ARMED CONFLICT RISK
SPECIAL ADVISO RY • 17 FEBRUARY 2017
The Fight Against the Islamic
State Group in Iraq
SITUATION SUMMARY
From 2014, the Islamic State group (ISIS) successfully gained and
maintained territory in Northern and Western Iraq, at the expense
of the Iraqi state. Since 2016, assorted security forces made up of
Kurdish Peshmerga, Shiite militias, and governmental forces have
succeeded in reducing the areas controlled by ISIS. The current
operation in Mosul marks the final major Islamic State stronghold
in Iraq. As it stands, an assortment of security forces have re-taken
most of the areas surrounding the city, as well as Eastern Mosul.
Western Mosul is likely to be difficult to retake. The location is
symbolic to ISIS; current leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed
the Islamic State ‘caliphate’ from Mosul’s grand mosque in June
2014. Nevertheless, ISIS is likely to be defeated in this location.
Following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat, the group is likely to
revert to more traditional Jihadist insurgency tactics. This will be
evidenced by a marked increase in terrorism throughout Iraq.
Local impact of ISIS. The impact of ISIS in Northern and Western
Iraq has been profound. The area is occupied by mostly Sunni
Muslims. However, there were previously large communities of
Kurds, Christians, and Yazidis in these regions. ISIS’ territorial
conquests have forced many of these communities from their
homes, often into large refugee camps located on the Turkish and
Kurdistan borders. With the territorial defeat of ISIS, these minority
Territorial map of Iraq, accurate as of January 2017
Source: Institute for the Study of War LiveAUMap, January 2017
communities are likely to return to their former villages. This may
lead to territorial disputes, due to multiple competing territorial claims. This has already been shown, as villages previous ly occupied by minority
communities have been re-inhabited by other populations.
Much of the area previously controlled by ISIS is dominated by tribal allegiances. Several tribes have allied with ISIS; such allegiances are unlikely to
change. This is because northern Iraqi tribes have more in common with ISIS than with alternative forms of political authority; namely, the Iraqi gove rnment.
Many members of ISIS originated from northern Iraqi Sunni tribes, and have maintained mutually beneficial relationships sin ce the fall of Saddam Hussein.
This includes using tribal contacts to sell oil, which has been utilised by ISIS as a source of funding. Therefore, once ISIS has been militarily defeated,
they are likely to continue using the northern tribes for support. However, this has led to further disenfranchisement for some Sunni’s. There have been
reports of ISIS affiliated families being forced from their homes by Iraqi security forces. Indeed, this has been targeted at specific tribes, as well as family
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members of known ISIS militants. Such policies are likely to continue, and will merely increase the sectarian tensions in the country. The conflict against
ISIS has severely damaged local infrastructure. Many large-scale oil refineries have been destroyed, both by ISIS and coalition airstrikes. In addition, civil
infrastructure has been neglected under ISIS; for example, much of Mosul’s means of water supply has been destroyed. This wil l take time to amend,
while at the same time posing likely targets for ISIS terrorism. The issue arises that if the Iraqi government is unable to maintain order i n the local area,
ISIS may retain the support of some of the population. This is because ISIS has the potential to remain as an alt ernative authority in the local area, and
will likely play on the failures of the Iraqi government to maintain order. Alternatively, another Sunni Jihadist group may step into the power vacuum left in
ISIS’ wake. Al Qaeda is reportedly making links in Northern and Western Iraq. As it stands, the primary authorities in the area are an intricate network of
ethnic, tribal and religious militias, which have no allegiance to the central Iraqi authority, and from which another Sunni insurgency is likely to arise.
National level impact of ISIS. The Sunni population has, in the past, been
subjugated by the government of Iraq; this is because Shia Muslims make
up most of the population in Iraq, and therefore dominate the country’s
politics. ISIS draws upon the Sunni population of the Northern and Western
regions for support and legitimacy. Many ISIS members are pragmatic
local Sunni tribesmen and citizens, who joined the organisation as an
alternative to the repressive central government in Baghdad. While ISIS is
likely to be militarily defeated, there is yet to be a comprehensive political
solution which will remedy the complaints of local Sunni’s in Iraq. ISIS is
able to become an alternative ‘shadow’ state to much of the Sunni
population. The continuing religious tensions and political failures within
the Iraqi government mean that ISIS can still garner support from the
minority Sunni’s. ISIS is likely to assume that Baghdad will not be able to
legitimately represent the Sunnis in Mosul, therefore allowing Islamic State
Bai Hassan Oil Station, near Kirkuk, following an attack by ISIS
Source: International Business Times, July 2016
to retain its relevance in the country.
Due to its territorial defeat, ISIS is likely to increase its acts of terrorism. The purpo se of such an insurgency is to exacerbate sectarian tensions. This has
already been seen in Baghdad. Throughout December 2016 and January 2017, as ISIS lost ground in Mosul, Shiite communities in Baghdad have been
hit by severe and suicide attacks with increasing frequency. Attacks have been concentrated in and around the Sadr City district of Baghdad; this area is
almost entirely populated by Shiite Muslims. This trend is likely to continue through 2017. Such attacks can be expected to e xtend to other cities. Southern
Shiite cities which have remained relatively untargeted by ISIS, such as Basrah, may see increases in suicide bombings and gu n attacks. Security forces
and government institutions are perceived to be dominated by Iraqi Shiite’s. As such , ISIS is likely to increase its attacks upon such targets. In Northern
and Western Iraq, security forces may be subject to fierce and severe terrorist campaigns by ISIS. Of particular concern are Fallujah and Ramadi, cities
that are Sunni dominated, and have a history of violent terrorism. In general, Iraq is likely to be subject to greater and more widespread terrorism.
Another national level impact of the ISIS conflict concerns the semi-autonomous Iraqi-Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurdish authorities have indicated that they
may not return some of the land that they have liberated from ISIS. This could lead to further tensions with the central Iraq i government, as calls for even
further Kurdish autonomy increase. Indeed, this could pose a large economic threat to the Iraqi state; a significant amount of the oil production facilities in
the Kurdish regions are still operating, while the facilities within the rest of Northern Iraq have been damaged by the ISIS conflict. The result is that a
significant amount of Iraq’s current oil wealth comes through Kurdistan, so the loss of the region could lead to economic downturn for the rest of Iraq.
Regional Level Impact. The regional impact of the ISIS conflict is substantial. The conflict in Iraq is indicative of a wider Sunni -Shiite conflict, which has
affected many countries in the Middle East. The religious divide has informed regional alliances; Iran now heavily backs the Iraqi government and Shiite
militias. In contrast, many individuals from Sunni-dominated countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have been known to support ISIS. It must be noted that many
such countries have made efforts to stop the flow of money and manpower in support of ISIS from their citizens. Nevertheless, ISIS has exemplified the
wider regional conflict. This conflict is likely to continue, regardless of the demise of ISIS in Iraq.
Iran has benefited from the ISIS conflict. The Shiite government, faced with a Sunni adversary in ISIS, turned to Iran as a natural ally. The influen ce of
Iran is now substantial. At a governmental level, Iran provides funding to Iraq. This is for use in the country’s infrastruc ture, as well as its security forces.
Iran also provides direct military support. This includes airstrikes, a supply of arms, and training. However, perhaps the mo st significant Iranian contribution
has been to support, fund, and train Shiite militias. These are smaller, paramilitary groups, which are not constrained to any central political hierarchy.
Throughout the ISIS conflict, these Shiite militias have been accused of many war crimes against Sunni communities. These oft en occur as villages
previously occupied by ISIS are ‘liberated’. The battle for Mosul is likely to lead to similar cases. These abuses have historically res ulted in Sunni
populations fearing the Shiite Iraqi government and militias; this is the basis for ISIS’ support in the region. Ira n is now heavily involved in the region,
and seems unlikely to reduce its influence in Iraq as ISIS loses territory. The very involvement of Iran in Iraqi politics ma y provide Sunni communities with
a reason to continue their support for ISIS.
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ISIS now has offshoots throughout the region. The main areas that ISIS operates in are Yemen, Libya , and Syria. The group also maintains allegiances
with other Islamist groups, including Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. As ISIS loses territory in Iraq, it seems likely that the group
will increase its operations in these countries. As such, there will be a heightened risk of terrorism in these countries. ISIS will likely play on the sectarian
and political crises that affect these countries. This has already been seen in Yemen, where ISIS has followed the model prev iously used in Iraq; ISIS
militants have established allegiances with local tribes who provide support, manpower and legitimacy to ISIS operatives in the country.
Global Impact of ISIS. One major global impact of ISIS has been the increase in terrorism, particularly in Europe. ISIS has very effectively pioneer ed and
encouraged home grown terrorism. In some cases, such as the 2015 Paris attacks, ISIS directly trained and guided terrorist s. However, individuals have
also been remotely guided by ISIS, often via social media platforms. This has required very little funding or training from ISIS, and has been epitomised
by the use of rudimentary weapons. The Berlin and Nice attacks of 2016 are examples of this; the attacks were conducted with trucks, which were used
to ram into large crowds of people. As ISIS loses territory and funding, it has the capability to continue its support of suc h attacks. Indeed, the loss of
territory may lead to increasing ISIS-affiliated terror attacks, as retaliation for military defeats in Iraq. Areas of high risk are popular tourist areas, especia lly
in major cities. Due to the rudimentary nature of these attacks, and the relatively low level of communications n eeded, attacks of this nature are hard to
predict.
Islamic State’s loss of territory may have an impact on the global oil market. As the
global oil price continues to rise, the production of oil in Iraq is also likely to increase.
Since the rise of ISIS in 2014, the Iraqi government, alongside international petroleum
corporations, have been unable to access the vast oil deposits located in northern and
western Iraq, within ISIS territories. Indeed, ISIS have raised significant amounts of
money from producing and selling this oil on the international black market. However,
the infrastructure in the area is now severely limited, due to three years of conflict in
the region. As ISIS loses its territory, there is a temptation for many global oil
companies to resume operations in Northern and Western Iraq. However, this is likely
to lead to a rise in ISIS attacks upon oil infrastructure in the area. ISIS has already
conducted targeted attacks upon oil pipelines and production facilities, especially in the
areas surrounding the Kurdish region. In addition, ISIS could potentially escalate
kidnapping, especially targeting employees of oil companies. On the 25th January
2017, ISIS kidnapped 20 Iraqi troops and five oil company workers near Khanaqin city.
The aftermath of the ISIS-inspired Nice attacks
Source: BBC, July 2016
This trend is likely to continue. As a result, there is a high risk to global oil companies
that wish to operate in Northern and Western Iraq.
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SECURITY ADVICE
SEVERE ARMED CONFLICT RISK
Solace Global would advise clients to employ the highest possible security measures and journey management planning when visiting Iraq. Within Baghdad itself,
Solace Global would advise clients to employ a fully-armed and armoured transportation detail for the foreseeable future, including a secondary convoy vehicle.
These enhanced security measures are required throughout Iraq, as the risk of travellers becoming caught up in terrorist attacks are extremely high. Travellers
should try to avoid areas likely to be targeted by Islamic State militants; this includes the more populated areas of Sadr City and other areas with a sizeable Shiite
population. Movement outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad without the highest level of security, is strongly advised against.
Travellers should avoid the areas surrounding Mosul for the near future. Locations within the city and its surrounding outskirts will be highly militarised, and there
will be constant violent conflict in the area. It is difficult to determine where and when ISIS will mount offensives, and so security precautions should be employed
around the clock. At the very least, travellers in the vicinity of Mosul will need full armed and armoured escorts, as well as Iraqi security force escorts if possible.
Solace Global would advise travellers in the south of the country, including Basrah, to maintain high security precautions. The risk is slightly reduced in the south
of the country; nevertheless, there have been attempts at terror attacks in southern cities. Therefore, clients would be advised to employ a fully-armed and
armoured transportation detail. A secondary convoy vehicle should also be employed if terror attacks have recently been reported in the area.
Solace Global would advise all clients travelling throughout Iraq to use travel-tracking technology, in order to gain rapid access to the latest incidents and to notify
others should an incident occur. This is essential in identifying and avoiding areas of high risk in real time, and will enable users to further mitigate the risks arising
from travelling in Iraq.
Solace Global remains available to provide the full range of Travel Risk Management services to clients.
Solace Global is also able to provide comprehensive crisis management, response, and evacuation services.
For further details please contact +44 (0)1202 795 801 or email [email protected]
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