Factionalism in multi-level contexts:
When party organisation becomes a device
Tània Verge, Universitat Pompeu Fabra ([email protected])
Raúl Gómez, EUI and Juan March Institute ([email protected])
ABSTRACT
This article provides a framework through which factionalism might be examined and
the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts. We discuss the
dynamic connections between factionalism and party structure by setting out a model of
the dimensions of factional organisation dependent on the tolerance of host parties
towards dissent and their degree of vertical integration. In multi-level contexts, both
dimensions come into play, their combination yielding four different strategies:
centralised, interlayered, multilayered and decentralised factionalism. We also consider
what implications there are for the party’s dominant coalition in episodes of high
factionalism. These can act as a catalyst for the modification of party rules that regulate
dissent and vertical distribution of power. The hypotheses developed are tested on four
Spanish political parties which differ on the autonomy of regional branches and
factions: the People’s Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, United Left, and the
Basque Nationalist Party.
Key words
Factionalism, party organisation, multi-level politics, vertical integration, Spain
–Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, 10-12 September 2009, Postdam, Germany–
Introduction
Factionalism has been poorly developed in the study of political parties and it is still
orphan of conceptual approaches and hypotheses. This is so despite most parties pass
through periods of unity and dissent according to particular external or internal
circumstances such as electoral performance, changes in leadership or succession
struggle (Hine, 1982: 48). Indeed, factionalism is ubiquitous in political parties (Sartori,
1976: 75; Harmel et al., 1994: 7). The study of factionalism is thus not confined to the
understanding of party politics but to the comprehension of politics at large (Belloni and
Beller, 1976: 549).
Hine (1982: 38-39) identifies three dimensions of intra-party group conflict: the
issues dimension, coverage and organisational solidity. Regarding the first, conflict
consists of either a policy or a strategy axis, or a combination of the two. Yet, party
conflict can also be motivated by patronage incentives such as power, career and spoils
(Sartori, 1976: 76). Most often the two types of factionalism interrelate (Janda, 1993).
Second, coverage comprises the number of arenas in which conflict occurs. Katz and
Mair (2002) suggest that in the modern catch-all party conflict is mainly played out in
the central office, so factions are expected to settle in this face (Carty, 2005: 5). As to
organisational solidity, scholarly disagreement denotes the existence of a continuum
from highly organised factions (Rose, 1964; Zariski, 1978), to loose and uncohesive
tendencies (Hine, 1982: 39; Key, 1952).
Institutional and internal incentives shape factions’ strategies (Boucek, 2005: 6).
On the one hand, the systemic opportunity structure may encourage factions to reflect
the country’s divisions (Duverger, 1964; Panebianco, 1988; Hennessey, 1968: 12).
Federal or decentralised states promote the formation of regionally rooted factions
(Köllner and Basedau, 2005: 17). On the other, factions’ degree of institutionalisation
depends on party regulation of dissent (Zariski 1978).
Intra-party actors perform ‘cost-benefit calculations on a continuous basis,
making strategic decisions designed to fulfill their basic objective’ (Laver and Shepsle,
1996). Since the dominant coalition may change party rules in moments of high
factional conflict, factionalism is intrinsically endogenous. It must thus be studied in a
dynamic perspective (Boucek, 2009: 25), contextualising its development and analysing
its course of action. Analyses of group dynamics require non-exclusive views of
factionalism. Abstracting out different characteristics and forms of organisation, we will
1
build upon broadly inclusive definitions, considering factions as intra-party groups that
act collectively in order to achieve some common goals (Belloni and Beller 1978:447;
Zariski 1960: 33; Bouceck 2009: 14).
This article provides a framework through which factionalism might be
examined and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts.
The second section discusses the dynamic connections between factionalism and party
structure and sets out a model of the dimensions of factional organisation according to
the tolerance of host parties towards dissent and their degree of vertical integration. It
also considers the dominant coalition’s strategic choices in episodes of intense
factionalism. The third section applies the hypotheses developed to four Spanish
political parties in which the autonomy of their regional branches and of factions differ:
the People’s Party/Partido Popular (PP), the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party/Partido
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), United Left/Izquierda Unida (IU), and the Basque
Nationalist Party/Partido acionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV). The final section concludes.
Factionalism and party organisation in multi-level settings
Factionalism can not be properly understood without taking into account how parties
organise. As Köllner and Basedau (2005: 19) suggest, it is often unclear whether it
results from a particular way of organising or whether the causality runs the other way
round. Although one has to be cautious when drawing connections between
factionalism and party structure, we suggest that this relationship can be studied if
factionalism is simultaneously examined both as dependent and independent variable
and if external factors (i.e. formal institutions, party system characteristics, socioeconomic, cultural and political features) are kept constant.
I. Factionalism as a dependent variable: the determinants of factional organization
When we consider factionalism as a dependent variable, we are interested in how party
rules encourage a particular type of factionalism. Belloni and Beller (1976: 548) defined
the procedural details of party organisation which may invite the formation of factions
as the ‘permissiveness of the parent body’. In our opinion, two basic party
organisational dimensions determine what shape internal conflict adopts: the autonomy
of factions and the autonomy of regional branches. Factions can turn these dimensions
2
into their advantage to pursue their goals. As Hine (1982: 38) notes ‘a group’s need for
organization will depend on the rules and conventions governing party life’.
The degree to which parties allow internal dissent and eventually formal
organisational divisions to function at the regional level is a major issue for parties
competing in multi-level systems (Houten, 2009). Territorial division and state
decentralisation processes impact on the most relevant dimensions of party organisation,
namely distributional conflicts over organisational resources, the definition of platforms
and priorities, electoral and governing strategies (Deschower, 2006; Downs, 1998;
Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Hopkin, 2003; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Biezen and
Hopkin 2006).
The extent to which the national level of the party is predominant in these
dimensions can be measured through a continuum that defines its vertical integration,
ranging from extremely weak intra-party linkages to highly integrated structures1, and
varies with institutional factors (type of power division within the polity and allocation
of resources), form of party organisation and ideology, and the party’s governing or
opposition status (Thorlakson 2001, 2006; Smiley, 1987). Vertical integration is defined
by sub-national party influence (the representation of party branches in the central level)
and sub-national party autonomy on candidate selection and on the management of the
party structure and discipline (Thorlakson, 2009).
Multi-level dynamics add complexity to the inherent (permanent or temporary)
lack of unity within parties. Parties are composed of sub-coalitions or groups of activists
who might disagree about the goals and how to pursue them (Kitschelt 1989: 47). The
group that controls skills and knowledge, recruitment, finances and communications is
the dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988: 37). Dominant coalitions are often non
homogenous. In this case, they become coalitions of factions made of governing and
opposition factions (Key, 1956). The party’s governing or dominant faction is then the
coalition component which is better equipped to impose its ideological or organisational
preferences (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 411).
Factions, be it formally structured or loosely articulated, help individuals in
different levels of the party to coordinate decisions (Carty, 2004: 15). The capacity to do
so depends on the ‘internal market for consent’, that is party pluralism, party sharing
and the representation of sub-party preferences and interests (Boucek, 2005: 21). Intra1
From weakest to highest, the categories included in the continuum are: truncated, bifurcated, confederal,
integrated and unitary parties. See Thorlakson (2001), Carty (1988), Dyck (1991), and Smiley (1986).
3
party democracy is advantageous for opposition factions because it maximises their
influence (Ibid., 21). Proportional representation in internal elections provides a strong
incentive for factional organisation, even if it is established in recognition of existing
factionalism (Hine, 1982: 42-43). Factions’ autonomy also increases with formal
recognition of dissent and with the access to resources party rules entitle factions to.
Previous research has stated that centralised parties are likely to discourage
factionalism and to induce factions to concentrate at the central level (Duverger 1954;
Zariski, 1960; Beller and Belloni, 1978; Müller-Rommwl, 1982; Köllner and Basedau,
2005). We argue that further theoretical refinements are required. In any multi-level
context, where some external resources may be accessed by the regional branches, both
vertical integration and factional autonomy will come into play, their combination
yielding four different strategies for factions (see Table 1) 2:
1) Centralised factionalism. If factions are recognised by party rules but regional
branches have limited autonomy (ie. federal bodies have the capacity to impose
decisions to the lower levels), concentrating factional activity at the sub-national
level is a hazardous strategy which could be easily counteracted by the centre. It
is then likely that in highly integrated parties factions will put their efforts at the
national level and compete with the dominant coalition for party patronage.
2) Interlayered factionalism. Factions are not tolerated or restrictively recognised
and the centre is very strong so it can easily intervene in any regional branch.
Possibilities for organisation and access to party resources are limited. As
minority factions cannot exclusively develop at either the central or the subnational level, they will be loosely organised, with regional leaders having to
retain power at the two levels in order to survive. Without one of these pillars,
their chances to mount an effective opposition will be scarce.
3) Multilayered factionalism. When party rules admit factions and regional
branches enjoy high levels of autonomy, factionalism can develop at either the
central or the regional level. Given that factions may need to follow distinct subnational strategies, they will most likely be heterogeneous at the central level.
2
Note that we will only examine parties that are to some extent vertically integrated. In other words, we
will exclude truncated, bifurcated, or extremely stratarchical parties (Carty, 2004) since cross-level
decision-making and strategies do not or hardly do not apply in these cases.
4
They will present different degrees of coordination and alliances are likely to
shift at different levels. Territorialised strategies might be more relevant in some
occasions, whereas in others factional activity might focus at the central level.
4) Territorialised factionalism. If factionalism is not allowed and vertical
integration is weak, minorities will be more effective if they organise at the
regional level, being able to fight for resources and power in certain domains the
centre has difficulties controlling. Hence, factions will act under the umbrella of
the territories trying to increase their power within the party structure and to
obtain access to organisational, political and economic resources by dominating
certain regions. This shall grant their survival as well as offer them valuable
means through which to confront the central (dominant faction’s) leadership.
Table 1. Factional organisation
Autonomy of the territories
Autonomy of factions
High vertical integration
Low vertical integration
High tolerance
Centralised factionalism
Multilayered factionalism
Low tolerance
Interlayered factionalism
Territorialised factionalism
II. Factionalism as an independent variable: party organisation as a device
We have presented how rules might lead factionalism to adopt different shapes.
Nonetheless, we are also interested in examining how intense factional conflict can act
as a catalyst for the modification of party rules. As Filippov et al. note, the designs of
parties are themselves endogenous: ‘[parties] are the product of design of institutions
that compel politicians to erect parties of a particular sort because that sort, and not
some other, serves their interests’ (2004: 196).
Whereas in the previous perspective dissident factions were the main actor
facing choices, here it is dominant factions which must decide what strategy helps them
advance their goals. Although factions’ and territories’ autonomy might provide
structural incentives to intra-party conflict, these are not static factors. Our second
hypothesis posits that dominant factions will make a strategic use of the party’s vertical
integration to counteract opposition factions; that is, the party organisation becomes a
device that loosens or strengthens control over regional branches to restrain factionalism.
5
The dominant faction’s responses with regard to vertical integration will vary
according to the level opposition factions concentrate at. Although divided dominant
coalitions hinder party change (Appleton and Ward 1997: 348; Harmel and Tan, 2003),
when factionalism is found at the central level, the dominant faction will loose vertical
integration so that allied regional branches can implement the goals which remain
blocked at the central level by opposing factions. This possibility will depend on the
rules for leadership selection, the support dominant factions can orchestrate amongst the
regional branches, and the selective incentives the former can offer in exchange.
Conversely, when critical factions organise their opposition from the territories,
the dominant faction will seek to increase the party’s vertical integration so as to reduce
the influence of hostile regional branches. This strategy is more likely to be
implemented the more homogeneous the federal dominant faction is.
Yet, territorial branches might also have incentives to keep or strenghten their
autonomy. The presence of certain idiosyncratic elements in the regional political
competition such as the strength of the centre-periphery cleavage might encourage
regional branches to request an increased autonomy in order to maximize their electoral
results in this layer of government. Yet, territories affected by factionalism face the
following trade-off: letting the central level to increase its power in order to attack
unruly factions, then limiting their own autonomy, or broadening the autonomy of the
territories, then unhappily granting opposition factions access to regional resources.
Finally, extreme factionalism can also lead the dominant faction to revise intraparty democracy (i.e. the voting system to elect decision-making bodies) and formal
recognition of dissent, including access to party resources.
An empirical evaluation of multiphaceted factionalism: The Spanish case
Spain’s decentralisation and democratisation processes occurred concurrently.
The previous unitary state gave way to a multi-level polity divided into seventeen
regions (namely Autonomous Communities), each of them with its own representative
and executive institutions (Aja, 2003). Both established and recently formed political
parties had to adapt their organisations to the new territorial dimension.
Four Spanish political parties have been selected for our analysis on the basis of
their different levels of vertical integration and tolerance of dissent. They also diverge
6
on their competitive position in the party system and the type of factionalism they have
experienced (more policy or more patronage-oriented).
The PSOE and the PP are the largest nation-wide parties which alternate in
government responsibilities at the federal level. Although the PSOE was founded in
1879, the party was strongly restructured during the transition to democracy.
Organisationally, it became a successful catch-all party with a rapid increase in size,
resources and members. Ideologically, the party abandoned Marxism and fully
embraced social democracy (Méndez, 2000). The PP (Popular Alliance/Alianza Popular
at the time) was born in 1976 as a coalition of seven conservative minor parties whose
members had been linked to the Francoist regime. The party stood very radical in their
right-wing stances until the mid 1980s when it gradually moved to the centre-right
(Montero, 1988). By then, all the founding parties along with other liberal and
Christian-democratic parties had dissolved into a single entity. The IU is the third
largest nation-wide party formed in 1986 as a coalition led by the Communist Party of
Spain/Partido Comunista de España (PCE) along with other minor left-wing parties as
a means to counteract the electoral crisis of communism (Ramiro-Fernández, 2004).
Due to a majoritarian twist in the electoral system, the IU has little governing potential
at the national level. The EAJ-PNV is a non state-wide party founded in 1895 and based
in the Basque Country and Navarre. Since the devolution of powers to the region (1980)
until April 2009 it governed the Basque Country (alone or as the senior coalition
member). It has also been a relevant actor at the federal level acting as a support party
between 1993 and 2000. It can be defined as a centre party (de Pablo and Mees, 2005).
In the following empirical analysis we are not interested in providing an
exhaustive diachronic description of factional activity but in analysing some episodes of
deep factionalism which illustrate the four categories defined in the previous section.
Centralized factionalism
Since 1979 the PSOE was dominated by Felipe González, as secretary-general, and
Alfonso Guerra, as deputy secretary-general. They managed to end up internal dissent
and the 1982 landslide victory ultimately favoured cohesion (Gillespie, 1995: 55).
González became Spain’s Prime Minister and, although Guerra occupied relevant
offices, including that of deputy prime minister, he focused on expanding his control
7
over the party. This triggered one of the most well-known episodes of factionalism in
recent Spanish politics.
At the time, the PSOE combined tolerant rules towards factionalism with low
levels of regional autonomy. Although informal factions had always existed, factional
activity was only formally admitted in 1984 in the loosest type. Factions could not have
their own symbols, organisational structure and vote discipline, although the latter two
aspects could be easily achieved through informal arrangements. They should confine
within the party and restrict their activity to fostering debate and providing input on
platforms and policy. Access to party documents and communication means was
limited. Rules concerning the election of party boards were modified to help minorities:
all groups reaching 20 per cent of the vote were entitled to 25 per cent of offices (Verge,
2007: 340).
As said, regional branches’ influence and autonomy were rather limited. For one
thing, the regional party structure was developed by the centre after the transition to
democracy. The federal bodies monitored, controlled and could veto the decisions
adopted by regional branches regarding candidate selection, manifestos, finances,
platforms and alliances choice. Coordination of public policy across territories was
assigned to the federal level. Besides, the presence of regional leaders within the highest
executive boards was insignificant during the 1980s (Méndez, 2000).
Although informal factionalism was common since the mid 1980s and the
1990s, factions have often been reluctant to apply for formal recognition –with the
exception of Socialist Left/Izquierda Socialista, which has never been a threat in terms
of effective opposition and membership support.
The factional episode we examine here initially opposed the party in public
office, whose economic policies were inspired by orthodox liberal ideas and developed
by a group of ministers directly appointed by González (later on called renovadores),
and the party in central office led by the left-winger Guerra and his followers
(guerristas). However, the reason was not only ideological, since the guerrista’s power
was based on an extensive patronage network. Although guerristas did never directly
attack the popular leader González, they criticised the liberal ministers’ economic
policies and accused them of having provoked the 1988 general strike. Liberal ministers
were also accused of populating political posts with technocrats from outside the party.
Rising levels of division finally resulted in a clear, and sometimes public, deterioration
of party-government relations (Guillespie, 1989).
8
Guerra and his supporters used the central party as a stronghold. Delegates in
party conferences were elected by provincial delegations, whose local leaders were
mostly controlled by the party apparatus. In fact, as provincial delegations voted in
block in party conferences, the guerristas enjoyed a great deal of influence within the
decision-making bodies vis-à-vis the renovadores (Maravall, 2003: 145).
Internal conflict hastened during the 1990s. Tensions between regional
powerholders, increasingly supportive of the renovadores sector (Gangas 1995: 169),
and the party in central office, in the hands of guerristas, emerged. But the strict way in
which Guerra managed the party along with a limited regional autonomy clearly
favoured the position of the centre.
González did then try to reduce the power of the guerristas by giving more room
to regional leaders. Thus, although the guerrista sector controlled the central office,
González used his position as Prime Minister to hold regular meetings with the regional
leaders and presidents of the regions governed by the PSOE. According to some party
officers, these meetings became more relevant than executive bodies (Méndez and Orte,
2010). As a result of the coordinated action between González and the regional leaders
along with an increasing dissatisfaction with how Guerra managed the corruption
scandals involving party members, by 1994 the presence of renovadores and regional
leaders in the executive bodies had enormously increased and the guerristas had been
cornered within the government too. Finally, the indirect block vote by provincial heads
of delegation was substituted by an individual and secret vote by all delegates thus
eroding one of Guerra’s main tools to control the party (Méndez, 2000: 117).
Interlayered factionalism
The organisational penetration of the PP began with the sub-regional level, the
provinces, which are the electoral constituencies in national and regional elections.
Regional organisation was only fully set up in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the party
structure was extremely centralised and hierarchical (the president of the party
accumulating numerous functions), and factionalism was forbidden and sanctioned with
the expulsion (Gangas, 1995: 156). All sub-national branches were obliged to follow the
instructions of the federal level, which approved the lists of candidates for all elections.
Due to the party’s deep presidentialism, coordination was often carried out between the
sub-national and the national leaders. As regional branches increased their competences,
9
new bodies were created to enhance control over them such as a national electoral
committee and a body in charge of coordinating the activity of the party in public office
at all tiers of government. Therefore, the odds for the appearance of factionalism
seemed limited. Besides, as opposition factions could only be informally organised,
they had to settle at both levels of the party organisation in order to survive, so they
were encouraged to deploy an interlayered strategy.
The factional conflict we analyse arose between 1982 and 1989 within the
federal leadership as well as between federal and sub-national leaders. On the one hand,
the once uncontested party leader Manuel Fraga was increasingly seen as an electoral
liability by the secretary-general and many sub-national leaders, especially after the
strategy of focusing exclusively on right-wing voters’ support collapsed in 1986 when it
was clear that the median voter was located in the centre-left (López-Nieto, 1995: 39).
Fraga thought that open lists for the election of decision-making bodies would help
soften the conflict, but they only empowered provincial leaders by facilitating their
coordination to obtain more central posts (see García-Guereta, 2001: 139).
On the other hand, there was a latent conflict between the sub-national and the
national organisation. The federal level aimed to renew the provincial and regional
executive boards and candidates to make the party more competitive by introducing
moderate and reformist leaders. Many of the newcomers belonged to the liberal party
the PP had formed a coalition with (the Democrat Popular Party/Partido Democráta
Popular, PDP). Sub-national organisations were very unhappy with what they
considered an excessive representation of coalition partners and many sub-national
leaders felt they had been displaced (Gangas, 1995: 168).
Eventually Fraga resigned and called a conference to decide on his succession.
Exceptionally in the party’s past and future history, two candidates competed for the
post: Miguel Herrero de Miñón, the leader of the parliamentary group and the man
Fraga had transferred the presidential powers to until a new leader was elected, and
Antonio Hernández Mancha, the president of the regional branch of Andalusia. The
latter won the ballot with the vote of 72 per cent of the party delegates, thanks to the
support of the sub-regional (provincial) delegates, one sector of the federal leadership
and the party’s youth organisation he managed to galvanise (Baón, 2001: 775).
However, the defeated candidate opposed the new leader by using the party in
public office, and thus the conflict persisted (Gangas 1995: 211). In order to shut the
conflict down, Fraga announced in 1989 his nomination as party leader, founding no
10
competition. Once back, he commanded a transition which led to the party’s
refoundation which was completed by José María Aznar, elected party president in 1990
(see García-Guereta, 2001). The party changed its ideological position towards the
centre, augmented the president’s competences3, and culminated the definition of the
territorial structure in two directions: one, provincial branches were put under the strict
control of regions; and, two, although the party apparently decentralised regions, the
latter became strictly supervised by the federal level too. Electoral and disciplinary
committees are only found at the regional level and they are monitored by the centre.
Party delegates are since then elected at the local level, diminishing too the power of the
provinces. And open lists have never been used again. Besides, it is the national
executive board, and not party delegates, who ratifies the highest party officers
(secretary-general, president of the electoral commission etc.).
Between 1989 and 1991 nine regional leaderships were changed from the centre
and by 1993 all regional branches but Galicia, which Fraga controlled, had been
renewed. Regional party leaders did not become members of the national executive
board until 1999, although presidents of the regional governments ruled by the party
incorporated in 1989. Nevertheless, regional representatives only account for 25 per
cent of this board (Astudillo, 2010). The disciplinary regime is also controlled by the
centre, which can dissolve unruly regional branches. All sub-national conferences must
be held in cascade following the federal conference, thus installing a stronger control
over the territories. Since 1989 regions cannot request the celebration of an
extraordinary conference. They can establish their rules but require federal approval as
well as candidates’ lists for all elections do – for local elections the federal level only
approves the lists presented in provincial capitals. Severe incompatibilities between
territorial and parliamentary representation were introduced too, limiting regional
influence on the party in public office at the federal level (Verge, 2007: 313).
Multilayered factionalism
Since its creation in 1986 the IU has gone through two significant episodes of
factionalism. The first occurred in the period 1991-97 and the second from 2000 to
3
The secretary-general’s functions diminished in favour of the president and the deputy-presidencies
were suppressed in order to avoid that (informal) factional activity could be orchestrated from there.
11
2008. In both occasions factions developed at the two levels of the party organisation
and mounted opposition to the dominant faction through a multilayered strategy.
By the beginning of the 1990s the IU was suffering from an increasing internal
strife. The multi-party left-wing coalition dominated by the Communist Party of Spain
(PCE) was divided on several issues which crosscut party lines. Regarding
organisational politics, although most of the leadership had once supported the PCE’s
dissolution into the new party, when some leaders claimed in 1991 that the moment had
arrived, the majority of communist leaders opposed fearing members’ rejection and
arguing that electoral progress diluted pressures to get rid of the party (RamiroFernández, 2004: 18). Confrontation over platform was also present in relation to the
degree of policy radicalism the party should defend. Finally, alliances and strategy
towards the PSOE generated the most acute division.
In 1992, founding parties ceased to enjoy representation quotas in executive
boards and conferences. Internal conflict was also regulated by admitting the creation of
currents of opinion at the federal level as far as they were established in at least four
regional party branches – they could also form within regional branches. Factions could
not impose vote discipline to their members or present candidates’ tickets in internal
elections. Opposition factions soon emerged and one of them, New Left/ueva
Izquierda, obtained the status of federal faction. Increasing divisions forced the party to
be more generous with factional activity. Constraints for their creation were softened as
the required presence at the regional level was reduced to three regions (RamiroFernández, 2000: 251). Factions were also granted access to party publication and
communication means. In 1994 factions were allowed to present their candidates in
internal elections but the pure proportionality principle was modified: seats in decisionmaking bodies would be allocated by consensus among the competing lists obtaining at
least 10 per cent of the delegates’ vote in the party conference (Gangas, 1995: 294).
Whereas New Left was the minority faction at the federal level, it managed to
become the dominant faction in seven regions. This way it could deploy a multilayered
strategy combining its opposition in the federal party boards with coordination with the
regional branches it controlled. The regional branches led by New Left challenged the
IU leadership by establishing local coalition governments with PSOE, which totally
confronted the party’s strategy to radically oppose the main left-wing party.
However, the dominant factions’ advantage was the control of the party’s
territorial structure due to federal vertical integration. It used its preeminence in the
12
federal bodies to increase the control over the territories. In 1997 when one of the party
branches reached an agreement with the PSOE for the regional election, the national
dominant faction created a new regional branch. The other regional units which had
supported the unruly branch saw their executive boards dissolved and their membership
purged (Paniagua and Ramiro-Fernández, 2003).
The dominant leadership gradually tightened up control of the territorial
structure. In 1994, the statutes established that the federal level should ratify the
candidate lists and platform for legislative elections. It was also specified that alliances
with nationwide parties or with regional branches of nationwide parties are a federal
competence. In 1997 the statutes clarified that, as far as an alliance affected the
coherence of the federal project, the competence to decide on it at any level corresponds
to the centre. Besides, the capacity to sanction regional branches if they contravene
federal decisions was strengthened by reducing the qualified majority the decision must
reach (Pérez-Nievas and Ramiro-Fernández, 2005). Although still far away from the
levels of the PP and the PSOE, vertical integration clearly increased.
The second episode of high factionalism emerged soon after the previous one
had just been resolved. The main actor behind internal conflict was not one of the
recognized factions but the very same PCE, which has been increasingly acting as an
opposition faction at both levels of the party organisation since 2000.
The severe electoral defeat in the 1999 local and European elections and in the
2000 legislative elections led to major change within the dominant coalition. The new
leadership sought to deradicalise the traditional communist discourse by relaunching the
organisation as a post-communist ecosocialist party as a means to recover votes. A more
pragmatic position towards the PSOE and towards office was introduced too. Since
2003 several regional branches have reached government coalitions with a broad array
of parties, including the PSOE, and later on in March 2004, when the PSOE went back
in a minority government, the IU accepted to support the government’s investiture, its
most important legislative initiatives in exchange of certain policy concessions.
Nonetheless, leadership replacement was only partial as the new elected leader
received just one more vote than his rival in the internal ballot and the minority faction
rejected this more policy-seeking strategy. The PCE considered the new ecosocialist
discourse as a threat to the organisation’s core ideological identity and a betrayal of the
party’s communist past, and strongly rejected the party-of-government role at the
regional level and support to PSOE in the national lower house (Verge, 2010).
13
As the distribution of seats in the highest party executive board is strictly
proportional to the votes obtained by competing lists, the losing candidate who
represented PCE’s majority faction (actually the PCE’s secretary-general) retained
considerable influence within IU’s dominant coalition, thus making it difficult to
implement party change4. The small difference in votes between the competing factions
forced the dominant faction to seek support in the non-aligned group, enabling it to win
on average about 55 per cent of the vote at the executive board. But this support was
unstable, and some of the dominant faction’s proposals were rejected. Besides, as the
dominant faction did not command the support of three-fifths of the vote, it risked
losing votes affecting conflict between the federal level and an unruly regional branch.
However, the multi-level setting allowed the dominant coalition to turn the
regional arena into its advantage and use the party meso-level to circumvent
factionalism. Whereas the opposition faction was still strong at the federal level, its
control over regions had weakened. The dominant faction used this decline to
implement change at the regional level. The support orchestrated at this layer came
along with an empowering of regional leaders in the national leadership selection
process –regional leaders were enfranchised as members of the selectorate5. Regional
party branches also obtained an increased autonomy in sub-national issues, including
the capacity to unilaterally decide whether to enter an electoral or a government
coalition. Those regional party branches facing stronger confrontation from the
opposition faction were also granted looser integrative linkages, establishing a
confederal vertical integration for those territories (Ṩtefuriuc and Verge, 2008).
Decentralised factionalism
Factionalism in the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) has traditionally divided those
who pursue a pragmatic nationalism which demands devolution but compromises with
Spanish politics and those who defend a more radical nationalism which advocates the
independence of the Basque Country and excludes collaboration with non-nationalist
forces (de Pablo and Mees, 2005). Although both souls have always coexisted, intense
4
In the 2003 and 2004 party conferences the leadership ballot yielded similar results, mantaining the
correlation of forces of the governing and opposition factions and therefore freezing conflict.
5
The election of the IU leader is a two-step process. Party conference delegates select half the members
of the Federal Political Committee, who will thereafter choose the leader in a separate vote. The other
half, consisting of regional delegates, later joins this committee in ratifying the appointment of the leader.
14
factional conflicts have come about occasionally. Of the two consecutive conflicts that
originated between the 1970s and the 1980s, we will only focus on the second.
Party rules forbid members to belong to any political or socio-political
association, trade union, or entity at odds with the party ideology. All members are
required to obey the party stances and discipline both at the federal and regional level6.
Non compliance can lead to expulsion.
However, in the period under study, regional branches enjoyed high levels of
autonomy. Not only was the central executive branch elected by the regions, but it was
also subject to territorial mandate, regional branches deciding on their delegates’ vote.
Moreover, the party defined itself as a confederation, and its central bodies were
exclusively formed by regional delegates. All territories had the same share within the
federal bodies, and the president of the executive board was a mere spokesperson, a
primus inter pares. Regions elected their leaders and candidates and autonomously
decided on electoral platforms and coalitions within their constituency. They had their
own disciplinary bodies, and although appeals to a federal disciplinary commission
were possible, all of its members were regional appointees but the president.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the most belligerent factional conflict was
territorialised. Organised dissent was strictly punished and only the regional umbrella
could provide minorities with some room to manoeuvre. The two consecutive conflicts
that originated between the 1970s and the 1980s involved groups opposing the
pragmatism of the dominant faction. Minority groups’ strategy was based on
penetrating the territorial branches first, and then proceed on to “assault the federal
party” (Arzalluz, 2005: 192).
After the first factional conflict of the 1970s, the dominant faction tried to calm
down internal dissent by giving some space to opposition. Thus, one of its leaders,
Carlos Garaikoetxea, from the region of Navarre, was appointed president of the federal
executive board in 1977. In 1980, with the triumph of the EAJ-PNV in the regional
elections, Garaikoetxea became the president of the Basque Country. However, due to
the strict internal ban on holding multiple posts, he was replaced as president of the
executive body by Xabier Arzalluz, a loyal member of the majority.
6
As the EAJ-PNV is a non-state wide party, the federal level corresponds in this case to the Basque
region and the regional level to the sub-national party structure, ie. Alava, Guipuscoa and Biscay –the
three provinces which constitute the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country–, and Navarre –
which is, on its own, a separate Autonomous Community. The territories of the French Basque Country
only got formal representation in 1987.
15
Seeking to increase his room to manoeuvre, Garaikoetxea asked the governing
bodies to exempt him from following party discipline, which was interpreted as a
challenge to the power of the party in central office (Arzalluz, 2005: 213) and,
consequently, to the dominant faction. As a result, the executive body blocked the
approval of several laws and initiatives in the regional parliament (Pérez-Nievas, 2002).
When Garaikoetxea realized he could not fully reach his goals by means of public
office, he turned to the regional branches. This increased territorial disputes between
both factions. The minority faction already controlled Navarre and aimed at the regional
executive bodies of Guipuscoa (Garaikoetxea, 2002: 214).
By that time, the dominant faction reached an agreement with the Popular Party
(PP) which involved supporting a PP-led government in Navarre in exchange for
support in all Basque local institutions (de Pablo and Mees, 2005). The Navarrese
regional brach, supportive of Garaikoetxea, strongly opposed the pact fearing a
declining electoral support in the region. The majority faction forced an internal ballot
and obtained the majority of the votes.
Despite its defeat, the Navarrese branch did not vote the PP’s candidate, arguing
regions were autonomous on alliances choice. Failure to comply with party discipline
provided the dominant coalition with a strong argument to purge the leaderships of the
hostile branches and forced the dismissal of Garaikoetxea as president of the Basque
government. As a result, almost all members of Navarre and half the members of
Guipuscoa were expelled (Acha and Pérez-Nievas, 1998), which triggered the split and
subsequent creation of a new party (Eusko Alkartasuna) in 1987.
Right after this factional episode, the statutes underwent several modifications in
order to increase the power of the centre vis-à-vis the regional branches. The influence
of regions in federal boards and disciplinary bodies was reduced. Most of their members
–all of them in case of the disciplinary body– are now directly elected by a National
Conference. New federal bodies, such as a quadrennial General Conference, were
introduced, and local branches were empowered with direct consultation mechanisms
which have to be set up by the federal level. Regional autonomy on finances, platforms,
campaigns and coalitions was cut down and the federal executive board took over the
selection of candidates for all but local elections (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas, 2009).
16
Concluding remarks
Far from being unitary actors, parties consist of competing groups. Although the
intensity of such groups’ demands, rationales and organisational features do vary,
factionalism in any of its looser or complex forms is intrinsic to parties.
Research on factionalism needs to address an endogeneity problem: Does
factionalism stem from a particular party organisation or do parties organise according
to the factional activity they experience? We argue that this problem can be solved by
analysing factionalism as a dynamic process, studying it as both dependent and
independent variable and keeping constant external factors such as party system
characteristics, socio-economic, cultural and political features, and formal institutions.
This implies examining the interaction of intra-party actors’ strategic choices, including
those of dominant and opposition factions.
We have focused on the dynamics of factionalism in multi-level contexts,
refining previous literature by incorporating two dimensions of analysis: the autonomy
of factions and the autonomy of territorial branches. Their combination yields four
strategies for opposition factions: centralised, interlayered, multilayered and
decentralised factionalism. Four Spanish parties were selected to illustrate our
hypotheses. In the PNV and the IU regional branches enjoyed notable levels of
autonomy. Nevertheless factions’ strategies were far more territorialised in the PNV,
where intolerance towards factional activity pushed the opposition faction to fight for
the control of regions. In the PP and the PSOE vertical integration was higher, albeit
factionalism also varied. While in the PSOE factions organised at the federal level, in
the PP collaboration between regional and federal leaders granted their survival.
We have focused on specific episodes of factionalism and claimed they may
constitute critical junctures for the party organisation. When faced with strong factional
activity, the dominant faction chooses to change rules regulating dissent.
Simultaneously, vertical integration is modified as a means to weaken the arena
opposition faction is using as a stronghold. Thus, party organisation becomes a device.
When factional activity is centralised, the dominant faction turns to regional
branches to marginalise opposition groups (PSOE). When the conflict is territorialised,
then vertical integration is tightened up (PNV). However, when interlayered (PP) and
multilayered (IU) factionalism is found, the dominant faction’s calculus varies. Whereas
in the PP the dominant faction increased the power of the centre, making it more
17
difficult for interlayered factions to survive, in the IU both strategies were found. The
first factional episode was solved by fighting the minority at both levels, but particularly
by restricting the territories’ room to manoeuvre. Conversely, in the second occasion the
dominant faction loosened vertical linkages, granting allied regions more autonomy to
circumvent the blockade at the federal level.
We therefore call on scholars to combine the two dimensions affecting party
factionalism. Definitely, more attention needs to be paid to their interaction and to the
effects of this interaction on the multi-level integration of party units, be it between the
federal and the regional level in federal and quasi-federal countries or between the
central and the local level in less decentralised polities.
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Authors’ biographical note:
Tània Verge is Ph.D in Political Science (2005, Universidad Complutense), Lecturer at
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra ([email protected]) and Senior Researcher at the
Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió. Her research interests focus on party politics and gender
and politics. Her last publication is “Gendering Representation in Spain: Opportunities
and Limits of Gender Quotas” (Journal of Women Politics and Policy, forthcoming).
Raúl Gómez is doctor-member candidate in the Juan March Institute and Ph.D
candidate researcher in the EUI ([email protected]). He holds a BA in Law (2002)
and in Political Science (2004, University of Murcia), a MA in Political Science (2007,
UAM) and a MA in Social Science (2008, Juan March Institute). His main research
interests are electoral behaviour, political parties and public opinion.
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