Handout 5- 1
Page 1 of 2
THE COLD WAR
of World War I1 i1933- 1945 ) the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as
the world's most powerful nations, or superporvers. b c h nation had an enormous amount
of r n i l i t a p . capability, political strength -and leadership, and economic potential. Relations
between these two countries were never friendly, but they were allies against Nazi
Germany during World War II. Immediately follorving World War 11, rivalry and suspicion
between the U.S. and the Societ Union intensified. Because of this political, economic, and
rnllitary rivalr?, soon created an atmosphere of tension and crisis that became known as the
Cold War.
At the end
The U.S. and the Soviet Union were rivals in almost eventhing during the Cold War. The
following is a brief description of the military, political, and economic competition between
rhe two superpowers.
Military Competition: At the end of World W a r II, the U.S. a n d the Soviet Union had the
nvo biggest militaries in the world. With the defeat of lu'azi Gemany, a common enemy had
been eliminated, but both nations' armed forces were maintained
_addition to conventional weaponp-, the L.S. had the technology t
d use atomic
w e 3 o~&t the end of World War I1 (which they used nvice on Japan). The Soviet Union
w m r e atomic weapons as well, and the). tested their first atomic bomb in 1948. Each nation
de~relopednew and more powerful nuclear and conventional weapons, and an m s race
was started. Each nation assigned their best scientists and engineers to produce the best,
most accurate and powerful weapons. After World W a r 11, U.S. President Ham. Truman
-began a policy of "containment," tvhich ir.ould last until the Cold War ended. The policy of
containmenrn meant that the U.S. would t r y to "contain" any attempts by the Soviet Union
to expand its power around the globe.
-%--
In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union e s t a b l i ~ h e d i all~anc
=~d
with other
nations. In April 1949, the United Scares formed the Norrh Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), whose purpose u s to defend against a possible Soviet invasion of Europe. In all,
fifteen nations would enter [he NATO alliance--[he U.S., Canada, Itdy, Portugal, Denmark,
Nonvay, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, West Germany, Britain, F m c e , Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. Likewise, the Societ Union, under their leaderjosef Stalin (Stalin means
"man of steelw in Russian),formed the Warsaw Pact military alliance in 1952 as a response
to NATO. In all, seven nations would join the Warsaw Pact (named afrer the city where the
agreement was signed): the Soviet Union, Polad, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Winston Churchill remarked that an lron Curtain had descended over Europe, dividing the
continent and restricting movement beh%-eenEkst and West. As both sides continued to
develop new weapons, the militstrategy of each nation centered around the defense of
its territory and the temtory of its allies.
--
Political Competition: The fundamenral basis for each nation's form of government is
vastly different and in conflict with the other. The concepts and ideas behind a form of
government or political system are called ideology. Both nations thought their form of
government to be superior. The Soviet Union was the polirical leader of the "Soviet Bloc,"
M e the U.S. was the leader of the "Free World." Below is a quick summary of the
,deological differences beween the U.S. and the Soviet Union:
OCTIR
University of Denver
Handout 5- 1
Page 2 of 2
h
Soviet Ideolna
Personal property should be limited in order to make the standard of living more equal
among all members of society.
Only one poll tical party is necessary, however the members of this party should be .
elected by the people.
The government should own most businesses,
The government should provide a large number of social srenices.
Personal property is a fundamental right of any individual.
Having more than one poiitical party is necessary in order to insure that opposing
viewpoints are heard.
Most businesses should be owned by private citizens.
The government should provide a small number of social services.
/---
,
Economic Competition: The U.S. and the Soviet Union also competed economicdly during
the Cold War. Each country had different economic philosophies. The economy in the
Soviet Union was heavily state-owned (or government) and was centrally planned by
government economic planers. The economy in the U.S. is owned mostly by private
corporations with minor degrees of government controI. Prices of goods and services in
centrally planned economies tend to be stable, whereas prices in free enterprise economies
tend to change often.
The Soviet Union formed the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This
organization closely linked the economies of Eastern Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, as well as Cuba, and Mongolia.
A special accounting unit, the tmsferable Ruble, was established as a means to facilitate
trade. This monetary unit was not honored by the U.S., Western Europe, or other nations
that demanded "hard currency for payment.
The U.S. barely traded with CMEA member countries during the Cold War. The U.S. Congress
imposed trading restrictions with CMEA member countries on many forms of high
technology, and all types of military equipment. The U.S. would not accept Soviet currency
(rubles) as payment for goods and services, only U.S. dollars.
m
R
University
Denver
The primary objective of United Stateh policy toward
the Soviet Union i s to convince Soviel leaders that i t is
in their inleresl to parricipate In a system of world cooperation, that there are no fundamental causes for war
between our two nations, and thal the security and prosperity of the Soviet Union, and that of the rest of the
world as well, i s k i n g jeopardized by rhe aggressive
26-1
militaristic imperialism such as thal in which the Soviet
Union is now engaged.
to
However. thew same leaders with whom we htbpe
to achieve an understanding on the principles of international peace appear to Mieve that a war with the United
Whire Hou.se Speciul Counsel Clurh Clifford pre- States and the olher leading capitalistic nations i s
purrd this privuie memomndurn f i r Presidtnr Trunlun inevitable. They are increasing their military power and
in IW6. Clifford was panicrrlurlv influenced b,v George the sphere o f Soviet influence i n preparation for the
Kennan's diplomatic c a b l ~ from
s
Moscow. which "inevitable" conflict, and they *re trying to weaken and
rrnphasized rhe need for U.S. "~.onruinmeni"(fl Snvier subvert their potential opponents by every means at
aggression. The memo also reflecrs ~ h rview of the SPC- their disposal. So tong as these men adhere to these
reraries of Srars. War, and Navv. as well as the Join; kliefs. i t i s highly dangerous to conclude that hope of
Chiefs of SIDRCli'ord deJt(v summarized ihe "hard international peace lies only in "accord." "mutual underline" view reward he Soviet Union, then emerging ur sanding:' or "solidarity" with the Soviet Union.
Adoption o f such a policy would impel the United
rhe consensus po.w!ir>n limon# administration oficia1.r.
-.
.
Stares to make sacrifices for the sake o f Soviet-U.S.
.SOURCE, C h d C11flr.d I,, Prrdrror T m ~ r u tSrptemhrr
.
24. IWO Clurh CItlf w d Paprrr. Hurn. 5 fnunw hhrun. m Wikiium Chulr urrd HurvulJ S~rkrM. relations, which would only have the effect o f raising
d..
A H~?iiuq
ol U l r T~rncI O K -.
@ I I.~W.I II
Soviet hopes and increasing Soviet demands. and to
.
..--ignore alternative lines of pol~cy,which might be much
more compatible with our own national and inrernalionA direct threat to American security is ~mplicitin at interests.
Soviet foreign policy which i s designed to prepare the
The Soviet government will never he easy to "get
Soviet Union for war w i t h the leading capitalistic along with." The American people musl aceuslorn themnations o f the world. Soviet leaden recognize that the selves to this thought, not as a cause for despair. bui as a
Uni~edStales will k the Soviet Union's most powerful fact to be faced objectively and courageously. I f we find
enemy if such a war as that predicted by Communist i t impossible to enlist Soviet cooperation in the solution
theory ever comes a b o u ~and therefore the United of world problems. we should be prepared to join with
States is the chief target of Soviet foreign and military the British and other Western countries in an attempt to
build up a world of our own which w i l l pursue its own
policy.. . .
The most obvious Soviet threat to American secu- objectives and will recognize the Soviet orbit as a disrity is the growing ability of the USSR to wage an tinct entity with which conflicl is not predestined but
offensive war against the United States. This has nat with which we cannot pursue common aims.
hitherto been possible, in the absence of Soviet longAs long as the Soviet government maintains irs
; range strategic air power and an almost total lack of sea present foreign policy, based upon the theory of an ulti! power. Now. however, the USSR is rapidly developing mate struggle between communism and capitalism, the
,.,' elements of her military strength which she hitherto United Stares must assume that the USSR might fighi at
lacked and which w i l l give the Soviet Union great any time for the two-fold purpose o f expanding the l e m offensive capabilities. Stalin has declared his intention tory under Communist control and weakening i t s potenof sparing no efforr to build up rhe military strength of tial capitalis! opponents. The Soviet Union was able to
the Soviet Union. Developmenl of atomic weapons, flow into the politicat vacuum o f rhe Balkans, Eastern
guided missiles, materials for biological warfare. a Europe. the Near East, Manchuria and Korea because no
strategic air force, submarines of great cruising range. other nation was both willing and able to prevent it.
naval mines and mine craft. to name the most impurtant, Soviet leaders were encouraged by easy success and
are extending the effective range of Soviet mil~tary they are now preparing to take over new areas in the
power well into areas which the United States regards as same way. The Soviet Union, as S~alineuphemistically
vital to its securiry. . . .
phrased it. is preparing "for any eventuality ."
chapter
26
The Cold War, 1945-1952
Clark C/zffoorr4
Memorandum President
Truman, 1946
--
!
:
a
>
i
,,
,,,
,.
7.
•
6,)
..-,
chaprrr 26 The Cold Wlr. 1 945- 1952 389
C
.
\
/
(
,
/
,
'
i ,;)
.- ,
The United States. with a military potential cornposed primarity of [highly] effective technical weapons,
should entenain no proposal for disarmamen! or limitation o f armarneor as long as the possibility of Soviet
aggression exlsts. Any discussion on the lirnitalion of
armaments should k pursued slowly and carefully with
the knowledge cons~antl
y in mind that proposals on oullawing alomic warfare and long-range offensive
weapons would greatly limir Unired States strength,
while only mderately affecting the Soviel Union. The
Soviet Union relies primarily on a large infantry and
artillery force and the resull o f such arms limitation
would be to deprive the Unired Stales of ~ t smost effective weapons wirhout impairing the Soviet Union's abili t y to wage a quick war of aggression i n Western
Europe, the Middle East or the Far East. . . .
I n addition to maintaining our awn strenglh. the
UnitedStates shouldsuppor~andassist a l l democratic
countries which are in any way menaced or endangered
by the USSR. Providing military support in case of
attack is a last resort; a more effective barrier 10communism i s strong economic support. Trade agreements.
loans and technical missions strengthen our ties w i t h
friendly nations and are effective demonstrations that
capiralism i s at least the equal of communism. The United Srates can do much to ensure that economic opportunities, personal freedom and s w i a l equality are made
possible in countries outside the Soviet sphere by generous financial assistance. Our policy on reparations
should be direc~edtoward strengthening the areas we are
endeavoring to keep outside the Soviei sphere. Our
effoFts to break down trade barriers. open up rivers and
international waterways, and bring about economic unification of counlries. now divided by occupation armies.
army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capa- are also directed toward the reesrablishment of vigorous
ble of seizing and holding stra~egicareas. must be sup- and healthy non-Communist economies.
ported by powerful naval and air forces. A war with rhe
In conclusion, as long as the Soviet governmenr
USSR would be "total" in a more horrible sense than adheres to i t s present policy. the United States should
any previous war and there must k constant research for mainmin mjl~taryforces powerful enough to reslrain the
tm~hoffensive and defensive weapons.
Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its preWhether i t would actually be in this country's sent area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere
interest to employ atomic and biological weapons should be given generous economic assistance and politagainst the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities is a ical support in their opposition lo Soviet penetration.
question which would require careful consideralion in Economic aid may also tre given to the Sovie1 govemthe light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. The ment and private trade with the USSR permitted pmviddecis~onwould probably be intluenced by a number of ed the results are beneficial to our interests. . . .
Even Ihough Sovier leaders profess m believe that
factnrs, such as the Soviet Union's capacity to employ
similar weapons, which can not now be estimated. Bur rhe conflicl hetween Capitalism and Communism i s
the zmportant point is that the United Slates must be pre- irreconcilable and must eventually be resolved by the
pared to wage atomic and biological warfare if neces- ~riumphof the lalter, it is our hope that they will change
sary. The mere fact of preparedness may k the only thcir minds and work out with us a fair and equiloble
powerful deterrent to Soviet aggressive action and in settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be
this sense the only sure guaranty of peace.
beaten and toc, determined to be frightened.
Unless the United States is willing to sacrifice its
future security for the sake of "accord" wirh the USSR
now, this government must. as H first step roward #odd
stabilirilion, seek to prevent addirlonal Soviet aggrcssion. , . This government should be prepared, while
scrupulously avoiding any act which would be an excuse
for the Soviets !o begin a war, l o resist vigorously and
successfully any efforts of the USSR to expand into
areas vital to American security.
The language of military power 1s the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The
United States musr use that language in order that Soviet
leaders will realize that our govemmenr is determined to
uphold the interests of its citizens and [he rights o f small
nations. Compromise and concessions are considered,
by the Soviels, ro be evidences of weakness and they are
encouraged by our "retreats" to make new and greater
demands.
The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the Unjted
States. w to attack on areas of the world which are viral
to our security, will be the military power of this counIT. I t must k made apparent to the Soviet government
that our srrength will be sufficient to repel any attack
and sufficient to defeat the USSR decisively i f a war
should start. The prospect of defeat i s the only sure
means of deterring the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union's vulnerability is limited due ro
the vast area over which its key indusrries and nalural
resources are widely dispersed, hut it i s vulnerable to
atomic weapons, biological warfare, and long-range
power. Therefore, in order to maintain our strength at a
level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet
Union. the Unired States must be prepared to wage
atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized
.
),',.
392
rbuptrr 26 Thc Cold War, 1945-1 952
e
came out of the war without devastation and much
slronger than before the war. Any talk on w r part a b u t
tht need for strengthening our defenses further is bound
to appear hypocritical to other nations. . . .
The real lest lies in the achievement of internationa1 unity It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions
for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring
international order without firs1 achieving an atmosphere
of mutual trust and confidence. The task admittedly is
not an easy one. . . .
Fundamentally, this comes down lo the point discussed e;uIitr in this letter, that even our own security,
in the sense that we have known i t in the past. cannot be
preserved by military means in a world armed with
atomic weapons. The only type o f security which can be
maintained by our own military force is the type describedbyamilitary man beforetheSenateAtomic
Energy Commission-a securily against invasion after
all our cities and perhaps 40 million of our city ppulalion have k e n destroyed by atomic weapns. That i s the
best that "security" on rhe basis of armaments has to
offer us. 11 is not the kind of securiry that our people and
the p o p l e o f the other United Nations are striving for.
I.
Why docs Wallace believe that the current American military policy is flawed? What alternatives
does he offer?
2.
Compare Wallace's treatment of Soviet motives to
Clifford's. How dn the rwn men diffpr in their
interprcrarinn of Russian history and foreign poiicy ?
3.
WharisWallace'svisionfori~erntionnlsecuriry?
Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the
Greek Government.
T h e very existence o f the Greek state i s today
threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand
I n March, 1937 President Truman appealed to armed men. led by Communists, who defy the Govern,--Congress for %400 million in foreign aid to rhe govem- ment's authority a1 a number of points, particularly
ments of Greece und Turkey, both of which were$ghring
along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed
to repress civil rebellions. Truman's speech morked a
by the United Nations Security Council is at present
new course in Americun fnreign pnlicv by asserting a investigating dis~urbedconditions in Northern Greece
responsibi1it.y to stop the spread of communi~mmvwhere and alleged border violations along the frontiers between
in the wnrld. Truman's vision divided the wnrld neat1.v Greece on the one hand and Algeria, Bulgaria and
into hvn c m p s , and it assumed that all social rc~~olution
Yugoslavia on the other.
w m being direcrcd from Moscow. The Truman Doctrine
Meanwhile. the Greek Government is unablt to
placed Cold War principles at the very foundation oj cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and
American foreign policyfor decdes lo come.
poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it i s
SOURCE: C o n p ~ Rdc c d , Morrh 12. I W7.
to reslore the authority to the Government throughout
Greek temlory.
~ m e c emust have assismce i f it is to become a
The gravity of the situation which confronts the self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The
world t d a y necessitates my appearance before a joint United States must supply this assistance. We have
session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the already extended to Greece certain types of relief and
national security of this country are involved.
economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no o t h
One aspect of the present siluation, which Iwish country to which democratic Greece can turn. No orher
to present to yw at this time for your consideration and nation i s willing and able to provide the necessary sup
decision, concms G r m t and Turkey.
pon for a demwratic Greek Government.
Tht, United States has received from the Greek
The British Governmenr. which has been helping
Government an urgent appeal for financial and aconorn- Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid
ic assistance. Preliminary reports frorn he American after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the
Ecanomic Mission now in Greece and reports from the necessity of reducing or liquidating ils committrnents in
American Ambassador in Greece cormborate the state- several parts of the world, including Greece.
/-ment of the Greek Government that assistance is imperaGreece's neighbor. Turkey. also deserves our
tive if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and
Ido not k l i t v e that the American people and the economically round state is clearly no less important to
263 The T i m a n Doctrine, 1947
/ \
-
*
)
1'
.. .
(._, I,
'
the freedom-loving peoples of the world than rhe f u t u r l
of Greece. The circumstances i n which Turkey
itself loday are considerably different from those
Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that hav
kset Greece. And during the war, the United States an
Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Neve theless, Turkey now needs our support.
\
Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Grear Britain and the United States
for the purpose of effecting the modernization necessary
for the maintenance of i t s national integrity. That
integrity i s essential to the preservation of order in thc
Middle East.
The British Governmenr has informed us that,
owing to its own difficulties, i t can no longer extend
financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of
Greece, if Turkey is to have the assislance i t needs. the
United States must supply it. We are he only country
able to provide that help. . . .
To ensure the peaceful development of nations,
free from coercion, the Uniled States ha$ taken a leading
part i n establishing the United Nations. The U n i ~ e d
Nations i s designed to make possible lasting freedom
and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to
help free peoples to maintain their free ins~itutionsand
their national integrity against aggressive movements
that seek to impose on them totalitarian regirnes. This is
no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian
regimes imposed on free peoples. by direct or indirect
aggression, undermine the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of counrries of the world
have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them
against their will. The Government of the United States
has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, i n Poland,
Rumania and Bulgaria. must also state that in a number
of other counvies there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly
every nation must choose between alternative ways of
life. The choice is too often not a free one.
O n e way o f life is based upon the w i l l o f the
majority. and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government. free elections, guarantees of individual liberty. freedom of speech and religion, and fretdom from plitical oppression.
The second way of life i s based upon rhe will of
the minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. I t
relies upon terror and oppression. a controlled press and
radio. fixed elections. and the suppression o f personal
attempted subjuga!ion by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I belkve that we must assist free peoples to work
oul their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.
P -w
,'
freedoms.
1 hlieve that i t must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting
C.
sta
1s
sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in
violation of the charter of the United Nations by such
methds as cuercion. or by such subleduges as political
infi Itration. In helping free and independent nations to
maintain their freedom. the United States will be giving
effect to the principles of the charter of the United
Nations.
Ir is necessary only to glance at a map to realize
that the survival and integrity of the Greek nafion are of
grave imponance in a much wider situation. If Greece
should fall under the control of an armed minority. the
effect upon its neighbor, Turkey. would be immediate
and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread
throughout the cnlire Middle East.
Moreover, lhe disappearance o f Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those
countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against
greal difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their
independence while they repair the damages of war.
I t would be an unspeakable vagedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelrning odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss o f
independence would be disastrous no1 only for them bur
for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure
would quickly b the lot of neighboring peoples striving
to maintain their freedom and independence.
Shouid we fail to aid Greece and Turkey i n this
fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the west as
well as to the east. We must take immediate and rcsolule
action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority
for assislance ro Greece and Turkey in [he amount of
$400,000,000for the period ending June 30, 1948.
I n addition to funds, Iask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks o f reconstruction. and for the
purpose o f supervising the use o f such financial and
malerial assistance as may be furnished. Irecommend
that aurhority also be provided for the instruction and
training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.
Finally, Iask that tht Cangress provide authority
which will permit the speediest and most effective use,
in terms o f needed commodities, supplies. and equipment, of such funds as may be authorid.
)'
\
)
i 1!
/I,
>
,
+
/'
"'
This is a serious course upon which we embark. I
would not recommend i t except that the alternative is
much more serious.
The United States contributed 5341.000,000.000
toward winning World War 11. This is an investment in
world freedom and world peace.
Thc assistance that Iam recommending for Greece
and Turkey amounts to little more than I tenth of 1 per
cent of this investment. It is only common Jcnsc that we
should safeguard this investment and make sure that it
was not in vain.
The seeds of tomlitarian regimes are nunurtd by
misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil
of poverty and strife. They reach h e i r full growth when
the hope of a people for a better life has d i d . We must
keep thaf hope alive. The free peoples of the world look
to us for suppon in maintaining their freedoms.
-
2 a
-
The Tmman L d t y Order,
1947
Amidst Republican charges that his Administration was "sop on communism, " Truman formulated a
domestic a c c o m p i m e n ; lo his a~iicommunistforeign
pniicy. In 1947 k issued an executive order establishing
a Layalrv Review Bwrd for the federa! civil service. The
board was empowered ro investigate and dismiss
employees suspected of disloyalty. The Anomey General
was direcred !a draw ~p a list of "subversive" orgmitar i m which would pmvidc a h i s for investigation. The
Loyolry Order legitimized ruzd further stimuhted, zhe
frenzy of onticommunist mi* in dl phaecs of AmenC M
SOURCE; Thr Nrw York T i m e ~March 23. IP17
--
Part I
1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every
ptrson entering the civilian employment of any d e w -
ment or agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government.
A.' lnvcsrigations o f prsons entering the wrnpetit i v e service shall k conducted by the C i v i l Service
Commission, except in such casts as are covered by a
spbcial agreement between the commission and any given department or agency.
8. Investigations of persons other lhan those entering the cornpetitivc service shall k conducted by the
'
\ !If r filter in our ludarhip, we may endanger
t k e q x u t of the w o r l d - a d we shall surely endanger
the welfare of this nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed u p i us by
the swift movement of events. Iam confident that tk
Congress will face thtse tesponsibilities squarely.
I.
C
Why does Trruruur believe ik "national securiry"
Acre? How does the Doctrine define "nati~nul
securiry "?
o/rhe U.S. to be a~st&
2.
What consequences does Truman foresee if the
U.S.fails to aid Greecc and Turkey?
3
How does Truman define rht diferences bezween
the two "alternative ways of life" available lo
nations ?
t rnploying department or agency. Departmnts and agcn-
cies without investigative organizations shall utilize the
investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission.
2. The investigations of persons cnlering the employ of the Executive Branch may be conducted after
any such p e m n enters u p n actual employment therein,
but in any such case the appointment of such person
shall be condirioned upon a favorable determination
with r e s p a to his loyalty. . . .
3. An investigation shall k made of all applicants
at all available pertinent sources of information and shall
include r t f t r t w to:
A. Federal Burcau of Investigation files.
B. Civil Service Commission files.
C. Military and Naval Intelligence fiia.
D.The files of any other appqwhtc government
invtstigativt w intelligence agency.
E. House Committee on un-American Activities
C
files.
F. Local lawenforcement f i l s at the place of residence and tmployment of the applicant, including
municipal, county and state l a w ~ n f o m m e n rfiles.
G. Schools and oolltgts attcnded by applicant.
H.Former employers of applicant.
I.References given by applican~
J . Any other appropriate source.
4. Whenever derogatory information with respect
to loyalty of an applicant is revealed, a full field investigation shall be conducted. A full field investigation shall
also be conducted of those applicants, or of applicants
for particular positions. as may be designatd by the
head of rhc employing depanmtnt or agency. such designations to be based on t h determination by any such
head of tht best interests of national security.
C