A New Perspective on Sympathy and Its Cultivation, with Insights from the Confucian
Tradition
by
Jing Hu
Department of Philosophy
Duke University
Date:_______________________
Approved:
___________________________
David Wong, Co-Supervisor
___________________________
Owen Flanagan, Co-Supervisor
___________________________
Michael Ferejohn
___________________________
Wayne Norman
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, in the Department of
Philosophy in the Graduate School
of Duke University
2017
ABSTRACT
A New Perspective on Sympathy and Its Cultivation, with Insights from the Confucian
Tradition
by
Jing Hu
Department of Philosophy
Duke University
Date:_______________________
Approved:
___________________________
David Wong, Co-Supervisor
___________________________
Owen Flanagan, Co-Supervisor
___________________________
Michael Ferejohn
___________________________
Wayne Norman
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Philosophy in the Graduate School of
Duke University
2017
Copyright by
Jing Hu
2017
Abstract
My dissertation aims to show that sympathy, when well-cultivated, is adequate
to motivate and produce altruistic behavior in a consistent and reliable manner. I do so
by creating a dialogue between the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions. I
define sympathy as a four-dimensional emotion—including perceptive, visceral,
motivational and cognitive aspects. I argue that sympathy in its mature stage is capable
of motivating people in a consistent manner, and its role in morality cannot be replaced
by other emotions. In addition, I argue that the leap from an unstable reaction to a
mature, consistent and reliable emotion is made through proper cultivation.
Cultivational methods such as ritual practice, rational persuasion, self-cultivation, etc.
are discussed and evaluated. I also discuss the limitations of sympathy and its
cultivation towards the end of the dissertation.
iv
Dedication
To grandpa.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... x
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ xi
1. Introduction: A Project on Sympathy ............................................................................. 1
1.1 Why Should We Study Sympathy?........................................................................... 1
1.2 Why Now? ................................................................................................................ 2
1.3 What is Special about This Project? ......................................................................... 3
1.3.1 Bridging the East and the West.......................................................................... 4
1.3.2 Seeking the Missing Piece: From a Problematic Emotion to a Cardinal Virtue 6
1.4 The Primitive VS Mature Form of Sympathy .......................................................... 8
1.5 This Project’s Tasks ................................................................................................ 11
2. Sympathy Redefined ..................................................................................................... 14
2.1 Why Do We Need Yet a New Definition? .............................................................. 14
2.2 ‘Sympathy’ and ‘Empathy’ in History ................................................................... 16
2.2.1 ‘Sympathy’ ....................................................................................................... 17
2.2.2 ‘Empathy’ ......................................................................................................... 18
2.3 Sympathy/Empathy Today— 5 Reasons Why We Couldn’t Reach a Unified
Definition ...................................................................................................................... 20
2.4 A Stipulated Definition of Sympathy in This Project ............................................. 29
vi
3. An Analysis of the Primitive Form of Sympathy .......................................................... 35
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 35
3.2 An Interpretation of Mencius 2A6 .......................................................................... 36
3.3 The Contexts and the Subject of Sympathy—A General Response ...................... 38
3.4 The Cognitive Component, Perception of Distress and Eliciting Condition ......... 40
3.4.1 An Evolutionary Perspective ............................................................................ 42
3.4.2 A Discussion of Hoffman’s 5 Modes of Empathetic Arousal ........................... 44
3.5 The Affective Aspect/ “I Feel Your Pain” .............................................................. 49
3.6 The Motivational Component — Dictates No Specific Action.............................. 51
3.7 The Mencian Triplet .............................................................................................. 53
3.7.1 The Mencian Perceptive-Affective-Motive Triplet.......................................... 54
3.7.2 Shared Representation..................................................................................... 56
3.7.3 Action-specific Perception Theory ................................................................... 59
3.8 The High Cognitive Activities as a Part of Ceyin zhi xin .......................................... 61
3.9 The Russian Doll Model ......................................................................................... 63
3.10 No Ulterior Motives and Suddenness in 2A6 ....................................................... 67
3.11 Sympathizing with the Beasts ............................................................................... 71
3.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 73
4. Cultivating Sympathy ................................................................................................... 75
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 75
4.2 From Sparing an Ox to Benevolent Policy-Making ............................................... 77
4.2.1 Mencius 1A7 .................................................................................................... 77
4.2.2 From an Ox to the King's People—3 Dimensions .......................................... 78
vii
4.2.3 Does the King Possess the Primitive Form of Sympathy? ............................... 81
4.2.4 Toward the Mature Form of Sympathy .......................................................... 84
4.3 Sympathetic Perception .......................................................................................... 89
4.3.1 To See VS. To Apprehend .............................................................................. 90
4.3.2 Strengthen Basic Sensitivity ............................................................................. 94
4.3.3 To Learn and Recognize Suffering Clues........................................................ 99
4.3.4 Understanding Others' Perspective – Stepping into Others' Shoes ............... 100
4.3.5 Caring and Beliefs .......................................................................................... 106
4.3.6 Pattern Matching ........................................................................................... 108
4.4 Additional Important Factors in Cultivating Sympathy ....................................... 110
4.4.1 Commitment to Ethical Cultivation .............................................................. 110
4.4.2 Verbal Persuasion .......................................................................................... 111
4.4.3 Constancy ...................................................................................................... 115
4.4.4 Actions One Frequently Performs ................................................................. 115
4.4.5 Ritual Practice................................................................................................ 117
5. Prinz’s “Empathy” Revisited ...................................................................................... 119
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 119
5.2 Prinz’s “Empathy” Revisited ................................................................................ 121
5.3 Emotion Sharing VS. Other-oriented Emotion Congruent with the Other’s
Situation ...................................................................................................................... 122
5.4 Matching Mental State ......................................................................................... 127
5.5 “Concern” and “Empathy”, Prinz on Batson’s Choice of Terms ........................ 131
6. Sympathy and Morality .............................................................................................. 139
viii
6.1 Introduction and the Objectives ........................................................................... 139
6.2 Sympathy as an Altruistic Motivator .................................................................... 141
6.2.1 Weak in Motivation? MFS and the Cultivation of Sympathy ...................... 142
6.2.2 Sympathy’s Motivational Function in High-Cost Altruistic Behaviors ......... 144
6.2.3 Does “Weak Emotion” Always Issue Weak Motivation? .............................. 151
6.2.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 158
6.3 Sympathy’s Epistemic Function and Its Importance in Moral Judgment Making159
6.4 Sympathy’s Function in Moral Education & Breaking Social Barriers ................ 164
6.5 Sympathy, Anger, and Shame .............................................................................. 169
6.6 Is Anger a Better Moral Emotion? ........................................................................ 170
6.7 Sympathy and Tolerance ...................................................................................... 173
6.8 Limitations and Project Conclusion...................................................................... 176
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 180
Biography ........................................................................................................................ 187
ix
List of Figures
Figure 1: The Russian Doll Model illustrates the structural relationship between PAM
and more sophisticated cognitive abilities. The outer layers of the doll, namely the
sophisticated cognitive capacities, always stays connected to its inner core of PAM.
Figure replicated from de Waal 2008. ..................................................................................... 66
x
Acknowledgements
This is not the most important part of a dissertation, but I have to admit
that I have thought about it a lot. I have always had the idea that one can only
write the acknowledgment after the whole dissertation is finished. It is almost
imperative. I had first imagined that I would write the acknowledgment in the
Perkin’s Library of Duke University, surrounded by a group of freshmen
working on their group project from organic chemistry. In the years I have been
working on this project, my imagination of writing this acknowledgment
changed many times. Sometimes the undergraduate students were not there;
sometimes they were dressed in blue to celebrate a Duke basketball win. Now
that I think about it, it is a ridiculous idea. To write the acknowledgment after I
finish writing the dissertation I mean, not wearing blue to celebrate a win. It is
ridiculous because writing a “thank you” note six years after I started this project
means that I will almost definitely miss some who I am deeply grateful of. I
wholeheartedly thank the individuals and institutes from whom/which I have
received generous help from. Please know that if your name slipped my mind at
this moment, your help is deeply appreciated. As a matter of fact, if you are
reading my dissertation and this acknowledgment, I probably meant to thank
you.
xi
My thanks go to my advisors David Wong and Owen Flanagan. Without
them, this project would not have been possible. Through the years, David and
Owen have offered me many helpful comments on my earlier drafts of this
project and the many versions of its proposal. Some of the ideas in this project
are inspired by David’s work, the long chats we had during my independent
studies and our regular meetings. From working with David as a teaching
assistant, I have learned how to be a patient teacher who understands students’
perspectives and different temperaments. I am also deeply grateful for the help I
have received from Owen, who gave me some of the most critical comments
regarding not only this project but also my career. It is impossible to summarize
my gratitude to them in a few sentences after knowing and working with them
for so long. Perhaps the least I can say is that David and Owen are amongst the
people who greatly influence my intellectual life and my life in general; they will
always be my role models, as philosophers and as teachers.
I would also like to thank my committee member Michael Ferejohn, who
has taught me most of the things I know about of ancient Greek philosophy and
has led me through my first job market year. Wayne Norman for the positivity
he brought to me and the project, the helpful comments I received—and not to
forget, for writing a song about the Mencian four sprouts and human nature.
xii
I would also like to take this chance to thank the philosophy department
at Duke, for having me as a part of it and making me feel a part of it. I want to
thank Gopal Sreenivasan and Karen Neander for being amazing DGS (Director
of Graduate Studies), I also want to thank Janelle Haynes, for being incredibly
helpful since the day I landed in Durham. Thank you, my fellow graduate
students, for attending my Work-in-Progress seminars and dissertation seminar.
My friends in Durham: Antong Liu, Bre Kerchner, Carlos Mariscal, Daniela
Miteva, Daniel Stephens, Heather Mayer, James Ong, John Park, Lok Chen, Ming
Lei, Nathaniel Gindele, Steve Martin, Susan Meyer, Yang Yu, Wenqing Zhao,
and Galip Gurkan Yardimci, thank you all for keeping me in good spirit.
During my research, I have received generous financial support from the
James B. Duke Fellowship and the Summer Research Scholarship from Fred and
Barbara H. Sutherland Fellowship Endowment.
Lastly, I’d like to thank my parents and my family for their unwavering
support. In the year of 1994, when my uncle Dr. Ye called us from Palermo, Italy
where he worked as a surgeon, he told my cousins and me who were in China
that, he knew it, there will be a doctor in each generation of our family. “There
will be one in your generation too,” he said on the phone from the other side of
the globe. When he said that, he did not mean a doctor in philosophy, nor did he
have his eyes on me. After all, he is right.
xiii
Chapter 1
1. Introduction: A Project on Sympathy
The subject of this project is sympathy,1 an emotion that attracts philosophical minds for
its ability to make people feel the pain of others, to urge people towards helpful behavior,
and to enable people to take perspectives other than their own. The project concerns
many aspects of sympathy, such as the cultivation of sympathy, which has been examined
closely in both Western and East Asian philosophical traditions. I hope to gather insights
by studying not only the Western ethical theories on sympathy but also the early
Confucian and Mencian ideas such as ceyin zhi xin.2 In the following sections of this
chapter, several issues that motivate this project’s inquiries are discussed before outlining
the main questions this project seeks to answer.
1.1 Why Should We Study Sympathy?
The rich and intriguing philosophical literature on sympathy piques philosophical
curiosity. Great thinkers discussed sympathy at length: Some tried to build a whole
freestanding ethical and political system upon sympathy [e.g. Adam Smith]; some argued
that it can be cultivated into one of the cardinal virtues. The epistemic function of
1
How sympathy is defined is addressed in chapter 2.
Ceyin zhi xin, sometimes translated as the heart of compassion, of commiseration. In my project,
I take it to denote a sympathetic response to others in distress, see chapter 2 and 3 for a
discussion of ceyin zhi xin.
2
1
sympathy is also celebrated: By providing accesses to others’ minds that are distinct yet
similar to that of our own, sympathy3 helps us to “Know ourselves!” in addition to “Know
thyself”. Being one of the most celebrated and ancient gifts humans possess, sympathy has
never ceased drawing academic interest throughout human intellectual history.
In today’s academic world, how to understand sympathy is the subject of heated
debate. Aside from the Aristotelian tradition’s discussion on compassion and the
sentimentalist tradition’s continuing interest in sympathy, empirical studies on this subject
also blossomed in the recent decades. Many philosophical questions revolving around
sympathy arise; some are ages-old, and some are new. What is sympathy? What is
sympathy’s role in morality? Does it pose an obstacle for fairness and justice? Is sympathy
a
good
guide
to
contemporary
ethical
questions
resulting
from
emerging
medical/technological development? I aim to address some of the questions here.
1.2 Why Now?
A cross-cultural study of sympathy is especially called for in the modern, interconnected
globe we live in and share with each other. Globalization brings us chances to interact
and cooperate with people who were not previously accessible due to geographical
remoteness. Nowadays, frequent intercontinental flights connect the world in ways it has
never been before. Technologies such as online video sharing and cloud computing are
spreading information over the mountains and the sea. Emerging new technologies help
to bridge geographic distances, but geographic barriers are not only obstacles that
Throughout the project I mainly use ‘sympathy’ to denote the emotion that is the subject of this
project. I occasionally mention studies done under the term empathy, compassion, and pity. The
differences between these terms are addressed and discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
3
2
separate people. Humans, separated by the mountains and the sea before, have
developed different cultures and customs. Can they now truly understand one another?
Can they truly understand others who have different table manners, family structures,
religious beliefs, and different looks? A study of sympathy may reveal some of the answers.
After all, if sympathy is an ancient gift, so ancient that humans possessed it before the
mountains and the sea separated them; perhaps it could help reunite them now that the
geographical obstacles cease to be.
The empirical research in both psychology and neuroscience allow us to take
advantage of this body of literature as well. Philosophers stand a better chance than ever
at uncovering not only the nature of this emotion but also its role in human psychology
and in morality. My project is one of the many that set off to ride the tides of this wave of
groundbreaking empirical studies.
1.3 What is Special about This Project?
This project is a cross-culture one that looks at both the Eastern and Western
philosophical tradition. Drawing insights form the early Confucian thinkers, it seeks to
address sympathy’s function in contemporary moral practice and normative theory. It
bridges different philosophical traditions and brings in a dynamic outlook on sympathy.
By viewing sympathy as a changing process that can be cultivated, this project adds a
missing piece into our understanding of the emotion’s value; it outlines the trajectory
from a fleeting emotion to a cardinal virtue.
3
1.3.1 Bridging the East and the West
A cross-culture study of sympathy helps us to better understand a number of issues.
Through contrast, we can begin to understand the “raw” emotion of sympathy, or its
essence, before cultures have shaped the emotion to various forms. Furthermore, the
ancient Confucian thinkers such as Confucius and Mencius never had a chance to discuss
their insights with their contemporary philosophers in Greece. This study aims to create
such a dialogue. The early Confucian thinkers, especially Mencius, had many valuable
ideas about human nature and moral psychology that strike us as plausible and insightful
when tested against findings of contemporary empirical studies. The Confucian ethical
system is frequently compared with Aristotelian virtue ethics not only because of their
period
of
origin
but
also
because
of
their
similar
interests
in
virtues,
cultivation/habituation of virtues and human flourishing in general. How does Aristotle’s
understanding of “habituation” differ from the Confucian cultivation of virtues? What
are the specific methods of cultivating sympathy/compassion according to ancient wise
minds? This project offers such a “dialogue” between the two traditions.
The benefits and significance of such a dialogue are two ways. On one hand, it
helps the Western tradition to learn from its parallel traditions. Not only can we take
insightful ideas from Mencius and other Eastern thinkers but also, we could reflect upon
our methodology. Such reflection may lead us to question some of the most fundamental
assumptions in the history of Western philosophy. For the former, Michael Slote has
offered several compelling reasons of why we should learn (and what we could learn) from
the Confucian tradition in “The Philosophical Reset Button: A Manifesto.”4 For the
4
Michael Slote, “The Philosophical Reset Button,” Dao 14, no. 1 (2015): 1-11.
4
latter, David Wong points out in “Growing Virtues” 5 that the Eastern philosophical
tradition does not make a sharp distinction between reason and emotion, as the Western
philosophical tradition does. The dichotomy starting from Plato is deeply ingrained in
Western mainstream philosophy: Reason/rationality is superior to emotions; they keep
the chaotic emotions in check. The 18th century sentimentalists think the opposite is the
dominant partner in the dichotomy, as the iconic statement from Hume suggested
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (T II.3.3 415). 6 Despite their
difference in believing whether reason or emotion is dominant, the dichotomy persists.
Thinkers in certain non-Western traditions on the other hand, free from the constrains
posed by said dichotomy, face a richer set of possibilities in interpreting emotions,
motivations and the cultivating of emotions. Therefore, we should learn from our parallel
traditions about such interpretations that are free from the reason/emotion dichotomy;
and perhaps further question this assumed dichotomy that has been challenged by recent
discoveries in psychology and neuroscience.
On the other hand, my project updates our understanding of the early Confucian
ideas such as ceyin zhi xin (
), bu ren ren zhi xin (
), and the cultivational
methods with the contemporary empirical studies. My work thus further provides us
chances to gain a deeper understanding of the ancient philosophers’ insights.
David Wong, "Growing Virtue: The Theory and Science of Developing Compassion from a
Mencian Perspective" in The Philosophical Challenge from China, ed. Brian Bruya (MIT Press, 2015),
23-24.
6 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), II.3.3 415. This iconic statement does not accurately reflect Hume’s
thoughts, a lot would argue, but nonetheless showcases one typical view.
5
5
1.3.2 Seeking the Missing Piece: From a Problematic Emotion to a
Cardinal Virtue
Virtues related to sympathy (e.g. compassion, and benevolence/ren) are frequently praised
in secular and religious contexts. However, the emotion of sympathy is sometimes not
trusted in philosophical theories as a reliable motivator. Sometimes this is due to the fact
that it is an emotion, which in general should not be trusted to some. For example, Kant
states that when “…a universal law the human race could admittedly very well subsist, no
doubt [is] even better than when everyone prates about sympathy and benevolence and
even exerts himself to practice them occasionally, but on the other hand also cheats where
he can, sells the right of human beings or otherwise infringes upon it.” (4:423)7 Sympathy
is obviously not very reliable to Kant as it only performs occasionally and allows one to
“cheats where he can, sells the right of human beings or otherwise infringes upon it.”
When describing that anyone in the right mind will certainly choose reason over altruistic
emotions, Kant further states that sympathy and general benevolence are useful yet
burdensome inclinations.8 Are we wrong about sympathy being a reliable motivator?
What accounts for the gap between the unstable/unreliable emotion and a cardinal virtue?
This project offers an answer.
Although many thinkers were impressed by how strongly sympathy can motivate
people, few of them went so far as to claim sympathy alone was adequate for an altruistic
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. And ed. Mary Gregor, with an
introduction Christine M. Korsgaard (Cambridge University Press: 1998)
7
Ibid., 101. Kant states, “there is no one - not even the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is
otherwise accustomed to use reason — who, when one sets before him examples of honesty of
purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even
combined with great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he might also be so
disposed. He cannot indeed bring this about in himself, though only because of his inclinations
and impulses; yet at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations, which are
burdensome to himself.”
8
6
grounding of morality. The reason for this is seemingly self-evident: Emotions, including
sympathy, are often considered unstable and being subject to many morally irrelevant
factors (such as one’s mood, one’s physical condition, physical distance between the agent
and the object, etc.). It is argued that as powerful as sympathy is, it should not be trusted
with the role of motivation for altruistic behavior.
Furthermore, philosophers differ in their opinions when it comes to what kind of
power sympathy has. The debate has been going on for centuries, with one side asserting
that sympathy or compassion can be a major moral or altruistic motivator, while the
other side criticizing them for being inconsistent and unreliable. This debate is alive and
well in our own times. Michael Slote promotes ethics of care, in which gender and ethnic
discrimination would diminish while tolerance will prevail. 9⁠ If we can sympathize more
with people with different problems, people from different backgrounds, wouldn’t the
world be a better place? Regarding the role of sympathy, the middle ground may be that
sympathy needs guidelines. We certainly cannot do without sympathy, yet sympathy is
not all that is required for laying the moral foundation of an individual. This seems to be
a reasonable and safe-if-not-creative take on the matter. However, some philosophers
disagree with this statement as well. For example, the contemporary philosopher Jesse
Prinz argues that sympathy is not necessary for morality. Prinz criticizes sympathy for
being highly selective yet weak in its motivating power. ⁠ What accounts for the huge
differences with regarding to sympathy’s value in the abovementioned theories? The
cultivation of sympathy, I argue, is the missing link between the spontaneous, unreliable
and fleeting sympathy and the celebrated virtue of benevolence.
9
Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (Routledge, 2007), 10-15.
7
Water flows downwards; seeds grow into trees and flowers. Emotions change and
“grow” too. The cultivation of sympathy, a process emphasized in both the Aristotelian
tradition (known as habituation) and the Mencian tradition, is the central subject of this
project and also the missing piece I bring into our understanding of sympathy. This
missing piece enables the leap from an unstable, biased primitive sympathetic response to
a mature, consistent and reliable emotion. Through proper cultivation, sympathy can be
transformed into its mature stage, which becomes a reliable moral guide. When studying
sympathy’s function and value in morality, this missing piece may not help us solve the
entire jigsaw puzzle, but certainly leaves important clues.
1.4 The Primitive VS Mature Form of Sympathy
Following the last section’s topic of the cultivation of sympathy, I make an
important distinction here. I draw the distinction between a natural and uncultivated
form of sympathy and a well-cultivated form of sympathy. By doing so, I hope to illustrate
both the nature form of sympathy and the function of cultivation.
The cultivation process, which I claim has the power of transferring the natural
and raw material of sympathy into a consistent and reliable virtue, calls for close scrutiny.
This is one of the tasks this project takes upon. To better study this process, I make an
important distinction: The Primitive Form of Sympathy (PFS) and the Mature Form of
Sympathy (MFS).
The term “mature form of sympathy” may seem a little strange at the first glance.
In everyday life we call someone sympathetic if that person cares for others, feels others’
pain, and tries to be helpful to others. There are people who show more sympathy than
8
others; and there are people who show less, or little sympathy. However, rarely do we say
that one shows a mature form of sympathy or that one has sympathy, but in a very
immature form. The distinction between relatively mature and primitive or immature
form of sympathy is crucial in this project. Sympathy, as a quality of an individual, is a
changing process rather than a static one. How people exhibit sympathy not only varies
among individuals but also varies throughout one particular individual’s childhood,
adolescence, and adulthood. Even after one enters adulthood, this process of change does
not necessarily stop.10 In this project, I use the phrase “the mature form of sympathy” to
refer to an individual’s sympathy if it is properly-cultivated and well-toned.
The
cultivating methods are examined and discussed in Chapter 4, which ends with an
account of the MFS.
A glimpse into the MFS tells us that it has the following characteristics:
Sympathetic Perception:
The MFS includes the capacity of perceiving a situation sympathetically. Scholars
have studied properties of sympathy that apply to MFS. Lawrence Blum calls it
“apprehension” of a situation;13 Nancy Sherman calls it a “practical reason as a kind of
perception, as a way of judging or construing the case prior to deciding how to act”.14
One must have a sympathetic perspective to perceive others as in need of help or in
distress—this sympathetic perspective involves an affective aspect. It is through this
affective aspect one perceives not only the operative information of a scene but gives
priorities to others’ pain and distress. The affective aspect of the perception allows one to
see and feel others’ distress. The way one perceives a situation, or one’s “take” on a
particular situation, determines a large part of how one would act in response to the
9
situation.15 Without this ability, one would not be able to see other’s pain accurately, let
alone feel other’s pain.
Individuals with MFS, when in a normal physical and
psychological state, are able to appreciate others’ distress, picking up important clues
indicating distress and constructing a situation as one that calls for help.16 If one cannot
see and feel other’s pain when the pain was fairly obvious, one cannot be said to be a
sympathetic person despite one’s willingness or even eagerness to help.
Stable State:
Sympathy in its mature form would arise in a consistent manner. In the case of
someone who occasionally exhibits sympathetic behavior, or someone who acts helpfully
out of a whim, we cannot conclude such a person is a sympathetic person, or to be
accurate, possesses the MFS. What accounts for this stability is one’s capacity related to
sympathy (such as sympathetic perception), one’s regulating of emotions, and one’s
altruistic beliefs. With these in place, one’s sympathetic responses will exhibit a pattern,
instead of being fleeting.
Motivation:
The MFS comes with altruistic motivations. Upon detecting clues of distress, the
one with the MFS would gain motivation to help or comfort the distressed.
Emotion Regulation:
An individual with the MFS can properly evaluate a situation. She is able to
compare different situations and consult her beliefs so as to regulate her sympathy. An
individual with MFS could regulate her sympathy and consult her other faculties such as
an evaluation of the situation, her believes about social justice, and her other emotions
such as anger at the unjust and her understand of the responsibility.
10
Perhaps now is a good time to answer this question: Is one’s possession of PFS or
MFS merely a matter of degree in sympathy? It is not. Nor is it the case that the “more”
sympathy the better. Excessive sympathy may cloud one’s judgment and compromise one
ability of behaving altruistically. For example, an adequate amount of sympathy to
victims helps one to stay emotionally connected yet not overwhelmed; excessive sympathy
on the other hand may undermine one’s role as a helper. Think of the doctors and nurses
in a war time hospital, sympathy for the victims may be what drives them to the
profession yet they cannot allow excessively sympathy in individual cases—which will
undermine their professional performance. The MFS allows one to have adequate
amount of sympathy; it also allows one to make adequate judgments, even when the
judgments are against one’s sympathetic inclination.
Personal Relationship &Community:
MFS is cultivated and fostered within a community and its members. MFS, in
turn, contributes to the flourishing of individuals and their relationship with others. MFS
creates and strengthens interpersonal bonding rather than weakening and diminishing it.
It is one of the key elements towards understanding people with different backgrounds;
sympathy therefore enables a healthy relationship inside and outside of the community.
Besides contributing on the individual level, sympathy in its mature form would also help
in creating an understanding and tolerant environment in society.
1.5 This Project’s Tasks
This project studies sympathy. To be more specific, it studies sympathy in its primitive
stage, in its mature stage and the process that bridges these two stages—the cultivation of
11
sympathy. I examine the following questions in this project:
Q 1: What is Sympathy?
Q 2: What is the Primitive Form of Sympathy? What characteristics does it possess?
Q 3: What is MFS?
Q 4: What are the ways to cultivate PFS into MFS?
Q5: Is MFS attainable?
Q6: What is sympathy’s role in morality?
I examine them in the following order:
Chapter one introduces the theme and questions of the project. It discusses the
uniqueness and significance of such a cross-culture and interdisciplinary project. It also
provides a preliminary answer to Q3. After the questions and objectives are presented,
Chapter two offers a terminological discussion of the terms “sympathy” and “empathy”.
In this chapter I stipulate a working definition of sympathy and explain how relevant
terminological issues are dealt with in the dissertation. After laying down the
terminological groundwork for this philosophical project, Chapter three aims to uncover
the characteristics of The Primitive Form of Sympathy (PFS). It answers Q1 and Q2.
In this chapter, I took Mencius 2A6 as the core case to describe PFS. Based upon
my understanding of PFS in the previous chapter, Chapter four illustrates the
cultivational methods—addressing Q4. It starts with Mencius 1A7. By discussing how
Mencius moves from “Sparing an Ox” to “Benevolent Policy-making” in his
conversation with King Xuan of Qi, I demonstrate that sympathy could be extended to
objects considered less likely to evoke the emotion. Cultivational methods such as
preserving basic sensitivity, learn and recognize suffering clues, verbal persuasion, ritual
practice (see 4.3-4.3) to name but a few, are also discussed. Mostly importantly this
12
chapter gives a philosophical justification that MFS is attainable, thus addressing Q5.
Chapter five defends sympathy against its critics. I argue that sympathy plays an
essential and irreplaceable role in morality, addressing Q6. I further suggest that being
one of the essential moral emotions, sympathy’s role in morality is related to one’s
understanding of human psychology and a boarder account of “human nature”. I thus
conclude the project by restating sympathy’s unique functions in morality. I would also
like to invite thinkers to work on sympathy and other moral emotions from
interdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspectives.
13
Chapter 2
2. Sympathy Redefined
Sympathy is a frequently discussed phenomenon in philosophy in addition to a common
emotion. What the term sympathy means and what it denotes is not without dispute—as
is true of any intensely discussed notion in philosophy. To preempt possible confusion
that may arise from the different usages of ‘sympathy’, this chapter provides a working
definition of it. One may ask, why not use an existing definition of sympathy to describe
the emotion? I argue in the following sections that it is nearly impossible to find a
universal or widely accepted definition of sympathy, not to mention one that fits the
purpose of this project. To support my claim, I briefly survey some of the historical and
contemporary accounts of the terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’, I then discuss the
difficulties in finding a unified or widely accepted definition of the emotion that is the
subject of this project. After providing five reasons of why finding a unified definition of
sympathy/empathy in the existing literature may be an effort in vain, I stipulate my own
definition of sympathy based on the core case of Mencius 2A6 in the second half of the
chapter. This chapter thus lays down the terminological groundwork for the rest of this
dissertation. It provides a definition of sympathy, and thus paves the way for the
discussion of the primitive form, the mature form, and the cultivation of sympathy.
2.1 Why Do We Need Yet a New Definition?
The phenomenon I wish to discuss is the emotion of distress one experiences in reacting
to others’ suffering. It is vividly depicted in Mencius 2A6, which we will discuss in a later
14
section of this chapter when analyzing the nature of this phenomenon. Facing the need
of a clear and comprehensive definition of this emotion, I propose to use the term
“sympathy” to denote this emotion in this project. I then stipulate a working definition of
“sympathy” in Section 2.5 that fits the purpose of this project and my understanding of
the phenomenon.
A stipulated definition is appropriate for two reason: 1) the current existing
definitions and usages of ‘sympathy’, ‘empathy’, ‘compassion’ and ‘pity’ are various; they
invite confusions in scholarly endeavor. There is little consistency in the way these terms
are used. A meaningful discussion demands a clear working definition. 2) The current
definitions in contemporary works lacks unity. Especially with the increasing uses of
“empathy” to cover much of what used to be denoted by ‘sympathy’, we are facing even
more confusions and ambiguities. Stipulating a working definition is the most efficient
and reasonable next step to take.
In the next section 2.2, I will briefly review several typical ways the terms
‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ are used, before starting to describe my definition of sympathy
in section 2.3 and 2.4. I shall use ‘sympathy’ to refer to the emotional phenomenon that
I study in this project unless otherwise noted. Exceptions may be made when I am
directly citing another scholar who uses a term other than sympathy.1 By sticking with
the term ‘sympathy’, I hope to preempt confusion that may result from terminological
differences when discussing the ideas from other scholars.
1
Certain literature that I cite may use ‘compassion’, ‘empathy’ or other different notions to
refer to their subject. That is not a problem. Be it studied under the name of empathy or
compassion, it is within the scope of my research as long as it refers to the emotion abovementioned, and fit in my definition of sympathy. I will note it if the cited author’s understanding
of sympathy is different from mine.
15
2.2 ‘Sympathy’ and ‘Empathy’ in History
The emotion I study in this project is sometimes referred to by ‘sympathy’,2 other times
by ‘empathy’, ‘compassion,’3 or ‘pity.’ There are many differences amongst how notions
like sympathy, empathy, pity, and compassion are used by individual philosophers. Some
of these differences are subtle, and some are seemingly critical. These notions can be
used to refer to very similar, if not the same phenomena sometimes. The pair of terms
‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ is particularly confusing. In neither academia nor everyday
usage is there a clear and widely accepted definition of the pair of notions. Let us
examine them one by one.
‘Sympathy’ may be used in ways different from my definition; e.g. it may refer to an attitude (A
is sympathetic to B’s view), which issues no motivation or affective components. The words “I
sympathize with you” often have a polite, symbolic meaning in everyday discourse, but they do
not necessarily express an actual moral emotion with affective and motivational components. I
will eschew the use of the term sympathy for such behaviors or processes.
2
The term ‘compassion’ has been widely accepted and discussed in ethical studies. For example,
Martha Nussbaum defines ‘compassion’ as “a word used to refer to the painful emotion
occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune.” Nussbaum includes
the “undeservingness” into the definition of compassion, and empathizes that the suffering
involves has to be serious rather than trivial. I discuss the former point in relation to Mencius 3A5
where he implied that in the core case of 2A6 it was not the child’s fault that she is in danger of
great suffering. I also discuss the latter point about the seriousness of the suffering in chapter five
as an argument against Prinz’s claim that fellow feelings are not very motivating when the risk
involves in helping are high. Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 301.
3
In everyday language, compassion is mostly used in a positive light; in ethical theories, it is often
discussed as a quality that is desirable and of moral value – which is a virtue, a goal for ethical
education. Paul Bloom suggests that compassion is distinct from empathy, in his own terms. He
argues in Just Babies that compassion can exist independent of empathy and is a preferred
emotion compared to empathy. I am skeptical on this account. It is not clear how compassion can
be separated from the abilities that enables empathy. Bloom has a forthcoming book titled Against
Empathy, perhaps he will offer new arguments on this point in this new book. See Paul Bloom,
Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil (Crown, 2013), 33-58.
16
2.2.1 ‘Sympathy’
‘Sympathy’, originally used to refer the harmonious relationship between humans and the
universe, and then one’s body and soul; it can be trace back to the Greek sympatheia, or
the Latin sympathia, means literally "with" (syn) "suffering" (pathos).4 In German, Mitleid
and Mitgefuhl are used to translate the words from Latin; the former is more common
while the latter is less so. In the Oxford dictionary, the word sympathy has two meanings:
“1. Feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s misfortune; 2. Understanding between
people; common feeling.”5 These two definitions of the word, which are supposed to
correspond to how we understand sympathy in our daily lives, reflect two aspects of the
emotion: the “concern/sadness” directed at others⁠ and the special epistemological
function of understanding others’ minds based on shared feelings. Interestingly, these two
usages also reflect the philosophical dispute over the term ‘sympathy’ as mostly an
epistemic tool or one’s caring attitude and concern.
The most famous and impactful account of sympathy comes from the 18th century
sentimentalism. Hume famously claims that, “minds of men are mirrors to one another”
(T II.2.5).6 Regarding to this powerful faculty of the mind, his close friend Smith describes
sympathy as, “whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person
principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of this situation,
in the breast of every attentive spectator (1759: II.i). ”7 The 18th century sentimentalists
Lauren Wispé, "The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: to Call Forth a Concept, a
Word is Needed," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,50, No. 2 (1986): 314.
4
“Definition of Sympathy in English,” Oxford Dictionary, March 7. 2016,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sympathy.
5
6
Hume, Treatise, II.2.5 163.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. K. Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1759/2002).
7
17
not only changed the prevailing view of emotions at the time but also greatly shaped
philosophers’ understanding of sympathy. In the sentimentalists’ eyes, sympathy not only
is an altruistic motivator but also could serve as the foundation for a sentimentalist ethical
and political theory.
It is worth noting that the thinkers of the sentimentalist tradition are well aware
of the fact that sympathy can be, and frequently is biased. They nonetheless believe that
a freestanding ethical system can be built upon it. The reason is that we can achieve a
fair and just standpoint through sympathizing with the “general point of view (Hume)”
or the “impartial inspector (Smith).”8 Although fascinating, this doctoral project is not
one that is devoted to explore and reexamine the sentimentalist tradition; nor do I
subscribed to some of the sentimentalist views of sympathy being the foundation of a
theory of justice (e.g. Smith).
2.2.2 ‘Empathy’
“Empathy” is a much younger word compared to “sympathy”. German psychologist
Theodor Lipps used the Greek word empatheia, meaning experiencing strong emotion or
passion, as a translation of Einfuhlung. Einfuhlung, which means “feeling into” is then
translated by Titchner into ‘empathy’ in 1909. 9 Thinkers such as the sentimentalists use
“sympathy” or “pity” (e.g. Rousseau) to denote a group of phenomena including basic
motor mimicry and imagination facilitated sympathy. The word “empathy” wasn’t
available to the English writers till 1909 when it was first introduced into English. This
Michael Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth
Century and Today (Oxford University Press, 2010), 66-97. For a discussion of how Hume and
Smith uses the idea of sympathy combined with impartial spectator and general point of view to
arrive at a just morality, especially chapter 3 and 4.
8
Edward Titchener, Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-processes (New York:
Macmillan, 1909), 21.
9
18
means that, in the past, “sympathy” was used to denote many of the functions that are
studied under the name of “empathy” by today’s empirical researchers, such as motor
mimicry, imagining being in another’s place, and etc.
After being introduced into English, “empathy” was first used in an aesthetic
context—when facing artwork, we “feel into” a piece of art so as to appreciate it; we can
also “feel into” the nature world, which is a special epistemological function the early
users of the term ‘empathy’ had attributed to it.10 The abilities of empathy are thought to
be essential to understanding the minds of others. Lipps argues, as summarized by de
Waal, “empathy is a special capacity, which enables one to identify with other’s
experience. Such identification…cannot be reduced to any other capacities, such as
learning, association, or reasoning. Empathy offers direct access to ‘the foreign self’.”11
In addition to its epistemological function, Lipps believed that empathy is based
on “inner imitation”— that empathy is based on “an innate, instinctual and, beyond that,
ultimately inexplicable human tendency to motor mimicry.”12 The view that sympathy is
based on motor mimicry is not new to philosophers—as has been observed by Smith:
When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person,
we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we
feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are
gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own
bodies, as they see him do…(1759: II.i)13
Karsten Stueber, “Empathy” in Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, ed. Anne L C Runehov and
Lluis Oviedo (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013), 723–727, Web.
10
Lauren Wispé, “History of the Concept of Empathy” in Empathy and its Development, ed. Nancy
Eisenberg and Janet Strayer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 17-37.
Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society (Random House, 2010),
65.
11
12
Stueber, “Empathy”, 7-8.
13
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 12.
19
As we can see, Smith observes the close relationship between imitation and
sympathy. It is not hard to imagine that the term ‘empathy’, in its development in the
last century, was heavily influenced by the preexisting concept of ‘sympathy’. Some tried
to use ‘empathy’ to substitute for ‘sympathy’, others tried to use ‘empathy’ to denote
phenomenon that are related to but not denoted by sympathy. It is worth noting that
‘empathy’ falls out of popularity in philosophy only decades after it was first introduced.
It is then broadly used in empirical studies such as psychology and social science. Very
recently, in the philosophical world, the term ‘empathy’ has regained some popularity as
an attempt to relate to the empirical works and/or taking a naturalistic approach. As we
can see, the two words ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ are interlinked in their development
ever since they both appeared in English. ‘Sympathy’ may carry heavier philosophical
implications because of its longer history, and because of a few extraordinary
philosophers whose names and philosophical contributions remain associated with the
term sympathy.
Through the development of the words sympathy and empathy, we can see that
they were once used interchangeably. Differences between these two words result more
from the historical contexts and disciplinary custom, rather than the nature of the
phenomenon they denote. In the next section, let us take a look at how these two
notions are used in today’s academia and why it is nearly impossible to reach unified
definitions.
2.3 Sympathy/Empathy Today— 5 Reasons Why We Couldn’t
Reach a Unified Definition
Given the many different definitions and usages of the terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’
20
and the confusion arising from such ambiguity, it seems necessary to reach a unified or at
least widely accepted definition before we can have a meaningful discussion of the
emotional phenomenon we are nothing but too familiar with. Such a task may not be
possible according to Andrew Terjesen.14 In addition to offering a comprehensive survey
of the terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ in historical and contemporary philosophical
literature and empirical studies, Terjesen concludes that the effort to find a unified or
universal definition of these two “inextricably linked” terms is deemed to be in vain. Is
Terjesen right in his claim? Let us take a look at a few examples.
Instead of summarizing and examining the different accounts of sympathy and
empathy, tasks already performed sufficiently by scholars such as Terjesen, I examine a
number of representative definitions before stipulating a definition of my own.
One often-cited definition of sympathy comes from Darwall
Sympathy for a person and her plight is felt as from the third-person perspective of onecaring, whereas empathy involves something like a sharing of the other’s mental states,
frequently, as from her standpoint. 15
In this definition, empathy refers merely to emotional sharing; sympathy, on the
other hands, highlights its third-person perspective and the feeling of concern (or some
kind of emotional investment to the victim’s welfare) towards the victim. Including the
element of concern in sympathy is not uncommon. The first definition of sympathy in
the Oxford dictionary, as noted above is: “Feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s
misfortune.”16 In addition, the assumption that sympathy contains certain kind of
Andrew Terjesen, “The Role of Sympathy and Empathy in Moral Judgment; with Special
Reference to David Hume and Adam Smith” (doctorate dissertation, Duke University, 2005), 3-14.
14
15
Stephen Darwall, "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89.2 (1998): 263.
16
“Definition of Sympathy in English,” Oxford Dictionary. See Footnote 14.
21
emotional investment directed at the other party’s wellbeing might precisely be why the
influential psychologist Martin Hoffman, whose 5 modes of empathetic distress I discuss
in chapter 3, stresses that “empathic/sympathetic distress” is a more accurate term
compared to “empathetic distress”, which he continues to use for convenience. Hoffman
defines empathy by stating that the key requirement of an empathetic response is “the
involvement of psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more
congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation.” 17 He also maintains in
his influential book Empathy and Moral Development that at around 2 years of age, as
one’s sense of self begin to emerge empathetic distress has a sympathetic distress
component, namely that in addition to feel a parallel emotion to the victim [empathy],
children are able to feel “sympathy” [understand others’ perspective and be concerned
for others, as Hoffman uses this word] for the victim. This transformation is crucial and
will stay with the children throughout their lives. In other words, every adult’s
empathetic distress has some sympathetic distress in it. One’s empathetic distress thus
involves both feeling for a victim and feeling with the victim. The term “Empathetic
distress” risks leading one to believe Hoffman’s research is merely about one’s matching
emotional response and not an emotion felt for the victim. Hoffman mentions in his
book, and later stressed it again in 2011 that “the term empathic/sympathetic distress
would be a more exact description (for what he previously called empathy)”, he admits—
though he had to continue use “empathetic distress” for convenience.18 19
Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications For Caring And Justice (Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 30.
17
“This transition [of gaining sympathetic distress] occurs in toddlerhood, at around 2 years of
age. As the sense of self and others as separate beings begins to emerge, empathic distress is
transformed in part into sympathetic distress. That is, the child continues to feel empathic
18
22
As we can see, there is no consistent distinction between what ‘empathy’ and
‘sympathy’ denotes. Even when the distinction seems neat and clear, they may end up
denoting different aspects or components of one same emotional phenomenon, as
Hoffman’s later adjustment to the concept of “empathic/sympathetic distress” suggests.
Prinz, in spite of his inherited ideas of sympathy from Hume and Smith, chooses
to use ‘empathy’ in his critical account of the emotion. This might be a result of Darwall’s
influence. Prinz states that his idea of empathy refers to “a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling.”20 He too, agrees with Darwall
“sympathy is a third‐person emotional response, whereas empathy involves putting
oneself in another person’s shoes.” However, he affirms that concern is not a part of what
he calls ‘empathy’. This distinction is essential to his account, since later he claims that
empathy is not necessary for morality and is not a reliable altruistic motivator—but
concern may be. 21
distress, more or less matching and operating in parallel with the victim’s feeling, but the child
now also has a reactive feeling of sympathetic distress or compassion for the victim. From then
on, through the last three empathy development stages and throughout adult life, empathic
distress has a sympathetic component. This is crucial because the sympathetic component gives
empathic distress a clearly pro-social dimension for empirical evidence and a theoretical analysis
of the processes underlying this transition). That is, one is now motivated to reduce another’s
distress, not only to reduce one’s own empathic distress. The term empathic/sympathetic distress
would be a more exact description but I’ll stick with the less cumbersome ‘empathic distress’
for convenience. But please keep in mind the sympathetic component: empathic distress past
toddlerhood and throughout adult life involves feeling for as well as with the victim. “
Martin Hoffman, “Empathy, Justice, and the Law,” in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological
Perspectives, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 234-236.
19
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development., 89-90
Jesse Prinz, “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological
Perspectives, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 212.
20
This view comes from Prinz, “Is Empathy Necessary?” in which he argues that empathy (so
defined by him) is not necessary for morality whereas sympathy (so defined by him) and concern
is useful. In a later publication “Against Empathy” Prinz changes his view about concern. He
21
23
Hoffman’s definition of empathic/sympathetic distress, if compared with Prinz’s
definition of empathy, allows the subject to feel an emotion that is “more congruent with
another’s situation”22 rather than what one expects the other to be feeling. In other words,
what matters is the other’s situation, rather than mental state. Prinz’s definition of “feeling
what one takes another person to be feeling,”23 denotes a more limited scope of
phenomenon. For example, individuals are sometimes motivated by what Hoffman calls
empathic/sympathetic distress to help when observing an acute distress of others’; Prinz’s
definition may exclude this type of motivation from “empathy” since the potential helper
may not be experiencing the same distress as the potential victim. I offer a more detailed
discussion of Prinz’s definition and its implications to his argument of the value of
empathy and other fellow feeling in chapter 5.
As we can see from the distinction between Hoffman and Prinz’s definition, not
only there is no consistent distinction between ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’, there is no
unified definition for ‘sympathy’ and what it really denotes. Reaching a unified definition
of sympathy is notoriously frustrating and confusing; ‘empathy’ on the other hand, despite
having a relatively short history, faces the same problems as ‘sympathy.’ Researchers have
long noticed the ambiguities over ‘empathy’.24 Accounts addressing terminological issues
over ‘empathy’ can be found in the introductory section of most empirical literature on
goes on to argue that even concern or care may not be needed or useful for morality either. I
discuss Prinz’s arguments in details in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Jesse Prinz, "Against
Empathy," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49.s1 (2011): 214-233.
22
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, 30.
23
Prinz, “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 212.
Wispé, “History of the Concept of Empathy”, 17-37. Wispé provided arguably the most famous
survey of different ways the terms ‘empathy’ has being used in research.
24
24
empathy nowadays. Two notable studies examining the various phenomenon the term
‘empathy’ covers are from Amy Coplan and Daniel Batson.
Coplan summarized her survey of different ways to understand empathy in the
following points:
Some of the most popular (ways to understand empathy) include the following:
(A) Feeling what someone else feels
(B) Caring about someone else
(C) Being emotionally affected by someone else’s emotions and experiences, though not
necessarily experiencing the same emotions
(D) Imagining oneself in another’s situation
(E) Imagining being another in that other’s situation
(F) Making inferences about another’s mental states
(G) Some combination of the processes described in (A)–(F) 25
As we can see, a number of the phenomenon commonly denoted by ‘sympathy’
can be found in this list too. Such as (B) denotes what Darwall included in ‘sympathy’,
and (A) and (F) are highlighted in Prinz’s definition of ‘empathy.’ Batson provides a
somewhat similar list of eight concepts in “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related
but Distinct Phenomena”.
Concept 1: Knowing Another Person’s Internal State, Including His or Her Thoughts
and Feelings
Concept 2: Adopting the Posture or Matching the Neural Responses of an Observed
Other
Concept 3: Coming to Feel as Another Person Feels
Concept 4: Intuiting or Projecting Oneself into Another’s Situation
Concept 5: Imagining How Another Is Thinking and Feeling
Concept 6: Imagining How One Would Think and Feel in the Other’s Place
Concept 7: Feeling Distress at Witnessing Another Person’s Suffering
Concept 8: Feeling for Another Person Who Is Suffering 26
Amy Coplan, “Understanding Empathy” in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives,
ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.
25
Daniel Batson, “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related But Distinct Phenomena” in The
Social Neuroscience of Empathy, ed. Jean Decety and William Ickes (Cambridge: MIT Press 2009), 48.
26
25
In these two lists, which illustrate the various ways scholars have been using the
term ‘empathy’, only Batson’s Concept 2 of “Adopting the Posture or Matching the
Neural Responses of an Observed Other” is not included in Coplan’s list. These 7 or 8
distinct yet related phenomenon listed above are evidences of the lack of unity when it
comes to the term ‘empathy’.27 At the same time, we can see Darwall’s definition of
sympathy and Prinz’s definition of sympathy are included in the lists: Darwall’s
sympathy is included in Coplan’s list as (B) and in Batson’s list as Concept 8; Prinz’s
definition of sympathy is included in Coplan’s list as (A), (D), (E), (F) and in Batson’s list
as Concept 1,3,4,5,6. ‘Empathy’, as we can see, has being used in academia to denote
the emotional phenomenon sympathy used to denote and now still do denote.
What is apparent is that all the ambiguities and confusions over ‘empathy’ are
the result of only about a hundred years of time, compared to the long history of
‘sympathy’. It makes us wonder what accounts for such difficulties in reaching a clear
definition. At least for ‘empathy’, philosophers’ notorious habit of creating new terms
and new definitions whenever they see fit should not to take the blame, since much of
the disagreements over empathy’s definition stem from disciplines other than philosophy.
Terjesen, who claims that reaching a unified definition of sympathy and/or empathy is
impossible, provides three reasons for his pessimistic claim on this matter:
1. … some people have defined ‘sympathy’ in a certain way and then define ‘empathy’ as
something different, but someone else has taken the exact same contrast but flipped the
terms.
2. Another reason … (is) the history of the terms. ‘Empathy’ is a linguistic latecomer and
has often been used to refer to concepts that were once entirely the province of the term
‘sympathy’….
Roughly, Concept 3=(A), Concept 1\5=(F), Concept 6=(E), Concept 7=(C), Concept 8=(B),
Concept 4 =(D).
27
26
3. Different disciplines have narrowed the definition of the concepts to reflect their
particular notion of what is important and have created a certain tradition of usage.28
I agree with Terjesen. Defining the pair of terms with the presumption that they
refer to different phenomenon, ‘empathy’ being a linguistic latecomer, and the distinct
emphases in different disciplines all contribute to this confusion. Relating to his third
reason that distinct emphases in different disciplines result in confusion, I would like to
add that even within a discipline, different methodology and distinct focuses of research
contribute to confusion over definition as well. In addition to the three reasons Terjesen
suggested, at least two other factors contributed to the confusion.
Reason number 4 is that researchers take different approaches in defining
sympathy/empathy. Some define sympathy by its eliciting condition, some by the
matching mental state between the sympathizer and the object, some by its action
tendencies, some by the underlying neurological components, and yet, some by a
combination of the above of some sort. For example, philosopher Martha Nussbaum
defines ‘compassion’ as “a word used to refer to the painful emotion occasioned by the
awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune.” 29 In this definition, one’s
cognitive state is highlighted: one has to be aware of the other’s undeserved misfortune. In
empirical science, some researchers, such as Jean Decety, define sympathy by its
hypothesized underlying mechanism. Decety, whose account we discuss in Chapter 3
and 4, analyzes the functioning architectural of human empathy and claims that
empathy is constituted by three major components: Shared neurological representation,
self-other awareness and regulatory function. Different defining methods sometimes
28
Terjesen, “The Role of Sympathy and Empathy in Moral Judgment,” 3-14.
29
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 301.
27
reflects a disciplinary difference such as the difference between Nussbaum and Decety,
but is not always so. For example, psychologists Hoffman’s definition that we discussed
earlier focuses on the phenomenon rather than the underlying mechanism. In Frans de
Waal’s words, as he discusses the various ways the term ‘empathy’ is used: “Some
definitions of empathy stress the sharing of emotions, whereas other definitions stress the
capacity to put oneself into the other’s ‘shoes.’”30 As we can see, the differences in
researchers’ focuses are account for a part of the different understanding and definitions.
The fifth and the last reason is our yet insufficient knowledge of this emotional
phenomenon (or perhaps, a group of phenomenon) that I call sympathy. Defining it from
different aspects without the whole picture in mind is like the old parable of “the blind
men and an elephant” in which a group of blind men touch an elephant to discover what
it is. Each person can only feel one part of the animal, such as its snout, ears or torso.
When the blind men compare their impressions of the animal, they find out that they are
in disagreement. Our research of sympathy and/or empathy is similar to the blind men’s
effort in picturing the elephant. Some definitions capture the affective and other-directed
forms of the emotion; some capture the epistemological and affective aspects; some notice
that whether the perceived victim deserves the distress plays a role in sympathetic
reaction (e. g. Nussbaum’s definition of compassion, and Mencius, discussed in chapter 3
and 4). The disagreement in definition may in fact be due to our yet incomprehensive
understanding of this emotional phenomenon (or this group of phenomenon) we refer to
by a number of different names. The fifth reason may relate back to Terjesen’s third
reason that “different disciplines have narrowed the definition of the concepts to reflect
Frans de Waal, "Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: the Evolution of Empathy," Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 59 (2008): 282.
30
28
their particular notion of what is important.”31 It is partially due to the fact that
researchers do/did not have sufficient knowledge of the emotion, they define sympathy
and empathy according to what they deem to be the most important features of the
phenomenon. It is my belief that once we get to know more about the different aspects of
the emotion, we will be able to diminish some of the compartmentalization created in the
past, which has been hindering our understanding of sympathy. A complete agreement
on the definitions of these terms may be hard to reach; for the present study it is therefore
important for us give a working definition and keep in mind how the terms are used by
different scholars.
2.4 A Stipulated Definition of Sympathy in This Project
Terjesen warns against stipulating a new definition of sympathy. He worries that by
stipulating new concepts of sympathy or empathy, we risk detaching the philosophical
debates from common language. However, a working definition is called for before we
could proceed with any meaningful research. Only after arriving at a working definition
of this emotion I call sympathy, are we able to further explore the characteristics of the
primitive and the mature form of sympathy and their roles in morality. From here
onward, I will use the term ‘sympathy’ to denote the emotion that is the subject of this
project, which is referred to by many names such as empathy, compassion, pity and so
on. While I choose to use ‘sympathy’ and provide a working definition of this emotion,
other scholars may have different preference and considerations—they may use
31
Terjesen, “The Role of Sympathy and Empathy in Moral Judgment,” 3-14.
29
‘empathy’ or ‘compassion’. The difference in terminology shouldn’t hinder academic
dialogues, even though it often does. In this project, some of the research I cite or discuss
may use ‘empathy’, ‘compassion’ or other terms; I will provide a footnote or a paragraph
addressing the terminological difference when necessary.
To define sympathy, I start from its basic characteristics. I use a case from
Mencius 2A6 as the core case of sympathy. Philosophers (ethicists in particular) and social
psychologists outside of the special area of Chinese philosophy discuss and refer to this
case frequently nowadays: Darwall cited this case at the beginning of “Empathy,
Sympathy, Care,”32 to showcase the important role of sympathy; the “opponent” of
sympathy Paul Bloom discusses this case in his book Just Babies as evidence of natural
sympathy and compassion.33 In addition to its increasing popularity in academia,
choosing 2A6 as the core case brings obvious advantages. As an example from a parallel
philosophical tradition, 2A6, or commonly known as “the baby in the well” case is
relatively free from the terminological confusion over sympathy/empathy we discussed in
the last section. Moreover, coming from a foreign tradition it is free from one of the most
fundamental assumptions of Western philosophy: As Wong points out, the studying of
Mencian philosophy, including the studying of this case, undermines the categorical
distinction between reason and emotion.34 The divide between reason and emotion, while
having dominated Western philosophy for a long time, has been frequently challenged by
empirical studies (and by philosophers) nowadays. At the same time, the interdisciplinary
study of psychology and neuroscience “are opening up a richer set of possibilities for the
32
Darwall, "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," 261.
33
Bloom, Just Babies, 44-45.
34
Wong, “Growing Virtue”, 23-24.
30
relationship among reflection, deliberation, emotion and desire in ways that resonate with
early Confucian philosophy.”35 Free from this categorical distinction between reason and
emotion, we are well set to uncover the nature of moral emotions such as sympathy. In
addition to the reasons above mentioned, Mencius also provides an account of
sympathy’s role in normative ethics and an account on its cultivation. Thus, 2A6 is a
perfect anchor for a project such as this one, which is by nature cross cultural and
interdisciplinary, and with focuses on the cultivation of sympathy and its role in morality.
I will now briefly summarize the four components of sympathy and provide a
working definition. The work of carefully examining each of the proposed component of
sympathy is left to the next chapter. Let us take a look at 2A6 and see what essential
components are there in sympathy:
The reason why I say that all humans have hearts that could not bear other’s suffering (bu
ren ren zhi xin
" is this. Suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall
into a well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling of shock, alarm and sympathy
(chuti ceyin zhi xin
)—not because one sought to get in good with the
child's parents, not because one wanted to gain good reputation among their neighbors
and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child's cries. From this we
can see that if one is without the heart of ceyin zhi xin (
" one is not human…
[
[
[
),
99
It seems a strange approach for me to define what sympathy is before offering a
careful study of its components, which is a task I save for chapter 3. Here, for the
35
Ibid., 24-25.
Mencius 2A6. Mengzi and Bryan Van Norden, Mengzi: with Selections from Traditional
Commentaries (Hackett Publishing, 2008). And
7
8
0
' , "
- )
36
Please note that this English translation is based on Van Nordan’s translation in Mengzi (2008) ; I
made some changes to it to better suit my understanding of the original text that is from Bojun
Yang’s (
) version of Mengzi Yizhu (1960). All cited translations and original texts of Mencius
(or Mengzi) in this dissertation, unless otherwise specified, are from the abovementioned two
sources and with changes made by me. Please refer to this note for the citations from Mencius.
31
purpose of informing the readers of what the subject of the research is, I provide a
working definition that fits my study that is carried out in the later chapters.
Sympathy is an emotion that arises from facing others in distress/need; it has 4
components (they may overlap, e.g. the bodily visceral component overlaps with the
feeling of the emotion). Based on the above texts, and Wong’s analysis of this passage in
“Growing Virtue”, I stipulate a definition of ‘sympathy’ as having the following four
components:
1.
A cognitive component of recognizing others in distress/need;
2.
A bodily visceral response;
3.
A motivational component;
4.
The “feeling” of the emotion sympathy itself. 37
The first component is the perceptive component of sympathy. The sympathizer
perceives and registers the others’ distress. In the 2A6 case, the bystander recognizes that
the infant is in imminent danger without much of conscious deliberation. The perception
of the infants’ forthcoming distress is an effortless and fast process that doesn’t require
complicated mental processing. This is not always the case. The perception of others’
distress in sympathy may also take slower forms that require complicated mental
processing. For example, when we read a UNICEF report that presents condition of
children in poverty, sympathy may arise as we understand and perhaps imagine what the
numbers and graphs mean. In this example, the perception is no longer a spontaneous
and fast reaction to imminent distress or danger; it is a carefully cognitive process that
37
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” 23.
32
includes semantic processing, rational calculation and imagination. More about this
cognitive components of sympathy is discussed in section 3.2-3.6 at the beginning of the
next chapter. The component of perceiving others’ distress is the first component of the
primitive form of sympathy.
The bodily visceral response includes contracting muscles, quickened breath and
heart rate, escalated blood pressure and so on. These physiological responses overlap with
the motivational component and the “feelings” of sympathy. This feeling is mentioned in
the texts by “a feeling of shock, alarm and sympathy (chuti ceyin zhi xin
)”
and later in 1A7 as “a feeling of unable to bear (others’ sufferings)”.38 Ce and Yin both
refer to some kind of painful feeling, yet it is different from directly experience the distress
of falling into a well. They refer to an affective feeling of the sympathizers, which I will
discuss in section 3.5 in details.
The motivational component, on the other hand, refers to the urge to aid. This
motivation is best described as an action tendency—it does not demand an actual action,
whether planned or not. The motivation may eventually result in various responses—
one may respond by directly help or seek help from others, one may also turn one’s back
to it. In 2A6, Mencius doesn’t state what action the sympathizer should or is likely to
take. In section 3.6, I argue that sympathy issues an action tendency without dictating
the action to take.
In my definition of sympathy, all four components must present. If one were
missing, I would refrain from calling this phenomenon sympathy. In the next chapter, I
discuss the four components in details in order to give an account of the primitive form
38
See note 45.
33
of sympathy, which is the starting point of the cultivation.
34
Chapter 3
3. An Analysis of the Primitive Form of Sympathy
3.1 Introduction
In order to better understand how we can cultivate sympathy, which is one of the
major questions this project addresses, it is important to understand what “raw materials”
we have to work with. After offering a stipulated definition of sympathy in chapter two,
this chapter studies the nature of the primitive form of sympathy. Basing on a
comprehensive study of Mencius 2A6, this chapter paves the way for further discussion
on the cultivation of sympathy, the mature form of sympathy and sympathy’s role in
morality.
This chapter aims to uncover a form of sympathy that is triggered easily and
sometimes spontaneously: a form that we can find in most, if not all, human beings, a
form of sympathy we can agree to be the starting point for cultivation. My discussion of
the primitive form of sympathy begins by introducing Mencius’s botanical metaphor of
the four sprouts (or beginnings/ ) that can grow into full-fledged cardinal virtues.1 I
focus on the first of the four sprouts—that is, the sprout of ren known as ceyin zhi xin. I use
ceyin zhi xin, especially as it is presented in passage 2A6, to be the core case of the primitive
form of sympathy (PFS, PFS is short for The Primitive Form of Sympathy). In doing so, I
For readers unfamiliar with the Mencian account, in a Mencian view, the four
sprouts/beginnings are the innate predispositions of humans. Mencius employs a botanical
metaphor in his theory— the four sprouts of virtues would, in an ideal situation, grow into four
virtues: ren (benevolence, humaneness ), yi (righteousness ), li (propriety, observance of rites
), and zhi (wisdom ).
1
35
am able to take advantage of the rich literature on this well-known case of unlearnt
sympathetic response.
The objective of this chapter is thus twofold: First, it seeks to provide the
dissertation project with a corner-stone by defining and describing sympathy in its
unlearnt form, thus paving the way for further discussion on the cultivation of sympathy
and the mature form of sympathy (MFS short for the Mature Form of Sympathy).
Secondly, I hope to make a special contribution to the Chinese philosophy community by
offering a new interpretation of ceyin zhi xin that is informed by recent empirical studies. In
the following sections of the chapter, I first examine the perceptive, affective and
motivational aspects of ceyin zhi xin individually; I then illustrate the triplet that I call the
Mencian perceptive-affective-motive triplet. In the end, I discuss the implication my
interpretation of 2A6 and Mencian ethics, which leads to the topic of the chapter after—
the cultivation of sympathy.
3.2 An Interpretation of Mencius 2A6
Let us now consider the famous passage from Mencius 2A6 [cited at the end of
chapter 2], in which the “sprout/
” of ren is described as an unlearnt and spontaneous
reaction to a child being in sudden mortal danger. In the text, this sympathetic reaction is
universal, free from calculation, and has a motivational component. I situate Mencius’
observations in a modern psychological framework and offer a description of the basic
characteristics of ceyin zhi xin.
In the original text, bu ren ren zhi xin (
“could not bear.” Mencius also uses ceyin zhi xin (
36
) literally means the heart of
) and chuti ceyin zhi xin (
) to refer to the first of the four sprouts (
). The momentarily alarmed and
sympathetic feeling may not necessarily be converted into action, but in it lies the
potential for the mature form of sympathy and, according to Mencius, one of the very
reason why human nature is good. This section does not concern itself with the perennial
debate about human nature, nor does it investigate the normative claim this passage
suggests—namely that we should cultivate our sprouts, or as Flanagan puts in Moral
Sprouts and Natural Teleologies, that “moral excellence involves growing all four seeds to
maturity.”2 Instead, I focus on the description of ceyin zhi xin itself.
Mencius stresses that this response is unlearnt, spontaneous and a response that
everyone (or most people) should have [I discuss whether most people should have ceyin
zhi xin in Section 3.3 The Contexts and the Subject of Sympathy—a General Response].
The expected sympathetic reaction is spontaneous in the sense that this process does not
require any special effort on the individual’s part: It does not require any additional
learning. Using Wong’s account of ceyin zhi xin as a starting point, I explore his proposed
four components of a cognitive component, a bodily visceral response, a motivational
component, and the “feeling” of the emotion itself in sections 3.3 through 3.6.
2
Flanagan maintains that this passages suggests both a Descriptive claim and a Normative claim:
Mencian Moral Modularity *descriptive: Human nature contains seeds for four different moral
competencies;
Mencian Moral Modularity *Normative: Moral excellence involves growing all four seeds to
maturity.
Owen Flanagan, Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleologies: 21st Century Moral Psychology Meets
Classical Chinese Philosophy (Marquette University Press, 2014), 33.
37
3.3 The Contexts and the Subject of Sympathy—A General
Response
Mencius makes the claim in 2A6 that “everyone” has this sympathetic response
when facing a child in immediate mortal danger, and whoever doesn’t have this response
is hopeless in ethical cultivation. 3 It is very interesting that Mencius should choose an
innot, vulnerable, harmless, and incompetent infant as the victim of this thought
experiment. Not all distress evokes sympathy. Distress may evoke disgust, fear and
schadenfreude—pleasure derived from the misfortunes of others. Certain factors are known
to stop one from perceiving a suffering individual in a sympathetic light. For example,
non-personalized others/abstract needs/chronic needs are limiting conditions that would
reduce if not diminish an individual’s sympathetic reaction.4 In addition, deserving one’s
There are cases of individuals who do not exhibit typical sympathetic responses. For example,
one of the symptoms of individuals with the condition of psychopathy is their lack of sympathy.
It seems that in these cases, there are certain disorders affecting the psychological mechanism
that underlie sympathy and other emotions, such as fear and anxiety. Though fascinating, the
particular case of psychopathy, is beyond the range of this thesis, as are the other rare cases in
which people lack the primitive form of sympathy. For two insightful study of psychopathy and
the relevant disorders, see Robert Hare, et al. "The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and
Factor Structure," Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 2.3
(1990): 338. And Kent Kiehl, et al. "Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal
Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging." Biological Psychiatry 50.9
(2001): 677-684.
3
For a discussion on how psychopathy affects moral reasoning; see especially chapter 3, Shaun
Nichols, Sentimental Rules: on the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (Oxford University Press,
2004).
Given that Mencius compared the four sprouts to a person’s four limbs multiples times, we could
assume that Mencius is not denying that there could be “bad seeds”, —some medical conditions
may render one incapable for having sympathetic reactions, just like one may not be able to grow
healthy limbs in some cases. Mencius does, however, insist that everyone has the same sprouts.
Zhao offers a recent discussion on whether the Mencian sprouts are universal; See Wenqing Zhao,
"Is Contemporary Chinese Society Inhumane? What Mencius and Empirical Psychology Have to
Say," Dao 13.3 (2014): 343-360.
See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2 From an Ox to the King's People—3 Dimensions, where I discuss the
limiting conditions for sympathy in details and the methods to bypass them.
4
38
suffering is one of such factors—if one is believed to be at fault for her own distress, her
distress is less likely to evoke others’ sympathy. If Joe, a competent adult, refuses to listen
to rangers’ warning or obey the safety regulations, his suffering resulting from such
negligence is less likely to evoke a strong sympathetic response. The child in 2A6 on the
other hand, is not at fault for the foreseeable misfortune; it is not her fault that she is
crawling toward the well—she doesn’t know better. Unfair prior interaction is also known
to reduce or diminish sympathetic reaction;5 in addition, the distress of a member from a
different ethnic group has less impact on one than a member of the same ethnic group as
the sympathizer. 6
We can see that in the 2A6 case, all the above-mentioned factors that are known
to diminish sympathy are “controlled” or “mediated” by Mencius. The potential distress
of the infant’s is close by and direct. The infant is also innocent, or to be more accurate,
incompetent; she doesn’t know better to avoid danger, nor can she impress people as
unfair in prior interaction. Considering the small size of the villages in the context of
Ancient China, an infant close to a village well is likely to be of the same descent as the
potential helpers; they may even be related. In addition, the strong urge to help may
result from our strong intuition to protect the young. As Wong comments “the example is
Tania Singer, Ben Seymour, John O’Doherty, et al. “Empathic Neural Responses are Modulated
by The Perceived Fairness of Others,” Nature 439(2006): 466–469.
5
Xiaojing Xu, Xiangyu Zuo, Xiaoying Wang, and Shihui Han, "Do You Feel My Pain? Racial
Group Membership Modulates Empathic Neural Responses," The Journal of Neuroscience 29, no. 26
(2009): 8525-8529. And Yawei Cheng, Chenyi Chen, Ching-Po Lin, Kun-Hsien Chou, and Jean
Decety, "Love Hurts: an fMRI Study," Neuroimage 51, no. 2 (2010): 923-929.
6
39
compelling because it corresponds to a widespread and powerful protective instinct that
human beings have toward their young.”7
Further, be it a lake, a pond, the sea, or a well, falling into deep water is one of the
most common threats small children face. This is common sense in Ancient China too;
most people perceive a child crawling towards a well as imminent danger or even death.
Thus, Mencius’ expectation that all will have a sympathetic reaction towards a child at
the brink of death is not only based on his confidence in our sympathetic faculty but also
on the assumption that all could see the obvious association between an infant climbing
towards a well and danger.
As we can see in the 2A6 text, not only the factors known to diminish sympathy
such as the victim’s culpability are mediated; it is also presupposed that a well is a lethal
threat to a close by infant is common knowledge. Hence, Mencius’ claim in 2A6 that the
sympathetic reaction is common can be persuasive. This general claim of “anyone in such
a situation would have a feeling of shock, alarm and sympathy”8 is not solely based on his
confidence in the kindness of “human nature”; but also the way he depicts the victim in
the context, and the context itself. It is worth noting that our core case is designed so as to
best and steadily induce one’s natural sympathy.
3.4 The Cognitive Component, Perception of Distress and
Eliciting Condition
In the text, little is said about how one realizes the child is approaching the well except
7
David Wong, “Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion,” Dao 14
2015 : 168.
8
Mencius, 2A6.
40
that it happens on the spur of the moment; zha jian (
suddenly seeing) is used to
depict the perception of this incident. It is almost as if the dangerous and urgent scene
simply captures our attention like a loud noise that alerts us. There is not much more to
this process, and it requires no special effort on the perceiver’s part.
The idea of perception in 2A6, however, needs to be situated in the general
context of distress detecting of human beings. A part of the ability to detect other’s pain
comes to us naturally. For example, a cry of pain catches the attention of nearby people
and is automatically registered as a signal of distress. It is usually the case that one needs
no special effort to learn the meaning of such basic signs. In Sentimental Rules, Shaun
Nichols mentions the view that signals of distress are like “bad music,” which
automatically alert and register to people in the vicinity.9 According to this view, the
receivers need not to pay special attention to receive such signals; and they cannot close
themselves off to these signals as long as they are in range. Indeed, we perceive certain
types of basic and typical signals of distress effortlessly. Such basic signals of distress
include a cry, scream, hiss of pain, frown, et cetera.10 These clues are not like a dim
lighthouse hundreds of miles away on a cloudy night that we have to search for—they are
pushed directly into our faces like the sunlight. Many scholars, including de Waal,
observe that when facing basic and surface signals of distress, we sometimes have little
control over whether to feel sympathy or not. People may passively avoid sympathetic
responses by covering their eyes in a movie theater or occupying their minds with other
thoughts—such attempts don’t always work. In the following subsections, I discuss the
9
Nichols, Sentimental Rules, 36.
Of course, distress may not always catch others’ attention. Latent distress such as emotional
torment may not alert the observer and cause an immediate, fast sympathetic reaction.
10
41
perception of distress from an evolutionary point of view, and then in Hoffman’s five
modes of empathetic distress.
3.4.1 An Evolutionary Perspective
The evolutionary perspective offers an explanation for the automatic detection
mechanism of others’ distress. A cry or a hiss can easily catch others’ attention, whereas
other equally loud noises do not have the same effect. When experiencing pain, people
typically cry, scream, or make certain facial expressions such as frown possibly due to
contraction of certain muscle groups. These reactions are difficult, if not impossible, to
hide or alter; they capture others’ attention easily and steadily.
From an evolutionary perspective on parental care, which is believed to be closely
related to human’s sympathetic capacities, the abilities to express one’s own and detect
others’ acute distress is critical for a group’s survival. A pre-lingual child may not receive
the help or care she needs if she cannot capture the caretaker’s attention when she is in
distress. If caretakers cannot detect a child’s discomfort and needs immediately, the child
has less chance of surviving.
11
On a larger historical scale, before human language is developed, our ancestors
may have also relied on distress-detecting mechanisms to attract potential helpers and to
locate their endangered fellows. This is supported by the fact that from mice12 to
Jean Decety, "The Neuroevolution of Empathy," Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 1231.1 (2011): 35-45.
11
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, ch1. Hoffman described an experiment on mice.
Subject mice in no physical pain exhibit symptoms of distress when a mouse that is in pain is in a
close distance.
12
42
chimpanzees, 13 primates and other mammals have similar mechanism of distress
expressing and detecting, which enables them to detect and be affected by their fellows in
distress.
One of the numerous documented examples about animals detecting others’
distress comes from de Waal: A young chimpanzee named Yoni would not always go to
Koht’s (Yoni’s “owner” and companion) side when treats are offered, but she would rush
to see Koht whenever the human pretends to cry.14 This cross-species distress-detecting
story is particularly intriguing for two reasons. First, it suggests that our ancestors and
other mammals may share an ancient cross-species mechanism that enables us to detect
others’ distress and react to it (e.g. Yoni rushes to Koht’s side to check on her). In the
process of evolution for humans, this distress detecting ability developed before language
and other more sophisticated cognitive abilities such as taking perspective other than
one’s own, imagination, reflective thinking, etc. This shared mechanism between humans
and certain primates enables individuals to detect and react to certain types of distress:
common distress in the ancient times and/or acute distress that demand(s) priority, so we
could respond rapidly, before/without sophisticated cognitive processes. As such, this
mechanism can operate without the aid from the more sophisticated cognitive abilities.
Many studies from de Waal would support this point, e.g. Frans de Waal, "Empathy in
Primates and Other Mammals," in Empathy: From Bench to Bedside, ed. Jean Decety (Cambridge:
MIT Press 2012), 87.
13
14
de Waal, "Empathy in Primates" Empathy”, 87.
Koht wrote: If I pretend to be crying, close my eyes and weep, Yoni immediately stops his play or
any other activities, quickly runs over to me, all excited and shagged, from the most remote
places in the house, such as the roof or the ceiling of his cage, from where I could not drive him
down despite my persistent calls and entreaties. He hastily runs around me, as if looking for the
offender; looking at my face, he tenderly takes my chin in his palm, lightly touches my face with
his finger, as though trying to understand what is happening and turns around, clenching his
toes into firm fists.
43
Secondly, the story of Koht and Yoni suggests that sometimes, others’ distress
(Koht pretending to cry) may be more powerful in motivating than selfish reasons (getting
a treat from Koht). This is quite interesting when one recalls that Mencius compares
those who are hopeless in ethical cultivation to beasts in 2A6.
By bringing in de Waal’s research on primate into the discussion, I don't intend to
show that human sympathy and animal “sympathy” are the same. They are not. Humans
possess far greater mental capacities such as imagination and language that enable us to
feel sympathy in ways that are beyond other animals. Rather, the above section is meant
to illustrate the common foundation of human sympathy and animal sympathy-like
reaction. The next section discusses Hoffman’s 5 modes of empathetic arousal, which I
briefly mentioned in chapter 2.
3.4.2 A Discussion of Hoffman’s 5 Modes of Empathetic Arousal
The spontaneity of sympathy that is described in 2A6 is in accordance with empirical
studies on sympathy sometimes being an automatic, fast-acting and involuntary reaction.
Hoffman’s research in Empathy and Moral Development is conducted under the name of
“empathetic distress”, though later when he summarizes his theory about empathy in
“Empathy, Justice and the Law”, he admits that “the term empathic/sympathetic distress
would be a more exact description” and he uses “empathetic distress” merely for
convenience [See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of Hoffman’s
definition of empathy]. 15 Despite the different terminology, Hoffman’s research is
instrumental for us to gain a better understanding of sympathy and moral development.
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, 29-62. And Hoffman, “Empathy, Justice and the Law,”
230-254.
15
44
According to Hoffman, there are five empathetic distress arousal modes: mimicry,
classical conditioning, direct association, mediated association, and role taking.16 The first
three modes are basic, as they require minimal cognitive ability and become
automatically triggered whenever cues of distress are detected. Even when one is not
paying attention or in some cases, sleeping, these three modes of empathetic distress
would still be activated; as they are “passive, involuntary, based on surface cues, and
requires little cognitive processing”. 17 The core case of 2A6, I argue, belongs to this
category. Let us take a look at the first three modes individually:
Mimicry involves two steps: (1) one automatically imitates the victim’s facial, vocal, and
postural expression of distress, and (2) the resulting changes in one’s own facial, vocal, and
postural musculature trigger neural circuits to the brain and feedback from the brain that
produce feelings which match the victim’s feelings.18
Mimicry is one of the basic and automatic modes that Hoffman thinks responsible
for empathic arousal. An example of this mode is the contagious basic reaction such as
yawning and vomiting. Once a person starts yawning, quickly the people around her start
to yawn—the same goes for vomiting. Adam Smith’s case of the “slack rope” [mentioned
earlier in section 2.2] is also an example of mimicry; it depicts the phenomenon of the
audience automatically adopting the slack rope performers’ posture. This mode is
involuntary in the sense that it is relatively independent of one’s higher cognitive activities.
One doesn’t have a say in whether to receive the contagious signal or be affected by it.
(b) conditioning—empathic distress becomes a conditioned response through observing
others in distress at the same time that one is experiencing actual distress.
16
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, 36-62.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
45
(c) direct association—makes the connection between a victim’s expression of distress or
cues in the victim’s situation and one’s own painful past experience, without requiring
conditioning.19
The second mode (b) conditioning refers to the phenomenon of experiencing
distress as a result of being conditioned to feel distress whenever another feels distress.
The third mode (c) direct association correspond to the response in 2A6. The potential
victim’s expression wasn’t mentioned in 2A6, but the situation as I discussed earlier is
very clear—the infant is facing mortal danger by approaching a deep well. The “painful
past experience” could be something the observer has experienced first hand, such as
having fallen into a swimming pool or a lake; it could also be something the observer has
heard about or had imagined that had brought one distress in the past. As mentioned
earlier, 2A6 presupposes that most people have the common experience or knowledge
about the danger of a well—they can see the obvious association between the depicted
situation and the harm that is going to befall upon the infant.
Let us take a look at the last two modes that require higher cognitive abilities:
(d) verbally mediated association—another’s distress is communicated and connected to
one’s own painful past experience through the medium of language, which makes it
possible to empathize with someone who is absent.
(e) perspective-taking—this is not a new mode, going back at least to David Hume, who
wrote that because people are constituted similarly and have similar life experiences,
imagining oneself in another’s place converts the other’s situation into mental images that
evoke the same feeling in oneself.20
Among the five different modes, “(d) verbally mediated association” and “(e)
perspective taking” requires more sophisticated cognitive abilities than the others. Mode
(d) verbally mediated association requires semantic processing, which would “put distance
between victim and observer.” In other words, when hearing or reading about a suffering
19
Ibid.
20
ibid.
46
victim, one may not have an as strong reaction as seeing the victim right in front of one’s
face, which evokes sympathy through the first 3 modes we discussed. However, sympathy
induced by “verbally mediated association” is not necessarily weaker than the first 3
modes. The distance between the victim and the observer could be manipulated.
Sometimes, good storytellers can reduce or diminish the distance between the audience
and a character; it is not uncommon that they can evoke extremely strong and longlasting sympathetic reactions.
Interestingly, “verbally mediated association” could depict the readers’
sympathetic reaction to the imagined endangered infant in 2A6. It is through language,
the audience of Mencius feels the pang of sympathy that they suppose the protagonist in
the story must also experience. When reading or discussing 2A6 two millenniums after it
was written, the readers can still resonate with an imagined protagonist’s response to an
endangered infant. It is through verbally mediated association Mencius persuades us that
everyone should have a sympathetic response to an endangered infant. He does so not
through consulting empirical studies, but by making the readers feel such a response and
then to agree with his claim given how strong and fundamental this sympathetic response
is to the readers.
Mode (e) perspective taking is sometimes singled out and called “sympathy” by
philosophers [e.g. Hume]; it is sometimes studied by empirical researchers under the
name empathy (see chapter 2, Batson and Coplan’s lists). Language is sometimes used as
a media in this mode, higher cognitive abilities such as imagination are often involved.
With perspective taking, one could imagine “what is the victim experiencing?” or “how
would I feel if in the victim’s place?” The readers or the audience of 2A6 do not directly
47
perceive a child falling into a well. The practice depends on a recollection; or imagining
what it is like to be in a situation like the one described.
I stated earlier that 2A6 is a case of mode (c) direct association; it is possible that (d)
verbally mediated association and (e) perspective-taking are involved in the process,
though not in the initial moment that Mencius stresses. The reason is that (d) and (e)
requires longer time to be activated—semantic processing and imagination takes longer
time than mode (a), (b), and (c), which requires minimal cognitive processing. The fast
reacting feature of 2A6 which Mencius stresses makes it most likely that it is a case of one
of the first 3 modes [mode (c)] rather than mode (d) or (e).
Together with the two higher-order cognitive modes of verbally mediated
association and perspective taking, the three basic empathetic/sympathetic distress
arousal models of mimicry, conditioning and direct association form the multidimensional empathetic distress system. This multi-dimension emotional empathetic
distress system enables one to capture not only direct and surface cues of others’ distress
but also less obvious signals of distress. These five modes can transfer into one another.
The one that felt sympathy for the endangered child as a result of direct association may
start to think what the child would feel if the child was injured severely in the accident.
How sad would the child’s parents be? What if something like that happened to me? Or
someone I know? Taking others’ perspective [mode (e)] may in turn enhance the already
existing sympathetic response. The five modes are not mutually exclusive in any sense;
they can work together and thus ensure one is responsive to a wide range of clues of
distress. Others’ distress can alert us in direct and automatic ways as in 2A6; they can also
affect us through imagination, role-taking or through other higher cognitive abilities that
48
require verbal communication and semantic processing.
2A6 denotes one of the very basic modes of direct association. It thus is fast acting,
spontaneous, requires minimal cognitive abilities and a response we can reasonably
expect to see in most if not all of our fellow human beings.
3.5 The Affective Aspect/ “I Feel Your Pain”
Ce and yin both denote a type of pain in the phrase ceyin zhi xin—they refer to the affective
aspect of the sympathetic reaction. Mencius also uses bu ren zhi xin (
ren zhi xin (
" and bu ren
) to refer to the sprout of ren. They denote the heart that “cannot
bear (other’s distress)”, or is “unable to endure other’s distress”, which focuses on the
affective aspect of the reaction. “What is this feeling (of unbearableness towards the
death-facing ox) really?”21 King Xuan of Qi asked this question about two thousand years
ago; to answer it, we must concern ourselves with the true nature of this distress caused by
others’ pain. It is useful to look at some of the modern research on the nature of this
distress.
One notable account on the nature of the distress evoked by others’ distress in
Mencius comes from Myeong-seok Kim. Kim suggests that the observer’s distress in 2A6
comes from both one’s construal of the situation in terms of an innocent creature being in
danger and some kind of concern for the victim [or for sentient being in general.] 22 I
agree with him that some cognitive component such as one being innocent or
undeserving of the suffering is a part of the perception process; I further emphasize that
21
Mencius 1A7.
Myeong-seok Kim, "What Cèyǐn zhī xīn (Compassion/Familial Affection) Really Is," Dao 9.4
(2010): 407-425, especially 408.
22
49
these types of components do not have to be full blooded judgments—as Wong points out,
the initial reaction is a fast appraisal; is subject to later adjustment.23 The affective aspect
of bu ren (
" does not necessarily dictate an ethical judgment or a full blooded
judgment of any type. When King Xuan of Qi (1A7) cannot bear to see the ox’s
frightened expression, or when the gentlemen cannot bear to see them [birds and beasts
they have seen living] die (2A6), it is not the case that the king or the gentlemen have
formed a full-fledged ethical judgment about whether the beasts or birds deserve to die.
The painful feeling does not solely come from a construal or a judgment of the situation
as Kim suggests, I argue, it also comes from the affective aspect of the sympathetic
response. The distress is a result of being influenced by others’ distress affectively. There is
not merely the cognitive appraisal but the affect that accompanies it.
Tania Singer and her colleagues, who suggest that the distress caused by real
suffering shares the same affective but not the sensory process as the real and original
suffering, presented notable research on the affective aspect of sympathy. 24 In a way,
looking at your stepped-on toe pains me; it gives me tickling sensations on my toe and
makes me want to do something about it (your toe, not mine); but it does not truly pain me
in the same way it pains you. The sympathizer does not have the sensory aspect, but only
the affective aspect of the observed pain. Looking at the infant falling into danger pains
one, but this distress of “unable to bear” is yet distinct from the distress of really falling
into a deep well.
23
Wong, "Growing Virtue,” 30.
Tania Singer, Ben Seymour, John O'doherty, Holger Kaube, Raymond J. Dolan, and Chris D.
Frith, "Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain," Science 303,
no. 5661 (2004): 1157-1162.
24
50
This finding is intriguing: In a way one feels another’s pain, and one’s body
readies itself for further actions to resolve the pain, but one does not really experience the
other’s pain as the other person does, nor does the pain compromise the sympathizer’s
ability to rescue the original sufferer [who may not able to do so due to the pain.] 25 In
other words, sympathizing with others’ distress gives the sympathizer a “taste” of the pain
through the shared affective component, but does not burden the sympathizer with the
real sensory pain. In sum, the distress one feels facing others’ distress comes from the
affective aspect of sympathy, it is not a fully-fledged judgment regarding others’ plight.
This affective response may be closely related to one’s perception and fast appraisal of the
situation, but it might be misleading to suggest it comes from one’s cognitive construal of the
situation, especially when it is unclear what Kim meant by this “cognitive construal.”
Let us now consider the motivational aspect before discussing the relationship
amongst the above-discussed perceptive and affective aspects of sympathy.
3.6 The Motivational Component — Dictates No Specific
Action
It is worth noting that Mencius does not claim that everyone would, or should, rush to
grab the child out of the well. In other words, he talks about the feelings and bodily
responses, but does not dictate what action one should take. The bodily readiness for
action does not prescribe a specific reaction. The reaction could be anything the
It gives us insights in answering worries about whether sympathizing with distressed others
will burden the sympathizer with too much distress. It is a real concern for some individuals,
especially those who are sensitive to others’ distress and for certain professions such as medical
professionals, who are frequently exposed to others’ sufferings. The key point is that, sympathy
is not simply a duplicated or weaker version of someone else’s experience—the sensory
component is missing even though the affective and motivating components are present. We will
discuss this issue in more details in chapter 5 and 6 in responding to Prinz’s argument.
25
51
sympathizer deems appropriate for the situation. Wong notes in “Growing Virtues”:
“The motivational elements need not and typically do not dictate specific action
tendencies… the specific nature of such action [as in the 2A6 case] would depend on the
circumstances. My first reaction to the child crawling towards the well may be to rush
over and grab it, but I may be too far away to get there in time, and my best action may
be to shout to others closer to the child. ”26 The rescuing method is left open; this is an
important point in Mencius’ account. Sympathy allows for different reactions. It allows
help carried out after the initial reaction—it allows help after careful calculation or
helping endeavor in cooperating with other individuals with a shared goal. Allowing
different helping behavior offers a potential response to those who doubt sympathy’s
moral usefulness because an optimal solution may not be reached when one is under the
stress that comes from sympathy. Sympathy could work with other faculties of the human
mind such as long term planning and rational calculation—sympathy could be useful in
rule based ethical theories/practice such as utilitarianism.
Studies about stress-responding behavior support this observation. One of the
typical psychological and behavioral responses to stress is fight-or-flight, a state in which
the muscles are tensed, heart rate and breath quickens, and one’s full attention engaged.
These reactions ready one for further action to either extricate oneself from the situation
or to confront the stress. In addition to this model, there is also the tend-and-befriend
model, which is said to be more of a typical response for females.
26
⁠
27
Shelly Taylor and
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” 28.
Shelley Taylor, et al., "Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females: Tend-And-Befriend, Not
Fight-Or-Flight," Psychological Review 107.3 (2000): 411. The claim that tend-and-befriend is typical
to females is controversial, though the proposed model as a typical reaction to stress is widely
accepted.
27
52
her colleagues proposed in 2000 that when facing stress, females typically respond by
protecting their offspring and seeking out social groups for mutual defense. The tend-andbefriend model has gathered wide acceptance, though whether it is gender-specific as
Taylor claims is open to debate. Together, these two models support the earlier assertion
that when facing stress one may formulate different responses, and that the exact course
of action cannot be accurately predicted. One may run away and refuse to acknowledge
the dangerous situation (flight); rush to the well and try one’s best to try to get the child
out (fight); seek help from others by yielding or screaming (befriend); or simply approach
the child (tend). There is no single “appropriate” response set in stone: the responses vary
according to the specific situations and the individuals facing them. The focus here is not
on the differences, but rather the action tendency—the universal bodily changes that
ready one for action.
3.7 The Mencian Triplet
The first half of this chapter [Sections 3.1—3.6] discussed the four components of ceyin zhi
xin (A cognitive component of recognizing others in distress/need; A bodily visceral
response [that overlaps with]; the “feeling” of the emotion itself; A motivational
component) individually. It provides a comprehensive account of the four components in
Mercian philosophy; these sections give us a good idea of what the primitive form of
sympathy is consists of. Based on the previous sections, sections 3.7—3.18 investigate the
relationship amongst the four components that were studied individually previously.
53
3.7.1 The Mencian Perceptive-Affective-Motive Triplet
Based on the description in Mencius, I propose a Mencian Triplet of perceptionaffection-motivation. As can be observed, the triplet of perceiving the distress, the
affective feeling and the motivation to help happens simultaneously. The process of
perceiving clues of distress, having the affective feelings/responses of distress, and the
motivation to aid are different aspects of the same emotional phenomenon—they are a
package in the case of ceyin zhi xin. Notice that given the overlapping nature of
components 2, the bodily visceral response, and component 4, the affective feeling of the
emotion, I summarize them into one aspect of this triplet. This triplet is the underlying
part of sympathy I should stress; we will discuss the other parts of sympathy in Section 3.
8 The Mencian Triplet and Ceyin Zhixin.
Flanagan is the one who first put forth the idea of a triplet in his work on the
modularity of morals.
According to Flanagan, ceyin zhi xin as a fundamental moral
modularity, at the same time as one that fits into P. F. Strawson’s idea, has the following
properties:
1. It is automatic, fast acting, and easily activated;
2. It involves affect (feeling), cognition, and conation, i.e. an action tendency;
3. It has features of cognitively impenetrability despite itself being cognitive, e.g., the
cognitive-affect-conation triplet is hard to turn off or keep from being activated; the
action can be stopped but only with conscious effort/veto, or sometimes only indirectly,
by doing something else;
4. These exists a well-defined class or stimuli that trigger it. 28
Flanagan’s triplet involves the affect, cognition, and conation. I borrow this idea
from Flanagan to help understanding the sprout of ren. In 2A6, the description of the
sympathetic response fits the description of Mencian Triplet—the reaction starts from
suddenly perceiving the incident, entailing affective changes [chu ti
28
Flanagan, Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleologies, 45.
54
referring to fear
on behalf of the death-facing infant] and motivation to help. This spontaneous reaction
does not go through complex calculation as evidenced by its fast speed.
One may wonder, are these three components of perception, affection and
motivation really connected—could they happen to be activated all together as a result of
coincident? In other words, must the three components all be present when one feels
sympathy? These three aspects must all be present in my understanding of sympathy.
Without perceiving the distress, one won’t have the motivational or affective response.
This perception can be a cognitively demanding process such as reading a fiction that
depicts one’s distress [such as Hoffman’s role-taking mode], it could also be a fast,
spontaneous reaction like 2A6 [such as Hoffman’s direct association mode].
A second question is whether one can have sympathetic perception or perspectivetaking without the affective aspect. Can we enter another’s mind and grasp how the other
thinks and feels without this affective aspect? It seems possible at least on a case by case
base. For example, we can calmly engage in perspective taking through analyzing a
patient or a fictional character’s inner world; we can also calmly project ourselves into
another’s minds. Affective response is not always necessary in such practice, even though
becoming emotionally aroused is sometimes hard to avoid when taking others’
perspective. Perspective taking without affective changes is possible, but it should be
noted that perspective taking without emotional engagement is not included in my
definition of sympathy. In others words, the affective aspect of “feeling” others’ distress
must be present in sympathy, according to my framework.
Motivation is also a critical aspect of sympathy. I discussed the various ways
motivation could exhibit itself in section 3.6. The motivation associated with sympathy
55
need not be a full pledged thought or plan of certain action, rather, it is an action
tendency that is closely related to the bodily and affective changed.
To conclude, the proposed Mencian triplet has the following features:
The perceiving of others’ distress, the affective changes, and the motivation to aid
together consist a Mencian perceptive-affective-motive triplet; this triplet is a basic
reaction to others’ distress or situations that are typically associated with distress.
Before I move further to discuss the features of this triplet, I need to stress that the
triplet is merely a part of ceyin zhi xin. Even though these three aspects are emphasized in
the original texts, it does not mean that the primitive form of sympathy contains only a
spontaneous reaction that is free from conscious calculation and regulation. In addition to
the triplet, ceyin zhi xin also contains a cognitively more demanding process that can adjust
and regulate the initial reactions. The interactive relationship between the triplet and the
higher cognitive functions is an important aspect of sympathy. As we shall discuss in
chapter 4, the cultivation of sympathy is precisely targeted at both enhancing the
spontaneous triplet and refining the conscious regulatory process. Before going into the
discussion of the adjusting and regulation functions that demands higher cognitive
abilities, let us examine the Mencian triplet in the original Mencian texts and empirical
studies.
3.7.2 Shared Representation
In addition to the Mencian Triplet in the philosophical literature, many observe the close
relationship amongst the perceiving of distress, the feeling of distress and the motivation
to aid. According to some of the most prominent modern psychologists and neurologists,
these three aspects make use of the same underlining mechanism of shared neural and
56
bodily representation.29 Please note that since most research in empirical studies are
conducted under the term “empathy”, in this section, when referring to the subject of
others’ studies I may use “empathy”. This section discusses empirical studies that lends
support to the above-mentioned Mencian Triplet. These evidences form empirical studies
are not yet conclusive, however, they give us hope that a structure such as the Mencian
triplet reflects the reality of human psychology.
The close relationship between imitation and sympathy has been proven in many
empirical studies in the recent decades; more and more scholars have begun to recognize
and design experiments to test the idea that common neural substrates are involved in
representing one’s own and others’ affective states. In the field of neuroscience, one
phenomenon known to be a basic mechanism of empathy is “neural resonance”, meaning
that “perceivers’ tendency to engage overlapping neural systems when they experience a
given internal state and when they observe (or know that) targets (are) experiencing that
same state.”30 It is also referred to as “shared neural representation” between the observer
and the suffer. Perceiving the emotional state of another triggers the shared neural
activations between self-related experience and other related experience; it causes a
matching emotional state in the sympathizer.31 The shared neural representation between
observers and victims/observers is believed by many to be the common foundational
For example, de Waal, “Putting Altruism back into Altruism.” And Decety, "The
Neuroevolution of Empathy," 35-45.
29
Jamil Zaki and Kevin N. Ochsner. "The Neuroscience of Empathy: Progress, Pitfalls and
Promise," Nature Neuroscience 15.5 (2012): 675-680.
30
Tania Singer, and Claus Lamm, "The Social Neuroscience of Empathy," Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences 1156, no. 1 (2009): 81-96.
31
57
mechanism of both imitation and sympathy/empathy.32 Especially after the striking yet
controversial discovery of “mirror neurons” by di Pellegrino et al three decades ago, 33
neuroscientists began to seek evidence for the claim that perceiving others’ affective states
and experiencing them first hand activate the same neurological substrates in the observer.
I should note that mirror neurons’ function in human empathy is highly controversial at
the present stage.
To be more specific, here I list a few of the many studies based on humans and
primates aiming to explain neural resonance on the neurons level; some of which indicate
that when observing and performing an action fires the same motor neurons. For
example, B. Wicker, et al.’s study on seeing and feeling disgust shows that feeling disgust
and seeing others’ disgusted facial expression triggers similar neurological responses. 34
When one experiences disgust, her anterior insular cortex is activated, which is also
activated when seeing another’s disgusted facial expression. C. Keysers and colleagues’
study shows activities in premotor cortex when perceiving others being touched and also
when the subject is actually being touched.35 In other words, “watching the movie scene
in which a tarantula crawls on James Bond's chest can make us literally shiver—as if the
spider crawled on our own chest.”36 In addition, M. Botvinick, et al. shows that when
Most empirical research use the term ‘empathy’ rather than ‘sympathy’ to refer to the
phenomenon I call sympathy in this project.
32
Di Pellegrino, Giuseppe, et al. "Understanding Motor Events: a Neurophysiological Study."
Experimental Brain Research 91.1 (1992): 176-18.
33
Bruno Wicker, et al. "Both of Us Disgusted In My Insula: the Common Neural Basis Of Seeing
And Feeling Disgust," Neuron 40.3 (2003): 655-664.
34
Christian Keysers, et al. "A Touching Sight: SII/PV Activation During the Observation and
Experience of Touch," Neuron 42.2 (2004): 335-346.
35
36
Ibid., Introduction.
58
watching videos of others’ painful facial expression, the cortical areas including anterior
cingulate cortex and insula is activated—The same as when one experience pain
oneself.37 This substantial and growing body of empirical studies lends support to the idea
that common neural substrates are involved in representing one’s own and others’
affective states. Some recent theories about sympathy hold that this “shared
representation of neurons” between the observer and the victim/sympathizer explains
how we can “put ourselves in another’s shoes”, or think/behave “on behalf of another” as
if in their place. Decety, arguably one of the foremost neuroscientists on empathy, calls
this shared activation of neurons “shared affective circuits” and “shared neurological
representation”; de Waal uses “shared bodily and neural representation,” and in some
occasion, “shared affective representation.” I will use “shared representation” in this
project for short. In sum, the shared representation between the victim and the
sympathizer is suspected by many modern empirical researchers to be the neurological
foundation of empathy/sympathy. This is hopefully, even though not conclusive, that on
the neurological level there might be a foundation for the closely related aspects of
perception and affective response, as in the Mencian triplet.
3.7.3 Action-specific Perception Theory
The motivational aspect is also closely connected with the perception of others’ distress
and the affective responses to others’ distress. In the field of psychology, there is a longstanding view that perception and action are deeply interactive and intertwined. The
action-specific perception theory, for example, posits that the potential actions we could
M. Botvinick, et al, “Viewing Facial Expressions of Pain Engages Cortical Areas Involved in The
Direct Experience of Pain,” Neuroimage, 25 (2005), pp. 312–319
37
59
take influences our perception.38 It outlines the close relationship between perception and
action. The theory suggests that our perception of the environment informs us about the
opportunities for action and their associated costs; meanwhile, different intention and
action capabilities result in different perception. For example, many athletes report that
their performance level influences their perception. Baseball players, when they are
hitting well, report that the ball appears bigger [like a grapefruit]; when they are not
hitting well report that the ball looks smaller.39 One explanation is that their intention
and bodily readiness to perform the action of hitting the ball influences how big the ball
appears—when it is a feasible action the ball appears bigger, when it is less probably of an
action judging by the play’s skill level, bodily readiness [whether the player is too tired to
perform such an action] and intention [whether the player is concentrated or
distracted]the ball appears smaller. This phenomenon of perceiving differently based on
one’s capacity level and intention is reported not only in baseball but also other sports
such as tennis, basketball, and golf – Witt’s results confirm that the perception of the
Jessica K. Witt, "Action’s Effect on Perception," Current Directions in Psychological Science 20, no. 3
(2011): 201-206.
38
D. R. Proffitt, “Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action,” Perspectives on Psychological
Science 1, no. 2 (2006): 110-122.
Jessica K. Witt, " See the Ball, Hit the Ball: Apparent Ball Size is Correlated with Batting
Average," Psychological Science, 16 (2005): 937-938.
39
“In describing a mammoth 565-ft home run, Mickey Mantle said, ‘‘I never really could explain it.
I just saw the ball as big as a grapefruit’’ (Early, n.d.). George Scott of the Boston Red Sox said,
‘‘When you’re hitting the ball [well], it comes at you looking like a grapefruit. When you’re not, it
looks like a blackeyed pea’’ (Baseball Almanac, n.d.).
Baseball Almanac. (n.d.). [George Scott baseball statistics]. Retrieved May 18, 2004, from
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/players/ player.php?p=scottge02
Early, L. (n.d.). Mickey quotes. Retrieved September 13, 2005, from
http://themick.com/MickeyQuotes9.htm
60
environment are affected by the perceiver’s behavioral potential. 40 In this theory, one is
seeing in terms of possible actions.
Theories such as the action-specific perception thus confirms the close
relationship between perception and motive. Applying the action-specific perception
theory to sympathy, it then confirms the close relationship between one’s perception of
others distress and the motivation to act, as the Mencian triplet suggests. It lends
credibility to my proposed Mencian triplet as the underlying mechanism of sympathy.
So far, I have supported the intertwining nature of the perceptive, affective and
motive components of ceyin zhixin, thus supporting my proposed idea of viewing these
three aspects as a unity—the Mencian Triplets. As mentioned earlier, the Mencian
Triplet is merely a part of sympathy, the next section discusses the other components
besides the Triplet. I will first use de Waal’s proposed structure of a Russian Doll to
illustrate the relationship between the triplet and other components of sympathy’s.
3.8 The High Cognitive Activities as a Part of Ceyin zhi xin
It would be a mistake to think sympathy is always a spontaneous and automatic knee-jerk
reaction,41 such as yawning in response to others’ yawning, vomiting in response to others’
vomiting. The Mencian Triplet are an essential and indispensable part of ceyin zhi xin;
there are also the more intelligent components that enables us to regulate and adjust the
response prescribed by the triplet. Mencius’ teaching emphasizes one’s reflection and its
impact on moral cultivation as well as exterior environment. It is apparent that sympathy
40
Ibid.
I owe the idea of comparing sympathy and “knee jerk” to Flanagan. Flanagan, Moral Sprouts
and Natural Teleologies, 43.
41
61
also includes “intelligent components” – higher cognitive actives such as calculation,
semantic processing, and imagination. In the cultivated form of mature sympathy, the
spontaneous part of sympathy would be expected to be constantly interacting with the
high cognitive parts so that the spontaneity could be in touch with one’s reflective
thinking.
The more intelligent components are always present in sympathy.42 They take a
bit longer than the triplet to be activated, yet are in constant interaction with the triplet;
they guide the triplet and play a role in deciding the possible actions to follow.
The cultivation of sympathy thus should place great importance on not only
strengthening the triplet but also enhancing one’s ability in regulating and adjusting the
initial reaction. The growing of the former ensures one remaining sensitive to distressed
others’—especially those near and dear; the cultivating of the latter allows one to act
adequately and to guide her own sympathetic reaction adequately. In addition, the
cultivation of the latter enables us to feel sympathy for objects the triplet is initially
insensitive to—for example, people who we dislike, who we find difficult to relate to
initially. Sometimes such maneuver is conducted by drawing analogies or re-evoking
one’s memories of an emotion, as will be discussed in chapter 4.
It is critical to understand sympathy as including both the higher cognitive
activities and the Mencian Triplet, as well as the interaction between these two categories.
As a matter of fact, the higher cognitive activities draw as much criticism to sympathy as
it defends sympathy’s value in morality. Because the higher cognitive activities could
42
Small children younger than certain psychological developmental stage are exceptions.
62
inhibit or veto one’s spontaneous altruistic responses, sympathy [and other altruistic
emotions] are sometimes viewed as unreliable or weak. On the other hand, some would
not admit the higher cognitive activities are a part of sympathy, and by the same rationale
denying the interactive nature between such higher cognitive activities and the
spontaneous reaction. This categorization invites criticism of sympathy as impulsive
responses that is easily out of one’s control, or posing a threat to a rational agent’s
autonomy. In understanding how the higher cognitive abilities are related to the basic
Mencian Triplet, I introduce de Waal’s Russian Doll Model, which helps illustrating the
relationship between the abovementioned two categories. It should be noted that the
Russian Doll Model has its own limitation—it presupposes a fixed and layered structure
that doesn’t capture the dynamic nature of sympathy as the growing sprouts and flowing
water metaphor highlights. The Russian Doll Model is, however, helpful in illustrating
the different components of sympathy.
3.9 The Russian Doll Model
Frans de Waal uses a Russian Doll Model to explain his understanding of empathy. De
Waal adopts a very broad definition of empathy that includes my sympathy, for a
discussion of de Waal’s empathy, see Chapter 5. I will use “empathy” when describing de
Waal’s study since that is the word he uses. I will stick with sympathy when I am referring
to the emotional phenomenon in a non-de Waal context. In this section, I first briefly
explain de Waal’s account before discussing its application in my understanding of the
primitive form of sympathy and its cultivation.
The Russian doll theory of de Waal’s proposes that empathy consists of a number
63
of components: Including the Perception Action mechanism (PAM), self-other awareness,
higher cognitive abilities, and regulatory function. They are related in a layered fashion
resembling a Russian doll set (See Figure 1). 43 Preston and de Waal use “Perception
Action mechanism (PAM)” to illustrate shared representation and its function in
empathetic capacity. The mechanism of PAM “provides an observer (the subject) with
access to the subjective state of another (the object) through the subject’s own neural and
bodily representations;”44 and as such is at the core of our empathetic capacity.45 This
PAM, could be a good candidate of the neurological mechanism that correspond with my
proposed Mencian Triplet of perceptive-affective-motive.
In the Russian doll model, the outer layers of the doll include higher cognitive
abilities such as perspective-taking, targeted helping. As Figure 1 illustrates, “The Russian
Doll model of empathy and imitation” suggests the close relationship between the PAM
and the capacities such as sympathetic concern and perspective-taking, which de Waal
calls the “outer layers” of the doll. Self-other awareness also plays a role in the model,
though its activation takes time, as suggested by the vertical axis.
Sophisticated cognitive capacities such as perspective-taking and targeted helping
are at work alongside PAM. For example, we have the ability to sympathize with others
by imagination. It enables us to sympathize with people we have never met, people who
are hard to relate to, and people who are in situations we are unfamiliar with. It not only
allows us to understand and perceive others’ less-obvious distress, but also enables us to
43
De Waal, "Putting the Altruism back into Altruism," 287, 288.
44
Ibid.
Stephanie D Preston and Frans BM De Waal. "Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate
Bases," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 1 (2002): 1-20.
45
64
empathize others’ distress in the context of their situation, personality, and mental states.
Jackson &Decety have a somewhat similar view of empathy; they proposed “the
architecture of empathy”, which also involves higher cognitive faculties, self-other
awareness, some kind of self-regulation in addition to shared neurological
representation.46
The abovementioned factors together contribute to the altruistic behavior we
typically associate with empathy. For example, self-other awareness facilitates targeted
helping—that is, helping in terms of what the sufferer needs instead of the empathizer’s
needs. It also allows more complicated cases of empathy in which one must construct
others’ desires or personality so as to understand their distress. In a way, PAM, which is
based on shared representation, exposes one to the gravity of others’ distress, while selfother awareness and other higher cognitive capacities enables targeted helping that is
appropriate for the sufferer. In the following, I will apply a structure similar to the
Russian Doll to ceyin zhixin.
Jean Decety and Philip L. Jackson, "The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy," Behavioral
and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews 3.2 (2004): 71-100.
46
65
Figure 1: The Russian Doll Model illustrates the structural relationship
between PAM and more sophisticated cognitive abilities. The outer layers
of the doll, namely the sophisticated cognitive capacities, always stays
connected to its inner core of PAM. Figure replicated from de Waal 2008. 47
Using the Russian Doll Model to illustrate sympathy, it allows a clearly layered
illustration of the components of sympathy. A structure similar to the Russian Dolls could
be used to explain ceyin zhi xin and is helpful in illustrating its cultivation. In my
proposition, the Mencian Triplet of direct, spontaneous reaction is at the center of the
doll [inner core], while the more sophisticated conscious adjusting capacities are at the
47
de Waal, "Putting the Altruism back into Altruism,” 288.
66
outer layers. The outer layers require higher cognitive capacities, unlike the inner core,
which is fast reacting. Our knowledge, ability of semantic processing, calculation, capacity
of imagination, even biased beliefs could play a role in the outer layers.
We should pay special attention to the limitations of the Russian Doll’s
application to sympathy in this project too: this model doesn’t illustrate the fact that
sympathy could be invoked from both the inner core [e.g. 2A6] and the outer layers [e.g.
reading 2A6]; stressing the layered structure the Russian doll model also doesn’t highlight
the dynamic relationship between the inner core and outer layers. The higher cognitive
abilities regulate and shape the inner core whereas the inner core also grounds the outer
layers. I discuss this interactive process in moral cultivation in chapter 4. Of course, we do
not expect a metaphor to be so powerful that it answers all/most of our questions
regarding sympathy, however, it is important to keep the limitations in mind while using
it as an explanatory tool. In the remainder of this dissertation, to better illustrate some of
my points, I will refer back to the Russian Doll Model and its inner core and outer layers.
It is important to keep in mind that the Russian Doll Model is instrumental in explaining
the different components of sympathy while this model does not convey all the important
aspects of my understanding of sympathy.
3.10 No Ulterior Motives and Suddenness in 2A6
In the original text, Mencius stresses that one has no ulterior motives when reacting to the
endangered child. He is certain that one reacted to the child “not because one sought to
get in good with the child's parents, not because one wanted to gain good reputation
among their neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the
67
child’s cries.”48 Of course, one could come to have these motives after the initial
momentary sympathetic reaction, but at least for a brief initial moment, one is not moved
by such selfish motives. I believe that this “purity of motive” is best explained by the
nature of sympathetic reaction. One’s attention is directed to the potential or actual
victim; one feels their distress affectively and is motivated to aid. This very feature of
sympathy is accurately described in 2A6 as “no ulterior motives”.
One should note that in the last clause, Mencius mentions, “not because one
would dislike the sound of the child’s cries.” 49 Psychologist Batson has developed
experiments about sympathetic reaction that can be directly applied to this claim.50 In
Batson’s experiment, each subject entered a room with a crying infant, and they could
leave the room at any time they wished. If they leave the room the moment they hear the
infant’s crying, like the way one would react to loud siren or the smell of rotten vegetables,
it would suggest that they would only offer help for selfish reasons—that is, to alleviate
their own distress caused by the annoying noise. When distancing one’s self from the
source of distress is an available and low-cost solution, we can reasonably expect the
subjects to leave the crying infant instead of trying to offer help (higher cost) if they are
purely motivated by self-interest. However, Batson’s subjects did not choose this option:
They went to check on the infants and tried to comfort it instead of simply leaving the
room. They might leave the room after realizing the infant was fine, or that there was
nothing one could do about it, but no one left the room without at least checking on the
48
Mencius 2A6.
49
Ibid.
Batson explains that escape is a feasible option if the altruistic behavior can be explained by
avoiding punishment or consideration of self-interest. Daniel Batson, The Altruism Question:
Toward a Social-Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991)
50
68
infant. Batson uses this experiment to support his empathy-altruism hypothesis, which
claims that empathy is an essential and dispensable altruistic motivation for humans. His
experiment certainly supports Mencius’ claim that one reacts with sympathy to the
endangered child “not because one would dislike the sound of the child's cries.”51
Kim, on the other hand, raises the age-old question of from where the purity of
motivation comes from. Some scholars have suggested that the lack of ulterior motive is a
result of suddenness. As stressed in the original text, one suddenly (zha) sees the child and
has the expected sympathetic reaction. Kim attributes this view to Kwong-loi Shun, who
seems to suggest there being a causal relation between the lack of ulterior motive and the
fact the reaction is sudden and fast. 52 Kim believes that the purity of motivation comes
from the distress one feels on behalf of the victim. For example, using ce and yin, which
both denotes some kind of pain as evidence, Kim argues that the purity of one’s
motivation comes from the distress, which is caused by the idea that an innocent being is
harmed. Insofar as the suddenness not being a casual factor of ceyin zhi xin, I am in
agreement with Kim on this point. This is not to say “suddenness” isn’t an important
feature of the description of 2A6. Mencius stresses it happened all of a sudden because
51
Mencius 2A6.
I believe this may be a misinterpretation of Shun’s original words, but nonetheless agree with
Kim that the purity of motivation (no ulterior motives) does not come from the speed by which
the observer reacts or the fact that she is caught off-guard.
52
I have reservation on whether Shun’s writing indicates that the purity of one’s motivation comes
from the suddenness of the situation; to me it is not obvious that Shun is suggesting a causal
relation here. Kim’s interpretation is based on the following quotation from Shun’s, “… such
reactions reveal something deep in the heart/mind and show one the kind of person one really is.
Since one is caught unprepared, the reactions are not guided by ulterior motives but come
directly from the heart/mind… ” (Shun 1997: 138-140). To me, this could be suggesting that being
“caught unprepared” made it clear for the readers that “the reactions are not guided by ulterior
motives ”, which is in accordance with my account in this chapter. Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and
Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 138-140.
69
“suddenness” highlights the altruistic nature of sympathy by showcasing the selfless
moment of the emotion. Although it is not the reason why the sympathetic reaction is
selfless, it helps to make it obvious.
“Suddenness” is not an essential feature when people act out of sympathy and put
their personal interests or even their very lives at risk to aid a victim. However, what
Mencius seeks in 2A6 is a story that can be instantly persuasive; a story that is immune
from doubts such as one possibly wanting to save the child for the fame, for the reward.
2A6 is instantly persuasive in that there is simply no time for premeditation or calculation.
The suddenness in this story leaves the readers no room for such doubts. This does not
mean suddenness is an innate or contributing aspect of an altruistic response.
The neuroevolutionary perspective also gives us insights on why one has no
ulterior motives. According to Decety, the “basic affective circuits”, which could be based
on shared neural representation, emerged much earlier in brain evolution than higher
cognitive capacities.53 This means that the basic mechanism of what enables one to feel
and be affected by others’ distress developed earlier than our more sophisticated cognitive
abilities. In other words, before homo sapiens were able to think about “ulterior motives”,
they were already reacting to their young in distress with some basic, spontaneous and
robust reaction similar to sympathy. Of course, later on, humans developed other abilities
important to the formation of sympathy: the abilities to think and reflect, to have longer
memory, to imagine things that didn’t actually happen, to take others’ perspectives, and
so on. However, the ancient basic affective circuits remain, though the later faculties
opened up a rich set of possibility of the forms sympathy may take [this relates back to the
53
Decety, "The Neuroevolution of Empathy," 35-45.
70
multi-dimensional system of empathic distress Hoffman suggested, empathy could be
evoked by different cues and take different modes of the five modes Hoffman discussed].
In terms of the ancient “affective circuit,” we are the same as our ancestors and some of
the other mammals. Having spontaneous and fast reacting responses with no ulterior
motives could be a feature that is built in to the nature of sympathetic reactions through
the course of evolution. This conclusion may leave some feeling unsettled. Does this mean
that sympathy is like animal instincts and desires? Then why does Mencius claim it the
sprout of ren while comparing those hopeless in ethical cultivation to beasts? The next two
sections discuss Mencius’ attitude towards sympathy for animals.
3.11 Sympathizing with the Beasts
In this section, I discuss sympathy for non-human objects in Mencius. First, Mencius
obviously recognizes that humans can feel sympathy for animals, and that such
experiences can be of moral and educational value. He makes use of such an instance to
educate King Xuan in becoming more sympathetic to his citizens in 1A7; he also talks
about gentleman’s sympathetic feeling towards birds and beasts as very common
phenomenon in 2A6.
As for the relation of gentlemen to birds and beasts, if they see them living, they cannot
bear to see them die. If they hear their cries, they cannot bear to eat their flesh.
…In the present case your kindness is sufficient to reach birds and beasts, but the benefits
do not reach the commoners. Why is this case alone different? 54
Xunzi, though disagreeing with Mencius on many accounts, goes further to claim
that among humans and animals, “none does not love its own kind”; he depicts examples
of birds having affection for their companions, while claiming humans have stronger
54
Mencius 2A6.
71
feelings than other creatures.
Among all the living things between Heaven and earth, those that have blood and qi ( )
are sure to have awareness, and of those that have awareness, none does not love its own
kind. Now if one of the great birds or beasts loses its group of companions, then after a
month or a season has passed, it is sure to retrace its former path and go by its old home.
When it does, it is sure to pace back and forth, cry out, stomp the ground, pause
hesitatingly, and only then is it able to leave the place. Even among smaller creatures such
as swallows and sparrows, they will still screech for a moment before being able to leave.
Thus, among the creatures that have blood and qi, none has greater awareness than man,
and so man’s feeling for his parents knows no limit until the day they die.55
The early Confucianists recognize that humans not only can feel sympathy for
animals’ distress but also should feel sympathy and care for animals (7A45). Of course,
the care one should have for animals do not entail benevolence—the exemplary persons
should only be benevolence to their fellow human beings.
The exemplary persons care for animals but do not show them benevolence; they show
people benevolence but not treat them as kin. They treat their kin and kin; show
benevolence to people, and care for animals.
0
7
”56
As such, humans can feel sympathy for animals. The early Confucianists’
understanding of sympathy is in accordance with the idea that we have the capacity of
not only recognizing basic distress of our co-species but also those of non-human
mammals’. 57 Animals’ distress thus has certain moral value in Mencian ethics since it
directly influences one’s ethical cultivation. A person who is insensitive to animal suffering
may not have an adequately functioning Mencian Triplet.
In addition, some Confucian thinkers question whether a human virtue of
Xunzi, “Discourse on Ritual(Li Lun
).” In Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 2nd
ed, trans. Eric L. Hutton, ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 2005), 283.
55
56
Mencius 7A45.
57
It is not clear whether Mencius thinks animals have sympathy or sympathy like emotions.
72
benevolence can grow out of animal like desires [if one focus entirely on the spontaneous
aspect of ceyin zhi xin and further equate the spontaneity as “animal like desire.”] Since
some animals seem to have responses like sympathy to their young in distress or danger. I
wish to address this concern by pointing out that first, this question would not be a
problem for a Mencian ethical framework. Ceyin zhi xin is not animal like in Mencius’
account — as the duan of ren, ceyinzhi xin is distinctively human’s. Mencius would not agree
that our basic disposition to feel sympathy is animal-like, as he sometimes equates losing
our duan with becoming animals. Thus, the spontaneity of ceyin zhi xin doesn’t make it an
animal like desire. Secondly, even if the Triplet of ceyin zhi xin is animal like in the sense
that certain animals may share the similar neurological circuits as humans, human
sympathy is distinctive in that we have the higher cognitive abilities that is far beyond
animals. Ceyin zhi xin includes both the Triplet and higher cognitive activities thus
differing itself from “sympathy like” reaction from non-human animals. It is thus not a
problem to claim that human sympathy could be cultivated into a virtue while animals’
sympathy like responses are hopeless in this regard.
3.12 Conclusion
Sympathy could be activated from the activation of the Mencian triplet of perceptiveaffective-motivate as in the 2A6 case, in which a child’s dangerous plight immediately
captures our attention. It may also slowly “sink in” —a reader of a fictional story may
gradually begin to sympathize with a character that initially appears unlikeable. This is an
example of sympathy being activated from the outer layer higher cognitive functions of
verbal mediation and/or imagination.
73
This chapter examined, based on the discussion of chapter 2, several features of
the primitive form of sympathy. I started from discussing the perceptive aspect, the
affective aspect, and the motivational aspect of ceyin zhi xin individually, and then moved
to examine the relationship amongst the three aspects. I propose a Mencian PerceptiveAffective-Motive Triplet, which suggests that these three aspects of ceyin zhi xin are
intertwined and interacting, as described in the 2A6 case. I then presented the Russian
Doll Model from de Waal to help illustrate the structure of sympathy as containing both
the Triplet and higher cognitive activities such as taking perspectives other than one’s
own, understanding abstract ideas, semantic processing, imagination, and so on.
The cultivation of sympathy from its primitive form to maturity targets the Triplet,
the higher cognitive components, and the relationship between them. The most effective
methods of moral education normally involve the cultivating of all these aspects
simultaneously, as we will see in 1A7 in the next chapter.
74
Chapter 4
4. Cultivating Sympathy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter takes a further step and moves from describing the primitive form of
sympathy to answering the question of "how do we cultivate sympathy, given its primitive
form?" It explicates a number of methods to cultivate sympathy and sympathy-related
capacities. These methods include preserving basic sensitivity, changing of perceptive
habits, understanding others' perspectives, practicing of rituals, verbal persuasion, and
reflection, to name but a few. I aim to show that, when provided with proper cultivation,
the mature form of sympathy is both achievable and reliable.
The study of the cultivation of sympathy is of special significance to the project for
two reasons. First, on the normative level, an account of cultivation helps to answer
whether sympathy can be a reliable and consistent moral emotion. Contrary to the
suggestions of some critics1 who limit their understanding of sympathy to its primitive
form, the “flawed” primitive form can be transformed into a reliable and consistent
mature form of sympathy; the cultivational process and the changes it brings about
provide crucial evidence for this claim. It is also worth noting that for all philosophers
from Mencius to Hume, Smith and contemporaries such as Michael Slote and Nel
Noddings, who place great importance on the role of sympathy in their respective moral
theories, none had claimed sympathy in its uncultivated form could be the sole
Paul Bloom, "Against Empathy," Boston Review, 10 Sept. 2014. Web.
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy#. And Prinz, "Is Empathy
Necessary for Morality?" 211-229.
1.
75
foundation of morality. The studies of the cultivational process of sympathy thus provide
support for the normative claims on the importance of sympathy.
Secondly, the process of cultivation relates the project to real human psychological
development and gives the project practical significance. Whether sympathy can be the
adequate motivational source for moral behavior is not only a question that invites
inquiries from a normative ethical point of view, but also a question that seeks realistic
answers. This chapter bridges the gap between a normative ethical question concerning
sympathy and the scientific studies in contemporary human psychology. It thus not only
supports my philosophical account with empirical evidence but also provides
philosophical justification for the practice of cultivating sympathy.
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the famous passage 1A7 from Mencius in
Section 4.2 From Sparing an Ox to Benevolent Policy-Making. I discuss the delicate
maneuver that Mencius, the master of moral education, performed in the effort to
persuade the King Qi of Xuan to see his people in a sympathetic manner and adopt a
benevolent policy. I take a close look at the case of Mencius 1A7 and related passages,
using it to argue that persuasion as a part of sympathy cultivation is most powerful when
the subject has the bodily readiness for the emotion. In the process, I also demonstrate
that sympathy can be “extended” to less-common objects of this emotion; such as people
far away, from a different ethnic group, or we dislike. Such “extension” is attainable,
especially when guided or facilitated by techniques such as imagination. In the follow
sections, based on Mencius' fascinating yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt as described in
1A7, I survey a number of implications that we can draw from this case, including the
manners through which sympathy could be extended from objects to which it is easy to
76
relate to objects less so; the limited effect of verbal persuasion, the importance of constant
practice, self-reflection and cultivation, the need for guidance, and the importance of
considering individualized features in ethical cultivation. I then discuss the cultivation
methods concerning sympathetic perception, including preserving one's basic sensitivity
towards suffering, prioritizing clues of distress, understanding others' perspective, and
maintaining a caring and loving attitude toward potential objects of sympathy. In
addition, I also discuss the pattern matching cognitive technique that contributes to
sympathetically interpreting others' situations. The example of ethical cultivation in 1A7
is the first case I address.
4.2 From Sparing an Ox to Benevolent Policy-Making
4.2.1 Mencius 1A7
In this section, I examine one intriguing case of cultivating sympathy in Mencius 1A7 to
demonstrate how the primitive form of sympathy can be cultivated into the mature form; I
also demonstrate how one's sympathy can be extended to multiple objects in distance.
Based on this case, I then discuss the several factors that affect the cultivation of sympathy.
In 1A7, Mencius tries to help King Xuan of Qi [
] to understand his own behavior
in order to make an ethical and political point.
Mengzi said, “I heard your attendant Hu He say,
While the king was sitting up in his hall, an ox was led past below. The king saw it and
said, "Where is the ox going?”
Hu He replied, “We are about to ritually anoint a bell with its blood.” The king said,
“Spare it. I cannot bear its frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the execution
ground.”
Hu He replied, “So should we dispense with the anointing of the bell?” The king said,
“How can that be dispensed with? Exchange it for a sheep.”
Mengzi continued, “I do not know if this happened.”
The king said, “It happened.”
Mengzi said, “This heart is sufficient to become King. The commoners all thought Your
Majesty was being stingy. But I knew that Your Majesty simply could not bear the
suffering of the ox.”
77
The king said, “That is so. There were indeed commoners who said that. But although
Qi is a small state, how could I be stingy about one ox? It was just that I could not bear its
frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the execution ground. Hence, I
exchanged it for a sheep.”2
0 7
0 5
5
5
7
7
[
‘
8
[
6
5“
5]
[
[
]
8
6
8
7
[
]
…
44
…
)
In the passage, King Xuan of Qi shares a personal anecdote with Mencius and
asks for his opinion. The king once saw an ox that was to be sacrificed in a ceremony
[consecrating a bell], and seeing the fear and sorrow in the ox's eyes, the king spared the
ox. Instead of sacrificing the ox as planned, he ordered that the ox should be replaced
with a sheep. After Mencius inquiries, the king states that he "cannot bear to look at its
(the ox's) frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the execution ground 1
…
2
Based on this story, Mencius tries to convince the king to
adopt a more benevolent policy toward his people who are in similar plight as the
frightened ox is.
4.2.2 From an Ox to the King's People—3 Dimensions
This case is an example of Mencius trying to cultivate the king's sympathy so it can be
extended to his subjects. This cultivational process is accomplished through altering the
cause of the king's sympathy in three ways:
1) from distress that is close by to far away;
2
Mencius, 1A7.
3
Mencius, 1A7
' ,
78
'
'
2) from distress that is directly observable to less observable, such as social and
psychological distress;
3) from distress of one individual's distress to a group of individuals'.
This case is of particular interest to my project because it is widely believed that
non-personalized others/abstract needs/chronic needs are limiting conditions that would
reduce if not diminish an individual's sympathetic reaction. Batson, the proponent of the
Empathy-altruism Hypothesis summarizes that, "empathy-induced altruism is not likely
to be evoked by the needs of non-personalized others...(a)those who live far away,(b)those
with whom we do not share group membership,(c)those who are not similar to us, (d)those
who have needs that we have no experienced ourselves, (e)those we dislike, and (f) those
we encounter as one of many individuals with similar needs. ...Each of these
characteristics has been proposed as a source of depersonalization and so a limiting
condition on empathic concern, however, existing research clearly supports only the last
two."4 Yet in the 1A7 case, Mencius takes up the challenge to make the king feel for the
distress that is far away, less observable, non-direct, and belongs to a group of individuals.
Mencius' attempt is managing (a) and (f) and possibly (c) and (d) in Batson's summary,
thus gives support the claim that the above mentioned limiting condition of sympathy, if
really exist, could be channeled or managed. Let me first explain the three ways through
which Mencius tries to extend the king's sympathy.
First, from the ox which is close by to the king, Mencius tries to extend the king's
sympathy to individuals who are far away and who do not have the chance to express
their pain and suffering in front of the king's eyes. This is thus an attempt to bridge the
4
Batson, Altruism in Humans, 193.
79
distance between the potential sympathizer and the potential victim. The primitive form
of sympathy is sometimes criticized as being subject to spatial bias, namely that typically
one feels stronger sympathy for people who are physically closer, and weaker or no
sympathy at all for people who are distant. This is a problem not only because people far
away may need our sympathy and help, but also that physical distance between the agent
and the sufferer should not be morally relevant. Thus the primitive form of sympathy,
prone to being biased; is often seen as an unreliable moral emotion. However, sympathy
can be channeled or modified by ways such as imagination or analogy so that people
would also care for suffering occurring at a distance. This is precisely what Mencius tries
to make the king feel for, – the sufferings that are at a distance.
Second, the ox's fear and distress is directly observable. The king's people's
distresses are less so. They may be anxious about paying high taxes, fearful of becoming
separated from their families because of war, or mourning the death of their loved ones
because of lack of nutrition or poor medical condition. These distresses are real and
meaningful, yet are less direct to the king's observation. Mencius' teaching can be viewed
as an attempt at transferring the distress the king feels in response to more visually direct
clues– -the ox's fear of death– to his people's plight, which are less obvious to the naked
eye. The visible signs of the ox's fear are direct and powerful; yet the people's pain and
suffering comes in many different forms, including social and psychological pain, which
are harder to perceive. This is an attempt to move the loci of sympathy from the more
obvious clues of distress to social or psychological distress that is typically less obvious.
Thirdly, this is also an attempt to extend sympathy felt for one individual to that
of a group. It was Mother Teresa who once said, "If I look at the mass I will never act. If I
80
look at the one, I will."5 In the 1A7 case, Mencius took up the challenge of making the
king care and act for the mass. Sympathy is an emotion normally felt for single
individuals or a small number of individuals (such as a family). "Caring" or "concern"
may be more adequate descriptions to capture the emotion felt for a group of people or a
general idea of individuals (such as the king's citizens and people lacking food in the
developing world). In the history of philosophical literature, whether sympathy or
compassion is an emotion that can be felt for multiple individuals at a time is open to
debate.6
4.2.3 Does the King Possess the Primitive Form of Sympathy?
Before closely examining the cultivation methods, one issue to be addressed is whether
the king possesses the primitive form of sympathy. According to the texts of Mencius, it is
obvious that Mencius believes the king has the sprout of ren, namely that the king is not
hopeless in the regard of ethical cultivation. After hearing the king retelling a part of the
story, Mencius tries to reassure him that what he felt was sympathy and that such
I found this powerful quotation of Mother Teresa's from Paul Slovic, "If I Look at the Mass I
Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and Genocide," Judgment and Decision Making 2.2 (2007): 79-95.
5.
6.
Arendt Hannah, On Revolution (Penguin Books, 1963, 1965), 89.
For example, Hannah Arendt asserts that compassion for a number of individuals at a same time
is only a theoretical possibility. Compassion should be directed to specific suffering or a
particular individual. If we increase the number of the subjects of compassion, the emotion will
degrade into something she calls "pity." Hume and Arendt's terminologies may differ from mine,
but they both agree with the observation that sympathy/compassion is normally felt towards an
individual or a few individuals.
To Arendt, the boundless "pity" is dangerous, once it replaces the genuine compassion. It can be
used to seek power and make excuse of cruelty, as she believed to be what happened with
Robespierre. "Moreover, sentiments, as distinguished from passion and principle, are boundless,
and even if Robespierre had been motivated by the passion of compassion, his compassion
would have become pity when he brought it out into the open where he could no longer direct it
towards specific suffering and focus it on particular persons. What had perhaps been genuine
passion has turned into the boundlessness of an emotion that seemed to respond only too well to
the boundless suffering of the multitude in their sheer overwhelming numbers."
81
sympathy is the hallmark of kingship. Mencius assures the King that his action did indeed
stem from sympathy rather than self-interest. One may think that Mencius is trying to
steer the king towards the path of benevolence and is thus praising his behavior as a
positive reinforcement.
After examining several details in the text, I come to the
conclusion that Mencius is also stating the truth—the king does possess the primitive form
of sympathy.
Let us consider the characteristics of the primitive form of sympathy as it was
summarized in the previous chapter. The primitive form of sympathy consists of both a
spontaneous reaction to another’s suffering and a higher cognitive process of evaluating
the situation. Certain physiological changes and motivational elements are also typical of
sympathy.
As Mencius suggests, the king was not being miserly when he ordered for the ox to
be replaced. The value of the ox or the replacement sacrifice was of no consequence to
him, and the feeling was other-directed. The fact that the king was able to notice the
frightened appearance of the ox proves that he possesses the ability to perceive distress in
others. He found the ox's frightened appearance unbearable; the above description
demonstrates that he perceives the situation in a sympathetic way. More specifically, the
frightened appearance of the ox distresses him, affects him psychologically and
physiologically—which could be easily explained by the shared bodily representation
between the ox and the king. The expression of the ox evokes a matching psychological
state in the king, the unbearableness reported by the king denotes the physiological
changes and distress he feels at the sight of the ox’s distress. This is evidence that the basic
82
underlying mechanism of sympathy is intact—the king is capable of picking out clues of
suffering; such perception affects him and brings him distress.
Further along the process, the suffering of the ox, in addition to making the king
feel unbearable, reminded the king of an innocent man going to execution. The sufferer's
innocence is an intriguing factor. The ox's plight reminded the king of an innocent man
going to execution, which the king might have witnessed in the past. The belief that the
man is innocent constitutes part of the perception as one calls for sympathy. The fact that
innocence came into the king’s mind also demonstrates that at least in his moral
reasoning “innocence” is associated with sympathetic reaction. The ox that was to be
sacrificed as part of the ceremony, though was for a perfectly legitimate reason—
observing the rituals of the ceremony, certainly did nothing to deserve the death. In fact,
in the retelling of the 2A6 story, Mencius emphasizes in 3A5 that it is not the child’s fault
that she is about to fall into the well—she does not deserve to die—being a small child it is
not her own fault that she climbs around the well. Emphasizing that the man was
innocent is another piece of evidence that the king possessed the ability to recognize the
common patterns amongst different cases of the others' suffering. He was thinking of the
suffering of the ox and the suffering of an innocent man going to execution as belonging
to the same kind– the ability of recognizing the pattern based on others' suffering.
In the end, the king was motivated by his feelings and acted on them—he spared
the ox. This demonstrates the motivational components of his sympathy. Thus,
independent of Mencius’ claim that the king has ceyin zhixin, the description of his reaction
to the ox exhibits key characteristics of the primitive form of sympathy. The king indeed
possesses the primitive form of sympathy as claimed.
83
In the texts, the fact that the king was able to recapture the frightened expression
of the ox and the feeling of being unable to bear its suffering proves that the king
perceives the ox’s plight in a sympathetic light; he possesses the ability to construct a
situation as calling for sympathy. However, according to Mencius, the king may need to
extend that a bit further– to his people. I argue the very first step Mencius takes in 1A7 is
an attempt to establish the king's perception of the situation as one calling for sympathy.
4.2.4 Toward the Mature Form of Sympathy
In 1A7, Mencius asks the king to remember a certain part of the story. During the process
of recalling and retelling his own experience, the king articulates that what he most
vividly remembers is the ox's frightened appearance.
Recalling or retelling one's experience, especially about how one feels and what
one sees from one's own perspective, is instrumental to understanding one's own emotions
and motives. It also helps one to recognize what are the important factors that trigger
one's emotional responses.
Aside from helping the king to articulate his psychological process, retelling the
story also serves another purpose. During the conversation, the king seems to be
pondering his own behavior while recalling the details of the story. These details include
the frightened appearance of the ox and the thought of an innocent person going to
execution, which are morally relevant properties. Mencius approves of the king's
perception of distress and acknowledges the king's feelings and bodily changes. He then
draws the king's attention to the latter's own subjects, people who might be in a plight
similar to that of the frightened ox. As a result of recalling his experience of feeling
sympathy, the king is in a psychological and biological state that is conducive to
84
sympathetic thoughts and reactions. Mencius then asks, "In the present case your
kindness is sufficient to reach birds and beasts, but the benefits do not reach the
commoners. Why is this case alone different?"7 It is worth noting that he is not trying to
point out that the king's behavior is in wanting of consistency: In other words, he is not
asking "as you were capable of feeling sympathy for an ox, shouldn't you feel sympathy
for your people, who surely deserve it more than an ox does?" Such a question may win
an argument, but it has limited effects on changing the king's behavior, as the king is a
person of authority and power. The king may grow discouraged by the thought that he is
not sufficient to be a king because he does not feel the same sympathy for his own people
as he did for a beast; and in frustration he may simply give up and turn away from
Mencius.
Wong points out that Mencius here is not attempting to "teach the king some new
moral knowledge," because the king probably already knows that he should be
sympathetic to his own subjects.8 Mencius is not trying to teach or persuade the king of
what he should do; instead, he is trying to "get the king to consciously reinstate his emotion
of compassion though reflection on the analogies from the suffering of an innocent man
to the suffering of the ox to the suffering of his people."9 In other words, when the king
7
Mencius, 1A7.
8
Wong, "Growing Virtue,” 23.
9. "Reinstatement" is a term Clore and Ortony use to refer to the phenomenon that "emotions can
arise through the reinstatement of prior emotional meaning, as when a current situation reminds
one of (i.e. primes) a prior emotional situation, and that under certain circumstance one can be
surprised by the emergence of such emotions." For detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see
Clore and Ortony (32-36). The way Clore and Ortony uses the term is different from Freud or
other scholars; they maintain that, "the central point about the reinstatement view is not the
obvious point that people learn from their prior experiences, but the idea that a current situation
can bring back whole prior episodes rather than some generalization derived from them or
abstract rule implicit in them." See Gerald L Clore and Andrew Ortony, "Cognition in Emotion:
85
recalls the story he actually feels the sympathy he has previously felt. He is not making a
judgment about who or what is deserving of his sympathy—he is, in fact, experiencing
sympathy itself. As a result of recalling the story, the king is emotionally primed to
experience sympathy, and he is more likely to perceive his subjects in a way that is in sync
with his psychological state. By drawing the king's attention to his people at this precise
moment, Mencius tries to get the king not only view his people as deserving of sympathy,
but to actually feel sympathy for them.
In other words, the King is already in a
sympathetic state after he vividly recalls the details of the incident along with his feelings
throughout; he is thus emotionally aroused by his past experience of sparing the ox's life.
Drawing the king's attention to his subjects at this moment, Mencius stands a better
chance of having the King feel for his subjects' misery in a sympathetic way.
The process can be viewed as a sophisticated cultivational procedure that Mencius,
being a master of moral education, tries to perform: He uses an episode of the king's
memory to manipulate the king’s sympathetic perception, and to bring the king to
perceive his people as the subjects of sympathy rather than only being subjects of their
king. Instead of urging the king to intellectually acknowledge his obligations as a ruler,
Mencius evokes the king’s emotion to get him feel such an obligation.
In terms of the Russian doll model I discussed in the previous chapter [Section 3.9
The Russian Doll Model of de Waal’s], the basic mechanism enables sympathy, namely
PAM, is activated as a result of the king’s remembering a previous incident of sympathy.
The neural representation associated with sympathetic reaction is activated. Thus,
through cognitively demanding functions such as remembering, reconstruction, and
Always, Sometimes or Never? " in Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion, ed. Richard D. Lane and
Lynn Nadel (Oxford University Press, 2001), 24.
86
imagination, Mencius guides the king to relive the experience and thus activates the basic
underlying mechanism of sympathy. In turn, after the basic mechanism of sympathy
[Mencian Triplet] is activated, Mencius attempts to substitute the original object of
sympathy to serve his purpose of persuasion. In the Russian doll model, this manipulation
could be understood as using the outer layers of the doll to evoke the inner core; and then
to guide the outer layer toward the desired direction while inner core is in an active state.
The inner core, or the Mencian triplet on the other hand, is guided to be expanded to the
king’s people—after successfully getting the king to actually feel sympathy for his citizens
in the present case, the king is likely to feel sympathy for them in the future when no one
like Mencius provides such guidance alongside him. Both the “inner core” and the “outer
layers” are enhanced through the interaction between these two components.
As we can see, the inner core of the king’s sympathy is not only activated through
the memorizing of the stories but also reshaped and strengthened. The king is now more
certain about his presumably sympathetic reaction to the ox. His sympathy for the ox,
perhaps initially not manifesting itself clearly to his own mind, is reaffirmed and
strengthened. He understands and is more confident now that it was not the price of the
ox or other factors that moved him, but sympathy. His belief of his sparing the ox was
motivated by sympathy is reaffirmed. This reaffirming doesn’t come from the fact that
Mencius told him so, but from the fact that “You [Mencius] spoke, and my heart
moved.”10 Mencius’ attempt of cultivating the king’s sympathy doesn't stop at evoking
and reaffirming his sympathy for the ox. After trying to strengthened the inner core of
the king’s sympathy, Mencius brings in the king’s people into consideration from the
10
Mencius 1A7.
87
outer layers. The education goes back to the interaction between the inner core and out
layers. Let us take a look at the rest of the 1A7 passage.
Mengzi said, "Let Your Majesty not be surprised at the commoners taking you to be
stingy. You took a small thing and exchanged it for a big thing. How could they
understand it? If Your Majesty was pained at its being innocent and going to the
execution ground, then what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?"
The King laughed, saying, "What was this feeling really? It's not the case that I grudged
its value and exchanged it for a sheep. But it makes sense that the commoners would say I
was stingy."
Mengzi said, "There is no harm. This is just the way benevolence works. You saw the ox
but had not seen the sheep. As for the relation of gentlemen to birds and beasts, if they
see them living, they cannot bear to see them die. If they hear their cries, they cannot
bear to eat their flesh. Hence, gentlemen keep their distance from the kitchen."
The King was pleased and said, "The Odes say,
Another person had the heart,
But I measured it.
This describes you. I was the one who did it. I reflected and sought it out, but did not
understand my heart. You spoke, and my heart moved. In what way does this heart
accord with being a king?"11
[
[
…
]
]
[
[
[
]
'(
It is clear that Mencius is well aware of the characteristics of sympathy and is
trying to make the king to realize that sympathy is what he was experiencing. When the
king puzzles about his own behavior and motivation, Mencius helps him to exclude the
other possible incentives here—he wasn't being stingy—the value of the ox or sheep
didn't even enter his mind; he didn't spare the ox because of its innocence alone, since
that wouldn't explain why he was fine with sacrificing the sheep which is equally innocent.
He tries to let the king see that he ordered to spare the ox because of the sympathy he felt
11.
12.
Mencius 1A7.
, 14-15.
88
for the ox. It is worth noting that the king receives Mencius’ comments with delight, being
pleased that Mencius could explain this puzzling feeling of his as sympathy. He is in a
receptive mood during the conversation. Later on in the story, Mencius moves forth to try
to persuade the king to adopt not only a benevolent ethical ideal but also a benevolent
social policy towards his people. In the rest of the 1A7 passage, Mencius's conversation
with the king moves from a puzzle in personal ethics to a broader scope of political
practice. The latter part of the discussion, unlike the earlier part, which focuses on the
king's experience with the ox, doesn't make the king as happy.
Despite Mencius' optimistic view on human nature and the view that the king has
what it takes to be a genuinely benevolent ruler, Mencius’ attempt at cultivating the king's
sympathy towards his own people ultimately fails. Mencius attribute this failure to the
king’s lacking of constant practice of sympathy, see section 4.4.3 for a detailed discussion.
There are several lessons we can learn from this attempt at cultivating King Xuan's
sympathy. The following sections of 4.3 and 4.4 address these factors.
4.3 Sympathetic Perception
Going beyond the 1A7 case, sympathetic perception is an essential aspect of sympathy
that is frequently neglected in some of the western mainstream ethical tradition such as
rationalism and consequentialism. I discussed how the perception of another's distress
could be an automatic process that requires no special effort on one’s part in the last
chapter. However, it is critical to note that aside from the direct and automatic manners,
others’ distress could also be perceived through ways involve sophisticated cognitive
activities. For example, psychological and/or social distress (e.g. depression, stress, shame,
guilt, or feeling of insecurity) is usually less obvious, and we often do not perceive them
89
unless we are actively searching for clues. In a modern society setting, we encounter latent
distress more frequently than direct and physical distress. Adequate sympathetically
perception, especially towards latent distress, requires practice and cultivation. The
perception of these latent distress requires cooperation between both the outer layers and
the inner cores. How can we enhance our ability to perceive latent distress? How can we
truly appreciate such psychological or social distress from the sufferer’s point of view?
This section provides some answers to these questions.
As Lawrence Blum, whose account I investigate in the following sections,
concludes, “In a Wittgensteinian spirit, the world of the kind person is different from the
world of the unkind.”13 The objective of section 4.3.2 through 4.3.7 is to study methods of
facilitating such a "kind person" outlook. It is worth noting that sympathetic perception
not only depends on the inner core of Mencian Triplet but also is intertwined with the
outer layers of higher cognitive activates. One’s beliefs, environment, personal mental or
physical states are intertwined and in constant interaction with one’s sympathetic
perceptions.
4.3.1 To See VS. To Apprehend
There are two scenarios when one fails to feel sympathy. One scenario is that one
recognizes the suffering but doesn't feel sympathy– one may believe that the sufferer
deserves the suffering, or rationalize the suffering by arguing that there are people who
are even worse off. Yet there is another scenario in which one simply fails to perceive the
suffering, as Blum states, “the model to be avoided here is that of all persons as having the
same apprehension of situations, and differing only in how they act in response to such
13.
Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, (Routledge Revivals, 2009), 95.
90
apprehension– the compassionate person acting to relieve the perceived suffering and the
uncompassionate person not doing so.”14 This section revolves around such a situation–
one's failing to perceive a situation sympathetically.
One should note that there is a distinction between “perceiving” another’s pain
and “sympathetically perceiving” the pain, or again in Blum’s words, to simply “see” the
distress is not the same as to have an “apprehension” of the distress. To be more specific,
to apprehend means to “apprehend the weal and woe of the other person as at stake in
the situation.”15 In some cases, merely perceiving another’s distress is insufficient to
facilitate sympathetic responses, and one may see others facing difficulties without
apprehending their pain. To illustrate this point, Blum gives an example of perceiving a
woman holding a heavy shopping bag on the subway.16 For the less sympathetic, one
may be perfectly capable of describing the situation and see the woman holding the heavy
shopping bag on the train; one will even say that the woman needs help if asked.
However, one may not be sensitive to her distress and doesn’t feel an urge to offer help.
The affective component of such perceiving of distress is missing. One is not blind to the
situation as he clearly sees the woman with her bag, but he doesn’t appreciate her distress.
This shows that the ability to construct a situation sympathetically requires not only
observation or grasping the “operative information”17 of the situation but also a great
affective sensitivity to other people’s suffering. Blum calls the ability to perceive other’s
pain and pick out the clues of distress the ability to “apprehend other’s weal and woe in a
14
Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, 130.
15
Ibid., 129.
16
Ibid., 130.
17
ibid.
91
situation;”18 according to him, even if one may be able to grasp the basic operative
information of a situation, one may “fail” to notice the features that concern others’
distress. Blum further notes, “Another’s weal and woe may be at stake in a situation, but if
the agent in question does not perceive it to be, he will lack a condition of being
motivated to respond to it.”19
Nancy Sherman describes a “practical reason as a kind of perception, as a way of
judging or construing the case prior to deciding how to ⁠act.”20 Both of them are
describing the ability to sympathetically construct a situation.
In the above-mentioned example, the man fails to grasp the important clues of the
woman's possible distress in the situation, namely that she looks uncomfortable and
harried. His attention is not drawn to her, and his mind does not register her distress. If
we later question him if anyone on the train needs help, he may then come to realize that
the woman with the bag does. In the same vein, sometimes people accuse of a person of
being cold-hearted or insensitive, but they may in fact be willing or even eager to help–
it's only that they first have to recognize the need for help.
In other words, one must have certain cognitive abilities and a sympathetic
perspective that involves an affective aspect to perceive others as in need of help or in
distress. The way one perceives a situation, or one's “take” on a particular situation,
largely determines how one would act in response.21 Without this ability, one would not
be able to see others' pain accurately, let alone feel others' pain. This capacity means that
18
ibid.
19
ibid. 129.
Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 13.
20
21
Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, 129-131.
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an individual, in a normal state, is able to appreciate other's distress and focus on other's
distress, picking up important clues and constructing a situation as one that calls for
help.22 It is only through this process that one may ready herself for possible altruistic
behavior. If one cannot “see” another's pain when the pain is fairly evident, one cannot
be said to be a sympathetic person despite one’s willingness or even eagerness to help.
This section discusses the ways to alter one's perceptive habit and enhance one's ability in
perceiving sympathetically. Going back to the quotation from Blum that was cited at the
beginning of this section, “the world of the kind person is different from the world of the
unkind.”23 The “kind person outlook” or sympathetic perception is one essential part of
the mature form of sympathy this project seeks to defend.
Sympathetic perception is without a doubt closely related to the affective and
motivational aspects of the emotion, as established by the Mencian triplet idea. Blum
seems to suggest that the sympathetic perception causes the motivational and affective
aspects of the emotion to be in a relevant state—I don’t subscribe to the exact same view.
I have discussed the interaction amongst the three aspects of sympathy in the previous
chapters. I remind the readers to keep the interaction amongst sympathetic perception,
affective aspect and motivational aspect in mind as we proceed with our discussion of
sympathetic perception.
By being in a normal state, I mean being in a non-extreme state, both physically and
psychologically. Extreme physical states, such as being in great pain or danger; extreme
psychological states, such as being frightened, in shock, in severe depression may render one
incapable of reacting to clues of distress as one would normally react.
22.
23.
Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality, 95.
93
4.3.2 Strengthen Basic Sensitivity
As argued in the last chapter, most of us have an inborn sensitivity towards others’
suffering: The inborn natural sensibility may vary; individual experience and the culture
also have effects on one’s level of sensibility. However, after acknowledging the
differences amongst individuals, we normally assume that the sensibility level of most
people are within a range— to Mencius the low bar is that no one would be unmoved
facing a child in sudden mortal danger. In a similar fashion, some of the distress signals
are like “bad music” (e.g. a cry of pain),24 which one perceives automatically; the receivers
of these signals need not to be paying attention, nor can they refuse to receive such signals.
Yet this natural sensibility to basic signals of distress may become dulled in the same
manner that our eyesight or hearing ability may deteriorate.25 Since the sensibility to
others’ distress may be lost if not preserved; a part of our efforts in moral cultivation
focuses on the preservation of this basic sensibility—this does not mean that preservation
is all that is necessary for moral cultivation. Our efforts should also be placed on
strengthening and reshaping this basic sensibility.
Overexposure to others’ distress is a threat to one’s moral cultivation. Mencius
empathizes that when the suffering is for a justifiable cause, one should avoid being
exposed to such sufferings especially when it is repetitive. In 1A7, he makes the
observation that “the exemplary people keep their distance from the kitchen;”26 the
kitchen being a place where the killing and processing of livestock normally occurs. This
24
See note 56.
By using this metaphor, I wish to emphasize that this sensitivity may become dull; it is not my
intention to suggest we were born with the "best" sensitivity to distress and can only preserve but
not to improve it like our eye-sight or hearing.
25
26
Mencius 6A7.
94
could be viewed as an attempt of avoiding being exposed to repeated suffering that is
inflicted for a justifiable cause.27
Hoffman shares a worry of habituation (“habituation” has a very different
meaning in psychological literature compared to in Aristotelian ethics), which he
describes as “another self-destructing mechanism, one applicable to direct affect as well as
emphatic affect is habituation: if a person is exposed to another's distress repeatedly over
time, habituation may occur ... and the cumulative effect may be that the observer's
empathic distress diminishes to the point of the person’s becoming indifferent to the
victim's suffering.” 28 This is also why Hoffman worries about the effect of media
repeatedly showing and broadcasting suffering others to its audience. He suspects that the
audience would become insensitive to such clues of suffering as a result. Aristotle’s insights
are relevant here: Children usually have keen eyes on morally significant clues whereas
adult may grow insensitive while gaining rational capacity and experience in moral
practice.
On the other hand, it is not the case that the less one is exposed to suffering the
better. As will be discussed in later sections, learning from experience about various forms
distress can take and the practice of sympathy are instrumental to not only gaining a
sympathetic perspective but also reshaping one’s sensibility to certain others’. Exposure to
others’ suffering seems like a delicate act: Overexposure might result in habituation as
Hoffman and Aristotle worries; yet underexposure may mean that one lacks the necessary
learning experience and exercise. In 1A7, Mencius worked on King Xuan’s basic
Mencius discussed a number of ways the cultivation may fail, which reflects on how the ability
to sympathize may become insensitive (1A7, 6A6, 6A8, 6A9, 6A15). We may in turn understand
how to preserve this basic capacity in the light of trying not to spoil it or harm it.
27.
28
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, 203.
95
sensibility to his subjects. He does so by trying to expand the king’s circle of care to a
larger scope through re-evoking the king’s past sympathy for an ox. If the education were
successful [it was not due to both King Xuan’s reluctance and the lacking of a constant
moral education], King Xuan would hopefully be able to have this spontaneous reaction
to distant others even without Mencius guiding him in the future. King Xuan would
become more sensitive to the distant others’ suffering—his basic sensibility is thus
reshaped in the sense that it is expanded and now “warms up” for certain objects that he
did not previously have a natural spontaneous sympathetic response to. Perhaps rather
than simply claiming a balance between under or over exposure to suffering is needed in
ethical cultivation, it is useful to think in terms of the layered structure of the Russian doll
model again.
The inner core of the doll, namely the basic mechanism underlying sympathy is in
need of both preservation and reshaping. In terms of preservation, we need to avoid
repeated exposure and over exposure to suffering in order to preserve our basic sensibility
and spontaneous reaction to other’s suffering—this is an instrumental strategy in the
cultivation of sympathy.
The reshaping of the inner core also requires adequate exposure to others’
sufferings. Moral education is frequently performed though manipulating the outer layer
functions when the inner core is activated [sometimes due to exposure to suffering, or as
in 1A7 through re-evoking memories about such an experience]—through the stated
process, the educator is able to manipulate the interactive activities between the outer
layers and inner core of the student’s so as to shape the latter. As in the 1A7 case, the
king’s sensibility to distant others’ suffering is, if the education were successful, enhanced
96
rather than weakened or damaged. More exposure to distress does not necessarily dull
one’s sensibility. In addition to preserving and reshaping the inner core, the “outer layers”
of the doll demands practices and experience as well. Such practices and experience
would be impossible without adequate exposure to suffering. 29 Exposure to others’
distress at the right moment, with the adequate mentality is important for the moral
cultivation—this process helps to get the inner core and outer layers “in tune” through
the exercise of interaction. In sum, over exposure to repeated suffering is not advised by
Mencius, the cultivation of sympathy requires adequate exposure—which helps educate
the outer layers and shape the inner core. Sometimes, shaping the inner core is done by
guiding the outer layers into interactive activities with the inner core, so as to change
one’s perceptive, affective and motivational responses to certain types of distresses of
others’.
The above discussion provides an explanation as to why on some occasions,
Mencius speaks of making efforts to “seek” the virtue of benevolence, while in some other
occasions talk about ethical cultivation mainly as efforts of preserving something that is
already in us—as both preserving and seeking are important strategies in cultivation.
Wong offers a rich discussion on cultivating compassion aiming at addressing the
famous and long-lasting debate on whether ethical cultivation is a matter of “crafting” or
“adornment” in Confucian philosophy.30 In other words, whether the ethical cultivation
in Confucian philosophy requires explicit efforts on the student and teacher’ part to shape
and restrict our nature, or that we already have inborn “good nature” that is simply in
Section 4.3.3 To Learn and Recognize Suffering Clues, 4.3.4 Understanding Others’
Perspective—Stepping into Others’ Shoes and 4.3.6 Pattern Matching are devoted to discussing
ways to enhance the “outer layers”.
29
30
Wong, "Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of Compassion," 1-38.
97
need of protection and nurture. 31 He argues that there are no real conflicts between these
two popular ideas in Confucian philosophy; rather, the different metaphors based on
which these two types of ideas develop apply to different kinds of impulses in human
nature. Natural sympathy is amongst the natural dispositions that can grow and be
cultivated for ethical purposes, while other dispositions may be resistant to moral
cultivation, such as the tendency to become preoccupied with one’s own welfare. My
discussion offers support to Wong’s thesis as well. My discussion provides the insight that
instead of a simple “balance” between under exposure and over exposure, the teacher
and student need to weigh the outcome in terms of both whether one’s basic sensitivity is
enhanced in a desired way or weakened, and the possible exercise one could go through.
In addition, the discretion with regard to being exposed to suffering abovementioned should be taken into consideration in evaluating sympathy’s role in morality as
well. For example, certain professions may require the practitioner to be exposed to
frequent and repeated sufferings of others. It becomes a worrisome problem in the
medical profession. The professionals may either become burdened with too much
distress resulting from witnessing the patients’ distress; or adopt a cold and insensitive
outlook to such sufferings to avoid such distress. These issues are sometimes used to
support the position that sympathy is problematic and not a good moral emotion (e.g.
Prinz and Blum). Before addressing such criticisms in Chapter Six, I briefly state my
position here: over-exposure to others’ suffering damages one’s sympathetic capacity.
That the process of damaging one’s sympathetic capacity is worrisome does not indicate
31
Ibid.
98
that sympathy is a liability to morality. On the contrary, it seems to suggest that adequate
sympathy is indeed an important aspect of human moral life.
4.3.3 To Learn and Recognize Suffering Clues
In most social environments there usually are a myriad of clues associated with human
interaction. Being able to identify and recognize the "distress clues" in such a situation is
the first step towards gaining sympathetic perception. For example, when a child
witnesses her friend's toy being damaged by an accident, instead of focusing on the
damage (that is, the broken toy), the parent or teacher may use verbal and non-verbal
cues to draw the child's attention to the sad expression on her friend's face. By doing this,
the observing child is led to recognize and focus on the other child's pain rather than
other factors such as the adult's blame, the broken toy, or the fact that she will no longer
be able to play the toy. By perceiving her friend as a victim rather than a wrongdoer or
simply outside one's concern, the child readies herself for sympathetic responses. In
similar situations in the future, the child will hopefully learn from her experience to
recognize the clues of other’s distress in similar situations—such as the sad expression that
is associated with the loss of a valued property. Given sufficient exercise, she may learn to
automatically recognize another’s psychological pain and distress and gain a great
sensibility to others’ distress, be it physical or psychological.
The above-mentioned cultivation process requires guidance as well as training,
but it may take place without clear intent. The educators do not need to direct the child's
attention purposefully with an express educational goal. In fact, it is normally done
without deliberation of either the receiver or the giver. In many of the cases, the
educators' role is played by parents who simply look at the hurt individual as a part of
sympathetic reaction of their own. The learner child mimics her parents' action by
99
following her parent's gaze to the child that is in distress. In daily life, in front of suffering
others, adults may look at them with concerning facial expressions, or talk with a slower
pace and lower voice; and in such cases children's attention would naturally be directed to
the suffering others. The anthropologist Naomi Quinn's description of the moral
education process for a child is, as summarized by Wong, "often not explicitly stated but
communicated in a glance, a gesture, a posture, even in what is not said, that is observed
in adults by children."32
In the case of adults who already have developed their own recognition pattern,
directing one's attention to certain clues may take many forms. One may do so through
verbal exchange, such as by simply asking "Have you thought about the other person's
feeling?" In some cases, directing the individuals to look at the victim's eyes enhances
one's ability in reading their emotions, suffering included.33
4.3.4 Understanding Others' Perspective – Stepping into Others'
Shoes
To recognize others’ suffering as different than our own is an essential step in the
cultivation of sympathy. This requires not only learning about different clues that could
indicate distress but also the ability of understanding others' perspective, desire, and
aspiration as different than our own.
In the simpler scenarios, the ability to take others’ perspective does not require
special cultivation; as mentioned in the last chapter, it comes to us naturally some time
after one’s second birthday.34 Children older than two normally come to realize that
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” 21. And Naomi Quinn, “Universals of Child Rearing,”
Anthropological Theory 5, no. 4 (2005): 477-516.
32
33
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” section 2C.2 "How Cognitive is the Cognitive Component."
34
Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, ch2.
100
another person sees things differently than the way the world is presented to her. For
example, she may understand that another person does not see her brother hiding behind
a door, though she sees him. Younger children normally don’t understand that others’
perspective is different than their own. Around this time, in addition to understand others’
perspective as different from their own they also come to understand others as different
people with different preferences than their own: A two-year old girl brings her friend’s
favorite toy to comfort him after presenting her own favorite toy fails to cheer him up.35
However, in more complicated social situations, taking another person’s perspective
requires the recognition that not only others’ perspective is different from one’s own but
also their desires, priorities, and characters. For example, Lily may very well understand
that Jay needs help with his homework while she does not, but she may have difficulty
understanding that Jay is a proud person who would refuse help unless offered in a very
subtle way. We may understand others’ perspective as different than our own, but how
good are we at it when facing individuals with distinctive characters? This is where
learning is required.
One way to exercise one’s ability in taking others’ perspective is through
practicing real human interaction. One cannot cultivate sympathetic perception in
solitude. Social experience is an important factor in cultivating a sympathetic perception.
In addition, reading literary fiction may enhance one's ability to understand
others' mental state, as Kidd and Castano and their colleagues reported in a recent
study.36 The study shows that reading literary fiction increases self-reported empathy
35
Ibid.
David Kidd and Emanuele Castano, "Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of
Mind," Science 342.6156 (2013): 377-380.
36.
101
[Kidd and Castano uses “empathy” in the sense of understanding others’ mental state, it
is closely related to sympathy and enhances sympathetic reaction.] Kidd and Castano
claim that clues of others' emotions and mental state are presented in writing to the
subjects is the reason why their self-reported understanding of others' mind improved.
Given the subjects' established perceptive habit, some of them may neglect certain clues
in daily life. Literary fiction presents such clues in a way that gives the readers a chance to
notice what they often neglect in social situations. Writers often don't directly tell the
readers what emotions the character experience. Instead, they present clues and
symptoms of one's inner world through carefully chosen words, leaving the readers to
comprehend what the characters are going through. This exercise not only helps one to
learn clues that may normally be neglected, but also helps one to construct others' inner
worlds basing on given clues. For example, a character could not hold her teacup steadily,
and her eyes were searching for support; she almost missed a step, and was speaking with
a nervous voice that others couldn't hear clearly. Such clues, if not presented in writing
and read by the reader word by word, could be missed if the reader/observer isn't very
observant in the real world. Reading fiction helps them to change their perceptive habit
of a situation by bringing their attention to clues of distress or emotions that they may
miss.
Kidd and Castano also suggest that the ability to understand others' desires,
intentions, and characters as different from one's own– or what we are familiar with– also
contributes to an enhanced understanding of others' inner working. Through reading
fiction, we exercise the ability to construct different characters with different mental states.
Kidd and Castano argue "fiction seems also to expand our knowledge of others' lives,
102
helping us recognize our similarity to them. Although fiction may explicitly convey social
values and reduce the strangeness of others, the observed relation between familiarity
with fiction and ToM (Theory of Mind) may be due to more subtle characteristics of the
text. That is, fiction may change how, not just what people think about others. " They
further suggest, "[fiction-reading] forces us to engage in mind-reading and character
construction." 37 In other words, reading a book about a hundred clues of distress may
not effectively help one to better perceive others' distress, but reading fiction may help. In
the same vein of thought, we can reasonably expect that story-telling and story-listening
have this function as well. In addition to conveying social and moral values in folk stories,
such activities also have the function of enhancing people's ability in seeing perspectives
other than their own.
In sum, reading fictions, story-telling, story-listening or any other activities involve
character construction can enhance our ability in perspective taking. It's worth noting
that in The Analects and Mencius, many of the passages are short stories about Confucius or
Mencius, disciples of Confucius, and several kings of their time. In The Analects, some of
the more prominent disciples are described or have spoken in several different passages;
as noted by Confucius himself, they each have distinct temperaments. For example, Zilu
was an impetuous person while Ran Qiu was sometimes too cautious; and based on this
difference in their character, Confucius gave them different advice when they asked him
the same question.38 Traditionally, it was a very common practice for a Confucian
37.
Ibid.
When asked by Zilu and Ran Qiu "upon learning something that needs to be done, should one
immediately take care of it?" Confucius instructed them differently and explains that the distinct
answers were based on the receivers themselves "Ran Qiu is overly cautious, and so I wished to
38.
103
teacher to ask his students to understand the disciples' distinct personality traits in The
Analects. This explains the phenomenon that The Analects is sometimes not only viewed as a
source of Confucian ethical ideas, but also a book that guides and helps one to become
virtuous in practice– at least in this case, more sympathetic.
The learning of The Book of Songs (
), one of the five classics that are part of
the Confucian canon, shares a similar function. Wong notes that studying The Book of
Songs “as well as accumulated experience in social interaction, aid in learning the range of
human desire and aspiration.”39 I further his point by arguing that the learning of such
classics enhances the reader's sympathetic perception by engaging them in the practice of
character construction. The learning of the 305 songs in the book leads its reader to
construct characters from different genders, regions and wildly disparate social-economic
stations. For example, in the very well-known Shuo Shu passage from The Book of Songs, the
readers are led to take the perspective of a farmer who is struggling because of his sadly
well-founded and constant worry that the large rats (government officials) are going to
take away the fruits of his labor.
Large rats! Large rats!
Do not eat our millet.
Three years have we had to do with you,
And you have not been willing to show any regard for us.
We will leave you,
And go to that happy land.
Happy land! Happy land!
There shall we find our place.
Large rats! Large rats!
Do not eat our wheat.
Three years have we had to do with you,
urge him on. Zilu, on the other hand, is too impetuous, and so I sought to hold him back. " The
Analects 11.22. The Classic Readings in Chinese Philosophy, Ivanhoe and Van Norden ed.
39
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” 11.
104
And you have not been willing to show any kindness to us.
We will leave you,
And go to that happy State.
Happy State! Happy State!
There shall we find ourselves right.
Large rats! Large rats!
Do not eat our springing grain!
Three years have we had to do with you,
And you have not been willing to think of our toil.
We will leave you,
And go to those happy borders.
Happy borders! Happy borders!
Who will there make us always to groan?40
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
”
While reading this passage; one takes on the perspective of a member of a low
social-economic class, sees his struggle and fear, and appreciates his wish for a happy state
in which people need not to worry about the product of their hard work being taken away.
Such passages from the Book of Songs, which portrait different characters’ distress and joy,
are read and sung by Confucian students; such activities are considered a part of the core
Confucian education. Through imagination, students receiving Confucian education that
prepares them as members of the ruling class sympathize with the characters in the songs.
Anonymous and James Legge, Book of Songs
)) in The Chinese Classics:
with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes, 1861.
40
105
There are both male and female characters from different [sub]cultures, geographical
areas, social economic classes, and age groups. The learning of this classic text thus
requires the students to frequently engage in the character construction exercise as Kidd
and Castano describes.41 The character construction is an exercise of both the outer
layers and inner core of sympathy. Sympathizing with various characters in the texts
helps one to apprehend and feel the characters’ plight so as to understand their mental
states. This educational process thus places these characters inside one’s circle of caring
by familiarize one with them and their sufferings— it becomes easy for one to have a
spontaneous sympathetic response to them after engaging in their character construction.
In the future, it becomes much easier for these Confucian students to sympathize with
objects similar to these characters, even when these objects are not near and dear, when
the clues of their sufferings are neither direct nor obvious. The technique of increasing
people’s ability in sympathetic perception through character construction has been in
practice in the Confucian tradition for more than two millennia.
4.3.5 Caring and Beliefs
Besides directing one's focus of attention to the suffering other, understanding others'
perspective and characters as different from our own, cultivating affection and caring for
others is another important aspect of developing the mature form of sympathy. How
much we like a person and care about her well-being affects not only how strongly we feel
for her distress, but also how sensitive we are to possible clues of her distress. As Margaret
Little points out, we are naturally attentive to people we care about or to people we like:
“What one is attentive to reflects one's interests, desires, in brief, what one cares about. ...
See Suzanne Keen for a comprehensive discussion on empathy and fiction reading. Suzanne
Keen, Empathy and the Novel (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2007).
41.
106
More generally put, if one cares about something one is prepared to respond on its behalf,
and preparedness to respond is intimately linked with awareness of opportunities to do
so.”42 For example, new parents are even more sensitive to an infant's crying than other
adults because, according to Little, they care and love their own new-born so profoundly
they would be attentive to anything that could be a signal of distress or danger.
This is in line with the Confucian idea of filial love — one’s love to her parents
and children. In Mencius, the heart of ceyin (ceyin zhi xin) is also used to refer to filial love in
addition to sympathetic reaction. This suggests that a close relation exists between
sympathetic reaction and one’s familial attachments. Filial love may come to us naturally.
Our love, if extended to outside of our family and to our friends or even strangers in a
society, would thus enhance our ability to perceive their distress as if they were our family
members. According to Little, to foster and cultivate a caring attitude towards others
would help us to become more attentive to others' distress.43 In the Mencian theory,
extending one’s love towards family members and friends to a larger scale — though to a
less intense degree — is frequently discussed as a part of one's ethical cultivation. Indeed,
there is the long-held Chinese tradition of using “uncle” or “auntie” to refer to people
who are neither family nor kin. By employing the language that carries affective
connotation, one’s basic affects and sympathy could be extended to those “uncles” and
“aunties”. This custom effectively serves the purpose of extending the sympathy
Margaret Olivia Little, "Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral
Epistemology," Hypatia 10.3 (1995): 117-137.
42.
43
Ibid.
107
developed towards one’s kin to others that are not in this initial circle thus expanding the
circle to a larger scope.44
Other than affection and caring towards others, our beliefs about whether the
others are friends or foe also affects how we perceive their distress. Instead of sympathy,
an enemy's distress may in fact bring joy. A guilty party's suffering may be viewed as a
result of justice being practiced; her suffering thus be viewed as not deserving of sympathy.
Mencius also emphasizes in 6A7 that the endangered child in 2A6 is innocent of her
suffering. According to him, it is not the child's fault that she was in mortal danger. This
belief not only justifies the sympathetic response, but also determines that one perceives
the situation sympathetically. Bias, harbored hatred or jealousy, believing that others
deserve certain suffering, or other hostile beliefs towards certain people may thus impede
our sympathetic perception. Therefore, in order to avoid such bias and hateful beliefs, it
is important to promote the value of tolerance on a societal scale; I discuss sympathy’s
function in promoting tolerant values in Chapter Six. On an individual level, to cultivate
caring and tolerate beliefs towards others, and be very cautious when making judgment
about others being deserving or guilty of sufferings is key to having a sympathetic outlook
on the world.
4.3.6 Pattern Matching
When one encounters unfamiliar situations in which distress is manifested in unfamiliar
or unusual ways, one may learn from other's sympathetic responses. The technique of
“pattern matching” helps us to perceive things that share similarities with those we know
The relevance of this custom to extending one's affection from kin to others is brought to my
attention by my advisor David Wong. Also thanks to my colleague Susanne Meyer to bring to my
attention this custom is in practice in some other cultures such as Indian.
44
108
before; it enables us to make judgment about new information and expand the scope of
our understanding. By this measure, we are capable of forming a quick judgment even if
we are unfamiliar or have no experience with this particular situation.
In his article Growing Virtues, Wong states that “the capacity to see in terms of
analogy, to see something in terms of something else based on similarities between the
two, is fundamental to human cognition. It is used to understand one less intelligible or
accessible realm of experience in terms of another more intelligible or accessible realm.”45
In this way, we are able to make quick judgments about and react (perhaps
sympathetically) to situations that are similar to those we experienced before. A child
may feel sympathy for her toy's broken arm, seeing the similarity between the toy's
broken arm and a person's broken arm. As in the 1A7 case, the king feels sympathy for
the ox's suffering because the ox reminded him of an innocent man going to execution–
in this case, he is seeing the ox as an innocent sufferer in the same light the executed man
was.
The important implication is that the "pattern" that we attempt to match, or the
similarities amongst situations that allow us to make such matches, are key to a
sympathetic outlook. By focusing on similarities that are related to morally relevant
properties such as innocence, suffering, vulnerability, we would foster a sympathetic
perceptive habit. On the other hand, if the personal is focused on similarities that invite
unwelcomed bias– such as different religious beliefs, races, or sports affiliations– may not
contribute to the formation of a sympathetic perceptive habit.46
45
Wong, “Growing Virtue,” 31.
Since pattern matching is a fast cognitive ability based on the similarities amongst the
situations, it may turn out to be inaccurate. "Seeing something x as if it were y" allows the
46
109
4.4 Additional Important Factors in Cultivating Sympathy
4.4.1 Commitment to Ethical Cultivation
The most critical factor that is missing in King Xuan's case is personal commitment to
ethical cultivation. In Book One of Mencius, King Xuan of Qi states he is willing to have
the Master "to redirect my resolution, enlighten, and instruct me. Although I am not
clever, please let me try." However, he eventually strays from the Master's way and shuts
the Master off when Mencius talks about how the policy he promotes requires more
obligations on the king's part. When asked by Mencius "if the region within the four
borders is not well ordered, then how should one deal with this? The King turned toward
his attendants and changed the topic." 47
Mencius's persuasion though delicately
constructed and carefully carried out, only works for those whose sprout of ceyin is intact,
who are willing, committed to ethical cultivation, and who actually put efforts into their
ethical cultivation. King Xuan of Qi possesses the primitive form of sympathy and states
he is willing to learn; however, he is not really committed in the end and does not put
effort into sustaining the cultivation on a frequent basis. One's own commitment and
effort plays the vital if not most important role in ethical cultivation.
Self-cultivation is a critical form of moral cultivation– the subject is granted a
greater degree of autonomy in self-cultivation than other methods we have talked about
so far. It is one's own responsibility to choose which part of oneself, the petty part or the
great part, to nurture and which part to forgo48. One is capable of assigning this process a
direction. Mencius speaks of the responsibility in self-cultivation and how this would
possibility of feeling sympathy for perceived but not actual distress. See Wong, “Growing Virtue,”
29-30.
47
Mencius, 1B6.
48.
Mencius 6A15.
110
entail that a person implants effort, will and self-reflection into one's path to righteousness.
In 6A15, Mencius says that, "those who follow their greater part become humans. Those
who follow their petty part become petty humans". Later he states that, "If one first takes
one's stand on what is greater, then what is lesser will not be able to snatch it away". In
both these statements, Mencius clearly implies that people have to make a choice to act
on their innate good nature, and it is up to one's self to either become a great or petty
human. Without the acknowledgement of this self-responsibility, ethical cultivation will
hence fail, as in the case of King Xuan of Qi.
Reflective thinking is a tool that is essential to self-cultivation. Master Zeng's
behavior of examining himself on three counts each day was mentioned as an exemplary
behavior in the Analects of Confucius and subsequently in the Chinese culture in general.
According to the Confucians, the organ that one reflects or thinks (si
) is heart (xin
),
only if it reflects, one can “get it”.
4.4.2 Verbal Persuasion
Following the 1A7 passage in the last section, Mencius’s conversation with the king
moved from personal level of the king’s ethical puzzle, to a broader scope of political
practice. As the king asks “you spoke, and in my heart there was a feeling of compassion.
In what way does this heart accord with being a king?” In response, Mencius said:
“Suppose there were someone who reported to your majesty, saying, ‘My strength is
sufficient to lift five hundred pounds, but not sufficient to lift one feather. My eyesight is
sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a wagon of firewood.’
Would Your Majesty accept that?”
Xuan said, “No.”
Mengzi said, "In the present case your kindness is sufficient to reach birds and beasts, but
the benefits do not reach the commoners. Why is this case alone different? Hence, not
lifting one feather is due to not using one's strength. Not seeing a wagon of firewood is
due to not using one's eyesight. The commoners not receiving care is due to not using
one's kindness. Hence, Your Majesty’s not being a genuine king is due to not acting; it is
not due to not being able."
111
Xuan said, “What is the difference between concrete cases of not doing and not being
able?”
Mengzi said, “ ‘Pick up Mount Tai and leap over the North Sea.’ If you say, ‘I cannot,’
this is truly not being able. ‘Massage the stiff joints of an elderly person.’ If you say, ‘I
cannot,’ this is not acting; it is not a case of not being able. So Your Majesty’s not being a
king is not in the category of picking up Mount Tai and leaping over the North Sea. Your
Majesty’s not being a king is in the category of massaging the stiff joints of an elderly
person.” “Treat your elders as elders, and extend it to the elders of others; treat your
young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of others; then you can turn
the whole world in the palm of your hand… ”49
7
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In the story, this part of the persuasion compared to the earlier discussed part relies
on the exchange of words, some logical arguments, and the discussed attempts to connect
with one’s emotions. The title of this section is “verbal persuasion” though persuasion has
always been understood as an art of both the delivery of words and the engagement of
emotion; 1A7 is not an exception. This section aims at discussing the verbal aspect of
persuasion. I use this phrase to empathies that without engaging one’s emotion,
persuasion relying solely or mainly on words have difficulties in persuading others to
adopt a different view or changing other’s behavior. 51
49
Mencius 1A7.
50
Mencius 1A7.
' ,
3'
'.
See Jonathan Haidt for a thoughtful discussion on the importance of appealing to others’
sentiments in persuasion. Haidt’s discussion has great relevance to both philosophy and social
psychology. Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and
Religion. Vintage, 2012.
51
112
For example, if my strength is sufficient to lift five hundred pounds, do you
accept that my strength is not sufficient to lift one feather? This rhetorical question
appeals to common sense and logical consistency, and is an example of verbal persuasion.
However, if this question were asked outside of the context of Mencius 1A7— that the
king eagerly inquires if he has the potential to be a good ruler and has re-evoked his
sympathy, it will have little effect in changing one’s view and behavior. Perhaps it will
even render one defensive. Verbal persuasion when performed alone without other
methods of cultivation has limited effects in the cultivation of sympathy.
Verbal communication may be helpful to the cultivation of sympathy in that it
helps to prime the student, as in the 1A7 case. It also helps the individual to articulate her
own experience and motivation. Voicing one’s experience, especially how one feels and
what one sees from one's own perspective, helps an individual to understand her own
emotion and action, as when Mencius was assuring the king he felt sympathy when
sparing the ox. By recalling or retelling a story, it helps one to recognize what are the
important factors that triggered one's emotion or action. By thinking over or talking over
such factors, it helps to enhance this reaction. In the king's case, when he was retelling the
story he articulates that it was the frightened appearance and not the cost of the ox that
he remembers vividly, and it was the man's innocence that he voiced and not other
features; it was thus his sympathy not self-interest that played a decisive role in his
action—and that is how he would remember this story after this hearing with Mencius.
Guiding another person to perceive or construct a situation and feel for it in a
certain way is a delicate job. However, a lot of times it is done without purposefully
educating the receiver. Music, storytelling, ritual practicing, self-reflection and so on are
113
all effective ways of cultivating one's sympathy. Quoting important moral principles in
hoping to change the receiver's beliefs and behaviors is neither the only nor the most
efficient way an educator could adopt. This process may not even rely on an exchange of
words. On the other hand, verbal persuasion appealing to reasoning or argument may be
extremely ineffective in the cultivation of sympathy as showed in King Xuan of Qi's case.
Verbal persuasion based on reasoning or argument can certainly provide the receiver
new information (for example, there is a famine in the south), help solve conflicts amongst
one's own beliefs; it is ineffective in changing one's fundamental beliefs or the basic
manner in which one responds to morally relevant clues. Mencius is more particular
about the subjects suitable for receiving verbal persuasion than Aristotle, only with those
who have the heart of ceyin and are not "destroying themselves" by speaking "opposed to
propriety and righteousness" and claiming themselves as "unable to dwell in benevolence
and follow righteousness", can he have a discussion with.
Mengzi said, "One cannot have a discussion with those who are destroying themselves.
One cannot act with those who throw themselves away. Those whose words are opposed
to propriety and righteousness are who I mean by 'those who are destroying themselves.'
Those who say, 'I myself am unable to dwell in benevolence and follow righteousness' are
who I mean by 'those who throw themselves away.'"52
7—
‘
—
‘
—
—
)
“
8
Mencius points out that in addition to one’s ability in reasoning, one must also
have the heart of ceyin and aim at ethical perfection instead of giving up in that regard in
order to be considered suitable for a discussion and receiving guidance from him.
52.
Mencius, 4A10.
53
Mencius, 4A10.
.
114
In conclusion, verbal persuasion appealing to reasoning and arguments may have
limited effects, to certain group of individuals– adults who can reason and have basic
ideas of their identity according to Aristotle; or people who aim at cultivate their virtues
and have not given up on the pursuit of such cultivation according to Mencius. It is a less
effective way unless combined with other cultivational methods.
4.4.3 Constancy
In order to keep one's muscles and bones strong and healthy, it is necessary to exercise
them on a frequent basis. Likewise, the cultivation of sympathy requires frequent
exercising of it. According to Mencius, not being able to sustain the cultivation process on
a frequent basis is one of the reasons for this failure. As he remarks in 6A9: "Do not be
surprised at the king's failure to be wise. Even though it may be the easiest growing thing
in the world, if it gets one day of warmth and ten days of frost, there has never been
anything that is capable of growing. It is seldom that I have an audience with the king,
and when I withdraw, those who 'freeze' him come. What can I do with the sprouts that
are there?" Although Mencius is not referring to King Xuan of Qi in particular when he
speaks of the king who fails "to be wise", this general claim shows Mencius' view on why
cultivation often fails. Not being able to sustain the process over a long period of time is
detrimental to the cultivation of sympathy or cultivation of any sort.
4.4.4 Actions One Frequently Performs
One’s efforts in cultivation include preserving one’s inherent four sprouts, which includes
the heart of ceyin. Remove oneself from an environment that is detrimental to the sprout
and stay in an environment suitable for the sprouts to grow. Mencius emphasized the
environment being one important factor in one's ethical education. In the Ox Mountain
passage in 6A7(8), the potential (of having trees) was there even though trees didn't cover
115
the Ox Mountain due to environmental differences between the two sides of the
mountain. Also as discussed in 1A7, "Hence, gentlemen keep their distance from the
kitchen"54 emphasize again one need to remove oneself form an environment where
killing is inevitable and repeatedly conducted. In 4B28, Mencius once again encapsulates
this point by stating, "by means of which gentleman differ from others is that they
preserve their hearts".55
Mengzi said, "Is the arrow-maker less benevolent than the armor-maker? Yet the arrowmaker only fears that he may not harm people; the armor-maker only fears that he may
harm people. The shaman healer and the coffin-maker are the same way, respectively.
Hence, one may not fail to be careful about one's choice of craft."56
7
5
6
:
:
:
8
-
If an action is an intrinsic part of one’s job, then the moral character of this action
would be important for one’s ethical cultivation, as its effect would be multiplied through
frequent repetition. Performing an action repeatedly shapes one’s affective propensity—
for one who not only makes arrows but also fears that they fail to harm others constantly,
Mencius worries for his ethical cultivation. Choosing one’s profession, therefore, might
also be a choice about ethical cultivation. One is responsible for choosing a profession
that would, if not foster, at least not harm one’s sympathetic cultivation.
54
Mencius 1A7.
55
Mencius 4B28.
56
Mencius 2A7.
57.
Mencius 2A7.
.
116
4.4.5 Ritual Practice
Just like craftsmen perfecting their skills through constant practicing, the practice of
sympathy betters one’s ability to handle situations in a sympathetic manner. It is true that,
for a lot of people, reacting to a situation in a sympathetic manner often comes naturally;
that is, without one putting efforts into a deliberate learning process: however, it is not
rare to see people who react to other’s distress with anger or excessive self-pity, or who
are simply overwhelmed by the stress and are therefore not able to perform any helping
behavior. In these kinds of situations, it is obvious that the signal of others’ distress is
picked up— as evidenced by the reaction. But, the reaction is hardly proper. Lacking
experience with handling others’ distress, being alien to a particular kind of situation, or
lacking proper guidance could be the reasons. The way in which one reacts to situations
calling for sympathy is, in a way, a skill that requires constant practicing and perfecting.
In addition, one could also gain knowledge about how to handle certain matters
through talking or interaction with others who have encountered similar situations before.
For example, adults may tell their teens to consider not only their current interest but also
the long-term consequence of having a fight with a friend from their own experience. In
the classic texts, Confucius and Mencius frequently discuss complicated moral situations
with interlocutors. The learning of these classes texts not only provides one knowledge of
such situations but also exercises one’s sympathy through imagination.
In the Analects, Confucius emphasizes the practice of emotions through the
performance of rituals in ceremonies. Besides serving the purpose of honoring the
ancestors of the community and building strong bonds among members, such rituals can
also be viewed as a way to keep one’s emotions active or to maintain one’s emotional
sensitivity. Through frequently engaging one’s emotions in ritual practices, one is not only
117
exposed to a variety of situations which may invoke the relevant emotions but also is able
to exercise the affective and motivational aspects of sympathy. It is through performing
such rituals and the Confucian education, which engages one both mentally and
affectively, people not only learn about what to be ashamed of and what to take pride in
but also keeps their affective propensity in accordance with such knowledge. As such, one
is able to keep in tune, both mentally and physically, with the culture and expectations of
her community; and is well prepared to play an adequate role in the community and in
the culture.
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Chapter 5
5. Prinz’s “Empathy” Revisited
5.1 Introduction
A recent debate revolving around the role of sympathy in morality is underway in both
academic circles and in the popular media. Social psychologist Paul Bloom, esteemed
philosophers Peter Singer and Jesse Prinz, as well as other scholars have argued against
the concept of empathy1 in a Boston Review forum named Against Empathy. “Empathy,”
according to their definitions, overlaps a great deal with the subject of this dissertation; I
will discuss the overlap and differences shortly in Section 5.3. Bloom has expressed
concern over the role of empathy in morality, judging it as too problematic to be reliable.
2
As for Prinz, he argues that empathy is not necessary for moral judgments, motivation,
or development. Thus in his view, “righteous anger at injustice is the best guide to good
action,”3 not empathy or other fellow-feelings. Furthermore, Singer also states:
“effective altruists rely more on reason than emotion.”4 This group of thinkers who
question the usefulness of empathy expresses their concerns over how suitable it is
These thinkers define empathy differently. Prinz’s definition is unique; it is discussed in
Chapter 2, 5.3, and 5.4. Bloom and Singer’s empathy is closer to the definition in empirical studies.
My definition of sympathy as having four components is also similar to how empathy is studied
in empirical studies, such as Hoffman, Batson, and de Waal’s definitions; see Chapter 2 and the
rest of this chapter for details.
1
Paul Bloom, “Against Empathy”. Bloom also has published in The New Yorker; see Paul Bloom,
"The Baby in the Well," The New Yorker 20 (2013).
2
Jesse Prinz, “Against Empathy,” Boston Review, August 26, 2014,
https://bostonreview.net/forum/against-empathy/jesse-prinz-response-against-empathy-prinz.
3
Peter Singer, “Against Empathy,” Boston Review, August 26, 2014,
https://bostonreview.net/forum/against-empathy/peter-singer-response-against-empathy-petersinger.
4
119
for empathy to function as an essential moral emotion. They believe that empathy,
as defined in their respective accounts, is unreliable and biased, and that it plays
little role in making moral judgments and provides weak motivation for moral
behaviors.
The debate over this topic in academia precedes a similar one in popular
media, and it has attracted the attention of a wide range of contemporary thinkers
with different academic backgrounds. Amongst the philosophers and other scholars
who took stances against the role of empathy in morality, Prinz presents the most
notable and systematic attack on the usefulness of empathy and other fellowfeelings [including sympathy as defined in this project 5]; this is an argument that I
will work to refute in this chapter.
The remainder of the thesis addresses some contemporary criticisms against
sympathy. Some of the aforementioned criticisms against empathy and fellowfeelings also apply to sympathy. The recent anti-empathy campaign uses the word
“empathy,” but the participants of this campaign acknowledge the use of
“sympathy” in philosophical accounts [e.g. Prinz inherits much of his
sentimentalist account from Hume and Smith’s theories on sympathy]. Relating
back to Chapter 2, in which I have discussed how “empathy” and “sympathy” are
used in recent academic discussions, their use of “empathy” is precisely as I have
described in Section 2.2.2: “very recently, in the philosophical world, the term
When using the term “sympathy” without further qualification in this chapter, the reader
should assume it means “sympathy as defined and discussed in this project.”
5
120
‘empathy’ has regained some popularity as an attempt to relate to the empirical studies
and/or taking a naturalistic approach.” 6
Since a comparison between Prinz’s empathy and my sympathy [or one
between Prinz’s and Batson or Hoffman’s empathy] will take up a considerable
length of discussion, I reserve Chapter 5 for this discussion. I will also relate this
discussion to the terminological arguments in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 6, after settling the terminological dispute on the Prinzian
empathy and my sympathy, I will then counter the specific arguments put forward
by Prinz. Prinz’s arguments are based on his definition of empathy as the sharing
of emotions between individuals. After discussing Prinz’s definition of empathy in
this chapter; I then address some of his criticisms against fellow-feelings in general
that also apply to sympathy. I focus mostly on Prinz’s “anti-empathic
sentimentalist” account, 7 which stands as a good example of the arguments against
sympathy in general. The remainder of the dissertation is thus roughly divided into
two parts: Chapter 5 discusses and questions Prinz’s account on empathy as
defined by him as an emotion-sharing process; Chapter 6 defends sympathy’s value
and special importance in morality.
5.2 Prinz’s “Empathy” Revisited
Chapter 2 states that “empathy” and “sympathy” are sometimes used to refer to
the same or similar emotional phenomena, yet sometimes, a term may be limited
6
Chapter 2, p 27, section 2.2.2 “Empathy.”
7
Prinz’s own words, see two footnotes down. Prinz, "Against Empathy," 216.
121
to a narrower scope than other common usages. This section discusses Prinz’s
definition of empathy as a vicarious emotion that requires a mental match between
the empathizer and the sufferer. It is instrumental for us to clarify Prinz’s
definition since our understanding of sympathy/empathy directly affects how we
assess the ethical function of this emotion. This section discusses some of the
differences between Prinz’s empathy and my sympathy, and some other definitions
such as Batson and Hoffman’s empathy, thus paving the way for a fair evaluation
of sympathy’s moral function.
5.3 Emotion Sharing VS. Other-oriented Emotion Congruent
with the Other’s Situation
In this section, I will mainly distinguish two types of understanding of
empathy/sympathy. As stated early on in this project [See Chapter 2], in terms of
“sympathy” and “empathy,” I do not think one is intrinsically superior to the other
in capturing the emotion we discuss. These two terms have historically been used
to refer to similar, and sometimes the same, phenomena. Prinz uses empathy to
denote the emotion that is distinct from my sympathy, which is similar to Batson’s
and Hoffman’s empathy. Let us take a close look.
The first type of definition is what I have discussed under the name of
“sympathy” in this project—the other-oriented emotion that is evoked by and
congruent with the other’s distress or situation (See Chapter 2). Batson’s
“empathetic concern” and Hoffman’s “empathy” are sufficiently similar to my
sympathy.
122
The second type is Prinz’s empathy that emphasizes the emotion sharing
between two individuals—it is described as “a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling.” 8 A similar definition can be
found in Bloom’s book Against Empathy: “Empathy is the act of coming to experience the
world as you think someone else does.” 9
In addition to the aforementioned two, there are other types of definition. I
will briefly mention them without going into too much detail since they are not
very relevant to my thesis.
The third type is de Waal’s definition of empathy, which includes
everything that is similar or related to what we call empathy.
Empathy: the capacity to (a) be affected by and share the emotional state of another, (b)
assess the reasons for the other’s state, and (c) identify with the other, adopting his or her
perspective. This definition extends beyond what exists in many animals, but the term
“empathy” in the present review applies even if only criterion (a) is met. 10
De Waal identifies three types of understanding of empathy [see cited passage
below] while maintaining that his research in “Putting the Altruism back into Altruism”
applies even if only criterion (a) is met. In other words, “the capacity to (a) be affected by
and share the emotional state of another,” is the requirement for empathy in his review—
this is a little vague as to what kind of emotional phenomenon de Waal is referring to. De
Waal’s broad and perhaps intentionally vague definition results from his belief that his
research should take a “bottom-up” approach in studying empathy—namely to include
all possible phenomena we call empathy and start our learning of the subject from there:
8
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 212.
9
Bloom, Against Empathy, 16. Italic his.
10
De Waal, "Putting the Altruism back into Altruism," 282.
123
Some definitions of empathy stress the sharing of emotions, whereas other definitions
stress the capacity to put oneself into the other’s “shoes.” The latter definitions are so topdown, however, that they disconnect empathy from its possible antecedents. We follow a
bottom-up approach instead, adopting the broadest possible definition, including mere
emotional sensitivity to others. 11
As we can see, de Waal meant to adopt the broadest possible definition so as to
include all possible objects into his study. It is a little unclear what he meant by “empathy”
or if he really provided an efficient and clear definition of empathy. Given the fact that he
is trying to adopt the broadest possible definition, it is safe to assume that de Waal’s
definition of empathy is meant to include both Batson’s other-oriented empathic concern
style of definition and Prinz’s mental state matching style.
Coplan has an argument against de Waal’s broad definition. In which she argues
for a narrower definition of “real” empathy. But the center of the debate is really on
whether the term “empathy” should include basic mechanisms such as mimicry (de Waal)
or be limited to higher cognitive processes such as complicated imagination (Coplan).
Prinz seems to agree with de Waal on this point given that he said the “taking” [as in
when someone is
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling”]could either be a
higher cognitive function or lower automatic reaction. I agree with Prinz on this point.
To read more about this discussion, see Coplan 2011.12
Here is a list of the types of definition I have discussed so far:
11
Ibid.
Amy Coplan, "Will the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for a Narrow
Conceptualization," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, no. s1 (2011): 40-65.
12
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a) an other-oriented emotion that does not require a mental match [e.g. Mencius’
ceyin zhixin, Wong’s “compassion,” my “sympathy,” Hoffman’s “empathy,” and
Batson’s “empathy”];
b) a vicarious emotion that requires a mental match [e.g. Prinz and Bloom];
Additionally:
c) the broadest definition that includes all related emotional phenomena [e.g. de
Waal];
d) Coplan’s highly cognitive empathy that excludes basic automatic functions such as
mimicry [e.g. Coplan].
To be more specific, I offer a discussion of Prinz’s empathy and the
implication of such definition. I will briefly talk about a disagreement between
Prinz and Batson regarding the definition of “empathy” and “concern” as well.
To remind the reader, as discussed in Chapter 2, Prinz’s definition of
empathy is:
The core idea, as I will use the term, is that empathy is a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. And the “taking” here can be a
matter of automatic contagion or the result of a complicated exercise of the imagination.
13
Prinz uses “empathy” rather than “sympathy,” as we can see from the titles
of his articles. He admits that his definition of empathy is very similar to Hume
and Smith’s definition of “sympathy,” and especially similar to that of Smith’s
despite the different choice of terminology.
13
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 212.
125
“Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally
concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of this situation, in the breast
of every attentive spectator.” Smith [1759:II.i] My question, in the pages that follows, is
whether empathy so-defined is necessary for morality.14
Thus, empathy as defined by Prinz is 1) essentially an emotion-sharing
process, and 2) it could either be a matter of automatic contagion like “catching”
the happiness of others when talking to excited fans celebrating a home win, or an
imaginative process such as coming to feel what it is like for a friend to lose her
child. The fact that Prinz’s empathy could be an automatic contagion is where his
definition differs from Coplan’s [the type d) definition]. Prinz also criticizes
Darwall’s definition as being overly intellectual because it demands imagination
and denies automatic contagion as a type of empathy.15
As for this section, I will focus on types a) and b). From here onward, I will
call type a) the “other-oriented emotion that does not require a mental match,” or
simply in my term “sympathy” [I may refer to it by Batson’s empathy too]; I will
call type b) “Prinz’s empathy,” “empathy [Prinzian],” “empathy that requires a
mental match,” or “empathy focused on emotion sharing.”
Compared with sympathy and other popular definitions of empathy such as those
of Hoffman, Batson, Decety, and de Waal, Prinz’s definition has an important feature:
Mental Matching Thesis: A demand for a matching mental state between the empathizer
and the victim.
14
Ibid.
I agree with Prinz. The automatic basic process should be included in empathy, given that it is
the basic mechanism that enables empathy. Drawl’s definition of empathy is “empathy
involv[ing] something like a sharing of the other’s mental states frequently, as from her
standpoint.” Darwall, “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” 263
15
126
I will discuss this feature in section 5.3 After that, I will briefly discuss a dispute
between Prinz and Batson regarding their choices of terms.
5.4 Matching Mental State
Prinz’s empathy requires a mental match that is not demanded by sympathy.
His
empathy is directed at an individual who feels or is taken to be feeling a certain emotion;
on the other hand, the definitions of Hoffman, Batson, etc., and my sympathy
accommodate cases in which one’s emotion is congruent with the situation of another.
Prinz uses an example to illustrate that in empathy, we should feel the feelings of the
object, instead of what we expect them to feel, or what we think they should feel. As
described by Prinz:
Suppose I encounter a member of a cult who is delighted by the cult leader’s nefarious
plans. The cult member should be afraid, but is not. If I feel fear on the cult member’s
behalf, that is not putting myself in the cult member’s shoes. As I will use the term,
empathy requires a kind of emotional mimicry. 16
As we can see, Prinz’s empathy demands a close matching of mental states between
the empathizer and the empathized, requiring the “I” and the “cult member” in his
example to feel the same emotion.17 Another example could be drawn from patients of
depression: Empathizing with Jack who suffers from depression means that the
empathizer takes Jack to be feeling depressed, and feels depressed herself to some extent.
The empathizer’s emotion must be the same as the empathized, only to a lesser degree.
Hoffman’s empathy on the other hand allows one to feel “an emotional state
16
Ibid., 211-212.
Prinz may allow errors in this process. E.g. Mark takes John to be feeling sad while John is
actually not. But at least ideally, when Mark empathizes with John, Mark should feel the same
emotion that John is experiencing.
17
127
triggered by another’s emotional state or situation, in which one feels what the other feels
or may normally be expected to feel in his or her situation.”18 Batson also states that
empathy is to be, as discussed earlier, “congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need.”
19
As we can see, it is clear that Hoffman and Batson do not require a mental match
between the sympathizer and sufferer—even if the victim is not feeling the emotion she is
expected to feel, one can still sympathize with her plight. In other words, we do not need
to believe that the sufferer is feeling emotion X to sympathize with her and feel X. We
may feel sympathy, according to Hoffman and Batson, for someone in immediate danger
but with no knowledge of it. We can sympathize with an endangered child who does not
know what death and injury are [Mencius 2A6], with a deceased person [Smith],20 with a
husband who has no knowledge of his wife’s affair, or with animals that lack a
sophisticated emotion repertoire but nonetheless have the basic emotions [Mencius 7A45].
As for Prinz, he admits that sometimes a situation can reveal a feeling, as in a marathon
match:
For example, one might feel empathetic hope for a marathon runner who is a few steps
behind the runner in first place, or anxiety for the first place runner when the second
place runner catches up. We can experience these feelings even if the runners’ facial
18
Hoffman, “Empathy, Justice, and the Law,” 231. Italic mine.
19
Batson, Altruism in Humans, 11. Italic mine.
One of Smith’s favorite examples is sympathy for the dead. “We sympathize even with
the dead, and overlooking what is of real importance in their situation, that awful
futurity which awaits them, we are chiefly affected by those circumstances which strike
our senses, but can have no influence upon their happiness. It is miserable, we think, to
be deprived of the light of the sun; to be shut out from life and conversation; to be laid in
the cold grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the earth; to be no more thought
of in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and almost
from the memory, of their dearest friends and relations. [I.I.1.13]” Smith, Haakonssen ed.,
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 16.
20
128
expressions reveal little more than muscular contortions associated with concentration
and physical exertion. A situation can reveal a feeling. 21
From this quoted example, it seems that in some cases, Prinz does allow one to
empathize [Prinzian] with another person without having direct evidence of what she [i.e.
the runner] is actually feeling. He states: “sometimes we experience emotions that we
think someone would be experiencing, even if we have not seen direct evidence that the
emotion is, in fact, being experienced.”22 This is, I would like to argue, very different
from what Hoffman and Batson’s empathy allows. In the marathon case, even though the
empathizer lacks direct and concrete evidence that the second runner is feeling hopeful or
that the first runner is feeling anxious, she is attributing these emotions to the runners.
She is taking the first runner to be feeling anxious and the second to be hopeful. A
situation can reveal a feeling in the sense that it helps to reveal the emotional state of the
runners. It essentially boils down to what one takes the other to be feeling. In sum, Prinz’s
empathy does not accommodate non-matching feelings toward the other.
The following is a summary of different definitions according to the emotion felt by
the sympathizer/empathizer:
The sympathizer/empathizer feels
a) a close match with the victim’s emotion—Prinz, Bloom;
b) a lose match with the victim’s emotion—same valence or compatible, Marsh’s
summary [will be discussed in the next three paragraphs];
21
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 212.
22
Ibid.
129
c) an emotion that is congruent with the perceived welfare or situation and does
not require a mental match—Batson’s empathy, ceyin zhixin, Hoffman’s
empathy, and my sympathy.
On the other hand, as in the case of b), many other definitions of empathy require
a loose matching. Based on de Waal, Decety, and Meyer’s studies, Marsh summarizes in
a review: “empathic emotional responses include both matching emotional responses—
you feel sad, so I feel sad—and compatible responses—you feel pain, so I feel anxiety, or
you feel anxiety so I feel compassion.” 23 This type of definition only requires the
empathizer to feel a loosely matching emotion with the empathized—it can be similar,
compatible, or simply of the same valence.
As for c), under this type of definition the sympathizer/empathizer feels an
emotion “congruent with the perceived welfare or situation” of the empathized, meaning
that the focus is also on another’s plight, and not just on another’s emotion. For example,
Batson does not require a mental match; he only requires the emotion of the empathizer
to be of the same valence as the perceived welfare of the other. He states: “‘congruent’
here refers not to the specific content of the emotion but to the valence—positive when
the perceived welfare of the other is positive, negative when the perceived welfare is
negative.”24 This means that one may feel “sad or sorry for someone who is upset and
afraid.” 25 According to these types of definition, the sympathizer’s emotion can be
compatible with another’s emotion or plight. The fact that the empathizer could have
Abigail Marsh, "Empathy and Compassion: A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective" in Empathy:
From Bench to Bedside, ed. Jean Decety (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 192.
23
24
Batson, Altruism in Humans, 11.
25
Ibid.
130
a similar or compatible response to the empathized allows the empathizer more
flexibility in what and how to feel and to act. For example, one may feel anger as a
result of sympathizing with Joe who has become depressed due to unfair treatment.
Instead of feeling depressed and self-destructive with Joe, one can take care of Joe and
make sure he seeks help, or fight for the cause that Joe is not able to fight for due to his
depression. As we can see, Prinz’s empathy requires a stricter match between the
empathizer and the empathized, whereas other researchers only require the empathizer
to have a similar or compatible response to the emotion [Marsh’s summary], or even just
a response compatible to the situation of the empathized [Batson, Hoffman, and Hu].
The narrowly defined empathy leads to another implication, namely that the
empathized emotion is a weaker version of the original emotion according to Prinz. After
all, an emotion one “catches” is likely to be weaker than the original one.26 My sympathy
on the other hand, encompasses cases like Joe’s, where one sympathizes with another
without necessarily feeling the same destructive emotion—this is a common
phenomenon, but is excluded by Prinz’s definition of empathy.
5.5 “Concern” and “Empathy”, Prinz on Batson’s Choice of
Terms
Batson uses “empathy” to refer to the other-oriented emotional response elicited by and
congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need.27 Mencius 2A6, which I use as
the core case of sympathy, is a perfect example of Batson’s definition—one’s emotional
response is elicited by the endangered baby and congruent with the baby’s welfare. This
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
131
definition differs from Prinz’s in that it does not require a mental match between the
sympathizer and the victim. For example, in 2A6, the baby may not feel fear or anxiety
due to its young age, whereas the bystander is feeling such emotions. The sympathizer’s
mental state does not necessarily match the baby’s. We will discuss the issue about
matching mental content in more details in the next section.
Prinz disagrees with Batson’s use of the word “empathy;” he claims that Batson’s
studies on empathy is confounded since it fails to separate two things: emotion sharing
[or what Prinz calls “empathy”] and worrying about the other’s welfare [what Prinz calls
“concern”]. Prinz argues that the term “empathy” should not be used to refer to the
emotional phenomenon Batson studies—“concern” is a better term according to Prinz,28
who states:
Batson’s construct might be better characterized as “concern,” because of its focus on
another person’s welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about “empathetic
concern.” Notice that this [Batson’s] construct seems to be a combination of two
separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is
something one can do even if one doesn’t feel what it would be like to be in their place. 29
Baton, in a response to the doubt of his choice of terms, states that “concern” by
itself is not a good choice for the other-oriented emotional phenomenon he and his
colleagues study, since “concern” can be used to refer to both self-oriented and otheroriented emotions. 30 We can be concerned for our own interests. Thus, contrary to
Prinz’s suggestion, Batson argues that “concern,” at least by itself, is not a good choice of
28
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 211-213.
29
Ibid., 212.
“Although feelings of sympathy and compassion are inherently other-oriented, we can feel
sorrow, distress, or concern that is not oriented toward someone else, as when something bad
happens directly to us. Both other-oriented and self-oriented versions of these emotions may be
described as feeling sorry or sad, upset or distressed, concerned or grieved. This breadth of usage
invites confusion.” Batson, Altruism in Humans, 12-13.
30
132
word to refer to this emotion commonly known as empathy or sympathy. 31
The real issue here goes beyond the semantic dispute of whether “empathy” or
“concern” is a better word for Batson to use. It seems to me that Prinz is accusing Batson
for confounding type a) and type b) definitions and letting “empathy [Prinzian]” taking
credit for “concern [Prinzian].”32 In other words, Prinz worries that Batson is letting the
emotion-sharing process between two individuals [not very motivating nor useful in
morality according to Prinz] taking credit for—say, the other-oriented concern for
another’s wellbeing [more motivating and useful in morality in Prinz’s view]. I do not
think Batson is guilty of this charge. Batson is aware that his other-oriented empathy does
not necessarily include the Prinzian emotion-sharing type of empathy [though sometimes
it does], nor does Batson buy into the view that emotion sharing would always lead to
other-oriented sympathy [or Batson’s empathy]. While Batson does not explicitly separate
these two emotional phenomena at the definitional level, he is certainly aware of the
differences in his research.
Prinz carries on to make the distinction between “a kind of feeling-for an object and
Batson uses the seemly confusing term “empathetic concern.” He uses “concern” in his
terminology of “empathic concern” simply to differentiate two cases: when the object is in need
[empathetic concern] and when the object is not [empathetic emotion]. In Batson’s language, we
experience an “empathic emotion” for Joe who gets a promotion, and “empathy [or empathic
concern]” for Jay who breaks his leg. According to Batson, “concern” in the term “empathetic
concern,” which is shortened into “empathy,” simply stresses the fact that the object is in distress
or need.
31
If so, “empathetic concern” combines two different things—a kind of feeling-for an object and a
feeling-on-behalf-of an object. Much of the empirical literature, including the superb research that
Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result, some of the existing studies
are confounded. They purport to show the value of empathy, but may really show the value of
concern.” Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 211-213.
32
Prinz also defines concern as “worrying about another’s welfare.” Ibid.
133
a feeling-on-behalf-of an object.”33 Without giving further explanation of what exactly
these two denote, Prinz seems to suggest that feeling-for an object is concern [Prinzian],
while feeling-on-behalf-of an object is empathy [Prinzian]. The concepts of feeling-for and
feeling-on-behalf-of are seen in philosophical discussions [Darwall also uses these paired
terms], but not shared by empirical researchers. Empirical researchers make the
distinctions between the focus of one’s attention being self-directed or other directed; they
also make the distinction between emotional sharing and other oriented concern, but they
don’t use the pair of concepts of feeling-for and feeling-on-behalf-of, since it is not entirely
clear what they denote in an empirical framework. Prinz went on to accuse Batson of
failing to make the distinction between feeling-for and feeling-on-behalf-of—which then
renders Batson’s research confounded, according to Prinz. Batson responds to Prinz’s
comment in a footnote that the relevant distinction psychologists make is about the locus
being on the empathizer or the sufferer, namely the emotion being other-oriented or selforiented.34 To Batson, the distinction Prinz draws between “feeling-on-behalf-of” and
“feeling-for,” is a matter of one’s focus of attention. I think this response misses Prinz’s
point about the distinction between feeling-for and feeling-on-behalf-of, which is supposed to
be about the distinction between emotional sharing and concern[Prinzian].
I will not go further into this dispute, though. The real important issue in the abovementioned discussion, as it seems to me, is the relationship between the Prinzian emotionsharing empathy and the other-oriented, concern-like emotion [Batson’s empathy]. They
can be viewed as two distinct emotional phenomena, yet they are closely related both
semantically and biologically. Emotion sharing sometimes gives rise to other-oriented
33
Ibid.
34
See two footnotes above.
134
sympathy, which sometimes in turn enhances the accuracy of emotion sharing. In 1A7, it
is through shared affective states that Mencius guides the king to care for his
subjects and adopt a more benevolent policy. Both the Prinzian emotion-sharing
empathy and sympathy can stand alone without needing the other. For example, Kate
can share Jay’s anxiety and start to get anxious about her own life rather than about Jay’s
wellbeing [Prinzian]; Kate could also be worried and want to help Jay so as to alleviate
his anxiety without feeling anxiety herself [Batson]. In moral education, it is through
affective and shared mental states that parents frequently encourage their children
to emotionally invest in another. Admittedly, the relationship between emotion
sharing and other-oriented sympathy is in need of further discussion. We have yet
to fully understand when and how the Prinzian empathy of emotion sharing lead to
genuine concern for the welfare of the other35—that is why isolating these components as
suggested by Prinz’s approach could be helpful. However, disregarding the close
connection between emotion sharing and other-oriented concern altogether by isolating
the former may not lead us to a comprehensive evaluation of the moral significance of
empathy.
Given the close relationship between the Prinzian emotion-sharing empathy and my
sympathy [or Batson’s empathy], the question is whether we should take approach 1):
separating the phenomenon of emotion sharing and that of other-oriented sympathy at
the definition level, but keeping in mind that they are closely related in our research; or,
take approach 2): using a term such as sympathy or “empathy [Batson]” to refer to the
I discussed in Chapter 4 of understanding others’ mind [through reading fictions, singing the
Odes, and engaging in character construction] could enhance one’s sympathy for the portrayed
objects.
35
135
other-oriented sympathy without isolating the emotion-sharing process from it, at the
same time, keeping in mind that emotion sharing and other-oriented sympathy could
occur independently sometimes. Both approaches have their merits, though we have yet
to find out which facilitates more meaningful discussions. The key issue is which approach
can better inform us about the nature and function of these emotional phenomena. I take
the latter approach of the two. I use “sympathy” to denote the other-oriented emotion
that is evoked by and congruent with another’s welfare [as Batson and Hoffman’s
definition]—it sometimes [even frequently] includes the component of emotion sharing.
Approach 1) could yield meaningful conversations too, but it seems to me that
Prinz’s approach would become problematic when reaching into the moral sphere. Given
that he takes a narrow definition of empathy, it is vital that he keeps the close relationship
between emotion sharing and other-oriented sympathy in mind in his evaluation of the
role of empathy [even the narrowly defined Prinzian empathy] in morality. However, this
has not been the case. In Prinz’s two publications mentioned above, he focuses on
refuting the thesis of “empathy is necessary for morality” and “empathy is a precondition
for morality.”
In both articles, “empathy” is narrowly defined as emotion sharing
between individuals and must be isolated from “concern.” This approach also dissociates
the Prinzian empathy from other closely related emotional phenomena such as care. The
association between empathy [Prinzian] and concern or that between empathy [Prinzian]
and care is critical in both moral cultivation and moral practice. Omitting to consider
these closely related phenomena inevitably results in an incomprehensive understanding
of the moral value of the Prinzian “empathy.”
While a good portion of Prinz’s arguments target at “all species of fellow-
136
feeling,” which I will discuss in the next chapter, the major components of Prinz’s
arguments are towards the Prinzian term of empathy. Before I present my defense
against sympathy, which belongs to what Prinz categorizes as “all species of fellowfeeling,” I also have some reservations regarding Prinz’s evaluation of the function
of empathy [as an emotion-sharing process] in morality. Prinz worries that the
association between “emotion sharing” and morally desirable attributes such as
genuine concern and altruistic motivation may sometimes be weak. My view is that
the relationship between emotion sharing and such desirable attributes, as well as
the cultivation of moral emotions, are the major issues Prinz has missed. As this
project [especially Chapter 4] maintains, moral cultivation and education enhance
such links between emotional sharing and morally desirable attributes. Through
moral education, by “putting yourself into others’ shoes,” a student of moral
education understands and feels how her behaviors may negatively affect another.
However, moral education scarcely stops at merely understanding another’s
mental state. The student can then associate this negative feeling with her own
inconsiderate actions; this association is sometimes enhanced automatically by the
student as soon as she is engaged in emotion sharing with the affected one, or is
sometimes a result of guidance from “teachers.” In one’s early stage of life, parents
normally serve this role as “moral teachers.” As described in Chapter 4, enhancing
one’s ability of understanding others’ mental states may increases one’s sensibility
towards their sufferings, which may lead to one’s concern for their plight and
genuine altruistic motivation. The isolation Prinz suggests is useful in
understanding certain features of emotion sharing, but is less helpful when it comes
137
to the moral sphere—by separating emotion sharing from concern and care one
will not be able to appreciate the full spectrum of the function of emotion sharing
in moral education and practice. My reservations towards Prinz’s evaluation of his
narrowly defined empathy submit two points for discussion, both of which are key
to this project; the two points are the dynamic view of sympathy that moves from
PFS to MFS through moral cultivation, and the holistic view of moral emotions in
relation with other emotions or faculties.
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Chapter 6
6. Sympathy and Morality
6.1 Introduction and the Objectives
This chapter presents my defense of the value of sympathy. I argue that sympathy is one
of the essential moral emotions that are fundamental to morality; it is a useful and reliable
moral guide. There might be situations in which sympathy is not appropriate and thus
not necessary; however, when it is appropriate and involved in moral deliberation, its role
is important rather than trivial.
This chapter claims a crucial role for sympathy in morality; the said claim is based
on the following propositions that I will argue individually throughout the chapter:
1) Sympathy in its mature form is an important and effective altruistic motivator.
This motivational function is from time to time combined with other moral emotions or
faculties, for example, one’s sympathy towards the sufferer of injustice may be combined
with one’s anger at the perpetrator.
2) MFS has a unique and valuable function in moral cognition. Sympathy not
only enhances one’s ability in detecting others’ distress, which is an important aspect of
morality, it also makes one feel for such distress. In addition, sympathy informs
individuals of others’ intention by providing a relatively reliable passage into others’
minds.
3) Sympathy plays an important role in moral education (as demonstrated in
Chapter Four).
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People worry about sympathy leading to biased moral judgment towards the
victims or incomprehensive understanding of the issue due to the bias and focus. I’d like
to argue it is sympathy, especially MFS, that brings a different perceptive into our
consideration in moral deliberation so that we can make moral judgments with the
victim’s plight in mind. Sympathy helps us making moral judgments with both the wrong
and the affected victims’ needs in mind.
4) Sympathy can reach less common objects such as people who are neither near
nor dear. In its mature form or when guided by others, it helps bridge the distance
between the sympathizer and her objects; it helps to transfer those objects into one’s circle
of care; it promotes care and tolerance in a society and helps to break social boundaries.
It helps make a group of distant and unfamiliar people’s needs and suffering relevant to
one by making one “feel” their distress.
The four above mentioned propositions support an Importance Thesis, namely
that sympathy is important for morality for its valuable and sometimes unique function in
moral motivation, moral cognition, moral education and its inclusive function. There are
a number of essential moral emotions [anger, disgust, joy, etc.1 ], and sympathy is, by all
means, one of them. In this chapter, I address some typical criticisms against sympathy.
Some of the concerns are not novel; they have been discussed or posed by other scholars,
including the rationalists as arguments against emotions in general. This chapter aims to
provide new insights in addition to recasting some of the classic responses. One recently
Based on Mencius’ four sprouts view, Flanagan suspects that there are anywhere from 7 to 11
seeds/sprouts that could grow into essential moral emotions. For a detailed account, see Flanagan,
Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleologies. And Owen Flanagan and Robert Anthony Williams, “What
Does the Modularity of Morals Have to Do with Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a
Few," Topics in Cognitive Science 2.3 (2010): 430-453.
1
140
paradigm of such criticisms comes from Prinz. I argue that these criticisms, Prinz’s
included, usually fail to acknowledge sympathy’s dynamic nature by viewing the emotion
as a fixed state. Omitting to take a developmental perspective results their failure in
acknowledging sympathy in its cultivated and mature form; this omission renders some of
the criticisms unpersuasive.
6.2 Sympathy as an Altruistic Motivator
Very recently, in his articles “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality? (Prinz 2011a)”
and “Against Empathy (Prinz 2011b),” Prinz presented powerful attacks against empathy
and “all species of fellow-feeling.” Amongst the list of worries suggested by Prinz, the
foremost problem is that such emotions are “not very motivating (Prinz 2011b, 225-227).”
As mentioned, Prinz defines “empathy” differently compared to my “sympathy,” which is
an other-oriented emotional response. “Empathy” in Prinz’s definition is a vicarious
emotion of one taking the other to be feeling a certain emotion and then feeling a similar
emotion [See Chapter Five for a detailed discussion.] Since Prinz invites us to reflect on
whether these worries would apply to “all species of fellow-feeling,” I use his list as an
example of criticisms of sympathy to examine sympathy’s features. In this section, I
discuss whether sympathy has sufficient motivational power. Let us take a look at Prinz’s
worries towards empathy and fellow feelings:
What I offer here is a laundry list of worries about empathy, some of which I have already
mentioned. I invite the reader to reflect on whether these worries threaten all species of
fellow‐feeling. First, as we have seen, empathy is not very motivating…. Second, empathy
may lead to preferential treatment…Third, empathy may be subject to unfortunate biases
including cuteness effects. ...Fourth, empathy can be easily manipulated. ...Fifth, empathy
can be highly selective... Sixth, empathy is prone to in‐group biases. Seventh, empathy is
subject to proximity effects…. Eighth, empathy is subject to salience effects…A morality
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based on empathy would lead to preferential treatment and grotesque crimes of omission.
2
The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh issues essentially target at two
problems: that empathy could be biased towards one’s kin, friends, in-group members,
those whom we like, and those who are similar to us, and that this bias could lead to
problematic behaviors. To be more specific, the fifth, sixth, and seventh criticisms target
the fact that fellow-feelings are selective towards certain types of objects—namely our ingroup members [sixth] and objects that are close by [seventh]. Furthermore, in stating
that “empathy may be subject to unfortunate biases including cuteness effects,” the third
criticism brings forth other types of biases—in addition to physical proximity and one’s
preferences over one’s in-group members, one is also biased towards likable and familiar
objects, as well as objects that we feel close to. I have addressed some of these worries in
Chapter 4 by illustrating that one’s sympathy can be extended to reach less common
objects that are neither near nor dear, whose suffering is neither here nor now. As for this
section, I shall discuss the function of sympathy in motivating altruistic behaviors. It
answers the question of whether sympathy has only weak motivational power.
6.2.1 Weak in Motivation? MFS and the Cultivation of Sympathy
In the earlier parts of this project, I have drawn a distinction between the
uncultivated natural sympathy and well-cultivated sympathy, labeling the former
as the primitive form of sympathy [PFS] and the latter as the mature form of
sympathy [MFS]. My first argument in support of the motivational power of
sympathy is based on the MFS. I argue that some of the critics, Prinz included,
2
Prinz, “Against Empathy,” 225-227.
142
have neglected the motivational potential of sympathy in this cultivated and
mature form.
Drawing insights from Mencian ethics and empirical studies, I have given
an account of the PFS and discussed its basic characteristics in Chapter 2 and 3.
In Chapter 4, I have illustrated ways to manage, channel, and modify sympathy to
make it both reliable and consistent. In addition to discussing a number of
cultivation methods and examples of teaching and learning, I have also examined
methods targeting distinct components of sympathy. The former helps us
understand how cultivation works while the latter justifies the cultivation process
empirically and philosophically. For example, avoiding exposure to frequent and
repeated suffering can preserve one’s basic sensitivity to another’s distress, thus
protecting the basic mechanism that enables sympathy. This basic mechanism can,
in turn, be exercised and shaped by one’s sympathetic experience. If a person has
once felt sympathy for Jay, an underprivileged member of a social group, it
becomes much easier to feel sympathy for someone else who is similar to Jay. The
basic mechanism of sympathy “warms up” for similar objects. At the same time, to
enhance our “outer layers” of sympathetic capacity, we learn about various clues
of distress. We learn them not only from the first-hand experience but also by
reading books, using imagination, and from the experience of others. In the past,
in addition to enhancing their capacity to understand the mental states of others,
the early Confucians also practiced rituals to cultivate emotions. Such practices
enhanced family and community bonds so that sympathy was easily evoked when
someone from the community was in need. Imagination and reading fiction and
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poems portraying different types of characters allow one to relate to those outside
of one’s own community and appreciate their weal and woe as if they were
someone dear and near. On the other hand, reflective thinking allows one to
consider their sympathy-related responses and evaluate how well they have done
regarding their ethical cultivation. The methods of cultivating sympathy and the
processes discussed above support the conclusion that the mature form of
sympathy is attainable.
Ignoring the concept of the MFS and the development of sympathy causes
one to reach the premature conclusion that sympathy is weak in motivating others.
The MFS provides reliable motivation in appropriate situations. This concept
along with the development process of sympathy is the first counter argument I put
forth against the claim that sympathy is weak in motivation. Moving forward, the
next section considers the motivational function of sympathy in certain cases,
namely when the costs of helping or rescuing is high.
6.2.2 Sympathy’s Motivational Function in High-Cost Altruistic
Behaviors
When taking costs into account, Prinz concludes “its [empathy’s] contribution is…
non-existent when costs are significant.”3 It is certainly not the case for sympathy
[it may not even be the case for empathy per his definition—but I will not pursue
this further]. When evaluating the motivational power of sympathy, we need to
pay special attention to cases in which the suffering is serious and urgent, and the
stakes
are
high—even
if
that
means
the
costs
of
helping
are
high.
For obvious reasons, we may not see empirical studies designed this way. Instead,
3
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 219.
144
we see experiments created to test if the sympathetic [most of the researchers do
not adopt a Prinzian style of definition of mere emotional sharing, as a result,
studies are mixed in terms of whether they are evaluating the Prinzian emotional
sharing empathy or my sympathy] level of an individual positively correlates with a
typically low-cost helping behavior, such as assisting with yard work or donating a
small amount of money to charity. For example, Prinz discusses a meta-analysis
from Eisenberg et al.
4
that discussed the correlation between sympathy and
prosocial behavior. In the analysis, Prinz admits that in the analysis both otheroriented sympathy[Mine] and empathy [as defined by Prinz] are evaluated, but he
nonetheless seeks to answer if [Prinzian]empathy is motivating. He concludes that,
“But I think the failure to find strong motivation associated with the various forms
of fellow-feeling, provide evidence for thinking that empathy is not a great
motivator.” 5 From here, we can see that the evidence is mixed—it is sometimes
unclear if the study is solely measuring [Prinzian]empathy’s function—especially if
the researchers conducting the research do not adopt a Prinzian style of definition
of empathy. We can also see that Prinz meant to argue for Prinzian empathy’s
weak motivational power based on his argument that the “various forms of fellowfeelings” have weak motivational power.
My main point is that when the results show a weak correlation between
one’s sympathetic level [either Prinzian empathy or my sympathy, since Prinz
seems to deduce the weak motivation of the former from the latter, see quote
Eisenberg Nancy, et al., "Relation of Sympathy and Personal Distress to Prosocial Behavior: A
Multimethod Study," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57.1 (1989): 55.
4
5
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 219.
145
above.] and a helping behavior, opponents of empathy and/or sympathy are
happy to conclude that this emotion fails to motivate altruistic actions even when
costs are low—therefore, it must be powerless in general, especially when the costs
are high. Prinz, whose arguments seem to be targeting at Prinzian empathy alone
in the earlier part of “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality,” later extends the claim
about the weak motivation to “all species of fellow-feelings.”
However, I would like to invite the reader to think in a different manner.
Just because one is reluctant to help when costs are low does not mean that one
would be equally reluctant when costs are high—on the contrary, serious and
urgent sufferings call for the strongest sympathetic reactions despite the high costs.
In other words, a person who is reluctant to give a dollar to a beggar may take a
great risk by jumping in front of an approaching bus to save the beggar’s life.
The seriousness of suffering matters. Our sympathetic responses do not
necessarily shy away in response to serious sufferings, even though its performance
may not be satisfactory in cases of more trivial plights. In addition to Mencius’s
example of 2A6, in which the pain is significant and urgent [i.e. the infant’s life is
at stake], Aristotle also empathizes that the “size” or seriousness of the misfortune
matters for compassion. Nussbaum describes the first necessary cognitive
requirement of compassion for Aristotle as “a belief or appraisal that the suffering
is serious rather than trivial.” 6 The serious misfortune involves “the recognition
that the situation matters for the flourishing of the person in question... We do not
go around pitying someone who has lost a trivial item… or even an important item
6
A painful emotion directed at the misfortune or suffering of another person [Rhet. 1385b13 ff.].
146
that is readily replaceable…” 7 When the misfortune is serious, it calls for an
immediate sympathetic reaction, which frequently motivates high-cost altruistic
behaviors.
Although we do not see high-cost altruistic behaviors in empirical studies
because it is unethical to create situations that call for such responses, we find
high-cost altruistic behaviors motivated by sympathy in our lives, popular culture,
and sometimes in other animals such as primates.
Let us look at some news stories of heroes or heroines who take extremely high
risks to save strangers. In the following examples, the altruistic behavior is jumping onto
the subway track to save a fallen victim.
The 19-year-old Nicholas Buxton saw a man suddenly fall to the subway track on
May 25, 2016, in New York City.
Recollecting the event, he said: “I went down
immediately. He was too heavy to move, and I yelled for help because, by that point, I
could see the train.” While pushing the man into the space under the track, Buxton was
warned by another passer-by and perfect stranger Luis Figueroa that the train was
arriving and that he “gotta get up.” The foreseeable suffering was anything but trivial—
the victim could die if no one helped. The risk was also significant—Buxton said he could
see the train approaching. Figueroa commented later: “If I didn’t pull him [in time], the
train hit him.” As we can see, the high risk involved in this incident did not stop Buxton
and Figueroa from helping the fallen man; Buxton “went down immediately” without
thinking—other thoughts such as anger at the negligence of others did not really enter his
7
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 306.
147
mind.8
A similar incident happened on July 20, 2016, when Victoria Owusu-Afriyie
jumped onto the tracks of the No. 2 Train in the Gun Hill Road elevated subway station
in New York City to save a woman who lost her balance and fell off the platform.
According to the report, “Victoria Owusu-Afriyie had no time to think when it all
happened Tuesday morning.” She said: “I saw this woman — she was on the track —
and I jumped down.” She made her sympathetic motivation clear in the report “I don’t
know – maybe I had hoped someone would do the same for me, I don’t know — just
wanted to help.”9 In this high-risk rescue [the electricity on the track had hit both her
and the fallen woman], she emphasized that she just wanted to help when seeing the
woman fall onto the track. She was not thinking about much else.
David Tirado was perhaps the one who made his altruistic motivation the clearest.
After saving a man who had fallen onto the subway track on June 10, 2016, at the City
Hall R Station in New York City, Tirado said: “And basically I just jumped straight in...
I just went for it. I looked into the tunnel and as soon as I didn’t see the train coming, I
was going for it.” According to the report, he said he was not scared; he explained: “I just
wanted to make sure he was okay. If someone is down and out, you have to help the
person, because you have to remember that could be you lying down there and you’re
going to need the help.”10
“Young Man Leaps onto Subway Tracks to Save Fallen Man as Train Approaches | NBC New
York,” accessed September 20, 2016, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Strangers-SaveMan-Fall-Subway-Tracks-Approaching-Train-380905191.html#ixzz4MAuz1Xzt
8
“Bystander Jumps to Rescue Woman Who Falls on Bronx Subway Tracks,” accessed September
20, 2016, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/07/20/bronx-subway-rescue/
9
“Hero from Crazy Subway Rescue Video Comes Forward: ‘I Just Went for It,’” accessed
September 20, 2016, http://gothamist.com/2016/06/14/subway_hero_speaks.php
10
148
The heroic individuals in the above stories reported strong urges to help—that they
just jumped down and went for it. There was no calculated thinking when jumping down
onto the track, no anger at the subway security system—the only thing on their mind was
that a person was in great danger and in need of help; they needed to make sure he or she
was rescued. These high-risk rescues best illustrate that it is the other-oriented emotion
of sympathy,11 not other types of selfish motivations, that can motivate altruistic behaviors
in urgent situations.
I have so far argued that sympathy exhibits great power in motivating helping
behaviors in urgent and high-risk situations. These arguments go directly against Prinz’s
claim that fellow-feelings are weak in motivating when costs are significant.
Let us also take a look at altruistic behaviors in some of the social animals. As
Batson summarizes, a number of studies or reports have documented the high-cost
altruistic behaviors of chimpanzees:
Chimps can also be heroes. They are poor swimmers and are usually careful to avoid
even shallow water (Goodall, 1986; O’Connell, 1995). Yet Goodall (1986) described the
case of an adult male chimp in Florida who drowned attempting to rescue an infant who
had fallen into the moat surrounding their enclosure. She also described an incident in
Oklahoma in which the famous female Washoe, the first chimpanzee to learn American
Sign Language, leaped a fence to rescue an unrelated 3-year-old chimp that had fallen
into the moat and was drowning. 12
On the other hand, De Waal comments on the behaviors of adult male
chimps: “It is hard to imagine that the chimpanzee’s extreme hydrophobia could
be overcome by a cognitive gamble on future returns. A male who jumps in the
water must have an overwhelming immediate motivation, which probably only
11
Or what Batson and Hoffman would call “empathetic concern” and “empathy.”
Batson, Altruism in Humans, 86-87. Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1986). Sanjida O’Connell, "Empathy in
Chimpanzees: Evidence for Theory of Mind?" Primates 36, no. 3 (1995): 397-410.
12
149
emotional engagement can produce.”13 De Waal suggests that empathy 14 leading
to altruistic behaviors could be inborn impulses rather than learned behaviors.
One of the important conclusions of his research on primates suggests: “Without
the emotional engagement brought about by empathy, it is unclear what could
motivate the extremely costly helping behavior occasionally observed in social
animals.” 15
We are also not unfamiliar with high-cost altruistic behaviors motivated by
sympathy in our own lives. One may say it is a sense of responsibility or courage
that motivates them, but there are certain cases that are clearly motivated mainly
by sympathy. When a hero or heroine dives into a running river to save a child, it
13
De Waal, "Putting the Altruism back into Altruism," 288.
In his studies, De Waal takes a very broad definition of “empathy” that includes both Batson
and Prinz’s versions of empathy. Since Prinz’s concern is against all species of fellow-feeling, de
Waal’s definition should fit into this category of all species of fellow-feeling. The following is de
Waal’s definition: “Empathy: the capacity to (a) be affected by and share the emotional state of
another, (b) assess the reasons for the other’s state, and (c) identify with the other, adopting his or
her perspective. This definition extends beyond what exists in many animals, but the term
“empathy” in the present review applies even if only criterion (a) is met.” De Waal, "Putting the
Altruism back into Altruism," 282.
14
He identifies three types of understanding of empathy [see cited passage below] while
maintaining that his research in “Putting the Altruism back into Altruism” applies even if only
criterion (a) is met. In other words, “the capacity to (a) be affected by and share the emotional
state of another” is the requirement for empathy in his review. The term “be affected by” would
include Batson and Hoffman’s definition, while “share the emotional state of another” is similar
to Prinz’s definition. As a matter of fact, it is safe to say De Waal’s definition of empathy is meant
to include both Batson’s other-orient empathic concern style of definition and Prinz’s mental state
matching style. De Waal’s broad definition results from his belief that his research should take a
“bottom-up” approach in studying empathy—namely to include all possible phenomena we call
empathy and start our learning of the subject from there.
“Some definitions of empathy stress the sharing of emotions, whereas other definitions stress the
capacity to put oneself into the other’s ‘shoes.’ The latter definitions are so top-down, however,
that they disconnect empathy from its possible antecedents. We follow a bottom-up approach
instead, adopting the broadest possible definition, including mere emotional sensitivity to others.”
Ibid.
15
De Waal, "Putting the Altruism back into Altruism," 292.
150
is seldom the anger at either the river or the negligent parents that motivates the
heroic deed; instead, the motivational power comes from the sympathy towards the
potential victim, as in the subway rescues. Motivated by sympathy, our fellow
human beings often engage in helpful actions that are extremely costly—people
risk their lives to save strangers who are in danger. Their behaviors provide the
most persuasive evidence for the strong motivational strength of sympathy.
Prinz might be looking at the wrong place when he concludes that empathy
and other “fellow-feeling” emotions have little motivational power when costs are
significant—it is exactly when the suffering is serious and urgent that sympathy
exhibits its power, and that is true even when the costs are great.
I have argued that sympathy issues strong and reliable motivation in cases
involving high risks and urgency. Sympathy should be viewed both as a tool to
help us appreciate others’ weal and woe and an emotional process that alerts and
moves us to attend to others’ acute and serious distress.
6.2.3 Does “Weak Emotion” Always Issue Weak Motivation?
Prinz and Bloom both attribute a view to the supporters of sympathy (in the sense of
broad other-oriented emotion). They assume that such supporters must accept the
following thesis:
If sympathy were a good moral guide, the more intense one experiences sympathetic
distress, the more motivated or moral one’s actions should be.
They equate more intense feelings of sympathy with more or better sympathy—or
stronger motivational force. They then set up to refute this thesis, but it is unclear if the
supporters of sympathy even adopt such a thesis, thus putting Prinz and Bloom in danger
of committing the classic fallacy of strawman.
151
Bloom in his recently book uses a very empathetic [In this paragraph when I use
the term empathy, I refer to Bloom’s “empathy”, which is similar to Prinzian thin
definition] fictional character “Hannah” as an example, refuting the thesis that being
“more” empathic is not always better. Bloom borrowed this Hannah character from
Simon Baron-Cohen, who meant to depict a “Level 6” individual.
Plausibly enough, he[Baron-Cohen] assumes that people differ in how empathic they are,
and he[Baron-Cohen] posits an empathy bell curve. It starts at Level 0, where a person
feels no empathy at all, as with some psychopaths and narcissists. And it runs all the way
to Level 6, the point at which an individual is “continuously focused on other people’s
feelings . . . in a constant state of hyperarousal, so that other people are never off their
radar.” 16
More empathy [this could be understood as both overly intense empathy in one
episode or having too much empathy overall that it creates a mental burden as in the
cases of some medical professionals] creates mental distress to the empathizer and
sometimes leads to a “burn out” that renders the empathizer incapable of further
empathizing with anyone, Bloom points out. I would like to first point out that “more” or
“more intense” empathy does not correspond with the mature and cultivated form of
sympathy we discussed. Supporters of sympathy or empathy are not simply campaigning
for more or more intense versions of such feelings. For supporters of moral emotions such as
anger or guilt, they are by the same token not proposing that the more or more intense
the emotions the better. Instead, we recommend an adequate and appropriate emotional
response. In the case of sympathy, I can agree with Bloom that it is not always better to
have more sympathy, “more intense sympathy,” “pro-longed sympathy,” or even
constant sympathy unconditionally— but this is not a reason to reject sympathy
altogether. MFS is not necessarily marked by high intensity or high sensibility, as
16
Bloom, “Against Empathy,” 132-133.
152
described in the previous chapters MFS is sympathy in its cultivated and regulated form.
Sympathy is not like “health” in Aristotle’s terms, which is indeed better to have more.
On the contrary, the MFS would avoid excessive sympathy.
Therefore, some of the arguments against excessive sympathy invite us to think
about how to better regulate sympathy—excessive empathy is a real concern [e.g. for
those in the health profession]. However, if we are only considering the philosophical
argument against excessive sympathy, and not presenting a categorical argument against
sympathy in general, it is more accurate to say that we are arguing against excessiveness.
Since it is unclear if any supporter of sympathy believes that a more intense emotion
constitutes a better moral guide, Bloom’s argument against the excessiveness of empathy
strikes me as an argument directed against a strawman.
On the other hand, Prinz takes an approach from the other side of this argument.
Prinz argues that since [Prinzian]empathy is a weaker emotion [in intensity] compared to
the victim’s empathized original emotion, it has little motivational power.
Moreover, there are independent reasons for predicting that empathy should have limited
motivational force. First, an emotion caught from another person is likely to be far weaker
than an emotion that originates in oneself. Second, when we consider others in need, the
emotions we are likely to catch are things such as sadness, misery, and distress. These
emotions may not be great motivators. Misery might even promote social withdrawal. So
there is little reason to think empathy, defined in terms of vicarious emotions, would do
much to make us work on behalf of people in need. 17
First, we need to challenge the view that a “far weaker” emotion has little
motivational power. As stated earlier, the intensity of an emotion does not
necessarily correspond with its power in motivation. As a matter of fact, this is
precisely the charm of sympathy—by providing the sympathizer with a taste of the
sufferer’s distress, it motivates yet does not paralyze the sympathizer with the same
17
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 220.
153
level of intensity of distress experienced by the original sufferer.
A weaker emotion can be, and usually is more effective in motivating rescue
or other helpful behaviors. Experiencing the sufferer’s distress in lower intensity is
not a drawback of sympathy, but a merit. Take Steve who just broke his leg, for
example; Steve may be in too much distress to help himself out—he might be paralyzed
by the pain. A bystander on the other hand, who feels Steve’s distress to some measure
but not overwhelmingly so, has a far better chance of helping him efficiently. This
bystander feels the distress affectively but to a lesser extent, and is thus motivated, yet
he/she can think more clearly and act more adequately on Steve’s behalf and for Steve’s
sake. A bystander who feels Steve’s distress to an equal extent may not be as helpful.
Thus, even though by and large an sympathizer may feel a weaker version of the
sympathized emotion, this does not mean sympathy could not motivate helping behaviors
effectively—this is why sympathy or sympathy-like emotions are so important in social
animals; when experiencing acute and paralyzing distress, someone else affected by the
suffering but to a lesser extent can come to the victim’s aid.
Relating back to the subway rescue stories discussed earlier in 6.2.2, we can see
that the high intensity of sympathized distress does not necessarily lead to the most
effective rescue. The heroic individuals did not feel the exact same distress experienced
by the potential victims under the track—however, they felt a strong motivation to aid
and were able to carry out effective rescuing actions. It was precisely because they were
not overwhelmed by the crippling distress—some potential victims could not move
because of the fall, and one even passed out because of a health condition— that they
were able to act as helpful rescuers. This again supports the idea that less intense
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sympathy can issue strong and reliable altruistic motivation; we don’t need extremely
intense or even excessive emotion to issue effective motivation to help.
Moreover, the first reason stating that “an emotion caught from another person
is likely to be far weaker than an emotion that originates in oneself” is not necessarily
true. There are exceptions to this even if we adopt Prinz’s definition of empathy,
because sometimes the empathizer could indeed feel the distress to a greater extent
than the victim does. 18
A parent may be deeply saddened by her child’s misfortune—beyond what the child herself
experiences. A person engages in the mode of role-taking empathy [Hoffman] may have a
stronger emotional response than that of the victim.
18
This leads to another implication, namely that the empathized emotion is not necessarily a
weaker version of the original emotion as according to Prinz. The claim that an emotion one
“catches” is likely to be weaker than the original needs to be questioned. There are at least two
obvious exceptions even if we adopt Prinz’s definition of empathy as a vicarious emotion of
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. First, when a parent empathizes with their
distressed child, the parent may feel the pain to a greater extent than the child, rather than lesser.
This is not uncommon, especially when the empathizer cares so profoundly about the
empathized, and when the empathizer has greater sensibility and understanding of pain than the
empathized. Compared to a child, a parent may have a deeper understanding of pain and
distress, and given her life experience, she is also better able to put the distress into perspective.
For example, when a child faces a common and ordinary obstacle for the first time, she might feel
very distressed, but knowing that the upcoming hardship is but one of the surmountable
challenges in life, the parent may feel less distress than the child does when empathizing with her.
For this same reason, when a child does not understand that a serious health condition is going to
significantly limit her life in the future, the parent may experience greater distress, instead of less.
For example, Smith describes:
What are the pangs of a mother, when she hears the moaning of her infant that during the agony
of disease cannot express what it feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she joins, to its real
helplessness, her own consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown
consequences of its disorder; and out of all these, forms, for her own sorrow, the most complete
image of misery and distress. The infant, however, feels only the uneasiness of the present instant,
which can never be great [TMS I. I.I.12]. Smith, ed. K. Haakonssen, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
15.
Smith’s example is an obvious exception to Prinz’s claim that a “caught” emotion is normally
weaker than the original one. In the example, the mother, as an adult who understands pain and
death, future and past, can experience far greater distress than the child possibly could. She can
also imagine the future of the child that is being affected by the present misery, or the future the
child would lose because of the present misery. The imaginative capacity is related to the second
155
I will say a little about the second reason argued by Prinz here, namely that
negative emotions such as misery or sadness are not motivating. Prinz thus
concludes that someone who feels these emotions via empathy should also
experience the lack of motivational force. This is a serious problem for Prinz’s
definition of empathy because it requires a close mental match between the
empathizer and the victim. It may not be as serious of a problem for those who
understand empathy/sympathy as a similar or compatible emotion to the original
emotion, or as an emotional response congruent with another’s situation. In other
words, my, Batson’s, and Hoffman’s empathy, along with other similar definitions,
allow one to feel worried or alarmed for a depressed individual—the sympathizer
[for the sake of brevity I am switching to my terms to refer to similar definitions
that do not require a close mental match] thus do not necessarily experience all
symptoms of being depressed such as the lack of motivation. Allie may feel sad or
anxious after sympathizing with Jack’s depression, but she may offer help instead
of feeling a weaker version of the debilitating depression herself. This is another
merit of sympathy understood as an other-oriented emotion—when one is in too
much misery to help oneself out, another person who feels a different emotion can
offer assistance. Thus, the sympathizer does not have to feel a same emotion as the
sympathize to carry out effective altruistic behavior. This merit is associated with
exception to Prinz’s claim—take the self-focused role taking mode of empathy for example
[Hoffman here adopts a different definition of empathy compared to Prinz, see chapter 2.]; when
imagining myself in Jones’ situation, it normally triggers a strong emotional response, which may
be more intense than Jones’ own emotion. These two types of exceptions suggest that Prinz’s
claim may not be accurate, namely that an emotion caught from another person is not necessarily
far weaker than an emotion originated in oneself; Prinz’s argument and its conclusion should
thus be questioned with consideration for the exceptions mentioned above.
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the earlier discussed point that a weaker sympathized emotion might be more
effective in motivating helping behavior. In sum, when the distress is paralyzing
[either because the distress is too severe or because the nature of such distress,
such as depression, panicking, and anxiety], sympathy allows the bystanders to
have a weaker, or a different emotion that is directed at the sufferer, thus allowing
effective assistance.
Prinz’s worry that the empathizer may lack motivation due to empathizing
with emotions such as misery or depression remain a real concern in our lives. In
my account, though one doesn’t have to feel exactly the same emotion as the
victim, sometimes one does. One may feel frustrated or depressed as a result of
empathizing[Prinzian] with someone who are experiencing these emotions—
sharing these emotions sometimes leads to other oriented sympathy. Does this
mean sympathizing with these emotions known to have little motivational force
also reduce the power of sympathy? I think this is a very good point Prinz has
brought up, and something we need to be cautious of. Although my definition of
sympathy bypasses this problem sometimes since one may be feeling a different
emotion as the victim who lacks motivation, sympathy may encounter this problem
as well.
Admittedly, the motivational power of sympathy may not always result in
action. There may be other competing factors inhibiting one’s altruistic motivation
[such as consideration of self-interest]. This is true for any moral motivation
ranging from emotions to calculated decisions. Anger may be suppressed; a sense
of justice may be swayed or misled. On the other hand, these altruistic motivations
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could also win out and leave a significant impact on our moral reasoning. Prinz
has a point in claiming that negative emotions such as anger, guilt, and disgust
sometimes exhibit strong motivational power. I would like to point out that
sympathy also demonstrates the same motivational power in appropriate
situations—if we consider 2A6 or similar urgent situations, in which the victim is
innocent, likable, and vulnerable, and the approaching suffering is serious and
undeserved, the altruistic intuition in such a situation is indeed very strong. In
fact, an opponent of empathy, Peter Singer, famously uses the child in the pond
case to motivate the thinking of our roles and obligations in global poverty. 19 As
we do not expect misplaced anger to be reliable motivators, we also cannot expect
sympathy to play its part in less appropriate situations.
6.2.4 Conclusion
So far I have presented three major types of arguments against those who are
skeptical towards the motivational power of sympathy. First, some of the critics fail
to adopt a developmental account. Their skeptical claims are unpersuasive because
they have not taken into account the cultivated and mature form of sympathy.
Second, sympathy is useful when the suffering is serious and urgent—even if that
means the costs of help are high. This goes directly against Prinz’s claim that
when facing significant costs, empathy and fellow-feelings have little motivational
power. Third, I have also argued that when the sympathizer does not feel the
sufferer’s distress in the same or higher intensity, it is a merit of sympathy rather
than a flaw. Less intense emotions can issue strong and effective motivation.
See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairs, (1972): 229-243.
Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty, Random House, 2009.
19
158
Critics such as Prinz neglected to consider that more weakly felt sympathy (or
fellow-feelings in his terms) is sometimes more effective in motivating altruistic
behaviors. It is a mistake to assume that reliable motivation requires extremely
intense or even excessive sympathy—the critics’ attack in line of this assumption is
a strawman style argument.
Lastly, I would like to direct the reader to the rich literature of Batson’s
empathetic concern and Hoffman’s empathy, both defined as an other-oriented
emotion that does not require a close mental match.20 Researchers in psychology
and neuroscience do not necessarily share my distinction between PFS and MFS,
but their studies suggest that the connection between empathy [the studies I have
mentioned generally adopt definitions similar to my sympathy] and altruistic
motivation is strong.
6.3 Sympathy’s Epistemic Function and Its Importance in
Moral Judgment Making
This section is divided into two parts. First, I aim to argue that empathy defined as
emotion sharing [Prinzian] has important and unique value in moral cognition, it
provides us paths into others’ minds. In “Against Empathy,” Prinz argues that “empathy
For example, after a comprehensive study of empathy and its development, Hoffman claims
“empathy has all the attributes of a pro-social motive.” In chapter 2 of Empathy and Moral
Development, he argues compellingly that empathy is associated with helping, that empathetic
distress precedes helping, and that empathizers feel better after helping. In addition, observers
help victims with greater urgency when they are feeling empathic distress, which “decreases
more quickly and they feel better when they help than when they don’t help and when despite
their best efforts the victim’s distress is not alleviated.” The connection between sympathy and
the altruistic motivation to help is thus obvious and well proven. See Hoffman, Batson, and etc.
20
159
plays this epistemic role contingently and that it is epistemically unreliable.”21 His
argument is based on evidence proving that empathy may distract one from morally
important clues and that biased sympathy may lead one to mistakes.22 These are indeed
worries we should bear in mind; however, there are reasons for us to think that the
epistemic role of empathy is unique and valuable for morality.
Second, I argue that sympathy plays an important role in moral cognition; it
enhances moral cognition and helps to bring others’ distress into our scope of care. It is
thus instrumental in moral judgment making. The division between Prinzian empathy
and my sympathy above-mentioned doesn’t mean that I subscribe to Prinz’s methodology
of defining empathy thinly as emotional sharing. However, since some of the powerful
criticisms comes from philosophers who have such a definition, it is helpful in this section
to present a two-fold argument against them. I must stress that emotional sharing and
other-oriented sympathy are closely related, even though one do not always entail the
other, one frequently leads to one another and enhances one another. At the end, given
sympathy’s unique role in moral cognition as well as empathy [Prinzian] having a close
tie with [sometimes being a part of] sympathy, sympathy’s importance in moral
judgments making is well supported.
First, empathy is an efficient way into others’ minds. Empathy allows fast
judgments and responses toward the situation another is facing, or the mental state of that
person. It alerts us to emergent clues, thereby facilitating fast and efficient responses.
Whenever distress is involved, it is likely that the situation is an urgent one; analyzing the
situation calmly may provide an optimal solution compared to a spontaneous reaction,
21
Prinz, “Against Empathy,” 223.
22
Ibid., 223-224.
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but it will take more time—by the time a solution is reached it might be too late to be
relevant and helpful.23 Emotions have the advantage of being fast-acting. Empathy is
efficient in gathering useful information regarding others’ situation and mental states.
In addition, empathy provide us with richer and deeper information of others’
plight and inner world. This is important for understanding latent distress. Masto offers a
very well argued epistemological argument against Prinz: it is only through empathy24 we
have access to certain essential and valuable moral clues—we receive richer and deeper
information about others’ feelings, motivation, and well-being, and moreover, we learn to
understand how people are going to feel and what the right thing to do is. As Masto
points out: “it is often hard to do the right thing. It is hard, in part, because it is hard to
know which of the things we can do is the thing that we morally should do. In many cases
facts about how people are going to feel help determine which act is the right one.”25
Empathy [Prinzian] provides us with a perspective into others’ feelings, motivation,
beliefs, and expectations. Given that one is feeling with the victim, one has similar or
matching bodily states as the victim due to mimicking the other’s posture, facial
expression, tone of speech, and so on [or in the neuroscientists’ terms, one has a matching
affective state with the victim given the shared bodily representation between them]
Sympathy and calculating are not mutually exclusive; our decision-making process is often a
combination of spontaneous reaction and later thinking, justifying, and adjusting the initial
reaction.
23
24
Like Prinz, Masto uses the term “empathy”; her empathy is roughly equal to Prinz’s, with
minor changes—she thinks that automatic take of another’s mental state shouldn’t count as
empathy. She also admits this difference shouldn’t hinder the discussion. Meghan Masto,
"Empathy and Its Role in Morality," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 74-96.
25
Masto, “Empathy and Its Role in Morality,” 84.
161
Empathy [Prinzian] enables one to feel the weal and woe of the other, which not only
helps one understand the victim’s plight, personality, and expectations but also makes one
more sensitive in perceiving clues relevant to the victim’s plight. Empathy[Prinzian]
provides us with a unique path into understanding others’ motivation and feelings; it thus
helps us predict how others are going to be affected by the outcome of a particular moral
decision. Empathy, through it cognitive function, exhibits its importance in helping one
make moral judgment.
On the other hand, sympathy, not defined as emotional sharing, has distinctive
function in moral cognition as well. It alerts us to morally relevant cues even when we are
not experiencing the same feeling as the victim. Sympathy is also closely tied to care, it
increases caring; caring in turn enhances the epistemic function of sympathy. I have
discussed this point earlier in Section 4.3.5 Caring and Beliefs. As Little points out, how
much we care about a person affects our sensibility to that person’s distress and plight. As
I have quoted in Section 4.3.4: “if one cares about something one is prepared to respond
on its behalf, and preparedness to respond is intimately linked with the awareness of
opportunities to do so.”26 Caring thus enhances one’s perception of a situation—
especially clues relevant to the victim’s wellbeing. We are naturally more attentive to our
kin and people who we care about—thus having keen eyes to their sufferings and
understanding their distress better than that of a stranger. We can also be cultivated to
care about a stranger or many strangers [as in 1A7 case] and expand our circle of caring
and understanding. By doing so, the epistemic function of sympathy could reach people
who are initially not part of one’s caring circle. Sympathy is frequently involved in this
26.
Little, "Seeing and Caring," 122.
162
expanding process. For example, the attempt to expand the king’s scope of caring in 1A7
is induced by sympathy—starting from sympathizing with an animal, and then to a group
of objects who are far away and unfamiliar to the king. Section 4.3.4 Understanding
Others’ Perspectives—Stepping into Others’ Shoes discusses the efforts to understand the
perspectives of others by reading and singing songs [The Book of Odes] that portray the
distress and joy of different characters. Through imagination, students receiving
Confucian education, which prepares them as members of the ruling class, sympathize
with the characters and their plight in the songs. There are both male and female
characters from different [sub]cultures, geographical areas, social economic classes, and
age groups. Sympathizing with various characters through repeated reading and singing
helps one understand the plight and mental states of the characters; more importantly,
this educational process places these characters inside one’s circle of caring. In the future,
it becomes much easier for one to sympathize with people similar to these characters,
even when they are not near and dear, when the clues of others’ sufferings are not direct
and obvious.
In sum, the epistemic function of empathy is unique and valuable. It guides us to
discover the morally right and appropriate behavior since it helps one understand others’
motivation, feelings, and expectations. It thus submits useful information for anyone who
wishes to make reliable and efficient moral judgments. Sympathy on the other hand also
helps us better apprehend the weal and woe of others; it helps expand our circle of care
and thus increases our sensibility towards clues relevant to others’ plight.
One may point to evidence that sympathy does not respond well to outer group
members or people whom we are unfamiliar with—but let us not overlook the important
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role sympathy plays in transforming outer group members into inner group members. Let
us not overlook sympathy’s role in expanding one’s caring circle—transforming a
previously unrelated, disliked, and remote individual [or individuals] into one[s] whom
we care about, and whose weal and woe we apprehend. Thus, when evaluating the
epistemic function of sympathy [and other fellow feelings such as care], we need to
inquire further, instead of focusing on its accuracy in an individual case. As I have
demonstrated, sympathy plays an important role in increasing people’s sensitivity and
understanding towards others’ plight and in helping us making good moral judgments.
6.4 Sympathy’s Function in Moral Education & Breaking
Social Barriers
Citing Mencius 1A7, I have shown how the scope of sympathy could be extended,
how the bodily changes accompanying sympathy could be used to aid moral
motivation, and how the “inherent weaknesses” of sympathy [for instance spatial
bias—one’s relative propensity to feel sympathy for individuals who are physically
close] could in fact be managed. Such biases could be mediated; one could feel or
be guided to feel sympathy for less common objects of sympathy. Sympathy could
be manipulated for ethical purposes, rather than posing a threat to morality. See
Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion. Prinz may have foreseen similar
responses as he states:
In response, the proponent of empathy might say that we need to empathize with distant
others in order to become outraged when they are harmed. But this suggestion is false
and futile. 27
Note that in 1A7 and my discussion of 1A7, King Xuan is led to empathize
27
Prinz, "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” 228.
164
with distant others, as Prinz has foreseen, but not made angry when the distant
others are harmed. Mencius continues to use sympathy as the fulcrum of his
persuasion. Prinz continues to argue:
It’s false, because we can directly condition each other to be outraged at the
thought of iniquity, genocide, and neglect. Like other emotions, anger can be
learned directly. For example, anger can be conditioned through imitation. If we
express outrage at injustice, our children will feel outrage at injustice. 28
The proposed “learnt anger” towards morally wrong ideas is questionable.
First, it is unclear if anger or outrage can be learnt through “conditioning” or
“imitation” in the way Prinz suggests. My discussion of Mencian philosophy in
Chapter 4 supplies a detailed discussion of how sympathy can be changed and
cultivated into its mature form—this cultivational process focuses on enhancing
one’s sensibility to the distress of others and on improving the capacity in
sympathetic perception, moral reasoning, and reflection. It involves not only the
education of moral values but also the extension and exercising of one’s
emotions—so that in the end one’s emotions can be in line with her moral values
in appropriate moral situations. On the other hand, Prinz’s proposition of moral
education of anger is in need of further discussion and justification. I remain
skeptical of the account that we can simply set certain target values and condition
a moral emotion to them, which is probably a naive idea of moral education. 29
There are indeed many insightful literature on how to use anger to advance our
understanding and practice of justice, however, Prinz’s illustration of anger’s
28
Ibid.
Claudia Passos-Ferreira offers an insightful argument on empathy’s role in moral development.
Claudia Passos-Ferreira, "In Defense of Empathy: A Response to Prinz,"Abstracta 8.2 (2015): 31–
51.
29
165
cultivation as “condition[ing] through imitation” and “directly learning [from
others’ angry behavior]” does not strike me as persuasive; his account of the
cultivation of anger may need further support from the work on moral cultivation.
Second, it is not clear if we know what to condition ourselves to. Prinz’s
proposed “learnt anger” is an oversimplified picture of moral education. As Masto
claims: “while some might claim that we have made significant moral progress, it is
highly unlikely that we have enough moral knowledge to be secure in the practice
of conditioning others to feel outrage, anger, or disgust at all of the actions that we
now believe are wrong.”30 It is risky—considering the mistakes we have committed
throughout human history as a result of conditioning people to be angry at or
disgusted by a group of people. It is anger and disgust we should be particularly
cautious of since they are harder to control. Masto cites slave holding, genocides,
Apartheid, etc. as examples of such conditioning,31 and I would also like to add
that such worries persist in our contemporary society. Hatred and bias towards
Muslims, towards gays and lesbians, and towards people of different ethnicity are
posing great threats to our society and putting some of the values we hold dear at
risk. In addition, discrimination and even genocide are often made easier by
making its victims “subhuman” or treat them as abstract ideas of evil. Sympathy
has the power of countering such tactics of “dehumanizing” by making one feel the
other as an individual. Sympathy, on the other hand, has the function of expanding
one’s caring circle—transferring previously unrelated, disliked, and remote individuals
into ones whom we care about, and whose weal and woe we apprehend. Sympathy goes
30
Masto, “Empathy and Its Role in Morality,”82.
31
Ibid.
166
beyond now and here by presenting distant others’ plight vividly in front of our eyes, as if
they are now and here.
For example, Frazer points out that sympathy [Hume’s sympathy] has
unique power in breaking down oppressive social institutions by bringing victims
who were excluded by such institutions “closer” to us. “There is, however, no
guarantee that even such intensely oppressive social institutions [such as slavery in
ancient Roman] will always succeed in excluding their victims from our sympathy.
The breakdown of such institutions comes when the plight of the excluded is
somehow ‘brought nearer’ to us and the circle of our moral concern is thereby
expanded.” 32 Frazer mentioned the expanding of one’s circle of moral concern
made possible by sympathy— this point resonates with what I discussed in Chapter
4 of expanding one’s circle of care so as to reach less common objects. In my
discussion in Chapter 4, Mencius uses sympathy to bridge King Xuan with his
people who are physically distant. As we can see, such distance could also be a
result of not physical remoteness but social hierarchy. Frazer continues to cite
W.E.B. DuBois’s beautiful passage, as I will cite here:
The nineteenth was the first century of human sympathy—the age when half
wonderingly we began to descry in others the transfigured spark of divinity which we call
Myself; when clodhoppers and peasants, and tramps and thieves, and millionaires and—
sometimes—Negroes, became throbbing souls whose warm pulsing life touched us so
nearly that we half gasped with surprise, crying, “Thou too! Hast Thou known Life?”33
Please note here Frazer is discussing Hume’s sympathy when he made the
above observation, which means that he is primarily discussing sympathy’s
function in breaking down oppressive social institutions in the sense that is similar
32
Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy, 54-55.
33
ibid.
167
to Prinz’s empathy. It thus provides an argument against Prinz from within the
sentimentalist tradition.
In addition, if we take 1A7 as an example again, it is apparent that anger is
sometimes inappropriate in moral education. King Xuan, as a powerful leader of
the ruling class, is not particularly outraged or angered by his own political
practice. He is angry about neither the high taxes he has imposed nor the wars he
has launched [or planned to launch] against the neighboring states. It is unlikely
that he could be conditioned to be outraged at the unjust and cruel laws he has
implemented, since he has done so to ensure his self-interest and what he believes
to be the best interests of the states. He benefits from such practices. As a person
with great power, authority, and pride, he does not perceive the practices as unjust
and is not angry at them. It is unlikely that anger or outrage could move him. In
the end, Mencius carefully chooses sympathy as the most appropriate fulcrum to
persuade the king; the king is pleased and responds: “I was the one who did it. I
reflected and sought it out, but did not understand my heart. You spoke, and my
heart moved.”34
Not everyone has the power and arrogance of a king. However, we can
relate to the case—we are sometimes blind to unjust or morally problematic issues,
especially when such injustice does not directly hurt our own interests. Without
sympathy, we may remain unmoved or even try to rationalize such injustice.
Sympathy, as Mencius has demonstrated, serves as an educational tool that leads
us to respond to the unjust issues by making us see and feel the distress of others
34
Mencius, 1A7.
168
that originally does not affect us.
6.5 Sympathy, Anger, and Shame
One additional point to be noticed here is that, as I have mentioned throughout
the thesis, I am not claiming sympathy is the better moral emotion compared to
other emotions. Nor am I arguing that sympathy [in its mature form or not] can
serve as the single ultimate moral faculty that replaces other emotions/faculties.
There are appropriate situations for sympathy; there are also situations when sympathy
does not apply. Prinz is right in recognizing that sympathy is directed at the victim, a fact
that seems to render it useless when there is no victim or when it is difficult to identify
one. On the other hand, there are cases more appropriate for sympathy than the other
emotions Prinz or others had recommended. For example, when there is only others’
distress but no identifiable perpetrator, anger does not apply while sympathy is
appropriate. With victims of an unforeseeable natural disaster we cannot identify an
offender because there is no transgression; anger, therefore, simply does not apply. The
altruistic emotions and behaviors towards these victims are driven mostly by sympathy.
In addition, even if a situation is appropriate for both anger and sympathy, anger
cannot replace sympathy: The objects of the said two emotions are different and they lead
to different action tendencies. Anger urges us to punish the transgressor while sympathy
moves us to help and tend to the victim. Even when both transgression and distress are
involved, these two emotions cannot replace each other’s roles because they have distinct
functions. When one jumps into a fast-flowing river to save a child, she does so out of
sympathy with the child or the parents, not out of the anger at the parents' negligence. It
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is entirely possible that one would also be angry with the parents and seek to penalize
them, but anger does not directly issue altruistic motivation toward the child and thus
cannot replace sympathy’s role.
My point is not that sympathy is better or more important than other emotions such
as anger. It is simply that there are appropriate situations for each of our moral emotions,
pointing out one emotion is not appropriate in some situations does not prove that it is
unnecessary. It is also the case that in moral education and moral practice, two or more
moral emotions are exercised. Sympathizing with people in poverty increases our anger
towards unjust distribution system, our recognizing of how unjust and undeserving
certain treatments enhances our sympathetic feeling towards its victims. Negative
emotions such as anger, guilt, and shame are frequently exercised in conjunction with
sympathy in both moral education and moral practice.
6.6 Is Anger a Better Moral Emotion?
My point is not that sympathy is a better moral emotion, as I have stated in the last
section. However, anger is considered a better moral emotion by Prinz when compared
with empathy [Prinzian] or the total effect of fellow-feelings such as empathy and concern
[both Prinzian terms]. Following Prinz’s suggestion, one should avoid letting fellow
feelings guide our moral lives, one should rely on other more useful and less problematic
moral emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, etc. He states:
Theoretical investment in such fellow-feeling distracts us from the emotions that
undergird moral assessments. We would profit more from research on anger, disgust,
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contempt, guilt, and the positive feelings associated with charity. Practically speaking, the
emphasis on empathy may be an invitation to bias.35
I think it is misleading and dangerous to claim emotions such as anger to be better
candidates than sympathy and other fellow feelings, especially in thinking that they are
relatively immune to bias and other human errors. For example, anger is not a better
moral emotion than sympathy.
Anger is problematic.36 It is not immune to some of Prinz’s criticisms against
empathy and fellow feelings. Anger, outrage, and resentment are sometimes biased
emotions. A transgression against one’s own interests typically excites more anger than a
transgression against others. When self-interest such as safety is at stake, anger may fail to
motivate moral behaviors. When anger works without a proper inhibition system, it can
be, and often is, excessive. It may lead to disproportionally severe punishment for a
transgression, but at the same time, it may also underperform. Anger may excite hatred,
increase bias, and nurture a cynical outlook that may result in social withdrawal rather
than engagement. When anger is turned towards oneself, when it is stored rather than
expressed, it becomes one of the most detrimental vices to one’s character and wellbeing.
On a larger scale, anger and disgust have led human history into the darkness that
some still could not face today. Masto is correct in pointing out that unregulated or illguided anger and disgust have left some of the worst marks in human history: “In fact,
when we think about the most significant moral atrocities in world history, including slave
holding, genocides, Apartheid, etc., we can observe that each was accomplished, in large
part, because a group of people was conditioned to feel disgust anger, or outrage by
35
Prinz, “Against Empathy
”231.
This is not an attack on anger as a moral emotion; rather, I aim to argue against the idea that
anger is a better moral emotion than sympathy and other fellow feelings.
36
171
people or actions that were not deserving of such emotions.”37 Indeed, anger and disgust
are frequently associated with discriminatory thoughts and attitudes. As Nussbaum
observes: “shame and disgust are frequently linked to a hatred that seeks the total
obliteration of the threatening object.”38 Negative emotions such as anger, disgust, and
shame may result in strong and appropriate motivation in some cases, but unlike what
Prinz suggests, there is no evidence that they are more reliable and less worrisome when
misplaced.
Prinz may suggest that he recommends not the “raw” and problematic anger that
people go to anger management courses for, but rather, its refined form of outrage. It is
only fair to compare a well performing and mature form of sympathy to the refined
indignation or outrage. Comparing an idealized idea of anger to sympathy in its biased,
uncultivated, and problematically primitive form is not going to bear meaningful
conclusions regarding the two emotions’ functions and roles in morality. Outrage, the
refined form of anger, may perform better than the unrefined and primitive form of
sympathy —but then again, is it not the case that most regulated and refined emotions
are better than unregulated and unrefined ones? [Rousseau will not agree with me.]
Rather than shedding any light on the nature of the emotions, the most meaningful
conclusion we can draw from such comparison is probably that education, refinement,
and cultivation are important and valuable processes for moral emotions.
37
Masto, “Empathy and Its Role in Morality,” 82.
38
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 300.
172
6.7 Sympathy and Tolerance
My overall claim is that sympathy is an important moral emotion; its significance is
demonstrated by its function in providing moral motivation, making moral judgments,
moral perception, and moral education. Is sympathy the sole guide for morality? I do not
think so. Notice that in the previous chapters, when we discuss sympathy and its
cultivation, we never exclude other emotions and faculties from this process. Contrarily, a
number of faculties such as other moral emotions [anger, guilt, shame and etc.],
regulation, calm calculation, imagination and so on are discussed in the process of
cultivating sympathy from its primitive form to maturity.
I have argued for the important value of sympathy in morality in the previous
sections of this chapter. I wish to discuss one additional point here: the function of
sympathy in inhibiting aggression and promoting a tolerant, inclusive outlook. Sympathy
inhibits aggression.
Here, I first consider a counter argument made by Bloom. Bloom’s definition
of empathy is Prinzian style—emphasis on emotion sharing. This paragraph
discusses the Prinzian empathy’s function in inhibiting aggression. Later on, I will
switch back to my term sympathy when discussing the other-oriented emotion that
does not require a mental match between the sympathizer and the victim. Bloom
argues in the Boston Review that empathetic individuals are not necessarily less
aggressive. He claims that “if you want to predict how aggressive a person is, and
you have access to an enormous amount of information about that person, including
psychiatric interviews, pen-and-paper tests, criminal records, and brain scans, the
last thing you would bother to look at would be measures of the person’s
173
empathy.”39 The evidence on the role of empathy as an inhibitor for aggressive
behavior is not conclusive, though there are many studies suggesting an inhibitive
function of empathy against aggressive behaviors. For example, Miller et al. (1988),
Feshbach et al. (1969), and many others suggest a positive correlation between
empathy and reduced aggression.40
However, instead of presenting more evidence from empirical studies, I want
to point out that empathy [Prinzian] also reduces aggression in indirect ways that
are hard to measure and not typically examined in empirical studies.
Current
empirical studies mainly examine the direct relationship between an individual’s
empathetic level and her aggressive behaviors. The basic idea is to answer this
question: if one is an empathetic person, will she be more or less aggressive? These
studies do not account for the indirect influence of empathy on a broader scale. For
example, empathizing with individuals from minority groups is a good way to
reduce anger and/or disgust towards them, which in turn leads to a reduction in
hatred and/or aggression that could result from biased beliefs and emotions.
Empathizing with a previously unfamiliar group of people leads to more inclusive
and tolerant views. These views, once expressed and spread in various forms
[including artistic forms such as films, photography, and stories] in the media, can
reach people and make them less likely to harbor hatred, distrust, fear, and bias
towards unfamiliar groups—thus reducing aggression towards these groups. Such an
39
Bloom, “Against Empathy.”
Paul A. Miller and Nancy Eisenberg, "The Relation of Empathy to Aggressive and
Externalizing/Antisocial Behavior," Psychological Bulletin 103, no. 3 (1988): 324.
40
Norma D. Feshbach and Seymour Feshbach, "The Relationship Between Empathy and
Aggression in Two Age Groups." Developmental Psychology 1, no. 2 (1969): 102.
174
indirect influence is difficult to measure in empirical studies but should not be
neglected. Thus, Bloom’s conclusion about empathy’s limited ability in inhibiting
aggressiveness should be questioned. The function of empathy’s [as an emotional
sharing process] has not been studied comprehensively by current empirical
research that is based on small scale levels of interaction between individuals.
Nussbaum has distinguished emotions into two types: those that “expand the
boundaries of the self further outwards…and [some emotions that] draw sharp
boundaries around the self…”41 Sympathy is of the former type. Sympathy enhances
caring and encourages an embracing attitude. It makes one open to the perspectives
of others; it allows oneself to be placed in a vulnerable position to the distress of
others. Sympathy also encourages one’s willingness to take risks, which is quite
opposite to the attitude typically associated with emotions like disgust [avoidance],
guilt [withdrawal], and anger [aggression or defensive behavior]. In an age of
globalization and in the society where people have vastly different cultural customs,
religious beliefs, and life styles, it is unimaginable to eliminate sympathy as one of
the essential moral emotions.
Some of the essential moral emotions such as shame and honor are now believed
to occupy a less important role in our moral lives than they used to have. They may still
be a part of our moral lives but may no longer be a pillar of morality as they once were.
The opponents of sympathy attempt to establish that the same is true for sympathy.
Sympathy should, as they believe, play marginal roles in morality because of its fleeting
nature and the various biases it invites. My project suggests quite the opposite. Like other
Of the latter type, “disgust is paradigmatic of such an emotion.” Nussbaum, Upheavals of
Thought, 300.
41
175
emotions, sympathy can be biased towards one’s own kin and inner group members.
However, with the proper guidance we can relate to outer group members as well; we can
take on the perspectives of outer group members and feel their weal and woe through
sympathy. By doing so, we could include into our circle of care those we originally do not
care about, as well as those who are not our inner group members. This special function
amongst many others marks the unique role of sympathy in our moral lives and moral
theories. Given its unique features such as its epidemic function, its altruistic nature, and
the openness it promotes, sympathy is not only irreplaceable but also fundamental to
morality. After discussing the various methods of cultivation, it is clear that with our given
primitive form of sympathy, we are facing a promising future—for both individuals to
attain the mature form of sympathy and for the society to become a more inclusive and
caring one.
6.8 Limitations and Project Conclusion
In this final section, I will outline some obvious limitations of this project before
presenting the conclusion, which should serve as a stepping-stone for the future work on
sympathy and its cultivation.
This project is limited by its scope. The philosophical texts are primarily from
early Confucian thinkers, especially Mencius.
To illustrate the nature and cultivation of sympathy, I make use of several
important passages from Mencius that are relevant to this emotion and its cultivation.
Works from later Confucian thinkers such as Zhuxi (1130 – 1200 C.E.) and Wang
Yangming (1472 – 1529 C.E.), as well as their principal contributions to the concept of
176
sympathy, are not considered. On the other hand, there is a rich literature and a
remarkable amount of contemporary works done on the sentimentalist tradition’s
accounts on moral education [especially Rousseau and J.G. Herder]. Studies of such
accounts are merely sporadically mentioned throughout this project. Some of the
important empirical studies on the hormone known to increase trust—oxytocin, are also
not discussed in this project.42 Future scholars could include such empirical studies while
examining my propositions on the cultivation of sympathy.
This project starts from defining sympathy and making the distinction between its
primitive and mature forms. After briefly discussing the difficulties in reaching a unified
or commonly accepted definition of sympathy in Chapter 2, I state that this project is set
to address six questions. Let us take a look at the questions again:
Q 1: What is sympathy?
Q 2: What is the Primitive Form of Sympathy? What characteristics does it
possess?
Q 3: What is the Mature Form of Sympathy?
Q 4: What are the ways to cultivate PFS into MFS?
Q5: Is MFS attainable?
Q6: What is the role of sympathy in morality?
In Chapter 2 and 3, I have answered Q1 by defining and describing sympathy as
having four components: the cognitive component of perceiving others in distress, the
bodily visceral response of perceiving the distress, the motivational component of aiding
Patricia Churchland, Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality (Princeton University
Press, 2011). Churchland offers a thoughtful discussion on the relation between oxytocin and the
development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality.
42
177
the victim, and the feeling of the emotion. Based on Mencius 2A6, I analyze the natural
and uncultivated form of sympathy—the primitive form of sympathy. I propose a
Mencian perceptive-affective-motivational triplet as a fundamental part of sympathy, and
then use a Russian doll model to help illustrate sympathy. In this model, sympathy
contains not only the triplet as the doll’s inner core but also the higher cognitive thinking
process as the outer layers. Making use of this Russian doll model, I discuss several
features of the primitive form of sympathy such as its spontaneity and altruistic nature in
Chapter 3, thus answering Q2. In Chapter 4, I address Q3 through Q5, and outline a
promising blueprint for the cultivation of sympathy. While stressing sympathy’s potential
in being cultivated into its mature form, I also warn against some of the conditions that
are detrimental to cultivation, such as the lack of consistency and having a bad
environment. I then devote Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to a discussion on Q6: what is
sympathy’s role in morality? Through questioning Prinz’s two controversial claims that
empathy and other fellow feelings are not important for morality [i.e. not a good moral
emotion, not a good moral guide, ill-advised to be placed in the center of morality, should
play marginal roles, etc.], I further establish sympathy’s important value and function in
morality. This project thus offers a comprehensive study of sympathy and its
characteristics in both its natural, primitive form and its mature, cultivated counterpart.
Making use of empirical studies and early Confucian philosophy, this project addresses
inquiries in moral psychology regarding moral emotions, and gives us insights into
questions unique to the ethos of this era.
The contribution of this project is not limited to sympathy. Using sympathy as an
example, my study also offers insights into the nature of all moral emotions and their
178
cultivation. Be it sympathy, gratitude, anger, disgust, or shame, they demand a dynamic
rather than static perspective. Instead of viewing the emotions as an unchanging part of
our nature, or as a threat to rationality and autonomy, we should instead see them as
“beginnings” or “sprouts” that are malleable in both reality and moral theories. Ethical
theories, on the other hand, should be informed by the nature and trajectories of these
beginnings—the psychological reality of moral emotions.
179
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, 1962.
Biography
Jing Hu is born and raised near the Yangtze River, in Wuhan, China. She attended
Wuhan University, where she was active in the debate team, and was awarded the First
Prize of Scholarship twice, and then the Second Prize of Scholarship once. Graduating in
June 2006 with a bachelor’s degree in philosophy, she went on to the Chinese University
of Hong Kong to pursue her M.Phil. degree in philosophy, she was fully funded by the
Hong Kong government fellowship. She worked with Kwong-loi Shun closely during her
time in Hong Kong and produced a master’s thesis on shame and its implication in East
Asian philosophy.
After defending the master’s thesis in Aug. 2008, she came to
Durham, NC for her doctorate studies at Duke University on Duke’s graduate fellowship
and James B. Duke scholarship. She works closely with David Wong and Owen Flanagan
at Duke on sympathy and the Confucian perspective on sympathy.
187