proceedings of the aristotelian society
Kant on the Ethics of Belief
alix cohen (edinburgh)
D r a f t
P a p e r
2013 - 2014 | issue no. 111 | volume cxiv
proceedings of the aristotelian society
135th session
issue no. 111
volume cxiv
2013 - 2014
kant on the ethics of belief
alix cohen
university of edinburgh
m o n d a y, 2 j u n e 2 0 1 4
17.30 - 19.15
the woburn suite
senate house
university of london
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london wc1e 7hu
united kingdom
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biography
Before joining the University of Edinburgh as Chancellor’s Fellow in January 2014, Alix
Cohen taught at the universities of York and Leeds, having previously held a Junior
Research Fellowship at Newnham College, Cambridge. She is the author of Kant and
the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History (Palgrave, 2009) and has
published papers on Kant as well as Hume and Rousseau. She is currently editing Kant’s
Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide (CUP, 2014) and Kant on Emotion and
Value (Palgrave, 2014). Alix is also Associate Editor of the British Journal for the History
of Philosophy and the Oxford Bibliography Online (OUP), and Executive Member of
the British Society for the History of Philosophy and the UK Kant Society.
editorial note
The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author’s
permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Issue No. 3, Volume CXIV (2014). Please visit the Society’s website for subscription
information: www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk.
kant on the ethics of belief1
alix cohen
This paper will explore the possibility of developing a
Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the
toolbox provided by Kant’s ethics. To do so, I will begin by
showing that contrary to what is often assumed, autonomy is
not just the remit of practical reason. I will then discuss
whether Kant’s universalisability test is applicable to the
domain of epistemic deliberation. I will conclude that it is
not only possible, it also produces results that are compatible
with Kant’s epistemic positions, as I will show in the case of
evidentialism and moral faith. Finally, I will suggest that the
epistemic version of the universalisability test I have
delineated also produces unexpected results, and that these
results have the potential to form the basis of fresh Kantian
answers to contemporary questions, as I will show in the
case of testimony.
ACCORDING to Kant, we are responsible for, and can be blamed for,
our beliefs.
We can of course blame someone who has given approval to a
false cognition, namely, when the responsibility actually lies
with him for rejecting those grounds that could have
convinced him of the object of the cognition he has, and could
have freed him from his error. (LL 126 [24:160])2
In line with many contemporary philosophers, Kant treats as
obvious the fact that we are epistemically responsible and yet denies the
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1
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloque of the Université de
Neuchâtel. I would like to thank all the participants for a very stimulating discussion.
Insofar as the following works by Kant are cited frequently, I have used the following
abbreviations: LL (Lectures on Logic), LA (Lectures on Anthropology), G
(Groundwork), A (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View), CPR (Critique of
Pure Reason), CPrR (Critique of Practical Reason), CJ (Critique of the Power of
Judgment), MM (Metaphysics of Morals), CF (Conflict of Faculties), WOT (What
Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?), WE (What is Enlightenment?),
2
See also ‘when one judges and accepts something before investigation, with the
resolve not to undertake any closer investigation concerning the whole thing, but
rather to rest completely content with it, then this is in fact a punishable prejudice’
(LL 130 [24:165]).
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kant on the ethics of belief
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possibility of a direct influence of the will on our beliefs:3 ‘The will does
not have any influence immediately on holding-to-be-true; this would
be quite absurd’ (LL 577 [9:74]). Although much if not all of our beliefs
are beyond the realm of direct voluntary control, he allows for an
indirect form of influence of the will on judgment. Whether we are right
or wrong, whether our beliefs are justified or unjustified, we are
responsible for them because we have the capacity to direct our
cognition according to rules.
But I will not defend this claim today.4 Instead, I will draw its
implications for a Kantian account of the ethics of belief, and in
particular the idea that the most fruitful analogy is not between belief
and action, as is often claimed, but between moral and epistemic
principles.5 To do so, I will explore the possibility of developing a
Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the toolbox
provided by Kant’s ethics. This paper is thus in many ways
programmatic. Eventually, I hope to be in a position to examine
whether such an account can provide plausible, Kantian answers to
certain debates in contemporary epistemology. But in the meantime, I
will reconstruct epistemic concepts and arguments on the model of their
ethical counterparts: the notions of epistemic autonomy, epistemic
principle, epistemic maxim, epistemically permissible, and epistemic
universalisability test.
i. the principles of thinking
On the Kantian picture, we are always the agents of our cognition, even
when it does not seem to be the case, for our capacity for rational
agency underlies all our cognitive activity: ‘the power to judge
autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles of thought in
general) – is called reason.’ (CF 255 [7:27]) Thus contrary to what is
often assumed, autonomy is not just the remit of practical reason. To
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3
See for instance Shah (2002): 436. For traditional arguments against doxastic
voluntarism, see Williams (1973).
4
I have already defended this claim in Cohen (2013).
5
For instance, as Audi writes, ‘Belief is profoundly analogous to action. Both are
commonly grounded in reasons; both are a basis for praising or blaming the subject;
both are sensitive to changes in one’s environment; both can appropriately be
described as objects of decision and deliberation, and beliefs can appear quite actionlike when conceived as formed by assent or by acceptance’ (Audi (2001): 93).
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understand this claim, let’s turn briefly to Kant’s argument for moral
autonomy.
Kant argues that all competing ethical theories are wrong because
they share a common premise: they define what is morally acceptable
on the basis of what agents (supposedly) want, and prescribe what they
should do if they want it to obtain, whether it is happiness, maximum
utility, or something else. By relying on agents’ desires in one form or
another, these theories defend what Kant calls heteronomous accounts
of moral value – the good is agent-relative, subjective, and contingent.
They prescribe that “If I want my action to be right, then I should
ground it on X”, with X taking the place of whichever value they put
forward. By contrast, Kant’s moral law is of the form ‘You ought to X’.
No ‘if’, no ‘then’. Autonomy as the source of moral value is defined in
terms of what all agents can will as a universal law. It prescribes for
everyone, equally and necessarily, irrespective of their desires.
On my interpretation, the same conception of autonomy applies to
the epistemic realm. Competing epistemic theories are wrong because
they make the same mistake: they assign an unconditional value to a
heteronomous conception of truth – whether it is what is supported by
evidence, what is useful, what the community believes or what god tells
me. They prescribe that ‘If I want my belief to be true, then I should
ground it on X’, with X taking the place of whichever value they put
forward. By contrast, Kant’s epistemic principles are of the form ‘You
ought to X’. No ‘if’, no ‘then’. They command to all, in the same way,
and in all cases: ‘thinking according to a commonly ruling maxim […]
is only using your own reason as the supreme touchstone of truth’ (LA
521 [25:1481]). In the case of epistemic norms as well as moral norms,
the only authority that can, and ought to, be shared by others, and in
fact by all others, is the authority of reason.
freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no
laws except those which it gives itself; […] if reason will not
subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has to bow under the
yoke of laws given by another (WOT 16 [8:145]).
Just as we act autonomously if we act on the moral principles we give
ourselves, we believe autonomously if we believe on the basis of the
epistemic principles we give ourselves.
From reason’s autonomy in thinking can be deduced three epistemic
principles that Kant groups under the term sensus communis: ‘1.
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Thinking for oneself. 2. Thinking in the place of another. 3. Always
thinking in agreement with oneself.’ (LA 520 [25:1480]) These are the
principles according to which we ought to form our beliefs. They guide
our thoughts, or to use the title of one of Kant’s essays, they orient
ourselves in thinking. Thus, following them amounts to acknowledging
the normative requirements of cognition. On the one hand, whatever I
believe ought to be guided by the appropriate epistemic principles. And
on the other hand, holding a particular belief is only justified if we see
epistemic norms as binding.
Crucially, as shown in Table 1, each of the principles of the sensus
communis is the epistemic equivalent of one of the three formulations
of the moral law. The maxim to think for oneself corresponds to the
formula of the law of nature. For, they both reject heteronomy and
command that we act or believe on sharable, universalisable principles
rather than private, subjective ones. The maxim to think oneself in the
position of everyone else corresponds to the formula of humanity. For,
they both prescribe that I ought to take others into consideration as
rational beings, whether morally or epistemically.6 Finally, the maxim
to always think consistently corresponds to the formula of the realm of
ends. For, they both demand systematicity in the form as well as the
content of our beliefs and our actions so as to allow the possibility of a
realm of ends.
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6
Through this principle, he ‘sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions
of the judgment […] and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint
(which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others).’ (CJ
175 [5:295])
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Table 1. Moral vs. epistemic principles
Moral principle7
Epistemic principle8
Formula of the law of nature
Formula of enlightened thought
(FLN/FUL)
(Think for oneself)
Formula of humanity
Formula of extended thought
(FH)
(Think in the position of everyone
else)
Formula of the realm of end
Formula of coherent thought
(FRE/FA)
(Think consistently)
The fact that our epistemic and moral principles are formally
equivalent is decisive because it shows that they are expressions of the
same normative power, reason. Thereby, it also substantiates Kant’s
cryptic remarks on ‘the unity of practical with speculative reason in a
common principle’ (G 46 [4:391]).9 From reason’s common principle,
the single supreme source of normativity, derive both epistemic and
moral normativity, moral norms in the case of the principles that guide
our will, and epistemic norms in the case of the principles that guide
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7
Here are three of the formulations from the Groundwork: (FUL) ‘Act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law’ (G 73 [4:421]). (FH) ‘So act that you use humanity, whether
in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means’ (G 80 [4:429]). (FRE) ‘Act in accordance with the maxims of a
member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends.’ (G 88 [4:439])
8
For formulations of the principles of the sensus communis, see LL 563 [9:57], CJ
174-5 [5:294-5] and A 308 [7:200]. For helpful discussions of the content of these
maxims, see McBay Merritt (2011): section 2, Wood (2002): 103 and O’Neill (1989):
chapters 1-2.
9
See also ‘…to attain insight into the unity of the whole rational faculty (theoretical
as well as practical) and to derive everything from one principle—the undeniable need
of human reason, which finds complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic
unity of its cognitions’ (CPrR 213 [5:91]). However, it goes beyond the remit of this
paper to defend Kant’s claim about the unity of reason. My point is merely that the
interpretation I defend in this paper seems to support it. For useful discussions of the
unity of reason, see for instance O’Neill (1989): Part I, Neiman (1994): 76-77, 12628, Nuzzo (2005): 57-sq. and Korsgaard (2008): 27–68, 100–126.
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our thought: ‘there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason,
which must be distinguished merely in its application.’ (G 46 [4:391])
If this is the case however, Kant’s account of epistemic principles
seems to be vulnerable to the same objection as his account of moral
principles. Namely, by defining cognition as a process guided by
principles, it ends up proving too much, for it entails that we believe in
an epistemically responsible way if and only if we are actually aware of
the epistemic principles that govern the acquisition of our beliefs. Yet in
many if not most cases, we do not in fact attend to the norms that guide
our cognitive endeavours and thus fail to demonstrate any such
reflective awareness. This would suggest that most of our beliefs are in
fact irresponsibly held.
Once again the analogy with moral deliberation can be useful to
address this objection. According to Kant, we do not, nor should we,
reflect on our moral principles every single time we act. Rather, we
select general principles of action that we then spontaneously apply to
the situations we find ourselves in. These principles have been reflected
upon and adopted on the basis of reasons for which we are answerable.
But once these are settled, we do not need to repeat the reflective
process every single time we act on them.10 The only requirement is that
we act from principles we have reflected upon. In this sense, whilst the
routine task of judgment is one of applying general principles to
particular cases, the moral principles we have adopted reflectively
simply play a background role in our everyday moral life.11 But instead
of entailing that we are not responsible for our everyday choices, this
account locates the primary burden of responsibility at the level of the
choice of principles rather than the level of their routine use.
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10
As Sullivan notes, ‘Many readers have been led to think that Kant claims we need to
use the Categorical Imperative in all our everyday decisions about how to act here and
now, when we generally already know in principle what is right and what is wrong. It
can be argued that Kant did know that in such decisions we simply act on the
appropriate moral principles – substantive categorical imperatives – we have already
adopted as our own policies.’ (Sullivan (1989): 56) See also O’Neill: ‘acting on a
maxim does not require explicit or conscious or complete formulation of that maxim.
Even routine or thoughtless or indecisive action is action on some maxim.’ (O’Neill
(1989): 84)
11
Note the distinction between moral principles in a background role and a moral
principles turned into habit. Only the latter are problematic: ‘virtue is not to be
defined and valued as […] a long standing habit of morally good actions acquired by
practiced. For unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually
purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, it is
neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new
temptations could bring about’ (MM 515-6 [6:383]).
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The same is true of epistemic deliberation. Kant’s account of the
role of epistemic principles does not imply that conscious reflection
upon them is necessary for the acquisition of every single belief: ‘For
common cognition it is not necessary that we be conscious of these
rules and reflect on them. If we were to do that we would lose very
much.’ (LL 15 [24:27])12 Rather, it is only necessary for complex or
uncertain beliefs – what he sometimes calls learned cognition:
If our understanding wants to have ascended to learned
cognition, then it must be conscious of its rules and use them in
accordance with reflection, because here common practice is not
enough for it. (LL 15 [24:27])
Although actual awareness of epistemic rules is not necessary for
every single belief-acquisition, it does not entail that we are not
responsible for every belief that is thereby acquired. Just as in moral
deliberation, the only requirement is that we act from the principles we
have reflected upon. On this basis, the authority we have over our
beliefs comes from our authorial role vis-à-vis the principles that guide
their acquisition. So it is not that our cognitive states are open to
deliberation as such. It is rather that when necessary, whether in a case
of learned cognition or when asked what we believe, we can, and ought
to, reflect upon our beliefs by investigating their grounds in accordance
with the epistemic principles we have adopted.
If approval does not arise immediately through the nature of the
human understanding and of human reason, then it still requires
closer direction of choice, will, wish, or in general of our free
will, toward the grounds of proof. (LL 125 [24:158])
If we chose not to do so, we should be blamed for it. But in this case, is
the blame epistemic or moral? Or to put it slightly differently, is
breaking an epistemic norm a moral violation or a mere epistemic
violation?
On the basis of Kant’s claim about the primacy of practical reason,
one may be tempted to think that his position should go along
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12
See also ‘Not all judgments require an investigation, i.e. attention to the grounds of
truth; for if they are immediately certain, e.g., between two points there can be only
one straight line, then no further mark of truth can be given for them than what they
themselves express.’ (CPR 366 [A261/B317])
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Cliffordian lines. 13 For, it would seem to entail that epistemic
normativity is a sub-category of, or grounded on, moral normativity.
And of course, it is true that epistemic and moral normativity are both
practically normative in the Kantian sense of the term: they have to do
with our capacity for self-determination, our autonomy. However, it
does not entail that epistemic norms are reducible to moral norms.
Rather, it entails that they are first and foremost rational norms. The
application of reason’s authority to a particular domain, whether we
are deliberating about what to believe or what to do, gives rise to moral
or epistemic norms. But what I take to be Kant’s point is that whatever
the domain, the source of normativity is the same, the authority of
reason. If this is correct, it should follow that the rational procedures
that apply to the moral domain ought to apply equally to the cognitive
domain. Otherwise, we need to question the idea that the same
normative power is at work.
The aim of the following section is to explore this claim by
examining whether Kant’s account of the universalisability test is
applicable to the domain of epistemic deliberation.
ii. the universalisability test of epistemic maxims
According to Kant, when an agent adopts a principle, it thereby
becomes his subjective principle of action, what he calls his maxim.
Thus a maxim formulates an agent's actual policy or intention: ‘A rule
that the subject makes his principle is called a maxim.’ (LL 473
[24:738]) Most familiar of course are our moral maxims, the maxims
that guide our actions. They are ‘the subjective principle[s] of acting
[…] the principle[s] in accordance with which the subject acts’ (G 73n
[4:421]). Less familiar are our epistemic maxims, the ‘[u]niversal rules
and conditions for avoiding error’ (LL 563 [9:57]) an agent adopts to
orient his thought. They are the subjective principles of thinking, an
agent’s epistemic strategy.14
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13
Kant claims that practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason at various
points, but in particular in CPrR 236-8 [5:119-21]. For discussions of Kant’s claim,
see for instance Neiman (1994): Chapter 3 and Korsgaard (1996): 173. Cf.
Clifford (1999).
14
See also ‘By what, however, does one recognize a sound reason? By the maxims,
when its maxims are so constituted, that its greatest use is possible by their means.’
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Famously for Kant, maxims of action are only morally permissible if
they pass a universalisability test.15 Its function is to rule out any maxim
that cannot become a universal law. In the following passage, Kant
suggests, albeit rather elusively, that epistemic maxims should also pass
a universalisability test.
To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask
oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something,
whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the
rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the
use of reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to
himself (WOT 18 [8:146n]).
Whilst this is as close as Kant gets to an epistemic universalisability test,
I will show that such a test can be reconstructed on the model of the
formula of universal law.
The formula of universal law states that ‘I ought never to act except
in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law’ (G 94 [4:402]). It is a negative procedure that establishes
whether my maxims are legitimate by determining whether they can be
willed as universal laws without generating contradictions. It consists
of two steps. First, I need to test whether my maxim leads to a
contradiction in conception: can I conceive of a world governed by it as
a law of nature? If I can’t, as in the case of breaking promises, I have
the perfect duty to refrain from acting on it: I ought to always keep my
promises. Second, I need to test whether my maxim leads to a
contradiction in the will: can I rationally will to act on it in a world
governed by it as a law of nature? If I can’t, as in the case of refusing to
help others, I have the imperfect duty to act on the opposite maxim: I
ought to help others. If my maxim passes both tests without generating
contradictions, it is morally permissible.16 By contrast with the realm of
the obligatory, permissible actions are morally neutral. They do not
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(LA 109 [25:548]) Note that this paper is not concerned with the regulative principles
of reason (for instance, the principle of systematic unity, in CPR 620-1 [A700/B729]).
They are commonly interpreted as transcendental or methodological principles
(respectively by Guyer (2000) and Grier (2001) for instance), but it has recently been
argued that they should be thought of as practical principles (Mudd (2013)). As far as
I can tell, my account is neutral on this question.
15
There is controversy surrounding the interpretation of the role of maxims in this
context. See for instance Wood (1999): 40-42, O’Neill (1989): 83-sq. and Sullivan
(1989): 47-53. However, these debates are irrelevant to my argument.
16
See in particular G 73-76 [4:421-424].
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violate any rational norm, nor do I have any positive duty to perform
them. They belong to the domain of the discretionary ends I adopt as
part of pursuing my own projects, and in particular my happiness.17
Thus, the universalisability test stipulates first what is morally
wrong (any maxim that cannot be universalised without leading to a
contradiction); second, what is morally obligatory (to refrain from
acting on any impermissible maxim and to act on the opposite maxim);
and third, what is morally permissible (to perform any action based on
a maxim that passes the universalisability test).
Now, let’s apply this model to the epistemic realm. Here is the
epistemic version of the formula of universal law: “I ought never to
believe except in such a way that my maxim should become a universal
law”.18 What does it mean for an epistemic maxim to be able to become
a universal law? To make sense of it, let’s begin by examining what it
means for an epistemic maxim not to be able to become a universal
law.
The test of universalisability excludes any epistemic maxim that
bases beliefs on subjective grounds. For, they are not sharable by all
others in principle, and thus cannot be universalised. Kant calls this
class of impermissible maxims ‘prejudice’: ‘Prejudice is a maxim of
judging objectively from subjective grounds’ (LL 473 [24:737]). 19
Typical examples of impermissible maxims of this kind are maxims of
wishful thinking:
frequently we take something to be certain merely because it
pleases us, and we take something to be uncertain merely
because it displeases or annoys us. This certainty or
uncertainty is not objective, however, but instead subjective.
(LL 157 [24:198])
Adopting as an epistemic maxim the principle ‘Take to be certain
whatever pleases me’ cannot be universalised, and thus it is
epistemically forbidden. More generally, any maxim based on the
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17
‘An action that can coexist with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that
does not accord with it is forbidden.’ (G 88 [4:439])
18
Or on the model of the alternative version of the formula of universal law: “Believe
only in accordance with that maxim that could be a universal law”.
19
Kant often notes that prejudices are of three kinds: inclination, habit and imitation
(LL 579 [9:76]). For a discussion of custom and imitation, see Munzel (1999): 223235 and McBay Merritt (2009): 992-3.
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‘subjective private conditions of judgment’ (CJ 175 [5:295]) – which
includes my desires, my idiosyncratic tendencies, my temperament, my
personal preferences, my history, but also other’s, including my priest’s,
my king’s and so on – none of these will pass the universalisability test
since by definition, it is not sharable by all others. Everything that
makes me who I am qua individual rather than qua rational cognizer
should not play an epistemic role, for the ‘objective grounds of truth
[…] are independent of the nature and interest of the subject’ (LL 574
[9:70]). By contrast, maxims that do pass the universalisability test are
maxims that can be adopted by all, at least in principle if not in
practice: they are ‘valid for the reason of every human being to take it
to be true; […] regardless of the difference among the subjects’ (CPR
685 [A820-1/B848-9]).
But this is all very abstract, so to make this account of epistemic
universalisability more concrete, let’s try the test on an actual maxim,
the maxim of evidentialism.
Evidentialist maxim (1): “I ought to base my beliefs
(fürwahrhalten) solely on the evidence that supports
them”.20
Does it pass the universalisability test? No, for the universalisation of
the evidentialist maxim (1) would rule out beliefs that are not based on
evidence and that we nevertheless want to hold – a priori propositions
such as that of mathematics or geometry for instance. I cannot possibly
will to give up a priori, non-evidential beliefs as part of my beliefsystem. Therefore, the universalisation of the evidentialist maxim 1
generates a contradiction in the will, and I can’t will that it be
universalized. So we need to reformulate the maxim in the following
way:
Evidentialist maxim (2): “I can base my beliefs on the
evidence that supports them”.
Now we seem to have the opposite problem. This maxim is obviously
permissible, but it doesn’t say much, in particular about the epistemic
situations in which it should apply and the ones in which it shouldn’t.
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20
See for instance Feldman (2004). Note that Kant’s notion of evidence includes
logical inference between evidence.
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So we need to reformulate the maxim so that it contains a clear
epistemic rule and a clear context for its application.
Evidentialist maxim (3): “I can base my a posteriori beliefs
(wissen) on the evidence that supports them”.
First, the universalisation of the evidentialist maxim (3) does not
generate a contradiction in the will, contrary to the evidentialist maxim
(1). For, it does not rule out other forms of non-evidential beliefs I want
to keep believing in (fürwahrhalten), including mathematics and
geometry. Second, its universalisation does not generate a contradiction
in conception. For, I can conceive of a world governed by it as a law of
nature. In fact, it seems that such a world would be quite a good
epistemic world. Therefore, it is permissible for me to adopt it as my
epistemic maxim since it generates no contradiction. However, this will
not do, for we want our evidentialist maxim to be an obligatory maxim
that prescribes an ‘ought’, and yet what we have so far is a mere
permissible maxim.
Evidentialist maxim (4): “I ought to base my a posteriori
beliefs (wissen) on the evidence that supports them”.
So to move from the evidentialist maxim (3) to its obligatory version
(4), we need to show that the universalisability test not only allows it,
but that moreover, it forbids any exception to it. For, if we can show
that we have a negative duty to refrain from acting on an impermissible
maxim, then we have the corresponding positive duty to adopt the
opposite positive maxim. For our evidentialist maxim to become
obligatory, we thus need to show that exceptions to it are
impermissible. So let’s discuss the case of a maxim that recommends an
exception to the evidentialist maxim (4) to see whether it is
impermissible.
Say I am in the process of determining whether I should believe that
p, an a posteriori proposition about the empirical world. As I do so, I
encounter a piece of evidence that falsifies it. If I choose to ignore this
evidence and believe p anyway because it suits my desires, I am in effect
acting under the maxim “I can ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies
a belief I desire to be true”. Yet this maxim is not universalisable, for it
refers to my inclinations, which, as subjective, differ depending on the
agent who adopts it. Therefore, first, it is not a policy that everyone can
follow. In fact, no maxim that involves holding something to be true on
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mere subjective grounds (desires, inclinations, etc.) rather than objective
grounds (evidence, proof, etc.) is universalisable for this reason.
Second, even if everyone could follow this maxim, the result would
be chaotic for science and defeat any attempt to acquire beliefs. For,
human beings are not cognitively self-sufficient, they have to rely on
epistemic cooperation and division of labour. Yet if this maxim was
universalized, they could not carry on relying on the evidence others
provide. And yet they need to since they are epistemically dependent
and their cognitive needs require the cognitive contribution of others.
Therefore, the maxim “I can ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a
belief I desire to be true” leads to a contradiction in the will: I cannot
consistently will it to be universal. So insofar as this maxim is not
universalisable, first, I have a negative duty to refrain from acting on it,
namely “I ought not ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies an a
posteriori belief I desire to be true”. And second, I have the positive
duty to adopt the opposite maxim, namely ‘I ought to take evidence
into account in cases of a posteriori beliefs’. Therefore, in the case of
the epistemic role of evidence, the test seems to give us the right kind of
results.
Of course a lot of work needs to be done to determine whether it
does so in most, if not all, cases, and unfortunately, I cannot do this
today. But as you can see in Table 2, I have spelt out what I take to be
the epistemic duties that result from the universalisation of the
principles of the sensus communis. This should give you a sense of the
potential of Kant’s account.
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Table 2. Epistemic principles and epistemic duties
Epistemic
principle
Think for oneself
Think in the
position of
everyone else
Think
consistently
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Positive duty
Negative duty
Unprejudiced
Prejudiced
(free from constraint)
(chained to constraint)
Enlightened
Superstitious
(not subject to rules of
nature)
(subject to laws of nature)
Active
Passive
(autonomous)
(heteronomous)
Broad-minded way of
thinking
Narrow-minded way of
thinking
Universal standpoint of
judgment
Subjective condition of
judgment
Extended mode of thought
Restricted mode of
thought
Coherent mode of thought
Incoherent mode of
thought
Logical way of thinking
Illogical way of thinking
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Although I would like to think that the principles spelt out in Table
2 are rather plausible, one may worry that Kant’s account is actually
unfit to provide an adequate epistemic framework. For, he famously
posits as epistemically permissible beliefs that are by his own definition
objectively insufficient. These are the Postulates of practical reason –
what is better known as his account of moral faith. We can never
‘know’ whether god exists or the soul is immortal: their existence is
neither susceptible of empirical support, nor demonstrable on a priori
ground. Believing in them does not have any objective ground, and yet
it is epistemically permissible (and of course, also morally necessary –
although there is no space to discuss this part of the argument here).21
Does it mean that Kant’s account of epistemic norms delivers
inconsistent results? For, it seems to entail that there are different
grounds for different beliefs, each with their own incompatible
standard. If this is the case, it threatens the very notion of an epistemic
universalisability test, for its intended function was precisely to provide
a universal formal procedure that applies to all beliefs, equally and
uniformly.
However, recall that as I noted at the beginning of this paper, the
maxims of reason are ‘principles of thinking’ (LA 520 [25:1480]).22
And crucially for Kant, thinking is broader than believing, and
knowledge does not exhaust the domain of cognition. For, there are
three modes of holding a proposition to be true (fürwahrhalten):
knowledge (wissen), which is both subjectively and objectively
sufficient; opinion (meinen), which is subjectively as well as objectively
insufficient; and faith (glauben), which is objectively insufficient but
subjectively sufficient (CPR 686 [A822/B850]). In other words, we only
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21
Note that beliefs in the existence of god and the immortality of the soul are
epistemically permissible but morally obligatory. However, in this paper, I am only
interested in the former. A postulate of practical reason is ‘a theoretical proposition,
though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a
priori unconditionally valid practical law’ (CPrR 238 [5:122]). It is posited on the
basis that it fulfils a need of practical reason, based on the command of duty, and
theoretical reason cannot prove its impossibility: ‘pure rational faith
(Vernunftglaubens) can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data of
reason and experience, because here the ground of holding true is merely subjective,
namely a necessary need of reason’ (WOT 13-4 [8:140-1]). See Wood (1970): 13-25
and (2002): chapter 3 for enlightening discussions of Kant’s position on moral faith.
22
See also ‘the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the way of thinking
(Denkungsart) needed to make a purposive use of it’ (CJ 175 [5:295]). In fact, it is the
aim of university education to instil students with the correct epistemic principles:
‘instruction in universities is properly this, to cultivate the capacity of reason, and to
get [students] into the habit of the method of ratiocinating, and to establish the
appropriate maxims of reason.’ (LA 107 [25:547])
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‘know’ if our belief has both subjective and objective grounds. 23
Otherwise, it is not knowledge but mere opinion or faith. And whilst it
is permissible to hold opinions, it is only qua opinions, that is to say, as
long as we acknowledge their lack of sufficient grounds. Insofar as
these modes of holding to be true set the norms of belief, Kant’s
account does entail that there are different kinds of beliefs, each with
their own standard.24 But far from being a weakness, I believe that it is
one of its strengths. For, although there are different types of grounds
for modes of believing, some objective, others subjective, they all obey
the same rational norm – they are all universalisable.
As a result, this section has argued that the application of the
universalisability test to the epistemic realm is not only possible, it
produces results that are compatible with Kant’s familiar epistemic
positions, as I have shown in the case of evidentialism and moral faith.
The final section will suggest that the epistemic version of the
universalisability test also produces unexpected results, and that these
results have the potential to form the basis of fresh Kantian answers to
contemporary questions. To support this claim, I will discuss the case of
testimony.
iii. the case of testimony
A number of commentators have argued that Kant belongs to an
individualist tradition according to which testimony has no epistemic
importance.25 For, if testimony is epistemically unreliable, it should
follow that either we have a duty not to rely on it, or we can only rely
on it if it plays a merely corroborative role. Either way on this view,
testimony is not, and should not be, a fundamental source of
knowledge. By contrast with this interpretation, I will argue that Kant’s
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23
Note that the strength of our objective grounds give rise to different degrees of
objective certainty. See Chignell (2007b) for a details account of this claim.
24
As Chignell has convincingly argued, ‘In contemporary discussions, the fundamental
attitude is assumed to be belief. For Kant (as for Locke, Leibniz, and some others in
the early modern tradition), the attitude is Fürwahrhalten —’assent’ or, literally,
‘holding-for-true.’ Assent for these writers is the genus of which most other positive
propositional attitudes (opining, having faith in, knowing, and the like) are species.
Kant doesn’t have an exact equivalent of our contemporary concept of belief, but if he
did that concept would also fit under the genus of assent.’ (Chignell (2007b): 34)
25
See for instance Schmitt’s claim that in Kant’s philosophy, ‘there is no reliance on
testimony’ (Schmitt (1987): 47).
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alix cohen
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epistemic universalisability test commits him to the opposite position.26
I will support this claim in three steps.
First, if I were to reject testimony as a source of information, I
would be unable to perform my duty of extended thought.27 For, the
duty to think oneself in the place of others requires that one ‘reflects on
his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only
determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others).’ (CJ 175
[5:295]) Yet I cannot access the standpoint of others without relying on
their testimony. Therefore, testimony is a pragmatically necessary
means to realize one of my core epistemic duties.
Second, the maxim not to rely on testimony can be thought of on
the model of the maxim not to keep our promises. When universalized,
the maxim not to keep our promises entails the disappearance of the
practice of promise making – a contradiction in conception.28 Similarly,
the universalisation of the maxim not to believe testimony would entail
the disappearance of the practice of testimony. For everyone would
eventually stop giving testimony since it would be a pointless exercise –
no one would believe it. Therefore, we have the negative duty to refrain
from not believing in testimony.
Third, the maxim not to rely on testimony can be thought of on the
model of the maxim of refusing to help others in need. The
universalisation of the maxim of refusing to assist others generates a
contradiction in the will. For, we are dependent and vulnerable beings,
and we know that we will probably need to rely on others’ help; or at
least that it is not impossible that we may need to at some point. Our
lack of self-sufficiency leads us to will that others help us if and when
we need it. Therefore, we cannot possibly will that the maxim “Refuse
to assist others in need” be universalized without being inconsistent.
Now, the universalization of the maxim ‘Do not believe testimony’
leads to the same result. For, our anthropological situation means that
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26
This is what Gelfert calls ‘a presumptive principle regarding the acceptance of
testimony’ (Gelfert (2006): 627). Whilst I agree with many of his claims, Gelfert fails
to relate what he takes to be Kant’s argument for testimony to the universalisability
test as the ground of our epistemic duties. Moreover, he seems to suggest that failure
to believe testimony is a moral failure (‘a lack of moral character’) whilst I argue that
it is rather an epistemic violation (Gelfert (2006): 649).
27
This is what Kant calls the maxim of incredulity: ‘To be incredulous means to stick
to the maxim not to believe testimony at all’ (CJ 336 [5:472]).
28
See G 57, 74 [4:403, 422].
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alix cohen
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we are epistemically dependent: not only do we need epistemic
cooperation, we naturally desire to communicate our thoughts.
There lies in our nature a certain inclination to communicate
our opinion to others […] This inclination does not arise from
vanity at all but rather from human reason's particular and
excellent disposition to communicate. (LL 140-1 [24:178])
Yet universalizing the maxim against testimony would generate a world
in which others would stop believing our own testimony, which we
cannot possibly will since we have a desire to communicate our
thoughts. Moreover, we cannot will that others believe our testimony
and at the same time that we ought not believe theirs without being
inconsistent. Therefore, since the maxim ‘Do not believe testimony’ fails
the contradiction in the will test, we have the imperfect duty to believe
testimony – although of course Kant notes that we should only do so in
the absence of defeating conditions.29
As a result, Kant’s argument for the epistemic role of testimony is
not merely that it is ineliminable given the kind of cognitive creatures
we are. Rather, it is a threefold: first, we need it; second, we ought to
refrain from not believing it; and third, we ought to believe it.
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29
Far from recommending credulity, the maxim that commands to believe testimony
is one of innocence until proven guilty. As Kant writes, ‘As for other things that
concern the credibility and honorability of witnesses who make assertions about
experiences they have obtained, everyone is taken to be honorable and upright until
the opposite has been proved, namely, that he deviates from the truth.’ (LL 196
[24:246]) For an insightful parallel between trust and testimony, see Gelfert
(2006): 634-5, 647. Moreover, as Gelfert notes, belief based on testimony is just as
good as belief based on experience, although just as with the epistemic role of
evidence, the legitimacy of testimony is limited to certain domains – in this case,
empirical certainty. With regards to a priori certainty, since reason can do so by
relying on its own operations, testimony is not only unnecessary, we have a positive
duty to do it ourselves: ‘When cognition has its ground of proof in nothing but
reason, however, but does not take it from experience, then the testimony of others
cannot be a ground of conduct’ (LL 320 [24:870]).
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conclusion
To conclude. My aim today was to explore the possibility of a Kantian
account of the ethics of belief by deploying the toolbox provided by
Kant’s ethics. Although much of it is still programmatic, I hope to have
shown that the account I have delineated is not only plausible from the
perspective of Kant scholarship, it has the potential to contribute
beyond it to current debates in the ethics of belief.
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences
University of Edinburgh
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3 Charles Street
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