AALBORG UNIVERSITY COPENHAGEN
Global Refugee studies
Master’s thesis
THE BALTIC STATES AS COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM
Egle Macijauskaite: 20126820
Supervisor:
Johannes Dragsbæk Schmidt
June 2014
2
ABSTRACT
The Baltic States have been Member States of the European Union for 10 years now, meaning
that their asylum systems are harmonized and in accordance with the regional and international
requirements. However, even being the frontier states the countries does not experience refugee
flows as other, especially Southern European Union countries. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is
to reveal the factors, contributing to this phenomenon.
This has been done through an examination of the historical aspects common for the Baltic
States as well as through the examination of several factors such as strict border control, high
level of corruption, low immigration prospects and rates of recognition – all contributing to the
states’ unattractiveness for asylum seekers. It has been analysed through the lens of four theories,
namely the theory of analytical liberalism, regional theory of intergovernmentalism, the concept
of security and the concept of social navigation and based on empirical data such as books and
articles.
The results have shown that there are many factors influencing the low number of asylum
applications in the Baltic States. It is mainly associated with the unattractiveness of the Baltic
States, consisting of complex issues, such as the strict border control, low recognition rates,
differences between the policy level and the practice in many areas related with asylum as well
as the degrading reception conditions in the reception centres and finally, the lack of integration
policies. It is stated, that the immigrants have been securitized in the countries due to the Soviet
occupation, in this way contributing to the emergence and development of strict immigration
policies and a securitized attitude of the society towards the immigrants. The mentioned factors
make the countries unattractive for asylum seekers, thus less desirable as asylum destination
countries in this way putting them in an exceptional situation among the EU Member States.
Key words: The Baltic States, asylum, immigration, European Union, Member States.
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ABBREVIATIONS
Belarus – the Republic of Belarus;
CEAS – Common European Asylum System
Estonia – The Republic of Estonia;
EU – The European Union;
EUROSTAT - The Statistical Office of the European Communities;
FRONTEX – European Agency for the Management of External Borders;
IOM – International Organization for Migration;
Latvia – The Republic of Latvia;
Lithuania – The Republic of Lithuania;
NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
New York Protocol - The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967);
Russia – The Russian Federation;
State Border Guard Service of Lithuania – State Border Guard Service at the Ministry of the
Interior of the Republic of Lithuania;
Sweden – The Kingdom of Sweden;
The Dublin Convention - The European Union Council Regulation No. 343/2003 of 18
February 2003;
The Geneva Convention - The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951);
The Reception directive - The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, laying
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection;
The Soviet Union – The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR);
UNHCR - The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 6
1.1.Problem area ..................................................................................................................................... 6
2. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Limitations ...................................................................................................................................... 11
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: COMMON ISSUES OF ASYLUM AND
MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION FRONTIER STATES ................................... 13
3.1 The Baltic States ............................................................................................................................. 17
3.1.1 Immigration, refugees, asylum – creation of regimes ............................................................... 18
3.1.2 Current asylum regime and the migration situation in the Baltics ........................................... 20
3.1.3 Migration patterns in the Baltics .............................................................................................. 22
4. THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................... 23
4.1 The security issue and the “securitization” .................................................................................. 23
4.2 Analytical liberalism ...................................................................................................................... 25
4.3 Intergovernmentalism .................................................................................................................... 26
4.4 The concept of social navigation ................................................................................................... 27
4.5 Summing up the theoretical framework....................................................................................... 28
5. STRICT BORDER CONTROL, RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION NORMS AND THE
UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES .............................................................................................. 30
5.1. Sweden’s example of liberal migration policies .......................................................................... 30
5.2 What is a strict border security? ................................................................................................... 32
5.3 The accession to the European Union and its impact on creation of asylum systems in the
Baltic States ........................................................................................................................................... 36
5.4 The Russian legacy and its influence to the nation-building in the post-Soviet period ........... 40
6. EXPLANATORY CONCEPTS FOR THE BALTIC STATES’
UNNATTRACTIVENESS ......................................................................................................... 44
6.1 Immigration history ....................................................................................................................... 44
6.2 Geographical position and the means of migration..................................................................... 45
6.3 Employment, welfare provisions ................................................................................................... 48
6.4 The misuse of the asylum system .................................................................................................. 50
6.5 The reception centres and their contribution to the Baltic States’ unattractiveness ............... 52
6.6 Integration perspectives ................................................................................................................. 55
7. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................... 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 61
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1. INTRODUCTION
434 160 asylum applications were registered in the European Union in 2013. The top 5 countries
with the highest number of applicants registered are Western European countries, namely
Germany, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Italy (Bitoulas 2014).
Numbers presented illustrate the most desired countries in the Europe, since they are not the EU
frontier states (except Italy), where those seeking for protection enter first, but the ones they
wish to end their journey in.
There are many routes used to reach the “fortress Europe1”, nevertheless in the past few years
the most popular ones were the most dangerous ones - by crossing the Mediterranean Sea from
North Africa to the mainland, for example. According to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, there were 15 000 migrants and asylum seekers who reached Italy and Malta by
sea in 2012 (UNHCR 2013). It is common that after lodging an application for asylum in one of
the frontier EU countries many migrate further to other European countries.
Having in mind that asylum regimes in all the EU countries are harmonized and are part of
Common European Asylum System, it is interesting why some countries are more favourable
than others, thus more desired among asylum seekers.
1.1.Problem area
The interest about asylum in Europe was developed at my previous job at the State Border Guard
Service of Lithuania, where one of my duties was to accept asylum claims as well as to interview
the applicants. I have talked to many asylum seekers in the 2 years I worked there. Most of them
acknowledged that they have lodged an application only because they were arrested while
illegally crossing the state border and that after the initial asylum procedure they will continue
the journey to their desired Western European country. Those aspirations to move forward to
Europe and aforementioned statistics were the ground ideas for this thesis.
The Statistical Office of the European Communities reveals, that the ‘asylum burden’2 among
frontier EU states varies significantly. While in three Baltic States 690 asylum applicants were
registered in 2013, three Mediterranean countries, namely Greece, Italy and Malta in total had
the amount of 38 400, which is almost 56 times as many applicants (Bitoulas 2014). The three
Baltic States are often treated as a single unit when one talks about their recent history, geo 1
This term is used in migration area in order to describe EU’s policy to defend itself from outside influences,
‘Asylum burden’ in this context is understood as responsibility to examine asylum applications according to
internationally established requirements.
2
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political situation or simply their small size. All three countries have regained independence and
built their nation states from scratch in the end of the 20th century and all have joined numerous
international institutions, including the EU (Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija
2013). Moreover, all three have ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 New York Protocol therefore, assures refugee protection. Nowadays, the Baltic
States are complete members of the European Community, formally capable of giving
international protection to many in need, however even though located at the external EU border,
are the less desired countries.
Thus, my aim is to illuminate the inequality of refugee burden3 in Europe and to find reasons
why some countries in Europe are more desirable than others with the focus on the Baltic States.
Hereby, I want to grasp what factors force those in need of protection to choose certain
destination countries and why the Baltic States are less desirable? Therefore, the research
question of this thesis is as follows:
Why are the Baltic States exceptional among the European Union Member States, when
looking at the number of asylum applications lodged?
What this thesis seeks to examine is why the immigration situation in the Baltic States is
relatively unproblematic compared to other, especially southern European Union frontier states
and what determines states’ attractiveness for irregular migrants and refugees.
There are multiple reasons for explaining this divergence. One approach to understanding why
the Baltic States have this low number of applicants is the fact that they are not as attractive for
the asylum seekers due to the restrictive immigration policies, that are the reaction to the Soviet
legacy (Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013). Another approach may
contribute to explain why the Baltic States are mostly seen as transit countries instead of being
the ones to settle in. One final explanation may be related to the fact, that for variety of reasons,
the number of illegal immigrants in the Baltic States is much larger than asylum applicants,
which means they simply do not lodge asylum applications.
By streamlining the similarities and differences between these three countries and comparing
them with other European States as explanatory concepts, the purpose is to reveal the factors
based on historical, political, societal and economic dimensions (Grigas, Kasekamp,
Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013). To look deeper into this, theories of analytical liberalism,
3
‘Refugee burden’ in this context should be understood as the number of those seeking for protection in different
countries and their unequal distribution.
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intergovernmentalism and concepts of social navigation and securitisation will be applied to
understand and explain the situation in the Baltic countries.
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2. METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based on an examination of the migration management in the Baltic States. The
main interest in the beginning was to understand, why the Baltic States, being the Member States
of the European Union and participating in the CEAS, are not experiencing big refugee flows as
others, especially Southern European frontier states. While working at the State Border Guard
Service of Lithuania, I noticed the existing differences between the policy level and the practice
in the area. After a broad research I have realised, that the phenomenon does not essentially exist
in Lithuania, however in other Baltic States as well and is presumably influenced by similar or
the same causes. This led to the decision of choosing migration management in all three Baltic
States namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a research object.
The initial assumption was that the underlying tendencies, causing the discrepancies between the
policy level and the practice, contribute to the Baltic States’ unattractiveness for immigrants,
including the asylum seekers.
Due to the time limit and the fact that the issue I am interested in, is of a political nature I have
decided to base the thesis on secondary data. I have realised that in order to collect my own data
I would need to get in contact with many asylum seekers in the Baltic States and expect them to
trust me, not to be afraid of me and of the possible consequences for revealing the truth and to be
honest with me. Moreover, I would need to enter the reception centres, what is impossible for an
outsider in the practice, as even the NGO’s representing the asylum seekers, have difficulties in
doing so. Finally, to possibly find out some violations and discrepancies would take more than 4
months, which was the limit for this thesis.
Therefore, I have come up with the decision to base the thesis on accessible secondary data, such
as legal documents, studies by authors writing about the migration management, as well as
written by local NGOs and focusing on the specific issues in all the Baltic States and each of
them separately. Since it is difficult to reveal the on-going practice in the area due to the lack of
documentation, I also used articles from the local newspapers, as the media is often being used
as a tool of fighting against the clandestine/illegal actions. I had difficulties in finding public
statistical information, relating, for instance, the number of people that are denied entry into the
Baltic States and other relative information. Therefore, as a former officer of the State Border
Guard service I have kindly asked my former colleagues to share some statistical information
with me, so I could analyse it thoroughly and make certain conclusions. In this way I was
secretly provided with the annual report of 2013, of the State Border Guard Service, including
the analysis of the statistics and on-going issues in all the related departments of the service,
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which is normally for internal use only. Thus, the complex of different sources was used in this
thesis in order to reveal as many discrepancies met in the area as possible.
The thesis was structured in this way: firstly, the common routes of migration to Europe,
numbers of lodged asylum applications and information about the common problems
experienced by other frontier European Union Member States was presented. I argue that it is a
necessary foundation in order to illuminate the similarities and differences among the frontier
European Union states, before narrowing down to the Baltic States perspective.
Secondly, the background information and historical perspective of the Baltic States was given
and the evolution of their migration systems was presented in order to reveal the similarities
between the countries in the Baltic Sea region and to grasp what has influenced the creation of
those systems.
Thirdly, the relevant information based on empirical data, was presented and analysed. To assure
that the analysis was done from the different points of view in order to make it more thorough,
four theories were considered useful and were applied in the analysis part of this thesis. It is
namely the theory of analytical liberalism, the security concept, the integration theory of
intergovernmentalism and the concept of social navigation. The theories play their own role in
the analysis, as they were able to explain some phenomenon from different angles and
perspectives. The concept of securitization and analytical liberalism explained the domestic
attitudes towards immigrants and their influence on certain decisions adopted in the immigration
area. The integration theory of intergovernmentalism was employed to measure the influence on
migration management from the regional level and the concept of social navigation explained
explicitly the push and pull factors related to the migration.
Because the purpose of this thesis was to reveal the factors that make the Baltic States
unattractive for asylum seekers, and to explain what might have caused that, the four theories
supported the comprehensive explanation. The structure presented sought to answer the research
question in the conclusion.
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2.1 Limitations
The research question of this thesis implied, that there could be many intertwined explanatory
reasons for answering it. However, only the most related ones were chosen in order to fit into the
framework of this thesis, and be more or less on the way to answering the research question.
Firstly, the focus was mainly on the Baltic States, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as
destination countries for asylum seekers and migrants in general. However, in order to give a
broader picture of the issue, other EU countries might have been taken into account. In this way,
another European country, namely Sweden was being used quite a lot as an exemplary country in
the EU migration area. This was done in order to illuminate related issues in the Baltic States’
migration systems and to compare them with the Swedish practice in the area, which is
considered exemplary in this area among the EU Member States.
Secondly, the focus group of this thesis was the asylum system and asylum seekers. However, in
order to be able to explain the contemporary situation in the asylum field, there was a need to
describe and include other categories of migrants and other types of migration. This is because
asylum is only a part of the whole migration picture and thus asylum issues must be seen in a
broader context, as the problems are similar with those, experienced by other types of
immigrants in the countries. Moreover, even though I was analysing the asylum systems, it is
inevitable to analyse it without further going into the analysis of other influential areas, such as
immigration legislation, public attitudes towards migration, the Soviet legacy in the Baltic States
and others, which all together being intertwined formed the asylum practices. However, these
areas were only briefly touched upon to reveal the underlying tendencies with regards to asylum
or migration, meaning that they were not analysed in a broader context.
Thirdly, this thesis sought to reveal the discrepancy between the de jure and de facto spheres in
the societies of the Baltic States, as much as it was possible due to the accessible data. It was
important to reveal this discrepancy in order to answer the research question, claiming that it
contributes to the states’ unattractiveness and is met in many areas of the states’ governing. The
separation of the two spheres served as a starting point for analysing the consequences, which
proved the existence of the discrepancies. As an example about the importance of distinguishing
these two areas, Poulain & Perrin (2003) argued, that in order to calculate migration flows in the
country, the differentiation between countries de jure and de facto populations is required. This
may also be applicable in many other areas related with migration management, such as asylum
claims, reception conditions and other that were used in this thesis. The discrepancies that could
be found in other EU Member States in different areas related to asylum seekers, were not
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discussed further, as I argue, they could be met in all the countries, however could have different
outcomes, depending on the overall situation.
Certain limitations were inevitable in order to write a structured analysis, which answers the
research question comprehensively however accurately.
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3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: COMMON ISSUES OF ASYLUM
AND MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION FRONTIER STATES
To begin with, the background information about the asylum situation in European Union will be
presented, with the focus on the frontier EU Member States. It is necessary to have a basic
understanding about the explicit problems experienced by the frontier EU Member States in
order to illuminate their different situation in the asylum area.
In the past several years the number of asylum applications in Europe has significantly
increased. In 2011 there were 302 000 registered asylum applications in EU274, while in 2012
the number of applicants rose to 332 000 (EUROSTAT 2013). In 2013 the number of asylum
applications reached 434 160 in EU28 which is an increase of approximately 30% compared to
2012 (Bitoulas 2014). The numbers presented imply that the annual growth of asylum
applications in Europe requires all EU28 to be prepared to cope with refugee flows, especially
the frontier states. However, not all the countries are equally prepared, neither do they
experience equal flows of irregular migrants. Some European countries are more attractive than
others and others are closer or/and easier to enter, for instance frontier EU Member States.
While the number of applicants granted refugee status or subsidiary protection in frontier EU
Member States varies and are not necessarily the highest among refugee hosting countries, as
mentioned before, these states, mostly due to their geographic proximity, encounter flows that
they are unprepared to handle. There are many routes to enter Europe, however the most
commonly used lie through one or another of the Mediterranean countries. The picture bellow
illustrates some commonly used routes:
4
European Union’s abbreviation, including the number of Member States
13
Source: Spiegel Online International 2013
As we can see in the above picture – 5 of the 7 commonly used routes pictured are leading to the
Mediterranean Sea. The number of irregular migrants in Southern European Union frontier
countries has significantly increased since 2011 when political developments in Southern
Mediterranean countries and in the Middle East have brought instability and, in some situations,
led to humanitarian crisis. The maritime borders of Greece, Malta, Italy and Spain were put
under pressure by a significant5 number of irregular migrants reaching their shores as well as
some land borders in Balkans (External Borders Fund 2013).
Some common issues that EU frontier states experience due to refugee flows may be
highlighted. Firstly, the failure of institutional infrastructures to respond to the immigration
surges, as it is noticeable especially in the southern EU states. For instance, Italy is only capable
of holding less than a third of all asylum applicants it gets (Spiegel Online International 2013).
5
The number of asylum applications in Italy in 2011 increased with 239% from 2010, and for Malta it was a 980%
increase from 2010. The number of applications from Tunisia increased 12-fold in 2011 with the vast majority
lodged in Italy (European Commission 2012).
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Bulgaria received more than 7145 asylum applications in 2013, which is 5 times more than in
2012 (Bitoulas 2014) and since the country is not well equipped for hosting as many asylum
applicants as it encounters – the applicants are being accommodated in dire conditions
(Gizdavkov 2013). The Greek asylum system is also a relevant example, since it is,
unfortunately, constantly criticized for its chronic deficiencies in terms of limited access to
asylum system, poor procedural quality, low recognition rates etc. (UNHCR Greece 2013). The
European Court of Human Rights has even ruled that the asylum system in Greece is degrading
and inadequate, thus most of the EU states cease to comply the Dublin Convention and return
asylum seekers to Greece if they first lodged an application there (Spiegel Online International
2013). Finally the flood of refugees overburdens the authorities of the small Mediterranean
island of Malta leading to insufficient protection and violations of human rights. No EU member
state is prepared for the masses of immigrants that flow in, but it is more difficult for a small
island like Malta to cope with it than it is for other EU frontier states (Pabst 2013), especially
because Malta had the highest rate among the EU Member States in 2012 with 4980 applications
per 1 million inhabitants (EUROSTAT 2013).
Secondly, several secondary issues arise due to the aforementioned incapability. As in the
context of the Italian asylum system, there is a convincing anecdotal evidence of an even higher
number of persons arriving in Italy by boat, beyond the official numbers of registered
immigrants (Chope 2013). Italian authorities are facilitating, whether intended or not, the
secondary movement to Western countries in this way threatening to undermine confidence in
European legal order as well as the Dublin Convention6. Reports on Italy states its ill preparation
for migration surges and the government’s unwillingness to learn lessons from the experience.
Unfortunately, due to all the factors mentioned above, Italy needs to face the reality that these
mixed migratory flows are not a ‘one-off’ but rather continuing (Chope 2013). In the case of
Bulgaria, state’s authorities have failed in crisis planning, since they lack experience in the area
and the refugee flow is not considered as a priority in state’s politics. Unfortunately, these issues
make Bulgaria one of the most vulnerable EU frontier states in terms of coping with
humanitarian crisis relief (Gizdavkov 2013). Talking about Greece - the humanitarian crisis in
relation to the refugee situation is aggravated by the economic crisis, which curtails the
government’s scope for action (Schaub 2013).
Thirdly, EU neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Belarus, Russia and the North African
Mediterranean neighbours separated by the sea, sometimes may be an issue. If the visa
6
The Dublin Convention is a European Union law determining state’s responsibility to examine an application of
asylum seeker, under the Geneva Convention, within EU.
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requirements are relatively loose and those transiting the country are not the top priority for the
government, the country may serve perfectly as a transit country as it is in the case of Turkey
(Schaub 2013). It’s geographical position and the government’s attitude allows migrants to
continue the journey undetected to northern countries by using several different ways (Chope
2013).
Finally, insufficient border control may be an issue. The lack of appropriate control may rapidly
make certain places of the EU external border as the main ‘gates’ to enter Europe. This had
happened with the Turkish - Greek land border, where the situation until the second half of 2012
was highly critical (External Borders Fund 2013) reaching the number of 55 000 irregular
entries. This border has long been one of the main ‘entry gates’ to EU, however became more
popular after other ‘popular’ maritime routes were more intensively controlled (Schaub 2013).
The figures dropped in 2013 due to strengthened surveillance and the construction of the fence in
the northern part of the border (Pollet, Soupios-David & Teffera 2013).
Eastern and Northern EU frontier states are in a better situation in terms of irregular immigration
comparing with Mediterranean states. Located in the North of Europe Finland and the Baltic
States as well as Eastern European states, mostly due to their geographical position and land
borders, do not experience countless and continuous migratory flows. In the past few years
irregular migration was mostly influenced by the Arab Spring in 2011 and the civil war in Syria.
Therefore, those seeking protection more often attempted to enter Europe through Mediterranean
routes thus overburdening southern EU frontier states (Chope 2013).
In 2011 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for greater solidarity
within Member States of the Council of Europe for European frontier states that are facing
arrivals from the Southern Mediterranean and in return - required from the frontier states to take
all the necessary measures for preventing secondary onward movements to other EU Member
States. However, as it was mentioned before in the Italian context, due to refugee surges in the
Mediterranean States, the unofficial incentives for the secondary movement exist and states’ are
unwilling to face the reality that these mixed migratory flows are not a ‘one-off’ but rather a
continuing issue (Chope 2013).
This brief overview gives an understanding about the common issues found in the frontier EU
Member States, especially the Southern ones. The distribution of asylum applications is unequal
and thus, reveals some common issues among them. As it was mentioned, neither of EU frontier
Member States is prepared to respond to irregular migration flows, thus the way Southern
countries responds to it, is being criticized. The main issue in terms of asylum systems in the EU
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frontier Member States is the absence of an integrated migration policy to deal with an increased
number of arrivals or a strategy on how to deal with large-scale emergency situations (Chope
2013). The unwillingness to establish certain policies is also noticeable. Moreover, neighbouring
EU countries is another problem, stimulating irregular migration to Europe through certain
routes, since liberal visa policies, negligent border security and indifferent attitude towards those
transiting the country, attract the attention of traffickers and thus, create channels into Europe.
3.1 The Baltic States
In this part the context of the Baltic States asylum systems will be presented since it serves as a
point of departure in answering the research question. Similarities and differences will be
presented in terms of history, culture, language and post-independence development with focus
on the creation of asylum regimes to give a holistic understanding of the asylum situation in the
Baltics.
The Baltic States are three Northern countries situated on the east shore of the Baltic Sea. For
most of their history the three countries have gone different ways, however in the 20th century
they shared a common trajectory, namely the escape from the Russian Empire, independence
during the inter-war period, wartime occupation followed by re-absorption by the Soviet Union
and at last the renewed struggle for independence in the end of the century (Alston 2011).
The countries shared a common fate however had different histories. The three are also different
in terms of language, culture and religion. Nonetheless, the rediscovery of their languages and
folklores was partly the factor that led to the emergence of nationalist movements (Alston 2011).
Another influential factor leading to revival was the drastic demographic shift especially in
Latvia and Estonia, due to Soviet-imposed massive influx of immigrants. Thus, the percentage of
ethnic Estonians and Latvians declined significantly to respectively 62% and 52%, putting into
doubt their continued status as majorities in their own homelands (Grigas, Kasekamp,
Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013). Aspirations to halt this negative trend contributed to the
development of nationalist movements with overtly expressed proposals concerning autonomy
and finally to independence in the end of the 20th century. The significant event that united all
the three Baltic States took place on the 23 August 1989, when over a million demonstrators
from all the three countries formed a human chain linking hands that stretched 595 kilometres
across the Baltic Republics and was named ‘The Baltic Way’ (Alston 2011). The countries
attempted to build regional alliances short after the independence in order to assure their own
collective security and have been treated as a block in the politics of the larger power since then.
In 1991 the Baltic Assembly was established. It promotes co-operation between the parliaments
17
of the Baltic States and discusses issues of common interest. All the aforementioned served as a
foundation for the establishment of an independent regional identity (Alston 2011).
3.1.1 Immigration, refugees, asylum – creation of regimes
The history of the three Baltic States presented above serves as the point of departure in
understanding their contemporary co-operation, unity and the sense of nationalism. In this part
the reader will be introduced to the creation of asylum regimes in the countries as well as the
present situation related to immigration in all the Baltic States.
In 1991, right after restoring independence the Baltic States became parliamentary democracies
with a common strategy to quickly integrate with Western Europe by joining as many Western
organizations as possible. This was done in order to guarantee the survival of their independence
(Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013). The first issues related to immigration
in newly independent states were related to the Russian minorities. In Latvia and Estonia
citizenship was not granted automatically to all residents after the independence, thus those who
settled in the Soviet period had to apply for naturalization, where basic competence in national
language was the main criterion. As a consequence many residents in Estonia and Latvia opted
Russian citizenship or remained stateless. Lithuania though granted all residents with citizenship
since the Russian minority was not substantial and ethnic Lithuanians comprised 80% of the
population (Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013).
The states had to provide legal and policy responses to the growing transit migration of asylum
seekers from the East aiming to reach Western Europe (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
Furthermore, Soviet-era legislation had to be modernized and EU acquis7 had to be implemented
due to the quest for membership in the EU (Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija
2013). A refugee policy emerged as an increasingly significant area for cooperation since it is
related to broader issues of security and external border control. In 1997 explicit requirements
for the applicant states including the Baltic States were set. It consisted of adoption of the
Geneva Convention8 and its necessary implementing machinery and the Dublin Convention as
well as adoption of related measures in the EU acquis to approximate asylum measures (Byrne,
Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
The first Baltic State to join the international refugee regime was the Republic of Lithuania. On
the 21st January 1997 it ratified the Geneva Convention and its New York Protocol. This was
7
‘Acquis communautaire’ is a French term used to refer to the EU’s total body of legislation, including everything
from treaties to directives, declarations, internationals agreements, the case - law of the Court of Justice, etc.
8
The Geneva Convention comprise of 4 treaties and 3 additional protocols establishing the standards of
international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict.
18
followed by the adoption of the Lithuanian Refugee Law. Thus, on 27th July 1997 the
Convention and the Refugee Law entered into force (European Parliament 1999). In 2004 the
Law on the Legal Status of Aliens of the Republic of Lithuania was adopted to bring the law in
accordance with EU standards (IOM Vilnius 2011). Lithuanian experts had stated, that the
restrictions adopted in the new Law on Aliens were mainly derived from those also adopted in
Western Europe such as ‘safe third country’, ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘manifestly unfounded
claims’ (Lavenex 2002). However, there was a societal difference between Western countries
and newly independent Baltic States, thus the same restrictions implemented may have different
outcomes. Therefore, the differences between the policy level – de jure 9 and the actual
implementation - de facto10 will be analysed further in the analysis part.
Estonia was the second one ratifying the Geneva Convention and the New York Protocol on the
19th of February 1997 (UNHCR 1997). The asylum area is regulated by the Act on Granting
International Protection to Aliens that was adopted in 2006 and contains principles proceeding
both from the Geneva Convention and EU directives (Politsei – ja Piirivalveamet 2014). Some
amendments were adopted after the European Commissions comments about limited progress in
the field of asylum, however Estonia was still called to strengthen the administrative capacities
for dealing with asylum seekers and to specify the role of the border police (Lavenex 2002).
The last one of the three to accede the Geneva Convention and the New York Protocol on the
19th June 1997 was Latvia. Its way towards accession is marked with initial opposition. Latvia’s
authorities explained the unwillingness to join the regime by two arguments, namely Latvia’s
unattractiveness for asylum seekers and the aspiration to avoid the risk of becoming a ‘buffer’
zone 11 for those heading west (Lavenex 2002). However, short after ratifying the Geneva
Convention, the Law on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Republic of Latvia was adopted,
which regulates all the matters regarding asylum seekers and refugees in Latvia (European
Parliament 1999).
Despite the initial imperfection of newly created asylum regimes, the accession to EU process
has encouraged significant advances in refugee protection. The process of transferring EU
asylum acquis introduced asylum determination systems and fundamental safeguards in the
9
De jure – means a state of affairs, that is officially sanctioned, thus in accordance with law (Washington University
School of Law 2014)
10
De facto – means a state of affairs, that is true in fact, however is not officially sanctioned (Washington
University School of Law 2014).
11
‘Buffer zone’ –is an area lying between two states and providing each with protection from the other
(Dictionary.com n.d.).
19
Baltic States’ jurisdiction based on Western European practices (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen
2004).
Finally on the 1st of May 2004, all the three Baltic States became the Member States of EU
(Grigas, Kasekamp, Maslauskaite & Zorgenfreija 2013), moreover their asylum systems are now
part of the CEAS, meaning that they are harmonised with EU acquis and being constantly
improved (IOM Vilnius 2011), at least formally.
3.1.2 Current asylum regime and the migration situation in the Baltics
In this section of the thesis the current asylum situation in the Baltics will be presented without
deep analysis about the root causes, which will be analysed in the analysis part of this thesis.
The Baltic countries stand out as countries with the lowest number of asylum claims and a low
number of refugees in EU. According to the UNHCR, this is a result of the Governments’ strict
migration policy and a lack of alternative strategies in the admission of refugees. It has stated,
that lodged asylum claims are being examined in a fairly competent, though restrictive way
(Human Rights Liaison Unit 2010).
From all the Baltic States Estonia stands out as the one having the lowest number of asylum
claims in the EU and a low number of refugees. In 2012 there were 75 asylum applications
lodged in Estonia, which is the rate of 55 applications per 1 million inhabitants of the country. It
was the second lowest rate in EU after Portugal, which had a rate of 30. Interestingly, only 10
applicants were granted refugee status (Bitoulas 2014). The number of asylum applications grew
in 2013 reaching 95, however only 7 applicants were granted asylum (The Baltic Course 2014).
Comparing Estonia to Latvia, the latter one got more than twice the applications - 195
applications in 2013, comprising the rate of 97 applications per 1 million inhabitants (Bitoulas
2014). Lithuania has the highest number of asylum applications lodged among the Baltic States
with 628 applications in 2012 and 400 applications in 2013 (Migracijos Departamentas 2014).
Interesting to note, that all three states have different numbers of applications lodged, Estonia
being the one with the lowest number however, comparing the recognition rates among them in
2012, Estonia was the one with the highest recognition rate comprising 32,8 %, followed by
Latvia with 17,8% and Lithuania with the rate of only 13,9% (EUROSTAT 2013).
The numbers and rates presented may illustrate the fact that to this date Lithuania is still mostly
considered as a transit country for illegal migrants and is not popular among refugees as a
country of asylum. This will be further discussed and analysed in the analysis part. To illustrate
20
aforementioned, it is important to note that from 400 applications in 2013 almost a third of them
– 124 were withdrawn, dragging the Lithuanian recognition rate down. The asylum application
most often is withdrawn when it is impossible to get in touch with the asylum seeker, which
means that he/she has left the country (Migracijos Departamentas 2014). On the other hand
Estonia, with the lowest number of asylum applications in EU, presumably either gets more
well-founded applications than those accidental and based on the secondary movement or many
illegal migrants do not apply for asylum and go underground. It is noteworthy, that according to
the report of the Eurobarometer, Latvia and Estonia were the leaders of the EU in undeclared
work in 2013, with 11% of the residents working illegally. Lithuania took the fifth place with 8%
of residents (European Commission 2013). The high rate of the undeclared work implies that
there are more possibilities to find a job even being an illegal migrant.
Coming back to asylum matters - all the Baltic States grant two forms of international protection:
refugee status and subsidiary protection (IOM Tallinn Office 2012). In the case of mass influx
they may also grant temporary protection for a group of refugees, however it has never been
granted so far in any of the Baltic States (European Migration Network 2012).
There are only 3 asylum centres in the Baltic States, one in each state. Interestingly, states’
institutions operate accommodation centres, both in Latvia and Lithuania. In Latvia the centre
belongs to the Office Citizenship and Migration Affairs and the maximum capacity of the centre
is up to 200 persons. However, due to the lack of means not all needs of asylum seekers are
being solved, including the health care services (Ministry of the Interior, The Republic of Latvia
2012). In Lithuania, the Foreigner’s registration centre is part of the State Border Guard Service
at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania where both illegal migrants and
asylum seekers are being accommodated. Officially stated that it has a capacity of 500 persons
(State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014), however in reality there may live up to 88
asylum seekers and 76 illegal migrants, ensuring the hygienic conditions (Foreigners
Registration Centre 2014). Moreover, it is not a social institution, on the contrary – authority
equal to the police, thus only a minimum level of social assistance is ensured (Human Rights
Liaison Unit 2011) and the territory is under surveillance by armed and uniformed officers. In
Estonia on the other hand, until the end of 2013 the Ministry of Social Affairs had administered
the centre and starting from 2014 the specialised state-owned enterprise, mainly providing social
welfare services to adults with special mental needs, administers the centre (European Migration
Network 2013). It may seem unreasonable to classify asylum into the same category with the
people, having special mental needs, however it is likely a better solution to be administered by
social workers than be guarded by armed border guards.
21
3.1.3 Migration patterns in the Baltics
So far the Baltic States have been described as countries of asylum, however it is important to
note, that in the context of migration, asylum is only a small part. In order to understand asylum
situation in the Baltics it is important to understand the whole migration context in the Baltics.
Short after the independence, the citizens of the Baltic States gained an opportunity to migrate to
the Western countries. However, the emigration became a national problem after 2004, when the
three joined the EU. Emigration from the Baltics rapidly increased then, due to free movement
and less requirements to work resulting in considerable depopulation.
Since the beginning of the 21st century - Latvia lost 9,1% of its population (Engbersen & Jansen
2013, p. 14) and Estonia’s population declined with 5,5% (Kaska 2013, p. 30). The country most
affected by the emigration surges was Lithuania, which lost 12,9% in the period and in total from
1990 have lost approximately 20% of the Lithuanian population of 1990s (Sipavičienė &
Stankūnienė, p. 46). Emigration in the Baltic States is tightly related to economic decline and
rising unemployment, as the majority of emigrants are young graduates and middle-age working
class people. As a consequence, the populations are ageing and decreasing (Engbersen & Jansen
2013, p. 16). Dropping fertility rates, emigration and growing number of retirees will pose
serious political and economical challenges in the near future. The states will face the need to
attract foreign workers themselves while at the same time trying to preserve their indigenous
cultural identities, that is an issue of importance in the Baltic States (The Lithuania Tribune
2013).
In the context of migration patterns presented above, numbers of asylum applications in the
Baltic States does not seem unreasonably low, since the countries are migrant sending countries
themselves. Emigration relates to many issues in the country that influence asylum trends as
well. This will be further analysed in the analysis part of this thesis.
22
4. THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section 4 different theories will be presented, namely the analytical liberalism, the
security concept, intergovernmentalism and the concept of social navigation that will be applied
in this thesis in order to answer the research question. The theories each play their different roles
in answering the research question comprehensively, from different points of view and will be
applied in the analysis part of this thesis, with no certain sequence.
4.1 The security issue and the “securitization”
To begin with, the security concept will be presented in order to conceptualize its role in the
states policy decision-making. The concept of security does not hold one definition and due to
diverse range of ways it can be interpreted and defined, it is thus a contested concept. Following
Alexander Betts definition it can be defined as “an object’s degree of vulnerability to a threat”,
that consists of two main elements – a threat and a referent object, that is vulnerable to that threat
(Betts 2009, p. 60).
The traditional realists understand a nation-state as the most important actor that maximizes the
welfare of citizens through upholding “national security” and their main goals are survival and
the national security. However, in the post-Cold War era the understanding of threats changed.
The domination of intra-state conflicts and humanitarian emergencies in the 1990s undoubtedly
attracted the attention of international policy–makers. Thereby, the ‘human security’ approach
emerged, arguing that there can also be other objects than only the states – such as individuals,
identities or groups (people), as well as the threats may be of wider range – such as economical
or environmental (Betts 2009).
The ‘human security’ concept focuses on the individual as a referent object of security, since the
state’s security is not always synonymous with the security of the people. It also broadens the
scope of threats that includes a range of non-military threats such as political, health, food,
economic, personal, community and etc. (Betts 2009). The individual constitutes the starting
point of the concept and focuses on their needs as well as the “freedom from pervasive threats to
people’s rights, safety, and lives” (Paris 2001, p. 90). Thus, it can be defined as a situation,
where individuals are protected from dangers that pose threat to their lives, freedom and dignity
(Jonsson 2009). Challenges to ‘human security’ are factors undermining society and the quality
of life, including for instance violations of human rights, demographic decline and crimes. These
societal and political forces reduce the security of the state (Shelley 2009).
23
On one hand, the relationship between the state and the individual is central to forced migration,
since sometimes there is a need to protect individuals outside the state framework. In this way
the concept may be used to attract more resources for refugees, to mobilize state support for
durable solutions (Betts 2009). On the other hand, it can also be used conversely in terms of
“securitization”, as it will be explained further on.
The term “securitization” was developed by the Copenhagen School12, which is mainly based on
the work of Ole Waever. It can be described as a “speech act” with real political effects when an
issue comes to be perceived as related to security, thus giving it a special status and legitimizing
actions that would otherwise not be legitimate, since security is seen as urgent and fundamental.
Bringing securitization closer to migration issues, the concept of societal security explains that
external threats are often to societal values, such as cultural identity consisting of language,
religion, ethnicity etc. (Betts 2009). Thus, if an issue is being linked to security - extraordinary
measures are being justified in the name of security. As a consequence, due to terrorism issues,
asylum and immigration in general have been linked to security both in the United States and in
the EU, resulting in the legitimation of practices such as suspension of civil liberties, extrajudicial detention, reinforced border control, refoulemement13 and forcible deportation (Betts
2009).
This section has briefly introduced the security issue and the concept of human security. In the
context of the Baltic States I argue, securitization took place in the post-Soviet period, in this
way contributing to the low number of asylum applications nowadays. The state-security concept
is too narrow thoroughly explain the causes for the contemporary restrictive immigration and
asylum policies in the Baltic States. Therefore, the human security concept will be used in the
analysis part of this thesis that will shift the analysis level from the state level to the societal and
to individuals composing it (Jonsson 2009).
The concept of human security will be applied in order to explain the Baltic States’
unattractiveness in terms of asylum. I argue, that asylum and immigration in general were
perceived as threats to the survival and existence of ethno-cultural societies in the nationbuilding process resulting in restrictive migration policies in the Baltic States.
12
The Copenhagen School represents the Critical Security studies. It draws upon constructivism and examines how
certain issues come to be seen through the security lens and thus, how some certain values in the societies come to
be seen as needing to be protected from the external threats (Betts 2009, p. 70).
13
‘Refoulement’ is a term meaning the forced return of a person to a country where he or she faces persecution.
24
4.2 Analytical liberalism
In this section the theory of analytical liberalism will be presented, which also contributes in
answering the research question, from a slightly different perspective, since it will help
explaining the influence of domestic powers to the formation of the national politics in the
immigration area and as Byrne, Noll and Vedsted-Hansen (2004, p. 377), argues, “To
understand the development of European asylum law in context one needs to acknowledge that
refugee law forms at the domestic level”.
Andrew Moravcsik has developed the theory of analytical liberalism on the legacy of classical
liberalism in 1997. Since classical liberalism was more ideology than theory, he abandoned
many of the normative and ideological claims and argued that domestic politics matters for a
state’s foreign policy (Betts 2009). He claims, that “the national interest in the state emerges
from the aggregation of domestic preferences”, thus foreign policies emerges from interestgroup formation and lobbying within the state (Betts 2009, p. 28). Moreover, he argues, that “the
domestic character of the state and domestic politics, irrespective of whether the state is liberal,
authoritarian, capitalist, or socialist” – matters the most, while denying the importance of
“liberal” character of the state, that matters in the classical liberalism (Betts 2009, p. 28).
From the analytical liberals’ point of view, the state is a passive receptacle of domestic interests,
thus the interests are drawn directly onto political parties and in this way they are being plugged
into political institutions. Even though institutions shape the final outcome in the states, they are
treated as exogenous to the domestic actors themselves (Brawley 2009). Domestic preferences
are emphasized as the driving force behind the policy and institutions merely filter them. The
state may also ignore some domestic interests and therefore domestic political machinations will
have little effect. The preferences are considered stable over time, difficult to adjust and
relatively impervious to politics when they are tied to actors’ identities (Brawley 2009).
The theory has a great potential to be applied when analysing migration issues, since states’
behaviour towards asylum seekers or migrants in general, are influenced by the domestic politics
and character of the state. Therefore, the existing public opinion, electoral politics, interest
groups, the states core political values and the decision-making procedures – all matter when it
comes to how the state responds to all groups of immigrants, by shaping their immigration
policies. Moreover it is argued, that the state character also shapes the states response to
immigration issues, since the states values contribute in shaping the policies in the way that
liberal, democratic states most likely respond to the issue in restrained, pacific and humanitarian
ways and conversely (Betts 2009).
25
The analytical liberalists’ approach to security issues consists of the domestic actors’ definition
of international interests and the means of defending them, in terms of domestic preferences. In
other words, it is defining what is valued and vulnerable in the society? Who is perceived as a
threat and how should it be met? (Brawley 2009). The definition of security may fluctuate due to
domestic groups’ competition for control over policy and the changes of parties in government,
resulting in narrow preferences in the security policy. Thus, the analytical liberal approach looks
to the material interests of domestic groups in order to examine how priorities in security policy
were set and how the security was attained. Competing domestic groups are expected to voice
through their rival material interests, where the winner shapes who enters the office, thus directs
the security policy in different directions (Brawley 2009).
I argue, that this theory together with the securitization concept will help in achieving a better
understanding of the development of immigration policies in the Baltic States. Domestic actors
define the threats in the society and influence the process of how they should be met. Here the
securitization comes into the picture, since necessary practices for meeting the threat are being
legitimized. By applying the theory, I hope to reveal the underlying tendencies in the Baltic
States related to states’ characters and the importance of public attitude that might have
contributed to their contemporary exceptional situation in terms of asylum.
4.3 Intergovernmentalism
In order to explain the EU’s impact on migration management in the Baltic States, the
integration theory, namely intergovernmentalism will be applied. It has a potential to explain the
balancing between the legal obligations of the EU on one hand and the domestic influence on the
other. It will help us to understand, why being member states of the EU, the Baltic States have
developed comparatively strict migration policies and why there is a significant discrepancy
between the policy level and the practice in the states.
Intergovernmentalism is based on the mainstream traditional political science theory – realism
thus, states are seen as selfish, pursuing to fulfil their own interests and they only participate in
the regional politics to benefit their own interests in the long run (Kelstrup, Sindbjerg Martinsen
& Wind 2008). An Intergovernmentalist approach regards a state as the most important actor in
the integration process. It concentrates on the study of politics between and within states, since
integration is understood as a series of bargains among states, assisted and facilitated by
supranational institutions, however bargains reflect national interests of the EU Member States
(Christiansen 2005). In addition, the states are not eager to spread the integration process to the
26
areas that are considered of “high politics” such as national security and defence (Bache, George
& Bulmer 2011).
The approach regards national governments as powerful actors in the regional integration, since
by protecting and promoting their national interests they control the nature and pace of
integration. Domestic groups are influential in the governments’ decision-making process,
however governments decisions are not simply a response to pressure from organised domestic
groups, but are rather politically calculated and driven by the domestic concerns (Bache, George
& Bulmer 2011) in this way slightly disagreeing with the theory of analytical liberalism.
Because this paper analyses the development of the restrictive migration policies in the Baltic
States as a cause for low number of asylum applications, the theory will help to look at the
underlying reasons for their development in terms of admission to the EU. I argue, that this
theory is relevant in illuminating the integration to the EU process, which definitely had its
impact on migration policies in the Baltic States. It will help to continue the explanation, how the
securitized issues in the states had to be in accordance with the supranational obligations and
what are the consequences of this process.
4.4 The concept of social navigation
Finally, but not the least important is the concept of social navigation, which will be presented in
this section. It will also be applied in the analysis part of this thesis, in order to give a different
perspective and to supplement the answer to the research question. I argue, this concept may
complement push and pull factors of migration.
Henrik E. Vigh uses the concept of social navigation in his article about the young people in
Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, in order to illustrate a navigation of social ties and options that arise in
order to escape the social death (the term will be presented further in this section) and in this way
to fulfil material and social needs. “The concept of social navigation provides insights between
objective structures and subjective agency” (Vigh 2006, p. 31).
Vigh (2006) is mostly discussing the mobilization of youths in situations of warfare, where war
becomes a terrain of possibility for them. However, beyond that he reveals three navigational
possibilities within the researched area, where one is migration. It stands out as the most
favourable, since by becoming migrants youths of Bissau hope to gain an adequate income and
be able to support the household in Guinea-Bissau. In other words, the navigation is an attempt
to govern your own life and is understood as a positive impact on one’s future or at least the
hope of it (Vigh 2006).
27
The concept of social navigation is based on the African term dubriagem, which cannot be
directly translated, since it does not exist in Portuguese. The locals explained the term as the
movement, dynamism and “ability to act in relation to the movement of the social terrain one’s
life is set in” in Vigh’s research. (Vigh 2006, p. 51). This movement requires one to assess the
immediate dangers and possibilities as well as to analyse possibilities of the desired (imagined)
social environment, finally actualizing it with the movement from the present to the imagined
future (Vigh 2006).
The concept of social navigation also includes the term social death, which describes a state,
when a person is unable to attend his social needs therefore cannot fulfil a process of social
becoming. This is a state one wish to escape. In other words, the social death is “an absence of
the possibility of a worthy life” (Vigh 2006, p. 45), meaning that socially a person is unable to
exist and his life does not entail the desired contents. In the pursuit of a worthy life migration
becomes a necessity (Vigh 2006, p. 103). The term will be employed to understand the push
factors and to enlighten the importance of the initial state of refugees prior to migration. It will
also help to reveal that certain states may entail contents of a social death even after migration,
leading to the secondary movement.
Even though Vigh (2006) describes a life of three young men in Guinea-Bissau, who seek to
escape the social death and their navigation towards gaining a positive social existence – it may
nevertheless contribute efficiently in this thesis. In the context of this thesis, it can help to picture
an individual perspective not only for aspirations to migrate but also to explain the decision of
choosing certain states (that are rarely the Baltic States) and how it is related to their future
expectations. In other words – to explain the push and pull factors more thoroughly. I argue this
may partly contribute to answering the research question and can help to explain the
contemporary asylum situation in the Baltic States, however looking from different - individual angle.
4.5 Summing up the theoretical framework
All the theories presented have different conceptual origins however I argue they all together can
successfully contribute to answering the research question, by offering different approaches. The
underlying pre-assumption of this thesis is that the Baltic States are unattractive for asylum
seekers, due to their restrictive migration policies developed as well as due to the clandestine
informal actions of public authorities working with illegal migrants. The research question
implies that the answer should consist of several influential factors, therefore by applying all the
four theories, I argue, the analysis will be comprehensive, since it will be done from the different
28
points of view. In this way the main factors contributing to the states’ unattractiveness and low
asylum application numbers will be assessed.
The theories are different in what they see as a main actor in the policy making process, such as
a state, a domestic interest groups, a society, an individual. However, in the context of this thesis,
an individual dimension at a certain degree is being used as an influential actor, in this way
connecting all the theories. The human security approach see people as a referent object,
analytical liberalism puts an emphasis on the influence of domestic groups, the concept of social
navigation describes an individual aspirations and his decision-making process and even the
theory of Intergovernmentalism recognizes the influence of domestic groups in the governments’
decision-making process even though, the decisions are not simply a response to pressure from
organised domestic groups, but are rather politically calculated and driven by domestic concerns
(Bache, George & Bulmer 2011).
Another issue that all the theories have in common is survival. All the measures taken to
influence the immigration policies are based on the survival, either of the state, society, ethnicity,
or individual. Thus, being conceptually different in the context of this thesis the theories have
uniting aspects.
All the 4 theories analyse an influence to the policy making process at different levels. The
concept of securitization and analytical liberalism reveal the domestic attitudes towards
immigrants and explain, how the domestic preferences and positioning asylum and immigration
as threats may influence a creation of politics in the asylum area. Zooming out to the regional
level, the integration theory of intergovernmentalism helps to analyse an influence of the
regional - EU – level, on migration management in the Baltic States and the consequences of
balancing between the regional and the domestic levels. Finally the concept of social navigation
will be applied to give a slightly different approach to answering the research question, since it
explains aspirations of an individual to migrate and an individual decision of choosing a certain
destination country. However, the decision is highly influenced by the factors, explained and
analysed with the three above-mentioned theories. By applying all the 4 theories, the analysis
encompasses 3 different levels therefore is able to explain the asylum situation in the Baltic
States comprehensively.
29
ANALYSIS
There are multiple reasons that put the Baltic States in an exceptional situation with regard to
asylum. This analysis chapter of the thesis will focus on different approaches that will be
analysed with selected theories of analytical liberalism, intergovernmentalism and the concepts
of human security and social navigation in order to analyse the current situation and answer the
research question. First and foremost the presumption about the strict border control will be
analysed, to explain what might have caused the contemporary strict immigration policies in the
Baltic States. Secondly, it will be interesting to discuss and analyse several issues met in the
Baltic States concerning asylum and immigration in order to explain, how they might contribute
to the unattractiveness for asylum seekers.
5. STRICT BORDER CONTROL, RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION
NORMS AND THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES
The recognition rates in the Baltic States given in the previous chapters confirm the statement
from the UNHCR about strict migration policies and restrictive examination of asylum cases in
the Baltic States. Comparing the rates with Sweden’s, which is considered having a liberal
migration policy and where in 2012 the rate of granting protection reached 39% and rose to 49%
in 2013 (Migrationsverket 2014) it is noticeable, that asylum systems in the three Baltic States
are less liberal than it is in Sweden. Therefore, it is important to describe a liberal migration
framework and compare it with the existing in the Baltic States, as in this way, the strictness
described by the UNHCR can be partly revealed.
5.1. Sweden’s example of liberal migration policies
As an exemplary model of liberal migration policies I have chosen Sweden, which is a
Scandinavian country, a close neighbour of the Baltic States. Sweden does not have an external
EU border, however has been leading in immigration numbers for many years comparing both
with the Baltic States and with the other EU Member States (Leslie 2012). In 2013, Sweden had
the highest number of the asylum applications per million inhabitants with almost 2000 per 1
million (Bitoulas 2014), confirming its attractiveness for asylum seekers. Sweden has a large
percentage of immigrants and asylum seekers due to its liberal, humanitarian–based immigration
policies, thus is referred as an “immigration country” (Leslie 2012). Ethical and moral reasons
are of high importance for accepting immigrants (including asylum seekers) in Sweden, thus
humanitarianism is prioritized (Westin 1996). Sweden has a long immigration history dating the
World War 2, when approximately 2.4 million people immigrated to Sweden. At that time
immigration was unrestricted, since no institution existed to control it (Leslie 2012).
30
Contemporary Swedish law is based on the principle of equality meaning that everyone living in
the country should be entitled to the same political, economic and legal rights (Gustafson 2009).
Helpfulness for those in need is a common attribute in Sweden, since every year approximately
100 000 immigrants who formally do not qualify for a refugee status come to Sweden and it is
very often that the vast majority is given permanent residency on the humanitarian grounds, that
may include many reasons (Benito 2007).
After the residence is granted another important step is integration to society. The Swedish
integration policy is deemed exemplary by the international community even though it has some
defects and unresolved challenges. The immigrants are often present in a public life, in this way
symbolising the openness of the multicultural society (Focus Migration 2009).
The Swedish liberalism towards immigrants can be explained by employing the theory of
analytical liberalism in connection with the concept of human security. Sweden has a long
immigration history, however, immigration has never been understood as a threat, in this way
forming the domestic character of the state, which can be described as liberal. The country
provides a high level of human security to its citizens, which affects the domestic preferences.
Consequently, according to the analytical liberalism, the domestic preferences influence the
state’s response towards immigrants (including asylum seekers), making it rather welcoming
than pushing away.
Looking through the lens of the social navigation concept, many of those in need for protection
or simply pursuing for a worthy life, would choose Sweden as a destination country, because as
the concept argues, a person makes a decision to migrate in order to escape the social death of its
life and to fulfil both economic and social needs. A country, where a high level of human
security is provided and immigration rules are liberal can be easily imagined as a destination
country.
Many aspects comprise liberal migration system, such as integration, attitude towards
immigrants and asylum seekers as well as history, economical situation and etc. Thus, while
explaining the Baltic situation and using different approaches further in the analysis I will once
in a while come back to the Swedish system and use it to make a contrast. I argue it is important
to compare the Baltic States with Sweden in terms of how they response to immigration, since
the latter is considered as an exemplary country in the matter. Being one of the countries, where
the number of immigrants is steadily growing, Sweden remains liberal and prioritizes
humanitarianism, while the Baltic States, on the contrary, even having a quite low number of
immigrants, seeks to defend the society from this issue therefore respond in a restrictive manner.
31
5.2 What is a strict border security?
Since a strict border security is being constantly mentioned as a part of the restrictive migration
policy in the Baltic States, it is therefore important to give a broader analysis of this issue.
A strict border security can be illustrated by analysing practices, implemented with the EU
asylum acquis, namely the safe third country14, asylum claims at the state border and ‘manifestly
unfounded15’ claims, both on de jure and de facto levels. The practice of the safe third country
invite abuses of asylum regimes, since the Baltic States are in the neighbourhood with Russia
and Belarus. To be more precise, in this situation, the implemented safeguards from the Western
practice are not eligible since it is hard to picture such neighbours as the safe third countries,
where protection to those in need would be provided in compliance with the Geneva Convention.
Asylum claimants at the external EU border have also been exposed to risk, since the border
guards enjoy considerable margins for rejecting persons and readmission agreements with the
Eastern neighbours were concluded (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
The statistic information could illuminate the strict border and immigration policies, however
information about expulsions, readmissions to the safe third country, refusals to enter and
manifestly unfounded claims in the Baltic States cannot be found at the official migration
webpages. Only the number of asylum applications and what kind of decisions has been made
are to be found. FRONTEX provides common statistics from all the EU Member States, having
the external EU border, however the information is not divided according to the frontier EU
Member States thereby specific numbers are not presented.
Fortunately, as a former officer of the State Border Guard Service of Lithuania, still having some
contacts there, I was able to get annual statistical information about the situation in Lithuania in
2013, which is a restricted document, only for internal use, containing information about
decisions made towards the asylum seekers and illegal migrants, so the de facto situation can be
evaluated16. Even though it does not cover all the Baltic States, their situation in migration area
is quite similar, since the number of asylum applications and the recognition rates varies
marginally. In this context it will contribute to the analysis of strict border control. Thus, by
14
’Safe third country’ is a third country, where the life and liberty of people are not threatened on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, as well as where the principle of
non-refoulement is respected, where prohibitions of international law related violence, torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment are respected (European Parliament and the Council 2013, p. 80)
15
‘Manifestly unfounded’ may be considered an application, when the applicant is from the safe country of origin or
provides false information, documents, when he/she withholds relevant information or documents, refuses to
comply with obligation to give fingerprints or is considered dangerous for national security, public order and etc.
(European Parliament and the Council 2013, p.78)
16
Reports are written for a limited internal usage only in the State Border Guard service of Lithuania.
32
analysing statistics of one state’s practices it is, I argue, possible to draw some general
conclusions about the others as well.
First of all, it is important to mention, that a strict border security and surveillance are being
improved every year, in this way making it more difficult to cross the border in the so called
“green zone”17. There are no physical fences built on the external EU border with Russia
throughout the Baltic States. Therefore the control is ensured by physically patrolling near the
state border or by observing it with installed video surveillance.
There were 308 violations of the state border recorded in the Republic of Lithuania in 2013,
which is 23,6% less comparing with the number of violations in 2012. Interestingly, 49,1% of
the committed violations of the state border consist of footprints found on the ground were no
suspects are being detained. This implies that almost half of all the illegal border crossings are
related both to illegal migration and smuggling of cigarettes. The number of illegal migrants
detained near the state border may also reveal the growing surveillance and strictness of the
border control. In 2013 there were 120 people detained due to the illegal crossing of the state
border, while in 2012 this number reached 106 (State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014).
Looking from the perspective of the theory of intergovernmentalism, the restrictive policies in
Lithuania are still in place even after 10 years of being the Member State of the EU and are,
moreover, even growing. This leads to the assumption that national interests in the context of
immigration management have not changed. Looking from a political perspective, the Baltic
States benefits from strictly guarding the external EU border, since in this way they protect their
societies, from the constructed and perceived threats, namely the immigrants.
As it was mentioned before, the official information about exact number of violations of the
external EU border in the Baltic States separately is not being published. Therefore, there were
difficulties to compare the numbers among the Baltic States. However, some information can be
found. In Latvia, for instance, the number of border crossing violations on its borders with
Russia and Belarus grew by 71% in the period from 2007 until 2012. While in 2007 the number
was 2364, it has risen and reached 4055 in 2012 (Petrova 2012). The rising number of violations
may also partly contribute to aspirations of the Baltic States to implement the stricter border
control at the external EU border.
Analysing the number of migrants denied to enter the country also enlightens the strictness. In
2013 the number of third-country nationals travelling to Lithuania reached 3.047.900 people,
17
The ”green zone” is a land border situated between border crossing points.
33
which is an increase of 5,5% comparing with 2012. 2865 migrants were denied to enter the
country due to several reasons namely the lack of valid travel document, usage of forged/fake
documents, the lack of valid visa, usage of forged visa, inability to prove the reason of the
journey and etc. (State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014).
One of the ways to enter the country in order to apply for asylum is to cross the state border in
the border-crossing points by using the methods described above. Many of those not admitted
might have been possible asylum seekers, who had expressed their intentions. The data shows
that they were denied to enter, thus assuming that their wills were expressed, they probably were
not listened. This illustrates considerable margins that border guards are enjoying, while possibly
accomplishing the government’s bidding. In this situation the difference between the de jure and
the de facto situation in the asylum matters is remarkable and can be explained on the grounds of
the security concept. Since the public opinion as well as the government’s attitude towards the
immigrants (including asylum seekers) is securitized, by positioning them as threats to the
societal security, the de facto situation does not comply with the legal obligations and is thus
unfavourable for claiming asylum. In this way the possible asylum seekers are forced to go
underground.
This discrepancy and the securitization may be partly explained as the legacy of the Soviet
Union. In the Post-Soviet period the Baltic States’ systems had to be reformed and institutional
changes to be made. While in Estonia in the Post-Soviet period younger people largely replaced
the central administration, Latvia and Lithuania faced resistance to change from the previous
nomenclature that sought to protect their interests. As a consequence, many civil servants from
the old system retained their posts. This implies, that the Baltic States accepted the new states of
affairs, however the implementation of laws and regulations was inefficient and obstructed by
corruption (Panagiotou 2001). Thus, the Soviet legacy persists somewhat in the government
institutions in the Baltic States, mostly in Latvia and Lithuania, especially in the immigration
area, where liberal values ought to be used, as it is the area where a state should express its
humanity, rather than hostility.
To illustrate this situation, the case study from the Republic of Lithuania will be presented. Two
Afghan minors – Qais (14 years old) and Ghulam (17 years old) had illegally crossed the Belarus
– Lithuania state border on the 4th of April 2013 and were immediately arrested by the officers of
the State Border Guard Service of Lithuania. According to their official statement – they had
verbally expressed their will for asylum and were promised to be taken to the Foreigners
Registration centre. Unfortunately, the reality is that they were detained and official charges
34
were placed against them for illegally crossing the state border (according to the Lithuanian law,
asylum seekers may not be persecuted for this crime at all). Moreover, they were sentenced for
committing the crime and the decision to expel them from the country was adopted 18
(Sinkevičius 2014). The situation reveals the attitude towards immigrants, which I argue is
securitized. The securitization of immigration is a set of issues in different areas related to
immigration, that are being understood as threats to the human security or to the values of
society and as a consequence, extraordinary measures are being taken and justified in order to
preserve the security. Thereby, the securitized attitude in this context influences the behaviour of
the State Border Guard Service officers, while upholding the rule of law and is inconsistent with
the legal requirements, however justified by the public authorities. The situation illustrates the
gap between the de jure and the de facto situations in Lithuania and reveals that officers enjoy
the ability to act on their own will instead of pursuing interests of those in need.
By employing the concept of social navigation in terms of the border guards activity in the
presented situation, the tendency may be seen, that the securitized attitude towards the
immigrants is widespread. This leads to a stricter control chosen by the officers, which may be
linked to underlying tendencies of securitization - to protect the societal values, threatened by the
immigrants.
Analysing the statistics about reasons of leaving the Foreigners Registration centre of Lithuania,
remarkable is the number of asylum seekers and illegal migrants who were expelled from the
country or returned to the safe third country by readmission agreements. According to the
statistics, more than a half of the residents of the centre were either obliged to leave the country
(0,6%), returned to the safe third country due to the readmission agreement (16,9%) or were
expelled (40,3%) (Foreigners Registration Centre 2014). Since the information about the
situation in migration area are being shared widely among the human smugglers, these numbers
confirm the strict border and immigration policies and possibly contribute to the lower number
of applications lodged in the Baltics. The concept of social navigation explains the individual
aspirations and decision-making process, which is done by migrating in order to escape the
situation one lives in. The statistics presented illustrate how the decisions made towards the
residents of asylum centre, could act as a push factor, pushing migrants towards other destination
countries, because every immigrant/refugee is in the pursuit of a worthy life and is thus willing
to maximize its possibilities of being accepted/granted asylum.
18
Translated by the author of this thesis
35
All the Baltic States have a land border with the Russian Federation (Lithuania with the Russian
Exclave Kaliningrad) and two of them also with the Republic of Belarus. Most of the illegal
migrants and possible asylum seekers cross those borders in order to enter the EU, however the
decision not to apply for asylum might be based on the aforementioned statistics, since the
chance of being denied to enter or returned to the safe third country is relatively high, moreover
recognition rates in the countries are low. Hence, all the described practices create genuine risks
that possible refugees may be directly or indirectly subjects to refoulement. This situation
happens because the decision to grant asylum or to return applicants to the safe third country are
based on reports, written by particular institutions, working with the migration matters (Lietuvos
Respublikos Vidaus Reikalų Ministras 2004). These reports are advisable, meaning that the
decision in every single asylum case is taken separately and considering the reports, therefore the
decision can vary. Looking at the statistics, the conclusion may be drawn, that both Belarus and
Russia are often treated as safe third countries and the readmission agreements are being used.
Moreover, if the applicant is not the citizen of neighbouring Belarus or Russian Federation and
the decision is adopted to return him/her to his/hers country of origin, he/she may be anyway
expelled to the neighbouring Belarus or Russian Federation, if he/she has a valid visa or enjoy
the visa-free regime in those countries.
In this way, the accession to the EU process aimed to lead the Baltic States to the same direction
with the other EU Member States yet brought incoherence and contradiction (Byrne, Noll &
Vedsted-Hansen 2004). In the following section, the analysis of the European influence will be
analysed further.
5.3 The accession to the European Union and its impact on creation of asylum
systems in the Baltic States
Asylum systems may vary even in a neighbouring EU Member States. This is a result of the EU
asylum acquis transformation process that is a constant interplay between domestic, sub-regional
and regional forces rather than a simple transposition of norms into domestic legislation (Byrne,
Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
In order to understand what has determined the creation of the strict migration policies in the
Baltic States and why these states are not experiencing significant refugee flows as the Southern
European Union frontier states, I will present how the accession to the EU might have influenced
the creation of the asylum systems in the Baltics and how it can be linked with current Baltic
States’ “unattractiveness” for asylum seekers.
36
Significant implementations to the asylum systems begun after applications for the EU
membership were submitted. Admission criterions required the Baltic States to engage in
extensive judicial, legislative, political and institutional reforms. There was a regionally
acknowledged need to have a coherent strategy with regard to asylum, which had links to
broader issues of external border control and security (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
In the EU acquis transferring period into the Baltic States legislation, the candidate states had to
fulfil ‘obligations of membership’ that entailed the obligation to implement the entire EU acquis
as it evolves (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004). Looking through the lens of the integration
theory of intergovernmentalism, the Baltic States were keen on integration to the EU in order to
assure their survival and to benefit from that in the long run. However, the Baltic States were a
different legal and political environment than those Member States, where the EU asylum acquis
was created. High level of corruption, legacies of post-conflict environments and nationalist
policies formed the domestic preferences of the Baltic States and this, according to the theory of
analytical liberalism, served as a basis for the state’s policy creation. In this context, the acquis
was successfully adopted, however due to the domestic influence, keeping the strictest criterions
possible in the immigration area.
Thereby, even though the accession process was successful, there was a challenge of protecting
refugees under treaties in divergent legal systems. This, and the previously discussed example
about the Afghans arrested in Lithuania, may imply, that a sharp difference between the policy
level – de jure and the practice – de facto exist. As a consequence, there is a risk of
compromised protection standards in the Baltic States (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
The theory of Intergovernmentalism is able to explain the emergence of the discrepancy between
the policies and the practice. The Baltic States, being selfish states, had a primary goal to survive
in the international arena after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To reach the goal a strategy of
integration to the EU was chosen, meaning that in order to pursue a scheme they were prepared
to comply with certain requirements and benefit from that. Thus, the accession of the EU acquis
had gone successfully. However, according to the theory, the governments’ decisions were
politically calculated and driven by the domestic concerns, moreover, the states were not eager to
spread the integration process to the areas that are considered of “high politics” such as national
security and defence (Bache, George & Bulmer 2011). As a consequence, the discrepancy
between the de jure and the de facto situations emerged, since the governments must balance
between the influence of the domestic interests and the regional goals of the country in the
regional area. Therefore, the policy level is in accordance with the requirements of the EU,
37
however its implementation in reality may be aggravated or incomplete. Moreover, due to the
domestic interests, the governments of the Baltic States tolerate it.
All the EU migration policies are framed under two conflicting policies: the realistic, focusing
on internal security and tightening territorial borders in order to fight illegal migration and the
liberal one, focusing on humanitarianism in terms of human rights and refugee protection as in
the case of Sweden. According to Lavenex (2001), the expansion of the European Union to the
Eastern and the Baltic countries, led to domination of strict migration policies in order to secure
the new external EU border against unwanted immigration. The implementation of the restrictive
policies usually reflects the influence of the most influential actors in the society, according to
the theory of analytical liberalism. In this context, together with the integration theory of
Intergovernmentalism, it explains the willingness to adopt restrictive immigration policies. The
realistic policy of internal security has something in common with regional goals and domestic
preferences. The Baltic States saw it as an advantage to benefit from and the willingness by the
domestic interests groups to establish stricter security measures was also considered.
Another European approach contributing to the explanation for implementing restrictive policies
in the Baltic States might be described as counter–measures, imposed due to restrictive policy
changes in the Western and Northern countries. This inspired policy changes in the frontier EU
Member States and was based on the fear of receiving masses of immigrants and becoming a
‘closed sack’ or ‘buffer zone’ (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004). Hereby, the frontier
Member States’ practices developed to non-arrival policies. Efficient border control may also
have an effect by diverting those seeking for protection to other states. As a consequence
restrictive practices discussed in the previous section, pose the protection under the Geneva
Convention (Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
The counter–strategies in the Baltic States were mostly implemented by their Scandinavian
neighbours, that donated equipment for appropriate sea border control thus, prevented both
illegal migrants and asylum seekers from moving westwards by the Baltic Sea. Nordic States
have also implemented various containment mechanisms in the Baltic States through the
assistance programmes. The officials in the Baltic States held the securitized perception, that
asylum seekers are essentially illegal migrants and this perception was affirmed by the Nordic
neighbours by implementing deflection measures in the Baltic States (Byrne, Noll & VedstedHansen 2004). The willingness to implement the measures was a reflection to the securitized
domestic preference and looking from the states’ perspective, it was beneficial to their
mainstream politics.
38
The goal of the Western European refugee agendas was to advance the refugee protection
standards in the Baltic States, by funding, training and providing technical assistance. However
the deficient policy model that was implemented aimed to deflect and deter asylum seekers in
this way bringing more incoherence and contradiction in the Baltic States (Byrne, Noll &
Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
The restrictive immigration policies are also partly a consequence of geographical position. The
countries have the external EU border, which may give rise to feelings of threat of mass transit
migration (Green 2007), especially since 2 of the 3 Baltic States have both the external and the
internal state border (see the picture bellow). In this context, the restrictive immigration policies
are justified as a measure to meet the issues threatening the society and its values.
Source: Nordic Centre For Spatial Development (NORDREGIO) n.d.
39
Finally, the Baltic States are relatively new members of the EU and are therefore unwilling to
remodel their domestic legislations again and again, especially by spreading more integration
into certain areas as immigration and security. Consequently it is difficult to update the initial
version of the EU acquis, which was adopted before the accession, to a more liberal version
(Byrne, Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 2004).
5.4 The Russian legacy and its influence to the nation-building in the post-Soviet
period
One approach to understanding why legal and political environment in the Baltic States was
different from the Western is the Soviet occupation and its legacy in the Baltic States societies.
Thus, in this chapter the historical perspective of the Baltic States will be presented and
analysed, since the assumption is that it had influenced the emergence and development of the
restrictive migration policies.
The Baltic States were independent before June 1940 when the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact19
divided influence spheres between Germany and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the Baltic
States were incorporated into the Soviet Union as its republics (Nikitina 2014) in August 194020.
The occupation was conditioned by the Soviet ideology with its totalitarian regime, meaning that
a very strict physical control was kept over the oppressed. The Soviet ideology created a multilayered language where, for instance, the occupation was understood as liberation, striving
towards equality of all the nations etc. (Annus 2012). Penetrating Russians or “reliable” Balts to
important positions of power implemented a strict political control over the governments and
political parties. National military units were abolished and local secret police offices were
directly subordinate to Moscow (Panagiotou 2001). Formal political integration of the Baltic
States into the Soviet political system was far-reaching, however beyond this formal integration
the actual integration was weaker, giving the opportunity for nationalist movements to emerge.
Even though education systems, media, cultural institutions etc. were all working in accordance
with the framework set by the Communist Party and all the Baltic States had been exposed to
intense policies of “russification”21, the actual cultural integration was also much weaker, than it
seemed on the formal level (Panagiotou 2001). Thus, residents of the societies were living a
19
The secret protocol in 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union.
In 1941 The Baltic States were occupied by Germany, which invaded the Soviet Union. In 1944 the Soviet Union
re-occupied or in Soviet terms – liberated the States from the German occupation.
21
“Russification” – it is a form of cultural assimilation process, where in this context the main vehicle was the
aggressive promotion of the Russian language, culture and immigration of native Russians to the Baltic States that
was encouraged by Moscow.
20
40
double life – the formal one where they must behave in accordance with the Soviet ideology and
the secret - nationalist life that could not be expressed in public.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “politics of memory”, shaped by the politics of
guilt, had dominated in the Baltic States. The perception that Russia as the Soviet successor may
have ambitions to economically and territorially re-conquer its neighbours and former Soviet
Union republics, strengthened aspirations to survive in the Baltic States and to protect their
independency (Nikitina 2014).
There is a widespread perception in Russia that the Baltic States were concerned about their
sovereignty due to possible Russia’s ambitions, thus they convinced the NATO and the EU to
extend the membership to the Baltics (Nikitina 2014). The possible ambitions seem quite
evidential since many verbally expressed threats were made against the Baltic States. For
instance, a Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrey Kozyrev in October 1995,
threatened to use “a full arsenal of methods” including military forces in order to protect Russian
citizens living in the Baltic States. Moreover, a Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskij in an
interview to the Estonian newspaper in 1996 said: “I’m telling you honestly that I’m doing
everything to liquidate the Baltic States” (Thompson 1998, p. 118). The theory of
intergovernmentalism is able to prove those perceptions, because the Baltic States were weak
while in their nation-building stage, thereby in order to survive, had chosen the integration to the
EU and NATO. However, the Baltic States were more likely to adopt stricter laws concerning
migration and citizenship (Thompson 1998). This was done due to the securitization of
immigration, which was used as a mean of diminishing the cultural homogeneity during the
Soviet occupation. As a consequence, immigration was linked to the security, resulting in a
stricter implementation of laws and practices in the area.
The first years after independence in 1991 were abundant with examples of nationalizing
discourses and policies in order to distinct titular nationality and primacy. The nationalizing
discourses were particularly strong in Estonia and Latvia, where a third of the population were
excluded from the citizenry due to the restrictive citizenship legislation. These actions can be
linked with the security issues, since Russian–speaking immigrants in Estonia and Latvia were
routinely characterised as unwanted, illegal “occupiers” or “colonists” and the public opinion
was expressed about the desire to see them emigrate (Brubaker 2011), in this way positioning
them as a threat to the survival of the titular nationality and primacy. The main idea behind this
was to diminish their political influence in the state politics (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds & Birka
2013). The state-building process in the newly independent Baltic States included a deeply
41
institutionalised ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood, understanding the state as made of
and for the ethnic nationals, as well as claims about states’ unhealthy condition and threat to
survival (Brubaker 2011). Nationalizing discourses were securitized through the “speech act”,
reflecting in strict immigration policies, especially related to the citizenship issue in this context.
As a consequence, up to date nearly half of the Russian-speaking population in both Estonia and
Latvia remains without citizenship (Brubaker 2011). The ethno-cultural division between the
citizens and residents in the Baltic States undermine the level of human security provided in the
states, since not all the residents are protected from dangers that pose threat to their rights. In this
way it undermines the societies and the quality of life in the Baltic States.
The nationalising policies were based on the argument, that in order to fully secure the states for
the titular nationalities, first of all the states need to be purged of individuals, organizations and
institutions that were responsible for the oppression (Smith et al. 1998). Moreover, the fear of
demographic extinction in Latvia and Estonia, became a dominant theme in a nationalist
discourse, thus both states strived to safeguard a secure homelands for the titular nationalities
(Smith, Aasland & Mole 1994). In this context, the act of securitizing ethnically distinct
residents is significant, placing them as a threat to the titular nationalities and legitimizing the
actions of meeting the threat. Thus, the Baltic States were trying to distance them from the chaos
and uncertainty flowing from ‘the East’. To do this they needed to regulate and monitor the flow
of goods and people across their borders. This monitoring has included the protection of
previously porous state borders in order to avoid the inflow of migrant populations and refugees
(Smith et al. 1998). The strict border control and immigration regulation was a consequence of
the securitization process, which positioned immigrants as a threat to the societal values, thus
legitimated the strictest border and immigration policies possible. Moreover, the public attitude
towards ethnically distinct residents was also securitized, by positioning them as threats to
ethnically homogenous society, resulting in discord and societal division.
These elements widely influenced the overall creation of newly independent Baltic States,
including the social, cultural and political dynamics, where also the legislation regarding
migration policies and border security was touched, making them less liberal than in other
Western or Scandinavian countries.
Due to these historical reasons and the fear that immigration has a negative impact on political
decision-making, immigration issue in the Baltic States has always been a sensitive issue, thus
contemporary national immigration and border security policies are hostile towards immigrants
(Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010). In Estonia for instance, very strict rules
42
regarding employment of migrant workers are limiting their opportunities for achieving the
stable conditions of life. Estonian legislation and policies fail to equip the newcomers with
information and skills that are needed in order to integrate to the society. Latvia’s example is
also related to the lack of information to the newcomers. The NGOs registered fail in creating a
common vision of immigration issues and public authorities are rather complicating things than
actually providing the necessary information (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010).
This, once again, proves the existence of a negative societal attitude towards the newcomers.
Positioning them as threats to the societal values results in an insufficient ensuring of their rights
and undermines their quality of life in the Baltic States.
43
6. EXPLANATORY CONCEPTS FOR THE BALTIC STATES’
UNNATTRACTIVENESS
One of the approaches to explain the Baltic States exceptionalism and in this way to answer the
research question is by using explanatory concepts and by arguing that due to their restrictive
policies regarding the security of the state border, policies regarding the employment of the
immigrants, welfare provisions as well as further integration perspectives – the Baltic States
remain unattractive as asylum destination countries and are only crossed in transit to the desired
ones. This chapter aims to analyse the underlying reasons for the aforementioned.
Asylum acquis is harmonised in all the EU countries and as it is stated in the European
Commission’s webpage for CEAS, asylum must not be a lottery (European Commission 2014),
unfortunately the present situation proves contrary, because national variations in recognition
rates persists. Asylum seekers from the same country of origin face substantially different
recognition chances in different Member States (Toshkov & Haan 2012). Some European
countries are more attractive and get more asylum applications than others therefore the
distribution of the “asylum burden22” is unequal with respect to the gross domestic product levels
of the destination countries. Relative benefits in the country of asylum most often determine the
destination country. According to Economic theory asylum seekers are more willing to apply for
asylum in rich countries with low unemployment rate, since rich countries are likely to have a
well-developed welfare system they may benefit and low unemployment rate contributes to
easier employment (Neumayer 2004). In other words, to countries where the level of human
security provided is high.
6.1 Immigration history
The choice to migrate to a certain country may also be influenced by countries’ colonial past,
labour import history and language. This is related to long-term residents of the destination
country, representing the diaspora of some countries of origin that can provide initial and
practical information for newcomers. Existing communities of past asylum seekers may also
contribute to the decision in the same way, since they can provide the necessary information and
thus, lower the costs of migration for those wishing to settle (Neumayer 2004).
The Baltic States do not have an immigration history (comparing to the other Western European
countries) and being comparatively young countries are mostly unknown for refugees, thus are
not the desired destination countries. As an example, aforementioned Afghans Qais and Ghulam
22
‘Asylum burden’ in this context should be understood as a distribution of asylum applications to different EU
countries.
44
in their case stated, that they were supposed to be smuggled to Sweden, which they knew as a
safe country to live, however ended up arrested in Lithuania, which they have never heard about
before (Sinkevičius 2014).
On the contrary, Sweden now is a multicultural society well known in many parts of the World
due to its long immigration history. Approximately 16% of the Swedish population are born in
another country (Statistics Sweden 2014). Consequently, the most common reason for residence
for non-Nordic immigrants in 2013 was family reunification (Statistics Sweden 2014). The facts
presented may act as pull factors while analysing them with the concept of social navigation.
“The concept of social navigation provides insights between objective structures and subjective
agency” according to Henrik E. Vigh (2006, p. 31). Objective structures in this context may be
interpreted as the social ties with relatives or friends in a certain country. In this way, the
country, where a person has some social ties, becomes a terrain of better possibilities. This
influences the subjective agency while making the decision on the destination country, since one
would rather take decision to migrate to the country, where he/she will be helped and assisted.
6.2 Geographical position and the means of migration
Geographical position may also be a significant factor for asylum seekers, considering that closer
countries might be reached cheaper, thus by bus, car, train, boat or sometimes walking, however
this happens mostly in the situation of imminent threat to their personal integrity and under great
time pressure or with the limited amount of money (Neumayer, 2004). In order to understand the
means of illegal travelling in order to reach a certain country, illegal migration should be
explained more explicitly, by dividing it into independent and organized smuggling.
The Baltic States, due to many factors already described in this thesis, serves mostly as transit
countries, rather than destination, both in the case of independent crossing and organized human
smuggling. Analysing the information from the State Border Guard service of Lithuania, some
common tendencies may be revealed. Illegal migrants, who usually travel independently, most
often come from neighbouring Russia, Belarus or further located Georgia. Organized people
smuggling networks that use the Eastern European route most often are smuggling migrant
groups from Asian countries, such as Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2013 Lithuanian
Border Guard Officers detained 14 organised illegal migrant groups together with their
smugglers. 8 of those groups were detained next to the internal EU border, while attempting to
cross the border to Poland (State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014). The standard of
living in Western European and Scandinavian countries are still higher than in the slowly
improving Baltic States. Moreover, the level of corruption is noticeably high and the rule of law
45
is still weak in the Baltics (Jonsson 2009), therefore, the place of detention (next to the internal
EU border, attempting to leave the country) and official statements in the further investigations
about the destination countries in the Western Europe or Scandinavia (State Border Guard
Service of Lithuania 2014), confirms the assumption, that the Baltic States are mostly used as
transit countries, especially when the journey is organized and carried out by the smugglers.
The popularity of this route first of all consists of geographical position. The Baltic Sea region
functions as a corridor to the Western Europe or Scandinavia and the Baltic States are situated in
the North-western borders of it (Gutauskas 2009). Such neighbours as Belarus and Russia
enables illegal migrants to approach Europe without many restrictions, since Russia and Belarus
have visa-free regimes with many Asian and Middle-Eastern countries and the transit migration
is not on the politicians agenda. Secondly, organized international networks of smugglers are
well developed in Eastern European countries, where the main obstacle – external EU border is
located. Most of the human smugglers detained in Lithuania are citizens of Lithuania, Poland,
Russia and Afghanistan (State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014). Criminal groups based
in Lithuania have strong ties with groups in Georgia, Russia, Central Asia and acts like a link to
Northern or Western Europe, while Estonian and Russian groups are believed to have divided
the markets in Sweden and Finland (Gutauskas 2009). Knowledge of the Russian language and
high corruption level in the neighbouring states opens the gates to Europe for illegal migrants
easier.
Organized crime groups are unfortunately a common phenomenon in the post-Soviet states. The
human smuggling has become a profitable business of the criminal and informal sector in the
Baltic States, contributing to increasing hidden economy in an already vulnerable economic and
political situation in the Baltic States (Jonsson 2009). Since the number of legal migration
possibilities decline, an increasing number of migrants are using services of illegal organisations
(Gutauskas 2009). The smuggling mechanism includes the shipping operations, gathering
information, planning, finances and other technical tasks. The criminal groups are often
international and multi-ethnic, well organized, consisting of different nationals, with divided
responsibilities in the state border crossing machinery, therefore without the initial background
information about the group members and their roles, it is difficult to disclose such crimes
effectively and put the offenders on trial (Gutauskas 2009). Officers must organize bilateral
operations with neighbouring countries what is often complicated, in order to bring all those
responsible for the crime to justice.
46
Unfortunately, even bringing to justice may not deter from this business in the future. The
practice of the Lithuanian courts reveals, that it is difficult to prove one’s guilt for organising the
human smuggling and the sentence for assistance to commit the crime is comparatively mild. As
an example, I will present one criminal case of human smuggling, where Lithuanian citizens
were sentenced for smuggling at least 200 illegal migrants to the Scandinavian countries in the
years of 2001-2002, by using forged Lithuanian passports and bribing the officers of the State
Border Guards Service. Due to its large extent, the case was only finished to examine in the end
of 2010. The two suspects were neglecting their guilt of organising the smuggling and without
legitimate proofs about them lying, they were sentenced only for assisting to commit the
criminal activity. One of the suspects was sentenced to 1 year and 3 months in jail while another
had only to pay the fine of 26000 LTL, which is approximately 56233 DKK (Poteliūnaitė 2011).
Taking into account, that the estimated amount they could have earned from this criminal
activity reaches approximately 400000 USD (app. 2 million DKK), the sentence seems
disproportionate and in this way facilitating this illegal activity. In addition, 6 of the 7 State
Border Guards Service officers, who were bribed and assisted to commit this criminal activity,
avoided criminal liability (Poteliūnaitė 2011)23. The organized groups of human smuggling exert
influence on criminal justice authorities as well as politics through corruption (Gutauskas 2009)
and as a consequence, it challenges the stability, legitimacy and efficiency of state institutions in
general (Jonsson 2009). Since the organized groups often operate with impunity and official
complicity, it contributes to the perception that the state institutions are unreliable (Gutauskas
2009).
The phenomenon of impunity I argue may be explained by the human security concept. As the
national governments are concerned about the welfare and security provision for their own
citizens, the crime as human smuggling is not a priority crime to prevent. The countries are
mostly being used as transit countries for smuggling illegal third-country nationals and consist of
nationals from different countries. As long as the Baltic countries are not countries of
destination, in this way undermining the needs of the titular nationals, the governments can
‘close their eyes’ and concentrate on the priority crimes, which bring them the actual benefit. As
a consequence this promote the existence of the de jure and de facto levels, in other words it
promotes the informal level in this way as long as it does not undermine the needs of societies.
The most used as a transit country for undocumented migration of the three Baltic States is
Lithuania, which is situated the most southern. Interestingly, it is also a country of origin for
trafficking of women (Gutauskas 2009). The United Nations Human Right Council has also
23
Translated by the author of this thesis
47
criticized northernmost situated Estonia, for not paying enough attention to international human
trafficking since the number of crimes related to it rose to 43 in 2013 (Rüütel 2014). Finally
Latvia is also facing the problem of human trafficking, since the number of victims is growing,
while the number of criminal proceedings against the traffickers is not increasing (The Baltic
Times 2012). Unfortunately, the criminal business of human trafficking is the fastest growing in
the world and is rather a latent crime, thus there is no exact information about it (Jonsson 2009).
The informal level in the Baltic States related to human trafficking and smuggling is quite
evidential, however so far they are not on the agenda in the Governments’ programmes. On one
hand, this may reflect the domestic preferences, according to the theory of analytical liberalism,
meaning that the societies are not concerned about certain crimes, since the attitude towards
illegal migrants are rather securitized than based on humanitarian grounds and the problem of
human smuggling does not seem evidential comparing with other crimes. On the other hand, the
number of criminal procedures does not reflect the fact that the crime is rapidly growing,
suggesting that public authorities and even politicians may be related to this illegal activity. The
case of human smuggling to the Scandinavian countries, presented in this section, illustrates how
officers of the State Border Guard service assisted to commit the crime, thus were part of the
smuggling mechanism. This partly confirms the assumption about the links between the
organized crime groups and the bureaucrats, in this way negatively influencing the level of
interest in the related crimes and their prevention.
6.3 Employment, welfare provisions
As it was mentioned before, the Baltic States themselves are the migrant sending countries due
to mostly economical reasons as high unemployment rate and low salaries, which is partly an
explanation why they are less attractive for asylum seekers who have aspirations for a better life
and are usually expected to send remittances to their families left in the countries of origin. In
general, all persons legally residing in the Baltic States may seek employment, disregarding their
ethnic background or religious affiliations (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010).
However, de facto situation is, that even though asylum seekers enjoy the right to work after
their application have been processed for 12 months, or after they are granted protection, the
chances of actually becoming employed remain low. Mostly, because the language barrier
dominates in the Baltic States, the fluency in the national language determines the employment
thereby aggravate the prospects of employment (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010).
The fact may be explained as a legacy of the nation-building period, when nationalizing
discourses took place in the Baltic States, positioning immigrants as threats to cultural identity
and resulting in certain requirements, as it is in the context of the local language. As a
48
consequence of restrictions adopted, the rate of unemployment among non-Estonians in Estonia,
for instance, remains two times higher than among nationals. Moreover, non-Estonians are
forced to work in unstable occupations and for less remuneration, since the Estonian labour
market is ethnically divided. In the case of Lithuania, immigrants are mostly considered as
means that can satisfy the shortage of the labour force, however without aspirations of long-term
integration and the labour market is regulated to “protect” internal labour force from loosing
their positions (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010). The examples presented illustrate
the consequences of securitized attitude towards the immigrants and the continuing justification
of certain practices on the grounds of societal security. This implies, that the employment of the
immigrants may only be justified due to shortages of the labour forces and the immigrants are
expected to leave the countries after their services are not needed anymore.
As a comparison Swedish example may be used, where even though immigrants face more
difficulties than natives in order to be employed, still more than half of foreign-born people are
being employed and their chances improve with the amount of year they live in the country.
Looking at the statistical information from Swedish Integration board, 67,5% of foreign–born
men and 61% of foreign–born women were employed in 2005 (The Swedish Integration Board
2006). This imply, that the attitude towards the immigrant employee is more liberal and
welcoming than in the Baltic States, moreover, their chances improve with years, meaning that
they are not expected to leave after the shortages of labour forces are reduced.
Prospects about the longer residence and future in the Baltic States are unfortunately
unfavourable to both immigrants and asylum seekers in this way pushing them to choose other
countries of migration instead of the Baltic ones. According to the Migrants Integration Policy
Index from 2006-2007 results, third-country nationals in Latvia had the worst legal security in
the country as long-term residents, workers, family members and naturalised citizens, followed
by Lithuania that ranked third worst in the mentioned areas (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas &
Žibas 2010). The mentioned facts are the assessment of the de jure situation in the integration
area. By adding difficulties met in the practice, including discrimination, intolerance, violence
and etc., the prospects of being provided with a sufficient level of human security remain low in
the Baltic States.
Medical facilities partly comprising welfare system in the country is also significant in the
destination country decision-making process. In the case of Estonia, again, the language barrier
is the main issue, since the medical personnel is required to speak only national language as well
as annotations of medicaments are provided only in Estonian language. In this context, the usage
49
of other language than Estonian is upon doctors’ good will and capabilities, since translation
services regulated by state does not exist in this area and must be covered by the patient, if in
need. These circumstances imply that many immigrants, who are not proficient in the national
language, risk damaging their health by ignoring their problems due to language issues
(Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010). It is a consequence of nationalizing policies that
took place and proves the securitization of the national language, aggravating the situation for
the immigrants in many aspects of life, lowering the quality of life, challenging the human
security and making the country less attractive for asylum seekers and other immigrants.
6.4 The misuse of the asylum system
The right to seek asylum in the Baltic States is presumably misused, in the case of transit
migration and detention next to the state border. In order to avoid the detention and deportation,
some illegal migrants apply for asylum and, enjoying the right to move freely in the country
afterwards, continue journeys to the destination countries. In 2013 Foreigners Registration
Centre of Lithuania registered 110 applicants, who had left the centre (State Border Guard
Service of Lithuania 2014). Due to this phenomenon, I argue, the attitude towards those seeking
asylum is securitized. As the numbers of those leaving the country after lodging an asylum
application is comparatively high, the public authorities justify the illegal actions in practice such
as ignoring the request of asylum as it was presented in the example about the Afghans Qais and
Ghulam. There is a widely accepted opinion among the public authorities, that the asylum
system is mostly misused, thereby the actual (and most of the time illegal – as presented in the
Afghans Qais and Ghulam example) measures to prevent this are taken. Even in the 2013 annual
report of the Foreigners Registration centre of Lithuania, the misuse of asylum system is named
as a problem that needs to be solved (Foreigners Registration Centre 2014). The securitized
attitude towards immigrants in the societies persists, and influences the response from the state
towards them. The theory of analytical liberalism helps to explain this long-term validity
arguing, that the domestic preferences are stable over time and difficult to adjust if they are tied
to actors’ identities, as it is in this context of the Baltic States.
The State Border Guard service of Lithuania alone detained 1639 illegal migrants in 2013, both
residing inside the country and those who have just crossed the border. However, there were
only 274 asylum claims (State Border Guard Service of Lithuania 2014). This implies that there
exists the unwillingness to use the asylum right in the Republic of Lithuania, since it is not a
desired destination country, or because the chances of being granted remain low. Many of those
detained soon after the deportation to the neighbouring countries, may use their chance to reach
the desired European country again. In this way, asylum right in Europe remains unused and is
50
‘saved’ for the desired Western or Scandinavian country. As the concept of social navigation
would explain this – an individual navigates to the desired social environment, by using the
objective structures in his way.
The unwillingness may also be explained by the fact that, in Lithuania only 19% of residents
trust the government and only 14% trust the national parliament, which are among the lowest
numbers in the EU. The situation is very similar but worse in Latvia, where the trust in the
government reaches only 10% and in national parliament 6% of all country residents. Estonia
however stands out among the Baltic States, with the trust in the government reaching 38% and
with 31% of the residents trusting the national parliament (European Commission 2009). The
numbers presented imply, that especially in Latvia and Lithuania, the national governments and
parliaments including public institutions are perceived as unreliable. This may explain, on one
hand, why many illegal migrants who may be qualified as refugees, chose to live in the country
illegally, instead of applying for protection. On the other hand, proves once again the reliability
of the accusations brought by the Afghans Qais and Ghulam, who claimed that the public
authorities operates to fulfil their goals instead of helping those in need. The distrust I argue is
partly a consequence of the Soviet legacy, since in the Post-Soviet nation-building period both in
Latvia and Lithuania many civil servants retained their posts, thus their pro-Soviet attitude
towards certain issues, while in Estonia they were replaced by younger generation public
servants (Panagiotou R.A. 2001), which presumably enshrine more liberal values.
Unfortunately, the fear and the unreliability of public authorities may contribute to the
contemporary low asylum applications’ number in the Baltic States. According to the Lithuanian
Human Rights Monitoring Institute, public authorities that are responsible for ensuring asylum
seekers’ rights, fail to do so. The clandestine politics, they claim, dominates in the Foreigners
Registration centre of Lithuania, where double standards are at the presence, thus lawlessness is
dominating over the legal requirements. Several cases of refusal to take the asylum applications
(from the detained illegal migrants), violence against residents resulting in injuries followed by
prohibition to get the medical treatment, were under investigation at the Lithuanian Human
Rights Monitoring Institute (Lietuvos Radijas ir Televizija 2013). All the presented lowers the
attractiveness of the Lithuanian asylum system and raises the degree of unreliability. Once again
the double standards in the countries are proved to exist. Balancing between the legal
obligations, put by the supranational institutions in the area, and the domestic preferences, that
are securitized, promote the informal measures taken by the public authorities against the illegal
migrants, who are considered as a threat to the cultural values and the security of society.
51
In summary, the aspiration to join the European Union has brought EU acquis to the Baltic
States’ legislations, however the framework for implementing the policies is not yet fully
developed, implemented by illegal actions in the practice and often misused. This may be easily
explained by the theory of Intergovermentalism, since it argues that states are not eager to spread
the integration process to the areas that are considered of “high politics” such as national security
and defence (Bache, George & Bulmer 2011), including the immigration issues. On the grounds
of the analytical liberalism theory, the assumption may be done, that the revival of nationalist
movements influenced political discourses and emphasized ethnic identity rather than civic
values. In this way immigrants were perceived as a threat to society, undermining it, thus it led to
development of anti-immigration stances in the Baltics (Green 2007). Restrictions on welfare
benefits, fewer work opportunities, low recognition rates and the threat of forced removal lowers countries’ attractiveness and their chances to be chosen as asylum destination countries
(Neumayer, 2004), since migrants’ aspirations are, according to social navigation, to enter the
social environment, where the chances of being granted residence/asylum are higher and the
future life expectations are favourable for immigrants.
6.5 The reception centres and their contribution to the Baltic States’
unattractiveness
In order to understand the Baltic States’ exceptionalism in the asylum area, some contributing
explanatory concepts were already presented. In addition, I argue, that the reception conditions,
may also influence the decision on asylum destination country.
Since refugees are the category of people who are fleeing the persecution, whose lives are in
danger, who might be victims of violence and who’s rights have been violated, it is important for
them to find a safe place to live, where they would be taken care of properly. Even though all the
EU countries have implemented the Reception directive, the actual or de facto situation in the
EU countries varies. The differences may be explained by the theory of Intergovernmentalism,
claiming the states’ unwillingness to spread the integration to certain areas related to security of
the state, exist. Therefore, I assume, that the refugee reception centres and the practical
provisions for asylum seekers are partly contributing to the low number of asylum applications
in the Baltic States, as people tend to choose what is best available for them, as the concept of
social navigation provides. To justify this assumption the description about the conditions for
asylum seekers in the reception centres in the Baltic States will be presented and analysed with
the chosen theories in order to reveal the grounds of certain practices and link them with the
individual decision taken.
52
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there are 3 reception centres in the Baltic States, each in
every. At Estonian Illuka Registration Centre the main issues (as for 201224) were the remote
location of the centre, language courses that were irregular, lack of information provided to
asylum seekers and the medical facilities accompanied by interpreting services (Saharov & Säär
2012). In 2012 Estonian Human Rights Centre acknowledged, that the reception conditions,
especially for asylum seekers with special needs, are faulty and even though they are prescribed
by law, they do not actually function in reality (Saharov & Säär 2012), again enlightening the
existence of discrepancy between the de jure and de facto situations in the Baltic States.
Problems in the same areas are also common in the Foreigners Registration Centre of Lithuania,
unfortunately, supplemented by some additional ones, such as security issues, right to move
freely outside the centre and lack of respect for ethnic or religious matters. For instance,
irrespective of the practiced religion, all the residents in the centre are being served of pork, even
though it is acknowledged by the European Human Rights Court, that certain nourishment rules
may be considered as part of practising the religion (Baltic News Service 2014)25. Even though
all the mentioned rights for asylum seekers are de jure implemented to the national legislation as
a consequence of adopting the EU acquis, secondary legal acts either do not regulate the issue or
make the requirements more restrictive, thus negatively influencing the actual every day practice
(Biekša & Samuchovaitė 2013).
To illustrate the situation some common discrepancies of implementation that influence the
reception conditions’ downgrading will be presented. To begin with, the reception directive
guarantees the right for asylum seekers to move freely within the territory of the host EU
member state and shall provide for the possibility of granting applicants temporary permission to
leave the centre (European Parliament and the Council 2013). Due to adopted secondary legal
acts in Lithuania, de facto asylum seekers are given permissions to leave the centre only from
6am until 11pm (excluding half an hour at 8.30 am and 8.30 pm when officers’ shifts are
changing). Moreover, the right to move freely is being used as a mean of punishment for failing
to do their cleaning duties. The worst part of this punishment practice is that the punishment is
valid for all the residents, living in the same floor with the violator (Biekša & Samuchovaitė
2013). In this way, the right to move freely outside the centre is disproportionally restrictive.
24
The Illuka Registration centre, located in Illuka municipality in Ida-Viru county, in the village of Jaama, had
operated from 2000 until early 2014, when the reception centre was moved to Väike-Maarja parish and given over
to AS Hoolekandeteenused to administrate it (European Migration Network 2013)
25
Translated by the author of this thesis
53
Another important issue in the centre is violence. No legal acts are regulating the violence
prevention in the centre, nor physical conditions allow separating warring persons. There is only
one building to accommodate asylum seekers, thus asylum seekers with warring ethnic
backgrounds, religions, homosexuals, single women and children, those addicted to drugs and
asylum seekers with special needs – are all accommodated in the same building, with only one
separation, that men and women live in different floors (Biekša & Samuchovaitė 2013). As a
consequence, in 2012 two Russian asylum seekers – a woman in August and a man in December
were killed during the conflicts in the accommodation building (Baltic News Service 2012)26.
There are also many other issues in the centre such as the pocket money, that are not regulated
by the Lithuanian law and the amount given is insufficient to meet their medical, hygienic or
other basic needs. Medical facilities are limited and in practice available only at the centre due to
the lack of secondary legal acts. Thus, no higher qualification specialists’ consultations are
available to asylum seekers (Biekša & Samuchovaitė 2013). Consultations of social worker and
psychologist are available only for those asylum seekers, who are able to speak Russian
language. Moreover, Lithuanian language courses are not available for asylum seekers (Biekša &
Samuchovaitė 2013). Unfortunately, the list may be continued, however may aim was to
illustrate the unattractiveness of asylum centre due to lack of secondary law acts and the actual
every day practice.
A comprehensive research has been made in order to find the issues of Reception Conditions
directive’s implementation in the Latvian Mucenieki Centre for asylum seekers, unfortunately no
researches were found except the general information about the centre and the de jure situation
in it. This implies two assumptions: that either the actual situation in the centre is in accordance
with requirements or it is not being researched well. The latter assumption is based on the fact
that the State Border Guard Service of Latvia is unwilling to cooperate with local NGOs,
working with migration issues, considering this cooperation as negative. It is a consequence of
public criticism in their activities, which was expressed by one of the NGO’s representative, in
Kiev on 7 February 2005, in the seminar “Procedure for admittance and detention” organised by
the IOM and UNHCR (Latvian Centre for Human Rights 2006). Since both Estonia and
Lithuania have issues regarding the actual implementation of reception conditions, it is likely
they also exist in Mucenieki Centre for asylum seekers. Unfortunately they are not well
researched and discussed in the public, thus cannot be discussed and analysed in this thesis.
26
Translated by the author of this thesis
54
The issues in the asylum centres and the fact that it contributes to the unattractiveness of the
Baltic States can be explained by using all four theories used in this thesis. Each of the theories
is able to explain some tendencies contributing to the unattractiveness in this way composing the
whole picture. It is so, because the issues mentioned can be linked with general tendencies in the
societies, discussed in this thesis. The fact, that the actual situation in the asylum centres varies
from the legal requirements reflect the states’ unwillingness to spread the regional integration in
this area, expressed by the theory of Intergovernmentalism. The secondary legal acts are often
insufficient to provide the needs of asylum seekers and it may be linked to the influence of the
domestic powers, whose attitude towards immigrants in general and asylum seekers in particular,
is securitized. This is done in order to ensure the human security, comprising of welfare
provisions for its own people, as it was discusses previously in the chapter. Finally, the social
navigation concept leads us to understanding of individual perspective while making the choice.
Knowing the difficulties awaiting in the Baltic States while living in the asylum centre, or even
risking a life while living there, lowers the chances of being chosen as a desired asylum
destination country. Moreover, by employing the concept of social navigation, another
explanation to why so many asylum seekers leave the centre after lodging an asylum application
can be found. Having in mind all the described issues met in the reception centres, the
conclusion may be drawn, that for some asylum seekers the life in the reception centres may
entail contents of social death. As a consequence, this lead to decision on secondary movement
to other countries.
Unfortunately, I argue the result of being unattractive for asylum seekers is more than satisfying
for the Baltic States. On one hand, the states are both integrated into regional politics, that they
benefit from and fulfil the requirements made, on the other hand, they satisfy the domestic
interests, by allowing the measures adopted in the national legislation and taken in the reality to
protect the society from the issue.
Summing up the section, concerning security issues and living conditions in the centres in the
Baltic States, the conclusion may be drawn that refugees – people who are in need of protection
and security, would rather chose another country to apply for asylum, where in the initial stage
they could feel protected and would be assisted properly as well as would have hopes of the
brighter future in the destination country, than it seems in the Baltic States.
6.6 Integration perspectives
In 2007 Eva Green made a research that examines public support for immigration standards. She
describes attitudes towards immigration criteria as different types of gatekeeping and argues that
55
these attitudes designate the level of endorsement of admission and expulsion standards for
immigrants (Green 2007). I will use this research in order to illuminate the situation in the
integration, and the theories in order to explain the influence of society on integration legislation
and common practices.
The results of the research revealed differences between regions in Europe dividing countries
into 3 types of gatekeepers, namely lenient, individualist and strict27, where individualist type
shares the characteristics of both lenient and strict (Green 2007).
Northern European (Scandinavian) countries were located to lenient type of countries, having a
lower level of generalized prejudiced attitude constructions, higher level of education, more
personal contacts with immigrants and less negative feelings of personal financial vulnerability.
These countries traditionally have a developed welfare system and pursue liberal migration and
asylum policies (Green 2007). This type confirms the Swedish example, where due to all the
mentioned factors, the level of attractiveness is high and thus the number of both asylum seekers
and immigrants is relatively high, compared with other EU states.
Western European countries were grouped in the individualist type that is more difficult to
define precisely, however they are described as older inhabitants than in lenient type, having less
immigrant friends and perceive collective vulnerability. They usually have a history of labour
importing or colonialism, thus have developed incorporation in society policies (Green 2007).
Finally, Southern and Eastern European countries, which are the focus group of this thesis, are
defined as strict gatekeepers, since their inhabitants support the strictest criteria for entry. They
are described as having a lower level of education, almost no personal contacts with immigrants,
strongly perceived feelings of personal financial vulnerability (Green 2007).
The explanation for this attitude towards immigrants in the Baltic States can be found in the
nation-building period and be linked with nationalizing policies adopted in order to ensure the
ethnic survival and welfare provisions for the titular nationals. At that time immigrants were
positioned as threats to societal values, thus both the discriminating attitude and measures taken
to meet the threat were legitimized and justified in order to protect the human security. Since the
Baltic States are relatively new members of the EU, they are unwilling to remodel both their
domestic legislation and preferences again, to make them more liberal, at least in this area of
immigration, that according to Intergovernmentalism, the state is not eager to spread the regional
integration to.
27
These are the categories defined by Green (2007) in her research
56
According to the results of the survey on discrimination in the Baltic States in 2009, 41%
Estonian, 34% Latvian and 26% Lithuanian respondents believed in widespread ethnic
discrimination in their countries. Since the number of recent immigrants in the Baltic States is
relatively small, they are not significant in local minority discourses, thus local governments are
struggling to adopt comprehensive immigration policies promoting the integration of recent
immigrants and addressing their specific needs (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010).
Moreover, in 2006 Latvia was qualified as the country where integration policies are the least
favourable amongst other EU25 (then) and 3 selected non-European states (Switzerland, Norway
and Canada) (Niessen, Huddleston & Citron 2007). The results are not surprising, knowing that
multiculturalism in Latvia is perceived as a threat to Latvian national culture, language and
identity (Iglicka & Pasiut 2012), thus consequential actions of the state are legitimized.
Policymakers in the Baltic States underestimate the importance of integration policies, thereby
they can be described as insufficient (as in the case of Estonia and Latvia), since newcomers are
not being provided with the stable conditions of life, as well as knowledge and skills necessary
for integration. In Lithuania, there are no integration measures applied for newly arrived thirdcountry immigrants at all (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010). It can also be seen as
a reflection of the domestic preferences of interest groups, advocating for the issues of
importance.
Nevertheless, refugees who are granted asylum and those granted subsidiary protection in the
Baltic States at least formally enjoy an integration mechanism composed of measures such as
language courses, education, employment, provision with accommodation, social protection and
health care (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010), however in the long term, after the
initial integration period is over, they risk meeting the same issues as the other third-country
nationals, residing in the Baltic States.
The level of tolerance, awareness of anti-discrimination legal provisions and instruments of
protection in the societies, is very low and disappointing even though the countries have
harmonised their legislations with the EU anti-discrimination requirements (Kovalenko, Mensah,
Leončikas & Žibas 2010). Here again the consequences of balancing between the regional
integration and the domestic preferences can be seen, since the de jure situation - legislation vary
from de facto - their practical expression. In this context the importance of media in forming the
attitude towards the immigrants should be noted, as it tend to use alarmist headlines and appeal
to negative impacts as well as threats posed by immigration (Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas &
57
Žibas 2010). In this way, the attitude adopted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union persists,
and the measures taken to meet the threats posed by immigration, are being justified.
Finally, restrictive immigration attitude is also a consequence of the competition for scarce
resources that emerges due to low-status position of Eastern countries’ comparing to Western or
Nordic ones (Green 2007). High unemployment rate might be one of the issues, since 47% of
respondents, in the research accomplished by the Centre of Ethnic Studies of Lithuania, thought
that there are enough foreign worker in Lithuania and that no more are needed (Kovalenko,
Mensah, Leončikas & Žibas 2010). Moreover, it is common that asylum seekers and refugees are
often confused with economic migrants, which indicates the low level of awareness about
refugees in the societies and in this way it is forming a negative attitude towards them (Saharov J
& Säär A, 2012). The fact, that the level of human security provided is low and is insufficient,
forms the selfish attitude, that the titular nationals should primarily enjoy the welfare provisions.
Thus, hostility against asylum seekers and other immigrants makes countries less attractive,
especially when it materializes in public demonstrations or violence against them (Neumayer,
2004). As a consequence, gatekeeping attitudes illustrate how national and sub-regional
particularities reflect to domestic migration policies and conversely – the influence of domestic
attitude and preferences.
58
7. CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the thesis the aim was to answer the research question: Why are the Baltic States
exceptional among the European Union Member States, when looking at the number of
asylum applications lodged?
The conclusions aim to provide the explanation to this question by combining the empirical data
with the four theories applied. To answer this question it had to be split into two parts that
together answers the main question. Firstly, the strict border control existing in the Baltic States
was presented and analysed. The conclusion is, that the strict border control and restrictive
immigration rules were a legacy of the Soviet occupation, experienced by the Baltic States and a
consequence for ensuring the survival of the state and ethnicity. Due to the fact, that during the
occupation, the aim was to diminish the homogeneity of ethnic nationals in the Baltic States, in
the nation-building period the opposite strategy was employed. The immigrants were thus
positioned as threats to the ethnic society and consequently securitized, which meant there had to
be certain actions legitimated to meet the threat. This conclusion partly explains the adoption and
development of the strict border control and restrictive immigration policies in the Baltic States.
Secondly, another explanation, supplementing the first one derives from the influence of the
European Union. The regional theory of intergovernmentalism made it possible for me to explain
the aspirations to join the European Union, as the states were concerned about their survival.
Therefore, the accession process run smoothly, however as it went to the migration issues – the
states were not eager to spread the integration process due to their securitized domestic
preferences. The fact that the countries now had to protect the external European Union border
was an advantage for the states, as they could justify the strictness on the basis of internal
European Union security. However, the theory of intergovernmentalism helped me to explain
well, that the governments’ decisions were driven mostly by the domestic forces and were well
politically calculated. Consequently, the balancing between the domestic preferences and the
European Union’s obligations influenced the divergence between the legal requirements and the
practice, which pose the refugee protection under the Geneva Convention.
The findings of this study have shown, that the Baltic States are unattractive for asylum seekers
due to analysed factors. Moreover these factors contribute to explaining the exceptional situation
of the Baltic States in the asylum area. First of all the Baltic States are migrant-sending countries
themselves, and do not have significant diasporas, which as the concept of social navigation
reveals, influences the decision of the destination country. Secondly, due to the geographical
position of the Baltic States, low level of human security provided, corruption and well59
developed illegal human smuggling groups that often have ties with bureaucrats - the states
mostly serve as a corridor to the Western European and Scandinavian countries, rather than
countries of asylum. Thirdly, the welfare provisions, employment and integration perspectives
are also affected by the securitization, as the policies were constructed in a way to protect the
interests of societies and exalt the ethnic nationals. The securitization was explained by the
theory of analytical liberalism, as it argues the state is a receptacle recipient of domestic
interests. The abovementioned factors proved to influence the contemporary Baltic States
situation in asylum area.
Finally, the discrepancy between the de jure and de facto situations in the countries was
illuminated and the conclusion is that it indirectly influences the number of asylum applications
lodged. The discrepancies were found in many areas related with immigration and asylum, such
as the activity of the officers working with the immigrants and asylum seekers, as well as in the
activity of the reception centres operating in the Baltic States. According to the concept of social
navigation, it is quite logic that people wish to navigate from the social death to the best possible
terrain, thus the fact that there are many obstacles waiting for them as asylum seekers in the
Baltic States, makes them either take the decision not to lodge the asylum application and go
underground or chose another country of destination. I do not argue, that there are no certain
discrepancies in other EU Member States, however in the context of this thesis, the aim was to
reveal the link between the discrepancies found in the Baltic States and the number of asylum
applications lodged, which proved to be significant. However the discrepancies found are only a
part of the whole migration to the Baltics picture, meaning that it does influence the number of
asylum applications in the Baltic States, however not solely.
Thus, the general conclusion is that all the mentioned factors explained by the chosen theories,
proved to contribute to revealing the unattractiveness of the Baltic States for asylum seekers. It is
therefore more convenient to remain illegal or use the states as a corridor to other EU Member
States. The overall result is that the Baltic States are in an exceptional situation in the EU, as
being the frontier states they do not experience big refugee flows, comparing with other frontier
EU Member States. Unfortunately, this exceptionality as it was proved in this thesis, was created
on selfish grounds - to benefit the needs of the societies and the states, rather than the refugees.
60
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