buyer relationship with the percentage of sales
made to the clients‟ unique specification (Customized) or alternatively with the length of the
relationship between the supplier and the customer (Age_rel_cust). The higher the percentage of
sales of customized goods and the longer the trade relationship, the higher the switching costs for
both supplier and customer and therefore the lower the competition (buyers and suppliers are in a
sort of monopoly power). Finally, we measure the bargaining power in the input and output
markets simultaneously. Our dataset includes unique qualitative and quantitative information on
the bargaining power of manufacturing firms in relation to both their customers and their
suppliers. First, we construct a dummy variable that measures the bargaining power of a firm
relative to its suppliers (Main_customer), which is equal to one if the firm is the most important
customer of its main supplier and zero otherwise. We compare this variable to the bargaining
power of a firm relative to its customers, measured by whether the firm‟s largest customer
accounts for more than 5% of sales (the median value). We also consider alternative thresholds
like 10% or 30% of total sales.
In our sample, 751 of 1,762 firms (43%) have weak bargaining power relative to their
customers (Sales_largest_cust is larger than 5%), and 637 of 1,514 firms (42%) are in a strong
position relative to their suppliers (Main_customer equals one). Firms with available information
on both sides of the markets are 1,205: 29% of firms have weak bargaining power relative to
their customers and strong market power relative to their suppliers; 37% of these firms have
17
weak bargaining power relative to both their customers and their suppliers; 14% of firms have
strong bargaining power relative to their customers and strong market power relative to their
suppliers; finally, 20% of these firms have strong bargaining power relative to their customers
and weak market power relative to their suppliers. The correlation between the market power in
the input and output markets is slightly negative (–0.0289) but not significantly different from
zero, suggesting that there is no correlation between the strength of the contractual position of a
firm in their input and output markets.
We use this information in two ways. First, we construct a new dummy variable (Bi_BP),
to measure the bargaining power in the input and output markets simultaneously. As visualized
in Fig. 1, we hypothesize that the most likely scenario for a firm to use its own payables to
finance its receivables – and match payment terms – is in the case where a firm is in the strong
position to demand trade credit from its suppliers, but must offer trade credit from a weak
position relative to its customers („Box 4‟). Hence, Bi_BP takes value equal to one if two
conditions are satisfied: First, the proportion of total sales that normally goes to the firm‟s largest
customer is greater than 5%, which indicates that the firm has weak bargaining power towards its
customer (Sales_largest_cust is larger than 5%).
Second, the firm is the most important
customer of its main supplier, i.e. the firm has strong bargaining power towards its supplier. In
the remaining cases („Boxes 1, 2, and 3‟), the variable is assumed to be zero. Second, without
assuming any particular order of the four markets in the table, we construct four different dummy
variables: Bi_BP_d1 takes value equal to the one if the firm is located in „Box 1‟and zero
otherwise; Bi_BP_d2 equal to one if located in „Box 2‟ and zero otherwise; Bi_BP_d3 equal to
one if located in „Box 3‟ and zero otherwise, Bi_BP_d4 equal to one if located in „Box 4‟ and
zero otherwise.
18
Figure 1: Bargaining Power (BP) of the firm in up-stream and down-stream markets
High BP towards customer
Sales_largest_cust<5%
Low BP towards supplier
Main_customer =0
High BP towards supplier
Main_customer =1
Low BP towards customer
Sales_largest_cust>5%
Box 1
Box 2
Box 3
Box 4
3.4 Financial variables
Next, we include various measures of financial liquidity. We use the percentage of
unused line of credit, equal to zero if the firm does not have a line of bank credit (LC_unused),
which is 7% on average. Less than 30% of firms have access to a line of credit from the banking
sector, and on average, firms that have a line of credit have 26% unused. The low-level of
financial access to formal credit market might suggest that many Chinese firms are credit
constrained. We also include two dummy variables equal to one if the firm uses local or foreign
bank financing (Bank) and family or informal credit (Fam/Informal). Finally, since we do not
have balance sheet information on cash holdings, we measure the availability of internal
resources by using a dummy variable equal to one if the firm uses retained earnings to finance
working capital or investment (RE). Bivariate tests find that firms that extend trade credit are
significantly more likely to have a larger unused line of credit and positive retained earnings.
4. Results
Regressions are shown in Tables 5 to 9. All regressions control for general firm
characteristics. Consistently, we find that larger firms are more likely to extend trade credit,
which might be related to their longer and more established customer and supplier relationships.
Moreover, younger firms are more likely to offer trade credit, which can be due to the fact that
new firms face stronger competition when entering the product market. Our finding that larger
19
and younger firms offer more trade credit is not necessarily counterintuitive in a developing
country context, where firms often remain small over time (and fail to grow as they age); for
instance, the correlation between firm size and age in our sample is only 0.30 percent. 13 Firms
are also more likely to offer trade credit the higher the number of customers. We find that firms
where foreign shareholders (individuals or institutional investors or firms) have the majority of
the firm equity have a higher probability to offer trade credit, while no relationship is found
between foreign ownership and the amount of trade credit and credit terms. 14 There is also some
evidence that exporting firms have a lower probability of offering trade credit; this might be
explained by the difficulty in collecting late payments overseas or litigating in a foreign court. In
general, however, we find no consistent significant relationship with state ownership.
Table 5 Panel A shows that various measures of weaker market power have a positive
and statistically significant effect on the decision to offer trade credit. For instance, the larger the
percentage of sales to the largest customer, or the larger the number of suppliers of the firm‟s
most important customer, or the lower the degree of concentration of the domestic market, the
more likely are firms to extend trade credit. In addition, firms that have introduced new products
or lowered prices in the past year are more likely to extend trade credit.
The finding that firms introducing new products are more likely to extend trade credit
could also be interpreted as evidence of the quality warranty theory, as suggested in Long, Malitz
and Ravid (1993) and Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011). Since a new product involves quality
uncertainty, trade credit could be offered to give the buyer the possibility to check the product
quality before the payment is due. Alternatively, in line with Lee and Stowe (1993), the
13
For additional discussion, see Klapper, et al. (2006), which shows that the relationship between age and size
(measured by value added) is smaller in countries with weaker business environments.
14
If we identify foreign-owned firms using a 30% cutoff, we find a positive and significant relationship with the
percentage of trade credit offered.
20
New_product variable could be interpreted as a proxy for complexity, suggesting that product
risk and asymmetric information on the product market that increase with complexity could
explain why firms offer trade credit. We can rule out these alternative interpretations by
controlling for the percentage of sales carrying a warrantee (Warranty) and for the percentage of
products that are certified (Certified). Both variables are likely to capture the need of quality
checking and more generally the degree of asymmetric information between buyer and seller and
its effect on trade credit. Results are reported in Table 5 columns (8) and (9) of Panel A. We find
that New_product is still significant with the expected sign, while selling products with a
warranty or selling certified products do not significantly affect the decision to offer trade credit.
Panel B of Table 5 includes product characteristics as a determinant of trade credit use.
According to Cunat (2007), suppliers extend more trade credit when intermediate goods are
specific to the buyer‟s needs or when the seller-customer relationship is longer. In both cases,
suppliers and customers are difficult to be substituted and thus create a sort of bilateral
monopoly. First, we include a precise measure of product specificity - the percentage of sales of
customized goods (Customized).15 Column 1 shows that selling a larger proportion of customized
goods does not have a significant effect on the decision to offer trade credit. The same result
holds when N_customers is removed to take into account potential bias due to the correlation
between the two variables (Column2). Selling customized goods could become relevant for trade
credit decisions only when the percentage of customized goods is high enough, i.e. its effect
could be non-linear. In Columns 3 and 4, we thus divide our sample in two sub-samples, using
the percentage of sales of customized goods equal to 50% (corresponding to 40% of the
15
One could argue that the number of customers (N_customers), already included in our regressions, also measures
the degree of product specialization/standardization. The idea would be that if a firm has only few customers, it
might be providing a specific good or service to a larger customer. Under this interpretation, our previous results
would suggest that firms supplying many goods (likely non-customized goods) face more competition and thus offer
less trade credit, which is in line with our bargaining power hypothesis.
21
distribution) as a threshold. While in Column 3 the coefficient is not significant, in Column 4 it
is statistically significant but with a negative sign: Firms selling customized products are less
likely to offer trade credit, in line with our previous evidence and with our bargaining power
hypothesis. Another possible explanation for the negative sign could be that the variable
Customized captures the illiquidity of the good, rather than the lack of competition. If the good is
made to the client‟s unique specification it can not easily resold in a secondary market. n that
case, firms are less likely to offer trade credit, consistently with previous theories (Fabbri and
Menichini, 2010) and evidence (Giannetti et al., 2011) on the role of collateral in supplier‟s
lending. Next, we do not find evidence that longer seller-customer relationships affect trade
credit supply (Column 5).
Finally, one could argue that the significance of Sales_largest_cust is consistent with
product specificity having a positive effect on trade credit supply, if more sales going to the
largest customer implies more customized goods. Column 6 of Panel B shows that the effect of
Sales_largest_cust still holds after controlling for the presence of customized goods and the
length of the buyer-seller relationship.
Table 6 investigates the effect of bargaining power on the percentage of sales financed
with credit (AR_per) and on trade credit terms, including the payment period offered (AR_days)
and the decision to offer a prepayment discount (AR_discount). Panel A uses the percentage of
sales of the largest customer (Sales_largest_cust) as a measure of bargaining power and shows
that when firms face an increase of competition in the product market, they allow customers to
pay a larger share of sales on account, extend the payment period before imposing penalties, and
are less likely to offer a prepayment discount, although this last effect is significant only at the 12
22
percent level. Panel B of Table 6 replicates the same analysis of Panel A using Lower_price as a
measure of bargaining power. The results are qualitatively the same.
Overall our findings are consistent with the idea that trade credit might be used as a
competitive device to reduce actual competition or to prevent entry. In both cases, trade credit
becomes crucial for the survival of the firm. A one standard deviation increment in product
market competition (measured by Sales_largest_cust) increases the likelihood to offer trade
credit (AR_dum) by about 0.018 percentage points, which corresponds to 5% of the average
likelihood. The same shock also increases the share of goods sold on credit (AR_per) by 2.7
percentage points, which corresponds to 19% of the average amount of trade credit offered. Both
figures suggest that the economic effect of competition on trade credit supply is economically
relevant. This would explain why even small firms without access to bank credit might still want
to extend trade credit to their customers.
Firms have different channels to finance the supply of trade credit, such as external
financing (bank credit or informal sources), internal resources (retained earnings), or
alternatively, credit from suppliers (accounts payable). Next, we examine the importance of a
firm‟s access to finance from its own suppliers on its decision to extend credit to its customers,
after controlling for other potential sources of accounts receivable financing. Table 7, Panels A
and B, document the relevance of each source of financing. As shown in Panel A, unused bank
credit lines (LC_unused) does not appear to have an effect on the likelihood to offer trade credit,
the percentage of sales financed by trade credit, the length of the payment period, or the offer of
a pre-payment discount.16 We also include dummy variables indicating whether the firm uses
retained earnings, bank financing, and informal or family sources of financing, and find
16
Note that the regressions using trade credit terms – AR_days and AR_discount – only include firms that offer trade
credit (i.e AR_d=0).
23
consistently that even after including these variables, only accounts payable terms are significant.
Our results are also robust to the inclusion of a dummy indicating positive profitability (not
shown).17
The most intriguing result of Table 7 is the robust finding that firms use accounts payable
to finance the provision of accounts receivable and that firms “match maturity” of trade credit
received from their own suppliers with the terms offered to their customers. We find very large
and significant relationships between the decision to offer and the use of trade credit; the
percentage of inputs purchased on credit and the percentage of goods sold on credit; and the
number of days extended to customers and the ones received from suppliers. A discrete change
in the decision to take trade credit (AP_dum) would double the firm‟s average likelihood to offer
trade credit (AR_dum). A one standard deviation increment in the percentage of inputs purchased
on credit (AP_per) more than doubles the average percentage of goods sold on credit. A discrete
change in the likelihood to receive a payment period longer than 30 days from suppliers
(AP_days) increases by 28% the firm‟ likelihood to offer the same payment period to its
customers (AR_days). These figures suggest that changes in the contract terms received by
suppliers have a significant economic impact on the contract terms offered by firms to their
customers.
A possible concern about the findings in Table 7 could be that omitted product or market
characteristics are likely to affect the suitability of a product for trade credit. If these
characteristics are similar for the up-stream and down-stream markets, then trade credit given
and taken are likely to be correlated. Our analysis already includes 12 sector dummies, 17 city
dummies and a measure of bargaining power of the firm towards its largest customer
(Sales_largest_cust). To address this issue further, we control for several product characteristics.
17
These results are also robust to the exclusion of accounts payable terms.
24
First, we add the percentage of customized goods (Customized). This variable could also be
interpreted as a proxy for liquidity. In fact, a customized good is not easily resalable in a
secondary market. Second, we control for the length of the buyer-seller relation (Age_rel_cust),
and third for the easiness of ensuring quality (Warrantee). The results are shown in Panel C of
Table 7: the matching story still holds.
Although the decision to extend trade credit is not significantly dependent on the
availability of internal and external financing, we do find that less liquid firms are significantly
more likely to extend trade credit if they receive credit from their own suppliers. Table 8 shows
our results. We find a significant effect of the interaction of the percentage of goods sold on
credit and our dummy indicating the use of bank financing, suggesting that firms with access to
bank financing rely less on accounts payable to finance the provision of trade credit to their own
customers. Moreover, the interaction term between the use of account payable (AP_d) and the
bank dummy is significant at 13%.
Table 8 also includes the interaction of accounts payable terms and dummies indicating
the use of retained earnings as a source of financing. Also, in this case, we find some interesting
and significant terms: the coefficient on the interaction between the use of account payable
(AP_d) and retained earnings (RE) is significantly negative, suggesting that firms with positive
retained earnings rely less on accounts payable to finance the provision of trade credit to their
own customers. All our results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of bargaining power and
several product characteristics, as shown in column (2), (4), (6), (8) of Table 8. Similar results
also hold if we look at trade credit terms (maturity and prepayment discounts, not shown).
Finally, Table 9 Panel A, shows that the extent to which firms match accounts payable
with accounts receivable depends on the bargaining power enjoyed simultaneously in the input
25
and output markets. In particular, the coefficients of the interaction term between our index of
bargaining power in both markets - Bi_BP - and the decision to offer trade credit or the share of
sales financed by trade credit – AR_dum and AR_per – are positive and statistically significant.
These findings suggest that our supply chain hypothesis is most likely to hold when firms need to
offer trade credit to their customers (as a competitive gesture), but have enough bargaining
power with suppliers to set their own credit conditions.18 Similar results are obtained when we
control for product characteristics (see columns (3) and (4) of Panel A).
One possible concern could be that this result is driven by the definition of the index of
bargaining power. To address this issue we proceed in two ways. First, we use alternative
definitions of the index (Bi_BP). While in columns (1)-(4) of Panel A, the threshold used to
define firms with low bargaining power in the product market is Sales_largest_cust equal or
larger than 5%, we use the 10% threshold in columns (5) and (6), and the 30% in the last two
columns. The coefficient of the interaction terms retains a positive sign and is statistically
significance in all specifications, with the significance increasing in the thresholds used. As a
further robustness check, we substitute our index with a list of four dummies capturing firms
located in each one of the four different market structures represented in Fig. 1. The dummy
Bi_BP_d4 captures firms with low bargaining power in the down-stream market and high
bargaining power in the up-stream market. We expect these firms to be more likely to match
payables with receivables than firms in the other three markets. Results are shown in Panel B of
Table 9. Columns (1) and (2) include the four dummies (Bi_BP_d1 is the default dummy)
without the interaction terms. None of the dummies is significant at the standard levels. When
we include the interactions terms (columns (3) and (4)), we find that they are all positive and
18
Notice that the variable Bi-BP is only available for the sub-sample of manufacturing firms. All results for all
tables are robust for the subsample of manufacturing firms.
26
statistically significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to match payables with receivables
when moving from market 1 to any of other three markets. However, the coefficient of the
interaction terms with market 4 - AP_d*Bi_BP_d4 and AP_per*Bi_BP_d4 - has the highest
economic and statistic significance. This finding suggests that firms with low bargaining power
in the down-stream market and high in the up-stream one are the most likely to match maturities.
This evidence is also robust to the inclusion of product characteristics (result not reported).
Finally, we perform a series of important robustness tests. We find that our results still
hold if we restrict the sample to only manufacturing firms, profitable firms (Profit_d=1), firms
with state ownership (national, state, and local, and cooperative/collective enterprises) lower than
50% (State=0), or to non-exporter firms (Export=0). Our results are also robust to the inclusion
of a dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a government sponsored industrial park,
science park, or Export Promotion Zone (EPZ).19
Next, although our data set generally provides only cross-sectional firm-level data for one
year, some questions in the survey refer to past firm activity. These questions allow us to control
for some changes in firm policy that occurred in the past. For example, the variable New_product
included in our regressions reflects whether a firm has introduced new products (or services) in
the past year and may proxy for changes in the firm‟s investment policy.
n addition, limited
accounting information is available, both for the current and previous years. We use this
information to control for potential idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level. For example, we
construct a set of dummy variables to control for whether the firm increased sales or fixed assets
in the past three years. These dummies are insignificant and do not affect our main results.
19
Regression results available upon request.
27
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence presented in the previous section raises some important questions. For
example, why do we find, contrary to previous literature, that credit constraints (LC_unused) do
not seem to affect the decision to offer trade credit either directly or indirectly through the
interactions with accounts payable? A possible explanation could be that the percentage of
unused credit lines does not necessarily capture the tightness of credit constraints. Firms are
required to pay fees on the proportion of unused credit lines and therefore have incentive to
reduce the unused portion. It follows that a fully used credit line does not necessarily identify a
credit constrained firm. However, when instead we include a dummy indicating the availability
of bank credit (both from local and foreign commercial banks), we find that firms with external
bank finance rely less on accounts payable to finance the provision of trade credit, but again no
direct and significant effect is found for the decision to extend credit or the amount of trade
credit offered.
Another possible explanation could be that trade credit is not necessarily more expensive
than bank credit. The central question then becomes how costly trade credit is, relative to bank
financing. Conventional wisdom is that trade credit is primarily a financing of “last resort“ for
firms that have exhausted or unable to access bank credit. However, some more recent papers
challenge this view. For example, Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen (2011) document that a
majority of the U.S. and European firms in their sample appear to receive cheap trade credit.
Similarly, Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) argue that there is no evidence that sellers use
“extravagant cash discounts” in Japan, while Marotta (2005) document that trade credit provided
by Italian manufacturing firms is only slightly, if at all, more expensive than bank credit. Our
findings are in line with this recent evidence.
28
Our result on the role of market competition raises another question: If competition is a
main driver behind the decision to offer trade credit, why do firms not simply reduce the product
price instead of offering a trade credit discount? A price reduction is not necessarily simpler
than offering trade credit. A price reduction is observable by competitors and can trigger their
immediate reaction by causing a price war that can be detrimental for the full industry. Trade
credit is a less aggressive and more flexible instrument. The two instruments – price reduction
and supply of trade credit - could also be used as complement strategies. The finding in Table 5 firms which lowered their prices relative to the previous year are more likely to offer trade credit
- could also be interpreted along this line.
To conclude, this paper uses firm-level data on about 2,500 Chinese firms to study the
decision to extend trade credit. Supplier financing is often overlooked in the capital structure
literature, although it is arguably the most important source of financing for small and medium
sized enterprises – particularly in countries with less developed financial and information
systems. We show that firms use trade credit as a competitive gesture. More specifically, firms
with weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis their customers, for example because of a highly
competitive output market, are more likely to offer trade credit and better credit terms.
Moreover, firms are likely to depend on credit from their own suppliers to finance the extension
of trade credit to their customers and to match credit terms between accounts payable and
receivable. This matching practice is largely used by illiquid firms and by firms facing high
competition in both the output market (firms need to extend trade credit to win competitors) and
in the input market (firms can get favourable terms from their suppliers). This evidence
highlights the importance to go beyond a simple bilateral supplier-customer relationship towards
a theory of trade credit where each firm is part of a supply chain financing.
29
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31
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Mean Statistics
Variable Name
Definition
Mean
Measures of Trade Credit
AR_dum
AR_per
AR_days
AR_discount
AP_dum
AP_per
AP_days
AP_discount
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers credit to its customers (i.e.
accounts receivable), =0 if the firm does not offer trade credit
The percent of monthly sales sold on credit
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers a number of days larger than
30 (median) before imposing penalties to its customers , =0
otherwise (and = . if AR_dum is =0)
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm offers a pre-payment discount on
credit to its customers, =0 otherwise (and = . if AR_dum is =0)
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm uses supplier credit (i.e. accounts
payable) to purchase inputs, =0 otherwise
The percent of inputs purchased on credit (based on period
averages), = 0 if the firm does not use trade credit
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the number of days the firm is allowed to use
the credit before its suppliers impose penalties is larger than 30
(median).
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm received a pre-payment discount on
credit from its suppliers, =0 otherwise (and = . if AP_dum is =0)
0.39
14.02
0.50
0.20
0.45
9.58
31.67
0.07
General Firm Characteristics
Age
Emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Log number of years (+1) since the firm was established
Log average number of total employees (including contractual
employees)
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the percentage of the firm owned by foreign
individuals, foreign institutional investors, foreign firms, and
foreign banks is greater than 50, =0 otherwise
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the percentage of the firm owned by the
government (federal, state, local, and collective/cooperative
enterprises) is greater than 50, =0 otherwise
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm is exporting, =0 otherwise
Log number of customers the firm supplies its goods
32
2.57
4.94
0.07
0.23
0.09
3.41
Indicators of (Weaker) Bargaining Power of the Seller (relative to its Customers)
Sales_largest_cust
No_supl_cust
Herfindal
New_product
Lowered_price
Customized
Age_rel_customer
Bi_BP
Percent of total sales that normally goes to the firm‟s largest
customer
Number of suppliers used by the firm‟s largest customer
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the Herfindal Index in the domestic market for
the main business line is greater than 0.21 (the median), =0
otherwise.
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the firm has introduced new products (or
services) in the past year, =0 otherwise
Dummy (0/1), =1 if on average, and relative to the average of the
last year, the firm has lowered prices on its main business line, =0
otherwise
The percent of sales made to clients‟ unique specification (i.e. that
cannot be sold to other clients)
On average, how many years the firm has done business with its
clients in its main business line.
Dummy (0/1), =1 if the percent of total sales that normally goes to
the firm‟s largest customer is greater than 5% (i.e
Sales_largest_cust>5%), and the firm is the most important
customer of its largest supplier‟s, =0 otherwise.
25.27
9.49
0.50
0.42
0.48
37.53
4.10
0.29
Financial Characteristics
LC_unused
Bank
RE
Fam/Informal
The percent of the firm‟s line of credit or overdraft facility that is
currently unused (=0 if the firm does not have a line of credit or
overdraft facility)
Dummy (0/1), = 1 if the firm uses local or foreign bank financing
for working capital or investment
Dummy (0/1), = 1 if the firm uses retained earnings for working
capital or investment
Dummy (0/1), = 1 if the firm uses family or informal financing for
working capital or investment
0.07
0.49
0.36
0.20
Other Firm Characteristics
Warrantee
Certified
The percentage of sales carrying a warrantee
The percent of products that are certified
33
90.7
46.57
Table 2: Summary Statistics
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Variable Name
Obs.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
AR_dum
2,157
0.39
0.49
0.00
1.00
AR_per
2,184
14.02
27.97
0.00
100.00
AR_days
818
0.50
0.50
0.00
1.00
AR_discount
823
0.20
0.40
0.00
1.00
AP_dum
2,100
0.45
0.50
0.00
1.00
AP_per
2,069
9.58
21.41
0.00
100.00
AP_days
656
0.25
0.43
0.00
1.00
AP_discount
829
0.07
0.26
0.00
1.00
Age
2,243
2.57
0.74
1.39
3.99
Emp
2,239
4.94
1.48
0.00
11.16
Foreign
2,242
0.07
0.26
0.00
1.00
State
2,242
0.23
0.42
0.00
1.00
Export
2,265
0.09
0.28
0.00
1.00
N_customer
Sales_largest_cust
1,874
1,814
3.41
25.27
1.75
30.21
0.00
1.00
14.31
100.00
No_supl_cust
1,580
9.49
12.94
1.00
99
541
0.50
0.50
0.01
1.00
Lower_price
2,222
0.48
0.50
0.00
1.00
New_product
2,223
0.42
0.49
0.00
1.00
Customized
2,047
37.53
42.05
0.00
100.00
Age_rel_customer
2,201
4.10
1.27
1.00
5.00
Bi_BP
2,071
0.16
0.37
0.00
1.00
LC_unused
2,152
0.07
0.21
0.00
1.00
Bank
1,549
0.49
0.50
0.00
1.00
RE
1,457
0.36
0.48
0.00
1.00
Fam/Informal
1,421
0.20
0.40
0.00
1.00
Warrantee
2,138
90.70
25.17
0.00
100.00
Certified
2,065
46.57
45.79
0.00
100.00
Herfindal
34
Table 3: Mean Differences, by Trade Credit Supply
See Table 1 for variable definitions. t-statistics show the mean difference of firms that offer trade credit to customers
versus firms that do not offer trade credit to customers. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Variable Name
AR_dum=0
AR_dum=1
Sig.
AP_dum
0.34
0.62
***
AP_per
4.44
17.51
***
AP_days
0.16
0.36
***
AP_discount
0.05
0.09
**
Age
2.60
2.51
***
Emp
4.84
5.11
***
Foreign
0.06
0.10
***
State
0.24
0.19
***
Export
0.09
0.11
*
N_customer
3.68
26.03
***
Sales_largest_cust
3.22
25.1
No_supl_cust
0.42
0.56
***
Herfindal
0.30
0.34
***
New_product
0.36
0.51
***
Lower_price
0.41
0.60
***
Customized
37.45
37.60
Age_rel_cust
4.04
4.18
***
Bi_BP
0.26
0.33
***
LC_unused
0.06
0.09
***
Bank
0.49
0.52
RE
0.33
0.42
***
Fam/Informal
Warrantee
0.20
89.43
0.21
93.46
***
Certified
41.42
54.99
***
35
***
Table 4: Correlation Matrix
See Table 1 for variable definitions ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Explanatory Variables
(1)
1.00
0.51***
.
.
-0.07***
0.11***
0.05**
-0.12***
0.04*
0.08***
-0.04*
0.02
-0.00
0.12***
0.09***
-0.02
0.08***
0.10***
AP_dum(1)
AP_per (2)
AP_days (3)
AP_discount (4)
Age (5)
Emp (6)
Foreign (7)
State (8)
Export (9)
N_customer (10)
Saleslargest (11)
No_supl_cust (12)
Herfindal (13)
New_product (14)
Lower_price (15)
Customized (16)
Bi_BP (17)
LC_unused (18)
(2)
(3)
1.00
0.25***
0.02
-0.03
0.14***
0.12***
-0.08***
0.07***
0.03
0.09***
-0.03
-0.06
0.14***
0.11***
0.07***
0.16***
0.16***
1.00
0.09**
-0.00
0.16***
0.03
-0.04
0.06
0.02
0.13***
0.03
-0.14
**
***
0.15
0.15***
0.09*
0.15**
0.09**
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
1.00
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.06
-0.04
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.01
1.00
0.29***
-0.11***
0.40***
-0.08***
0.01
-0.05**
-0.01
-0.00
-0.06***
-0.05***
-0.06***
-0.03
-0.02
1.00
0.09***
0.21***
0.21***
0.22***
0.03
-0.06
-0.06
0.23***
0.06***
-0.04**
0.14***
0.20***
1.00
-0.15***
0.36***
-0.06**
0.16***
0.07*
0.07*
0.03
0.01
0.12***
0.07***
0.08***
(8)
(9)
1.00
-0.12***
0.03
-0.11***
0.03
0.01
-0.03
**
-0.07
-0.10***
-0.04*
0.00
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(16)
(15)
(17)
(18)
1.00
-0.06***
1.00
***
-0.16***
0.15
-0.05*
-0.03
0.18***
***
***
-0.06
***
0.06
0.15***
0.11***
0.10***
-0.11
***
0.19
0.06**
-0.27
***
-0.05
0.06
**
***
1.00
-0.14
***
0.07
-0.02
0.10***
0.34***
0.27***
0.01
1.00
-0.19
***
0.02
-0.01
-0.08
***
-0.06
**
-0.04
1.00
-0.14**
***
0.18
-0.00
-0.06
0.10**
1.00
0.22***
1.00
-0.00
0.12
***
0.16
***
0.07
0.15
0.08
***
***
1.00
0.07
***
***
0.00
1.00
0.08
***
1.00
Panel B: Dependent Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
AR_dum
0.27***
0.30***
0.23***
0.08**
-0.06***
0.09***
0.08***
-0.06***
0.04*
0.13***
0.02
0.02
-0.13***
0.15***
0.18***
0.00
0.09***
0.07***
AR_per
0.23***
0.35***
0.20***
0.00
-0.06***
0.10***
0.09***
-0.08***
0.12***
0.02
0.09***
-0.03
0.09**
0.14***
0.17***
0.03
0.13***
0.08***
0.01
0.05
0.08**
-0.04
0.00
AR_days
AR_discount
0.09
***
0.06
*
0.07
*
-0.02
0.14
**
-0.08
-0.02
0.13
***
-0.02
-0.03
0.09
***
-0.05
0.02
-0.00
0.02
-0.00
-0.01
0.05
37
0.12
***
-0.09
**
-0.02
-0.11
0.02
0.02
**
0.12*
0.00
0.16
***
0.01
0.08
*
-0.00
-0.10
***
Table 5: Trade Credit Supply and the Firm Bargaining Power (Panel A)
The reported estimates are from logit regressions. AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts
receivable. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city
dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Age
Emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
(1)
(2)
AR_dum
-0.22
[0.02]***
0.09
[0.06]*
0.49
[0.06]*
-0.04
[0.83]
-0.38
[0.11]
0.16
[0.00]***
0.08
[0.06]*
N_sup_cust
AR_dum
-0.09
[0.42]
-0.3
[0.64]
0.70
[0.01]***
-0.05
[0.79]
-0.44
[0.07]*
0.16
[0.00]***
(3)
Sales<10%
AR_dum
-0.16
[0.31]
0.10
[0.23]
0.17
[0.79]
0.11
[0.66]
0.21
[0.66]
0.21
[0.32]
(4)
Sales>=10%
AR_dum
-0.30
[0.04]**
0.08
[0.27]
1.02
[0.00]***
0.09
[0.72]
0.57
[0.11]
0.06
[0.32]
0.11
[0.09]*
-0.09
[0.32]
0.16
[0.08]*
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
AR_dum
-0.25
[0.11]
0.12
[0.14]
0.47
[0.18]
0.17
[0.52]
-0.18
[0.60]
0.14
[0.03]**
AR_dum
-0.12
[0.16]
0.06
[0.13]
0.52
[0.02]**
-0.01
[0.91]
-0.41
[0.04]**
0.13
[0.00]***
AR_dum
-0.13
[0.12]
0.05
[0.27]
0.47
[0.03]**
-0.04
[0.76]
-0.38
[0.06]*
0.13
[0.00]***
AR_dum
-0.11
[0.16]
0.04
[0.36]
0.48
[0.02]**
-0.03
[0.79]
-0.37
[0.06]*
0.13
[0.00]***
AR_dum
-0.09
[0.30]
0.04
[0.33]
0.50
[0.03]**
0.01
[0.94]
-0.36
[0.07]*
0.13
[0.00]***
0.21
[0.06]*
0.21
[0.06]*
0.001
[0.66]
0.20
[0.09]*
-0.49
[0.02]**
Herfindal
Lower_price
0.53
[0.00]***
New_product
Warrantee
Certified
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-2.77
[0.00]***
1,446
0.10
-1.88
[0.03]**
1,157
0.08
-2.66
[0.00]***
520
0.13
-2.72
[0.00]***
595
0.11
38
-14.29
[0.00]***
443
0.10
-2.85
[0.00]***
1,713
0.09
-2.54
[0.03]**
1,721
0.09
-2.57
[0.00]***
1,701
0.08
0.4e-03
[0.76]
-2.72
[0.00]***
1,610
0.08
Table 5: Trade Credit Supply and the Firm Bargaining Power (Panel B)
The reported estimates are from logit regressions. AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts
receivable. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city
dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Age
Emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Customized
(1)
(2)
(3)
Customized <
50%
(4)
Customized
>=50%
(5)
(6)
AR_dum
-0.10
[0.22]
0.03
[0.39]
0.49
[0.02]**
-0.02
[0.85]
-0.37
[0.07]*
0.15
[0.00]***
0.00
[0.62]
AR_dum
-0.20
[0.01]***
0.10
[0.01]**
0.39
[0.06]*
-0.05
[0.71]
-0.36
[0.06]*
AR_dum
-0.13
[0.23]
0.03
[0.51]
0.38
[0.31]
0.07
[0.70]
0.22
[0.45]
0.19
[0.00]***
0.00
[0.65]
AR_dum
-0.09
[0.54]
0.02
[0.77]
0.51
[0.08]*
-0.24
[0.36]
-0.56
[0.09]
0.09
[0.07]*
-0.01
[0.08]*
AR_dum
-0.14
[0.08]*
0.06
[0.14]
0.46
[0.03]**
0.04
[0.78]
-0.39
[0.06]*
0.14
[0.00]**
AR_dum
-0.19
[0.05]**
0.07
[0.16]
0.50
[0.05]**
-0.02
[0.86]
-0.39
[0.10]*
0.16
[0.00]***
0.00
[0.25]
0.04
[0.45]
0.07
[0.07]*
-3.15
[0.00]***
1,383
0.10
-0.00
[0.60]
Age_rel_cust
-0.02
[0.61]
Sales_largest_cust
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-2.51
[0.00]***
1,653
0.08
-1.99
[0.00]***
1,873
0.07
-2.93
[0.00]***
642
0.09
39
-1.19
[0.30]
1,011
0.11
-2.72
[0.00]***
1,714
0.08
Table 6: Trade Credit Supply and the Firm Bargaining Power (Panel A)
The reported estimates are from OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2) and from logit regressions in
columns (3)-(6) . AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if
the firm offers to its customers a number of days larger than 30 before imposing penalties. AR_discount is
a dummy indicating if the firm offers a pre-payment discount on credit to its customers. See Table 1 for
variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are
shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Age
Emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
(1)
AR_per
-2.42
[0.03]**
1.63
[0.00]***
3.12
[0.41]
-2.15
[0.23]
0.73
[0.83]
0.39
[0.35]
1.53
[0.00]***
Customized
Age_relation_cust
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-0.30
[0.95]
1,459
0.10
(2)
AR_per
-2.63
[0.02]**
1.56
[0.01]***
2.97
[0.44]
-2.30
[0.21]
0.52
[0.88]
0.36
[0.85]
1.41
[0.00]***
0.09
[0.88]
0.92
[0.07]*
-3.52
[0.56]
1,452
0.11
(3)
AR_days
-0.26
[0.11]
0.14
[0.08]*
-0.31
[0.32]
0.09
[0.75]
-0.03
[0.94]
-0.04
[0.58]
6.37e-03
[0.13]
566
0.13
40
(4)
AR_days
-0.24
[0.15]
0.15
[0.06]*
-0.25
[0.43]
0.09
[0.73]
0.05
[0.89]
-0.05
[0.49]
7.39e-03
[0.09]*
-0.18
[0.03]**
-0.04
[0.64]
-1.29
[0.41]
563
0.13
(5)
AR_discount
-0.02
[0.92]
-0.15
[0.19]
-0.28
[0.62]
-0.29
[0.40]
-0.25
[0.66]
0.06
[0.45]
-8.36e-03
[0.12]
550
0.13
(6)
AR_discount
-0.04
[0.86]
-0.16
[0.17]
-0.30
[0.60]
-0.28
[0.43]
-0.28
0.64
0.08
[0.43]
-8.60e-03
[0.12]
0.17
[0.13]
-3.8e-04
[0.99]
0.22
[0.86]
549
0.14
Table 6: Trade Credit Supply and the Firm Bargaining Power (Panel B)
The reported estimates are from OLS regressions in columns (1) and from logit regressions in columns (2
and (3). AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm
offers to its customers a number of days larger than 30 before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy
indicating if the firm offers a pre-payment discount on credit to its customers. See Table 1 for variable
definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown
in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Age
Emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Lower_price
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
(1)
AR_per
-1.62
[0.11]
1.30
[0.02]**
4.41
[0.20]
-2.40
[0.15]
2.45
[0.44]
0.04
[0.92]
5.64
[0.00]***
0.31
[0.95]
1,733
0.10
41
(2)
AR_days
-0.19
[0.17]
0.11
[0.14]
-0.13
[0.62]
0.25
[0.32]
0.45
[0.16]
-0.07
[0.17]
0.28
[0.12]
(3)
AR_discount
-0.05
[0.72]
-0.11
[0.23]
-0.05
[0.88]
-0.24
[0.43]
-0.40
[0.34]
0.08
[0.19]
-0.15
[0.52]
691
0.10
674
0.12
Table 7: Trade Credit Demand and Supply (Panel A)
The reported estimates are from logit in Columns (1), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8), and OLS in Columns (2)
and (6). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly
sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days
larger than 30 before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy indicating if the firm offers a prepayment discount on credit to its customers. Columns (3-4) and (7-8) include only the sub-sample of firms
that use accounts receivable. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector
dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1)
L_Age
L_emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
LC_unused
Bank
AP_dum
AP_per
AP_days
AP_discount
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Unused Line of Credit (LC_Unused)
Bank Financing (Bank)
AR_dum
AR_per
AR_days AR_discount AR_dum
AR_per
AR_days AR_discount
-0.18
-0.24
0.06
-2.36
-0.32
-196
-0.32
0.31
[0.07]*
[0.23]
[0.78
[0.04]**
[0.00**
[0.17]
[0.18]
[0.30]
0.04
0.14
-0.16
1.05
0.05
0.38
0.22
-2.25
[0.42]
[0.18]
[0.24
[0.08]*
[0.42
[0.62]
[0.07]*
[0.16]
0.51
-0.11
0.08
0.91
0.47
0.65
-0.23
0.45
[0.05]**
[0.77]
[0.89
[0.80]
[0.13]
[0.89
[0.60]
[0.54]
-0.00
-0.29
-0.42
-1.75
0.02
-2.98
-0.52
-0.15
[0.00]
[0.38]
[0.28]
[0.34]
[0.91
[0.19
[0.20]
[0.77]
-0.27
0.07
-0.70
1.71
-0.47
-1.85
-0.20
-0.23
[0.27]
[0.90]
[0.37
[0.61]
[0.08]*
[0.63]
[0.73]
[0.77]
0.14
0.35
0.07
0.10
0.15
0.40
0.05
0.06
[0.00]***
[0.39]
[0.36]
[0.25
[0.00]***
[0.50]
[0.58]
[0.58]
0.07
1.17
0.01
-0.01
0.11
1.98
0.02
-0.01
[0.12]
[0.01]***
[0.05]**
[0.07]*
[0.04]**
[0.00**
[0.00]***
[0.16]
9.55e-04
0.88
-0.43
0.66
[0.99]
[0.14]
[0.51
[0.86]
-0.13
-1.08
0.05
0.59
[0.39]
[0.59]
[0.84]
[0.12]
1.51
1.39
[0.00]***
[0.00]***
0.35
0.33
[0.00]***
[0.00]***
0.56
0.56
[0.06]*
[0.10]*
0.61
0.52
[0.29]
[0.43]
-3.54
-0.69
-19.10
0.48
-3.24
-8.28
-1.28
-1.28
[0.00]***
[0.66]
[0.01]*** [0.00]***
[0.93]
[0.25]
[0.38]
[0.38]
1,360
404
478
1,354
968
911
307
360
0.16
0.14
0.14
0.18
0.14
0.18
0.17
0.19
42
Table 7: Trade Credit Demand and Supply (Panel B)
The reported estimates are from logit in Columns (1), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8), and OLS in Columns (2)
and (6). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly
sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days
larger than 30 before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy indicating if the firm offers a prepayment discount on credit to its customers. Columns (3-4) and (7-8) include only the sub-sample of firms
that use accounts receivable. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector
dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1)
AR_dum
L_Age
-0.24
[0.06*
L_emp
0.02
[0.78
Foreign
0.61
[0.06]*
State
0.12
[0.59
Export
-0.30
[0.31
0.17
N_customers
[0.00]***
0.11
Sales_largest_cust
[0.05]**
RE
0.14
[0.39
Fam/Informal
AP_dum
1.55
[0.00]***
AP_per
AP_days
AP_discount
Constant
-3.41
[0.00]***
Observations
906
Pseudo R-squared
0.19
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Retained Earnings (RE)
Family & Informal Financing (Fam_Inf)
AR_per
AR_days AR_discount AR_dum
AR_per
AR_days AR_discount
-0.44
0.41
-0.31
0.40
0.31
-2.03
-2.19
[0.09]*
[0.21]
[0.02]**
[0.12]
[0.33]
[0.15]
[0.13]
0.19
-0.21
0.04
0.22
-0.22
0.60
0.85
[0.13]
[0.23]
[0.55]
[0.09]*
[0.25]
[0.42]
[0.25]
-0.41
0.29
0.47
-0.25
0.44
4.21
1.66
[0.36]
[0.66]
[0.17]
[0.60]
[0.56]
[0.40]
[0.73]
-0.73
-0.37
-0.01
-0.77
-0.46
-0.67
-1.72
[0.09]*
[0.50]
[0.96]
[0.08]**
[0.42]
[0.76]
[0.44]
-0.30
-0.07
-0.40
-0.36
0.01
-1.31
-0.64
[0.63]
[0.93]
[0.18]
[0.58]
[0.98]
[0.75]
[0.87]
0.42
0.11
0.13
0.16
0.45
0.09
0.13
[0.44]
[0.20]
[0.29]
[0.00]***
[0.39]
[0.30]
[0.26]
1.57
0.02
-0.1
0.08
1.40
0.03
-0.00
[0.00]***
[0.01]***
[0.39]
[0.15]
[0.01]**
[0.00]***
[0.67]
0.22
0.48
1.83
[0.47]
[0.17]
[0.36]
-0.25
0.04
-0.39
0.25
[0.22]
[0.90]
[0.40]
[0.91]
1.55
[0.00]***
0.35
0.37
[0.00]***
[0.00]***
0.68
0.57
[0.05]**
[0.10]*
1.05
0.68
[0.12]
[0.31]
-18.59
0.29
-3.29
-19.03
0.23
-0.01
-0.06
[0.00]***
[0.87]
[0.00]***
[0.00]***
[0.90]
[0.98]
[0.99]
292
326
892
287
319
903
888
0.17
0.17
0.19
0.16
0.15
0.20
0.21
43
Table 7: Trade Credit Demand and Supply (Panel C)
The reported estimates are from logit in Columns (1), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8), and OLS in Columns (2)
and (6). AR_dum is a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable. AR_per is the percent of monthly
sales sold on credit. AR_days is a dummy indicating if the firm offers to its customers a number of days
larger than 30 before imposing penalties. AR_discount is a dummy indicating if the firm offers a prepayment discount on credit to its customers. Columns (3-4) and (7-8) include only the sub-sample of firms
that use accounts receivable. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector
dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1)
AR_dum
-0.31
[0.01]***
L_emp
0.04
[0.50]
Foreign
0.39
[0.21]
State
-0.03
[0.86]
Export
-0.48
[0.08]*
N_customers
0.17
[0.00]***
Sales_largest_cust
0.01
[0.03]**
Customized
0.09
[0.25]
Age_relation_cust
0.04
[0.56]
Warrantee
7.72e-04
[0.86]
Bank
0.09
[0.54]
RE
L_Age
AP_dum
1.44
[0.00]***
AP_per
AP_days
AP_discount
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-4.03
[0.00]***
955
0.18
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Bank Financing (Bank)
Retained Earnings (RE)
AR_per
AR_days AR_discount AR_dum AR_per
AR_days AR_discount
-0.33
0.30
-2.28
-0.25
-2.09
-0.41
0.30
[0.18]
[0.35]
[0.09]*
[0.06]*
[0.15]
[0.12]
[38]
0.21
-0.25
0.69
0.01
0.51
0.20
-0.21
[0.08]*
[0.15]
[0.36]
[0.88]
[0.51]
[0.11]
[0.25]
0.18
0.43
0.51
0.53
0.84
-0.25
0.11
[0.69]
[0.57]
[0.91]
[0.11]
[0.44]
[0.55]
[0.86]
-0.51
-0.05
-2.76
0.14
-0.73
-0.86
-0.32
[0.21]
[0.91]
[0.21]
[0.52]
[0.74]
[0.06]
[0.57]
-0.15
-0.13
-1.98
-0.31
-1.55
-0.26
0.05
[0.80]
[0.88]
[0.59]
[0.31]
[0.71]
[0.68]
[0.95]
0.34
0.05
0.14
0.19
0.42
0.05
0.29
[0.54]
[0.63]
[0.27]
[0.00]***
[0.44]
[0.57]
[0.03]**
1.81
0.02
-0.01
0.11
1.47
0.27
-0.09
[0.00]***
[0.01]***
[0.20]
[0.07]*
[0.01**
[0.02]**
[0.52]
0.53
-0.11
0.32
0.10
0.35
-0.14
0.33
[0.50]
[0.37]
[0.04]**
[0.19]
[0.65]
[0.26]
[0.07]*
0.87
-0.01
0.00
0.08
0.82
-0.01
0.09
[0.18]
[0.89]
[0.98]
0.24
[0.21]
[0.94]
[0.59]
0.02
0.00
-0.01
-0.00
-0.00
0.01
-0.01
[0.69]
[0.66]
[0.32]
[0.63]
[0.93]
[0.54]
[0.18]
-0.01
0.59
0.84
[0.97]
[0.12]
[0.66]
0.14
1.83
-0.25
0.33
[0.40]
[0.36]
[0.45]
[0.35]
1.59
[0.00]***
0.35
0.35
[0.00]***
[0.00]***
0.60
0.68
[0.08]*
[0.05]**
0.53
1.03
[0.41]
[0.14]
-1.10
0.84
-5.65
-4.06
-3.82
-17.92
-0.08
[0.56]
[0.65]
[0.41]
[0.00]***
[0.58]
[0.83]
[0.96]
301
356
952
892
889
286
323
0.13
0.20
0.20
0.16
0.19
0.19
0.20
44
Table 8: The Financing of Trade Credit Supply
Is Trade Credit Demand More Important for Less Liquid Firms?
The reported estimates are from logit (Colums 1, 2, 5, 6) and OLS (Columns 3, 4, 7, 8) regressions. AR_dum is a
dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable and AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. See Table
1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are shown
in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1)
L_age
L_emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
AR_dum
-0.31
[0.01]***
0.05
[0.42]
0.49
[0.11]
-3.85e-04
[0.99]
-0.49
[0.07]*
0.15
[0.00]***
0.11
[0.04]**
Customized
Age_relation_cust
Warrantee
Bank
0.05
[0.77]
(2)
(3)
Bank Financing (Bank)
AR_dum
AR_per
-0.29
-2.05
[0.02]**
[0.12]
0.04
0.73
[0.47]
[0.30]
0.46
1.51
[0.13]
[0.73]
-0.01
-3.29
[0.95]
[0.12]
-0.49
-2.11
[0.07]*
[0.56]
0.16
0.53
[0.00]***
[0.30]
0.11
1.95
[0.06]*
[0.00]***
0.08
[0.24]
0.04
[0.57]
9.21e-04
[0.83]
0.09
2.27
[0.65]
[0.24]
(4)
(5)
AR_per
-2.07
[0.13]
0.64
[0.39]
1.17
[0.79]
-3.38
[0.12]
-0.31
[0.52]
0.54
[0.30]
1.82
[0.00]***
0.43
[0.58]
0.76
[0.24]
0.01
[0.85]
2.39
[0.22]
AR_d
-0.23
[0.06]*
0.02
[0.75]
0.61
[0.06]*
0.09
[0.68]
-0.28
[0.35]
0.17
[0.00]***
0.11
[0.06]*
0.46
[0.03]**
1.87
[0.00]***
RE
AP_dum
Bank *AP_dum
1.61
[0.00]***
-0.45
[0.14]
1.66
[0.00]***
-0.47
[0.12]
AP_per
0.50
[0.00]***
-0.29
[0.00]***
Bank *AP_per
(6)
(7)
Retained Earnings (RE)
AR_d
AR_per
-0.23
-1.99
[0.07]*
[0.16]
0.01
0.58
[0.83]
[0.43]
0.57
4.41
[0.08]*
[0.38]
0.08
-0.72
[0.68]
[0.74]
-0.28
-1.27
[0.34]
[0.75]
0.18
0.43
[0.00]***
[0.42]
0.11
1.53
[0.07]*
[0.00]***
0.09
[0.22]
0.07
[0.27]
-0.00
[0.66]
0.47
[0.03]**
1.89
[0.00]***
0.50
[0.00]***
-0.29
[0.00]***
RE*AP_dum
-0.79
[0.02]**
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-3.82
[0.00]***
968
0.18
-4.13
[0.00]***
955
0.18
-1.85
[0.70]
965
0.20
-6.92
[0.30]
952
0.20
45
-3.60
[0.00]***
906
0.20
AR_per
-2.04
[0.15]
0.48
[0.53]
4.06
[0.42]
-0.80
[0.72]
-1.49
[0.72]
0.43
[0.43]
1.42
[0.01]**
0.29
[0.72]
0.83
[0.20]
-2.66e-03
[0.94]
1.60
[0.19]
2.66
[0.20]
0.38
[0.00]***
0.38
[0.00]***
-0.06
[0.56]
-0.09
[0.98]
903
0.20
-0.06
[0.56]
-3.77
[0.58]
889
0.20
-0.76
[0.02]**
RE*AP_per
Constant
(8)
-4.23
[0.00]***
892
0.20
Table 9: The Financing of Trade Credit Supply
Is Trade Credit Demand More Important in Competitive Markets? (Panel A)
The reported estimates are from logit (Colums 1, 3, 6) and OLS (Columns 2, 4, 6) regressions. AR_dum is
a dummy indicating the use of accounts receivable and AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on
credit. See Table 1 for variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city
dummies. Robust p-values are shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
L_Age
L_emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
AP_dum
(1)
AR_dum
0.22
[0.03]**
0.05
[0.37]
0.48
[0.07]*
0.01
[0.95]
-0.29
[0.23]
0.14
[0.00]***
0.07
[0.09]*
1.37
[0.00]***
AP_per
Bi_BP
Bi*AP_dum
-0.35
[0.13]
0.53
[0.08]*
Bi*AP_per
Customized
Age_rel_cust
Warrantee
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-3.23
[0.00]***
1,389
0.16
Sales Threshold =5%
(3)
(2)
AR_per
AR_dum
-2.50
0.18
[0.02]**
[0.08]*
1.03
0.02
[0.08]*
[0.67]
0.98
0.52
[0.78]
[0.05]**
-1.84
0.02
[0.31]
[0.88]
1.49
-0.31
[0.65]
[0.21]
0.33
0.15
[0.42]
[0.00]***
1.08
0.07
[0.02]**
[0.09]*
0.07
[0.14]
0.26
[0.00]***
-1.51
-0.36
[0.52]
[0.13]
0.60
[0.05]**
0.22
[0.02]**
0.00
[0.13]
0.02
[0.66]
0.00
[0.83]
-3.68
-2.18
[0.00]***
[0.68]
1,328
1,381
0.17
0.18
(4)
AR_per
-2.58
[0.03]**
0.76
[0.23]*
1.78
[0.63]
-1.48
[0.44]
1.67
[0.62]
0.27
[0.54]
0.99
[0.05]**
0.30
[0.00]***
-3.50
[0.22]
9.97
[0.01]***
0.01
[0.68]
0.73
[0.20]
0.01
0.87
-0.93
[0.89]
1,321
0.17
46
Sales Threshold =10%
(6)
(5)
AR_per
AR_dum
-2.93
-0.24
[0.03]**
[0.04]**
0.51
0.02
[0.50]
[0.72]
2.17
0.56
[0.57]
[0.04]**
-1.40
-0.00
[0.55]
[0.98]
-0.48
-0.37
[0.89]
[0.15]
0.19
0.69
[0.00]***
[0.22]
0.08
1.67
[0.14]
[0.00]***
1.34
[0.00]***
0.22
[0.00]***
-3.05
-0.37
[0.22]
[0.13]
0.72
[0.02]**
0.28
[0.00]***
-2.09
[0.03]**
1,035
0.16
9.98
[0.36]
1,032
0.17
Sales Threshold =30%
(7)
(8)
AR_dum
AR_per
-0.24
-2.92
[0.04]**
[0.03]**
0.01
0.45
[0.80]
[0.55]
0.54
1.80
[0.05]*
[0.63]
-0.02
-1.36
[0.90]
[0.56]
-0.36
0.75
[0.17]
[0.83]
0.19
0.73
[0.00]***
[0.20]
0.06
1.61
[0.10]
[0.00]***
1.35
[0.00]***
0.25
[0.00]***
-0.39
-1.81
[0.19]
[0.56]
1.04
[0.00]***
0.25
[0.02]**
-2.02
[0.03]**
1,035
0.17
-10.01
[0.35]
1,032
0.17
Table 9: The Financing of Trade Credit Supply
Is Trade Credit Demand More Important in Competitive Markets? (Panel B)
The reported estimates are from logit in Colum 1 and OLS in Column 2. AR_dum is a dummy indicating
the use of accounts receivable and AR_per is the percent of monthly sales sold on credit. See Table 1 for
variable definitions. All regressions include 12 sector dummies and 17 city dummies. Robust p-values are
shown in parentheses, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
L_Age
L_emp
Foreign
State
Export
N_customers
Sales_largest_cust
AP_dum
(1)
AR_dum
-0.25
[0.03]**
0.03
[0.64]
0.62
[0.03]**
-0.01
[0.94]
-0.38
[0.14]
0.17
[0.00]***
0.11
[0.26]
1.52
[0.03]**
(2)
AR_per
-3.39
[0.02]**
0.70
[0.37]
2.84
[0.48]
-1.55
[0.52]
0.01
[0.99]
0.21
[0.71]
1.16
[0.35]
AP_per
Bi_BP_d2
Bi_BP_d3
Bi_BP_d4
0.32
[0.00]***
-0.04
[0.99]
-0.58
[0.30]
-0.03
[0.99]
-0.18
[0.63]
-0.24
[0.38]
-0.25
[0.51]
Bi_BP_d2*AP_d
Bi_BP_d3*AP_d
Bi_BP_d4*AP_d
(3)
AR_dum
-0.25
[0.03]**
0.03
[0.64]
0.58
[0.04]**
-0.01
[0.94]
-0.34
[0.21]
0.19
[0.00]***
0.01
[0.08]*
0.74
[0.03]**
-0.64
[0.08]*
-0.46
[0.13]
-0.79
[0.02]**
0.76
[0.02]**
0.81
[0.04]**
1.25
[0.00]***
Bi_BP_d2*AP_per
Bi_BP_d3*AP_per
Bi_BP_d4*AP_per
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
-2.09
[0.03]**
1,004
0.16
12.59
[0.23]
1,001
0.16
47
-1.74
[0.07]*
1,004
0.16
(4)
AR_per
-3.50
[0.01]***
0.88
[0.26]
2.82
[0.47]
-1.79
[0.46]
0.53
[0.88]
0.38
[0.52]
0.03
[0.48]
0.14
[0.16]
-5.77
[0.03]**
1.52
[0.60]
-2.12
[0.51]
-0.04
[0.78]
0.11
[0.37]
0.34
[0.00]***
13.33
[0.22]
1,001
0.18