The University of Chicago
Post-Revolution War:
A Product of Irredentism
by Gentry Kip Jenkins
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR
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Introduction
Revolutions are exceptionally rare events. Despite their rarity, their dramatic effects on
domestic structures, as well as their impact on international affairs, make them a worthy subject
for further exploration. It has been found that states that experience revolutions are significantly
more likely to be engaged in wars in the initial period after those revolutions than other states
(Maoz, 1989). Examples of such “post-revolution wars” include the War of the First Coalition,
the Polish-Soviet War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Iran-Iraq War. Why does
revolution within a state create such a high likelihood of war between states?
The “revolution-to-war” literature has provided several explanations for the same
phenomena.1 One existing explanation argues that these wars result from systemic pressures
wherein other states seek to reassert the established form of political legitimacy while the
revolutionary state seeks to spread its revolutionary form of legitimacy abroad. Another
prevalent argument is that post-revolution wars are the product of shifts in the balance of threat.
According to this theory, revolutions heighten the perception of threat within both the
revolutionary state and its neighbors. This threat creates a spiral of suspicion which leads to war.
In this essay, I will argue that post-revolution wars revolve around neither interstate
conflicts of political legitimacy nor perceptions of existential external threat. Instead, postrevolution wars are the product of bargaining failures tied to irredental claims which are
produced and/or exacerbated by revolutions. Revolutions are conducted by loose coalitions.
These coalitions dissolve following the successful overthrow of the state and coalition members
compete for primacy. Primacy is gained by legitimating oneself and delegitimating others in the
eyes of the populace. In this competition for primacy, territorial claims are accentuated by
1
In this way, its literature is comparable to the “democratic peace”. Much of the contestation is not over whether
the phenomenon indeed exists, but rather what best explains why it exists.
2
revolutionaries as a means of solidifying their legitimacy. Neighboring states resist these claims
while also exhibiting sincere concern for the security of their ethnic kin within the revolutionary
state. The consequent territorial claims prove irreconcilable because of their perceived
indivisibility and indirect utility for the disputants. Post-revolution wars then ensue from these
delimited, but indivisible, irredental territorial claims.2
I proceed in the following way. First, I discuss the definition of revolution and explicate
the empirical “revolution-to-war” observation. Second, I lay out the existing explanations and
their relevant limitations. Third, I introduce my post-revolution irredentism theory. This section
first addresses how revolutions generate irredental claims within both revolutionary states and
their non-revolutionary neighbors. It then explains why bargaining failure ensues due to the
characteristics of these irredental claims and the post-revolution situation.
Defining Revolution
Within this essay, a revolution is defined as “the destruction of an existing state by
members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order…based on
different values, myths, social classes, political institutions, and conceptions of the political
community” (Walt 1996:12). That the revolution must entail the violent destruction of an
existing state by members of its own society, helps divorce the independent effects of revolution
from correlated events that could bias the result. Specifically, this aspect of the definition
eliminates liberation movements as well as foreign interventions (and manipulations) from the
universe of revolutions. Liberation movements are eliminated because these occur in a polity
2
A more general finding of this study is that nationalism can make issues, particularly territorial issues, indivisible.
As indivisibility is a particularly powerful path to bargaining failure, the expansion and deepening of nationalism
throughout the world can help explain the intractability of many territorial disputes. In this author’s opinion, it is
quite likely that nationalistic disputes over territory will remain a prevalent source of conflict in the world, even
while other forms of interstate conflict decline in likelihood.
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that is not an existing state. Foreign interventions are eliminated because they are not driven by
members of a state’s own society. The exclusion of these two phenomena is important because
each hold the potential to bias towards post-revolution conflict in ways that do not deal with the
revolutionary characteristics of the state. As an example, while Vietnam certainly experienced a
dramatic shift in its political foundations, its conflicts afterwards were the result of its prior
colonial identity, rather than the direct effects of revolution. As an example of the second, the
Glorious Revolution in England was largely conducted by a Dutch invading force. The Dutch
hoped to form an alliance with the new English regime, which they would create, against France.
Therefore, that England became involved in a war following this “revolution” results more from
the alliance conspiracy that preceded intervention than from the characteristics of the revolution
itself. So, while interesting questions in their own right, the exclusion of national liberations and
foreign interventions is preferred in order to craft a sound theory of the distinct phenomenon of
revolution-to-war.3
The revolution-to-war phenomenon was recognized by Zeev Maoz in his study of new
regimes attempting to join the “club of nations” following violent struggles for independence or
regime change (Maoz 1989). As Maoz notes, “both old and new revolutionary states exhibit
significantly higher levels of dispute involvement than either ‘normal’ or evolutionary states”
(Maoz 1989: 215). Maoz further notes that this difference is “statistically significant up to year
9”, meaning the first nine years that a revolutionary state is in the system following their regime
creation through violence (Maoz 1989: 215). This relationship becomes even stronger (in terms
3
Furthermore, this study is agnostic about the causes of revolution. However, it is implicitly assumed that
revolutions are primarily driven by domestic forces which create loose coalitions as a means of overthrowing the
existing state. Such a perspective helps defend against the argument that international conditions simultaneously
cause both the revolution and the ensuing war. Both the logical flow of my theory and the plausibility probe on the
French Revolution demonstrate that while territorial disputes may exist before the revolution, it is the postrevolution conditions which transform these disputes into indivisible irredental claims. Thus the causal arrow in my
theory must work through revolution to reach war.
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of both likelihood and intensity) as we refine our universe to revolutions as defined by Stephen
Walt (Walt 1996). For instance of the seven revolutions that Walt explores (France, Russia, Iran,
America, Mexico, Turkey and China), six led to violent conflict between the revolutionary state
and at least one of its neighbors. Notably, while Walt only defines four of these as “wars”, I
would define all six as wars due to the existence of violent conflict between the regular ground
forces of each state.4
A particular hurdle for any studies of post-revolution wars is deciding what constitutes
the “post-revolution”. Few revolutions have clear end-points; in fact, many revolutionary states
remain in a state of upheaval and “revolution” for several years. So when does one “start the
clock”? For this study, the post-revolution period will be defined as the time following the
successful overthrow of the previous regime. This definition is desirable for a couple reasons.
First, it is much more concrete and observable than other potential candidates. Revolutionary
fervor may fade gradually, but the fall of a regime (especially the seizure of power from a head
of state) can often be marked on a calendar. Second, this definition still allows the logic of all
the competing theories (at least within this study) to function. The fall of a regime threatens the
foundations of legitimate of neighboring regimes built on similar structures. Such an event also
begins the spiral of threat between revolutionaries and their neighbors. Furthermore, in the case
of my theory, the fall of the old regime also initiates the breakdown of revolutionary coalitions
and begins the outbidding between groups for a legitimate claim to power. For these reasons,
marking the post-revolution period as beginning with the fall of the old regime is both practical
and logical.
4
Furthermore, while I adopt Walt’s definition of revolution, I disagree with his interpretation of which cases fit that
definition. For instance, Walt considers the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution as meeting his
requirements. I disagree. The former entails too much foreign intervention and the latter was a war of independence.
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Existing Explanations
In recognizing the statistical correlation between revolution and war, Maoz crafted an
intuitive explanation for this correlation which would lay the groundwork for future discussions.
Recognizing that wars are both initiated by and against revolutionary states, Maoz acknowledged
that incentives for “violent external behavior” were created for both revolutionary and nonrevolutionary states in the post-revolution environment (Maoz 1989: 204). For the revolutionary
state, there were fears that their entry into the club of nations would be rejected or resisted.
Furthermore, revolutionary elites feared that both internal and external opponents would seek to
violently force a return to the status quo ante. On the side of non-revolutionary states in the
region, there were fears that the ascendance of a revolutionary state would “become a catalyst
and model for other sub-national units seeking national independence” or other forms of
revolutionary change (Maoz 1989: 204). From both perspectives it is not that revolutionary
change necessitates international conflict but rather that it produces fears and perceptions of
enmity which lead to conflict. Thus fears regarding the implications of revolution (contagion)
and counterrevolution (status quo defenders) become “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Maoz 1989:
227).
These initial propositions would evolve into at least two distinct explanations for the
revolution-to-war phenomenon which can be labelled as (1) revolutionary internationalism and
(2) the balance of threat. Revolutionary internationalism is built on recognition that
revolutionary states disrupt the homogeneity of the international (or regional) system by
challenging the established form of political legitimation within states. The balance of threat
argues that post-revolution wars result from a combination of shifts in the balance of power,
threat perceptions, and offensive capabilities which result from revolution. However, at their
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heart, both explanations are built on the notion that revolutionary ideology foments conflict. In
the former, this is through direct struggles over the form of political legitimation. In the latter,
ideology augments perceptions of threat, which leads to suspicion and war. Thus both
explanations stand or fall based on whether ideological divergences actually influence state
perceptions and behavior.
Both revolutionary internationalism and balance of threat carry significant empirical and
theoretical limitations. Empirically, both theories fail to satisfactorily account for cases where
states do not feel strongly threatened by competing structures of legitimation, where spirals are
one-sided, or where threat is late-coming. Furthermore, these theories fail to explain postrevolution wars that follow a state becoming more like its neighbor ideologically. From a
theoretical perspective, these explanations fall short in explaining the timing and specific causes
of war, location of conflict, as well as variance in outcomes – that not every revolution leads to
war.
First, not all regimes are equally threatened by revolutionary or counter-revolutionary
forms of political legitimacy. As evident in the case of revolutionary France, the advent of a
revolutionary state does not immediately (nor invariably) lead to anxieties of de-legitimization or
perceptions of external threat. As Walt points out, reactions to the revolution were initially quite
mild throughout Europe, with some even pleased by the turn of events, which they believed
would make France less of a threat (Walt 1996: 59). Even once the situation between France and
Austria had boiled to the point of war, France, despite its rhetoric of universalism, believed that
it could fight a limited war against Austria and hoped to get Prussia to side with France
(Rothenberg 1988: 783). Thus, as Rothenberg states, “Clearly then, for all the ideological
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rhetoric of both sides, the ideological factor, if not totally absent, was not foremost in causing
war” (Rothenberg 1988: 783).
Second, some post-revolution wars were conducted between states that had moved closer
to one another with regard to political legitimation. An example of this is the war between
Cambodia and Vietnam following the Khmer Rouge revolution. Prior to the revolution,
Cambodia had been under the military rule of General Lon Nol, who had himself deposed
Sihanouk. The creation of a communist state in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge brought its
legitimating structure closer to Vietnam, while driving it further away from its other neighbors.
Yet war erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia just three years following this revolution. This
case suggests that ideological characteristics are insufficient to explain war outcomes and may be
overridden by other salient factors.
Third, these explanations cannot explain the specific timing and causes of war.
Revolutionary internationalists simply believe that revolution makes war more likely but do not
explain when that war will manifest itself and what conditions make violence most likely.
Balance of threat does provide numerous linkages which increase the likelihood of suspicion and
thus war. These linkages range from misperception of intentions, to historical grudges, to elite
manipulations of domestic populations, to underestimation of the other’s sense of vulnerability,
to exile manipulations of external actors, to the breakdown of the regular modes of
communication and so forth (Walt 1996). The more of these linkages which are active at any
given moment, the more likely war will be. The difficulty becomes an issue of which factors are
actually doing the “heavy-lifting”. For instance, the testimony of exiles, which Walt includes as
one of these linkages, seems to rarely produce an independent or pivotal effect. With such a
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plethora of potential influences and no method for discerning their relative weight, the timing of
war is unpredictable.
Fourth, these theories fail to sufficiently explain where we should expect conflict.
Revolutionary states often have multiple neighbors and, through ideological diffusion, could
influence states well beyond their borderlands. Therefore, even if we can expect war between
the revolutionary state and another state, which state would it be or should we expect a grand
counter-revolutionary coalition? The existing theories do not appear to answer this question,
though they could be extended to expect certain outcomes. For instance, revolutionary
internationalism would expect war to be waged between the revolutionary state and those
regimes which feel most keenly threatened by a competing legitimation structure. Thus war
should be expected from regimes that already feel threatened domestically. As for balance of
threat, we could expect that war is more likely with direct neighbors as proximity is another
dimension of threat (Walt 1985). Furthermore, historical grudges may also lean more towards
particular states. However, these expectations are but extensions of the theory and are ad hoc at
best.
Finally, these explanations fail to account for variance in the dependent variable of postrevolution war. Not every revolution leads to war. Yet both revolutionary internationalism and
balance of threat only seek to explain why revolution makes war highly likely. Neither theory
has an adequate explanation for a “no war” outcome.
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Post-Revolution Irredentism
Introduction
My post-revolution irredentism theory seeks to correct these shortcomings by stepping
away from the ideological antipathy argument and emphasizing the effects of revolution on the
national-territorial identity of the revolutionary state and how this identity affects the relationship
between the revolutionary state and its neighbors. In this way, national identity and its effects
rather than universal ideology become the driver for war. Post-revolution irredentism theory
may be summarized as follows:
Revolutions are conducted by coalitions which emphasize vague goals and national ideals
as a means of maintaining unity. Once the revolution is “won”, this coalition breaks apart and
subgroups compete for the position of legitimate ruler/administration. To gain an advantage in
this competition, groups will seek, through outbidding, to draw upon nationalism and “the
people” as a source of legitimation. As nationalism entails a territorial identity, revolutionaries
are keen to make irredental claims and exaggerate any threat to specific national territories. The
territories which are most amenable to such claims are territories that are currently in dispute or
have been disputed in the past. These irredental claims reignite and/or harden these pre-existing
disputes, while also making their resolution more urgent.
Simultaneously, neighboring states may exhibit concern for their ethnic kin within the
revolutionary state as the tumultuous situation threatens their physical, as well as their fiscal,
security. These ethnic kin are most likely to be located in territories that have been or are
currently being disputed. This is further exacerbated through balancing nationalism which occurs
in neighboring states as nationalism swells within the revolutionary state. Thus neighboring
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states may reach out to these disputed territories, potentially with aspirations of annexation, as a
prompt means of protecting their kin and increasing their state security.
Whether as a product of coalitional competition within the revolutionary state or ethnic
anxieties within its neighbors, irredental claims are expressed between the dyad. These claims
lead to war due to bargaining failures that are themselves a product of the revolutionary situation.
These bargaining failures result primarily from the indivisibility of the territory. Once a regime
has claimed a territory by virtue of it constituting part of the national identity, it cannot be
substituted, split, nor shared. The territory has essentially become civic-sacred space by being
framed as the property of the nation. Thus the nationalist rhetoric of revolutionary and
neighboring states alike creates a situation wherein states will not concede on territorial claims.
War then ensues. However, a “no war” outcome is possible within this theory when
revolutionary states and their neighbors lack competing territorial claims.
The causal path of post-revolutionary wars can thus be depicted as follows:
Revolution
M1:
Coalitional
Breakdown
and
Competition
M2:
Outbidding
Nationalism
M3:
Irredental
Claims
M4:
Bargaining
Failure
War
Before expounding on each component of this theory, a couple of clarifications may
prove useful. First, one may wonder how nationalism differs from universal ideologies, as both
constitute a body of ideas with the potential to shape state behavior. Second, one may ask how
my concept of coalitional competition for legitimacy differs from the conflict over forms of
legitimation addressed by revolutionary internationalism. Following a discussion of these
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concerns, the incentives for irredentism on states following revolutions will be elucidated. Then
an explanation for why bargaining failures follows will be provided. Finally, I will demonstrate
how post-revolution irredentism theory differs from diversionary war theory.
Nationalism vs. Universalistic Ideology
Revolutionaries often invoke both universal ideology and nationalism in their efforts for
mass appeal. However, these two concepts are, in some respects, exact opposites. By definition,
universal ideology is universal. As Walt explains, “…in order to attract popular support,
revolutionary ideologists tend to portray their new political ideas as self-evident truths – creating
a strong bias toward universalism. After all, how can a self-evident political principle be valid
for one group but not for others?” (Walt 1996: 28). So, if revolutionaries call for popular
sovereignty in one state because it is the true principle of governance, then they are also
establishing that popular sovereignty is the proper form of governance in neighboring states.
Therefore, revolutionary ideology, when universalistic, is naturally inclusive.
In contrast, nationalism is exclusive. To understand nationalism, it is first necessary to
define a “nation”. I adopt the definition of nation as provided by Anderson: “an imagined
political community… imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1991: 6).
Important to our discussion here are the final two characteristics: limited and sovereign. As
Anderson explains, “The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them… has
finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson 1991: 7). By nature of
being limited, nations are exclusionary because there are peoples and lands beyond their
boundaries that do not constitute part of their nation. Furthermore, the second characteristic of
being sovereign entails that nations expect, or at least desire, to be subject to no other nation. As
Anderson puts it, “…nations dream of being free… the gage and emblem of this freedom is the
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sovereign state” (Anderson 1991:7). Thus nationalism is a belief in and support of the nation
including an acknowledgement of its boundaries and, arguably, a yearning for its sovereignty.
Regardless of whether nationalism is benign (as in the case of supporting self-determination for
all peoples)5 or malign (as in believing that one’s nation is superior to other inferior and
unworthy nations), nationalism is always exclusionary to some extent.6
Despite the deep differences between nationalism and universal ideology, revolutionaries
often draw upon both in their search for support. For instance, the French revolutionaries spoke
of the universal “Rights of Man” while also lauding the particular virtues of the French nation
and people (Walt 1996: 52). The critical issue is whether universal ideology or nationalism
played a greater role in the actual decision-making of revolutionaries and their neighboring
counterparts.
While revolutionary internationalists and balance of threat theorists tend to put most of
the weight on universal ideology, my theory argues that nationalism is the greater influence.
Though only an inspection of the empirics can fully demonstrate the relative salience of these
ideas, there are a few reasons to expect nationalism to out-weigh universal ideology. First, as
Anderson points out, “…since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in
national terms – the People’s Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and so forth
– and, in so doing, has grounded itself firmly in a territorial and social space inherited from the
5
Notably, this benign nationalism may be construed as universal. That is, the belief that all nations deserve a state
may be promoted with universal implications. However, the important distinction which is being made here is that
nationalism is always divisive in that it divides people according to territorial and ethnic lines. While these different
nations may all be legitimated through the same forms, their national identities are different and largely exclusive.
To assume a new national identity can be a difficult process and may entail an abandonment of one’s former national
identity.
6
Another way of looking at the nationalism vs. universalism distinction is on the differences in how the “self” and
the “other” are defined. Within nationalism, the “self” is territorially and often ethnically bounded. Beyond these
territorial and ethnic bounds is the “other”. In contrast, universalism creates both a transnational “self” and a
transnational “other”. For instance, a class-based ideology may consider all workers to consist as parts of the “self”
(or “us”), while considering the international bourgeoisie to be an adversarial “other”.
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prerevolutionary past” (Anderson 1991: 2). This fact, that revolutionary states maintain (and
often enhance), even within their name, their definition as a nation, demonstrates the prevalence
of nationalism within them. Second, the fact that ideologically-sympathetic nations have often
gone to war, further manifests the superiority of national identity to ideology in the minds of
leaders and peoples. As examples, consider the wars between Cambodia and Vietnam as well as
the war between China and Vietnam (Anderson 1991: 1). Finally, in a more practical sense,
leaders need to derive support from the populations most proximate to them (and currently under
their “control”). Nationalism, which allows for the creation of extra-territorial “others” to unite
against (if not at the present, in the future) can allow for greater elite manipulation than universal
ideology which may actually “other” components of the proximate population while hoping for
support from distant and relatively unconnected populations. In short, both preliminary evidence
and practicality suggest that nationalism will typically trump universal ideology when the chips
are down.
Competition for Legitimacy vs. Forms of Legitimacy
Post-revolution irredentism theory does not deny that revolutions often create new forms
of legitimacy that differ dramatically from those of other states in the system. However, while
revolutionary internationalism (and to an extent balance of threat) consider conflict to revolve
around international differences in forms of legitimacy, I consider domestic competitions over
legitimacy to serve as the seeds of international conflict.
In order to understand this distinction, we need to unpack how revolutions are conducted
– by loose coalitions. Regimes, with their control of the coercive and extractive capabilities of
the state, are very difficult to overthrow. Consequently, revolutionaries – those who aspire to
overthrow the regime and create a new type of regime in its stead – will often resort to broad
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coalitions in order to overcome the strong advantage of the regime over any single group. As
Arjomand explains, “… the possibility of successful revolutionary action usually depends on the
formation of coalitions among opposing social groups” (Arjomand 1986: 384). These groups
agree on one thing: the current regime is unacceptable and should be overthrown. Usually, the
groups that form this revolutionary coalition agree on very little else.
However, rather than allow differences of vision to weaken and divide their coalition
before victory, differences are glossed-over and goals are kept vague. As Burns puts it,
“Revolutionary factions, despite their diversity, typically appeal to a small set of images and
concepts, which most significant factions treat as legitimate. However, these images and
concepts are more significant for their connotative rather than their denotative nature: within the
process of revolutionary upheaval, their content is neither agreed upon nor publicly specified”
(Burns 1996: 350). These images and symbols usually revolve around national and cultural
identity, an aspect which each faction can agree upon. For instance, Burns argues that these
images “typically include a vilification of the old regime… and some appeal to generalized
cultural images that are uncontroversial within the society” (Burns 1996: 350). Burns further
notes that in the case of Iran, the Shah’s opponents – though consisting of liberal, leftists, and
Islamic contingents – were unified by their nationalism (Burns 1996: 359). In addition to
overcoming coalitional differences, appeals to nationalism can overcome collective action
problems by giving moral weight to revolutionary movements. For instance, Slater has noted the
importance of “emotive appeals to nationalist… sentiments and solidarities in sparking and
sustaining popular collective action against dictatorship” (Slater 2009: 206).
Once the old regime is overthrown by a revolutionary coalition and the window opens to
create a new regime (and state), the ambiguities in relation to goals become unacceptable. Each
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faction then enters into competition with one another to gain control of the nascent state in order
to form it in their own image. As Arjomand wrote in the case of Iran, “The coalition between the
Shi’ite clerics and the new middle class was highly unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on
the part of the former and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long:
having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no time in liquidating the Westernized intelligentsia”
(Arjomand 1986: 392). Therefore, while hatred of the old regime and vague symbols of
nationalism can hold a coalition together, the removal of the old regime creates coalitional
breakdown.
Yet winning the coalitional conflict doesn’t require killing members of other factions and
such a strategy may not be sufficient for victory. Rather, the conflict continues to be one of
legitimacy, much as it had been when resisting the old regime: the faction that can establish itself
as the most legitimate in the eyes of the population (or the most salient portions of it) while delegitimizing its opponents, has the greatest probability of success. Put simply, factions must
engage in outbidding behavior. As Burns states, speaking of what kind of state will be produced
by a revolution, the “results of the revolution depend much more on the power struggle that
develops within the coalition (including the skillful manipulation of symbols) than upon the
society’s cultural heritage” (Burns 1996: 352). This “skillful manipulation of symbols” is largely
what allows a faction to gain the upper-hand. Therefore, revolutionary factions are faced with an
initial incentive to appeal to symbols that will resonate with their domestic population and grant
them legitimacy. These symbols entail the invocation of the imagined community of the nation
and therefore nationalism. Notably, even revolutionary regimes that formally hold power within
a state will remain wary of potential opposition during the early years of their rule and will seek
opportunities to reaffirm their legitimacy and de-legitimize potential opponents.
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As explained in the next section, this coalitional breakdown and the fight for legitimacy
over other factions, leads to escalating nationalism, as each faction seeks to outbid the others,
which ultimately manifests itself in irredentism – the claiming of territory beyond one’s present
borders due to cultural, historical or ethnic ties. This irredentism then leads to bargaining failure
and war as explained later.
This factional contest for legitimacy is much different than the international conflict over
forms of political legitimacy emphasized by revolutionary internationalists. Forms of political
legitimation dictate what types of rulers are legitimate and from what source their power should
properly be derived. For instance, this is the conflict of divine right monarchs vs.
representational democracies. Conversely, factional contests for legitimacy are about what
particular group will establish the regime within a nascent revolutionary state. While such
competition may involve an internal dispute about what form of political legitimacy the state will
adopt, such a dispute is not necessary. Two factions may appeal to popular sovereignty as their
form of political legitimation, but each still needs to gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the
population to hold power and defeat the other faction.
Irredental Incentives
Revolutionary States
As factions within the revolutionary coalition compete for legitimacy using the currency
of nationalism, assertions escalate and culminate in factions making irredental claims.
Irredentism is an extreme manifestation of nationalism which naturally creates conflict with
other states. This is because irredentism represents an acknowledged discrepancy between “the
nation” and “the state” wherein there exists territories (or peoples) beyond the borders of the
state, which are perceived to rightly belong to the nation. Irredentism further seeks to rectify
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these discrepancies by expanding the borders of the state to match the claimed borders of the
nation. Irredentism is, by its nature, offensive and expansive.
In addition to these expansive, irredental claims, regimes may also make protective
claims of threatened territories. Apparent threats to territories that have changed hands in the
past, especially ones that have only recently been regained or that have a mixed ethnic or
national composition, may also be invoked to gain domestic benefits similar to irredental claims.
We shall call these “protective claims”. Statements regarding such threatened territories are
defensive in nature, but can lead to such offensive actions as preemptive war.
Why would a revolutionary faction resort to irredental or protective claims? While the
incentives for appeals to nationalism have been discussed, this peculiar type of nationalism can
be especially useful for an insecure revolutionary faction, especially one that currently (albeit
precariously) holds power. First, irredental and protective claims craft an adversarial, extraterritorial “other” while framing the faction as the champions of the nation. Second, irredental
and protective claims force other factions to either back the claimants or hazard appearing
unpatriotic. Third, actual territorial gains (or greater control over current territorial holdings)
will demonstrate the superiority of the current faction-in-power to its predecessors (revolutionary
or otherwise). Fourth, crafting a war-like environment allows for greater strong arm policies
domestically. This permits the faction-in-power to be more coercive towards opponents without
appearing illegitimate. Finally, irredental and protective claims allow actors to reignite or draw
attention to existing disputes, rather than having to seek out a new crisis. Pre-existing territorial
disputes are familiar to the audiences of revolutionaries. Revolutionaries don’t have to invent
and sell a new issue; instead, they merely need to make these existing claims more salient and
urgent.
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The combination of these incentives makes it extremely likely that at least one faction of
the revolutionary coalition will resort to irredental or protective claims, so long as such claims
can be logically made. That is, irredental or protective claims cannot be fully invented.
Historical and cultural references must be made and accepted in order for claims to have any
influence. Where a territory has no historical or cultural affinity to a nation – in the eyes of that
nation’s people – an irredental claim cannot be logically made.
Neighboring States
The post-revolution situation also creates incentives for neighboring states to make
irredental and protective claims against the revolutionary state, though the incentives are
different. Revolutions are violent, tumultuous events in the states where they occur. Even
following the revolution, internal competition and the establishment of the new state endanger
the well-being of individuals and groups within the bounds of the revolutionary state. Ethnic
minorities within a state, especially those considered to be of another nation, may be particularly
victimized or at least excluded from access to political power. This will be most noticeable
when the revolutionary state seeks to assert its authority over territorial peripheries and solidify
its borders, according to the incentives mentioned above. Notably, such efforts will often
revolve around disputed territories, where ethnic minorities may be concentrated.
As a consequence, neighboring states (either the regimes within them or their general
populations) may feel acute concern for their ethnic kin, and their assets, within the revolutionary
state. In order to secure their physical and fiscal security, the neighboring state may seek to
pressure the revolutionary regime to return to the preexisting (tacit) agreements for their
treatment. The neighboring state may also seize the opportunity to annex the region inhabited by
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their ethnics (or another historical claim) as the ultimate means of ensuring their security, as well
as achieving territorial gains.
Attempted annexation is most likely when the revolutionary state appears unwilling or
unable to respect the rights of extra-national minorities in the region, as well as when nationalism
begins to swell within the neighboring state. As nationalism can translate into an increased
capacity for mass mobilization, it becomes a form of power that other states may seek to balance
against. One effective means of balancing nationalist capabilities in one state is to invoke
nationalism in one’s own. For instance, Bukovansky notes that by 1796, Prussia had recognized
that it must appeal to nationalism and “the people”, as France did, in order to be victorious in war
(Bukovansky 1999: 213). Bukovansky further points out that European nationalism largely
emerged from the demonstration effects of French nationalism and French occupation
(Bukovansky 1999: 214). While this reaction of balancing nationalism was delayed in the case of
the French Revolution, once nationalism is a latent force within a state, it can be enflamed much
more readily and completely. As nationalism and irredentism surge within a revolutionary state,
it should not be surprising that nationalism and irredentism will also swell in its neighbors. This
combination of balancing nationalism and seeking to protect ethnic kin will make those
neighboring states with minorities in the revolutionary state likely to declare and pursue
irredental claims.
Bargaining Failure
Whether as a result of coalitional conflict within the revolutionary state or out of a desire
to protect ethnic kin by the non-revolutionary state, it is highly likely that an irredental or
protective claim will be established between the dyad (so long as there exists some historically or
culturally claimable territory between the two). But why do these irredental claims lead to war
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rather than a bargained outcome? Wars are very costly in terms of both blood and treasure. We
would expect states to avoid them whenever possible and make bargained agreements. In the
case of territory, bargained agreements could include overlapping sovereignty, division of the
territory, or acquisition by one party through concessions to the other (such as payment, trade, or
acquiescence on another issue). Put more simply, territory can be shared, split, or sold.
But irredental claims which result from post-revolution situations typically fail to achieve
such bargained solutions. This is because these irredental claims, forged by revolutions, suffer
from at least two strong causes of bargaining failure: issue indivisibility and indirect utility.
As Fearon states, “Perhaps some issues, by their very natures, simply will not admit
compromise” (Fearon 1995: 382). These are issues, or in this case claims, that cannot be shared,
split, or sold. While Fearon believes that indivisible issues are few and far between because
issue linkages and side-payments make almost anything negotiable, Kirshner argues that
indivisible issues are “not that rare” (Kirshner 2000: 144). In addition to fights over leadership
of a state, Kirshner points out that “there appear to be a number of conflicts around the globe
over questions of meaningful territory” (Kirshner 2000: 144). Such meaningful territories are
often indivisible because of their association with identity. Some of these territories, such as
Jerusalem, constitute a part of religious identity. Consequently, groups may and do strongly
resist dividing it, sharing it, and especially “selling” it.
But how is indivisibility (especially with regard to territory) produced? As Hassner
points out, there is a disagreement among scholars as to whether indivisibility is produced
through interaction or whether it is a characteristic attributed to an issue by an actor (Hassner
2009: 39). This study takes the attributed characteristic approach for two main reasons. First, if
indivisibility was created through interaction, it would “be impossible to identify indivisible
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issue ex ante, because they will not exist prior to interaction” (Hassner 2009: 40). As an
attributed characteristic, indivisibility can arguably be known prior to the dispute. Second, and
relatedly, the attributed characteristic approach allows for the monadic definition of an
indivisible issue. In other words, a single actor can consider an issue indivisible, independent of
the designation of other actors in a given situation. While conflict is most likely when both
actors consider an issue to be indivisible (dyadic indivisibility), even monadic indivisibility can
greatly increase the prospects for conflict and violence. The monadic designation of an issue as
indivisible is driven by ideational forces, beyond material considerations, with the issue often
being tied to identity or morality.
Furthermore, I adopt Hassner’s “three-part definition of indivisibility”: cohesion,
boundaries, and uniqueness (Hassner 2009: 41). First, cohesion entails the inability to subdivide
a territory. It has become a whole that cannot be split without significantly losing its value
(beyond the proportion of the split). Second, boundaries involve the increasing clarity and
rigidity of the demarcations separating the territory in dispute from surrounding areas. Finally,
uniqueness deals with the growing value and irreplaceability of the territory. It cannot be
substituted.
All of these characteristics are attributed to a territory through social construction. As
Hassner explains, writing specifically about sacred sites, “shared understanding of a space as
sacred is a social construct, produced and sustained by interaction between members of the
society” (Hassner 2009: 95). While this may be especially true with regard to sacred sites, any
territory can become indivisible if it is viewed by members of its society as an indispensable part
of their identity – national, religious, or otherwise. Indeed, as Hassner points out, indivisibility
doesn’t just entail that the territory can’t be divided, it also means that a group “consider the
22
issue indivisible from themselves, signifying that they will not tolerate parting with it” (Hassner
2009: 42). But for this to occur, territory must be considered part of a society’s identity and must
be made meaningful beyond its material worth by appeals to this identity.
In the case of revolutions, territories are made meaningful (and ultimately indivisible)
through nationalism and irredentism. Curiously, a revolution was needed to open this avenue of
territorial meaning. The French Revolution dramatically altered the perception of territory from
a source of dynastic wealth to a part of the national identity (Bukovansky 1999: 206). As
Bukovansky explains, prior to the French Revolution, “Neither contiguity nor national
homogeneity were major priorities of 18th century monarchs, though territorial gains figured
significantly. But there were other means of righting perceived imbalances, including money,
titles, and prestige” (Bukovansky 1999: 205). In other words, this was the time when sidepayments and issue linkages could be used to compensate for territory. Following the revolution
and the surge of national rhetoric, such compensations were no longer feasible. Territory was no
longer the property of the ruler, but rather the domain of the nation. This did not mean all
territories became meaningful, but it did allow regimes and their populations to understand
territory in a new way, and those regions which could be framed as historical or cultural
heritages could become indivisible. This indivisibility would harden as claims were established
and repeated. That is, once a territory was claimed on irredental grounds, the dispute became a
matter of identity and could no longer be treated as a negotiation over a tract of land.
Notably, Hassner argues that “all territorial disputes move toward indivisibility over
time” (Hassner 2009: 163). This entrenchment of territorial disputes is caused by the deepening
of the three characteristics which Hassner associates with indivisibility: “cohesion, boundaries,
and uniqueness” (Hassner 2009: 164). These three characteristics of indivisibility, which
23
entrench territorial disputes, are themselves the product of the continuation of the dispute over
time. That is, the longer the dispute lasts, the stronger these characteristics are likely to become.
For instance, in the case of uniqueness, Hassner explains, “Changes in the fungibility of territory
are driven by loss of life in defense of the disputed land but also by the emotional attachments to
homes, landscapes, and symbolic sites, such as memorials or religious shrines” (Hassner 2009:
164). Some of these effects can only ratchet upward. For instance, more lives can be lost for a
territory, but lives, once spent, cannot be “unlost”. Thus, all existing territorial disputes harden
over time.
This process is also helped along by ideational elites, whose apparent expertise and
authority allow these individuals to partially shape the meaning of specific territory (Hassner
2009: 97). In the case of irredental claims, political elites and other intellectuals may manipulate
the salience and definition of claims through appeals to historical, ethnic, and cultural narratives.
Thus revolutionary factions, which are often headed by such political and intellectual elites, are
poised to manipulate these claims while also having incentives to do so as a means of outbidding
their opponents. As Hassner points out in the case of civil-religious spaces, “In encouraging
citizens to conceive of the disputed territory as civil-religious space, elites can highlight its
irreplaceable value, integrate the space into the nation’s narratives, and link its future to that of
the homeland. Leaders may do so by adopting a quasi-religious discourse that associates the
disputed territory with the identity of the state, its history, and the nation’s sacrifices at times of
war” (Hassner 2009: 167). Irredental claims, which are legitimated through appeals to national
history and heritage, are a prime example of such civil-religious space, especially when blood
has previously been shed for them.
24
But territorial claims are not perfectly malleable. There are constraints which limit both
the making and unmaking of irredental claims. Because indivisibility is socially constructed,
changes to the meaning of territory have to be socially-accepted by the pertinent society. This is
difficult because over time extant narratives become “entrenched and increasingly resistant to
change” due to “repetition and routine” (Hassner 2009: 96). As a result, elites are not wholly
free to create and dissolve irredental claims at will.
The creation of an irredental claim must draw upon existing narratives of historical,
cultural or ethnic ties to the territory. These narratives cannot be completely invented, though
they may certainly be embellished or spun. However, the appeals to these narratives must be
sufficiently convincing to the national audience. Otherwise, revolutionary elites will gain no
benefits (in terms of granted legitimacy) from championing these nationalist claims. In addition,
this nationalist claim must be convincing if these revolutionaries expect citizens to fight and die
for it. These constraints on being able to “sell” a population on an irredental claim serve as a
significant determinant for where (and whether) revolutionaries will establish and promote
irredental claims.
Concerning the ability to negate an irredental claim, revolutionary elites are also
constrained. Once a claim is established and accepted on nationalist grounds, a leader would be
hard-pressed to devalue its meaning. The national importance of the territory has become a
“social fact” (Hassner 2009:96). The more likely result (assuming that the population has truly
accepted its importance as a part of the national identity) is that the leader would hazard
delegitimation in such an attempt. Indivisible claims on territory, once made, are very difficult
to unmake. Thus, while indivisibility of irredental claims can be socially-constructed by clever
revolutionary elites through a manipulation of narratives, they cannot as easily devalue the
25
territory when the threat of war looms. Unable to back down, states that establish irredental
claims are likely to enter conflict unless their opposite considers the territory of minimal value.
In addition to the indivisibility of these irredental territories, regimes may gain benefits
from the war over the territory beyond the value of the territory itself – this is the argument of
indirect utility. As Kirshner explains indirect utility, “States… can often derive indirect utility
from war, that is, benefits which are not a function of the costs and benefits of the specific
contest itself” (Kirshner 2000: 146). These potential benefits can include a boost in domestic
prestige, the divergence of attention from internal shortcomings, and the opportunity to
legitimate suppression of domestic opponents. These incentives increase the likelihood that
revolutionary regimes in particular will fight for a territorial claim even when the direct benefits
of territorial acquisition are less than the costs of war.
Thus between the indivisibility of the territory and the indirect utility of these wars, both
of which are products of the post-revolution environment, bargained solutions between the
revolutionary state and a neighbor with competing claims are highly unlikely. The result is that
wars become highly likely following revolutions. However, these wars will be initiated between
the revolutionary state and a state with a competing territorial claim. Where competing claims
do not exist, wars will not be initiated. Furthermore, wars will be initiated, not when a
revolution creates a competing form of political legitimacy, but rather when coalitional
competition has escalated to the point of irredental claims, with these claims being considered
indivisible.
Conclusion
This study has argued that post-revolution wars are the product of nationalism and
irredental claims rather than the result of ideological antipathies. Revolutions are distinct
26
moments where not only the state, but also the national identity, is reorganized and susceptible to
manipulation. Revolutionary factions are incentivized to appeal to nationalism for legitimation.
Invocations of nationalism escalate and irredental claims are established. These irredental claims
lead to bargaining failures which result in wars. Recognition of this path to war suggests that
post-revolution wars will revolve around those territories where national claims overlap. As a
result, it is possible to create expectations regarding which states are likely to move towards
interstate conflict in a post-revolutionary situation. Knowing where risks are highest is hopefully
the first step towards mitigating those risks and thereby avoiding the horrors of war.
27
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