On the Path to Pre-crime?
Assessing US Domestic Counterradicalization Policy
Mohammad Islam
May 21, 2012
CISAC Honors Thesis
Advised by Professor Martha Crenshaw
Table
of
Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...1
Chapter
1:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………….2
The
Issue…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
On
the
Agenda…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6
Benchmarks………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..9
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..10
Chapter
2:
Conceptualizing
Radicalization………………………………………………………...................12
Local
Law
Enforcement………………….………………………………………………………………………….14
Federal
Government………………………………………………………………………………………………….18
Debate
Outside
of
Government………..…………………………………………………………………………25
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..27
Chapter
3:
Radicalization
on
the
Agenda……………………………………………………….......................29
Theory
of
Agenda‐Setting…………………………………………………………………………………………..29
2001
Lackawanna
Six………….……………………………………………………..………………………………32
2002
Portland
Seven………………………………………………………………………………………………….34
2004
Madrid
Bombings…………………………...……………………………………………………..…….…….35
2005
London
Bombings…………………………...…………………….………………………………..…………36
Homegrown
Terrorism
Prevention
Act
of
2007…………………………………………………..………39
2007‐2011
Homegrown
Terror
Cases………………………………………………..……………………….41
2011
Peter
King
Radicalization
Hearings…………………………………………………………………….43
Scholarly
Debate………………………………………………………………………………………………………..44
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...49
Chapter
4:
Counter‐radicalization
policy……………………………………………………….......................50
Messaging………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….51
Community
Engagement…….……………………………………………………..……………………………….52
Domestic
Intelligence………………………………………………………………………………………..……….57
Debating
Policy………………………………………………………………………………………………………….64
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………72
Chapter
5:
Benchmarks………………………………………………………………………………….....................74
Bureaucratic
Organizational
Theory…………………………………………………………………………...74
Defining
Effectiveness………………………………………………………………………………………………..76
Community
Engagement……………………………………………………………………………………………81
Domestic
Intelligence………………………………………………………………………………………..……….83
Chapter
6:
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………........................86
Policy
Recommendations………….………………………………………………………………………….........89
Works
Cited………….…………………………………………………………………………………............................93
Appendix
A:
Cases
of
Homegrown
Extremism……………………………………………………………..100
Appendix
B:
Congressional
Hearings
on
Radicalization………………………………………………..110
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not be possible without the support and guidance I received from
numerous individuals. Their contribution in shaping my work is beyond calculation. First, I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Martha Crenshaw, who was extremely generous with
her time during the course of my research and provided me with invaluable advice and
perspective on my topic. Her unparalleled expertise in counterterrorism and counterradicalization provided great guidance in structuring my arguments and overall thesis. Her
willingness to read through multiple drafts of my chapters and provide detailed comments for
improvement was exceptionally helpful. Second, I would like to thank Professor Chip Blacker
for his thoughtful questioning and emphasis on preciseness during our honors seminar that
helped guide my research process. Third, our teaching assistant David Blum provided us with
helpful advice on requirements and logistics throughout the year. Professor Thomas Fingar, who
led the summer seminar, was extremely helpful in framing my puzzle and research question in
the initial stages of my research. Fourth, I thank Ben Hall for his fascinating law enforcement
expertise, pointed questioning, and numerous comments and criticisms that helped me produce a
better thesis. Lastly, I want to thank all of my fellow honors students, whose academic pursuits
and camaraderie provided inspiration for me to pursue my own.
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACLU
American Civil Liberties Union
AP
Associated Press
BCOT
Building Communities of Trust
CAB
Community Awareness Briefing
CAIR
Council on American-Islamic Relations
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CRCL
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CVE
Countering Violent Extremism
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOJ
Department of Justice
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
GPRA
Government Performance and Results Accountability
JTTF
Joint Terrorism Task Force
LAPD
Los Angeles Police Department
MPAC
Muslim Public Affairs Council
NCTC
National Counterterrorism Center
NYPD
New York Police Department
STREET
Strategy to Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers
List of Figures
Figure 1:
Number of Homegrown Extremism Cases Identified by
Muslim Community Members
82
Figure 2:
Number of Homegrown Extremism Incidents without
Informants or Undercover Agents
84
Abstract
From 9/11 to 2011, there were 192 cases of Islamist homegrown terrorism, and almost
half of those attacks have occurred in the years 2009 and 2010. The apparent surge in
homegrown terror cases raises questions about the efficacy of the government’s attempt at
preventing homegrown terrorism and countering radicalization. This thesis investigates the
government’s definition of radicalization, its counter-radicalization policies, the metrics used to
evaluate policy success, and the pathway of radicalization to the national public policy agenda.
The results show that there is a discrepancy between federal government agencies and local law
enforcement agencies on the role of Islamic ideology in radicalization. This discrepancy has been
reflected in policy, leading law enforcement to pursue domestic intelligence collection activities
at the early stages of radicalization, increasing the potential to confuse expressive forms of
Islamic religiosity with radicalization. The result is the lack of a unified domestic counterradicalization policy on the national and local levels. The quantitative metrics the government
has used to evaluate counter-radicalization policy have weak explanatory power, highlighting the
limitations of quantitative metrics in evaluating counter-radicalization policy success. Given the
important place homegrown terrorism has on the national agenda and the media and public’s
sensitivity to terrorism after 9/11, radicalization will likely continue to be an important issue in
the near future.
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction
The threat is real, the threat is different, the threat is constant. The threat has changed
from simply worrying about foreigners coming here, to worrying about people in the United
States, American citizens -- raised here, born here, and who for whatever reason, have decided
that they are going to become radicalized and take up arms against the nation in which they
were born.1
- Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General
There have been 192 cases of homegrown terrorism in the United States from the
September 11 attacks to 2011, and almost half of those cases have occurred in the last two
years.2 Although Al-Qaeda’s influence in the world has been waning,3 there seems to be a
paradoxical surge in the number of homegrown terrorism cases. Does this signal a growing trend
of homegrown terrorism in the United States? Are current counter-radicalization strategies
failing? The United States has developed policies to deal with the radicalization threat, but it has
been forced to navigate difficult waters in trying to ensure national security while preserving
civil liberties. The large number of cases of homegrown terrorism suggests that the policies are
not effectively deterring individuals from committing acts of violence.
Although there are various types of domestic terrorism, this paper will focus on terrorism
associated with and inspired by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates because it poses the greatest and
preeminent terrorist threat to the United States.4 Consequently, this type of terrorism has been the
focus of public alarm and legal and policy initiatives taken by the U.S. government. Moreover,
1
Holder, Eric. ABC “Good Morning America” Interview, December 21, 2010.
A full list of all cases considered are provided in Appendix A.
3
National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Government Printing Office, 2008, p.
69.
4
National Security Strategy. Washington: White House, 2010, p. 19.
2
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2
since the narrative that Al-Qaeda is trying to push to radicalize individuals within the United
States has largely targeted the Muslim community, government policy directed at this segment of
the population will be the focus of this paper.
In order to investigate this apparent surge in homegrown extremism, I ask the following
questions:
1) How significant of a threat is homegrown terrorism, and is the threat increasing?
2) What are the U.S. counter-radicalization strategies and how effective are they?
This thesis seeks to provide a useful guide for policymakers to understand the government’s
approach to counter-radicalization and to glean important insights about how the policies can be
amended to be more effective, or if they should exist at all. This chapter will provide an
introduction to the definition of radicalization, its path to the public policy agenda, and to the
benchmarks in evaluating counter-radicalization policy. I introduce these concepts in particular
because they represent the gaps in the existing literature that this thesis aims to contribute to
fulfilling.
Chapter 2 fully investigates the definition of radicalization – exploring how different
actors within the government, divided into law enforcement agencies and the federal government
agencies, understand radicalization and the influence of Islamic ideology in their definitions.
Chapter 3 uses Kingdon’s model of agenda-setting to analyze how the issue of radicalization
came onto the U.S. national public policy agenda. The scholarly debate in the current literature
about whether radicalization deserves that position on the agenda is also presented, with the
discussion divided into two schools of thought: opponents who do not believe radicalization is a
significant enough problem to be on the agenda and proponents who acknowledge the problem is
limited, but emphasize the powerful repercussions if it is not dealt with. Chapter 4 delves into the
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3
government’s counter-radicalization policies, analyzed at the federal and local law enforcement
levels. The scholarly debate in the literature about counter-radicalization policy is more nuanced.
I present the argument of scholars who believe there should be no counter-radicalization policy
and then the internal debate on various aspects of counter-radicalization policy by scholars who
believe the government must have one. Since metrics will be an important part of investigating
the efficacy of those policies, Chapter 5 is devoted to analyzing the metrics government agencies
have used to evaluate their counter-radicalization policies and what statistical conclusions about
policy progress can be reached from those metrics. Chapter 6 will discuss the policy implications
of this thesis and offer recommendations for policymakers about how they can reconsider or
reevaluate the current U.S. government approach to combat radicalization and homegrown
extremism.
The Issue
Definitions
are
important
when
discussing
radicalization
and
homegrown
terrorism
because
of
the
ambiguity
surrounding
the
terms.
Homegrown
terrorism
is
the
easier
of
the
two
to
define.
While
the
focus
was
primarily
on
the
threat
of
Al‐Qaeda
operatives
attacking
the
United
States,
the
attention
has
now
turned
to
radicalized
individuals
who
have
lived
substantial
portions
of
their
lives
in
the
United
States
and
are
generally
well
integrated
in
American
society.
This
represents
a
very
different
situation
from
Islamist
domestic
terrorism
in
Europe,
in
which
the
integration
of
Muslims
into
European
society
is
a
central
issue.
In
this
thesis
I
define
homegrown
terrorism
to
be
violent
acts
committed
against
American
targets
at
home
or
abroad
by
U.S.
citizens
or
residents.5
Radicalization
is
much
more
difficult
to
define.
As
mentioned
above,
Chapter
2
will
be
devoted
to
fully
examining
5
I have included both legal and illegal residents in the subset of U.S. residents on the basis that they underwent their
process of radicalization in the United States. See Appendix A for all the cases considered.
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4
the
government’s
definition
of
radicalization,
but
what
can
be
generally
said
is
that
radicalization is a process that individuals undergo on the pathway to violence. The culmination
of the process is a homegrown terrorist attack. However, it is important to note that not all
individuals undergoing radicalization will reach the point where they feel it is necessary to
commit violent acts. We can further divide radicalization into two categories: behavioral
radicalization and cognitive radicalization. Behavioral radicalization represents the point where
the individual feels it is necessary to commit an act of violence.6 This has also been referred to as
violent extremism by the federal government. Cognitive radicalization is the support or adoption
of violent ideas without the final step to engage in violence.7 However, even these definitions
have inherent ambiguities, as I will show in Chapter 2. For example, there is not always a clear
distinction between violence and nonviolence and between an individual who is a real threat
versus someone who shares the same core religious ideology but is entirely nonviolent.
There is a major discrepancy between the federal government’s approach to defining
radicalization and that of local law enforcement.8 For example, The White House has not
attributed any specific religious ideology as the driving force behind violent extremism other
than to mention these violent extremist attacks are directed or inspired by Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates. In contrast, the New York Police Department’s radicalization report specifically
identifies this ideology as jihadist or jihadi-Salafi, the driving force behind acts of “autonomous
jihad.”9 The White House is much more cautious about linking the Islamic religion with acts of
violent extremism – indeed Islam is only mentioned in the White House strategy in the context of
6
Neumann, Peter. “Preventing Violent Radicalization in America.” Bipartisan Policy Center. Jun. 2011, p. 16.
Ibid.
8
The federal government is defined to be federal agencies including the White House, DHS, and NCTC. The local
law enforcement agencies considered are the NYPD, LAPD, and the local offices of the FBI.
9
Bhatt, Arvin, and Mitchell D. Silber, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” New York: NYPD
Intelligence Division, City of New York Police Department, 2007, p. 6.
7
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5
reassuring the world that the U.S. is not at war with Islam.10 Although the NYPD states that this
driving ideology is an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam, it nonetheless describes
Islamic ideology as the foundation for radicalization. Thus this discrepancy between the local
and national levels of government underscores the fact that there is a lack of a clear definition of
radicalization among government entities. The federal government generally perceives weak
links between extreme Islamic views and violence while local law enforcement generally sees
strong links.
The presence of these contrasting concepts can be further linked to a shift in terminology
between the Bush administration and the Obama administration. The national security strategy
and national strategy for combating terrorism released by the Bush administration in 2006
highlight the threat of Islamic violent extremism, and state that democracies like the United
States are not immune to homegrown terrorism, as was shown by the July 7 bombings in London
by Muslim British nationals.11 As noted above, the Obama administration rejects placing an
Islamic designation on violent extremism, and instead describes the driving force behind
radicalization simply as Al-Qaeda’s ideology.12 Thus there has been a clear shift in the definition
of radicalization from the Bush to Obama administrations.
On the Agenda
There has been much discussion on why people become radicalized and analyses of
government deficiencies in policy. Moreover, debates among academics and government
officials about whether radicalization should be on the public policy agenda are present in the
existing literature. However, there is a gap in the literature in how exactly this issue came to the
public policy agenda in the first place. This will be the focus of Chapter 3. In order to understand
10
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, p. 7.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President], 2006, p. 10.
12
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, p. 7.
11
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6
how radicalization came onto the agenda, we need to understand how issues generally are placed
on the U.S. policy agenda. Kingdon’s model of agenda setting will provide the theoretical basis
for understanding the agenda setting process. Kingdon defines the agenda as the list of subjects
or issues that government officials and people outside of government working with those
officials are paying serious attention to at any given time. Three sets of variables – problems,
policies, and politics – interact to determine what gets on the agenda.13 Kingdon defines the
problem stream as “the perceptions of problems as public issues requiring government action.”14
The policy stream consists of analysts examining problems and proposing solutions, and the
political stream encompasses everything from the public mood to interest group campaigns.
Agenda-setting opportunities, called policy windows, open and close based on the interaction of
these three streams. Policy entrepreneurs, as Kingdon calls them, take advantage of open policy
windows to advocate for issues they would like to see placed on the policy agenda.
In their analysis of Kingdon’s analytical framework, Howlett, Perl, and Ramesh
determine that most problems come to the agenda because of feedback from existing programs or
because of sudden, unexpected events.15 Thomas Birkland further developed this idea of these
sudden and unpredictable events, which he called focusing events, influencing the agenda setting
process. Birkland provides examples of past focusing events that had major effects on the public
policy process, such as the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989. A year after the spill the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 was passed in reaction. The oil spill helped to dramatize the problem of oil pollution
and bring it to the top of the agenda. Without it, Birkland contends the fourteen-year-long
gridlock over comprehensive oil spill legislation would have likely continued until some other
13
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984, p. 20.
Ibid.
15
Howlett, Michael, Anthony Perl, and M Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems. 3rd
ed. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 104.
14
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7
event incentivized Congress to take rapid action on the problem.16 Although all focusing events
do not necessarily spur immediate policy action, they can grab the policymakers’ attention with
the right mix of political entrepreneurs.
The starting point of chronological events that brought radicalization and homegrown
terrorism to the agenda will be the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although there were incidents of
terrorism related to Islamist extremism in the United States before this time, 9/11 marks a major
turning point where terrorism soared to the top of the public policy agenda. Thus the policy,
problem and political streams that existed from 9/11 to 2011 will be investigated to determine
when and how radicalization came to be an integral part of the national counterterrorism agenda,
a phenomenon that has not been investigated in the existing literature.
A look at the national security strategies employed by the Bush administration provides
some clues as to the timeframe of the radicalization agenda setting. As mentioned above in the
discussion of the disparities between the Obama and Bush administrations’ radical ideology
terminology, homegrown terrorism was part of the Bush administration’s national strategy on
combating terrorism in 2006. However, his 2003 strategy has no mention of radicalization or
homegrown terrorism. While it does emphasize the need to identify and locate terrorist
organizations operating abroad and at home,17 there is no indication that the National Security
Council at that point in time had in mind the threat of U.S. citizens or residents undergoing a
process of radicalization and committing violent attacks. The Department of Homeland Security
strategies show a similar trend. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes
numerous times that the United States is not immune to the threat of “Islamic extremist
16
Birkland, Thomas A. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1997, p. 3.
17
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President], 2003, p. 16.
Islam
8
radicalization” within its own borders.18 However, the 2002 strategy makes no mention of
Islamic radicalization or homegrown terrorism in its blueprint of domestic counterterrorism
strategies.19 Thus the literature shows that in the 2002-2003 timeframe there is attention given to
attacks within the homeland, but no focus on individuals radicalizing to commit those attacks –
instead it seeks to prevent existing terrorists in the United States from being able to carry out
attacks, similar to the 9/11 hijackers. The 2006-2007 strategies show a clear shift to incorporate
radicalization – by this time it was already on the public policy agenda. Since Kingdon and
Birkland’s models predict that a critical event such as a crisis can bring an issue to the agenda, I
will investigate the important instances of domestic terrorism that occurred around this period,
including the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings, along with the policy
entrepreneurs in the United States that helped the issue ascend to the important position in the
government’s agenda that it currently has.
Benchmarks
As I will show in Chapter 4, many scholars have emphasized the need to develop metrics
for counter-radicalization as an important part of the government’s overall policy. For example,
in comparing the British Prevent policy to the US domestic counter-radicalization policy, Peter
Neumann argues that “neither of the two policies has established metrics that would make it
possible to measure and compare their effectiveness.”20 Lorenzo Vidino notes that the
government has attempted to set metrics, such as “simple quantitative analyses of program
participation to more complex indexes seeking to determine the level of community
18
National Strategy for Homeland Security. [Washington, D.C.: The White House], 2007, p. 6.
National Strategy for Homeland Security. [Washington, D.C.: The White House], 2002.
20
Neumann, Peter. “Preventing Violent Radicalization in America.” Bipartisan Policy Center. Jun. 2011, p. 22-24.
19
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9
engagement,” but none of these attempts provide a clear assessment of policy progress.21 These
scholars criticize the government for not having adequate benchmarks but call on them to
establish “empirical metrics” without providing guidelines as to how this can be accomplished.
There is a gap in the literature in terms of a full evaluation of the metrics the government has
been using for counter-radicalization policy.
Conclusion
I have shown that there are three significant gaps in the existing literature that will be
addressed in the additional chapters of this thesis. First, although there are scholars who debate
about whether radicalization is a serious enough problem to be on the public policy agenda, there
is no discussion about exactly how radicalization got on the agenda. In order to conduct this
analysis I plan to look at events chronologically starting from the 9/11 attacks to 2011. Second,
there is little discussion in the present literature about counter-radicalization benchmarks. There
lacks a detailed analysis of metrics the government has used to evaluate the success of its
counter-radicalization programs. Third, the current literature provides few analyses of the
government’s definition of radicalization. This thesis will show the discrepancies in definition of
radicalization that exist between the federal government and local law enforcement: law
enforcement describes Islamic ideology as the root of radicalization while the federal
government refuses to.
In the final analysis, the central question about the effectiveness of U.S. counterradicalization policy is an important one that needs to be answered. Over one trillion dollars has
already been spent on domestic homeland security since 9/11.22 This paper will seek to
21
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe.” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 262, 2010, p. 10.
22
Mueller, John, and Mark Stewart. “Money can’t buy zero risk.” The Australian Financial Review, May 20, 2011,
p. 3.
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10
determine whether the dollars spent on counter-radicalization are justified, using the
government’s own metrics for evaluation. This research will also shed light on how significant a
problem radicalization is and whether it deserves to be on the public policy agenda. It will also
address the specific policies counter-radicalization policy should consist of, if it is to be
implemented at all. The various insights this research can provide coupled with the resources and
lives at stake make this assessment of counter-radicalization policy effectiveness extremely
important.
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11
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Radicalization
In order to understand policy, we must understand the concepts that form its foundation.
In this chapter I will present the government’s definition of radicalization to allow the reader to
have a better understanding of how different agencies’ interpretations of radicalization has led to
the creation of their policies. Radicalization has been widely used by both government officials
and academics in the counterterrorism field to explain the emergence of Al-Qaeda inspired
homegrown terrorism. However, a close look at the government’s definition of radicalization
indicates a lack of uniformity. In this chapter I will argue that there is a discrepancy in the
concept of radicalization between the federal government and local law enforcement regarding
the influence of Islamic ideology. The federal agencies of interest include the Department of
Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center. The local law enforcement
agencies I will consider are the Federal Bureau of Investigation,1 New York Police Department,
and the Los Angeles Police Department.2 In addition to these government participants, I will
address non-governmental actors such as academic scholars, Muslim communities, and civil
rights groups. The analysis will focus on scholarly community’s debate about the concept of
radicalization and the American Muslim community and its allies’ response to the government’s
definitions. The importance of concepts and definitions are inherent in the fact that one cannot
make policy around an issue or problem without defining what it is, and I will seek to show that
the divergent understanding of radicalization among government actors will only help exacerbate
this problem.
1
Although the FBI is a federal agency, it operates on a local level with its 56 field offices.
There are of course some other local governments engaged in radicalization work, such as the Ohio Department of
Public Safety. See Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the House Committee on Homeland Security,
One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, 2010. However, the number of homegrown terror attacks in their
respective states and the size of their programs make the LAPD and NYPD arguably the most important local
government agencies to consider.
2
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12
Although there are undeniably various forms of radicalization, this thesis will focus on
terrorism associated with and inspired by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, because it poses the
greatest and preeminent threat to the United States.3 Since the narrative that Al-Qaeda is trying
to push to radicalize individuals within the United States has largely targeted the Muslim
community, government policy directed at this segment of the population will be my focus.
To offer a fair analysis of the government’s understanding, it is important to set the
context: radicalization is not easy to define. Radicalization does not always lead to violence. As
introduced in Chapter 1, radicalization can be categorized into two areas: cognitive
radicalization, the adoption of extreme ideas, and behavioral or violent radicalization, which is
the culmination of the radicalization process that leads to acts of violence. However, the
delineation between cognitive radicalization and behavioral radicalization is not always clear. In
the United States, the First Amendment protects free speech, even radical speech. The job of law
enforcement is extremely difficult when trying to navigate the waters between an individual who
is an actual threat and one who is simply outwardly religious.
Moreover, radicalization is a general term that can be highly subjective. It applies to the
young men and women in 19th century imperial Russia who comprised the People’s Will, the
organization that succeeded in assassinating Czar Alexander II.4 It can also describe the process
by which the Norwegian political extremist Anders Breivik underwent, and prompted him to
bomb government buildings in Oslo before carrying out a mass shooting at a youth political
summer camp.5 Radicalization is a multi-staged process that can, but not necessarily must,
culminate in a terrorist attack. Thus government officials and law enforcement must work in a
3
National Security Strategy, [Washington, D.C.: The White House], 2010, p. 19.
McCauley, Clark R, and Sophia Moskalenko. Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 5.
5
Goodman, David J., and Elisa Mala. “At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting.” New York Times, July 22, 2011.
4
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13
complex and ambiguous environment to try to distinguish real threats from displays of Islamic
religiosity.
The existing literature on radicalization does not provide a thorough analysis of the
government’s definition of radicalization. How pronounced are the discrepancies in how
different branches of the government view radicalization? This is a particularly important
question because if the government cannot agree on a definition of radicalization, can it develop
a coherent policy for it? I will investigate the discrepancies by looking at how local law
enforcement agencies and the federal government view radicalization differently.
Local Law Enforcement
1)
New York Police Department
The NYPD describes radicalization as a process that drives “unremarkable” people to
commit terrorist attacks. Radicalization consists of four distinct stages in a linear process:6
Pre-radicalization
Pre-radicalization is defined to be the point of origin for individuals before they undergo the
radicalization process.
Self-identification
Self-identification is the phase in which individuals start to explore Salafi Islam and begin
associating with others who share this same ideology. The transition from a previous ideology to
this new one is caused by a triggering event, which can be economic, social, political, or
personal.
6
Bhatt, Arvin, and Mitchell D. Silber, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” New York: NYPD
Intelligence Division, City of New York Police Department, 2007, p. 6-7.
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14
Indoctrination
Indoctrination is the stage at which the individual has fully adopted Jihadi Salafi ideology and
his beliefs become more extreme. He has also realized his ideology must be buttressed by action,
called militant jihad. The group of similar minded individuals that he has aligned himself with
reinforce this view.
Jihadization
Individual members of the group recognize their duty to participate in jihad and designate
themselves as mujahedeen. The group begins the operational planning, preparation, and
execution for a terrorist attack.
The NYPD’s definition of radicalization is one that clearly invokes the Islamic nature of
radicalization that is inspired by Al-Qaeda. The ideology of radicalization is defined as jihadi or
jihadi-Salafi ideology that drives young people living in the West to carry out attacks of
“autonomous jihad” against their host countries.7 Although the NYPD states that this driving
ideology is an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam, it nonetheless describes Islamic
ideology as the foundation for radicalization.
2)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI’s conceptualization of radicalization is very comparable to that of the NYPD. In
a report published in 2006, the FBI describes the radicalization process for an individual who
converts to Islam and eventually commits an act of jihad. The FBI states that “radicalized US
converts to Islam and their potential to attack the Homeland are growing concerns of the US
Intelligence Community (USIC).”8 The FBI perception of radicalization has also remained
constant between administrations. Even with the transition to the Obama administration, the FBI
7
Ibid., p. 6.
The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad [Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation],
2006, p. 4.
8
Islam
15
still defines radicalization and Al-Qaeda inspired ideology in terms of Islamic ideology. The FBI
continues to be concerned about “homegrown individuals engaged in Islamist extremism.”9 The
FBI defines radicalization as a cycle that consists of four stages,10 a religious conveyor-belt
model similar to the one the NYPD has adopted.
Pre-radicalization
During this stage the individual converts to Islam, or an individual who is born Muslim
reinterprets his faith to adhere here to a more extreme form of the religion. The motivating factor
can be internal or external from the influence of a group. The convert can be influenced by
extremists in any number of locations such as mosques, prisons, and internet chat rooms.
Identification
The individual accepts a radical ideology and identifies with a particular extremist cause. He will
also support violent acts against the United States and its allies, but not necessarily feel the need
yet to take action. Overseas travel or continued contact with like-minded individuals can
strengthen his resolve.
Indoctrination
The convert realizes that he must act in order to fulfill the needs of his ideology. The individual
now actively participates in a group or has created a “jihad environment” for himself. He feels
the need to prove himself for a greater cause.
Action
The final stage consists of participation, which can be violent or nonviolent, in a terrorist attack
to inflict damage to the enemy. Each terrorist attack will consist of three stages: preparation,
planning, and execution.
9
Heinke, Daniel and Ryan Hunter. “Radicalization of Islamist Terrorists in the Western World.” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, September 2011.
10
The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad, p. 5-8.
Islam
16
High-ranking FBI officials have verified this definition of radicalization through
congressional testimony. In 2006 Donald Van Duyn, Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI, testified before the House Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Risk Assessment that Islamic radicalization of U.S. persons is a
growing concern.11 However, Van Duyn notes that “the issue is not Islam itself but how the
religious ideology is used by violent extremists to inspire and justify their actions.”
As I have stated earlier, understanding definitions are critical because they will shape
policy. In order to prevent radicalization from progressing to the final stage, the definitions and
conceptualizations of what constitutes indicators of radicalization will be important in shaping
counter-radicalization policy. For example, a preliminary list of indicators that the FBI has
assembled to identify an individual undergoing radicalization include behavior such as growing
facial hair, wearing traditional Muslim attire, and frequent attendance at a mosque or prayer
group.12 These indicators seem to conflict with the Obama administration’s goal to separate
strong religious beliefs from radicalization. The policy ramifications in defining indicators in this
way will be explored in Chapter 4.
3)
Los Angeles Police Department
The Los Angeles Police Department has taken a more moderate approach towards
defining radicalization with respect to the other law enforcement agencies. For example, the
LAPD has established a partnership with DHS to create a strategy to counter violent
extremism.13 The LAPD has taken great precaution in dealing with its Muslim communities to
11
Van Duyn, Donald. Islamic Radicalization: Testimony Before the Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives, One
Hundred Ninth Congress, Hearing Held September 20, 2006. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2006.
12
The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad, p. 10.
13
Downing, Michael P. The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Extremism: Testimony Before the
Committee on Homeland Security, Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 30,
2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007.
Islam
17
avoid alienating them, arguably more so than the NYPD and FBI. However, its leaders have not
shied away from understanding the threat in terms of Islamic ideology. Before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Michael Downing, commanding
officer of the Counter-terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the LAPD, testified that the
problem we face in the U.S. is that of “political jihadists,” individuals who seek to create discord
in the community and a sense of alienation of Muslims to in order to further a political cause.14
Downing notes that the LAPD has been successful in helping magnify the moderate Muslim
voice to prevent extremists from gaining support within the Muslim community, thereby
suppressing radicalization. Given Downing’s statements, we can conclude that the LAPD, like
the NYPD, has not shied away from identifying the Islamic origin of its counter-radicalization
policy, although it has taken a much more moderate approach, which is represented in its policies
that are discussed in Chapter 4.
These major local law enforcement agencies have clearly noted the Islamic influence in
the radicalization process. They identify what they call jihadi ideology adapted from Salafi or
Wahhabi Islamic teachings to be the underlying impetus for radicalization. Although there is
consistency among local law enforcement, the same cannot be said between the federal
government and local government.
Federal Government
1)
The Obama White House
The White House has not named any specific religious ideology as the driving force
behind violent extremism other than to mention violent extremist attacks are directed or inspired
by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In the Obama administration’s counter-radicalization strategy, a
14
Ibid.
Islam
18
violent extremist is an individual who supports or commits ideologically motivated violence to
further political goals. The individual has reached the point where he or she intends to commit
an act of violence.15 While the White House states that it will work to counter the range of
ideologies that radicalize individuals, the radicalization process is not defined and thus the
administration’s understanding of cognitive radicalization, supporting or adopting violent ideas
without taking the final step to engage in actual violence, is ambiguous.
This is not necessarily the case with local law enforcement. The NYPD clearly states that
while at one time it would have the indicator of an attack be at the point in which a group would
actually plan an attack, now it has shifted its “focus to a much earlier point - a point where we
believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of
radicalization.”16 The LAPD holds a similar stance. Downing reassured the senators during his
testimony that although law enforcement’s ultimate goal is to achieve the loyalty and good
citizenship of Muslim-Americans, the department will not slow down its efforts to “hunt down
and neutralize small numbers of ‘clusters’ on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory.”
Thus the differences between the White House and local law enforcement are twofold: 1)
the Islamic label put on the ideology that drives these individuals to radicalize and 2) the
perception of cognitive radicalization. The latter discrepancy has particularly important policy
ramifications. Since the NYPD intends to identify the point where radicalization begins, the
possibility arises of criminalizing phases of the radicalization process that exist in a gray area,
such as having “militant ideas” but not acting on them. The LAPD also is willing to “neutralize”
individuals on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory, but it remains unclear exactly
where the line is drawn for criminal versus legal behavior in the radicalization process. On the
15
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism In the United States. [Washington, D.C.: Executive
Office of the President], 2011, p. 1.
16
Bhatt, et al., p. 5.
Islam
19
other hand, the Obama administration, which outlines a high-level strategy to counter
radicalization through community engagement and capacity building, is focused on stopping
those who have radicalized to the point where they are willing to commit violence. The White
House takes a much more cautionary approach when dealing with the earlier stages of
radicalization, warning that strong religious beliefs, including nonviolent Salafi ideology, are
protected by the First Amendment and should not be confused with violent extremism.17
2)
The Bush White House
How did the current administration and local law enforcement come to different
definitions of radicalization? Did this divide between the federal government and local law
enforcement always exist? A close look at the counter-terrorism strategies of the Bush
administration and the Obama administration shows a transition in the conceptualization of
radicalization and homegrown terrorism. The national security strategy and national strategy for
combating terrorism released by the Bush administration in 2006 highlight the threat of Islamic
violent extremism, and state that democracies like the United States are not immune to
homegrown terrorism, as was shown by the July 7 bombings in London by Muslim British
nationals.18 The Bush administration had no reservations about defining the problem as one with
Islamic roots. Although President Bush has stated numerous times the need to separate terrorism
from the faith of Islam, the administration still defined violent extremism as Islamic, perpetrated
by individuals “who hate what America stands for.”19
The Obama administration has not been willing to take the same approach when it comes
to the radicalization concept. President Obama made it a point from the very beginning of his
presidency to reassure Muslims at home and abroad that his administration will seek a new way
17
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, p. 8.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President], 2006, p. 10.
19
Khan, Suhail A. “American’s First Muslim President.” Foreign Policy, August 23, 2010, p. 1.
18
Islam
20
forward with the Muslim world.20 In his 2011 State of the Union address, Obama reassured
Muslim Americans that although extremists will try to inspire acts of violence, the strength of
our communities would provide the resolve to respond.21 Moreover he noted that Muslim
Americans are part of the American family, attempting to counter the atmosphere of alienation
that Muslim Americans have felt since 9/11, with a majority stating in Pew polls conducted in
2007 and 2011 that practicing their faith has been more difficult since 9/11.22
The shift in terminology from the Bush administration the Obama administration begets
the question: why was there not a similar shift in terminology with local law enforcement? The
FBI, although operates locally, is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice, a federal
government agency – why did they not restructure their definition of radicalization? The answer
is not completely clear. Although local law enforcement agencies like the NYPD receive federal
funding dollars, they largely operate autonomously. For example, some of the controversial
domestic surveillance programs the NYPD has used, described in detail in Chapter 4, elicited no
comment from the Obama administration, although other politicians including the New Jersey
governor and members of Congress have criticized the NYPD for these programs.23 Moreover,
although the Bush administration finished its two terms and ended its control of the White
House, the head of the FBI that President Bush appointed and the head of the NYPD continued
to lead their respective organizations. Robert Mueller, who has been FBI Director since
September 4, 2001, has addressed the threat of Islamic radicalization during the tenure of the
Obama administration and Raymond Kelly, NYPD Commissioner since 2002, has vigorously
20
Obama, Barack. A Moment In History: the Inauguration of Barack Obama. [United States]: MPI Home Video,
2009.
21
Obama, Barack. Presidential Address Before a Joint Session of Congress: Message From the President of the
United States Transmitting the President's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress On the State of the
Union. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.
22
Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Terrorism. Pew Research Center, August
30, 2011.
23
DeFalco, Beth. “Chris Christie Criticizes NYPD Surveillance Secrecy.” Huffington Post, February 29, 2012.
Islam
21
defended his clandestine programs targeted at the American Muslim community. Thus, although
officials have not explicitly made comments about why they did not solely adopt the Obama
administration’s violent extremism, we can reasonably say that the leadership of the law
enforcement agencies likely had important effect on the decision to continue to use Bush-era
terminology. Moreover, both Bush, who appointed Mueller, and Michael Bloomberg, who
appointed Kelly, were Republicans, highlighting the partisan divide that exists on the issue
between Republicans in the Bush administration and Democrats in the Obama administration.24
3)
Department of Homeland Security
In addition to the White House, the other major federal players in the homegrown
terrorism arena are the FBI, Congress, and the Department of Homeland Security. DHS, created
after 9/11 with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, has been charged with the
principal task of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States.25 Unsurprisingly, the
department’s definitions of the problem have fluctuated with the administration in the White
House. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes numerous times that the
United States is not immune to the threat of “Islamic extremist radicalization” within its own
borders.26 During the Obama administration’s term, with the introduction of the violent
extremism terminology, the Department of Homeland Security has been more cautionary about
assigning an Islamic label to describe radicalization. John Cohen, the head of the program on
countering violent extremism, has stated that his organization is not even interested in the
“radicalization label” and questions the utility of using terms like “jihadist” or “Islamist,” which
24
Although Bloomberg won his latest mayoral campaign as an Independent, he was a member of the Republican
Party from 2001 to 2007. See Chan, Sewell. “Bloomberg Leaving Republican Party.” New York Times, June 19,
2007.
25
Homeland Security Act of 2002: Report Together with Minority and Dissenting Views (to Accompany H.R. 5005)
(including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). [Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2002.
26
National Strategy for Homeland Security [Washington, D.C.: The White House], 2007, p. 6.
Islam
22
have different interpretations for different people.27 DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has made
limited use of the Islamist term, instead referring to it as Al-Qaeda’s ideology and underscoring
the point that “violent extremism isn’t constrained by international borders, or by any single
ideology.”28 Moreover, ethnicity, religion, or cultural background does not explain why certain
individuals chose to go down a violent path and commit acts of terrorism.
4)
Congress
Much of the hype around radicalization has actually not come from the executive branch
of the federal government, but rather from Congress. The fact that there are so many members of
Congress with different views on homeland security makes it difficult for any uniform definition
of radicalization to emerge. In April of 2007, Jane Harman, a California Democrat, introduced a
bill to set up a commission to study violent radicalization. The bill did not make any reference to
Islamic ideology - instead it defined violent extremism as “adopting or promoting an extremist
belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political,
religious, or social change.”29 Although Harman’s bill never made it to a Senate vote because of
the controversy surrounding setting up a national commission to study radicalization, Peter King,
a New York Republican, would later set up his own set of hearings in March 2011 specifically
focused on the radicalization of Muslim Americans, and investigating their contribution to
prevent radicalization in their community. King emphasizes that political correctness is what is
holding federal officials back from condemning Al-Qaeda inspired radicalization as Islamic
27
Stone, Andrea. “Counter-terrorism Czar Resists Muslim Labels, As Critics Say Right-Wing Threat Looms
Larger.” Huffington Post, November 17, 2011.
28
Napolitano, Janet. “How DHS is Countering Violent Extremism.” Homeland Security Blog, August 8, 2011.
29
Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007: Report (to Accompany H.R. 1955)
(including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). [Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2007].
Islam
23
radicalization, advocating for the government to make the link between Islamic ideology and
violent actions taken by Muslims.30
As I have shown above, the major players in government domestic counter-radicalization
policy are prominent local law enforcement agencies like the LAPD, FBI and NYPD and federal
government entities like the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, and Congress.
However, these policy actors do not seem to have a consistent definition and conceptualization
of radicalization. The primary point of disagreement is in characterizing the root ideology in
violent extremism – should we describe it simply as Al-Qaeda’s ideology, or can it be traced to
Islamic schools of thought and called jihadist, Salafist, Islamist, or Islamic? The number of terms
is numerous, but that in no way aids in creating a consistent policy. While the White House and
Department of Homeland Security seem to characterize radicalization emanating from the
Muslim community solely as violent extremism, the FBI and law enforcement agencies go
further and describe the root of the problem to be radical Islamic ideology. Various members of
Congress have defined and tried to investigate radicalization in terms of their own political
ideologies, and so it is expected that there is no uniformity in Congress’ conceptualization of the
issue. But what about the discrepancy in definition between the Obama administration and local
law enforcement? Although President Obama has outlined a very high level strategy that
discards an Islamic label for radicalization and homegrown terrorism, is this conceptualization of
radicalization simply impractical when local governments craft policy towards their Muslim
communities? Or is law enforcement simply worsening the problem by alienating the Muslim
community using definitions and terms that mischaracterize their religion?
30
Compilation of Hearings On Islamist Radicalization: Hearings Before the Committee On Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 10, June 15, and July 27,
2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
Islam
24
Debate Outside of Government
1)
Scholars
Scholars have also been trying to define the concept of radicalization. Clark McCauley
and Sophia Moskalenko state that it is too simple to conclude that violent extremism from the
Muslim community is a product of Islamic extremism that is associated with Wahhabism and
Salafism. Moreover, most Wahhabists and Salafists do not support terrorism. For example,
Saudia Arabia is the bastion of Wahhabism and the government has an extensive counterradicalization program to combat extremism. Salafi Muslims adhere to a strict interpretation to
the Qur’an – Islam as it was practiced centuries ago, and most aim to rid themselves of the
material connections of the world.31 McCauley and Moskalenko also emphasize that ideas are
not the same as action. Although millions of Muslims abroad are shown to sympathize with
Islamic extremist goals in polls, the number of Muslim terrorists is nowhere near that order of
magnitude.
Scholars on the other end of the spectrum have advocated for the federal government to
take a stronger position on ideology, especially in regards to the different schools of Islamic
thought. If the government perceives one school of Islamic thought to be more in tune with
American ideals, should it intervene in ideological and theological matters by supporting the
most “American” Islamic ideology against ideologies that are perceived to be dangerous and
contributing to radicalization? Lorenzo Vidino argues that the U.S. government should be
prepared to engage itself in this ideological debate in order to “find ways to counter the
theological message of violent extremism,” but to tread carefully because of potential
31
McCauley, Clark R, and Sophia Moskalenko. Friction : How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Islam
25
backfires.32 Peter Neumann also espouses this viewpoint; he notes that “it might be appropriate
to challenge the group and its ideology directly and aggressively.”33 If Salafism is the ideology
primarily responsible for radicalization, then by their reasoning the government should define
radicalization to have roots in that ideology in order to discredit that ideology. However, there
may be serious potential for conflicts if the government is perceived to be supporting one
interpretation of religion over another, which raises legal issues of constitutionality.
2)
Muslim Community Response
One common point made in the strategies of all the major players has been the need to
the engage the Muslim community in order to create a successful counter-radicalization program.
What kind of response has the debate over the conceptualization of radicalization elicited from
Muslim Americans? After the publication of the NYPD’s radicalization report, the Muslim
American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) released a counter report addressing the civil
liberties implications in the NYPD document. The organization criticized the report for
presenting “a distorted and misleading depiction of Islam and its adherents” and urged the NYPD
to use the term “violent extremist” in its analysis on terrorism instead of Islamic religious
terminology like “jihadist” and mujahedeen,” in order to decouple religion from terrorism.34
After the publication of the FBI’s 2006 report on the radicalization process, numerous
organizations, including the Muslim Public Affairs Council and the Center for Constitutional
Rights co-signed a letter with the American Civil Liberties Union addressed to FBI director
Robert Mueller, urging him to review the document for its anti-Muslim bias and factual
32
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe.” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 262, 2010, p. 11.
33
Neumann, Peter. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011, p. 8.
34
Ali, Faiza N., and Sara Sayeed. “CountERRORism Policy: MACLC’s Critique of the NYPD’s Report on
Homegrown Radicalization.” Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition. 2008, p. 7.
Islam
26
inaccuracies.35 The co-signers also note that “the FBI report is wholly inconsistent with the 2011
White House strategy to prevent extremist violence.”36 It is clear that the Muslim community
and its allies are extremely wary of Islamic terminology in the radicalization dialogue, and
clearly support the Obama administration’s “violent extremism” terminology as a more
appropriate label to discuss the process of radicalization and homegrown terrorism.
3)
Civil Rights Groups
As noted above, civil rights groups have partnered with Muslim communities to demand
the government to restructure its definitions of radicalization without including any, in their
perspective, Muslim bias. For example, the ACLU has criticized the FBI for controversial
material used to train agents that describes Islam as a cult and inherently violent political
ideology that forms the basis for terrorism.37 Civil rights organizations have not only criticized
the mischaracterization of Islam in the government’s definitions, but also the extreme focus put
on American Muslims when other types of domestic terrorism are just as prevalent. For example,
the Southern Poverty Law Center has criticized Peter’s King’s radicalization hearings as
mischaracterizing the threat in terms of only Muslims when extremist groups on the right have
allegedly been increasing and posing just as great of a threat.38
Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been to characterize the government’s conceptualization of
radicalization. I have identified the major government players in domestic counter-radicalization
policy, including the White House, Congress, DHS, and local law enforcement agencies. As I
35
Letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller Regarding Radicalization. American Civil Liberties Union. October 4,
2011, p. 1.
36
Ibid., p. 3.
37
“ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI’s Use of Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim Counterterrorism Training Materials.”
American Civil Liberties Union, October 2011.
38
Potok, Mark. “Why Are Peter King’s Hearings So Loathsome? Let Us Count the Ways.” Southern Poverty Law
Center Hatewatch, March 8, 2011.
Islam
27
have shown, the government lacks a clear and consistent definition of radicalization. The
primary discrepancy is in describing radicalization as having roots in Islamic ideology. Local law
enforcement agencies generally perceive a strong link between extreme Islamic views and
violence while agencies of the Obama federal government see weak links. For example, as noted
by the letter sent to Robert Mueller by the ACLU, the FBI’s conceptualization of radicalization
seems to be in conflict with Obama’s strategy because it defines Islamic ideology to be the
source of the problem and it uses physical attributes of strong religious belief as indicators for
radicalization. I have also shown that there has been a shift in terminology from the Bush
administration to the Obama administration. While the Bush administration was more
comfortable with characterizing radicalization as Islamic, the Obama administration has shied
away from doing in an effort to make the Muslim community feel less alienated. The reader will
now have an understanding of the internal dynamics within the government in conceptualizing
radicalization, and be more aptly able to consider a pivotal question that will be discussed in the
subsequent chapters: how can the US government create an effective counter-radicalization
policy
Islam
28
Chapter 3: Radicalization on the Agenda
In the previous chapter I discussed the inconsistencies between the federal government
and local law enforcement in defining radicalization. In Chapter 4 I will analyze how this
discrepancy in definition is manifested in policy differences between the federal and local levels.
In this chapter I will investigate not the source of radicalization itself, but the source of its
ascension to the national public policy agenda. To accomplish this investigation, I will look at
the narrative of events surrounding radicalization. Radicalization, particularly Islamic
radicalization, was not always on the public policy agenda. The current literature has included
the debate surrounding counter-radicalization and the policies to enforce it, but there is a gap in
the literature in how exactly radicalization came to the public policy agenda in the first place. I
will argue that the 2005 London bombing was the turning point in U.S. domestic terrorism
history that brought radicalization onto the agenda and elevated the perceived threat of
homegrown extremism from the American Muslim community. Moreover, although
radicalization can at worst be considered a limited problem, the sensitivity the public has
developed towards Islamist terrorism after September 11 and the potentially catastrophic effects
of a successful terrorist attack make it unlikely that radicalization will descend from the public
policy agenda.
Theory of Agenda-Setting
In order to understand how radicalization came onto the agenda, we need to understand
how issues generally are placed on the U.S. policy agenda. Kingdon’s model of agenda setting
will provide the theoretical basis for understanding the agenda setting process. Kingdon defines
the agenda as the list of subjects or issues that government officials and people outside of
government working with those officials are paying serious attention to at any given time. Three
Islam
29
sets of variables – problems, policies, and politics – interact to determine what gets on the
agenda.1 Kingdon defines the problem stream as “the perceptions of problems as public issues
requiring government action.”2 The policy stream consists of analysts examining problems and
proposing solutions, and the political stream encompasses everything from the public mood to
interest group campaigns. Agenda-setting opportunities, called policy windows, open and close
based on the interaction of these three streams. These windows can result from focusing events
such as crises, accidents, or scandals. Policy entrepreneurs, as Kingdon calls them, take
advantage of open policy windows to advocate for issues they would like to see placed on the
policy agenda.
Deborah Stone builds on Kingdon’s model by highlighting the importance of the framing
of issues. Stone stratifies her theory into three strands, similar to Kingdon. The first strand
focuses on the characteristics of the actors making policy, including politicians, interest groups,
and bureaucrats. In analyzing the policymakers’ characteristics, Stone looks at personal attributes
such as attitude as well as their available resources to understand how they can bring issues to
the agenda. The second strand focuses on the nature of the problems themselves, whether they
are grave or moderate, have economic or health consequences, or are temporary or long-term.
This strand, by characterizing the problem and its consequences, determines whether the problem
will reach a broader audience. The third strand focuses on the framing of the issue – the use of
symbols, narratives, metaphors, and language to ascend the issue onto the public policy agenda
or keep it off.3
1
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984, p. 20.
Ibid.
3
Stone, Deborah A. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political Science Quarterly 104(2):
281-300, 1989, p. 281-282.
2
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30
Thomas Birkland further developed the idea of sudden and unpredictable events, called
focusing events, influencing the agenda setting process. Birkland argues that regardless of the
specifics of the event, a large event, such as an oil spill, a plane crash, or earthquake induces
similar patterns of individual and group responses. The news media frames the event and
dramatic footage is aired of people or property effected. In the aftermath of the event, the news
media focuses its attention on the individuals, including government officials, academic experts,
and industry leaders, who can explain the cause of the event. Gathering its information from the
news media, the public’s attention subsequently turns to how the aftermath of the event will be
handled, whether by aiding the victims of a natural disaster or punishing those culpable for a
manmade tragedy, possibly through government legislation.4
Birkland provides examples of past focusing events that had major effects on the public
policy process, such as the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989. A year after the spill the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 was passed in reaction. The oil spill helped to dramatize the problem of oil pollution
and bring it to the top of the agenda. Without it, Birkland contends the fourteen-year-long
gridlock over comprehensive oil spill legislation would have likely continued until some other
event incentivized Congress to take rapid action on the problem.5 Although all focusing events
do not necessarily spur immediate policy action, they can grab the policymakers’ attention with
the right mix of political entrepreneurs.
The starting point of chronological events that brought radicalization and homegrown
terrorism to the agenda will be the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although there were incidents of
terrorism related to Islamist extremism in the United States before this time, 9/11 marks a major
4
Birkland, Thomas A. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1997, p. 2.
5
Ibid., p. 3.
Islam
31
turning point where terrorism soared to the top of the public policy agenda. Thus the policy,
problem and political streams that existed from 9/11 to the current time will be investigated to
determine when and how radicalization came to be an integral part of the national
counterterrorism agenda, a phenomenon that has not been thoroughly investigated in the existing
literature. I will highlight significant events that occurred in the history of domestic terrorism
since 9/11 that have had major impact in the ascension of radicalization on the agenda and
explain why others have not. In the events where plots are considered, I chose to consider the
plots that consisted of a significant group of people and elicited the most government and media
reaction, which is likely to have the greatest impact in bringing radicalization to the agenda.
2001 Lackawanna Six6
Six months before the 9/11 attacks had elevated Islam to the public discussion and
Islamic extremism to the public policy agenda, six Yemeni-American childhood friends traveled
to Afghanistan to attend an al-Qaeda training camp. The media dubbed the group the
“Lackawanna Six” after the town just south of Buffalo they called home. The men’s trip to
Afghanistan was first brought to the attention to law enforcement by an anonymous handwritten
letter sent to the FBI building in Buffalo. The sole FBI agent specializing in foreign
counterterrorism brought up the issue to the chain of command, but at that time, months before
9/11, it seemed implausible that Osama bin Laden would be targeting Americans for recruitment.
After 9/11, the “driving goal of the government was to find the next sleeper cell before it
struck.”7 The case was so important to law enforcement and the CIA that President Bush was
receiving regular updates about the men, then under surveillance by the FBI. The men were
6
Although the Lackawanna Six plot developed before the September 11 attacks, this case is still considered in the
timeline of events because it represents an early case in which American citizens were involved in a terrorist plot.
Moreover, the arrest, trials, and discussion surrounding the group began in 2002.
7
Bergman, Lowell and Matthew Purdy. “Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case.” New York Times.
Oct 12 2003.
Islam
32
never found to be planning an attack, but the FBI had enough evidence to arrest them for
providing material support to Al-Qaeda by training at a terrorist camp. They were indicted and
received up to 10 years of prison each.
The Lackawanna Six case was an important one in the history of domestic terrorism in
the United States. President Bush even lauded the capture of the Al-Qaeda sleeper cell in his
State of the Union address. But while the Lackawanna Six did raise the issue of Al-Qaeda
recruitment to prominence, policymakers and law enforcement were not talking about
radicalization or homegrown terrorism – they instead described the phenomenon as sleeper cells.
These men, although all American citizens and some even American-born, were not considered
to be “radicalized” individuals but instead an Al-Qaeda cell that wanted to commit another attack
on American soil. Radicalization did not come under the radar of the federal government, even
though they received briefings about the case. The Bush administration’s 2003 strategy on
combating terrorism has no mention of radicalization or homegrown terrorism. While it does
emphasize the need to identify and locate terrorist organizations operating abroad and at home,8
there is no indication that the National Security Council at that point in time had in mind the
threat of U.S. citizens or residents undergoing a process of radicalization and committing violent
attacks. Although in later reports, after radicalization become a commonly used term, the
Lackawanna Six case was used as an example of radicalization, the literature at that time does
not show any indication of the government being concerned about American citizens or residents
undergoing a process of radicalization and committing terrorist attacks. Dina Temple-Raston
notes in her investigative analysis of the Lackawanna Six plot that the six men were known as
8
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President], 2003, p. 16.
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“America’s first homegrown al-Qaeda cell,”9 indicating that at the time the notion of Al-Qaeda
sleeper cells trumped any fear of Islamist radicalization.
2002 Portland Seven
Less than three weeks after the September 11 attacks, three men, a Jordanian-born legal
resident and two American citizens, were reported to the FBI by a Skamania County deputy
sheriff after he found them engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit near Washougal,
Washington. A year later the three men and two others were indicted on multiple charges of
aiding and attempting to join Al-Qaeda. Another pair, Maher Hawash and October Lewis, was
later charged in lesser crimes relating to aiding the original group of five men. A majority of the
men were either U.S. born or naturalized American citizens. However, the Americans were not
considered to have undergone a process of radicalization. John Ashcroft, then U.S. Attorney
General described the Portlanders as terrorist cell members.10 Radicalization was not a concept
the government considered in the context of Islamist groups. Moreover, tension and suspicion
had developed regarding Muslim communities after 9/11, but the focus at that time was not on
radicalization, but sleeper cells already in the United States. In his 2002 State of the Union
address, President Bush warned of individuals who are like “ticking time bombs” and could go
off without warning.11 At the time, the perspective was shaped by Al-Qaeda cells already in the
United States waiting for an opportune time to attack.
9
Temple-Raston, Dina. The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror: The Jihad Next Door.
PublicAffairs, New York (2007).
10
Budnick, Nick. “The Making of a ‘Terrorist.’” Willamette Week, October 16, 2002.
11
Bush, George W. State of the Union Message: Message From the President of the United States Transmitting a
Report On the State of the Union. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2002.
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34
2004 Madrid Bombings
Three days before the 2004 general elections in Spain, multiple coordinated explosions
simultaneously went off in its commuter train system, killing 191 people and wounding more
than 1800.12 Although at first ETA, the Basque separatist group, was believed to be responsible,
the true culprits turned out to be a group of mostly Moroccan men, using explosives stuffed into
sports bags. The government and the news media at the time continued to use the term Al-Qaeda
sleeper cell to describe the individuals culpable. The Wall Street Journal describes the men as a
new breed of Islamic holy warrior, called Takfiris. The Takfiri movement was supposedly
strongest in Morocco and Algeria, and its members recruit women for acts of terrorism and adopt
a Western profile, exempting them from traditional Islamic practices in order to keep a low
profile and avoid detection.13 The New York Times reported that American officials noted “the
attack might fit a new model in which local Islamic extremist groups, perhaps only loosely
affiliated with Al Qaeda, might carry out attacks without the direct coordination of Qaeda
leaders.”14 The American media was concerned about Al-Qaeda and its affiliates entering
countries or established cells rising up to commit terrorist attacks, but again there is no indication
of discussions of radicalization. Instead the attacks are framed similarly to the modus operandi of
the 9/11 attackers, characterized as a foreign, or in this case Moroccan, terrorist threat.
The Madrid bombings represented less of an indication of an emerging homegrown
terrorism threat than a further warning signal to government officials about Al-Qaeda sleeper
cells existing in their country. The threat, rather than originating internally, was perceived to
12
"Terror in Madrid: Train Bombs Kill at Least 190 in Spain; Basque Group Or Al Qaeda is Suspected in Attack on
a Staunch U.S. Ally; Sowing Fear on Eve of Election." Wall Street Journal: A.1. ABI/INFORM Global, Mar 12,
2004.
13
"New Breed of Islamic Warrior is Emerging; Evidence in Madrid Attack Points to Takfiris, Who use Immigration
as a Weapon." Wall Street Journal: A.16. ABI/INFORM Global. Mar 29 2004.
14
Golden, Tim and David Johnston. “Officials Tending to Blame Qaeda for Madrid Attack.” New York Times,
March 16, 2004.
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35
have foreign roots. After the suspected Moroccans were arrested, officials in Morocco and Spain
looked for a link between suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in both countries, with the possibility
that terrorists were funneled to Spain to attack Western targets. Jamal Zougam, one of the main
suspects in the bombings, had traveled to Morocco just weeks before the attack, indicating a
similarity with the Lackawanna case of travel to the country that was the source for the terror.
The Madrid bombers, like the Lackawanna Six group, were strongly affiliated with a foreign
terrorist organization. The domestic response in the United States to the bombings was hearings
to address the critical transportation infrastructure in the US and its susceptibility to terrorist
attack. Using Kingdon’s framework, while there may have been policy entrepreneurs (the
policymakers themselves in this case) bringing the issue of transit security to the agenda, there
was no such equivalent for radicalization or homegrown terrorism because the perception of
these issues framed in this manner did not exist at the time. As I have shown, the news media
had not portrayed these terrorist acts and plots as cases of Islamic radicalization up until this time
– the terminology simply did not exist in the mainstream dialogue and discussions of government
officials and news media. Instead the focus was on Al-Qaeda sleeper cells already established in
the country. We will see that the London bombings provided the catalyst for change.
2005 London Bombings
The London bombings represented the first perceived case of homegrown terrorism and a
major turning point in the history of domestic counterterrorism. On the morning of July 7, 2005,
there was a coordinated attack of suicide bombs on London’s public transit system during rush
hour traffic. Fifty-two people were killed, and over 700 people injured15 in the worst terrorist
attacks on London soil. The four suicide bombers were among the dead, but this time the
15
"Britains First Suicide-Bombing?" Economist.com / News Analysis Jul 12 2005: 1-. ABI/INFORM Global;
ProQuest Research Library.
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36
perpetrators were not members of a sleeper cell – they were all British-born citizens that were
not proven to be part of a larger terrorist network. Although two of the four bombers made a trip
to Pakistan a year before the attack, they did not participate in any terrorist training camps. The
profiles of the men do not indicate they were susceptible to terrorism. Two of them were married
with children and only Germaine Lindsay, the convert and Russell Square bomber, openly
showed support for Al-Qaeda before the attacks. These men, compared to the terrorist cells law
enforcement was investigating, seemed rather unremarkable. Like the Lackawanna Six, the
Madrid bombers were young Muslim men with families and jobs. However, these men did not
have explicit connections to worldwide terror networks. Moreover, unlike the Lackawanna Six,
these men were extremely successful in their plot.
Using Kingdon and Stone’s framework of agenda setting, we can see that the importance
of framing here is particularly relevant in comparing the London bombings to the Madrid
bombings. The news media and politicians framed the Madrid bombings as a foreign threat while
the London bombings were perceived as a “homegrown” phenomenon. Indeed, afterwards
Londoners tried to make sense of the bombings by looking at factors that might have encouraged
the attacks. In the United States, the news media reported that there was shock in London over
investigators’ discovery that the bombings were the work of homegrown suicide bombers.16 The
media framed it as a “stunning twist,” something unexpected that did not have any strong
precedent. Although there were reports grouping the Madrid and London attacks as terrorist
attacks by “homegrown jihadists,”17 the international news media in 2004 was not using such a
term – only after were these previous cases considered examples of homegrown terrorism.
16
Analysis: Shock Over the News that Last Weeks Bombings in London were the Work of Homegrown Suicide
Bombers. Washington, D.C., United States, Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio, 2005.
17
Hegland, Corine. "Counter-Terrorism at the Crossroads." National Journal Jul 16 2005: 2260-5.
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37
Moreover, as I have shown above, there were simply no indications within the United States
government in 2004 that the Madrid bombings had created concern over average United States
citizens, not tied to terrorist networks, committing terrorist attacks. The London bombings
completely changed this perception.
The United States and Great Britain were already strong allies at the time, with the
British committing troops to both the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns to capture Osama bin
Laden and dispose Saddam Hussein of alleged weapons of mass destruction. After the bombings,
the FBI provided British investigators with intelligence aid, sending a list of names of suspects in
the bombings. Tony Blair and George Bush had a strong relationship, especially with regards to
how to deal with the War on Terror. Thus it is not surprising that Blair’s rhetoric would have a
resounding effect on the perception of domestic terrorism in Washington. Shortly after initial
discoveries were made, Blair noted that although the men had acted in the name of Islam, the
majority of British Muslims, described as decent, peaceful people, did not support their actions.
Blair made an effort to the separate the attacks from the religion of Islam, as he perceived the
majority of Muslims in the country practiced it. However, he did not shy away from identifying
the attacks as Islamic in nature, stating that the threat from homegrown Islamic terrorism would
last a generation.18 The head of MI5 domestic intelligence agency, Dame Elizabeth
Manningham-Buller, reinforced the prime minister’s message. She stated that individuals were
moving from passive support for terrorism to active terrorism through “being radicalized or
indoctrinated” by friends, families, the news media, and the internet.19
Although radicalization and homegrown terrorism were clearly on the public policy
agenda in Great Britain, was the same true in the United States? The Madrid bombings did not
18
Cowell, Alan. "Blair Says Homegrown Terrorism is Generation-Long Struggle." New York Times (1923-Current
file): A6. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008). Nov 11 2006.
19
Ibid.
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spur any legislative or policy action that incorporated radicalization. A close look at how the
national security strategies of the United States changed afterwards show the effect of the
London bombings. The national security strategy and national strategy for combating terrorism
released by the Bush administration in 2006 highlight the threat of Islamic violent extremism,
and state that democracies like the United States are not immune to homegrown terrorism, as was
shown by the July 7 bombings in London by Muslim British nationals.20 Thus the Bush
administration, emulating the Blair administration, become a policy entrepreneur and helped
bring Islamic radicalization to the policy agenda.
Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007
By April 2007, violent extremism was already on the pubic policy agenda in terms of
strategy, but Jane Harman, Democratic representative of California’s 36th district, decided there
was a need to increase the government’s understanding of radicalization. Harman decided action
needed to be taken to better understand the homegrown terrorism phenomenon. She sponsored
and introduced a bill on April 19, 2007, aptly named the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007. The stated purpose of the bill was to prevent violent
radicalization and ideologically based violence in the United States. According to the bill’s
committee report submitted by Representative Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, there were a
number of hearings on radicalization held before the bill was introduced that influenced
Harman’s decision to pursue the legislation. For example, on April 5, Haman’s Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment held a field hearing in
Torrance, California and heard testimony from a variety of scholars and officials in the counterradicalization field. They included William Bratton, chief of police of the LAPD and Brian
20
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President], 2006, p. 10.
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Jenkins, senior advisor at the RAND Corporation.21 The Center for Constitutional Rights, a nonprofit legal advocacy organization, notes that the bill’s inspiration were homegrown terrorism
incidents such as the Oklahoma City bombing, the 2005 plot to bomb synagogues in Los
Angeles, and the foiled car bomb plot at Los Angeles International Airport. Moreover, Harman
had a close relationship with the RAND Corporation, and experts from RAND such as Jenkins,
who has emphasized the threat of radicalization, seem to have influenced her decision to pursue
the legislation.22
The bill itself allocated funds to create a grant program for the study of radicalization and
homegrown terrorism prevention, a national commission, and a standard for cooperation with
other nations.23 The bill is significant in the timeline of homegrown terrorism because it marks
the first time actual legislation was created to try to better understand radicalization. The policy
opportunity window was wide open after the 2005 London bombings to increase understanding
and reform the government’s domestic counterterrorism policy, creating a problem stream that
was very important to members of the House Committee on Homeland Security. The policy
stream also came together because Congressional findings had determined there was a need to
investigate the process of radicalization, and setting up a commission to analyze this problem
could provide a solution. However, the politics stream did not provide as much of a clear path for
radicalization to get on the legislative agenda.
The bill passed the House with an overwhelming majority, but by the time it had reached
the Senate there was already a political fallout with civil rights groups that were concerned with
the danger to civil liberties that the bill could lead to. For example, the American Civil Liberties
21
Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007: Report (to Accompany H.R. 1955)
(including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). [Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.], 2007.
“Factsheet: The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007.” Center for
Constitutional Rights, 2007.
23
Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007.
22
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Union (ACLU) contested that the bill would cause law enforcement to focus on thought, and not
action.24 This could then lead to unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and belief. The
concerns raised by the ACLU were enough that once the bill reached the Senate, it never made it
onto the floor for a vote and died in committee. The death of the Homegrown Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2007 underscores the fact that although homegrown terrorism and
radicalization were on the public policy agenda, there was still tension among the political
entrepreneurs who wanted to investigate it further and those who wanted to take it off the
agenda. However, although the legislation failed, the Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act
underscores the government’s first attempt to pass legislation investigating homegrown terrorism
and radicalization, securing its place on the legislative agenda.
2007-2011 Homegrown Terror Cases
In the years after radicalization had come onto the agenda, the perception of the threat
compounded in the years between 2007 and 2011 because of the apparent surge in the number of
homegrown terror cases, especially in the years 2009 and 2010. While radicalization came onto
the agenda with the London bombings in 2005 and Congressional investigations into
radicalization started in 2007, the large number of cases in these critical years reinforced its place
on the agenda. For example, in this period there were a significant amount of cases of SomaliAmericans returning to their ethnic roots and joining Al-Shabab, a U.S. designated terrorist
organization.25 The peak in cases in 2009 served to frame the importance of the problem and
only widen the opportunity timeline for radicalization to stay on the agenda. Political
entrepreneurs in the government like Representative Peter King and Senator Joe Lieberman used
24
“ACLU Statement on the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007.” American
Civil Liberties Union. Nov 28 2007.
25
For the full list of Somali cases, see “Joining the Fight in Somalia.” New York Times, October 30, 2011. Available
at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html.
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those cases as justification for investigating radicalization and homegrown extremism through
congressional hearings to make sure the issue continued to stay on the national agenda.
2011 Peter King Radicalization Hearings
The years 2009 and 2010 saw a surge in the number of homegrown terrorism cases.
There was the case of Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S. army psychiatrist who became radicalized
through interactions with the now deceased radical imam Anwar Al-Awlaki. He shot and killed
12 U.S. soldiers and 1 civilian employee, and wounded 32 others in a shooting at Fort Hood,
Texas,26 the worst shooting ever to take place on a US military base. A little more than a month
later, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, better known by his media-designated pseudonym as the
Underwear Bomber, tried to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear while on board a plane
to Detroit from Amsterdam.27 In these two years alone, almost half of all documented cases of
homegrown terrorism occurred.
The large number of cases in those years brought radicalization back to the top of the
public discourse, and Peter King, representative of New York, capitalized on these circumstances
by holding a hearing on March 10, 2011 to investigate Muslim Americans’ contributions in
curtailing radicalization in their community. The hearing was emotionally charged, with
divisions among party lines in drilling witnesses that ultimately resulted in painting a divergent
picture of the Muslim community, with one side claiming that Muslims were ignoring
radicalization while the other contending that Muslims were actively cooperating with law
enforcement.28 King mostly invited speakers that agreed with his perception that the Muslim
26
Campoy, Ana. "U.S. News: Survivors Describe Horror of Shooting at Fort Hood." Wall Street Journal:
A.5. ABI/INFORM Global.Oct 14 2010.
27
Devlin, Barrett. "U.S. Details Underwear Bombers Ties to Yemeni Al Qaeda Leaders." Wall Street Journal
(Online): ABI/INFORM Global. Feb 11 2012.
28
Scott, Shane. “Domestic Terrorism Hearing Opens with Contrasting Views on Dangers.” The New York Times.
Mar 10 2011.
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community needed to do more to prevent radicalization and certain groups like CAIR hindered
this process. For example, Zuhdi Jasser, President of the American Islamic Forum for
Democracy, stressed the dangers of political Islam while Marvin Bledsoe told the story of his
own son’s radicalization that resulted in an attack on a US military recruiting office in Little
Rock, Arkansas.29 Members of Congress not only listened to testimonies, but also actively
participated. Keith Ellison, the first Muslim American elected to Congress, gave a tearful
testimony about contributions Muslim Americans have made to preserving American’s national
security and Representative Sheila Jackson of Texas rebutted King’s allegations of political
correctness surrounding the hearings with angry charges of McCarthyism.30 The King hearing
provide further evidence that since radicalization has come onto the public policy agenda in the
United States, contentious politics has followed it. Although the usefulness of the March 10
hearing31 is a matter of debate, it no doubt has kept radicalization at the forefront of the agenda
and was important in refocusing the public’s attention on the topic.
As I have shown through this series of events, the 2005 London bombings represented a
major turning point in the history of U.S. domestic counterterrorism – the bombings made
“homegrown terrorism” and “radicalization” common language among government officials and
the press. In addition to these two groups, the emergence of radicalization on the agenda has also
engendered a debate between scholars. Radicalization is on the agenda, but should it be? The
literature presents two schools of thought. In one, opponents argue that the government is
exaggerating the terrorist threat and capitalizing on the public’s heightened fear of terrorism after
29
Hearing on the Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response.
Committee On Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March
10, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
30
Stanley, Alessandra. “Terror Hearing Puts Lawmakers in Harsh Light.” New York Times, March 10, 2011.
31
There were subsequent hearings held on radicalization by King’s Committee on Homeland Security on June 10
and July 27 (See Appendix B), but they did not create as much controversy because they did not specifically look at
the American Muslim community’s contribution to preventing radicalization.
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the 9/11 attacks. In the other, although scholars are not as vocal as arguing that radicalization
should be on the agenda, they do emphasize that it is a serious problem that the government has
to deal with.
Scholarly Debate
Ian Lustick contends that while the government has “registered some convictions on
charges of fundraising for foreign groups appearing on its list of terrorist organizations,” there
have been numerous false arrests, failed prosecutions, and de-escalated indictments.32 Lustick
notes one particular example of counterterrorism hyperbole by the federal government in the
departing speech given by Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2005. He claimed that more than
375 people had been charged on terrorism related crimes, with 195 convicted or entering guilty
pleas.33 However, Lustick notes that the Washington Post soon afterwards published a detailed
analysis in which the government’s successes were shown to be overstated – of the 195
convictions, only 39 were actually for terrorism or national security related crimes. Moreover,
the median sentence for those given guilty convictions was just eleven months.34 Lustick lists
several cases of homegrown terrorism brought about by the government that resulted in no
indictments related to terrorism or national security or in some cases, no trials. In one, the FBI
feared two sixteen-year-old girls who were long-term illegal residents of the United States to be
suicide bombers. After six weeks of detention they were quietly released with no trial or charge.
Lustick argues that although there is a terrorist threat to the United States, there is a “strong
32
Lustick, Ian. Trapped In the War On Terror. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p. 44.
Ibid., p. 37.
34
Eggen, Dan and Julie Tate. “U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges.” Washington Post,
June 12, 2005.
33
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desire of government officials to justify the scale of the War on Terror with discoveries of
homegrown threats.”35
David Cole notes that the government has a weak track record at locating domestic
violent Islamist extremists. Since 9/11, even though 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have
been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, 8,000 Arabs and Muslims have been
interviewed by the FBI, and over 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned in preventive
detention facilities, not a single individual from that group stands convicted of a terrorist crime
today, making the government’s record 0 for 93,000.36
Although the Lustick and Cole highlight the dearth of terrorist convictions since 9/11, it
is important to note that their analyses were published in 2006, before the perceived surge in the
number of cases of homegrown terrorism in 2009 and 2010. Thus their analyses are limited by
their time frame. However, their conclusions are still relevant because more recent scholarly
work has reached similar conclusions. For example, Risa Brooks states that “the threat posed by
Muslim homegrown terrorism is not particularly serious, and it does not appear to be growing,
especially in its most lethal incarnation – deadly attacks within the United States.”37 Brooks
argues that although there was a surge of arrests related to homegrown extremism in 2009, they
do not necessarily indicate there has been an increase in radicalization. Brooks provides possible
alternative explanations such as more terrorist offenses coming to official attention because of
aggressive policing, or factors that contributed to the timing of the arrests to result in a large
cluster of arrests – making them an artifact of data rather than of statistical significance.38
35
Lustick, p. 42.
David Cole, “Are We Safer,” New York Review of Books. Volume 53, No. 4 (March 9, 2006), p. 3.
37
Brooks, Risa A. “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?”
International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), p. 42.
38
Ibid., p. 14.
36
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Moreover, Brooks investigates the thesis that Muslim Americans could be more inclined
to participate in terrorist activity in the United States and concludes that existing scholarship on
radicalization and empirical studies “provide only limited guidance to efforts to assess the
prospects for Muslim American terrorism in the United States.”39 Thus current empirical studies
do not allow us to assess whether Muslim American extremism actually exists at a significant
rate, nor do the surge of arrests provide any conclusive evidence of growing radicalization.
Consequently, Brooks argues that Muslim American radicalization is not serious enough to need
to be on the public agenda.
Charles Kurzman argues that Islamist radicalization and homegrown terrorism does not
need to be on the agenda because Islamists have found it very difficult to recruit American
Muslims to join their ranks. Although Al-Qaeda’s leadership has encouraged American Muslims
to attack the United States from within, the numbers show that the American Muslim community
has not responded cooperatively. Kurzman notes that although the government has stressed the
threat of militant Islamists originating in the United States, these claims are exaggerations. From
2001 to 2006 approximately a dozen people were convicted in the U.S. of having links to AlQaeda and fewer than 40 American Muslims committed acts of domestic terrorism.40
Kurzman puts the threat of Islamic extremism into perspective by comparing it with
murders in the United States. Since 9/11, there have been more than 140,000 murders, resulting
in more than 15,000 per year.41 Deaths from Islamist extremists numbered less than three dozen,
less than three-hundredths of a percent of the total. Kurzman attributes the disproportionate
attention given to terrorism by the public because of its dominance in media headlines. The large
39
Ibid., p. 12.
Kurzman, Charles. The Missing Martyrs : Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011, p. 13.
41
Ibid., p. 14.
40
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amount of media coverage of terrorism has given consumers a skewed perspective of the
prevalence of terrorism and a level of fear that is disproportionate to the number of deaths that
result from terrorism. While Kurzman’s comparative numerical analysis may be accurate, it is
limited by the fact that it cannot account for the emotional connection to Islamist attacks that
most Americans have retained since 9/11, which may partly explain the public and government
officials’ preoccupation with terrorism.
John Mueller warns us about the need to be cautious in evaluating the homegrown
terrorist threat. Like some of his fellow opponents to radicalization on the public agenda, Mueller
emphasizes the large amount of money spent on domestic homeland security. Since 9/11, the
cumulative increase in domestic homeland security spending has exceeded $1 trillion. Mueller
alleges that government officials have not applied proper risk assessment and cost-benefit
approaches that have been standard for decades. Moreover, they have engaged in different types
of probability neglect that may inflate the threat of terrorism.42
On the other side of the spectrum, Peter Neumann argues that the threat from al Qaedainspired domestic terrorism is serious. Neumann cites as evidence the surge in radicalization
cases in 2009 and 2010.43 He also bases his analysis of the radicalization threat on a previous
report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group, in which Peter
Bergen and Bruce Hoffman contend that the radicalization threat is “not only diversifying, but
arguably intensifying.”44 Nevertheless, Neumann acknowledges that “experts are right to caution
that the numbers are small and that, overall, the threat from al-Qaeda-inspired homegrown
42
Mueller, John E. Terror, Security, and Money : Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland
Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 2.
43
Neumann, p. 7.
44
Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman. “Assessing the Terrorist Threat.” Bipartisan Policy Center. Sept. 2010, p. 29.
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terrorism remains modest.”45 In the mindset of adequate preparedness he stresses however that
the threat is serious and important enough to evaluate how ready the government is to confront
the challenge., and so it should be n the agenda.
Brian Michael Jenkins asserts that while America is not immune to radicalization and
homegrown terrorism, the number of individuals actually engaging in violence is extremely
minute. Jenkins rejects the idea of sleeper cells still existing in the United States, arguing that the
majority of cases of homegrown terrorism are of individuals whose radicalization was a personal
decision. However, Jenkins states that there are still questions that need to be answered in order
to better understand radicalization, such as the role of conversions and the role of the Internet.
Thus radicalization still needs to be on the agenda of policymakers in order to better understand
the full scope of the threat, even if it remains relatively small.
Mark Hamm notes the prevalence of radicalization in U.S. prisons. Hamm describes
radicalization as a problem unlike any other in history faced by prison administrators. He
conducted a two-year study of trends in prisoner radicalization, composed of an extensive
literature review, 140 hours of interviews with fifteen prison chaplains, nine gang intelligence
officers and 30 inmates imprisoned for violent crimes in California and Florida.46 Hamm
concluded that an individual prisoner moving from radicalization to terrorism recruitment was a
highly unlikely event. Only a small percentage of converts to Islam and those in white
supremacy groups actually radicalize to the point where they engage in terrorist action. However,
Hamm argues that it is not the absolute number of prisoners following extremist interpretations
45
Neumann, p. 12.
Hamm, Mark. “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions.” National Institute
of Justice Journal 261 (Oct. 2008). Available: http://nij.gov/nij/journals/261/prisoner-radicalization.htm#note11.
46
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of religious doctrine that poses the greatest risk; it is instead “the potential for small groups of
radicals to form support networks for terrorist goals upon release.”47
Conclusion
The theories of agenda setting provide us a way to understand the process of how
radicalization came onto the agenda. After 9/11, we have seen cases of terrorism, which would
later be defined to be homegrown terrorism, that at the time were not framed in such a way by
the press or politicians. The Portland Seven case, the Lackawanna Six case and the 2004 Madrid
bombings did not bring radicalization and homegrown terrorism to the agenda. The critical
turning point was the 2005 London bombings. The shock over “homegrown” jihadists in Great
Britain had reached across the Atlantic and shifted the national security strategy of the US in
order to account for this possible threat from within. Since 2005, there has been a contentious
battle between political entrepreneurs to deal with radicalization in the American Muslim
community. The London bombings brought radicalization onto the national agenda, and the 2007
Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act was the first instance of the issue entering the national
legislative agenda. The apparent surge in plots in the years 2009 and 2010, especially the large
number of Somali Americans going abroad to fight with Al-Shabab, prompted controversial
public hearings by Peter King and the national counter-radicalization strategy released by the
Obama administration in 2011. Radicalization is on the agenda and is unlikely to leave anytime
soon. The presence of cases of domestic Islamist terrorism, the news media’s coverage of these
events, and the sensitivities surrounding terrorist attacks on the homeland after 9/11 make it
likely this debate will not go away anytime soon.
47
Ibid.
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Chapter 4: Counter-radicalization Policy
In the previous chapters I have discussed the inconsistencies within the government with
regard to the concept of radicalization. I have shown that there is a discrepancy between local
law enforcement and the federal government in its understanding of radicalization. The federal
government is not willing to associate violence with extreme Islamic views while law
enforcement has framed its strategy with this view. If the government does not have a uniform
definition of radicalization, can it form a coherent policy to prevent it? In this chapter I argue that
the government does not have a unified national approach to counter-radicalization. While
counter-radicalization strategies are being employed at the federal and local levels, there is a
strong disconnect in the policy area of domestic intelligence collection that makes any whole-ofgovernment approach to countering radicalization difficult. Moreover, on the domestic
intelligence front, law enforcement has not clearly separated counter-radicalization activities
with those for counterterrorism.
In characterizing the government’s policy, I will continue to distinguish local law
enforcement and federal government agencies as I have in Chapter 2 when discussing how these
entities had different definitions of radicalization. In this chapter I will investigate how those
differences in definition have manifest themselves in differences in policy. For the federal
government, I analyze the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National
Counterterrorism Center. The law enforcement category encompasses the FBI, the NYPD, and
the LAPD. I will categorize the government’s counter-radicalization policies into three areas:
messaging, community engagement, and domestic intelligence. I define messaging to be the
expressions the government has made in entering the debate regarding radicalization.
Community engagement primarily consists of the activities the government has taken to build
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50
ties with local Muslim communities. I consider domestic intelligence both in terms of
surveillance activities and the use of informants and undercover agents.
Messaging
The White House has made messaging a key part of its counter-radicalization policy. The
administration aims to target Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and counter their violent extremist
narrative through promoting the unifying and inclusive nature of American ideals.1 Noting AlQaeda has promoted the idea that the US is at war with Islam, the administration has made an
effort to dispel this misconception. President Obama has stated on numerous occasions that the
US is not now, nor will ever be, at war with Islam. Moreover, the administration has conveyed
the notion that the federal government does not view Islam as inherently violent. John Brennan,
Obama’s senior national counterterrorism advisor stated that jihad does not consist of the killing
of innocent men, women, and children, but instead refers to an internal holy struggle that is an
important tenet of Islam.2 Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Robert Godec
reinforced this perspective by making it clear that the federal government’s official position is to
“not describe our enemy as jihadists or Islamists because jihad is holy struggle.”3 The federal
government has taken it upon itself to support the mainstream view of jihad, which precludes the
killings of innocent people, as an effort to prevent individuals from radicalizing. In response to
Peter King’s criticism about the government’s refusal to identify Islamic ideology as the root of
1
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism In the United States. [Washington, D.C.: Executive
Office of the President, 2011, p. 6.
2
Brennan, John. Securing the Homeland by Renewing America’s Strengths, Resilience, and Values. Center for
Strategic and International Studies. 26 May 2010.
3
Godec, Robert F. Remarks at the Global Young Leaders Conference, June 30, 2010. Available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/143809.htm.
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51
radicalization, Paul Stockton remarks that not doing so is a part of the federal government’s
strategy in order to avoid legitimizing Al-Qaeda’s message.4
The federal government has also used communication as a way to promote grassroots
activism in order to the counter violent extremism. The National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) developed a Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) in 2010 in order to communicate to
the public efforts by Al-Qaeda to recruit Americans for its cause.5 The NCTC uses the briefing to
highlight recruiting videos and other forms of online propaganda in order to help community
activists understand the nature of the threat so they can contribute to countering Al-Qaeda’s
narrative. The Department of Homeland Security has also planned to create grant programs to
provide funding for programs that will seek to “counter violent extremist narratives and
ideologies.6
Local law enforcement agencies have not engaged in this kind of messaging. As I have
argued in Chapter 2, local law enforcement has identified jihadi ideology as the root cause of
violent extremism; therefore efforts to try to separate Islam and violent extremism are not
relevant to the interests of law enforcement, so they generally do not engage in this ideological
debate.
Community Engagement
Radicalization will likely occur among individuals who are a part of local communities.
Consequently, both the federal and local governments have engaged in counter-radicalization
policies that put community engagement at the forefront. The federal government and local law
4
Stockton, Paul. Hearing Before the Committee On Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred
Twelfth Congress, First Session, December 7, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
5
Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.
[Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2011], p. 19.
6
Ibid.
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52
enforcement have both emphasized the need to improve their respective engagement programs
with Muslims communities in order to increase the level of trust between their members and law
enforcement. I will show that in the area of community engagement, there is little discrepancy
between the federal government and local law enforcement – all relevant parties have created
policy initiatives to engage the Muslim community. Studies have shown that Muslim intracommunity policing has produced substantial results – American Muslims are able (to a certain
degree) prevent radicalization of their youth.7 The Obama administration has stated “countering
radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and empowering individuals
and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism.”8
I.
Federal Government
The Obama administration seeks to carefully structure its CVE strategy to avoid
securitizing engagement activities with communities. The U.S. Attorneys, who have experience
with engaging in communities in their districts, have led efforts to hold events to discuss issues
such as civil rights and counterterrorism security measures, promote awareness about the threat
of violent extremism, and facilitate partnerships within communities to prevent violent
extremism. Thirty-two U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have participated in this pilot program.9 For
example, in Minnesota the U.S. Attorneys Office created the Young Somali-American Advisory
Council, made up of Somali-Americans aged 18 to 30, to educate them about their civil rights
and the DOJ’s investigative processes. The Minnesota office is also working with the council to
7
See Kurzman, Charles. “Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting.” Triangle Center on Terrorism
and Homeland Security. Feb 2, 2011.
8
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism In the United States. [Washington, D.C.: Executive
Office of the President, 2011], p. 2.
9
Strategic Implementation Plan, p. 9.
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53
create videos explaining the community’s constitutional rights that can be shown on Somali
television to reach out to elders in the community.10
Federal inter-agency efforts at community engagement have also been expanding in an
effort to better share information, regarded as a pivotal aspect for success for counterradicalization and counterterrorism policy. The Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice united to establish a National Task Force in November 2010 to coordinate
all relevant community engagement efforts, compile best practices, and report back to field
agencies, including the U.S. Attorneys.11
The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) set up roundtables in
fourteen cities across the nation. The DOJ produced pamphlets translated into a myriad of
languages, including Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, to educate communities on civil rights protections,
in an effort to reassure the American Muslim community that the government will not forsake
their rights in order to prevent terrorist attacks. The Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security have a Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) initiative, which develops
relationships between the law enforcement agencies in order to educate their communities on
protection of civil rights, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and incident
reporting to law enforcement.12 In its roadmap for future implementation, the federal government
has stated that it intends to increase the level of engagement with Muslim communities and
create more events that are particular to disseminating knowledge about countering violent
extremism.
10
Jones, B. Todd, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota. “Countering Violent Extremism through CommunityBased Approaches.” Offices of the United States Attorneys Briefing Room. July 2011.
11
Strategic Implementation Plan, p. 9.
12
Ibid.
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54
II.
Law Enforcement
Law enforcement has also emphasized the need to engage the American Muslim
community through its counter-radicalization policy. By their very nature local governments are
in greater position to reach large numbers of their constituents. The New York Police
Department engages Muslim community members through its Community Partnership Program
and its New Immigrant Outreach Unit.13 The Community Affairs Bureau, which administers
these initiatives, set up a citywide youth cricket league in 2008. Over 100 teenagers ages
fourteen to nineteen primarily of South Asian descent signed up.14 The bureau stated that its
goal is “to have a good understanding and relationship with Muslim immigrant communities” in
the New York Police Department. The Los Angeles Police Department has reached out to
Muslim communities as part of its Community Engagement Initiative, as a need-finding measure
to build a strong level of trust and steady partnership between Muslim communities and law
enforcement.15 LAPD Deputy Chief Michael Downing has stated that the best way to fight
terrorism is through engagement with the community.16 The LAPD’s Sheriff’s Department has
established a Muslim Community Affairs Unit. The unit has created the Young Muslim
American Leaders Advisory Council to interface with young Muslim leaders and holds monthly
meetings with community members to provide training on issues such as hate crimes, identify
theft, and domestic violence and allow for open discussion of issues important to the Muslim
community. Moreover, the LAPD has reached out to the community outside traditional
13
See Community Affairs Bureau website, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/community_affairs/special_outreach_programs.shtml.
14
Press Release, N.Y. Police Department, NYPD Forms Cricket League for New York City Youth. 22 July 2008.
15
Press Release, L.A. Police Department, LAPD ‘s Community Engagement Initiative, 11 Nov 2007.
16
Press Release, Muslim Public Affairs Council, On NYPD Surveillance, MPAC Works in Coalition with DOJ,
Federal Agencies, Mayors Offices & LAPD. 24 Feb 2012.
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55
engagement activities, such as by attending religious celebrations and mosque open houses and
by giving presentations at Islamic schools for show and tell and drug recognition.17
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has also created engagement initiatives with local
Muslim communities in order to build a level of trust between the parties. For example, the
Minneapolis division has pursued “enhanced engagement” with Arab and Muslim communities
in order to protect the national security of the United States while preserving the individual civil
rights of members of the community, building a lasting partnership based on mutual trust and
respect.18 Each of the FBI’s 56 field offices has a Community Outreach Program under the
leadership of a Community Outreach Coordinator. The Citizens’ Academy, a eight to ten week
program conducted by all of the field offices teaches community leaders about the FBI’s
mission, strategies, and operations.19 Realizing that youth are at the greatest risk of
radicalization, field offices have sponsored teen academies to introduce FBI agents to young
members of the community. The Adopt-A-School/Junior Special Agent program also serves as a
bridge for agents to provide an amicable and trustworthy FBI image to youth adults.
Within the community engagement segment of counter-radicalization policy, there is
clearly significant agreement on its importance and implementation. Both the federal government
and law enforcement have sought to develop strong partnerships with Muslim communities in
order to strengthen community ties to give Muslims a sense that law enforcement would protect
their civil rights while pursuing its counter-radicalization strategy. In congressional testimonies
17
See Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Muslim Community Affairs Unit, available at http://lasheriff.org/sites/muslimoutreach_new/Top_Stories/MCA%20Overview%20Jan%202011%20LoRes.pdf.
18
Press Release, FBI Minneapolis Division, Enhanced Engagement with Arab and Muslim American Communities,
Available at http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/news-and-outreach/outreach/enhanced-engagement-with-arab-andmuslim-american-communities.
19
Hovington, Brett. Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee On Homeland Security, House
of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, March 17, 2010. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.,
2010.
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56
officials from these government agencies have highlighted the creation of programs such as these
as indicators of the success of their counter-radicalization. The effectiveness of metrics like these
as indicators of counter-radicalization progress will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Domestic Intelligence
Domestic intelligence may be the most important part of counter-radicalization strategy
to observe indicators of radicalization, but it is undoubtedly also the most controversial. Since
radicalization presumably precedes a homegrown terrorist plot, it becomes difficult to monitor
because cognitive radicalization is protected by the First Amendment – it is legal to have radical
ideas. In this section I will show that while the federal government and local law enforcement
have generally agreed in the policy area of community engagement, domestic intelligence seems
to present a principal point of discontinuity between the policies of law enforcement and those of
the federal government. I define domestic intelligence to consist of the use of both informants
and undercover agents and surveillance to procure information about would-be terrorists.
I.
Federal Government
Although the federal government itself, according to information that is publicly
available, has not engaged in gathering domestic intelligence, officials have not excluded
themselves from the discussion about the importance of domestic intelligence in counterradicalization. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has advocated for the need to
“strengthen intelligence analysis” and research in order “to better understand the phenomenon of
violent extremism.20 Obama administration officials have also emphasized resources allocated
for domestic intelligence collection.21 However, the Obama administration has provided little
20
Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet: The Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Countering
Violent Extremism, 2011, p. 2.
21
Remarks by Dennis McDonough. “Partnering with Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism in America.” 6
Mar 2011.
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57
public information on the implementation of domestic surveillance measures. Moreover,
according to Faiza Patel from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, the
National Counterterrorism Center nor DHS have provided specific guidelines as to how domestic
intelligence for counter-radicalization purposes can be implemented without violating the
Constitution.22
Although the federal government has not directly been involved in intelligence gathering,
they have set up entities to help in the integration and coordination of intelligence gathering and
sharing among federal, state, and local partners. The DOJ and the FBI have created the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities, with
106 active today. According to the FBI, the purpose of the JTTFs are to provide “one-stop
shopping for information regarding terrorist activities” and “pool talents, skills, and knowledge
from across the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single team that responds
together.”23 For example, the New York JTTF, in conjunction with the NYPD, was instrumental
in uncovering the Newburgh Four plot, preventing four men from executing attacks on a Bronx
synagogue and Jewish Center and shooting down military planes at Stewart Air National Guard
Base.24 The JTTFs consist of multifaceted teams of investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT
experts and terrorism specialists. Although they existed before 9/11, 71 of the current 106 were
created after the attacks, now employing a grand total of 4,400 law enforcement officials and
agents.25 Although the JTTFs operate largely in secrecy, the FBI has said the JTTFs are “the
22
Patel, Faiza. “Rethinking Radicalization.” Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School. 2011, p. 1.
“Protecting America From Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.” FBI Website, Available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
24
“Investigative Programs.” FBI Facts & Figures, 2010-2011. See http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/facts-and-figures-2010-2011/investigative-programs.
25
“Protecting America From Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.” FBI Website, Available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
23
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nation’s front line on terrorism.”26 Bjelopera notes that “their operations are highly tactical and
focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to
thwart terrorist plots.”27
In addition to the JTTFs, the federal government has established fusion centers. With
over 40 spread throughout the United States, they have also been important in coordinating
intelligence sharing on the federal and local levels. The fusion centers were created to “broaden
sources of data for analysis and integration beyond criminal intelligence, to include federal
intelligence as well as private and public sector data.”28 Although the fusion centers are owned
and operated by state and local entities, the Department of Homeland Security and Department
of Justice provide personnel, connectivity to federal systems, technical assistance, and funding.29
Fusion center development occurred in two waves, in 2003 and 2005. Rollins notes that
important influences for the development of the fusion centers were strong agreement amongst
Governors that each state should have a fusion center and the support of important federal
homeland security entities, such as the Director of National Intelligence and the Homeland
Security Advisory Council. The fusion centers differ from the JTTFs because a majority of them
serve a solely, or at least primarily, analytic role. Although the fusion centers provide support for
operations and investigations, usually they are not directly involved in such activities.30
Moreover, although both prevention and response are functions the centers fulfill, there has been
a bias towards preventive analysis, especially in terrorism prevention activities. Not only are the
26
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at Our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces,” May 2009. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may09/jttfs_052809.html.
27
Bjelopera, Jerome P.. “The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations” Congressional
Research Service. December 28, 2011, p. 13-14.
28
Rollins, John. “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. January 18,
2008, p. 1.
29
“National Network of Fusion Centers.” Department of Homeland Security State and Urban Area Fusion Centers.
Available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm#0.
30
Rollins, p. 23.
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fusion centers solely focused on counterterrorism, they have increasingly moved towards an allcrimes and even a broader all-hazards approach.
Thus, although the federal government is not directly collecting intelligence and while
there may be questions about the guidelines set for protection of civil liberties, there is no doubt
that the federal government is actively involved in the integration and coordination of
intelligence collection and analysis. They have provided funding, federal intelligence, and
personnel for domestic intelligence investigations that have included homegrown terrorism
incidents.
II.
Law Enforcement
Law enforcement has been much more direct in its domestic intelligence collection
activities, but this has also been the source of the greatest controversy. The LAPD, NYPD, and
FBI have all had or attempted to have intelligence collection activities targeting the American
Muslim community. I argue that in this area of counter-radicalization policy law enforcement has
conflated counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts. Moreover, domestic intelligence in
the early stages of cognitive radicalization is at serious risk of mistaking radicalization for
religiosity.
On November 9, 2007 the Los Angeles Police Department announced it was creating a
community mapping project in order to identify hotbeds of radicalization in the Muslim
community. Deputy Chief Michael Downing emphasized the need to identify at-risk
communities, to know their location in order to be able to reach out to them more effectively.31
By the next day the LAPD was on the defensive because of outcry from some Muslim activists
and civil libertarians. Critics, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations, contended that
31
Renaud, Jean-Paul, Paul Pringle, and Richard Winton. LAPD to build data on Muslim areas. Los Angeles Times,
November 9, 2007.
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the mapping project was impractical because Muslims in the United States are not isolated in
enclaves like their European counterparts, making it nearly impossible to determine “where all
the Muslims are,” which the LAPD had stated as its intent32 Downing, who announced the
project, said the project would determine the geographic distribution of Muslims in the Los
Angeles areas and take “a look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic
breakdown, socioeconomic status and social interactions.”33 The LAPD planned to combine
forces with an unnamed academic institution and look for Muslim partner to help carry out the
mapping project.34 The American Civil Liberties Union meanwhile rejected the project on
principle, with then Executive Director Ramona Ripston comparing it to the Red Scare of the
1950s and claiming it was “nothing short of racial profiling”.35 Five days later, the project was
no more. The LAPD stated that the original intent of the plan was “to bring together the
department with the Muslim community” but the amount of discontent created within the
community made terminating the mapping project the best approach.36
Since 9/11, the New York Police Department has become one of the country’s most
aggressive domestic intelligence agencies.37 The NYPD had clandestine surveillance programs
exposed by the Associated Press that monitored the daily lives of Muslims in New York and
nearby areas in the Northeast, outside its traditional jurisdiction. Undercover agents were
dispatched as part of an expansive human mapping project targeting the Muslim community.
Bookstores, bars, cafes, and nightclubs were all venues of investigation. Moreover, the NYPD
32
Ibid.
MacFarquhar, Neil. “Protest Greets Police Plan to Map Muslim Angelenos.” New York Times, November 9, 2007.
34
Ibid.
35
Richard Winton, Teresa Watanabe and Greg Krikorian. “LAPD defends Muslim mapping effort.” Los Angeles
Times. November 10, 2007.
36
Richard Winton and Teresa Watanabe, “LAPD Muslim mapping project killed.” Los Angeles Times. November
15, 2007.
37
Apuzzo, Matt, and Adam Goldman. “With CIA Help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas.” Associated Press.
August 23, 2011.
33
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used informants to analyze the sermons of imams in local mosques, looking for signs of extreme
rhetoric.38 It is clear from their type of surveillance that the NYPD was focusing on the early
stages of cognitive radicalization, creating conflict with expressive forms of Islamic religiosity,
especially Salafi interpretations of Islam that the NYPD has identified as the root ideology of
radicalization.39 Seeing the fallout from the LAPD mapping project, current and former officials
in New York realized they needed to keep their domestic intelligence clandestine.40 Moreover,
Larry Sanchez, the CIA veteran who was tapped to head the NYPD’s intelligence division,
testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security that law enforcement would have to
start monitoring behaviors that are innocuous, “looking at behaviors that could easily be argued
in a Western democracy, especially in the United States, to be protected by First and Fourth
Amendment rights.”41
Not only did the NYPD monitor Muslim communities in New York, but they also
targeted Muslim students, sometimes in areas outside their traditional jurisdiction. NYPD
undercover agents looked for signed of Salafism, especially with the kinds of speakers Muslim
student associations brought to their events.42 One undercover agent also attended a white-water
rafting trip with students, noting the number of times they prayed per day.43 Thus the NYPD
engaged in monitoring the early stages of the cognitive radicalization process. The indicators
they looked for essentially coincided with the individual’s interpretation of the Islamic religion.
38
Ibid.
Bhatt, Arvin, and Mitchell D. Silber, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” New York: NYPD
Intelligence Division, City of New York Police Department, 2007, p. 6.
40
Apuzzo and Goldstein, supra note 19.
41
Violent Islamist Extremism, 2007: Hearings Before the Committee On Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009.
42
Chris Hawley and Matt Apuzzo. “NYPD infiltration of college raises privacy fears.” Associated Press. Oct. 11,
2011.
43
Powell, Michael. “Police Monitoring and a Climate of Fear.” New York Times, February 27, 2012.
39
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The FBI too has had its own fair share of problems with domestic surveillance of Muslim
community members. The San Francisco divisional office, before it established its formal
community outreach program, secretly collected information on its local Muslim community
from 2004 to 2008 on mosque sermons and conversations among mosque attendees.44 The
ACLU, who uncovered documents that detailed these collection activities through a Freedom of
Information Act request, has alleged that the FBI has used its community outreach activities as
fronts for clandestine intelligence that violates Constitutionally protected rights, while the FBI
has rebutted the charge by claiming the intelligence collection has an important law enforcement
justification in order to improve its outreach programs to Muslim communities.45
The FBI has also used undercover informants in mosques as a way to prevent homegrown
terror attacks, recruiting individuals to provide insider intelligence from within Muslim
communities. According to the New America Foundation, 36% of all homegrown terrorism cases
have involved informants helping to uncover the plot. The FBI has contended that informants are
an important part of their terrorism prevention work, but it has not come without drawing the ire
of Muslim groups. For example, Craig Monteilh was employed to help build a case against a
mosque member in an Irvine, California mosque, but his mission backfired – the Muslims at the
mosque were so alarmed by his violent rhetoric that they obtained a restraining order against him
further attending their mosque.46 Shakeel Syed, the executive director of the Shura Council of
Southern California, a group representing over 75 mosques, stated that the Muslim community
44
Levine, Dan. “FBI said to have gathered intelligence on California mosques.” Reuters, Mar 27, 2012.
Ibid.
46
Markon, Jerry. “Tension grows between Calif. Muslims, FBI after informant infiltrates mosque.” The Washington
Post, December 5, 2010.
45
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felt betrayed over the incident, undermining the FBI’s relationship with the Muslim
community.47
The greatest source of disagreement between the federal government and law
enforcement lies in the policy area of domestic surveillance. While there is much cohesion
between how the federal government and law enforcement handles their community engagement
programs, the differences in domestic surveillance prevent the establishment of a unified
counter-radicalization policy. There is a significant discrepancy between policy on the federal
level and policy implemented by law enforcement on a local level. The policy implications for
this inconsistency in policy implementation will be discussed in the next chapter on the
effectiveness of the counter-radicalization policy.
Debating Policy
Counter-radicalization policy has been a topic of intense debate among scholars. In this
part of the thesis I will present the arguments of scholars who have engaged in this debate,
separating them into two schools of thought: those who believe there must be some form of
counter-radicalization policy and those who reject the need for any type of counter-radicalization
policy.
Is counter-radicalization policy necessary to prevent homegrown terrorism? Risa Brooks,
whose research was referred to earlier to present the arguments of opponents to radicalization
appearing on the public policy agenda in the second chapter, has also contributed to the argument
about how unnecessary counter-radicalization policy could actually help to diminish the overall
national security of the United States. In addition to concluding that the threat of American
Muslim radicalization is not particularly severe, she also notes that mischaracterizing the threat
could be extremely costly both financially and in terms of national security. Costs for homeland
47
Ibid.
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security have risen since 9/11, and overextended efforts put into unnecessary counterterrorism
measures could detract from law enforcement attention needed in other areas.48 Overestimating
the threat also diminishes the American public’s resiliency against terrorism because it invokes
fears disproportionate to the actual threat. Rhetoric that magnifies this threat can also be
deceptive considering the fact that most of these attacks are self-initiated and disconnected.
Moreover, if an atmosphere is created in which the threat of homegrown terrorism
appears severe, Brooks warns that law enforcement may use counterproductive methods that
alienate the Muslim community and compromise the trust that exists between law enforcement
officials and Muslim communities. This will have an adverse effect on law enforcement’s ability
to capture terrorists because the Muslim American community has been instrumental in
providing tips to officials and also self-policing their own community.49
Faiza
Patel
criticizes
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
and
National
Counterterrorism Center for not expressly stating how exactly counter-radicalization policy that
includes domestic surveillance can exist without impinging on protected Constitutional rights.50
Moreover, since radicalizing individuals are usually in contact with others that share similar
views, Patel concludes that special counter-radicalization intelligence collection is not necessary
– “targeted intelligence and normal police work” would allow law enforcement to identify
violent extremists before they are able to commit a homegrown attack.51
Among the proponents of a counter-radicalization policy, there is an internal debate about
the nuances of the policy. Is it appropriate for the government to engage in the theological debate
surrounding Islamic ideology? Should domestic intelligence be a central part of the U.S.
48
Brooks, p. 43
Brooks, p. 45.
50
Patel, p. 1.
51
Ibid., p. 11.
49
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65
domestic counter-radicalization strategy? These are the types of questions that scholars have
tried to address. I divide this section into the main issues surrounding the design of counterradicalization policy, and highlight the debates specific to each of them. In some cases, the
policy recommendations have near unanimity among scholars, and I note these cases where
appropriate.
Understanding the Muslim community
Since the American Muslim community is perceived to be the primary target of alQaeda’s radicalization efforts, Peter Neumann emphasizes that the government must increase its
understanding of the internal dynamics of the diverse Muslim community, in terms of the various
ethnicities that compromise the community and the diverse political and religious beliefs that its
members adhere to.52 Lorenzo Vidino complements this position by adding that Muslims in the
United States are diverse and descend from numerous countries, requiring law enforcement to
tailor their counter-radicalization policy to specific communities.53
Separation of Counterterrorism and Counter-radicalization
Lorenzo Vidino stresses the importance of setting a clear differentiation between counterradicalization policy and counter-terrorism policy. Obscuring the two will stigmatize the Muslim
community and make counter-radicalization policies less appealing to them, threatening the level
of cooperation needed to ensure policy success.54 Neumann also recommends that the U.S.
government should avoid securitizing its relationship with its community partners.55 However, as
one law enforcement official put it, while all community outreach efforts do not need to be for
the purpose of counter-radicalization, it is important to let the Muslim community know that the
52
Neumann, p. 41.
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Toward a Radical Solution.” Foreign Policy. 5 Jan 2010.
54
Ibid.
55
Neumann, p. 8.
53
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main goal is to prevent individuals from committing acts of homegrown terrorism.56 Thus,
although it is important to not solely engage the Muslim community for security purposes, law
enforcement should make it clear that they do want the community’s help in combating violent
extremism, which would have mutual benefits for all parties involved.
Choosing the right partners
There must be partnerships created and maintained between the various Muslim groups in
the United States, but the question of whether to incorporate Islamists, such as Muslim
Brotherhood affiliates and Salafi groups, into the mix engenders debate among scholars.
Neumann argues that although these groups should be engaged, there should be a clear
differentiation between engagement and empowerment. Moreover, groups will not be suitable
government partners if they do not meet some basic criteria, such as being committed to
upholding the U.S. Constitution and denouncing terrorism and the killing of Americans all over
the world. Since scholars and government officials alike have looked to British models for
framing counter-radicalization policy in the U.S., we can also explore how Robert Lambert,
former head of the Metropolitan Police Muslim Contact Unit in London, argues in favor of
“police negotiation leading to partnership with Muslim groups conventionally deemed to be
subversive to democracy.”57 Lambert notes that these Islamist groups have the credibility and
legitimacy of the Muslim community to be able to convince radicalized individuals not to carry
out attacks, and thus they are assets in preventing terrorism. He provides the example of the
counter-radicalization program STREET (Strategy to Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers),
which is run by Salafis in the Brixton district of London. Lambert notes that the program has
been successful in countering the message of al-Qaeda-linked preachers in the area and
56
57
Interview with former LAPD official, 4 May 2012.
Lambert, Robert. Countering Al Qaeda In London. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2011, p. 1.
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preventing young men from joining their ranks. However, Vidino contends although the
Islamists could provide benefits in the short-term, it is unclear what the long-term implications
could be in terms of social cohesion and integration.
Training of personnel
Neumann argues that there should be training on engagement, outreach, and cultural
competency in order to allow law enforcement officials that are responsible for developing with
local Muslim communities. For example, there have been cases in which misunderstandings
between law enforcement and the Muslim community have created tensions, such as the
mischaracterization of an Islamic religious leader in an FBI outreach workshop in Seattle in
2011.58 FBI agents were also found to have trained using offensive material that characterized
devout Muslims as potential violent extremists and characterized the Prophet Muhammad as a
cult leader.59 It is clear that training material that conflates religiosity with radicalization and
disparages Islamic leaders is detrimental to building strong partnerships with the Muslim
community. The government needs to properly vet individuals who train law enforcement to
make sure their training materials are based on fact and do not contribute to alienating the
Muslim community from law enforcement.
Confronting extremist ideology
Should the United States support one interpretation of Islam over another? If the government
perceives one school of Islamic thought to be more in tune with American ideals, should it
intervene in ideological and theological matters against ideologies that are perceived to be
dangerous and contributing to radicalization? Vidino argues that the U.S. government should be
prepared to engage itself in this ideological debate in order to “find ways to counter the
58
59
Heffter, Emily. “FBI ends up offending Muslims at outreach workshop.” Seattle Times 10 Sept 2011, natl. ed.
Goode, Erica. “FBI Chided for Training That Was Critical of Islam.” New York Times, 16 Sept. 2011.
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theological message of violent extremism,” but to tread carefully because of potential
backfires.60 Neumann also espouses this viewpoint; he notes that “it might be appropriate to
challenge the group and its ideology directly and aggressively.”61 According to them, groups in
the U.S. advocating a religious ideology that is on par with al-Qaeda’s should be challenged
through counter-messaging from the government. However, there is a serious potential for
conflict if the government is perceived to be supporting one interpretation of religion over
another, which raises legal issues of constitutionality. Samuel Rascoff argues that by pursuing
this strategy the U.S. government is in potential conflict with the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution, which prevents the government from establishing any form of official religion.62
Rascoff argues that by entering into the theological debate, government officials are establishing
a form of Official Islam in the country. Moreover, unlike countries like Saudi Arabia and
Indonesia, Muslim countries with counter-radicalization programs that use governmentemployed religious scholars during the cognitive radicalization process, the U.S. government is
not in the position to pursue a similar strategy because it does not have the religious legitimacy
of those Muslim countries.63
Capacity-building
Possible at-risk areas for radicalization like prisons and the internet have also come under
the radar of government officials. Hamm recommends that government should put more
resources to expand its prisoner counter-radicalization program by hiring chaplains and Muslim
American guards and counselors in order to make Muslin inmates feel less like outsiders in the
60
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe.” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 262, 2010, p. 11.
61
Neumann, p. 9.
62
Rascoff, Samuel. "Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization," 64 Stanford L.
Rev. 125 (2012) p. 130.
63
Hasan, Mehdi. “The Wrong Kind of Intervention.” The Guardian. 10 July 2010.
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prison environment.64 Bert Useem rebuts by stating that the number of individuals radicalized
from prisons will be extremely small, and argues that as long as law enforcement continues to be
alert and collaborative, the threat of prison radicalization will continue to diminish.65 Jerome
Bjelopera notes that prisons have not played a significant role in creating homegrown terrorist
plots.66
The internet has also been an avenue of radicalization for vulnerable individuals. For
Vidino, the Internet has become a collaborative tool for “American aspiring jihadists and likeminded individuals worldwide.”67 However, while there have been cases of individuals
radicalizing over the internet, such as the case of Major Nidal Hasan,68 the federal government is
not in the position to take down websites by American citizens because they have violent ideas
or extremist rhetoric. While websites originating overseas do not have the privilege of
Constitutional protection, websites with extreme rhetoric in the United States cannot be as easily
removed.69 For example, Revolution Muslim, a New York City Islamist group previously led by
Jesse Morton (aka Younus Abdullah Muhammed), was able to continue operating its website for
three years even though they posted messages in support of the September 11 terrorist attacks
and the Fort Hood killings. The site was brought down and the Morton was arrested after he
64
Hamm, Mark. “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions.” National Institute
of Justice Journal 261 (Oct. 2008), p. 1.
65
Useem, Bert. The Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. Prisons: Testimony Before the Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, Hearing Held June
15, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.
66
Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.”
Congressional Research Service. 2010, p. 2.
67
Vidino, Lorenzo. “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32 No. 1 (2009), p. 12.
68
Major Nidal Hasan was communicating by e-mail with the radical imam Anwar Al-Awlaki before he staged his
attack, See Ross, Brian. “How Anwar Al-Awlaki Inspired Terror from Across the Globe.” ABC World News. 30
Sept. 2011.
69
Written Statement of the ACLU. U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Web Sites: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee On Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, September 29, 2010. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.,
2010.
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admitted to conspiring to solicit the murder of the artist tied to the “Everybody Draw
Mohammed Day” movement in May 2010 and encouraging violent extremists to attack the
writers of South Park because of an episode that featured Muhammad in a bear suit.70 Moreover,
Jarret Brachman contends that the Internet is unlikely to be the sole sufficient place for a person
to undergo radicalization, but rather a contributing medium for it.71
Profiling
John Horgan notes that much of the discussion and thinking about terrorism is rooted in
assumptions about profiling while at the same noting that no terrorist profile has yet been
found.72 Horgan argues that “profiling the individual has no future in serious analyses of either
the terrorist or the pathways in which he or she engages.”73 Instead of profiling individuals,
Horgan argues that law enforcement should consider profiling the process of violent
radicalization and the meaning of engagement with that process for the individual. This would
provide a way to create phase-specific counterterrorism initiatives. However, Horgan does not
explicitly mention how to profile these processes, and there are cautions law enforcement will
have to take before engaging in such a policy. The process of violent radicalization will be
difficult to monitor because at first the individual undergoes a process of conceptual
radicalization, and it is not illegal to have violent ideas in the United States. Although the British
have a more proactive radicalization policy, ideas, even violent ones, are protected by the First
Amendment. Moreover, controversial methods of monitoring that were clandestine but
70
Press Release, “Leader of Revolution Muslim Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage
Violent Extremism.” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington Field Office, February 9, 2012.
71
Understanding Cyberspace As a Medium for Radicalization and Counter-radicalization: Hearing Before the
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee On Armed Services, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, Hearing Held December 16, 2009.Washington:
U.S. G.P.O., 2010.
72
Horgan, John. “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization
into Terrorism.” The ANNALs of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618:80 (2008), p. 83.
73
Ibid., p. 92
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eventually leaked to the press elicited angry outcry from the Muslim community, threatening
counter-radicalization cooperation with law enforcement.74
Benchmarks
The scholars who advocate for counter-radicalization policy underscore the need for
methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy. Although they acknowledge the difficulty in
developing metrics for counter-radicalization policy, the scholars argue that policymakers cannot
determine successes and if objectives were reached without rigorous metrics, which have been
overlooked in the past. Neumann and Vidino both hold this view, that metrics are critical to
determining the success of the policy.75 Patel adds that a mechanism should be put in place for
evaluating whether domestic surveillance in counter-radicalization policy actually contributes to
the wider counterterrorism goal of preventing terrorist attacks.76 The full discussion of metrics is
provided in the next chapter.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown the disagreement between the federal government and law
enforcement in the domestic intelligence collection area of counter-radicalization policy. While
there are many similarities between the federal government and law enforcement in how they
handle their engagement and outreach initiatives with the Muslim community, there is no unified
counter-radicalization policy from the national level to the local level. Scholars have debated the
nuances of what the government’s policy should be, especially on the areas of challenging
radical interpretations of Islamic ideology, choosing legitimate Muslim partners to collaborate
with to counter radicalization, and whether policies with the intent to counter radicalization, as
opposed to simply building strong relationships, only serve to alienate the community. The
74
See Sullivan, Eileen. “FBI recorded personal data at Muslim events.” San Francisco Chronicle. 1 Dec 2011.
See Neumann, p. 22 and Vidino, p. 11.
76
Patel, p. 29.
75
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government’s fractured counter-radicalization policy program raises the important question of
whether there can be an effective policy when the primary stakeholders understand the issue
differently and thus frame and implement policy inconsistently.
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Chapter 5: Benchmarks
In the previous chapter I touched upon the emphasis put on metrics by scholars
discussing counter-radicalization policy. In this chapter I will investigate the importance given to
benchmarks by looking into organizational theory, evaluating the efficacy of benchmarks
government officials have used for counter-radicalization policy, and providing policy
recommendations for the future of counter-radicalization policy. In order to do a quantitative
analysis of the cases, data from all 192 cases of homegrown extremism are used. Each individual
who has radicalized and been indicted in a plot or crime relating to homegrown terrorism is
defined to be a case of homegrown extremism.1 The full list of cases that are considered for this
study are included in Appendix A. I will show that while government officials have touted
certain examples of progress made in their counter-radicalization programs, they have not
provided rigorous metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of their programs. I will argue that this is
partly because there are no wholly proficient quantitative metrics to measure counterradicalization effectiveness. Moreover, efforts to defend or highlight the effectiveness of
counter-radicalization policies have in many instances confuses benchmarks appropriate for
measuring counterterrorism success with those for counter-radicalization.
Bureaucratic Organizational Theory
First, we start by asking: why are benchmarks so important to government agencies? Max
Weber notes that the reason is because they serve as objective indicators of performance, which
help to increase bureaucratic efficiency. The existence of benchmarks allows employees, at least
presumably, to be judged on criteria that contribute to the output of the government organization
1
It is important to note that many of these individuals were not convicted of a terrorism charge and most of the
cases did not actually lead to plots. However, these cases are still included because radicalization does not
necessarily lead to the individual committing a violent act, but in many cases manifesting their radicalization in
other ways, such as by providing material assistance to terrorist organizations or conspiring to engage in violence.
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as opposed to subjective measures like likability.2 James Wilson also describes the importance of
measuring government personnel on their contribution to the organization rather than their
political network. Legislation to enforce these criteria, known as the Pendleton Act, has three
goals: “to hire employees on the basis of merit, to manage these employees effectively, and to
treat all employees equally.”3
Benchmarks are also important in dealing with external overseers, which in the U.S. is
usually Congress. As Wilson notes in his analysis of American bureaucracies, Congress
possesses “an awesome arsenal of weapons that it can use against agencies: legislation,
appropriations, hearings, investigations, personal interventions and ‘friendly advice’ that is
ignored at an executive’s peril.”4 Moreover, members of Congress tend to prefer to hear
straightforward and unambiguous progress on agencies’ objectives and goals, rather than hear
about the difficulty in achieving results. Wilson describes this bias of Congress: “members of
Congress like bureaucrats who do things for their district, accomplish stated goals economically,
or (if they lack information on these matters) behave in a forthcoming and frank manner in their
dealings with Congress with respect to the use of resources and the treatment of citizens.”5 Since
this political dynamic exists within Congress, agency heads find it easier to deal with Congress
when they have quantifiable metrics. No member of Congress is interested in why the job is
difficult to measure. Thus agency executives have a strong incentive to provide Congress with
numerical data, such as X number of arrests or Y number of plots foiled – even though
sometimes these metrics can be misleading, incomplete, or counterproductive, and thus not true
2
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: The Free Press, 1964, p. 340.
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books,
1989, p. 139.
4
Ibid., p. 236.
5
Ibid., p. 252.
3
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indicators of success.6 We can conclude that given the nature of bureaucracies, it is not
unreasonable for Congress to desire metrics to measure policy success. We shall, however, see
that quantitative metrics have less explanatory power when it comes to trying to measure
counter-radicalization policy success.
Although there is much scholarly discussion about the need for government to create
benchmarks to evaluate their policies, there remains a gap in the literature in the discussion of
how the government agencies pursuing counter-radicalization strategies have evaluated and
presented the success of their programs to Congress. To provide this analysis, I look to
government agencies’ public testimonies to Congress and their internal performance documents
produced for Congress in order to understand how efficacy of these policies is being tracked. In
multiple testimonies to government overseers, officials have discussed the progress regarding
their counter-radicalization programs by highlighting new programs and the number of plots that
have been foiled as a result of law enforcement activity. I intend to show that metrics such as
these have weak explanatory power.
Defining Effectiveness
Before analyzing the metrics that the government has used to evaluate effectiveness, we
must also define what effectiveness would be in this context. In looking at the way the
government has defined effectiveness, we uncover some of the problems that have resulted in
counter-radicalization metrics being confused for those more appropriate for counterterrorism.
For example, Raymond Kelly has defended the NYPD monitoring programs before the New
York City Council because of the fourteen plots that have targeted the city since 9/11.7 The
NYPD has framed its success over the fact that “the 10 years since September 11, 2011 mark the
6
7
Zegart, Amy. Interview, November 2, 2011.
Goldstein, Joseph. “Kelly Defends Surveillance of Muslims.” New York Times, Feb. 27, 2012.
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first decade-long period since the 1970s in which no terrorist attacks occurred in New York City,
despite 14 plots targeting it.”8 For the NYPD, effectiveness is defined to be the absence of
successful terrorist attacks. However, framing effectiveness is this way creates confusion and
undermines the separation of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization metrics. While the
foiling of the majority of plots might be a good way to look at counterterrorism success, the very
existence of all those plots might be a negative indicator for counter-radicalization success.
There has been a similar trend on the federal level. An analysis of the performance
reports released by domestic national security agencies shows a similar lack of separation
between counter-radicalization and counterterrorism and/or metrics that have dubious efficacy.
Since President Obama signed the Government Performance and Results Accountability (GPRA)
Modernization Act of 2010 into law, government agencies are required to provide Congress with
policy performance updates on an annual basis.9 The DHS Performance Report for Fiscal Years
2010-2012 only references violent extremism in the context of law enforcement training: the
percent of law enforcement officials trained by the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties on methods to counter terrorism and other violent acts is the only relevant benchmark.10
The training includes cultural competency, community engagement, and countering violent
radicalization, but the effectiveness of the training is assessed by a 10-12 questionnaire post
training. The Department of Justice does not address radicalization or homegrown terrorism
directly in its performance report but does use number of “catastrophic acts of terrorism” as a
8
NYPD Webpage, “NYPD | Terrorist Plots.” Available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/nypd_foils_plots_targeting_nyc.shtml
9
GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. [Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.
10
Fiscal Year 2012 Performance and Accountability Report. [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security].
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metric for the FBI’s performance in preventing terrorism and promoting the nation’s security,
with the goal of zero achieved for fiscal year 2011.11
The federal government and law enforcement agencies have not defined a clear strategic
goal for counter-radicalization success, especially with respect to domestic intelligence
collection. As I have showed in Chapter 4, on the domestic intelligence collection front, the
government has confused counter-radicalization policies with those more appropriate for
counterterrorism. This has reflected in the government’s framing of goals for effectiveness: there
is a general lack of separation between the two policy areas. Although the absence of terrorist
attacks is clearly the overall counterterrorism goal, the goals for counter-radicalization must be
more specific, or the possibility of creating policies that are unconstitutional increase in order to
fulfill goals through artificial metrics.
Moreover, federal government officials have testified before Congress to highlight the
creation of programs, but have provided little information about their overall effectiveness. The
testimonies of interest came from the relevant congressional committees: the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and Committee on Intelligence, and the House
Committee on Intelligence and Committee on Homeland Security. The testimonies analyzed
concerned homegrown terrorism either directly or indirectly.12 In addition to academics and
former government officials who testify, the testimony of current officials from agencies like the
Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center is particularly
noteworthy. The full list of testimonies considered is provided in Appendix B.
I argue that these government agencies have not provided any reliable quantitative
metrics to measure the effectiveness of their counter-radicalization policies because there are no
11
Fiscal Year 2011 Performance and Accountability Report. [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice].
While in many of the testimonies analyzed homegrown terrorism or radicalization was not the central topic for the
testimony, officials would tend to at least address the topic briefly in their testimonies.
12
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quantitative metrics to fully measure counter-radicalization policy success. A success in
countering an individual’s path to radicalization would be the government’s direct or indirect
efforts to prevent the individual from taking the final step to aid or undertake an act of violence.
Since this concerns an individual’s thought process, it is impossible to measure. Government
officials very well realize the extreme difficulty in trying to quantitatively measure the
effectiveness of their programs to counter violent extremism. As James Clapper, the Director of
National Intelligence, notes in a statement made to a joint testimony to the House and Senate
Select Committees on Intelligence, “homegrown violent extremists are examples of the difficulty
and complexity of defending against terrorists attacks generally, and of the asymmetric measure
of success.”13
Clapper notes that the critical factors in countering terrorism are the expertise of the
intelligence workforce, the integration of intelligence activities, and the expansion of information
sharing.14 Others have also emphasized the move to become a more intelligence-driven
organization as an indicator of better preparation for terrorism prevention. The Aspen Institute
Homeland Security Group notes that the Department of Homeland Security continues to “expand
its intelligence mission”15 and Mike Rogers, Chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence emphasizes the need for the FBI to “complete its intelligence
transformation.”16
13
Clapper, James. Joint Hearing to Mark the 10th Anniversary of 9/11: Statement for the Record, Committee on
Intelligence, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held June 15, 2011.
Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
14
Ibid.
15
Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group. Homeland Security and Intelligence: Next Steps in Evolving the
Mission. Testimony Before the Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth
Congress, First Session, Hearing Held January 18, 2012. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
16
Rogers, Michael. Domestic Threat Intelligence: Opening Statement, House Committee on Intelligence, One
Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 4, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
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Although it is important for the government to employ smart people in its intelligence
agencies and work to improve integration and information sharing among the constituent
agencies, metrics concerning these areas are not specific evaluators of counter-radicalization
policy. We see that there is little separation between metrics used for counter-radicalization and
counterterrorism. Moreover, these are not adequate indicators of counter-radicalization policy
progress. Robert Mueller, director of the FBI, has used quantitative measures in these areas to
highlight effective policy, such as the doubling of agents assigned to national security work, the
increase in the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF)s and the increase of field offices
since September 11.17 While they do indicate a growing law enforcement capacity, indicators
like these do not provide the entire picture of success. For example, although as Mueller notes,
the number of analysts and terrorism task forces has been increasing since 2009, this does not
explain the peak in homegrown terror plots in 2009. The increase in law enforcement capacity
does not present a good indicator of success in countering radicalization. Metrics such as this are
short-term and fail to provide the larger picture of the extent of policy progress. Moreover, there
has not been a strong push by congressional leaders to demand stronger metrics specific to
counter-radicalization. Congressional members seem to be accepting measures like these as
progress, whereas the level of understanding they provide in terms of progress is actually quite
dubious..
In order to analyze the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policy, I divide the current
counter-radicalization into two categories: community engagement and domestic intelligence
collection. I use the data compiled in Appendix A to show through quantitative analysis that the
17
Mueller, Robert. The State of Intelligence Reform Ten Years After 9/11: Testimony Before the House Committee
on Intelligence, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 6, 2011. Washington: U.S.
G.P.O., 2012.
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benchmarks agencies of government have used show no conclusive results. The metrics are
evaluated over time because we are interested in indications showing policy progress over time.
Community Engagement
In testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Lee Baca stated that the
LAPD measures success “by the trust that we enjoy with community leaders, members of the
community in general, and the organizations that represent the community.”18 An indication of
that trust is the number of “tips, leads, and reports of suspicious activity by Muslim community
members and organizations.”19 There has been aggregate quantitative analysis done on crime
reporting by the Muslim community concerning violent extremist plots. The New America
Foundation has released figures stating that of the 192 incidents of homegrown terrorism, in 41
cases (21%) Muslims tipped and/or cooperated with law enforcement.20 The Muslim Public
Affairs Council (MPAC) have contended that the figure is even higher when there Muslim
cooperated helped to break up an actual terror plot, stating that Muslim communities have helped
law enforcement uncover 2 out of every 5 Al-Qaeda homegrown plots.21 However, there is no
similar analysis for how the tips have changed over time. I argue that although this is not a
perfect indication of community engagement, this benchmark would indicate the effectiveness of
the community policing model that both local law enforcement and the federal government have
pursued, discussed in Chapter 4. To complete my analysis, I use all 192 cases of homegrown
terrorism to investigate the level of community reporting. Although the majority of the cases
were not actual terrorist plots, I use all the cases because we are not concerned with only cases
18
Baca, Lee. The Extent of Radicalization in the Muslim American Community and That Community’s Response:
Testimony Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session,
Hearing Held June 15, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
19
Ibid.
20
Tips and Cooperation by Muslim Communities and Families. New America Foundation, 2012. See
http://homegrown.newamerica.net/about/tips-and-cooperation-muslim-communities-and-familes.
21
Beutel, Alejandro J. “Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States.” Muslim Public Affairs Council. Last
updated January 9, 2012.
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with tips that lead to counterterrorism success – that would be a better metric for
counterterrorism policy. Instead the cases where Muslim Americans provided tips provide a
count of instances the Muslim community placed enough trust in law enforcement to provide
them sensitive information about a member of their own. The data is presented in Figure 1, along
with a polynomial regression.
The plot shows a general trend of tips from the Muslim community decreasing from years
2002 to 2009, and then gradually increasing according to the polynomial regression fit to the
data. It is important to note that in the years 2009 and 2010, where the number of incidents of
homegrown terror was particularly large, the proportion of cases with Muslim community tips
was relatively low, with 5% of cases in 2009 and 3% of cases in 2010. The difficulty I seek to
show with this analysis is that it is hard to represent any substantive picture of how the Muslim
community level of trust has changed over time. While it is clear that the Muslim community has
contributed a significant number of tips overall to law enforcement, it is difficult to assess how
that level of trust has changed over time from merely quantitative measurements.
Figure 1: Number of Homegrown Extremism Cases Identified by Muslim Community
Members
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Domestic Intelligence
The more controversial aspect of government counter-radicalization strategy inevitably
calls into question its efficacy. As noted above, law enforcement agencies such as the NYPD
have defended their domestic intelligence programs by claiming they have helped to prevent
terrorist attacks. An analysis of the NYPD surveillance programs produces more mixed results.
The AP notes that while the NYPD surveillance programs were successful in uncovering certain
plots like the 2004 Herald Square subway bombing plot in Manhattan, there were other cases that
fell through. For example, they missed Najibullah Zazi, a congregant at a Queens mosque the
NYPD had infiltrated, and Adis Medunjanin, a member of the Muslim student association the
police kept tabs on. The two were accused of another subway bombing plot in New York City.22
However, again law enforcement has framed success using a metric more appropriate for
counterterrorism than counter-radicalization evaluation. Moreover, the data for cases where
informants and undercover agents were not used seem to paint a different story. The regression
for the 192 incidents of homegrown terrorism where undercover agents or informants were not
used is provided in Figure 2. 23
22
Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, Eileen Sullivan. “NYPD’s spying programs yielded only mixed results.”
Associated Press. December 23, 2011.
23
This is the union of all cases where undercover agents or informants were used subtracted from the total number
of cases.
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Figure 2: Number of Homegrown Extremism Incidents without Informants or Undercover
Agents
As the data shows, the majority of incidents of homegrown extremism in 2009 and 2010
(the peak years) came to the attention of authorites through sources outside of law enforcement
undercover agents or informants. This calls into the question the efficacy of these domestic
intelligence programs. Regarding terrorist plots in New York City, the AP alleges that “the
NYPD played little or no role in preventing many of those attacks.”24 The data seeems to suggest
that law enforcement has been able to uncover the majority of incidents of homegrown
extremism without the use of informants or undercover agents, raising questions about the
efficacy of these domestic intelligence programs, especially ones that seek try to profile
cognitive radicalization.
Law enforcement has no easy task in trying to prevent acts of homegrown terrorism.
From this analysis on benchmarks we see that identifying effective metrics is as comparable of a
challenge. Weberian and Wilsonian bureaucratic and organizational theory posits that metrics,
24
Apuzzo, et al.
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especially quantitative ones, are important to external overseers like Congress. However, we see
two important problems in Congress’ dealing with counter-radicalization metrics:
1) There is conflation of metrics for counter-radicalization and counterterrorism, and
Congress has not pushed government officials for metrics specific to the former.
2) There are significant limits to using quantitative metrics like the number of new programs
created to evaluate counter-radicalization progress.
Metrics will continue to be important in evaluating policy, but the government must reconsider
current couner-radicalization strategies in terms of the ability to measure their success. If there
are no great quantitative metrics to measure the strategies, as we have seen with counterradicalization policies, should we continue with those strategies? It would be unwise to reach a
conclusion merely based on the number of good metrics – indeed we would be falling prey to
the very tendency Congress has shown: accepting, or in this case rejecting, policy progress based
on some numerical values with no direct correlation. For example, although there is no strong
quantitative indication of an increased beneficial level of engagement with the Muslim
communtiy over the years, that does not necessarily mean stopping engagement events with
Muslim community members will make no difference in counter-radicalization success. Instead,
this chapter seeks to highlight the difficulty in finding suitable metrics for counter-radicalization
and that Congress must restructure its oversight to account for this and provide more scrutiny to
counter-radicalization policies that currently appear to be working only according to dubious
metrics.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The goal of this thesis has been to characterize the government’s approach to counterradicalization policy, understand how it perceives the issue of radicalization, how the issue rose
to its present level on the public policy agenda, and investigate the benchmarks used to evaluate
the policies. However, it is important to note the limitations of the thesis as a policymaking
guide. The information used for analysis is unclassified and publicly available. It is possible that
a different set of conclusions could be reached with access to classified information, especially in
evaluating the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policy. For example, if government
agencies have developed a series of internal classified metrics that may provide a better measure
of effectiveness, then they might be able to glean more information from quantitative metrics.
Moreover, the thesis seeks to fully characterize the government’s policy, not simply overly
criticize the government for steps it has taken to characterize radicalization. I emphasize to the
reader the difficulty in defining radicalization, devising policies that ensure national security
while preserving civil liberties, and determining adequate benchmarks for measuring policy
effectiveness. Within this context I have analyzed the puzzle of a seemingly increased threat of
homegrown extremism by assessing the government’s counter-radicalization strategies.
First, I have shown that there is a discrepancy in the definition of radicalization between
law enforcement and the federal government. The federal government is less willing to describe
Islamic ideology as the root of homegrown extremism. The Obama administration has instead
preferred to use the term violent extremism to describe the phenomenon and Al-Qaeda’s
ideology to classify the source, eschewing terms that associate terrorist activity with Islam. Law
enforcement agencies, like the NYPD and the FBI, have been less hesitant to define
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radicalization in this way, characterizing the radicalization process as a linear conveyer belt-type
model with Salafi Muslims entering on one end and violent jihadists exiting out the other.
Second, the difference in conceptualization of the issue has led to differences in policy
implementation. While there is much agreeement between the federal government and law
enforcement on their community engagement programs, domestic intelligence collection is a
principal point of disagreeement. Law enforcement has actively engaged in monitoring the early
stages of the radicalization process, which overlaps extensively with outwardly displays of
religiosity. The NYPD has conducted clandestine programs mapping restaurants, shops, and
clubs that Muslims have frequented in order to identify potential hotbeds of radicalization.
Federal officials have noted the importance of domestic intelligence collection and set up fusion
centers and joint terrorism task forces to aid in information sharing of intelligence, but have not
provided concrete guidelines for how domestic intelligence should be collected.
Third, using Kindgon’s model of agenda-setting I have shown that the 2005 London
bombings represented the turning point in the history of US domestic counterterrorism policy.
The 2005 bombings, unlike other international cases like the 2004 Madrid bombings and
domestic cases like the Lackawanna Six and Portland Seven in 2002, was the primary impetus
that brought radicalization onto the public policy agenda in the United States. Moreover, scholars
have diverged into two schools of thought regarding the place of radicalization on the agenda:
the opponents like Charles Kurzman emphasize the inability of Al-Qaeda to inspire or recruit
large numbers of American Muslims and the proponents like Robert Neumann acknoweldge that
it is a limited problem but can have grave consequences if not understood and challenged. I
conclude that althought it is a limited prroblem, it is unlikely to descend from the public policy
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agenda because of the sensitivity the public has towards and the attention the media has given
Islamist terrorism since 9/11.
Fourth, quantitative metrics are difficult to evaluate counter-radicalization success. I
divided the policies into two areas of evaluation: community engagement and domestic
intelligence collection. I used Muslim community tips for evaluating the trust level between
American Muslim communities and law enforcement and the number of cases where undercover
agents and informants did not play a role in uncovering plots to receive insight in the efficacy of
the domestic intelligence program. I have shown that these metrics have limited explanatory
power in measuring policy effectiveness because conclusive results cannot be obtained from
statistical analysis of these metrics.
According to Weber and Wilson’s theories of organizational behavior, metrics are
imporant to organizations because external overseers have demanded them. However, I show
that Congress has not put enough pressure on federal officials to demand metrics that are specific
to counter-radicalization, often conflating metrics for counterterrorism and counterradicalization. Moreover, while the theory points to Congress’ obsession with numerical
benchmarks, I posit that in the field of counter-radicalization policy, quantitative metrics do not
solely provide an accurately picture of the success of counter-radicalization programs.
These findings have given way to policy recommendations that could be useful to
policymakers as they refine their counter-radicalization strategies. Counter-radicalization policy
is still in its infancy, and while the Obama administration and law enforcement agencies have
taken important strides in countering violent extremism, there are improvements and adjustments
that could provide a better approach to radicalization.
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Policy Recommendations
1) Take steps to unify counter-radicalization policies
The White House has designated itself as the leader for a whole-of-government approach to
counter-radicalization policy. While the Obama administration is the first administration to
release an official counter-radicalization policy, many questions remain regarding the policy
implementation. The federal government should provide more specific details on how its
policy on the national level can be integrated with the policies of local law enforcement.
Although it is difficult to have a unified set of definitions across every level of government,
the place of Islamic ideology in the definitions of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is
something that must be resolved. This discrepancy has presented itself in the divergent
policies law enforcement and the federal government have crafted, and also is a point of
contention for American Muslims who resent the association of their entire faith with
terrorism.
2) Modify the domestic surveillance in counter-radicalization policy
The domestic surveillance program, as it is presently crafted, stands little chance of counterradicalization success. While law enforcement has sought to identify and monitor potential
“hotspots” of radicalization, they have done little to counter the radicalization process.
Instead the focus has been to monitor individuals until they are at the brink of committing a
homegrown attack and then sending in undercover agents to stage sting operations.
Monitoring American Muslims solely on the basis of their religion is in conflict with
Constitutional protections of religious freedom and should be eliminated. These also run
counter to the U.S. Attorneys Guidelines for FBI national security investigations, which state
that race, ethnicity and religion are not sufficient factors to open an investigation into an
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individual.1 Domestic intelligence collection as it now stands undermines the overall counterradicalization policy because clandestine monitoring programs have only helped to build
mistrust between local law enforcement and their Muslim communities. The monitoring and
surveillance of the early stages of cognitive radicalization should be eliminated.
3) Establish a clear separation of counter-radicalization and counterterrorism metrics
In numerous testimonies and public statements, government officials working in the counterradicalization area have provided metrics more appropriate for counterterrorism, such as
foiled plots, as an indicator of policy success. While this can reasonably be considered a
counterterrorism success, the same metric cannot be applied for counter-radicalization. In
fact, it is a counter-radicalization failure because the individual has completed the process to
radicalization and is willing or trying to commit a homegrown terrorist attack. Moreover,
officials seem in many cases to lack goals that are specific to countering radicalization,
instead framing effectiveness in terms of the wider counterterrorism goal. There must be an
unambiguous separation between benchmarks appropriate for counterterrorism and those for
counter-radicalization. Members of Congress should push for government agencies for more
information regarding how they define success for their counter-radicalization, rather than
accept indicators like number of offices or number of analysts, which have dubious
correlation even to counterterrorism success.
4) Understand the limits of quantitative metrics
There are limits to the insights that Congress and government officials can glean from
quantitative metrics for counter-radicalization. In the quantitative analysis I have presented, I
1
Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Security Investigations, and the Collection
of Foreign Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select Committee On Intelligence of the United States Senate, One
Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, September 23, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009.
Islam
90
have shown that quantitative metrics lack great explanatory power in assessing counterradicalization policy. Does the trend in Figure 1 showing a relative decrease from 2002 to
2010 indicate a level of distrust forming between law enforcement and their Muslim
communities? Does this mean that the community engagement initiatives created by law
enforcement and federal agencies are not working? While metrics are necessary for policy,
policymakers should be suspicious of abstruse measures like number of offices or number
community events held. As Bjelopera notes, “counting the number of engagements events is
one thing. It is quite another evaluating their impact.”2 It seems the Obama administration
has already begun to digest this conclusion, stating in its counter-radicalization strategy
implementation plan that “future evaluations will shift away from benchmarks performance
measures towards impact assessments.”3 However, the administration has not defined the
structure of those impact assessments, and so it remains unknown the extent to which
counter-radicalization policies can be measured on a more holistic level, incorporating both
quantitative and qualitative data.
Radicalization continues to be a hot issue for policymakers and academics. The
extrapolation of current homegrown terrorism data to predict the future outlook of the threat
remains difficult if not impossible. The number of terrorism cases in 2011 has already decreased
from the peak numbers seen in 2009 and 2010, but can large groups of American Muslims
radicalize again? And what effect will the US military drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan have
on violent extremism? While some analysts have predicted a deterioration in the security
2
Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.”
Congressional Research Service. 2010, p. 72.
3
Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism In the United
States. [Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2011, p. 6.
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91
situation abroad,4 there is a possibility of a decrease of terrorism at home. Robin Wright, a senior
fellow at the New America Foundation, notes that “Islamist terrorist [is] being spread partly by
the war on terrorism – or actually, by two wars on terrorism, in Iraq and Afghanistan.”5 While
the future is uncertain, homegrown extremism, although a limited problem, remains high on the
public policy agenda and the government as a whole should take steps to clearly convey its
definitions, its policy, and metrics for success.
4
The latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), still classified but leaked to the press, describes reductions in U.S.
forces as a contributor to stalemate in the war and a factor in leading to negative consequences in the aftermath of
the withdrawal. See Schake, Kori. “In Afghanistan, military success and overall failure.” Foreign Policy. January
13, 2012.
5
Wright, Robert. “Who Created Major Hasan?” New York Times Opinion Pages. November 21, 2009.
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Appendix A: Cases of Homegrown Extremism1
Name
Year
Arrested
Citizenship
Muslim
Community
Tip
Al Saoub, Habis
Abdulla
Ford, Patrice
Lumumba
Bilal, Ahmed
Ibrahim
Bilal, Muhammad
Ibrahim
Battle, Jeffrey Leon
2002
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Hawash, Maher
2003
No
Yes
Lewis, October
Martinique
Mandhai, Imran
2003
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Bishop, Charles
2002
Lindh, John Walker
2002
Galab, Faysal
2002
Mosed, Shafal
2002
Taher, Yassein
2002
Goba, Yahya
2002
Alwan, Sahim
2002
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Informant
or
Undercover
Agent
Yes
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
Major Plots2
Portland
Seven3
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Lackawanna
Six
1
This data was compiled from the New America Foundation’s database of homegrown jihadist cases (Available at
http://homegrown.newamerica.net/jihadist), the Southern Poverty Law Center’s intelligence report on terrorism
(Available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/fall/ten-yearsafter/30-terrorist-attacks-an), and the Congressional Research report on American Jihadist Terrorism (Available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf).
2
In the cases where there was a serious plot in formation or where a group of individuals conspired to form a plot
together, the plot is identified.
3
Two members of the group, Maher Hawash and October Lewis, were arrested a year later from the others in 2003,
but are presented with the other members in the table.
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100
al-Bakri, Mukhtar
2002
Derwish, Kamal
2002
Elbaneh, Jaber A.
2003
Padilla, Jose
2002
Ujaama, James
2002
al-Marri, Ali
Osman, Semi
2002
2002
Hassoun, Adham
2002
Hadayet, Hesham
Mohamed
Jokhan, Shueyb
Mossa
Khan, Majid
Kwon, Yong Ki
2002
Royer, Randall
2003
Abdur-Raheem,
Caliph Basha
Chapman, Seifullah
2003
Benkhala, Sabri
2003
2002
2002
2003
2003
Hasan, Mahmood
2003
Khwaja
Aatique, Muhammed 2003
Abdur-Raheem,
Hammad
Surratt, Donald
Thomas
Al-Timmi, Ali
2003
Chandia, Ali Asad
2003
Khan, Masaud
2003
Al-Hamdi, Ibrahim
2003
2003
2003
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Student visa
Legal
resident
Illegal
resident
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
Refugee
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Lackawanna
Six accomplice
Dirty bomb
plot
Virginia
Paintball Plot
Islam
101
Paracha, Uzair
2003
Akbar, Hasan
2003
Abdi, Nuradin
Faris, Iyman
2003
2003
Lewis, October
Martinique
Cousins, Clifton L.
2003
Elshafay, James
2004
Siraj, Shahawar
Matin
Warsame,
Mohammed
Abdullah
Babar, Mohammed
2004
resident
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
No
No
No
No
Refugee
Naturalized
citizen
No
No
No
No
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Illegal
resident
Legal
resident
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
2004
Legal
resident
No
No
al Saoub, Habis
Abdulla
Anderson, Ryan
2004
No
No
No
Yes
Aref, Yassin
Muhiddin
Hossain, Mohammed
Mosharref
Ali, Ahmed Omar
Abu
Samana, Hammad
2004
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
Refugee
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Patterson, Gregory
2005
No
No
James, Kevin
2005
No
No
Washington, Levar
2005
No
No
Shah, Tarik
2005
No
Yes
Hayat, Hamid
2005
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
No
Yes
2003
2004
2004
2004
2003
2005
Attack on US
soldiers in
Kuwait
Brooklyn
Bridge
bombing plot
Herald Square
subway
bombing plot
Bush
assassination
plot
Albany
mosque plot
Jamiyyat UlIslam IsSaheeh – Plot
to attack
southern
California
targets
Islam
102
Jayyousi, Kifah
2005
Sabir, Rafiq
2005
Chandia, Ali Asad
2005
alMutazzim, Mahmud
Faruq Brent
Gadahn, Adam
2005
Sadequee, Ehsanul
Islam
Ahmed, Syed Haris
2005
Amawi, Mohammad
Zaki
El-Hindi, Marwan
Othman
Mazloum, Wassim I.
2005
Taheri-Azar,
Mohammed Reza
Phanor, Stanley
Grant
Batiste, Narseal
2005
Abraham, Patrick
2006
Herrera, Naudimar
2006
Augustin, Burson
2006
Lemorin, Lyglenson
2006
Augustine, Rotschild
2006
Williams, Kobie
Diallo
Shah, Syed Maaz
2006
Qazi, Shiraz Syed
2006
Mirza, Adnan Baber
2006
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. Born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Illegal
immigrant
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Pakistani
national
Pakistani
national
Pakistani
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Washington
DC building
bombing plot
Toledo, Ohio
Plotters
UNC vehicular
murder plot
Liberty City
Seven – Plot to
bomb Sears
Tower
Islam
103
Shareef, Derrick
2006
Haq, Naveed
2006
Farhane,
Abdulrahman
Hashmi, Syed
2006
Ahmed, Zubair
2007
Ahmed, Khaleel
2007
Maldonado, Daniel
2007
Duka, Dritan
2007
Duka, Shain
2007
Duka, Eljvir
2007
Tatar, Serdar
2007
Abdullahu, Agron
2007
Shnewer, Mohamad
Ibrahim
Defreitas, Russell
2007
Paul, Christopher
2007
Hall, Paul
2007
Ahmed, Khaleel
2007
Vinas, Bryant Neal
2008
Shumpert, Ruben L.
2008
Siddiqui, Aafia
Bana, Jamal Sheikh
2008
2008
2006
2007
national
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. Born
citizen
Illegal
resident
Illegal
resident
Illegal
resident
Legal
resident
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Plot to attack
Rockford,
Illinois
shopping mall
Toledo Plot
accomplices
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
U.S. born
No
citizen
Student visa No
Naturalized No
citizen
Fort Dix Plot
JFK jet fuel
bombing plot
Long Island
Railroad
bombing plot
Yes
No
No
Islam
104
Ahmed, Shirwa
2008
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
No
No
Cromitie, James
2009
No
Yes
Williams, David
2009
No
Yes
Williams, Onta
2009
No
Yes
Payen, Laguerre
2009
No
Yes
Muhammad,
Abdulhakim
2009
No
No
Boyd, Daniel Patrick
2009
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
No
Yes
Sherifi, Hysen
2009
No
Yes
Subasic, Anes
2009
No
Yes
Boyd, Zakaria
2009
No
Yes
Boyd, Dylan
2009
No
Yes
Hassan, Mohammad
Omar Aly
Mohammad, Jude
Kenan
Yaghi, Ziyad
2009
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Kaziu, Betim
2009
No
No
Zazi, Najibullah
2009
No
No
Finton, Michael
2009
No
Yes
Smadi, Hosam
2009
Illegal
resident
No
Yes
Abousamra, Ahmed
2009
U.S. born
citizen
No
Yes
2009
2009
Newburgh
Four
Shooting at
Little Rock,
Arkansas
military
recruiting
center
Quantico base
bombing plot
NYC subway
bombing plot
Plot to bomb
Springfield, IL
federal
building
Plot to bomb
Dallas, TX
skyscraper
Plot to
Islam
105
Mehanna, Tarek
2009
U.S. born
citizen
No
Yes
Headley, David
2009
U.S. born
citizen
No
No
Hasan, Nidal Malik
2009
No
No
Chaudhry, Umar
2009
Yes
No
Zamzam, Ramy
2009
Yes
No
Minni, Ahmad A.
2009
Yes
No
Khan, Waqar
2009
Yes
No
Yemer, Aman
Hassan
Salat, Mustafa
2009
Yes
No
No
No
Omar, Ahmed Ali
2009
No
No
Maruf, Zakaria
2009
No
No
Ahmed, Salah
Osman
Abshir, Khalid
Mohamud
Hassan, Mohamed
Abdullahi
Isse, Abdiweli
Yassin
Faarax, Cabdullaahi
Ahmed
Isse, Abdifatah
Yusuf
Kastigar, Troy
Matthew
LaRose, Colleen
2009
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Shahzad, Faisal
2010
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
Legal
resident
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
No
No
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
assassinate US
politicians and
attack
shopping malls
Plot to attack
Jyllands-Posten
newspaper
offices
Fort Hood
shooting
Five northern
Virginia men
to Pakistan
Attempted car
bombing in
Times Square
Islam
106
Alessa, Mohamed
2010
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Yes
Yes
Almonte, Carlos
2010
Yes
Yes
Rockwood, Paul
2010
No
No
Chesser, Zachary
2010
No
No
Morton, Jesse Curtis
2010
No
No
Masri, Shaker
2010
No
Yes
Jehad, Mostafa
2010
No
No
Hammami, Omar
2010
No
No
Shehadeh, Abdel
Hameed
Ahmed, Farooque
2010
No
No
No
Yes
Mohamud,
Mohamed Osman
2010
U.S. born
citizen
Yes
Yes
Martinez, Antonio
2010
U.S. born
citizen
Yes
Yes
Aldawsari, Khalid
Ali-M
Ferhani, Ahmed
2010
No
No
No
Yes
Mamdouh,
Mohamed
Ali, Abdisalan
2010
No
Yes
No
No
elShukrijumah, Adnan
Ahmedzay, Zarein
2010
No
No
No
No
Hasanoff, Sabirhan
2010
Legal
resident
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
No
No
2010
2010
2010
2010
Plot to bomb
Washington
DC subway
stations
Plot to detonate
van packed
with explosives
in Portland
Plot to attack a
Maryland
armed force
recruiting
station
Plot to bomb
US targets
Plot to attack
New York City
targets
Islam
107
al-Hanafi, Wasam
2010
Doreh, Issa
2010
Shahzad, Faisal
2010
Medunjanin, Adis
2010
Abdi, Abikadir Ali
2010
Bujol, Barry
2010
Mohamud, Ahmed
Nasir Taalil
Yusuf, Mohamud
Abdi
Yusuf, Nima Ali
2010
Ouazzani, Khaled
2010
Khan, Raja Lahrasib
2010
2010
2010
Hussein, Abdi Mahdi 2010
Mobley, Sharif
2010
Paulin-Ramirez,
Jamie
Awlaki, Anwar
2010
Melaku, Yonathan
2011
Abdul-Latif, Abu
Khalid
Mujahidh, Walli
2011
Begolly, Emerson
2011
Abdo, Naser
2011
2010
2011
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
Refugee
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Legal
resident
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Legal
resident
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
U.S. born
citizen
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
U.S. born
citizen
No
No
Plot to shoot
targets in
Washington
DC
Plot to Attack
Seattle Military
Processing
Center
Plot to
encourage
jihadist acts in
the US
Plot to attack
targets near
Fort Hood
Islam
108
Hasbajrami, Agron
2011
Legal
resident
U.S. born
citizen
No
No
Ferdaus, Rezwan
2011
No
Yes
Hammadi, Mohanad
Shareef
Khan, Hafiz
2011
Refugee
No
Yes
2011
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Refugee
No
No
Khan, Irfan
2011
No
No
Pimentel, Jose
2011
No
Yes
Orbach, Oded
2011
No
No
Alwan, Waad
Ramadan
Brice, Joseph Jeffrey
2011
No
Yes
U.S. born
citizen
Naturalized
citizen
Legal
resident
No
No
Pouryan, Alwar
2011
No
No
Khalid, Mohammad
Hassan
2011
No
No
2011
Plot to fight in
Pakistan
Plot to attack
US Capitol and
Pentagon
Islam
109
Appendix B: Congressional Hearings on Radicalization
Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government Affairs
Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States. Hearing
Before the Committee On Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Senate, One Hundred
Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held December 7, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.,
2012.
Intelligence Reform--2010: Hearings Before the Committee On Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second
Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.
Violent Islamist Extremism: al-Shabaab Recruitment in America. Hearing Before the Committee
On Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First
Session, Hearing Held March 11, 2009. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010.
The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It: Hearing Before the
Committee On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One
Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, July 10, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009.
Violent Islamist Extremism, 2007: Hearings Before the Committee On Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First
Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009.
House Committee on Homeland Security
Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response:
Hearing Before the Committee On Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred
Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 10, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
The Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in US Prison: Hearing Before the Committee On
Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session,
June 15, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
Al Shahaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the
Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee On Homeland Security, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, July 27, 2011. Washington: U.S.
G.P.O, 2012.
Violent Extremism: How Are People Moved From Constitutionally-protected Thought to Acts of
Terrorism? : Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee On Homeland Security, House of Representatives,
Islam
110
One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, December 15, 2009. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.,
2011.
Federal Government Intelligence Sharing with State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement: An
Assessment Ten Years After 9/11. Hearings Before the Committee On Homeland Security, House
of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, February, 28
2012. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2012.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before the
Committee on Intelligence, Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held
January 31, 2012. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
Joint Hearing to Mark the 10th Anniversary of 9/11, Committee on Intelligence, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held September 13,
2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
The State of Intelligence Reform Ten Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the House Committee on
Intelligence, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 6, 2011.
Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
Homeland Security and Intelligence: Next Steps in Evolving the Mission. Hearing Before the
Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First
Session, Hearing Held January 18, 2012. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
Domestic Threat Intelligence, House Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred Twelfth
Congress, First Session, Hearing Held October 4, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2012.
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Web Sites: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, September 29,
2010. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2010.
House Committee on Armed Services
Understanding Cyberspace As a Medium for Radicalization and Counter-radicalization:
Hearing Before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee of the
Committee On Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress,
First Session, Hearing Held December 16, 2009.Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010.
Islam
111