– 1 –
Love in a Time of Cholera
Thabo Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
[December 2008]
In his book Diplomacy, Dr Henry Kissinger discusses the place of the issue
of human rights in the East–West struggle during the Cold War. He writes
that: ‘Reagan and his advisers invoked (human rights) to try to under­mine
the Soviet system.’ … It is clear that some within Zim­babwe and elsewhere
in the world, including our country, are following the example set by
‘Reagan and his advisers’, to ‘treat human rights as a tool’ for overthrowing
the government of Zimbabwe and rebuilding Zimbabwe as they wish. In
modern parlance, this is called regime change.
Thabo Mbeki, open letter to the ANC, December 2003.1
Realistically, Zimbabwe will never share the same neighbourhood with the
countries of Western Europe and North America, and therefore secure its
success on the basis of friendship with these … It may be that, for whatever
reason, you [Tsvangirai] consider our region and contin­ent as being of little
consequence for the future of Zimbabwe, believing that others further away,
in Western Europe and North America are of greater importance.
Thabo Mbeki, letter to Morgan Tsvangirai, November, 2008.2
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has long been suspicious of
any claim by Thabo Mbeki to be an honest broker in the Zimbabwe crisis,
having raised concerns in this regard from the moment South Africa showed
itself willing to endorse the fraudulent elections of 2000.3 Recently, calls by the
MDC for Mbeki to recuse himself as a facilitator to an accord between the
1 ‘We will resist the upside-down view of Africa’, ANC Today, 3(49), 12–18 Dec. 2003, <http://
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2003/at49.htm>.
2 ‘Mbeki and MDC’s explosive exchange’, The Star, 28 Nov. 2008, <http://www.iol.co.za/index.
php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=vn20081128052242195C129532&singlepage=1>.
3 James Myburgh, ‘No change in ANC Zimbabwe policy’, MoneyWeb, 5 Apr. 2007, <http://
www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page292686?oid=84771&sn=2009+Detail&pid=292676>.
1
Chapter One
parties have grown louder.4 Given the track record of the Mbeki administration
towards Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, it is moot that Mbeki should have
been allowed to occupy the position of facilitator at all.
Three clear policy determinations have characterized the Mbeki administra­
tion’s approach to Zimbabwe:
•The policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’, the hallmark of which was a
refusal to address and, by extension, to condemn, human rights
abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Mugabe
regime and its supporters, no matter how egregious.5 In terms
of this policy the strongest criticism ever levelled by the Mbeki
admin­istration in relation to human rights abuses has been to
call on ‘all parties’ to refrain from violence even when there is
clear docu­menta­tion showing that the violence is perpetrated
almost exclusively by ZANU(PF) supporters. This approach
reached its most bizarre point when the call for ‘all parties’ to
refrain from violence was repeated after the MDC leader, Morgan
Tsvangirai, along with several supporters, was brutally beaten in
police custody on 11 March 2007 and images of his injuries and
those of others were broadcast around the world.
•The policy of blocking any criticism or proposed actions against
Zimbabwe in international forums. This policy was articulated in
the Mbeki administration’s refrain that Zimbabwe issue must be
resolved ‘by Zimbabweans’.
•The policy of deflecting pressure for action on Zimbabwe by
claiming that talks or negotiations between the contesting parties
in Zimbabwe are in progress and alternative or supplementary
action is not necessary while these talks are under way.6
An overview of Mbeki’s and his administration’s policies since 2000 illustrate
this quite clearly.
In 2000, ZANU(PF)’s seemingly immutable, yet complacent, hold on power
was shaken when a government-sponsored new constitution for Zimbabwe was
4 ‘Mbeki urged to step down as Zimbabwe talks collapse’, SW Radio Africa, 20 Jan. 2009,
<http://www.swradioafrica.com/news200109/mbeki200109.htm>.
5 Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is quoted as stating that ‘the world would never
hear one word of criticism of Zimbabwe “as long as this [African National Congress] government
is in power”. ’ Tony Leon, ‘Depressing consistency in Mbeki’s stance on Mugabe’, Business Day,
29 Apr. 2008, <https://africanpress.wordpress.com/2008/05/03/zimbabwe-depressing-consistencyin-mbekis-stance-on-mugabe-opinion>.
6 This policy has been noted by others – see, for example, ‘Road Map to Democracy in Zim­
babwe’, speech by Tony Leon MP, Leader of the Democratic Alliance, at the South African
Institute of International Affairs Johannesburg, 2 Dec. 2003, <http://www.polity.org.za/article/
leon-roadmap-to-democracy-in-zimbabwe-02122003-2003-12-02>.
2
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
rejected in a February referendum. Given that parliamentary elections were sched­
uled for June 2000, and that the constitutional referendum had been interpreted
more as a vote of no confidence in Mugabe’s rule, drastic action was required
by ZANU(PF) if it was to regain its previously unwavering support in rural areas.
Widespread invasions of white-owned farms began within days, accompanied
by extreme state-sponsored violence that left many farm-workers and white
farmers dead, women raped, labourers tortured, and hundreds of thousands of
workers displaced and jobless.7 The clear intention was to destroy the support
that white farmers were providing to the recently formed MDC opposi­tion and
to eliminate opposition to ZANU(PF) emanating from farm labour.8
As much of the world watched aghast while atrocities took place on the
farms, the Mbeki government implemented an economic ‘rescue package’ for
the Mugabe regime of close to R1 billion which had been announced a few
weeks earlier. This ‘rescue package’ included more than twenty joint-investment
projects in Zimbabwe that would benefit ANC-supporting Black Economic
Empower­ment partners and South Africa’s state-owned corporations, such as
the Develop­ment Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development
Corporation. Other beneficiaries were South Africa’s power and fuel giants
ESKOM and SASOL, to whom the Mugabe regime was heavily indebted.9
Opinion on Zimbabwe, particularly in relation to the land invasions, became
divided along racial lines. Some regarded Mugabe’s land policies as representing
a genuine attempt to address ‘one of the enduring legacies of colonialism’ – largescale white ownership of land. Others, and particularly governments in the West,
viewed the land invasions as a cynical ploy to maintain power by destroy­ing the
base of the opposition.10 Addressing concerns by the (largely white-supported)
South African opposition Democratic Alliance over rights abuses in Zimbabwe,
Mbeki made clear his position on the issue, stating that the ‘clamour over
7 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Politically Motivated Violence in Zimbabwe
2000–2001 (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001), <http://www.hrforumzim.
com/frames/inside_frame_reps.htm>.
8 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Injury in Addition to Insult: A Preliminary Report on
Human Rights Violations on Commercial Farms, 2000 to 2005 (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights
NGO Forum and the Justice for Agriculture Trust [JAG] in Zimbabwe, June 2007), available at
<http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/farm_seizures180607.pdf>. While other reports have
attempted to place the motivation for the land invasions more firmly in the context of land
reform – see, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Blood, land and sanctions’, The Independent,
25 Feb. 2009, <http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/column/comment/70-comment/626blood-land-and-sanctions> – interviews with over 2,000 farmers and farm-workers conducted by
the Research and Advocacy Unit in Zimbabwe suggests otherwise.
9 ‘Zimbabwe: Economic rescue package’, IRIN, 22 Feb. 2000, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.
aspx?ReportId=12436>.
10 See Dale T. McKinley, Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe
under Mbeki, March 2003, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000263/P254_McKinley.pdf>.
3
Chapter One
Zimbabwe reveals [the] continuing racial prejudice in South Africa’.11 He also
commented, ‘We are engaging this issue. We are in favour of land redistribution
in Zimbabwe. You couldn’t sustain a colonial legacy and let it be.’ 12 The violence
and chaos of the land invasions in the period 2000–2002 spilled into the electoral
process with endemic and brutal attacks on those opposed to ZANU(PF),
particularly in areas where opposition support was the strongest.
In early May 2000, in the month before the June elections, Mbeki flew to
Bulawayo. A photograph taken of him walking hand-in-hand with Mugabe on
his arrival was soon to become an all-too-familiar image of comradely partiality.13
Indeed, Mbeki’s public displays of affection for Mugabe stand in stark relief to
his careful avoidance of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. During this visit
Mbeki blamed the violence in Zimbabwe on the fact that the land question
was still ‘unresolved’. A few weeks later Mbeki travelled to the United States
where he declared that, despite the high levels of continuing violence, there
was no reason to think the elections in Zimbabwe would not be free and fair:
‘If you stand there a month before the elections and already discredit them, I
don’t think that is correct.’ 14
Despite the widespread and systemic violence and intimidation, South
Africa’s official observer missions for the parliamentary election of 2000 and
presidential election of 2002 gave both polls a clean bill of health. The observer
group of 2000, headed by Mr Tony Yengeni, former ANC Chief Whip, a man
whose integrity the South African government felt was appropriate to the task,
was dispatched to Harare. Yengeni (who was subsequently convicted of fraud in
relation to South Africa’s controversial ‘arms deal’) pronounced the elections
‘free and fair’ on the basis that the two days of voting had been marked by
‘tranquillity’.15 This finding simply ignored the months of mayhem, oppression
and violations of human rights that had preceded the voting. Back in South
Africa, the report was subsequently amended, with the finding that the election
was ‘free and fair’ replaced by the more ambiguous term ‘credible’.16
11 ‘[Letter from the President:] Clamour over Zimbabwe reveals continuing racial prejudice in SA’,
ANC Today, 1(9), 23–29 Mar. 2001, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2001/at09.htm>.
12 Questions answered by President Thabo Mbeki in the National Assembly, 26 March 2003,
Cape Town, <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/president/pqa/q0326-03a.htm>.
13 See ‘Mbeki urges end to land crisis’, BBC News, 6 May 2000, and accompanying photograph,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/737257.stm>.
14 ‘Mbeki backs Mugabe’s UK observer ban’, The Mercury, 24 May 2000, <http://www.
themercury.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=3535&fArticleId=qw959163181609B216>.
15 ‘DP slams Yengeni as “unprofessional” ’, Independent Online, 29 June 2000, <http://www.iol.
co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_%20id=13&art_id=ct20000629092243771Y525785>.
16 James Myburgh, ‘The ANC’s support for Mugabe, 2000–2003’, PoliticsWeb, 10 July 2008, <http://
www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=93869&sn=Detail>.
4
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
A similar approach was taken by Dr Sam Motsuenyane, who headed the
South African government’s observer mission for the 2002 presidential election.
The report issued by this group announced that ‘the authorities charged with
conducting the elections discharged their work satisfactorily, except for the
decision to reduce the number of polling stations in some urban areas’.17 The
exception alluded to referred to the deliberate reduction of the number of polling
stations in key opposition strongholds, which made it physically impossible for
an estimated 400,000 voters (the margin by which Mugabe officially won the
election) to cast their vote in Harare alone.18 Court orders to extend the voting
times were ignored or incompletely applied, and voting regulations requiring
booths to remain open for those queuing to vote were flouted. The report
pointed out that ‘campaigning was characterised by polarisation, tension and
incidents of violence and intimidation. The intention seems to have been to
intimidate members of other parties’.19 This representation effectively glossed
over the empirical evidence that over 90 per cent of the violence was perpetrated
by ZANU(PF) supporters on opposition supporters.
The report also noted that ‘The Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for a
free press’, but failed to explain that the only independent daily newspaper (the
Daily News) had been under constant threat and harassment, which included the
bombing of its presses by government supporters. The report also ignored the
fact that the Zimbabwe government retained exclusive control over all electronic
media, of which it took full advantage to promote ZANU(PF). Motsuenyane’s
observer group nevertheless announced the elections as ‘legitimate’.20 Mbeki
had also commissioned Judges Khampepe and Moseneke to observe and report
to him on the 2002 elections. What was believed to be a scathing report issued
by them was suppressed by Mbeki, leaving the Motsuenyane report as the final
South African verdict on the fraudulent election.21
South African government observers went through the motions again
for the 2005 elections, which again clearly did not meet the basic electoral
require­ments to be considered free and fair. In the months prior to these
elections, SADC adopted a set of ‘Principles and Guidelines on Elections’
17 Interim Statement by the South African Observer Mission to the Zimbabwean Presidential
Elections of 9 and 10 March 2002, 13 Mar. 2002, para 6, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2002/
zimb1303.htm>.
18 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Human Rights and Zimbabwe’s Presidential Election:
March 2002 (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, May 2002).
19 Interim Statement, para. 7.2.1.
20 Ibid, para. 10.
21 ‘Mbeki “ignored judges” on Mugabe’s stolen poll’, Business Day, 12 May 2008, <http://www.
kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/080512bday.asp?sector=ELEC&year=2008&range_start=391>.
5
Chapter One
to guide electoral conditions and conduct amongst member states.22 Mugabe
duly played along, introducing largely cosmetic changes to the electoral pro­
cedures, which Mbeki accepted at face value. Despite the establishment of a
new electoral commission, it remained comprised of members seemingly pre­
pared to do the bidding of ZANU(PF) and Mugabe. There had also been no
significant improvement to pre-election conditions, yet Mbeki continued to
reason that all was well:
Things like an independent electoral commission, things like
access to the public media, things like the absence of violence
and intimidation – those matters have been addressed … I have
no reason to think that anybody in Zimbabwe will act in a way
that will militate against elections being free and fair.23
Mbeki’s response to the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections in Zimbabwe
was con­sistently out of kilter with most international observers. The EU had
roundly con­demned the violation of basic electoral standards and imposed
travel restrictions on senior ZANU(PF) officials in 2002.24 In the same year,
the Common­­wealth also responded by suspending Zimbabwe as a member.
Despite having been part of a three-country committee that had recommended
suspension, in March, 2002, Mbeki criticized the Commonwealth’s decision.25
Seemingly intending to relieve pressure on Mugabe, Mbeki announced he
would be facilitating meetings between ZANU(PF) and the MDC to resolve
the Zimbabwe issue.26
The following month, South Africa played a key role in blocking a condem­
natory resolution on Zimbabwe at the annual meeting of the United Nations
22 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, <http://www.sadc.int/
index/print/page/117>.
23 Quoted in ‘Sokwanele’s response to statements made by President Mbeki’, 4 Mar. 2005,
<http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/sokwanelesresponsetombekiscomments_4marc
h2005.html>. See also ‘Mbeki opens his mouth and puts both feet in it to defend Zimbabwe
polls’, Cape Times, 4 Mar. 2005, <http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=2434330>.
24 ‘EU agrees Zimbabwe sanctions’, BBC News, 18 Feb. 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/1827827.stm>.
25 ‘C’wealth officials meet Obasanjo over SA U-turn’, Daily News, 27 Mar. 2003, available at
<http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar27b_2003.html>; and see ‘Shock at Mbeki’s “offensive”
Zimbabwe comments’, Sunday Independent, 14 Dec. 2003, available at <http://www.afrika.no/
Detailed/4519.html>.
26 Patrick Bond, African Development/Governance, South African Subimperialism and Nepad.
Paper presented at the International Conference on ‘The Agrarian Constraint and Poverty Reduc­
tion: Macroeconomic Lessons for Africa’ (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17–19 Dec. 2004), 19, <http://
www.networkideas.org/feathm/dec2004/Conference_Papers/South_African_Subimperialism_
NEPAD_PB.pdf>.
6
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR).27 In successive years, Mbeki’s
administration repeatedly introduced motions of ‘no action’ on the situ­ation
in Zimbabwe at the UNHCHR, effectively averting any formal debate on the
issue. Mbeki’s administration followed up its 2003 no-action motion by calling
for Zim­babwe’s reinstatement into the Commonwealth.28 South Africa sub­
sequently cancelled the Commonwealth’s review meeting on the issue, which
would have meant that Zimbabwe’s suspension would have lapsed.29 However,
fearing eventual renewed suspension, Mugabe unilaterally with­drew Zim­babwe
from the Commonwealth.
The Mbeki administration’s stance at the UNHCHR was echoed in other
bodies of the United Nations. At the 59th Session of the General Assembly’s
Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) in 2004, South Africa
also proposed a no-action vote on the crisis in Zimbabwe. The South African
representative criticized what he considered a double standard whereby countryspecific human-rights-based resolutions were ‘only drafted to address crises in
developing countries’, claiming that this ‘constituted an affront to the integrity
of the African political leadership’.30
In 2008, the South African government used its position (and, at one stage,
that of Chair) on the United Nations Security Council to prevent any action on
Zimbabwe. In April 2008, South Africa combined forces with China to prevent
the Zimbabwe issue from appearing on the Council’s agenda. Again, in June,
South Africa blocked debate on Zimbabwe’s political situation, demanding
that only the humanitarian situation be discussed. This stance was defended by
South Africa’s foreign affairs’ Chief Director for UN Issues, Xolisa Mabhongo,
who argued that Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to international peace and
security.31 Such reasoning avoided realities on the ground, including the regional
implications of the mass exodus from Zimbabwe, which was undoubtedly a
contributing factor in the xenophobic violence which erupted in South Africa
in May 2008,32 the recent spread of cholera to South Africa from Zimbabwe
27 Tom Lodge, Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of South Africa in Africa, 5,
<http://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/paper1373299325.pdf>.
28 ‘Commonwealth split by “Zimbabwe problem” ’, New York Times, 9 Dec. 2003.
29 ‘Commonwealth “to re-admit” Zimbabwe’, BBC News, 10 Feb. 2003, <http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/2743743.stm>.
30 ‘Concluding current session, Third Committee decides to take no action on human rights
situations in Sudan, Zimbabwe’, Press Release, GA/SHC/3811, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2004/gashc3811.doc.htm>.
31 ‘Notes following UN Security Council Briefing by Mr Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director:
United Nations, Union Buildings, Pretoria, Tuesday 10 June 2008’, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/
speeches/2008/mabh0611.html>.
32 ‘South Africa’s hard truths’, The Guardian, 19 May 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/may/19/southafricashardthruths>.
7
Chapter One
on account of a collapsed water and sewage-reticulation system,33 and the
Zimbabwe government’s claims in November 2008 that MDC activists were
receiving military training in Botswana for cross-border insurgency.34 In July
2008, South Africa again adopted this stance by lobbying Russia and China
to exercise a veto against a resolution which would have imposed an arms em­
bargo on Zimbabwe and sanctions on Mugabe and eleven of his supporters.
South Africa argued that sanctions were inappropriate at a time that it was
facil­it­ating negotiations between ZANU(PF) and the MDC.35
Mbeki’s approach thus provided protection for Mugabe in international
forums, including during meetings of the African Union. In 2002, the African
Union’s (AU) Commission on Human and People’s Rights undertook a factfinding mission to Zimbabwe to investigate allegations of human rights abuses.
The Commission’s team found evidence of ‘political violence ... torture ... and
arbitrary arrest ... of opposition members of parliament and human rights
lawyers’.36 The report was formally adopted by the AU in January 2005. In
May of that year, Mugabe’s government embarked on what it called Operation
Muramba­tsvina. This ‘operation’, under the guise of ‘urban renewal’, resulted in
the demolition of thousands of homes and the displacement of an estimated
700,000 people, predominantly the urban poor considered politically volatile.
These actions prompted stinging criticism from the UN Special Envoy on
Human Settlement Issues, whose report roundly condemned the actions of
the Zimbabwe government in relation to the operation.37 The South African
govern­ment remained silent.
As a result, in 2006, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
proposed a resolution on the crisis in Zimbabwe, condemning ‘the human rights
violations currently being perpetrated [there]’. This strongly worded statement
was based on its own report from the 2002 mission and the UN Report on
Operation Murambatsvina. South Africa had stepped up to defend Zimbabwe
33 Health in Ruins: A Man-Made Disaster in Zimbabwe (Cambridge, MA: Physicians for Human
Rights, 2009), <http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/2009-zimbabwehealth-report-summary.pdf>.
34 ‘Zimbabwe accuses Botswana of training insurgents’, Reuters, 15 Dec. 2008, <http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSL1373625>.
35 ‘Security Council fails to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe leadership as two permanent
members cast negative votes’, Security Council SC/9396, 11 July 2008, <http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2008/sc9396.doc.htm>.
36 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Executive Summary of the Report of
the Fact-finding Mission to Zimbabwe, 24th to 28th June 2002, para. 3, <http://www.achpr.org/
english/Mission_reports/Zimbabwe/factfinding%20mission%20to%20Zimbabwe.pdf>.
37 See, generally, United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the
Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements
Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka (UN, 2005), <http://ww2.unhabitat.org/
documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf>.
8
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
by preventing any discussion of the proposed resolution. Despite the fact that
the Zimbabwe government had been in possession of the Commission’s report
for over two years, South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Dhlamini Zuma,
supported Zimbabwe’s (false) claim that it ‘had not had time to respond’ to the
Commission’s report, and supported other spurious procedural objections to
the discussion of the resolution.38 Zimbabwean Information Minister Jonathan
Moyo’s accusation that the opposition MDC had ‘smuggled’ the report on to
the AU agenda at the behest of British Prime Minister Tony Blair also met with
no objections from Pretoria.39
International efforts to isolate Mugabe and his close associates through
travel and financial sanctions have been consistently opposed by Mbeki, who
has called for the sanctions to be lifted and undermined the effectiveness of the
travel ban. This was most prominent during arrangements to convene the EUACP (European Union – African Caribbean and Pacific) summits, most recently
by Portugal in December 2007. South Africa supported the call by African states
to boycott the summit, as it had done successfully during the aborted 2003
summit, unless Mugabe was permitted to attend.40 In the same year, in the face
of EU objections, Francis Nhema, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Environ­ment and
Tourism, was nominated to chair the United Nations Commission on Sustain­
able Development, a somewhat ironic nomination in view of Zimbabwe’s eco­
nomic collapse. Zimbabwe’s ambassador to the UN responded to the EU’s
objections by asking, ‘What has sustainable development got to do with human
rights?’ South Africa supported the eventually successful nomination.41
South African intelligence services and defence forces have maintained a
close relationship with their Zimbabwean counterparts during Mbeki’s presid­
ency. In June 2006, Zimbabweans were treated to film footage of South Africa’s
Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, hugging Zimbabwean State Security
Minister, Didymus Mutasa, during a visit to Zimbabwe to discuss ‘undisclosed’
issues.42 Only weeks before the meeting, Mutasa had been directly implicated in
intra-party violence in his home area of Rusape.43
38 ‘How SA backed Zim lie’, Mail and Guardian, 9 July 2004, available at <http://www.zwnews.
com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=9638>.
39 ‘Opposition is “selling out” Zimbabwe, Mail and Guardian, 7 July 2004, available at <http://
www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/040707mg.asp?sector=hr&year=2004&range_start=121>.
40 ‘Africa–EU summit: The Zimbabwe factor’, Sunday Mail, 18 Nov. 2007, available at <http://
panafricannews.blogspot.com/2007/11/africa-eu-summit-zimbabwe-factor.html>.
41 ‘UN “green” boss destroys Zim farm’, Sunday Independent, 13 May 2007, <http://www.iol.co.za/
index.php?sf=15&set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=vn20070513084109894C588733&singlepage=1>.
42 ‘Mbeki responds to pressure on Zimbabwe crisis’, SW Radio Africa, 9 June 2006, <http://www.
swradioafrica.com/news090606/Kasrils090606.htm>.
43 ‘Mutasa men’s murder trial slated for July’, Zimbabwe Independent, 30 June 2006, <http://
www.theindependent.co.zw/local/11026.html>.
9
Chapter One
Since 2004, armaments to the value of more than $237,401 (R3.3 million)
were quietly transferred from South Africa to Zimbabwe. Trade records show
that in 2004 South Africa exported about 2.6 tonnes of revolvers, 2.5 tonnes
of other firearms, between 4 and 7.5 tonnes of cartridges and what appear to
be parts for military vehicles to Zimbabwe.44 All of this equipment was vital
for the continuance of Mugabe’s repression of the opposition by members of
the army and police. The South African defence department donated Dakota
aircraft engines worth millions to Zimbabwe, while South Africa’s Armscor
trans­ferred spares to get Zimbabwean military helicopters flying again. Zim­
babwean soldiers and flying instructors have been trained by the South African
National Defence Force and the South African Air Force. The flow of arms to
Zimbabwe required approval by the South African government’s National Con­
ventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), headed by Sydney Mufamadi
(subsequently appointed by Mbeki as a key figure in the negotiations between
ZANU(PF) and the MDC). The Committee has failed to reveal detail on arms
sales since 2005, despite legal obligations to do so.45 The extent of the supply
of arms to Zimbabwe from South Africa was highlighted in April 2008, when
Armscor was contracted to transport weaponry destined for Zimbabwe and
carried by Chinese freighter, the An Yue Jiang, from Durban port to Harare.
The arms were due to arrive in Zimbabwe as the Mugabe regime was putting
into place arrangements, co-ordinated by select members of the military, for
a bloody suppression of the electorate to ensure ‘victory’ in the presidential
run-off election. NCACC policy prohibits the flow of arms from South Africa
to conflict zones. Despite this policy, Mbeki and Mufamadi insisted that the
delivery be allowed. Only action by human rights NGOs in South Africa
stopped the consignment from arriving in Zimbabwe.46
Throughout the 2000 to 2008 period, Mbeki has sought to deflect criticism
from his policy towards Zimbabwe. In October 2006, following what was be­
lieved by some commentators to be an ANC directive, the government-owned
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) banned critics of Mugabe,
and of Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policy, from SABC, including President Mbeki’s
brother, Moeletsi, Zimbabwean Archbishop Pius Ncube, Mail and Guardian
owner Trevor Ncube, and Eleanor Sisulu.47 Editorial policy – marked by a
44 ‘SA arms flow to Zimbabwe’, Mail & Guardian Online, 27 June 2008, <http://www.mg.co.za/
article/2008-06-27-sa-arms-flow-to-zimbabwe>.
45 ‘Is South Africa selling weapons to Zimbabwe?’, Sokwanele, <http://www.sokwanele.com/
thisiszimbabwe/archives/1154>.
46 ‘Sent sailing: How SA legal experts fought off arms ship’, Legalbrief Today, 14 May 2008,
<http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story=20080514164912609>.
47 ‘Prominent Zimbabweans barred from speaking on SABC’, SW Radio Africa, 13 Oct. 2006,
<http://www.swradioafrica.com/news131006/sabc131006.htm>.
10
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
fawning interview with Mugabe by Snuki Zikalala, the SABC’s head of news
and current affairs, following the 2005 elections – gave support to Mugabe and
Mbeki’s policies. In addition Mbeki deflected criticism by a repeated refrain
that negotiations ‘are in progress’ between the MDC and ZANU(PF) and that
he was engaged in dialogue with Mugabe.
The manner in which these assurances were expressed to Mbeki’s ANC
party did not inspire confidence. Addressing the ANC’s 51st National Confer­
ence in 2002 (in Stellenbosch, at which ZANU(PF)’s Emmerson Mnangagwa
was a formal guest), he declared: ‘We are ready to engage both our ally and
fellow liberation movement, ZANU(PF), and all others concerned, to help
resolve the various issues in a constructive manner.’ 48 This blatant partisan­
ship in relation to Mugabe was recently repeated in October 2008 in a letter
from Mbeki to the new President of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, where he sought
to justify his policies while in office. In that letter he proudly refers to Robert
Mugabe as one of several leaders with whom he has been ‘privileged to
interact’ and who is one of the ‘titans’ who ‘were and are the true heroines
and heroes of our struggle’.49
As mentioned above, the claim that negotiations were in progress played
a key role in defeating a UN Security Council resolution for sanctions upon
Mugabe and eleven of his close associates. Having initially suggested that they
would vote with the other countries which held a veto power, Russia and
China vetoed the resolution after lobbying by South Africa.50 This is but one
of numerous in­stances where Mbeki used the excuse of ongoing negotiations
to defer action on Zimbabwe, the claim being deployed whenever pressure was
increased on either himself or Mugabe in relation to the Zimbabwe crisis. To
cite but a few of many examples in addition to those already mentioned above:
at the World Economic Forum in Durban in June 2003, President Mbeki
predicted that a solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe would be found within a
year.51 And in July 2003, when George Bush visited South Africa and the press
speculated that Bush would use the occasion to apply pressure on Mbeki to
resolve the Zimbabwe issue, Mbeki claimed: ‘We have urged the government
and the opposition to get together. They are indeed discussing all issues. That
process is going on.’ 52 This was despite strong denials from the MDC that any
48 ‘ANC cheers for Mugabe regime’, The Telegraph, 18 Dec. 2002, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
expat/expatfeedback/4184987/ANC-cheers-for-Mugabe-regime.html>.
49 ‘Mbeki writes letter to Zuma’, Daily News, 2 Nov. 2008.
50 ‘Russia, China veto UN sanctions on Mugabe’, allAfrica.com, 12 July 2008, <http://allafrica.
com/stories/200807120002.html>.
51 See ‘Road Map to Democracy in Zimbabwe’, speech by Tony Leon (fn. 6).
52 Ibid.
11
Chapter One
such dialogue was in fact in progress.53 Undeterred, and foreclosing debate on
Zimbabwe, Mbeki reportedly gave Bush an assurance that Mugabe would leave
office by December that year.54
This, then, is the backdrop to the events of 2008, when Mbeki’s role as a
mediator became that much more significant.
One of the few positive results that emerged from Mbeki’s interaction with
Mugabe appears to have been to persuade Mugabe that a way out of the isolation
of his regime was to hold elections that had a semblance of compliance with
democratic norms. However, even this positive development is not untainted.
In late 2007, Mbeki persuaded the MDC to accept a constitutional change,
which was a key part of Mugabe’s strategy and one which allowed parliament
to appoint a new president pending elections if the incumbent (i.e. Mugabe)
left office for any reason.55 Mbeki assured the MDC that the quid pro quo
would be an easing by Mugabe of repressive laws affecting elections.56 When
Mugabe never delivered on this undertaking, Mbeki did nothing.
ZANU(PF) having won a two-thirds majority in parliament in 2005, both
Mbeki and Mugabe believed that Mugabe could secure victory in the March
2008 elections without engaging in the violence that had characterized the 2000
and 2002 elections or fully utilizing the unrepealed and repressive laws which
ought to have been amended as part of the quid pro quo. Both were mistaken.
Although the March 2008 ‘harmonized’ elections (in which the presidential,
Senate, House of Assembly and local-government elections were held simul­
taneously) were a long way from fair (owing to ZANU(PF)’s manipulation of
the voters’ roll, control over the electronic and printed media, and use of state
resources, particularly food handouts, for party-political purposes), they were
certainly the closest to free and fair elections since the crisis began. The combined
MDCs took 109 of 210 House of Assembly seats against ZANU(PF)’s 97. The
elected seats in the Senate split 50–50. Although the results of all the elections
were known within 48 hours of the poll, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
(ZEC), eked out the results and announced them as if dealing a pack of cards,
with one seat declared won by the MDC, the next by ZANU(PF).
53 ‘Zimbabwe’s MDC opposition denies dialogue with ruling ZANU-PF’, VOANews, 9 July 2003,
<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2003-07-09-44-Zimbabwe-s-66322892.html>.
54 ‘Zimbabwe, a thorn in the side of Africa’, Inter Press Service, 22 July 2003, <http://www.
ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=19345>.
55 Accordingly, since the upper house of parliament, the Senate, contains sufficient unelected
presidential appointees to ensure a ZANU(PF) majority in the combined houses, Mugabe would
effectively be able to hand-pick his successor on retirement, and ZANU(PF) could do the same
upon Mugabe’s death. See also Chapter Eight.
56 ‘Zimbabwe: Where next for Mbeki’s mediation?’, Africa Research Institute, 1 Nov. 2007,
<http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/events-details.php?id=bfb79b059e>.
12
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
The results of the presidential election, however, were withheld. The obvious
reason was that Mugabe had lost the poll. In a context of mounting concern
regarding reports of targeted violence, Levy Mwanawasa, the Zambian president
and incumbent chair of SADC, convened an emergency summit to discuss the
refusal of ZEC to declare the presidential result.
Mbeki’s reaction to these unfolding events displayed a fundamental lack of
objectivity. He travelled to Zimbabwe on the way to the emergency summit,
greeting Mugabe with the usual hugging and hand-holding. After a short
meeting with Mugabe, Mbeki addressed reporters on the failure to release the
results of the presidential poll, stating that the delay was part of the ‘normal
electoral process in terms of the law of Zimbabwe’ (when it clearly was not),
and infamously stated that he would not describe the situation ‘as a crisis’.57
Mugabe decided that it would be politic not to attend the emergency SADC
meeting. However, his input was reportedly delivered by Mbeki, apparently
causing Mwanawasa to remark that ‘If Robert Mugabe has anything to say to
me as chairperson, then he can talk to me himself.’ He added that Mbeki was
creating the impression that he was becoming ‘Mugabe’s messenger’.58 In addi­
tion, Mbeki sought to prevent Tsvangirai from addressing the SADC meeting,
but was overruled by Mwanawasa.59
When the results of the March presidential poll were finally released in
May, the poll gave 1,195,562 votes (47.9%) to Morgan Tsvangirai, 1,079,730
votes (43.2%) to Robert Mugabe, 207,470 votes (8.3%) to Simba Makoni, and
14,503 votes (0.6%) to Langton Towungana. The lengthy delay in releasing the
results lent credence to the notion that they had been manipulated to reduce
Tsvangirai’s poll to below the ‘50% plus one’ necessary to prevent a run-off.
The run-off itself, which should have been held ‘within 21 days of the previous
election’, was delayed by ZEC to 27 June 2008. Mugabe used the hiatus to
mobilize the military and militia. The action mirrored Mugabe’s response to the
referendum defeat of 2000, though it surpassed that response in the degree and
extent of violence meted out to MDC supporters and perceived supporters.60
The brutal military crackdown on the opposition was euphemistically re­
ferred to as Operation Mavhoterapapi (‘Where did you put your X?’ or ‘How
did you vote?’). Thousands were arrested and beaten up, and more than two
hundred MDC supporters killed; senior members of ZANU(PF) were directly
57 ‘Mbeki urges patience on Zimbabwe’, BBC News, 12 Apr. 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7343907.stm>.
58 ‘What went on at the SADC meeting’, The Star, 16 Apr. 2008, available at <http://www.
swradioafrica.com/pages/whatwenton160408.htm>.
59 Ibid.
60 This is discussed further in Chapter Three.
13
Chapter One
implic­ated. It was during this period that Mbeki sought to allow the arms ship­
ment carried by the An Yue Jiang to be delivered to Zimbabwe. Mbeki was fully
aware of the deteriorating conditions on the ground, and of who was respons­ible,
as he had dispatched a team of retired South African National Defence Force
Generals to report on the situation.61 The team’s report apparently detailed the
extent of the violence in graphic fashion, but, as with the Khampepe/Moseneke
report before it, it was never made public by Mbeki.62
The extent of the violence rendered participation in the run-off election by
Tsvangirai, and appropriate observation of the process, impossible. Without any
real monitoring taking place, ZANU(PF) was left to present whatever results it
wanted for the one-man election. It did not miss the opportunity, claiming an
85 per cent ‘victory’ for Mugabe, with a slightly increased voter turn-out from
the first election, despite the boycott by the MDC. The extent of the electoral
farce precluded even the usually sympathetic election observers, who had been
allowed in by ZANU(PF), from endorsing the election. They unanimously pro­
nounced that the election did not reflect the will of the people.
Mugabe, however, had himself sworn in as president a few hours before the
results had been officially announced and within hours had jetted off to an
AU summit in Cairo.63 Two weeks later he attended a SADC meeting. At both
these forums he was invited and attended as ‘President of Zimbabwe’ despite
the universal rejection of the June election. However, Botswana unequivocally
refused to recognize Mugabe’s presidency,64 and other SADC states, including
even South Africa, prevaricated on the issue. The correct course of action would
have been for SADC to refuse to recognize the obviously fraudulent result and
to demand a fresh election, independently supervised. Instead, Mbeki moved
quickly to help Mugabe out of his ‘legitimacy crisis’. The MDC proposed a
transitional government leading to fresh elections, but Mbeki quickly poured
cold water on any such aspirations.65 In mid-September 2008, after protracted
negotiations, the MDC leadership, under extensive pressure from Mbeki, agreed
to a power-sharing arrangement. Most significantly, the agreement recognized
Mugabe as president of Zim­babwe with immediate effect and agreed that he
‘Violence “shocks” SA generals’, Business Day, 14 May 2008.
‘The other secret Khampepe report’, Business Day, 12 May 2008, available at <https://www.
givengain.com/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=2137&news_id=72405&cat_
id=1586>. See also ‘Southern African History Archives: On-going PAIA requests’ at <http://www.
saha.org.za/about_saha/freedom_of_information_programme/outstanding_paia_requests.htm>.
63 ‘AU: None dared point a finger at Mugabe’, Africa News, 1 July 2008, <http://www.africanews.
com/site/list_messages/19216>.
64 ‘Botswana no longer recognises Mugabe’, Daily News, 28 July 2008.
65 See, for example, ‘Mugabe open to talks on unity govt, Mbeki says’, TopNews, <http://www.
topnews.in/mugabe-open-talks-unity-government-mbeki-says-250555>.
61 62 14
Love in a Time of Cholera: Mbeki’s Relationship with Robert Mugabe, 2000–2008
would ‘continue’ to hold office.66 Mbeki had thus, for the moment at least,
resolved Mugabe’s legitimacy crisis.
The agreement left Mugabe’s powers largely unfettered and intact, though
under a restructured form of government. The implementation of this restructur­
ing was to require further and extended negotiations. In particular, Tsvangirai’s
appointment as Prime Minister under the agreement (with singularly amorphous
powers) was to come later, depended on Mugabe’s discretion (which he has
so far declined to exercise), and relied on a constitutional amendment (which
would have to be approved by ZANU(PF) ) before that post had any status in
law.67 During this period Mugabe has used every opportunity to flaunt his ‘reelection’ and recognition on the international stage, while blatantly belittling
Tsvangirai by refusing to allow his passport to be renewed.68
Given Mbeki’s support for Mugabe in the months and years preceding the
signing of the agreement on 15 September 2008, it is not surprising that the
agreement sought to restore Mugabe’s legitimacy, left him in full control, and
admits scant hope for the return of the rule of law and democracy in Zim­
babwe. In short, it represented a fundamental rejection of the March election
results and, as such, affords little ostensible benefit to the people of Zimbabwe.
It has silenced the MDC and the clamour for fresh and free and fair elections
in Zimbabwe. The agreement is presented as a panacea to Zimbabwe’s political
and economic woes, although it is unclear how this will be realized. Once again
the ploy of negotiations has rescued Mugabe – and from his most severe test
yet. The only mystery is why the MDC permitted Mbeki the space to do this.
However, disputes over Mbeki’s role in the negotiations in late November
2008, and in particular in the dispute over the allocation of ministries, indicates
that the MDC has finally realized that Mbeki is probably the most unsuitable
leader within SADC to claim the position of an honest broker between
ZANU(PF) and the MDC. The MDC has now demanded the removal of
Mbeki in the strongest terms, and, as the above indicates, quite rightly so.69
Article 20.1.6(1) of the Global Political Agreement (GPA).
This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
68 Husdon Yemen Taivo, ‘The fallacy of Tsvangirai’s hand in Western sanctions’, The Standard,
1 Nov. 2008, <http://www.thestandard.co.zw/letters/19156-the-fallacy-of-tsvangirais-hand-in-westernsanctions.html>.
69 See fn. 4.
66 67 15