Greymouth March 10th Tornado 2005

Student Research Report 2005/01
Greymouth March 10th Tornado 2005:
An Investigation of the Effects and Subsequent
Response and Recovery Process
Kristen MacAskill
October 2005
3rd Professional Year Project
Supervised by Dr Erica Dalziell
Department of Civil Engineering
University of Canterbury
Resilient Organisations Programme :: New Zealand :: www.resorgs.org.nz
Executive Summary
The purpose of this research was to investigate and document the damage caused by the tornado that
touched down in Greymouth on March 10th 2005. Investigating the damage that occurred and
studying the recovery process after the event helps to gain a better understanding of the implications
for future disaster. A further purpose of this report is to gain an understanding of the perception that
the Greymouth community has of the risk that tornadoes pose to them.
The tornado is viewed as a large event in Greymouth; however its direct effects were confined to a
narrow strip of destruction through a mainly commercial area of town. $9.2 million in insurance
claims have been made as a result of the tornado. It is the only tornado to feature on the New Zealand
Insurance Council database. The path of the tornado is still evident six months after the event. The
high demand for builders has slowed the reconstruction process. No businesses have failed due to
disruption from the tornado, however it will take twelve months for some of them to return to normal
operating capacity.
Help from volunteers and local tradespeople ensured an efficient two day clean up of debris and
minimised further damage that could have been caused by rain on the evening following the tornado.
The effect of the informal volunteer work was significant due to the strong relationships and networks
that exist in the relatively small and isolated town. There was some interruption to traffic and
electricity during the afternoon following the tornado. Electricity was reinstated to most people within
a few hours and all roads were open the next day. Assistance from Urban Search and Rescue ensured
that the emergency services had the capacity to deal with the situation without the declaration of a
civil defence emergency.
Management of the risk of natural hazards became a shared responsibility of local authorities and the
central government when the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 was introduced. In
this act there is emphasis on local communities being self sufficient in the event of a disaster. No
Civil Defence Emergency was declared after the tornado and the Grey District Council led the
response and recovery process. It was the general view of those interviewed in the Greymouth
community that the District Council and emergency services did a good job in implementing a
recovery process. Although not formally activated, the event proved to be a good test of the Civil
Defence Emergency Plan as some improvements in the communication with public and media were
identified. There were a few issues that arose in the response and recovery process and the following
recommendations would increase readiness and ensure efficient response and recovery in the event of
any future natural disaster:
•
Emergency services need to have a backup to the cellphone network (such as a radiophone) to
coordinate their activities because overloading can be a problem even in an event affecting a
confined area.
•
Clear, open lines of communication are needed between the media and the organisation
leading the recovery process. Media should be utilised to communicate with the local and
national community so that the facts of the situation are known. This will stop people from
panicking unnecessarily and help direct them to any services they may need.
•
The organisation leading the recovery process needs to have good internal information flow so
that they are able to communicate responsively to public enquiries.
ii
•
People should regularly check that their insurance is up to date. If a claim is disputed,
employing the skills of a mediator may help to smooth the process of getting an insurance
claim resolved.
•
People in organisations involved in the recovery process need to be educated as to how to deal
with people who have experienced the disaster. A disaster affects people emotionally and
psychologically, so special care needs to be taken in communications to avoid upsetting the
person further.
Meteorologists cannot accurately predict when a tornado will form (Tornadoes! 2005). They know
the general atmospheric conditions that are condusive to tornado formation but the short-lived nature
of tornadoes make them difficult to predict accurately. As a result of two tornadoes touching down in
Greymouth in the last two years, people are becoming more aware of the possible (but currently
unquantifiable) risk of tornadoes. Despite the damage of the tornado in Greymouth, the community is
grateful that there were no major casualties. As a result of being directly affected by the tornado,
businesses and residents have become more careful about making sure that they have good insurance
cover. The majority of locals interviewed as part of this research currently accept the risk of
tornadoes. However, some would consider moving away from the area if tornadoes continued to
touch down.
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge Mayor Tony Kokshoorn and Alan O’Connell of the Grey District Council
for providing me with important information with regards to the response and recovery process in
Greymouth. Thank you to: Des Bull (member of USAR Task Force 2), Erica Dalziell (Project
Supervisor), Warren Gray (NIWA) and Gary MacAskill (Former Insurance Lawyer) for your time and
expertise. Thank you also to those in the community who were directly affected by the tornado for
taking time to talk to me about their experience.
I would also like to acknowledge John Williams (resident in Greymouth) and David Brundson
(USAR) for providing photos.
iv
Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv
1.0
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Objectives of this Research ......................................................................................... 1
2.0
Research Methodology................................................................................................... 2
3.0
Background .................................................................................................................... 3
3.1 How Do Tornados Form?............................................................................................ 3
3.2 Tornadoes in New Zealand ......................................................................................... 4
3.3 Natural Hazards and Civil Defence............................................................................. 6
4.0
The Greymouth Tornado: 10th March 2005 .................................................................. 8
4.1 Tornado path ............................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Summary of Damage................................................................................................... 9
4.2.1 Damage to lifelines.......................................................................................... 9
4.2.2 Structural Damage........................................................................................... 9
5.0
Response....................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 Immediate Response ................................................................................................. 13
5.1.1 The Role of Grey District Council ................................................................ 13
5.1.2 Urban Search And Rescue............................................................................. 15
6.0
Impact Assessment....................................................................................................... 16
6.1 Vulnerability of the community ................................................................................ 16
6.2 Atmosphere around town .......................................................................................... 17
6.3 Businesses ................................................................................................................. 17
6.3.1 Damage, Response and Recovery ................................................................. 18
6.3.2 Insurance ....................................................................................................... 25
6.3.3 Emotional stress related to business.............................................................. 27
6.3.4 Other issues ................................................................................................... 27
6.3.5 Business Continuity....................................................................................... 27
6.4 Residential................................................................................................................. 28
6.4.1 Response........................................................................................................ 28
6.4.2 Recovery........................................................................................................ 29
6.5 Other members of the community............................................................................. 30
7.0
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 32
7.1 Media Exposure......................................................................................................... 32
7.2 Perception.................................................................................................................. 32
7.3 Civil Defence Emergency Management ................................................................... 33
7.4 An Insurer’s Perspective ........................................................................................... 34
7.5 Problems identified ................................................................................................... 35
7.6 Assessment of Response ........................................................................................... 36
7.7 Suggestion for Further Research ............................................................................... 38
8.0
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 39
9.0
References and Bibliography ....................................................................................... 40
Appendix I: Interview Questions ........................................................................................... 44
Appendix II: Damaging Tornado Events Since 1996 ............................................................. 49
Appendix III: Aerial photograph............................................................................................. 51
v
1.0 Introduction
1.1
Purpose
The purpose of this research was to investigate and document the damage caused by the tornado that
touched down in Greymouth on March 10th 2005. This will include a broad analysis of the direct and
indirect economic effects.
There has been little analysis of the economic impacts of natural disasters in New Zealand, compared
to that done overseas (Gray et al 2004). Extreme weather events can inflict significant costs on the
community. It is important to carry out such analyses as they can assist in the development of
appropriate response measures to mitigate impacts of future events. This is especially so in the current
media climate where there has been extensive coverage of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and
Hurricane Katrina. This has heightened the awareness of New Zealanders to the effects of natural
disasters. New Zealanders are exposed to a number of natural hazards, yet in general the public are
not well prepared for an event affecting them (Gough et al. 1997).
Greymouth is a small town on the West Coast of the South Island of New Zealand with a
population of just under 10 000 (Statistics New Zealand 2001 Census). A further purpose of this
report is to gain an understanding of the population’s perception of the risk that tornadoes
pose to them. It is important to gain an understanding of people’s perception of hazards
because their perception correlates to how well they are prepared for a hazard event (Gough
et al. 1997; Davis et al 2005). Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002,
communities in New Zealand are expected to be self reliant in the event of disruption. By
having an understanding of the community’s perception of risk, the local authorities are more
able to develop a relevant disaster plan for the community.
1.2
Objectives of this Research
1.
To document the physical impact that the tornado caused in Greymouth.
2.
To investigate how the community reacted to the event and to identify the key issues that
the community faced after the event.
3.
To investigate community understanding and perception of the risk.
4.
To determine the direct and indirect economic effects on the community.
5.
To analyse the response and recovery process with respect to the New Zealand National
Civil Defence Emergency Strategy.
1
2.0 Research Methodology
A literature review was carried out in order to gain an understanding of the nature of tornadoes and
how they form. The review involved an investigation into the significance of tornadoes in New
Zealand and the risk management processes that have been developed with regards to natural hazards.
The results of this review are detailed in Section 4 of this report.
Some background research was carried out with regard to the best interviewing practice and papers of
a similar nature were reviewed in order to compile a set of relevant and useful questions. Three papers
were used in order to help develop the line of questioning (Gray et al 2004; Davis et al 2005; Becker et
al 2001). The papers involved research into perceptions and impacts of natural hazards within
communities using a survey format. Some of the questions in these papers were adopted into a format
suitable for semi-structured interviews. Correspondence with Adam Munro of Environment Waikato,
who has had experience in this field of work (see Becker et al. 2001), also helped to confirm that the
appropriate questions were being asked. The semi-structured style interview was chosen as it enables
more ‘rich’ information to be gathered through the use of open questions. This style also provides
scope for further questions to be asked in response to the interviewee’s answers as the interview
progresses (Wengraff 2001) (The Art of hearing Data, 2000).
The interviews were done on a non-random sample of the Greymouth population. Due to time limits,
areas that were directly affected by the tornado were specifically targeted. Thus, the research was
carried out on a “purposive sample” (Clark, 1976).
A copy of the original interview questions is given in Appendix I. As is appropriate with semistructured interviewing, the original set of questions were not strictly adhered to during the interview,
but were used more as a guide for discussion. The interview started with asking the residents to
explain their experiences on the day that the tornado hit in order to establish a good rapport. Once this
was established the residents often only needed prompting in order to get the information required.
Frequently, questions were answered before they were asked. Some of the original questions proved
to be irrelevant to the information that was actually needed from the interviewees.
2
3.0 Background
A hazard is an event that has the potential to cause damage or loss of life. There are a number of
definitions for the term “disaster”. It can be defined as what happens when a hazard affects a
vulnerable community or area (Global Education Centre Website, 2005). A disaster is “a serious
disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material,
economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to
cope using its own resources.” (HEMNZ Bulletin, 2005 p7). A further definition is: “A disaster is an
unexpected natural or man-made catastrophe of substantial extent causing significant property damage
or destruction, loss of life or sometimes permanent changes to the natural environment” (online law
dictionary, 2005).
There was no loss of life due to the tornado in Greymouth; the community coped reasonably well
using its own resources and the damage was confined to a 400m wide path. Accordingly, the tornado
could be classed as a disaster only to a certain extent under all definitions. Whether or not the March
tornado is classed as a disaster, an investigation of the damage and study of the recovery process after
the event will help gain a better understanding of the consequences of future disasters.
3.1
How Do Tornados Form?
Tornados are formed within a thunderstorm. In order for a thunderstorm to form three things need to
occur (Furr 2005):
1.
Instability
Instability in the atmosphere occurs when there is warm, moist air at lower
altitudes and cold dry air further up the atmosphere. This phenomenon
creates an upward movement of the air mass near the ground. The
presence of cumulonimbus clouds (Figure 1) are an indicator of an
unstable atmosphere. (Cumulonimbus Clouds, 2005)
2.
Upward Lift
This could be caused by the presence of mountains, cold fronts,
converging air or differential heating. These elements act as the “trigger”
for the formation of a tornado.
3.
Moisture in the mid – low atmospheric levels.
As the moist air rises in the updraft created by the instability, the moisture
cools and condenses. This process heats the surrounding air making it less
dense and the updraft process is continued as this air rises.
Figure 1 Example of a tornado that
has developed from a cumulonimbus
cloud formation
(Source: users.castel.nl/
~brinb05/Con16.htm, accessed August
2005)
A thunderstorm consists of three stages: The cumulous stage, a mature stage and dissipating stage
(Furr, 2005). If a tornado is going to form, it will do so in the mature stage where the storm is in its
most severe form. The formation of a tornado requires a rotation of the wind with respect to height
(called veering). A low pressure area is created at the centre of the rotation (How a Tornado Forms,
3
2005) and when this pressure is low enough, the rotating column of air makes touchdown with the
ground and a tornado is formed. The exact nature of the atmosphere that causes tornadoes to form is
unknown by meteorologists (Tornadoes! 2005) and their short-lived nature make them difficult to
predict accurately.
3.2
Tornadoes in New Zealand
Figure 2 shows the distribution of tornado incidences across the world (within which New Zealand
features as a tornado prone area). It is almost impossible to warn the public in New Zealand about the
presence of a tornado once it has formed as the nature of tornadoes is still not known well and they
cannot be predicted precisely. Due to their short-lived nature and a lack of precise knowledge about
how tornadoes form, it is difficult to estimate how many touch down each year. The MetService
sometimes states 20 tornadoes touch down in New Zealand per year, but this is a rough estimate
(Warren Gray, pers. comm. 2005). It can be confirmed that, of these tornadoes, only one or two a year
will actually cause substantial damage. Appendix II contains a summary of the information on
significant tornado events in New Zealand since 1996, gathered from a list of severe weather events on
the MetService website (2005).
Figure 2 World distribution of Tornadoes
(Source: http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/earth/Atmosphere/tornado/agri_map.html,
Accessed July 2005)
Typically, tornadoes in New Zealand are rated as F0 on the Fujita-Pearson scale with wind speeds of
up to 116kmph. This is the lowest rating of strength and the tornadoes are generally short-lived. The
tornadoes in New Zealand are very small compared to the tornadoes in the United States which
sometimes reach the most violent ratings of F4 and F5 (where wind speeds can reach speeds over
418kmph). However, these types of violent tornadoes are actually very rare and only account for 1%
of the total number of tornadoes that have been recorded worldwide since 1950 (Tornadoes! 2005).
4
In New Zealand, tornados occur mostly on the West Coast of the South Island and on the Western side
of the North Island between Taranaki and Waikato (Gorman, 2005). Tornadoes occur in Greymouth
because the interaction of the landscape and weather produce conditions that are conducive to tornado
formation. An example of such interaction starts with cold westerly winds coming from the Tasman
Sea. When this air hits the land, it is lifted and this causes instability. The presence of the Southern
Alps acts in turning the wind which can initiate the rotation of a thunderstorm (The Breeding Ground
For NZ Tornadoes, 2005). Table 1 lists damage causing tornados that have occurred on the West
Coast in the past five years (Reid & Turner 1997).
Date
Touchdown
08/09/2000
28/03/2001
20/02/2003
Hokitika
Cobden
Hokitika
16/06/2003
Greymouth
02/11/2003
05/01/2005
Westport
Hokitika
10/03/2005
Greymouth
05/09.2005
Hokitika
Damage
Roofs lifted and debris thrown up to 300m in the air
Approximately 20 houses damaged
Small twister, no significant damage however a dog was
sucked into the funnel
Total damage approximately $300 000. Most notable
damage was to roofs
Affected 20 businesses
One house destroyed
Tornado occurred in the main street but there was no major
damage
Destroyed buildings and cars and caused disruption to
power
Damaged roof of one house and truck thrown on its side
Table 1 Tornadoes on the West Coast
(Source: “Coast Prone to Twisters” The Press 11th March 2005)
Tornadoes are not considered to be a major threat in New Zealand as they tend to be weak and shortlived. The damage that they have caused and their potential to do widespread damage is low. Their
threat is especially low compared to other natural hazards, such as earthquakes and flooding (see Table
2). Thus little attention is given specifically to them when it comes to hazard management and
awareness.
Table 2 Table of Natural Hazard incidents
(Source: Britton et al. 2005)
5
3.3
Natural Hazards and Civil Defence
Disasters are difficult to manage due to the complexity associated with them. However, by attempting
to manage the risk a better understanding of the disaster is gained (Risk and Realities, 2005), thus, a
more effective response and recovery plan could be developed. The emergency management system
for disasters is centred in the community, where the aim is to encourage people to be responsible for
their own welfare. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM) 2002 proposes a multiagency approach to handling emergency situations where coordination is the key to managing the
recovery process (South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission, 2004). Although no emergency
was declared in Greymouth after the tornado, coordination of agencies was certainly a key feature in
the recovery process and is discussed in section seven. The CDEM Act requires local agencies to
coordinate CDEM activities across the “four Rs”:
1.
Reduction – Analysis of potential risks to the community is carried out and precautionary
measures then taken where appropriate in order to reduce the effects of these risks if they
were to occur.
2.
Readiness – Programmes and systems are developed before an emergency takes place to
ensure an effective and efficient response.
3.
Response – Implementing the programmes and systems in order to reduce the effects of
an event.
4.
Recovery – Involves a long term view of response until the community has regained the
capacity to function without external help (CDEM Strategy 2004).
The management of risks associated with natural hazards are the shared responsibility of the local
authority and the central government. In order for the government to provide assistance, the local
authorities must have taken reasonable steps towards risk management (Risks and Realities 2005). In
the West Coast CDEM plan, tornados and strong winds have been ranked as a relatively low risk to
the area. Table 3 is an analysis of the risk given in the appendix of the CDEM plan. Because of the
low priority rating of the risk, resources for risk management are more focused on higher priority risks
such as earthquakes, landslides and flooding. However, the tornado that occurred in March is a
reminder that tornados have the potential to cause problematic damage to a New Zealand community.
Analysis of the effects of tornados would serve as a useful tool in developing future policies of hazard
management.
6
Risk description
Tornados and strong winds
Strong winds and tornados have caused considerable damage in the region. By
World standards, West Coast tornados are small, short duration events, however
historically they have caused considerable damage. The West Coast is one of the
most at risk regions in the country.
Likelihood
Little research has been done to determine this. Since 1919 over 50 tornados
have been reported (mostly from coastal areas) – many occurring in remote rural
areas will be unreported. Approximately one a decade causes considerable
damage.
Occurrence:
Pronounced in winter months.
Consequence:
Capacity to cause severe damage.
Human-social: injury and death from flying debris (someone reported killed in
the 1870s).
Economic-infrastructural: power cut/blocked roads = short term. Damage to
businesses = longer term. Business may not make full recovery.
Environmental: debris can destroy natural habitats.
Table 3 Tornado and Strong Wind risk on the West Coast
(Source: West Coast CDEM plan)
7
4.0 The Greymouth Tornado: 10th March 2005
4.1
Tornado path
The tornado hit Greymouth at 1pm, Thursday 10th March 2005. A cold front bringing in unstable air
from the south/southwest followed a strong northwesterly wind and high moisture. This created the
right conditions for a tornado to occur, with the determining factor being a north easterly flow at low
levels along the Southern Alps, which brought on rotation of the storm (Gorman, 2005). An
interesting feature of this tornado is that it formed in the absence of a thunderstorm. Further
investigation of the atmospheric conditions at the time is needed to determine what caused this tornado
to form (Warren Gray pers. comm. 2005).
The tornado formed as a water spout in the river mouth (shown in Figure 3) and made a path of
devastation approximately 4km long and 400m wide. Figure 4 shows some photographs of the
tornado as it progressed through the town. Appendix III shows an A3 sized aerial view of the narrow
path of destruction through the town supplied by the Grey District Council. The photograph was taken
between the 12th and 14th of March; the path of the tornado has been highlighted.
K MacAskill
Figure 3 Mouth of the Grey River
The tornado came within 100m of the path of a tornado that occurred in 2003. It was an unusually
strong tornado for New Zealand, causing significantly more damage than its predecessors (as can be
seen in Table 2). It was given an F1 rating (with wind speeds around 180kmph) but it is possible that
it could have been an F2 (with wind speeds reaching 250kmph). It is estimated that the tornado lasted
10 seconds. Claims have been made that a smaller tornado had preceded it earlier in the week.
Weather radar coverage would have been able to track the tornado, however these facilities are
available only in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. (Gorman, 2005)
8
Anon.
Figure 4
Anon.
Anon.
The Greymouth tornado caught on camera
The event was rated as level two on a scale of one to five in the West Coast Civil Defence Emergency
Management Plan (T. Kokshoorn, pers. comm. 2005). No emergency declaration was made and the
incident was dealt with by the District Council and local emergency services, using the Coordinated
Management Incident Structure.
4.2
Summary of Damage
Several buildings in the direct path of the tornado had to be demolished. There were two sources of
damage to buildings: the first was the force of the wind which tore off structural envelopes; the second
was flying debris hitting buildings at high speeds. The most common damage was smashed windows,
parts of roofs torn off and destroyed garages. The Insurance Council of New Zealand’s records show
that the total claims for costs to insurance members as a result of the tornado was $9.2 million. It is
the only tornado event on the West Coast that is listed on the Insurance Council’s records.
4.2.1 Damage to lifelines
Figure 5 shows one of the power lines that broke in two as a result of the
tornado’s force. The mains electricity was interrupted but most people had
power back on after only a few hours. Those whose properties suffered
significant damage did not have power restored until their properties had
been deemed safe.
Some people experienced problems with the cellphone network on the
Thursday afternoon.
There was some interruption to traffic in town as roads were blocked by
police due to dangerous debris and live wires. This created some traffic
problems. Most of the debris was cleaned up within two days.
J Williams
Figure 5 A damaged power line
4.2.2 Structural Damage
Table 4 documents some of the structural damage that was caused by the tornado. Figures 7 to 9 show
some of the damage that is outlined in the table. Information for this table was collected through
researching media coverage of the events and interviews. Figure 6 is a smaller version of the photo in
Appendix III, showing the path of tornado through the town. The businesses consulted in this study are
highlighted. The crosses on this figure highlight where residential housing sustained significant
damage. “Tornado 101” and “The Big Twister” are two booklets that were produced soon after the
event that provide excellent photographic evidence of the damage.
9
Location
Extent of damage
Residential
A number of houses
affected in Collins Street,
Swainson Street and
Alexander Street.
Community
Rugby clubrooms
Kowhai Manor Rest home
The following businesses
were those most
significantly affected by the
tornado
Alan Devine Engineering
Damage to approximately 45 homes (Marshall 2005). 16
houses were badly damaged or destroyed (Impact, 2005)
Collins street sustained the most damage. Contents of
houses were strewn on lawns, a lot of shattered glass on the
ground and trees uprooted.
Front walls damaged and memorabilia stripped.
Roof torn off at one end causing major structural damage.
Up to 30 Businesses affected (Kidson, 2005).
Commercial/
Industry
Westfleet Fishermans co-op
Smiths Speed and Spares
Auto Village Complex
Aratuna Freighters Ltd
Tour and Charters
Video Ezy
NZ Safety
Boc Gas
Golf range
Tasman Tyre Treads
Trans-West Freighters
Devine and Garlick
Engineering
Wrightsons
Caltex
Lifelines
Injuries
Other
Dozens of cars
Trees
Significant damage to two sides of the building and the
roof.
Structural damage to front sections of the building and part
of the roof.
Roof torn off parts of the building and pushed inwards in
other areas.
Badly damaged roof and windows– part of roof found
2.5km away. Tenants needed temporary premises whilst
building repaired.
Some damage to roof and one truck overturned.
Windows of the entire fleet (14 buses) were smashed while
sitting in the bus depot.
Contents of the shop ripped apart.
Damaged stock
Concrete tilt up slab bent out
Some damaged stock.
Walls blown down, roof punctured. Building condemned.
17/18 holes of the minigolf course badly damaged.
Superficial structural damage to building.
Significant damage to building. 12 tonne truck overturned
in the yard.
One of the biggest buildings in Greymouth and incurred
major structural damage. This included the collapse of an
80 year old brick wall. Almost all windows smashed.
Part of premises condemned however main shop
undamaged.
Some damage to parts of the structure due to flying debris.
Two pumps unoperational.
4 of 5 main feeders at the Greymouth substation damaged.
At one stage during the afternoon half of Greymouth
residents were without power. Power was re-established
during the afternoon.
Hospital had to use generator power for a short time.
Powerlines snapped in half
Two people admitted to hospital with injuries, with a third
being treated and discharged.
St Johns treated three people with minor injuries.
Damaged from small pieces of flying debris to completely
wrecked.
Uprooted.
Table 4 Summary of damage
10
Figure 6 Tornado Path & Affected Businesses
11
Anon.
D Brunsden
Figure 7 Damage caused to residential properties in Collins street
Anon.
Anon.
Figure 8 Debris lying in the streets. Veranda torn off house on the corner
Anon.
Anon.
Figure 9 Overturned and damaged vehicles
12
Anon.
5.0
Response
5.1 Immediate Response
Immediately after the tornado struck, the local police
surveyed the area and blocked off roads that were
dangerous due to being covered by debris and broken
power lines (for example see Figure 10). The role of
the police was to act in an emergency response mode
to secure the area until local authorities had been given
the opportunity to get the appropriate response process
set up. By 8am Friday morning active police
involvement ended. The police fielded a number of
calls from people offering their services and it was
arranged for these people to meet at the fire station
where they were then designated to specific areas.
(Senior Sergeant Clifford Paxton, pers. comm. 2005).
Anon.
Figure 10 Dangerous Debris
There are two incidents of theft on police records in relation to the tornado (Senior Sgt Paxton, pers.
comm. 2005) One incident was the burglary of a motor home while the owner was being treated in
hospital for injuries sustained in the tornado. This incident was reported several times in the media
and it is likely that this helped discourage any further incidents occurring.
A sense of community spirit was evident as volunteers came together with building crews to clear the
debris left in the wake of the tornado. Within 20 minutes of the tornado striking people were out in
the streets beginning the clean up. This process was assisted by a fleet of trucks and front end loaders.
The Gloravale Christian community contributed teams of builders and crew to work throughout the
town. KFC provided food for these clean up crews. 25 people from Urban Search and Rescue
(USAR) worked through Thursday night to secure damaged buildings. New World donated food
vouchers valued at $350 which were distributed to make sure that people were being fed.
The clean up process was aided by good weather in the week following the event. The majority of
debris was cleaned up in the first two days. The main challenge in the first week was to secure
affected buildings to avoid theft and minimize any further damage that could be caused by rain.
5.1.1 The Role of Grey District Council
A meeting was called immediately after the event to assess the need to declare a state of emergency.
In order for a Civil Defence emergency to be declared, a situation must arise where the safety of the
public or property of New Zealand has been compromised. This compromise is such that loss of life,
injury, illness or distress has occurred and cannot be dealt with by the existing emergency services, or
there is a need for special organisation (CDEM Act Interpretation, 2005). It was decided that a
declaration was unnecessary as there were no major casualties and the tornado itself was no longer a
threat. There was only a need to coordinate a clean up rather than protecting people from further risk.
As the event was rated as a level two incident, Civil Defence did not take the lead role in the response
and recovery process (CDEM Plan, 2005). The local police and volunteer fire brigade did not have
the capacity to coordinate the process so the Grey District Council adopted the lead role. Civil
Defence was kept on standby as a precautionary measure and the Council followed their Civil Defence
plan to the extent thought appropriate.
13
Thirty minutes after the tornado hit, the Mayor was informed that an Urban Search And Rescue
(USAR) team had already been deployed from Christchurch. USAR are trained in responding to
hazards, so have a good knowledge of high priority jobs in clean up operations. The group worked
through the night to secure buildings and provide a safer environment for recovery activities.
A meeting was held by the Council at 4pm (three hours after the tornado had hit) to develop direction
for recovery. The recovery process did not strictly follow any formal plans because no emergency had
been declared. However, elements of the CDEM plan were used as part of the recovery. For example,
a recovery committee was formed between the Council, Housing New Zealand, Victim Support and
Work and Income. People from head offices of each entity came to Greymouth and daily meetings
were held to coordinate where support was needed and direct activities for the day. Jobs for the
committee were (in order of priority):
1. House all residents requiring accommodation.
2. Liaise with insurance companies for residents having problems.
3. Help residential owners financially where possible.
4. Help vehicle owners financially where possible.
5. Assess need of businesses to help where possible. Advise West Coast Development Trust of
businesses who needed further help.
One of the main focuses of the Council was to reassure people that the recovery was moving forward
and to keep everyone informed with up to date information. The Mayor was out in the streets giving
words of support whilst investigating the worst hit areas. A list of contacts had been developed in the
Civil Defence Plan previously, however it was through an intimate knowledge of the local community
that the Council made calls to ask people for assistance in the clean up. Local radio stations were used
to provide information to public after the event. For example, the bus fleet was out of action so
parents needed to be informed that their children were okay and that some would have to come to the
school to pick them up, while others would have their children taken home in army trucks.
The Mayor went into the affected areas of town to investigate what issues needed to be dealt with
immediately. The cellphone was used as a means of directing the response from the affected areas.
Displaced residents were provided with emergency accommodation and elderly people moved out of a
rest home that had been hit.1
The Council was surprised at the lack of requests for financial assistance. They had expected many
more people to take advantage of the Mayoral Relief Fund. This perhaps can be attributed to the
nature of the community where people assume that there were others more in need than themselves.
Refer to Section 7.1 for further discussion on this subject. A month after the tornado only a fraction of
Mayoral Relief Fund had been distributed. An insurance assessor was employed by the council to go
out and find people to distribute the Mayoral Relief Fund to, this ended up totalling $90,000. In
accordance with the priorities of the recovery committee, financial help was first offered to residents
who were badly affected, then to people whose vehicles had been damaged, then to businesses. (T.
Kokshoorn, pers. comm. 2005)
1
Residents were moved to an empty student hostel recently purchased by the local polytechnic.
14
5.1.2 Urban Search And Rescue
Urban Search And Rescue (USAR) is comprised of personnel that are highly trained in dealing with
urban emergencies. It is administered by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
and the New Zealand Fire Service. The purpose of USAR is to provide an integrated response through
drawing together expertise in responding to emergency situations to reduce the impact of a disaster.
USAR is still in its development stages as it is only at two thirds of the recommended minimum
operational capability (with around 60 members currently part of Task Forces) .
In the event of a serious incident, the Fire Service communication centre identifies the need to deploy
a USAR task force. The decision to deploy is made at a top level of the Fire Service, at the national
headquarters. A team of 25 members of USAR Task Force Two were deployed to Greymouth after
receiving a request from the Fire Service within 30 minutes of the tornado impact. There were some
initial delays once the team arrived as the local police were not aware of the availability and role of
USAR teams in New Zealand, so this needed to be explained. Lack of general knowledge about the
capabilities of USAR is an issue that has been identified by USAR and planning is currently underway
to inform people of this resource (John Lovell, pers. comm. 2005).
The aim of the team was to assist the fire brigade through:
• Securing dangerous structures (minimizing further damage to buildings and injuries to
people).
•
Searching for anybody that may be trapped in debris.
•
Waterproofing damaged buildings to minimize further damage.
•
Securing/removing dangerous material that could fall on people such as damaged chimneys.
USAR Task Force Two based themselves at the local fire station and worked overnight to secure
buildings and ensure safety through reducing hazards such as removing loose roofs. They made a vital
contribution to reducing the impact of the tornado on the town. Figure 11 shows the team at work
using equipment borrowed from local businesses. The Task Force received a general appreciation of
their work as it raised the level of safety in the town through their expertise and efficiency. Most
locals welcomed their help and supplied cups of tea as a token of appreciation. A prime example of
the important role USAR played in the recovery process was their work in cleaning up broken glass
and debris at Dispatch and Garlick Engineering. The building was one of the worst hit in the area and
it was essential that work was not stopped for more than two days in order for the company to survive.
(Des Bull pers. comm. 2005) (USAR website, 2005).
D Brunsdon
D Brunsdon
Figure 11 USAR Crew in action on the Dispatch and Garlick building
15
6.0 Impact Assessment
6.1 Vulnerability of the community
A previous study (Gough et al 1997) revealed that people believe that cleaning up after a disaster is a
community activity; those who were least affected helping out those who were most affected. The
community spirit was a “humbling feature” of the response to the “Weather Bomb” that hit the
Coromandel in 2002 (White 2003) and this statement can be transferred to the response in Greymouth
after the tornado. Everyone that was involved in the interviewing process commented on how well the
community came together to tidy up the town immediately after the tornado. Tradespeople from
around the town stopped work on their jobs for the day to help secure buildings around the town.
There was no coordinated clean up contract between the council and contractors, such as Fulton
Hogan and Westroads; the nature of the community determined that these businesses voluntarily came
to help. A comment was made in the interviews that people in the Greymouth community are
predisposed to helping others out in a disaster situation, as the nature of the climate on the West Coast
means that everyone is at risk from being affected by a weather event, so people pitch in where they
can.
People’s vulnerability to a risk is influenced by the following factors (Buckle, 1998):
1. Resource Availability (e.g. wealth, income, insurance)
2. Social isolation (e.g. poor social networks)
3. Pre-existing stressors (e.g. previous exposure to disaster)
Lower income individuals have fewer resources at their disposal and tend to experience longer periods
of residential instability following a disaster event (Hutton, 2001; Miller & Nigg, 1993).
Greymouth is a small town on the West Coast of the South Island of New Zealand with a population
of just under 10 000. The median income is $14,800 for Grey District and $18,500 for all of New
Zealand. (Statistics New Zealand 2001 Census). Most people who were affected by the tornado had
good insurance cover. The high amount of insurance cover is likely to be due to people being aware
of their risk to natural hazards though living in Greymouth’s environment which makes the town
prone to flooding. However, the relatively high cover came as a slight surprise to the Council as the
tornado tore through Blaketown, which is an area of reasonably low socio-economic status. The
actual status of those who were directly affected was not identified in this study, so no definite
conclusion on this issue can be established.
The West Coast is the most isolated part of New Zealand (Greymouth, 2005) but social isolation is not
a factor within Greymouth. Research has shown that a community is a voluntary construction; people
decide to participate in a location and in doing so they contribute to the community spirit of that place
(Wild, 1981). The isolation of Greymouth contributes to the strong community spirit within the town.
The people who live there choose to participate in a town which is large enough to be self sufficient
but small enough for people to know other members of their community.
There are many definitions of “community”. Stephenson (1979) discusses two definitions. Firstly,
“the community” refers to a settlement that is defined by geographic boundaries. Secondly, a
“community” suggests something more social including personal intimacy, emotional depth and social
cohesion. The cohesive social network within Greymouth aided the efficiency of the clean up process
following the tornado. People had friends and family to help them clean up as well as neighbours
whom they did not know. Formal volunteer groups such as the Gloravale Christian group also assisted
the clean up process. The culture of the town reflects the more traditional view of a community.
16
People help out neighbours in need because they know the same would be done if the situation was
reversed. This culture is becoming less prevalent in the growing New Zealand cities. In cities, people
often do not know who their neighbours are and the large size of the community makes an integrated
network across the community impossible. That is, there is a lack of “community” in “the
community” (Stephenson, 1979).
Finally, a tornado that touched down in 2003 followed a path that was very near to the 2005 tornado.
Some who live in the area near these two paths are becoming more aware of the risk of tornados
affecting them. A number of those who were directly affected by the March tornado said that they
would not stay in the same place if another tornado were to come through; thus this tornado has
become a pre-existing stress factor for any future events that may occur. If tornados continue to form
in Greymouth, people are going to be more likely leave the community rather than rebuild. This could
have a negative effect on the strong community spirit within the town.
6.2 Atmosphere around town
A number of people were severely affected by the damage caused by the tornado. Significant damage
was sustained by a number of houses and businesses. Within the narrow strip of destruction, damage
to housing ranged from superficial debris damage to significant structural damage resulting in housing
being demolished. Despite this, the general feeling around the community was one of relief and
optimism. That is because a number of those affected thought that the situation could have been a lot
worse. It was extremely lucky that no-one was killed and there were minimal injuries. But for a
number of fortuitous factors there were minimal injuries and damage caused by the tornado. These
factors included:
•
Residents of the Kowhai Manor Rest home were congregated at one end of the rest-home and
hospital for a check up after lunch, thus the area of the building that was in the path of the
tornado was unoccupied when the tornado struck.
•
The tornado’s path narrowly missed the main shopping area.
•
Many people had stories of flying debris narrowly missing them.
•
The tornado path struck the front shop of Boc Gas but left numerous gas filled bottles
untouched just metres away.
•
The power cut off at Dispatch Engineering just in time for workers to hear the roar of the
tornado and to dive for shelter.
6.3 Businesses
The impact of the tornado on the businesses in its path varied with the size and type of the business.
The purpose of this section is to document the experiences of some of the businesses that were directly
affected by the tornado. The first section describes damage that was caused and how long it took for
businesses to return to a degree of normality in their operation. The following sections discuss some
of the comments raised during the interviews; these comments are not attributed to any particular
business to protect commercial sensitivities.
17
6.3.1 Damage, Response and Recovery
Allan Devine Engineering – Machining and hydraulic repairs; specialists in general and marine
engineering.
The tornado tore the roof off the portal frame building, along
with the west side and front walls shown in Figure 12. A
major loss to the business was the destruction of an eight
tonne bucket truck. It is thought that the strongest point of
the tornado must have been centred over the truck in order to
produce enough force to move it. If the centre had been ten
metres closer to the building it would have caused a lot more
damage to it, and would have been more likely to cause loss
of life. Only the purlins and roofing materials needed to be
replaced as the steel structure was unaffected by the force of
the winds. The main doors were salvaged and repaired by
the business.
Figure 12 West side and front ends of the
building were repaired quickly
A relation of the owner is a carpenter and he arrived on the scene immediately to measure up the
building. This early action meant that the business was first in line for steel roofing and quick work on
the premises meant that a majority of the rebuilding was completed in four days and the building was
fully secure in six days. Other businesses offered facilities to enable the business to carry out
scheduled work. Two repair jobs were relocated in order to complete them but the focus was put on
getting the existing premises up and running rather than spending time relocating equipment.
It is difficult to assess the potential jobs that the business has lost through people being deterred from
approaching the business in the knowledge that it was directly affected by the tornado. However,
existing customers were understanding and prepared to wait for their jobs to be done. There had been
some work gained due to damage to property caused by the tornado but a potential opportunity was
lost as the eight tonne truck that could have been out on hire following the tornado had been written
off.
Smiths Speed and Spares - Suppliers of automotive parts and accessories
Severe damage was caused to the roof of the premises. Most of the beams were still structurally sound
so the work cost was in the replacement of purlins and re-roofing. An extensive amount of damage
was done to windows and the walls on one corner of the building. The first priority in the response to
the tornado was to check that everyone was safe then to check the building for parts that had the
potential to come loose in further winds and cause more damage.
During the afternoon friends, family, customers and other volunteers helped in the clean up. A real
estate agent organised storage space in empty premises across the road that had been unaffected by the
tornado. Stock was moved into the building that evening.
The staff spent two solid weeks cleaning up the majority of the debris. Full capacity had not been
reached in September because efficiency has been hindered due to the temporary set up of the shop. It
is not expected that the business will reach full capacity until March next year.
18
The section of the building to the right of Figure 13 needs to be redesigned as the existing roof design
no longer meets the required building standards. Some of the roof has been rebuilt using existing
beams with new purlins and iron. Other parts of the roof needs beams replaced. Figure 14 shows a
laminated beam that has torn apart along its laminations due to twisting. The premises initially used as
temporary storage were purchased. This was done to avoid having to move the shop out (if another
buyer had purchased the premises) before the old premises had been repaired.
K MacAskill
Figure 13 New roof on two storey building. Reconstruction on right building has had problems
K MacAskill
Figure 14 Laminated beams did not survive
Driving Range and Mini Golf Course
The building for the driving range was condemned because of damage caused to the structure.
Seventeen of the eighteen holes in the mini golf course sustained damage. The driving range and mini
golf course were relatively new businesses having only been operating for three months and one
month respectively. It is difficult to assess how much income was lost through the temporary closure
of the business as it was only just getting established. However, insurance cover for business
continuity identified trends for sales and loss of income costs were covered through extrapolating
these trends.
The major clean up process was completed in two days. The worst fear of the owner was that a
passer-by would injure themselves on the debris lying on the exposed site and effort was put into
cleaning up as quickly as possible.
It is essential that these businesses are in operation by the summer months as this is their most
profitable trading period. The new building for the driving range arrived in Greymouth late August
and it is expected that operations will resume in early October. The state of the property six months
after the event is shown in Figure 15.
19
K MacAskill
K MacAskill
Figure 15 Upper: New building yet to replace the destroyed building.
Lower: Work is still to be done on the minigolf course.
Video Ezy - A Video Hire Company
The Video Ezy premises had the roof torn off and all the windows broken (as shown in Figure 16).
The first focus for the owners after the tornado was to sort out temporary premises for the business.
NZ safety (which leases the premises next door) offered space in their shop which helped to get the
business operating in eight to nine days. A week was spent getting the shop set up while processing
any product that was being returned. Salt water brought in with the tornado caused some damage to
stock.
Anon.
Figure 16 Severe damage to the Video Ezy Premises
The business is going to make the temporary premises permanent and construction of a new access for
NZ safety was occurring in late August (see Figure 19). Video Ezy had to leave a corridor of access
for customers to get to NZ safety which was set up in the back of the premises because of the
temporary arrangement. This meant that Video Ezy had to extend their morning hours in order to
work with NZ Safety hours. The business was yet to return to a status of normal operation six months
after the tornado so it was difficult to gauge the total damage to the business.
20
Trans-West Freighters – Transport Company
Significant damage was caused to the building and fences surrounding the yard. A twelve tonne truck
was lifted up during the tornado and was left overturned in the yard. The business did not close at any
time after the tornado. No alternative premises could be found so operation continued on site. A
builder arrived on site during the afternoon after the tornado hit to help board up windows. Staff did
the clean up on site and this cost up to $30 000 worth of time, which is approximately 15% of the total
cost incurred. The builder was available to help start repair work on the building however there were
problems with getting approval for work to start from the insurance company. The builder was
contracted for other work so Trans-West had to wait four to six weeks before repair work was started.
This work took nearly three months to complete.
Tasman Tyre Treads Suppliers of vehicle tyres and batteries
The worst damage caused by the tornado to Tasman Tyre Treads was the cladding being ripped off a
building. The overturned vehicle in Figure 17 shows the strong force of the tornado as it passed these
premises. The nature of the stock at Tasman Tyre Treads meant that it was resistant to damage and
only negligible costs were incurred through damaged stock.
Anon
K MacAskill
Figure 17 Overturned vehicle outside Tasman Tyre Treads
Figure 18 Old sign is the only sign of damage in August
The business was closed for one and a half days and part of the business remained closed for a number
of weeks. Staff had contacts with local tradesmen which meant that the clean up process was done
quickly. Staff worked into the night to secure the building as quickly as possible.
The business has five locations throughout New Zealand and employs a total of 30 staff. A small
amount of financial assistance was offered to the business in July when the remaining money in the
Mayoral Relief Fund was being distributed. The offer was turned down as the business had the
resources it required to recover from the damage.
The only remaining work to be done is the installation of an electrical sign out the front of the business
(shown in Figure 18) and some paintwork. The delay in getting the sign replaced is due to having to
get consent to put up an improved sign and working out with their insurers how much money will be
paid out for the new sign. The paintwork is not an essential job and it has been delayed until the
weather is more suitable.
21
Boc Gas - Specialists in gas supplies and related products
A tilt up concrete slab wall was bent outwards as a result of the forces applied to it when the tornado
came through the building. There was a lot of damage done to stock in the shop which rendered it not
saleable. The building was made adequately secure during the afternoon after the tornado and it took
two days to clean up a majority of the debris.
Quick communication helped to minimize the effect on the business. A portacom suitable for
temporary premises was sourced and transported from Christchurch the following day and power was
on by day three. There were minimal effects on the service as a system was already set up to divert
unanswered phone calls to another branch. Any orders made were then notified through calling the
manager’s cellphone.
It was fortunate that the tornado passed through the left side of the building shown in Figure 19
because their gas bottles are stored in the right side. If they had been struck the cost of damage would
have been a lot higher. The arrows in Figure 19 point to the tilt up panel that was badly damaged and
how close this was to the gas bottle storage.
K MacAskill
Figure 19 Left: View of the entrance to the premises, only the left-hand side of this building was
affected by the tornado. Right: New tilt up panel erected Late August.
The office was still using the portacom in late August. Extra space in the gas bottle store was
temporarily housing shop stock until reconstruction was finished. The majority of reconstruction was
carried out in only one week but over five months passed before it commenced. The damaged tilt up
slab was not replaced until mid-August due to the unavailability of tradesmen.
There was no notable loss in income to the business as it was able to continue running through the
help of other branches. The offer of help from the Mayoral Relief Fund was turned down as the
business had enough resources behind it to avoid any financial problems
Westfleet Fishermans Co-op – Fishing operation
Westfleet is one of the larger businesses affected by the tornado. It was essential that the business did
not lose much operating time as the large turnover and perishable nature of their stock meant that a
lost day results in a significant loss of revenue. There can be up to two million dollars of fish stock in
their cold stores at any one time and it is important that the business keeps processing these.
22
Carpenters and tradesmen were contacted immediately. Initial repairs saved the main electrical area of
the engineering room from rain damage that evening. The initial cleanup of debris took two days and
this was done with internal labour. Temporary props were put in to support roofs where the truss
system had been damaged. Figure 20 shows one of these props still in place almost six months after
the event.
Damage is being repaired by the engineering staff of the business. The final stage is reconstructing the
office area which is expected to be finished by October. The building was reconstructed with extra
strengthening and safety glass has been used in replacement windows in order to make the building
more secure. This construction is shown in Figures 21 and 22.
K MacAskill
Figure 20 Temporary support
Figure 21 Extra strength used in new structure
Figure 22 Safety glass used in the new windows
Dispatch and Garlick Engineering Manufacturer of milking equipment, pressure vessels, steel
fabrication, general - marine and heavy engineering
Dispatch and Garlick Engineering were the largest business to be hit by the tornado and the building
sustained the most significant amount of damage. Therefore, significant photo documentation has
been included to show the extent of the damage and the repairs. Most of the roof was torn off and
many windows were destroyed. The photo montage in Figure 23 show the major damage caused to
the structure. Due to the large turnover of the business and tight time frames for delivery it was
essential that little operational time was lost.
23
Anon
Figure 23 The tornado path went straight through the middle of the business (unknown source)
Immediately after the tornado a staff member got as many tarpaulin covers as possible from
downtown. The USAR team helped to secure the building. As a result, no water damage was
sustained from the rain that evening. Part of the workshop was set up after one day and some
production resumed. The first day involved cleaning up rubble and a glazier measured up the
windows. Clean-up work was done by staff as the area was reasonably dangerous for volunteers to
work in. Construction of a temporary frontage and the repair of part of the roof was completed the day
after the tornado. Some upcoming jobs were given to competitors and there would have been some
loss in profit through being unable to undertake work that had been quoted.
The building housing the business is listed as a historic building. The Historic Places Trust has
contributed some finance in order to maintain the historic fabric of the building. A small donation
from the relief fund was also accepted. Construction on a new roof has been started but is yet to be
finished as it is a major construction job. Figures 24 to 29 show the state of the building in late
August. There was a delay in obtaining drawings for the new building which had to be redesigned to
bring it into compliance with the latest building codes. In late August some staff were still spending
time working on damage that was caused by the tornado.
K MacAskill
Figure 24 Temporary frontage
Figure 25 Temporary structure
24
K MacAskill
Figure 26 Weather protection
K MacAskill
K MacAskill
Figure 27 Part of the new structure in place
Figure 28 New structure tied into existing columns
K MacAskill
Figure 29 Extensive damage still evident
6.3.2 Insurance
There were four main insurance related problems associated with the tornado:
1. Underinsurance
2. Dealing with insurance assessors
3. Cost of labour
4. Finalising costs
25
Some businesses directly affected by the tornado did not have complete and up-to-date insurance
cover. One business was underinsured by approximately 20% through underestimating the worth of
their building and the risk of damage. They have since increased their coverage so that they are well
insured for future events. Another business had a twelve year old policy that did not cover later
improvements to the building, such as a roof replacement. They were aware that the policy was out of
date and had mentioned this to their insurance broker a few months before the tornado, but nothing
had been done to update it. Furthermore, after the event the owner of the business wanted to ensure
that what was left of the business was still covered. They were assured that the policy was still valid.
However, $3500 further damage was caused on a new roof due to wind gusts, but this damage was
uninsured as the policy had ended when the sum insured had been paid out only a couple of days
previously.
Another recurring problem was frustration surrounding the work of insurance assessors. Some initial
delays in settling insurance claims resulted from lack of confidence in the professional ability of the
insurance assessors to correctly assess the remedial costs of the damage that occurred. In order to
overcome this, two of the businesses interviewed recommended the use of a mediating group between
the insurers and the business, as this had made their experience in dealing with insurers less
problematic. The presence of an advisory group acts as a buffer zone between the insurance
companies and the insured. As this group does not have a stake in the financial situation those insured
feel less concerned that the damage they have sustained has been undervalued. Such a group may also
be helpful in advising people of items that can be claimed under the insurance cover that would not
have been considered, such as the cost of photocopying documents done as a result of the interruption.
Disagreement over the cost of labour involved in rebuilding after the tornado added to the frustration
of the insured. Insurers would only pay out a certain rate for tradesmen and this did not always meet
the charge out rates of those who carried out the work. This was especially frustrating for businesses
that had tradesmen who had dropped their tools on a well-paid job in order to secure damaged
buildings as quickly as possible to prevent further damage occurring that otherwise would have
resulted in a higher claim on the insurance.
Finally, another problematic experience with an insurer occurred not in the initial process, but six
months later. One of the businesses had still not returned to normal operating conditions and was
unable to finally quantify the amount of its claim for damage. It was under some pressure from the
insurer, which wanted to finish processing the claim. This gave the businesses’ owners added
frustration, as their continuing to operate in a temporary manner was due to external factors that they
were unable to control.
The cause of insurance problems is often because there is a lack of understanding of the underlying
law of insurance. People may not have a full appreciation of what their policy covers. The insured
may feel that they have been treated unjustly when they do not receive the compensation expected.
But, they may be unrealistically expecting more compensation than what they were insured for. There
is also a problem in the industry where assessors have a range of abilities and they act on the basis of
the insurer’s policies. This can result in people not receiving the cover for which they were entitled.
Ensuring good personal relations to reduce misunderstanding between the parties would help to
mitigate this problem. In the event of a disaster communities may want to jointly instruct a
professional lawyer to advise them on their claims. It is crucial to employ the right lawyer because
hiring a lawyer (especially for smaller personal claims) can create further problems and make the
claim process more complicated. (Gary MacAskill, pers. comm.2005)
26
6.3.3 Emotional stress related to business
As with any major disaster, people experienced various degrees of shock following the tornado.
However, this shock subsided during the week following the event and the major stress associated
with the businesses affected by the tornado was involved in trying to recover the business to normal
operating levels.
It will take up to twelve months after the tornado for most businesses to return to normal. A lot of
staff time was spent cleaning up in the initial two weeks following the tornado. However, almost six
months later cleaning up is still an ongoing process. Part of this problem is having a business set up in
a temporary manner which has means that it is not being run as efficiently as usual because time is
spent locating items that keep being relocated.
Emotional and psychological stress of those affected emerged over the weeks of clean up. The real
pressure for a number of businesses was dealing with the administration involved with the insurance
process. Unavailability of tradespeople also served as a point of frustration as it has caused delays in
getting business back to normal. Another source of stress was experiencing difficulties when dealing
with landlords which delayed the recovery process.
6.3.4 Other issues
One of the businesses received an official complaint about the state of its building early in third week
after tornado. The source of the complaint was not revealed to the business owner so the issue could
not be discussed with the complainant. The complainant did not appear to realise the special nature of
the situation and make an exception to the state of the building. Not only was there a high demand for
builders, but work on the building was being held off to maintain evidence of the extent of damage for
insurance claim purposes.
Another issue that arose in the response and recovery process involved an incident where an employee
from OSH arrived at one of the businesses to stop men fixing up a damaged roof. There were four
men on the roof but only two harnesses available and it is against standard regulations to have anyone
working in such a situation without a harness. OSH had a legal obligation to stop the work but this
caused aggravation amongst the workers trying to make the building safe and prevent further damage.
The building was considered to be in a “perilous” state and it was felt by an engineer and employee of
the organisation involved who was leading the clean up, that normal regulations should be overlooked
in such circumstances and that OSH had exceeded their jurisdiction. See the discussion Section 8 for
more comments on this issue.
6.3.5 Business Continuity
Business continuity is a major concern in natural disaster events because history shows 50% of
businesses fail as a result of being affected by such an event (Nelson District Council, 2005). All the
businesses affected by the tornado in Greymouth were recovering, with a positive outlook six months
after the event. An interesting factor in the recovery of the businesses is that none of the people
interviewed said explicitly that they followed a contingency plan to recover the business. However, a
three stage contingency plan that businesses are recommended to have (Nelson District Council)
follows very closely the process that happened naturally in Greymouth. This is set out below:
27
Recommended course of action
What actually happened
Phase 1:
Secure hazardous conditions;
Buildings secured over first 24 hours.
Immediate
establish the control organisation;
Loose debris cleaned up in the streets
Response
provide initial status report. Phase 1 is
over 48hours.
likely to extend for the first 24 hours
or so.
Phase 2:
Effect minimum operational status; to
This phase typically extended from
Business
review phase 1; to initially prepare for
1.5 days to 9 days excluding the golf
Continuity
phase 3. Phase 2 is likely to extend
range and mini golf facility
for up to two weeks.
Phase 3:
Provide an orderly programme for full
Businesses are gradually becoming
Disaster Recovery
operational restoration. Phase 3 may
fully operational after 6 months. The
extend for six months or more.
process has depended on the
processing of insurance claims,
discussions with landlords and the
availability of tradesmen
One problem that has been encountered by some of the businesses is the unexpected amount of time
that it has taken to recover from the disaster. This has proved to be a point of frustration for people,
however the cause of this problem was due to external issues, rather than their lack of planning. One
such issue was that there was already a heavy demand on builders in the region. The Insurance
Council reported people taking advantage of the situation and doubling their rates for reconstruction
and repair work (Slade, 2005). There were also reports of people quoting work that they were not
qualified to carry out.
6.4 Residential
The purpose of this section is to outline the recovery process from a resident’s perspective and to
highlight some of the problems that arose during this time.
6.4.1 Response
It was the general view of those interviewed in the Greymouth community that the District Council
and emergency services did a good job in implementing a recovery process following the tornado.
The residents generally had very good experiences with their insurers whilst one resident had
problems similar to those experienced by business through a lack of trust of the insurance assessor.
Friends, family and locals came down to the areas hit by the tornado to help clean up. Family arrived
with tarpaulins and immediately got to work. Contractors had been organised by the council to collect
the debris that was being piled up at the front of people’s sections. Although residents recognised the
need to clean up the street, there was a feeling that the quick rate at which most of the debris was
collected meant that a number of items that could have been recovered were never found by their
owners.
28
The clean up process was hindered through a large amount of traffic accumulating in the street. It is
human nature to be curious and despite requests from authorities asking people to stay out of the area,
a large number of “rubber-neckers” blocked up the streets to get a closer look at the damage. People
greatly appreciated the help that they received from volunteers but they had strangers walking through
their sections. One couple recalled a strange man walking around their house. They assumed that he
was associated with one of the organisations helping in the clean up but they never found out. Not
only was this matter a risk for theft, but it added to the stress of the people trying to clean up. Their
property was in a mess and they were suffering from a degree of shock from what had just happened
and the strangers and media invading their space to get a closer look simply added to their stress and
frustration.
A resident of a house that was badly damaged was taken to the hospital for a check up. Upon
returning to his house he was told by a police officer that he was not permitted to go onto his property
to collect his belongings. The resident was frustrated by this as the only possessions he had were what
he was wearing. The officer threatened to put the resident in jail over night and the encounter ended
up in a $450 fine for verbally abusing a police officer.
6.4.2 Recovery
One resident directly affected by the tornado encountered a major problem when trying to build a new
house to replace the one destroyed by the tornado. His section had become rezoned as an industrial
area; a change of which he was unaware. Obtaining a permit to rebuild the house proved difficult and
resulted in a trip up to Wellington to sort out the problem at Parliament. Temporary accommodation
then proved difficult to find. The Housing Corporation rang around motels in Greymouth asking for
accommodation for three months at a reduced rate; most of them refused to drop their rates. The next
problem encountered was disagreement with the insurance assessor. The assessor insisted on buying
all the resident’s new belongings for him in Greymouth so that the local economy would benefit. The
assessor also insisted on buying the new items. This frustrated the resident as he felt that he was being
treated unfairly by the assessor as there was no allowance for flexibility. For example, buying items in
Christchurch would have been cheaper which could have reduced arguments between the parties about
the cost of the items being replaced.
Some residents felt that there was an element of injustice with money from the Mayoral Relief Fund
helping out those whose insurance did not cover the cost of damage. This meant that people who were
more diligent in covering their risk thought that they were neglected for doing so.
In general, the residents’ view of the District Council and emergency services work was positive in the
way the recovery process was handled. In coordination with local businesses and volunteers, a
majority of the debris was cleared away within two days following the tornado. Small tokens of
support such as free tickets to the Topp Twins show were appreciated by the residents as this helped to
lift spirits and let people know that help was available if they wanted it. Further items of support
included the distribution of food vouchers from New World. One couple mentioned a $1000 “stress”
payment from their insurers which had been unexpected but greatly appreciated.
A positive consequence of the tornado is that it has significantly improved the appearance of Collins
Street, shown in Figures 30 and 31. Houses that were not in a very good state have been repaired and,
in once case, reconstructed, due to the damage caused by the tornado.
29
K MacAskill
Figure 30 A tidier version of Collins Street
K MacAskill
Figure 31 Replacement house in Collins street. The section behind is still empty
6.5 Other members of the community
Local School
St Patricks primary school was not far from the path of the tornado. When the tornado was spotted by
one of the staff, she rushed outside and shouted at the children to get them inside. The children were
then told to get under their desks, as they would have done in the event of an earthquake. The school
has a “phone tree” system set up where it is the responsibility of the Board of Trustees to contact a list
of parents to inform them of the situation. Word is filtered down through the contact list and
notification is passed back when a parent was unable to be contacted. Parents were asked to pick up
children during the afternoon as the bus fleet had been hit by the tornado. There was “phenomenal
traffic” in the area which caused a number of delays.
After the event staff discussed whether or not they should have rung the fire alarm. However, it was
quickly realised that this would send a message to the children to gather outside, which is the opposite
of what they wanted to happen. They also discussed whether a system of one bell for a fire and two
for a tornado could be adopted. This idea was rejected as it could cause confusion amongst the
children. It was decided that the children understood the urgency in the teacher’s voice and that this
was the best option available to them. A decision was also made to run tornado practice drills with the
earthquake and fire drills that are done each year. The path of the 2003 tornado had passed the other
side of the school, so staff are very aware of the possibility that a tornado could strike the school.
However, the drill will not be instigated until next year as the children are still sensitive to the shock of
the last tornado.
30
Rest Home and Hospital
The Kowhai Manor Rest Home and Hospital is an interesting case study as it is a business as well as a
home for a number of elderly people. The tornado struck just after the residents had finished lunch.
Many of the residents had not returned to their rooms because a podiatrist was visiting to do some
checkups. If this had not been the case then the number of casualties would have been more
significant as the tornado tore through one of the wings of the manor.
The tornado passed through one of the wings of the manor and ripped off a section of the roof. In the
panic of the tornado someone suggested activating the fire alarm. Fortunately this was not done as the
fire drill would involve taking residents outside, which is exactly the opposite of what should be done
in a tornado. After the tornado hit no calls for help were made, people just turned up on the doorstep
to help. No one had been badly hurt so the main focus of the afternoon was to find beds for all the
residents that evening. Some residents were moved to a different rest home and others to the hospital.
The phones were not working so friends and family were arriving at the scene in panic to find their
relatives. The process was described as organised chaos as there was no specific person in a lead role
giving out directions. One of the jobs was to ensure that medication was sent out with patients and a
record needed to be kept as to the whereabouts of each person; however there was no-one coordinating
who went where. Nurses from the hospital arrived to assist staff. Despite the goodwill of the helpers,
staff felt overpowered by all the help that was being offered and they felt as if the situation had been
taken out of their hands. To add to the difficulties some patients did not want to move as they did not
fully understand the situation and this took up valuable staff time. This represents a need for
organisations to plan the management and leadership in such events. Volunteer help was an essential
part of the response and recovery process in Greymouth however if they are not given direction their
help many actually be hindering the situation.
The clean up at the Home was similar to what had happened to the rest of the town, where the
community came out to help. People were up on the roof tying it down almost immediately after the
tornado and one of the local doctors came up to the home as soon as he had heard that it had been hit.
Staff were under a lot of stress through having to deal with all their patients, whilst recovering from
the shock of the event. Staff had to come to work the next day and were stressed from the day before.
It was hard for staff not rostered on the day before to fully appreciate the emotional effects that the
event had on those who had experienced the tornado. In order to keep working, staff supported
themselves by talking about what had happened over a cup of coffee. Relating the event to one
another gave them strength to get through the day and it was at this point that the services of Victim
Support would have been helpful. A few days after the event some residents could not understand
why they were not in their own rooms and were becoming angry and upset. Victim Support was
available for residents the day after the tornado but many were still in shock or did not understand
what had happened. Staff did not get to speak to Victim Support until a week after the event and it
was felt by some staff that the process should have occurred in the opposite order.
Another issue in the recovery process for the home was that families of residents began complaining
about their relatives having to share rooms with other residents whilst the affected wing of the resthome was being fixed. This was frustrating for the staff as there were few other options unless the
families chose to care for their relatives at home.
It took approximately five months for the rest-home to return to normal operation. Due to the
deteriorated mental condition of some of the residents, they would not remember the tornado, thus
emotional and psychological effects of the event are minimal. The emotional effects that the tornado
had on the staff however were evident six months after the event.
31
7.0 Discussion
7.1 Media Exposure
The tornado received major exposure within New Zealand on the main news programmes. On the
10th, the 11th and the 14th of March there was a total of 45 minutes of National television air time
dedicated to the event. This time was spread over One News, Three News, Breakfast and on Prime
TV. Reporting included disbelief of the devastation and that the clean up would take weeks. Quotes
from newspaper and internet reports include:
“There is disbelief at the widespread damage caused by a tornado in Greymouth this afternoon”
(Widespread Damage in Greymouth, 2005)
“There’s a lot of destruction – the tornado’s come in from the sea and it’s gone right through.”
(Widespread Damage in Greymouth, 2005)
Mayor: “It just cut through everything – new buildings, old buildings, houses have been demolished
and there are roofs off,” (Tornado rips through NZ town, 2005)
Not surprisingly, the Information Centre received a large number of phone calls from New Zealanders
wanting to cancel accommodation. This was a concern as the Hokitika Wildfoods festival was being
held that weekend, which is a huge event for the West Coast. The media coverage was giving New
Zealanders the impression that a large part of Greymouth had been wiped out, whereas in reality the
devastation was confined to a relatively narrow path which did not affect a majority of Greymouth
businesses. This false impression could have caused unnecessary indirect effects on the town through
a downturn in visitors. Staff in the Information Centre managed to prevent many cancellations. There
was no significant effect on the Wildfoods festival during the weekend as a result of the tornado.
Numbers at the festival were down from the previous year but this was because organisers had put a
limit of 18 000 tickets for the festival and these sold out.
7.2 Perception
People’s perception of risk plays a major role in the way in which they react to the risk (Davis et al.
2005; Becker et al. 2001). It is important to note that people’s perception of risk is not always in line
with that of experts. Whilst experts tend to focus on the technological and statistical aspects, the
public focus more on factors such as how much they know about the risk and the worst possible
outcome of the risk. Other factors that influence people’s perception of risk are social, economic and
temporal effects, magnitude of consequences, control over consequences and personal exposure
(Gough et al. 1997). The community may not be specifically concerned about a risk when there is
little that can be done in order to prepare better for that risk. Through understanding people’s
perception of risk the authorities are better able to create a relevant risk management programme that
is effective within the community (Gough, 2000).
Many people affected by the tornado could not sleep the night following the event. A number of
people reported still feeling nervous when the wind picked up almost six months after the tornado
came through, demonstrating that the psychological effects from the recent tornado were significant.
One interviewee showed signs of reducing to tears as she recalled what happened on the day of the
tornado and remembered how close a number of people came to being killed. However, people are
generally of the view that it is unlikely/unlucky that a tornado will have a significant effect on them,
but recognise that there is an element of the unknown.
32
The strong social network that exists in Greymouth has reduced people’s perception of their exposure
to the risk of a tornado, because they know that they would have strong support if they were to be
directly affected. The community is more aware of the occurrence of tornadoes in the area. Because
of the 2003 and 2005 tornadoes following similar paths through Greymouth, the area has become
known as “tornado alley” among the locals. An element of personal exposure has begun to take effect.
Many who were interviewed expressed a view that they would never want to experience a tornado
again and if another should directly affect them, they would move out. There was also the view that if
you were to move somewhere else, you would probably be living closer to a fault or more prone to
other natural hazards, so the situation would not be improved.
There is little that can be done in order to better prepare for the risk of a tornado and the community is
not specifically concerned about the risk. The only action that has been taken since the event is to
make sure that insurance is up to date. People are not expressly concerned about another tornado
occurring but the effect of the March tornado still sits in the back of their minds. A factor in the
relatively calm attitude towards the risk is that only three people were admitted to hospital as a result
of the tornado. Despite the initial shock of the tornado people now view the damage as relatively
minor when comparing it to loss of life.
Some work has been done to make structures more resistant to damage in strong winds. For example,
the use of safety glass in replacement windows and a fence that was built by one of the residents in
Collins Street has been constructed in a “zig-zag” fashion to improve bracing and bolts have been used
instead of nails.
7.3 Civil Defence Emergency Management
The “four Rs” of the Civil Defence Emergency strategy are reduction, readiness, response and
recovery. The Ministry of Civil Defence has published a brochure titled “Will you cope when disaster
strikes?” to help communities prepare for a disaster through readiness. This brochure has good
information in it with regards to how to prepare for a storm event. It is a good point for discussion
with regards to a tornado event. When a strong wind warning has been issued the brochure advises:
•
Listen to your radio for information
•
Bring pets inside
•
Bring rubbish bins indoors
•
Secure outdoor furniture and lightweight garages
•
Put tape across large window to prevent them from shattering
Then during the storm it is advised to:
•
Open a window on the side of a building away from the wind
•
Close curtains to slow down flying glass and other loose objects
•
Stay away from doors and windows. If the wind is destructive take shelter further inside the
house.
33
•
Use a mattress for protection against flying debris
•
Stay away from metal and electrical fixtures
•
Contact your local council if your house or building is severely damaged by the wind
•
Don’t walk around outside
•
Don’t’ go driving unless absolutely necessary
After the storm:
•
Avoid broken power lines
•
Contact your local council for advise about cleaning up debris
An examination of “what to do in a storm” shows that much of the information appears to be common
sense. Some is also irrelevant in the event of a tornado as there is simply not enough time to think.
Most people in Greymouth reported only having enough time to dive towards the closest object that
could provide them with shelter (ranging from a digger bucket to an office desk).
The advice given for after a storm event is very relevant to the situation after the tornado in
Greymouth. People were contacting the local Council to find out how to help or how they can get
help. This proves the need for the Council to be well organised with regards to response and recovery
and would suggest that the Council should look at this area more closely as there was some downfall
in their system here and this is discussed in section 8.6.
7.4 An Insurer’s Perspective
There was a total of $9.2 million in insurance claims made as a result of the tornado. AMI insurance
was interviewed to get an insurer’s perspective on the insurance process that followed the tornado.
AMI has an in-house assessor that processes its West Coast claims locally. A disaster recovery team
from Christchurch assisted in this process. A lot of the repair work was cash settled rather than
tendered out for builders who were already busy. The company also has its own contacts in the
building industry to which work is contracted out. This set up meant that the company did not require
quotes or multiple assessments on repair work and the claims could be processed more quickly. This
system is viewed by the company as a win-win situation; the company can process claims with less
paper work and if the insured can get the job done cheaper than the payout it was viewed as a bonus
for the insured.
The company was at less of a risk than other insurance companies as the underwriting criteria is
cautious about the type of policies that can be issued. AMI does not cover commercial insurance and
this is where a number of claims were made. Also, people could only insure their homes at market
value, so the company was not liable for the cost of replacement of a house. Other companies would
have incurred larger costs here as the cost of replacement of some of the houses is significantly higher
that their pre-tornado market value. As a result, people who were only insured for the market value of
their house may get an insurance pay out, but they cannot afford to rebuild. This is a risk that people
take with this type of policy.
AMI were aware of the media coverage regarding insurance issues after the tornado with claims that
insurers were delaying the recovery process through making price gouging claims and requiring
34
quotes from trades people to be assessed before any work was done. AMI did not require quotes
through cash settling a number of their claims so allegations made in the media did not apply to them.
As a result of the tornado AMI have gained business through people realising that they are
underinsured or have the wrong policy and are no longer wanting to carry this risk. (Rod Brown, pers.
comm.2005)
7.5 Problems identified
Research shows that local people will assist each other in times of need; it is a natural social
behaviour. Planning through means such as risk management just makes the process more efficient.
(Developing community resilience as a foundation for effective disaster recovery, 2004). Through
being aware of the problems in the response and recovery after the tornado, communities can better
prepare themselves for future natural hazard events and local authorities can plan for a better
organized response. Despite the view that some locals have of the tornado being a major event, its
effects were very confined. The problems that occurred during this event will certainly escalate in a
larger disaster.
2
•
National and world news gave the impression that Greymouth was wiped out. Tourists rang
up to cancel accommodation. By the 11th of March there were news reports saying
Greymouth wiped out. This problem was addressed promptly as the Council tried to use the
media to emphasis that only the strip was affected and that most of Greymouth was still
operating normally.
•
The first couple of days following the tornado involved a major clean up of debris. However,
after three days there was little action with regards to people getting roofs fixed. People
started ringing council with regards to the problem. Some frustration mounted as following
the normal insurance criteria system was delaying work. In order to instigate action the
Mayor accused the insurance industry of making unnecessary delays, suggesting that the
situation had special needs thus should be treated with special criteria. The Insurance Council
claimed that suspicions of price gouging were the cause of delays in processing claims
however this claim was strongly refuted by the Greymouth community.
•
There was a slow start to getting insurance claims processed and there was a lost opportunity
from offers of help from carpenters in Nelson (Tony Kokshoorn pers. comm.). Once the claim
process was underway the insurance system worked well. However, the next problem that
quickly followed was the inability to get tradesmen to complete the reconstruction jobs as
there is a high demand for them already in the area.
•
Staff fielding calls at the District Council sometimes did not have enough knowledge to help
people out and give them direction. Also, numerous offers of help were being received from
around the country but no one was officially coordinating these calls so the offers were
unlikely to have been utilised to their full extent.
•
The Council was surprised at the lack of people asking for assistance from the Mayoral Relief
fund. When the Council approached businesses offering $500 assistance some turned the
offer down so that those more in need of the cash could be helped. Some people thought that
the $50 000 Government pledge to the fund was a minimal token of assistance.2
People can feel injustice when they do not receive financial support when others in their situation have done so.
There is perhaps a small issue here of people not understanding the role of Government in such situations.
35
•
The fire brigade experienced problems through the loss of power as the phones at the base
were not operational. The cellphone network was overloaded which further hindered the
communication problems. Communication abilities were limited to the use of radio
telephones.
•
The clean up of broken glass was a difficult task, especially in residential areas. Shards of
glass were picked up by hand. Pieces of glass have been trampled into the grass which makes
a complete clean up difficult. People were still finding glass in their garden in August. This is
a concern as children playing in the area could be injured.
•
Those working with people who have experienced a disaster needed to make a special effort to
show compassion. People sometimes do not realise the emotional and psychological effects
that such an event can have on a person and their need for support. People in organisations
such as OSH and the Police Force have a legal obligation to do their jobs in the event of a
disaster, but this can cause conflict when they confront people who have been directly affected
by a disaster. A factor contributing to this issue is likely to be in the delivery of the message,
not in the message itself. Care should taken in the way people communicate and instruct those
who are affected by a disaster in order to avoid aggravation and frustration. Rather than
instructing people what they cannot do, a more constructive approach to the issue would be
received with less resistance.
7.6 Assessment of Response
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight some of the key parts of the recovery process after the
tornado and to the extent to which they were successful.
The response of the community was a main factor in the efficient clean up of the affected area. Many
residents and businesses had friends or family that were in the building trade and could help them
protect their buildings from the immediate danger of rain and also to help rebuild relatively quickly
despite the demand for builders in the region. The culture of the small town community has a
resilience that would not be seen in cities due to the solid informal social network. The volunteer base
helped to clear up a large amount of shattered glass. This glass was a major hazard for people. It is
important to clean up glass as quickly as possible to prevent further injuries and also to prevent it from
being trampled into grass, where it could resurface several months after the event.
The recovery process had the appearance of good organisation however a significant portion of it was
due to the good will of the local people. There does not appear to be a need to formalise a process of
response when a Civil Defence emergency is not declared for a disaster in Greymouth as there is a
solid community network of support that automatically drives the process. If more of the town had
been affected then there are certainly points of weaknesses in the response and recovery process
implemented, such as reliance of people voluntarily helping out. If there was a larger scale event,
more people and businesses would be affected therefore the volunteer support base would be reduced,
as people would have to attend to their own needs. Also, in a larger event, the extent of the damage
could mean that it is too dangerous for volunteers to walk the streets offering their services. A prime
example of this situation was at Dispatch and Garlick engineering where buildings sustained extensive
damage. The engineering firm utilised their own staff in order to coordinate an efficient recovery
process as they had more awareness of the potential hazards within the building. In a larger event
Governments often provide financial support for communities in the event of a disaster. This is a humanitarian response to
help sustain the community through preventing large adverse economic impact. The tornado in Greymouth was not a major
disaster therefore there was not the need for the Government to provide more assistance
36
there would be the need for a more formal coordination of volunteers (whether they are formal
organisations or members of the community) in order to ensure their safety and prevent further
injuries.
Previous studies have shown that the communities appreciate their local authority having a genuine
commitment to communication (Gough 2000). The Council were reasonably successful in their aim to
keep the community informed and reassured. In order to make the process more successful, the local
authorities need to make sure that their staff are well informed so that they can inform the public and
coordinate their enquiries. The most significant improvement that the council could make to the
response and recovery is to better prepare their lines of communication with media and should have
someone in charge of enquiries.
In the event of a natural hazard people are not only exposed to the risk of the event but the damage
that it causes. People affected want to claim possessions from their houses and fix broken roofs
however these actions could be putting themselves in further danger. This causes conflict with
emergency services and organisations such as OSH because they have a legal obligation to ensure that
people are safe. It is important in these situations that those who have legal obligations find ways to
convey their messages with regard for the emotional state that people may be in.
An aspect that was appreciated by the residents who were directly affected by the tornado was the
tokens of support provided by the Council and New World. The small gestures and kind words helped
to lift spirits and help people get through an emotionally and psychologically challenging time in the
days immediately after the event.
Another important point is that people need up-to-date insurance cover and understand the details of
their cover. The number of people covered by insurance was relatively high in Greymouth but some
businesses were underinsured. This could severely affect a business’s ability to recover from such a
set back.
An interesting aspect of people’s immediate reaction when they saw a tornado approaching was to put
the fire alarm on. Fortunately they chose not to do so as they realised taking people outside in a
tornado is the action opposite to what should be done in a tornado. There is perhaps a need to reassess
emergency procedures in the tornado prone areas of New Zealand (just as St Patricks school have done
in the wake of the March tornado) to ensure that people do not automatically head to the fire alarm in
such a situation.
37
7.7
Suggestion for Further Research
With two tornados occurring within two years, people in Greymouth are more aware of the risk of
more tornadoes forming. An interesting point of further study would be to survey the residents in
Greymouth to investigate whether or not they would take action as advised in the brochure when a
strong wind warning is issued. The problem at this stage is that experts do not know if damaging
tornados are going to become more frequent in the area as a result of climate change, and it is near
impossible to predict the touchdown of a tornado. Approximately one month after the tornado in
March there was a front page warning in the local newspaper that the weather was conducive to the
formation of tornadoes. Providing too many warnings could result in their message becoming
meaningless if tornados do not follow after them.
38
8.0 Conclusions
The most realistic option available for people to prepare for another tornado in Greymouth is to make
sure they have good insurance cover and be well networked within their community. The good
response of the community to the tornado that touched down in Greymouth on March 10th 2005 is a
reflection of the strong social network within the small town. Help from volunteers and local
tradesmen ensured an efficient two day clean up of debris and minimised further damage that could
have been caused by rain on the evening following the tornado.
The response of emergency services, lead by the Grey District Council, provided grounding for a fast
response to the tornado. Assistance from USAR ensured that the emergency services had the capacity
to deal with the situation without the declaration of a civil defence emergency. Although not formally
activated, the event proved to be a good test of the Civil Defence Emergency Plan as some
improvements to this with regard to the communication with public and media were identified.
The tornado is viewed in Greymouth as a large event however its direct effects were confined to a
narrow strip of destruction through a mainly commercial area of town. $9.2 million in insurance
claims have been made as a result of the tornado. Businesses have become more careful about making
sure that they have good insurance cover as a result of being directly affected. Six months after the
event the path of the tornado through the town is still evident as the demand for builders has slowed
down the reconstruction process. No businesses have failed due to disruption from the tornado
however it will take up to twelve months for some of them to return to normal operating capacity.
Fortunately, business recovery followed naturally a three phase process in a reasonable time period
(Section 7.3.5). In a larger scale event the natural process is likely to be hindered due to more people
requiring assistance, so business recovery planning is recommended to ensure that recovery will occur
as quickly as possible.
There were a number of issues identified that could be the cause of significant problems in a future
event that affects a larger portion of the town. In order to mitigate bigger problems the following
suggestions are made:
•
A backup to cellphone network is important even for relatively small events.
•
Have clear, open lines of communication with the media and utilise them to communicate
with the local and national community.
•
Ensure good internal information flow within the organisation leading the recovery process.
•
Regularly check that insurance is up to date and employ the skills of a mediator to smooth the
process of getting an insurance claim if it looks as though it will be complicated.
•
People involved in the recovery after a disaster need to be educated in how to deal with people
who have experienced a disaster.
•
Formal coordination of volunteers may be needed where there is a high risk of injury due to
debris.
As a result of two tornados striking the town in the last two years, the community are becoming more
aware of the possible (but unquantifiable) risk of tornados. They accept this risk as a part of life.
However, if damaging tornados become more frequent, people are going to be more likely leave the
community rather than rebuild. This could have a negative effect on the strong community spirit
within the town.
39
9.0 References and Bibliography
Becker, J; Johnston, D; Munro, A & Smith, R 2001 “Effects of the 1995-1996 Ruapehu eruptions on
communities in central North Island, New Zealand, and people’s perceptions of volcanic
hazards after the event” The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies Volume
2001-1
Bell, R; Gray, W; Johnston, D; Leonard, G & Walton M, 2004 “The Waikato Weather Bomb –
Understanding the impact” NZIER authoritive analysis March
Britton, R & Clarck, G “Redesigning Emergency Management: Applying Principles and Practices in
New Zealand” Ministry for Emergency Management Retrieved 27th July 2005 from
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz:9999/vestris/searchmcdem.htm
Buckle P “Re-defining Community and Vulnerability in the Context of Emergency Management”
Retrieved October 2005 from:
http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/resources/buckle-communityvulnerability.pdf
Clark, L “Introduction to Surveys and Interviews” – Learning packages in the policy sciences, New
York, 1976
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Etna, Italy” The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies Volume: 2005 -1
Buckle & Coles 2004 “Developing community resilience as a foundation for effective disaster
recovery” The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 19 no. 4 November
“Emergency vs. Disaster”, HEMNZ Bulletin Issue 93, 14 March 2005, Retrieved 15th September
2005 from http://www.hemnz.org.nz/pdf/93.pdf
Gorman, P 2005 “Conditions Ideal For ‘Commando’ Attack”, The Press, 11 March. Retrieved 6th
July 2005 from Factiva Database
Gough, J 2000 “Perceptions of risk from natural hazards in two remote New Zealand communities”
The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies Volume 2000-2 Retrieved 1st
August 2005 from: http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2000-2/gough.htm
Gough J, Gregory G & Loveridge A 1997 “Social and Cultural Aspects of Natural Hazards Perception
and Response” New Zealand Geographer 53(1) pp47-54
Hutton D, 2001 “Psychological Aspects of Disaster Recovery: Integrating Communities into Disaster
Planning and Policy Making’ Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Retrieved August
2005 from: http://www.iclr.org/pdf/research%20paper%2016%20%20paper%202%20david%20hutton.doc.pdf
Kidson, S 2005 “Nelson Builders Not Needed”, The New Zealand Press Association 15th March.
Retrieved 6th July 2005 from Factiva Database
Marshall, C 2005 “$10 Million Clean-up Bill For Greymouth Tornado”, The New Zealand Press
Association 11th March. Retrieved 6th July 2005 from Factiva Database
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Miller K, Nigg j 1994 “Event and Consequence Vulnerability: Effects on the Disaster Recovery
Process” Disaster Research Centre and Development of Sociology, University of Delaware
Newark, DE Retrieved August 2005 from: www.udel.edu/DRC/prepapers.html
2005 “Resilient New Zealand: National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2003 –
2006” Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
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1997 Christchurch, N.Z. Centre for Advanced Engineering, University of Canterbury
Slade, M 2005 “Peter Blight from Masters Builders surprised at price gouging claims in wake of
Greymouth tornado”, Bulletin supplied by IRN Limited 15th March. Retrieved 6th July 2005
from Factiva Database
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of Action: Pacifica Islands Regional Progress Report (1994-2004), SOPAC Technical Report
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Stephenson J (Ed) 1979, Opportunities for Change Creating a Sense of Community Community
Forum, New Zealand
2005 “The Breeding Ground for NZ Tornadoes” The New Zealand Herald, 11 March
2005 “Tornado in Greymouth – a few seconds of mayhem” Impact, vol. 20 p12
The West Coast Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, Retrieved August 2005 from:
http://www.wcrc.govt.nz/council/Emergency_management/emergency_management.htm
“Tornado rips through NZ town – Breaking News” Retrieved 16th March 2005 From
http://smh.com.au/news/World/Tornado-rips-through-NZ-towns/200....
Wengraph, T “Qualitative Research Interviewing” London, 2001
White, R “Weather Bomb – Coromandel Experience” Tephra Vol 20 June 2003 Ministry of Civil
Defence Emergency Management.
“Widespread Damage in Greymouth”, Retrieved 16th March 2005 from
http://home.nzcity.co.nz/news/default.asp?id=48380&c=w. Retrieved 6th July 2005 from
Factiva Database
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Australia
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Hearing Data” 25th January 2000 Retrieved July 2005 from
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/ss/fundproject/file2/
“Cumulonimbus Clouds” Retrieved July 2005 from:
http://www.ace.mmu.ac.uk/eae/Weather/Older/Cumulonimbus_Clouds.html
“Disaster - Definition of Disaster in Encyclopaedia” Retrieved 15th September 2005 from
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Disaster, 2005
41
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http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/earth/Atmosphere/tornado/formation.html
“Fact Sheet: Disasters” Retrieved 15th September 2005 from www.globaled.org.nz
Furr, J ‘Tornado Formation’ Retrieved 7th July, 2005, from
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Further Websites accessed
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www.stats.govt.nz Accessed August 2005
www.nelsoncitycouncil.co.nz
www.globaled.org.nz, September 2005
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Disaster, September 2005
42
Legislation
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http://www.legislation.govt.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes
Personal Communications
Brown R, Greymouth AMI, August 2005
Bull D, member of USAR Task Force 2, July 2005
Gray W, NIWA, August 2005
Kokshoorn T, Mayor, Grey District Council, August 2005
Lovell J, Ministry of Civil Defence, September 2005
MacAskill G, District Court Judge, former Insurance Lawyer, October 2005
McEnaney A, Greymouth Fire Chief, August 2005
0’Connell A, Local Recovery Manager, Grey District Council, August 2005
Paxton, Senior Sergeant C, Greymouth Police, August 2005
43
Appendix I: Interview Questions
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THOSE IN THE COMMUNITY AFFECTED BY THE TORNADO
IMPACT
1. Where you at anytime uncertain about your future when the tornado hit? If so, what were your
concerns?
2. What did you do when the tornado hit?
3. How did you feel when the tornado hit?
4. Were you aware that you were at risk of tornado damage before the tornado hit in March 2005?
5. If another tornado was to occur tomorrow, how prepared do you think you are to cope with it?
6. Did your home, contents or any of your household’s other possessions suffer from tornado
damage?
7. What assistance did you require to recover from the tornado?
8. How long did it take to get your home back to normal?
9. Did you have insurance to cover the damage? Please estimate the total amount paid out (if any)
by insurance company.
10. Did you or your household bear any financial costs as a direct result of the tornado event, that
were not covered by insurance (excluding loss of earnings, if any)? If so, please estimate the
total cost of your household’s expenditure (in dollars) not covered by insurance.
RESPONSE
11. Can you recall the sequence of events in the afternoon following the tornado?
12. Can you recall the sequence of events in the week following the tornado?
13. Who did you come into contact with in the recovery process?
14. Do you know who USAR are?
15. Are there any actions you have undertaken as a result of this event? Have you taken any
measures to protect your household against further damage from a tornado event? If not, why
not?
16. How much time in total did members of your household spend on responding to the tornado
and/or helping with the cleanup?
44
RECOVERY (ISSUES)
17. Did you have any particular issues in recovering your household back to normal?
18. In an ideal world, what services and help would you expect in the event of a tornado hitting
the Greymouth community?
19. Who do you think should be responsible for the recovery process of the community in the
event of a similar event occurring?
20. Are there any extra measures that you believe the local authorities should be taking in order to
improve the recovery process if another tornado were to hit Greymouth?
21. Have you had any insurance related problems as a result of the tornado?
(Tick only one per line)
PERCEPTION/ ATTIDUDE TOWARDS RISK – also measure of understanding
22. To what extent to you believe that…?
Not at all
I won’t prepare for tornadoes because they
are too destructive
A tornado is unlikely to affect me during my
lifetime
It is unnecessary to prepare for torandoes as
assistance will be provided by the Council
and/or the emergency services
A damaging tornado is something that could
occur in the future
(Scale)
A great deal
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
23. When did you become aware of the possibility of tornado formation in Greymouth? How?
24. Have you seen any information regarding tornado hazards for your community before or after
the March 2005 event?
25. How concerned are you about the risk of tornados? How do you view the last tornado as a
disaster?
26. Was the tornado event the worst (i.e. biggest impact) natural hazard your household has
experienced at this property? If not, when was the worst experienced? (Please give details)
How do you view the likelihood of a tornado occurring in the next 5-10years as a threat to the
Greymouth community, and what are the potential effects do you think it could have?
27. How has the last tornado event changed your thoughts with regards to your exposure to the
risk of natural hazards?
45
SENSE OF COMMUNITY
28. How long have you lived in this community?
29. What are your views on the nature of the Blaketown/Greymouth community?
30. How would you describe your relationship with other people in the community?
46
BUSINESS QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Briefly, please note what the impacts were from the damage.
2. Please estimate the cost of damage to your business’s stock (if any) caused by the tornado:
A: Insured: $ __________
B: Uninsured: $ __________
3. Please estimate the cost of damage to any of your business’s other property or assets (if any)
caused by the tornado:
A: Insured: $ __________
B: Uninsured: $ __________
4. Did the cost of your insurance increase after the event?
5. If yes to question 4, what increased? (i.e. excess? Premium? Some other cost?)
6. For how many hours/days (that you would otherwise be open) were you unable to conduct
business due to the tornado and/or damage from it?
7. Please estimate your loss of revenue from the hours/days you were unable to conduct business
due to the weather bomb (if any)?
8. Please estimate the value of any increased business (eg. purchase of repair material) you
received as a result of the tornado(if any)?
9. How much time in total did members of your staff spend getting your business back to normal
due to the tornado? (e.g. 3 people working for 1 day each equals 3 days)
____________ hours or _____________ days
10. How much time in total were members of your staff unable to attend work due to the tornado?
11. Did your business suffer any of the following indirect impacts from the tornado? (Tick all that
apply)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Loss of time/revenue/income because business had to cease for a period
Staff unable to come in to work
Staff time spent on the floods
Emotional stress/trauma
Deterioration in health
Other (Please specify____________________________________)
None of these
12. For how many hours/days (that you would otherwise be open) were you unable to conduct
business due to the flooding and/or damage from it?
13. Has your business undertaken any further planning/mitigation measures since the tornado event
to ensure business continuity in the future?
14. How many years has your business been trading?
47
15. How many employees does the business have?
1. Full time: _____________ people
2. Part time: _____________ people
16. What has been your business’s average turnover in the last 3 years (before tax)?
1 Under $50 000
2 $50 001 to $100 000
3 $100 001 to $250 000
4 $250 001 to $500 000
5 Over $500 000
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ASK ME?
48
Appendix II: Damaging Tornado Events Since 1996
Adapted from:
McGavin, T “Notable weather events since 1996: Tornadoes” Retrieved August 2005 from:
Analyses http://www.metservice.co.nz/default/index.php?pkey=190512&ckey=195195
Period of
Severe
Weather
14-19 August
2004
Details
A vigorous trough of low pressure which crossed New Zealand mid-August was
responsible for a 5-day period of stormy weather, including a violent tornado in
Taranaki
One thunderstorm was so vigorous it spawned a violent tornado at Motunui, near
Waitara, Taranaki, which destroyed a farmhouse, killing two of its occupants
(another two survived with serious injuries). The tornado came off the sea around
6am, leaving a path of destruction about 4 km long, and 500m wide. It also destroyed
a shed, killing 70 calves, and damaged power poles and lines, cutting power to about
1200 homes, as well as uprooting many trees. This was the first fatal tornado in New
Zealand since 1991 when one in Albany, Auckland killed a man.
16-18
September
2003
The first of these fronts crossed much of New Zealand during the morning of 16
September. Thunderstorms embedded within the front affected many western
districts, especially Westland, Buller, Nelson and Wellington. Two tornadoes linked
to the thunderstorms were noted, one in Westport (causing damage), and a small one
in Runanga
25-30
October 2002
On 25 October an active cold front crossed New Zealand. A thunderstorm within this
front spawned a tornado as it crossed Blockhouse Bay and Lynfield in Auckland. A
number of homes were severely damaged, with roofs lifted, windows broken and
trees uprooted
On 26 October, severe west to northwest gales hit parts of Hawkes Bay and
Wairarapa, then on 27 October, thunderstorms occurred in many South Island places.
In Christchurch, an afternoon thunder and hailstorm resulted in flash flooding of
properties. Hailstones up to golf-ball size damaged strawberries and other crops. A
tornado associated with the storm was captured on video in the Taitapu area, near
Lincoln
31 October 4 November
2001
On 3 November more thunderstorms affected northern New Zealand. A tornado
spawned from one of these thunderstorms did significant damage in the Awakeri to
Thornton area, just west of Whakatane, Bay of Plenty.
The tornado struck just before noon and left a trail of damage from Awakeri towards
the sea. Buildings in the path of the twister were either partly damaged (eg, roofs
lifted, windows broken) or, in some cases, completely demolished. One man had a
lucky escape after running from his 10m long shed just seconds before it was ripped
away. He said the tornado sounded "like a hundred lions roaring".
49
A large number of trees were uprooted and had limbs torn from them. A showpiece
rose garden was decimated.
Power was cut to thousands of homes in the Whakatane area after debris was blown
across lines and power poles were downed.
Another tornado was reported at Ohaupo, just south of Hamilton, Waikato on 3
November.
21 April
2000
22-24 March
1997
The next day (4 November), at least 4 funnel-clouds were observed in the vicinity of
the previous day's tornado, causing concern for those performing clean-up
operations.
Minor residential damage in Pukenui
The waterspout moved southwards over the sea east of Devonport and then made
landfall at Kohimarama Beach, where it twisted shop awnings and tossed tables and
chairs around.
50
Appendix III: Aerial photograph.
51