Chinese Affect towards European Culture:
Research Findings and Policy Implications
Christian WELZEL and Timo GRAF
August 2011
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Positive affect towards European culture is conceptualized as the opposite
of symbolic threat and expected to be associated with more favorable
opinions about China-EU relations, the EU’s role in the world and the EU’s
relative performance vis-à-vis China.
2. 87% of urban Chinese express positive affect towards European culture;
95% and 82% endorse the spreading of European culture in China and
European ideas about democracy, respectively.
3. Urban Chinese do not perceive European culture as a symbolic threat to
their own culture.
4. The study finds that (1) perceptions of European trustworthiness, (2)
perceptions
of
European
aggressiveness,
(3)
individual
cognitive
mobilization, (4) perceived value distance, and (5) the communicated
image of the EU have significant effects on urban Chinese affect towards
European culture.
5. Affect towards European culture is significantly associated with more
favorable evaluations of China-EU relations, the EU’s role in the world and
the EU’s relative performance vis-à-vis China. This is also true for
contentious issues such as the EU’s international promotion of democracy
and China-EU current relations.
6. The attractiveness of European culture constitutes a formidable component
of the EU’s soft power in China.
7. Despite limited room for improvement, the EU can increase its soft power
in China by (1) improving perceptions of European trustworthiness, while
simultaneously reducing perceptions of European aggressiveness, (2)
supporting the Chinese population in acquiring more knowledge about the
EU and Europe, (3) reducing the perceived value distance between China
and the EU, and (4) improving the EU’s image in Chinese mass media.
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Chinese Affect towards European Culture:
Research Findings and Policy Implications
Christian Welzel and Timo Graf*
Introduction
1.1
This paper addresses the following questions: Do urban Chinese express
positive or negative affect towards European culture? What are the
determinants of this affect? And what are its consequences for Chinese
evaluations of (1) China-EU relations, (2) the EU’s role in the world and (3)
the EU’s relative performance vis-à-vis China in various domains?
1.2
There is neither a scientific nor a popular consensus on how to define
culture. We define culture as the historically transmitted system of social
organization of a particular group of people – in terms of artifacts,
institutions and ideas. China-EU relations are relations between two sociopolitical entities (or groups) with or rather from two different cultures.
1.3
Generally, the culture of an out-group may be perceived as constituting a
threat to the culture of one’s in-group, i.e. the culture of the out-group
may be perceived as a “symbolic threat.” Previous research on intergroup
relations shows that symbolic threats have significant negative effects on
attitudes towards out-groups.
1.4
By contrast, it is also possible that the culture of an out-group is perceived
as something positive and potentially inspiring. In such a case, we may
speak of positive affect towards the culture of an out-group. Along these
lines, “symbolic threat” can be re-defined as negative affect towards the
culture of an out-group. It is hypothesized that positive affect towards
European
culture
is
significantly
associated
with
more
favorable
evaluations of China-EU relations, the EU’s role in the world and the EU’s
relative performance vis-à-vis China.
*
Christian Welzel, Professor for Political Culture Research, Leuphana University, Germany,
[email protected]; Timo Graf, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University
Bremen, Germany, [email protected].
3
Do urban Chinese express positive of negative affect towards European
culture?
2.1
Since culture is a multi-dimensional construct, the dependent variable
“affect towards European culture” was measured by having each survey
participant indicate his/her endorsement of the following seven “items”:
Affect
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
2.2
Spread of European culture
Spread of European fashion
European music
European movies
European sci./tech. advances
European ideas about democracy
European ways of doing business
Positive
(%)
95.5
92.3
82.2
83.2
90.0
81.6
85.1
Negative
(%)
4.5
7.7
17.8
16.8
10.0
18.4
14.9
From the above figures one can see that the overwhelming majority of
urban Chinese express positive affect towards various aspects of European
culture. Moreover, except for a small minority, almost all urban Chinese
welcome the spread of European culture in China (95.5%).
2.3
Similarly astonishing is the high percentage of urban Chinese who express
positive affect towards European ideas about democracy (81.6%), despite
the fact that a large majority of 70% of urban Chinese view the EU’s
international promotion of democracy critically (see below).
2.4
For subsequent analyses, the responses to the above items were combined
into an index, so that the phrase “affect towards European culture” always
refers to index values. The above aggregate responses to the seven affect
items (all weighted equally) translate into 87% of survey participants
expressing positive affect towards European culture.
2.5
Finally, it is important to note that all of the survey respondents were
registered residents of large cities at the time of the survey, i.e. no rural
residents participated in this study. Consequently, the findings of this
study may not be extended to China’s rural population.
What determines urban Chinese affect towards European culture?
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3.1
The following variables have been found to have significant effects on
urban Chinese affect towards European culture (ranked by the magnitude
of their effects):
3.2
Perceived trustworthiness of Europeans: As Chinese perceptions of
European trustworthiness increase, so does Chinese affect towards
European culture. This finding reflects the common argument that trust
breeds affect.
3.3
Perceived aggressiveness of Europeans: The relatively strong negative
effect of perceived aggressiveness supports our conceptualization of
negative affect as “symbolic threat”, i.e. the more Europeans are
perceived as being aggressive, the more their culture is perceived as
constituting a threat to Chinese culture.
3.4
Cognitive mobilization: Greater knowledge about the EU and Europe,
higher levels of education and attentiveness to international news all have
positive effects on affect, thus supporting the argument that individual
cognitive mobilization fosters a more self-directed life and reduces ingroup
orientations,
thereby
decreasing
individuals’
susceptibility
to
perceiving foreign cultures as symbolic threats.
3.5
Perceived value congruence: The positive effect of perceived value
congruence confirms previous empirical findings that as the perceived
value congruence increases, attitudes towards foreign cultures, countries
and people become more positive. Generally, humans prefer the familiar
over the alien as it reduces the risk of making incorrect predictions about
the future contingent actions of the “Other”.
3.6
Communicated image of the EU: As one would expect in the case of a
collectivist culture such as the Chinese, the “opinions” of others, be it
friends or the news anchor, have a significant effect on individuals’ affect
towards European culture.
3.7
It is important to note that the above factors account for only 13.4% of
the variance in urban Chinese affect towards European culture, i.e. 86.6%
of variance are explained by factors, which are not discussed in the
literature and therefore not included in our model. This calls for future
research.
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3.8
Once we control for the above factors, the following variables have been
found to have NO effect on Chinese affect towards European culture:
income; nationalism; European language skills; travel to EU countries;
direct contact with Europeans. The last three variables are all indicators of
“cross-group contact.” The fact that these variables have no effect on
Chinese affect towards European culture rejects the famous “contact
hypothesis” that cross-group contact generally has a positive effect on
intergroup relations; this hypothesis could not be confirmed for the
Chinese side of Sino-European relations.
3.9
Interestingly, income does not matter for Chinese affect towards European
culture, which means that the EU cannot rely on the growing affluence of
the Chinese as a factor that will increase the EU’s soft power in the form of
positive affect towards European culture.
3.10 Amidst Western fears of popular Chinese nationalism, it is also important
to note that Chinese nationalism has no effect on Chinese affect towards
European culture and is thus unlikely to diminish the EU’s soft power in
China.
3.11 Finally, it is important to point out that age in and by itself is generally a
significant predictor of affect towards European culture. However, once we
control for the communicated image of the EU, the effect of age becomes
insignificant. This suggests that the differences in affect towards European
culture between the different age groups are mediated by the images that
have been communicated to each group. Given the ideological divide and
the otherwise strained relations between Europe and China before 1990,
one would expect that it is the elderly (> 45) to whom a more negative
image has been communicated. However, it is the younger age groups
(<20-30 and 31-45) to whom a significantly more negative image of the
EU has been communicated. This bodes ill for the future of the EU’s soft
power in China.
What are the consequences of Chinese affect towards European culture?
4.1
China-EU
relations:
The
overwhelming
majority
of
respondents
characterize China and the EU as being “partners” or “friends” (93%)
rather than “enemies” or “rivals” (7%). Also, 93% of the respondents wish
to see more cooperation between China and the EU. However, only 69% of
the respondents view the prospects of China-EU relations as being positive.
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What is more, China-EU current relations and the friendliness of current
relations are positively evaluated by as little as 46% and 36% of the
respondents, respectively.
4.2
The EU’s role in the world: The majority of respondents consider the EU to
play a positive role concerning “peace in the world” (80%), “fighting
terrorism” (76%) and “fighting poverty” (75%). Even more respondents
view the EU as playing a positive role with respect to “scientific progress”
(94%), the “protection of the environment” (91%) and the “international
economy” (86%). By contrast, 70% of the respondents see the EU’s
international promotion of democracy as being motivated by self-serving
interests.
4.3
EU-China comparison: Almost all respondents view the social welfare
situation (93%), the quality of life (89%) and the environmental situation
(89%) as being better in the EU than in China. However, fewer
respondents view the prospects of the European economy (78%) and the
employment situation in Europe (64%) as being better than in China. And
only a minority of 40% considers family relations to be better in the EU
than in China, while another 40% evaluates family relations in the EU as
being worse than in China.
4.4
Ultimately, Chinese affect towards European culture is significantly
associated with more favorable opinions about all aspect of China-EU
relations, the EU’s role in the world and the EU’s relative performance visà-vis China. Although these associations do not allow for causal inferences,
further tests have shown that urban Chinese expressing positive affect
towards European culture have, on the whole, significantly more positive
opinions about the EU in all three issue areas than those expressing
negative effect.
Policy Implications
5.1
On the whole, Urban Chinese express high levels of positive affect towards
European culture, including European ideas of democracy, despite the fact
that the majority of urban Chinese views the EU’s promotion of democracy
in the world as being motivated by self-serving interests. Hence, European
culture is not perceived as a symbolic threat to Chinese culture, but
viewed as something attractive and potentially inspiring.
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5.2
Given this attraction and the fact that affect towards European culture is
associated with more favorable opinions about the EU, we recommend the
EU promote European culture in China in order to expand its soft power.
Despite limited room for improvement, the EU can further increase its soft
power by reinforcing Chinese perceptions of European trustworthiness,
while
simultaneously
reducing
Chinese
perceptions
of
European
aggressiveness.
5.3
Furthermore, given the negative image communicated to the younger
generations of urban Chinese, the EU should pay attention to and try to
positively alter its image in the Chinese mass media. This step should be
accompanied by measures to enhance the knowledge China’s urban youth
has about the EU and Europe through targeted sponsoring of youth
exchange programs (both cultural and educational) and mobile “road
shows” displaying European technological and political innovations.
5.4
Finally, the EU should find ways to reduce Chinese perceptions of value
incongruence, which find expression in China’s repeated calls for respect
for the (perceived) value differences between the EU and China in its
official communications with the European Commission. The EU should
counter Chinese perceptions and rhetoric of this kind by emphasizing
common values such as the rule of law and by flexing its muscles on more
contentious issues such as human rights in backroom talks rather than on
the public stage provided by the mass media.
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