Noblesse Oblige:
How power influences moral judgments.
Tim de Wilde
5673771
Master thesis
Research Master in Psychology
University of Amsterdam
Prof. dr. C.K.W. de Dreu &
Prof. dr. G. A. van Kleef
June 2012
Noblesse Oblige 1
Noblesse Oblige 2
Abstract
This study investigated how power, conceptualized as people’s position in social hierarchy,
influences moral judgments and decision making. It was hypothesized that (A) high power
individuals make more judgments in which the moral value of an action is determined by the
consequences of that action (utilitarianism), because they either (B) feel free and unconstrained
and are less sensitive to emotions or (C) they experience a sense of noblesse oblige: the
obligation to lead and serve a large collective they feel responsible for. In both a correlational
and an experimental study, hypothesis A and C received support. Thus, because high power
individuals experience more noblesse oblige, they make more utilitarian moral judgments and
decisions and less deontological judgments (judgments in which the moral value is determined
by the extent an action adheres to a rule). Implications, suggestions for further research and the
study’s limitations are discussed.
Noblesse Oblige 3
Great power involves great responsibility.
― Franklin D. Roosevelt
For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have
committed much, of him they will ask the more.
― Luke 12:48
Noblesse oblige: How position influences moral judgments
Gyges, a sheep herder in Greek mythology, found a golden ring that made him invisible. He
travelled to the court, where he seduced the queen, slew the king and took the kingdom. Plato
(360 B.C.) wrote about the myth: ‘Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the
just put on one of them and the unjust the other [..] No man would keep his hands off what was
not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie
with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would.’
Plato articulated what many people know as the adage that power corrupts. And indeed
studies in the psychological science uncovered that powerful people are found to lie more
(Carney, Yap, Lucas & Mehta, 2012), use other less powerful people as instruments (Gruenfeld,
Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Kipnis, 1972, 1976), deceive others more in negotiations (Boles,
Croson & Murnighan, 2000); show less compassion for people in distress (Van Kleef, Oveis,
Van der Lowe, LuoKogan, Goetz & Keltner, 2008); share less money with a less powerful
partner in a dictator game (DeCelles et al. 2012; also see Hangraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke &
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De Dreu, 2008) and are in general more likely to act in a self-interested way (Anderson &
Galinsky, 2006; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006).
Whereas this research may be taken as supporting the idea that powerful people are
morally debased, there actually is little direct evidence for such a conjecture. However, both the
conceptualization of power and the operationalization of morality can be criticized, rendering
these initial findings indefinite.
In most psychological studies, power is examined in isolation, for example by making
people remember a situation in which they experienced power. Power in reality however, tends
to be constrained and is embedded in the position someone has in a social hierarchy (Overbeck,
Corell & Park, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Often people have power, not only because
others depend on them but also because they had the right to wield power by notion of their
position (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). With these positions come obligations, responsibilities and
duties (Biggart & Hamilton, 1987 & Hamilton & Biggart, 1985).
Here we take this notion seriously, and, in contrast to previous work on power and sociocognitive judgments, examine how someone’s position in the social hierarchy influences their
moral judgments and decision preferences. Accordingly, we define power as a person’s ability to
influence other peoples’ outcomes by notion of their position (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi &
Gruenfeld, 2006). Power stems from the ability to reward, punish and control valuable resources
(Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003).Consequently, we contribute not only further insight into
the power-morality relationship but also uncover why this relationship exists. This is critical as it
remains to be seen whether power indeed corrupts.
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In the next sections we will first discuss what we mean by moral judgments, and discuss
recent literature on how people make moral judgments. This will then be connected to research
investigating how power influence people’s behavior, perception, cognitions and emotions.
Hypotheses were tested in a correlational and an experimental study that will be reported and
discussed next. We will conclude with implications and discuss avenues for future research.
Moral Judgments
Definitions. Morality plays an important role in people’s lives. Morals guide behavior, and
provide the background to judge other people’s behavior against. According to Turiel (1983, p.
3) the moral domain consists of ‘prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining
to how people ought to relate to each other’. In other words, moral domains prescribe what is
right and what is wrong. This does not mean that there is one morality (see Haidt, 2010). Two
incompatible actions can be morally defensible from a different perspective, like deontology and
utilitarianism.
Two types of moral judgments: deontology and utilitarianism. Deontology is a moral
philosophy with an emphasis on moral rules. It emphasizes people’s rights and duties. In
utilitarianism, however, the moral value of an action is determined by evaluating the
consequences. For instance, in deontology it is never right to kill someone (following the rule
‘thou shall not kill’), but in utilitarianism it might be moral to kill someone if, by killing, you
save more lives. In our study, participants will be presented with dilemmas that contrast a
characteristically deontological choice option with a characteristically utilitarian choice option.
An example is the footbridge dilemma (Thompson, 1985) 1:
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A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if
the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in
between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge
stands a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five
workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large
body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will
be saved. Would you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five
workmen?
The deontological choice would be to leave the man standing on the bridge, and
according to utilitarianism you should push the man off the bridge. Most people in this dilemma
choose the deontological option (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2008).
Arguably, this is so because this dilemma is very personal and elicits a lot of negative emotions.
People tend to make moral judgments intuitively (for a review: Haidt, 2010; Haidt, Koller
& Dias, 1994; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Yet, this does not mean moral judgments
are never made through reason, or that reason cannot override our intuition (Ditto, Pizzaro &
Tannebaum, 2009; Haidt, 2007; Narvaez, 2010; Pizzaro & Bloom, 2003). For example, Pizzaro,
Uhlman and Bloom (2003) found that when you simply ask people to make a “rational, objective
judgment” they will reason more. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen (2001)
argue that deontological moral judgments are made by intuitions and are driven by emotions,
while utilitarian judgments are made by more reasoned processes that are necessary to overcome
these initial emotions. Consequently, different judgments involve and activate different,
Noblesse Oblige 7
dissociable brain structures (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al.,
2001).
Greene et al. (2004) found brain areas associated with intuition and emotion (e.g. the
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex [VMPFC], Amygdala) to be activated more in personal moral
dilemmas, like the footbridge dilemma. As a result people make more often a deontological
choice. Making a utilitarian choice requires people to overcome their initial emotions. Therefore,
when people make a utilitarian judgment in a personal dilemma this takes more time and it
requires the activation of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex – an area implicated in cognitive
conflict. Furthermore, areas associated with conscious cognitive control (e.g. the Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex) were activated when making utilitarian judgments (see also Greene, Morelli,
Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008; Paxton, Ungar & Greene, 2012). Other research supports
this account by showing that for example when parts of the VMPFC related to emotion are
damaged people make more utilitarian judgments (Koenigs, et al 2007; Ciaremelli, Muccioli,
Ladavas & di Pelligrino, 2007). Moreover, a positive mood can help to overcome the negative
emotions elicited by the dilemmas which also leads to more utilitarian choices (Valdesolo &
DeSteno, 2006).
In sum, (1) deontological judgments stem from people’s intuitions, are therefore made
faster than utilitarian judgments which (2) require more controlled reasoning. (3) High conflict
personal dilemmas elicit (mostly negative) emotions that need to be overcome to make a
utilitarian judgment, and (4) positive emotions might reduce cognitive conflict, making it easier
to render utilitarian judgments. Next, these findings on moral judgments are integrated with two
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distinct perspectives of power: power as approach and freedom and power as noblesse oblige.
Accordingly, two competing sets of hypotheses are formulated.
Power as Approach and Freedom
The subjective feeling of power (actually possessing it, merely thinking about it, or being
primed by it) can bring people in a different psychological state than people without such
feelings of power (Galinsky & Magee, 2008; Kipnis, 1976). The approach-inhibition theory of
power (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003) states that because powerful people are less
dependent on others, they face less constraints on their behavior, experience greater control, and
have developed an approach rather than an avoidance orientation (Smith & Bargh, 2008).
Powerful people, therefore, feel and behave more freely, are more goal oriented (Galinsky,
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008); and are more likely to take risks (Anderson &
Galinsky, 2006). In relationship with moral dilemmas this would suggest that high positioned
individuals would prefer to take action in the moral dilemmas.
Moreover, power also influences how emotions are processed (see also Van Kleef et al.
2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2006). Powerful people experience more interpersonal
distance between themselves and less powerful people (Lee & Tiedens, 2001), are less likely to
comprehend how other people see, think and feel about the world (Galinsky et al., 2006), react
less on other people’s emotions (Anderson, et al, 2003) and experience more positive emotions
and less negative emotions (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Langner & Keltner, 2008). As utilitarian
choices are more reason-based, less intuitive and less affect driven, it follows that:
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H1: High power individuals make more utilitarian judgments than people with less
power.
H2: High power individuals make more utilitarian judgments because they more free, and
more unconstrained than low power individuals.
In line with what we know on how utilitarian judgments are made we thus also expect that:
H3: High power individuals experience less negative and more positive emotions about
making their choice and thus, they will make their choices quicker and find the choice
easier than low power individuals.
Power as Noblesse Oblige
To be granted power and to stay in power individuals need to be socially engaged and
work in the interest of the group. In this sense it is stunning that the behaviors that powerful
people seem to elicit, as described above, seem so ill suited for this purpose. Probably, this is the
reason why in reality society and organizations put all kinds of controls into place to ensure that
those in power behave in the interest of the group (see Keltner et al., 2008). Formal examples of
such controls are elections, and a board of directors in companies. Less formally, people use for
instance gossip to influence someone’s status and reputation to keep the powerful under control
(Dunbar, 2004; Owen & Sutton, 2001; Eagly & Johnson, 1995; Logli, 2008).
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At the same time society tries to cultivate the idea that those in power should take care of
the less well off. This principle is known as noblesse oblige (nobility obligates). This principle
entails that if you have much power, skills etc. this comes with a lot of responsibility – it obliges
you to give back to your group or society. For instance, powerful people reduce their offers to a
partner in an ultimatum game when their own power increases relative to their partner, but when
the partner is powerless they increase their offers. At the point powerful people feel socially
responsible (Handgraaf et al., 2008; see Frieze & Boneva, 2001). In our opinion, by
conceptualizing power as someone’s position in social hierarchy, we will relate more to powerful
people’s sense of social hierarchy, status concerns, and sense of noblesse oblige.
Accordingly, when being granted power elicits the sense of noblesse oblige it would lead
powerful people to make utilitarian choices more often (as in H1), however not because of the
reasons specified in H2. Rather, utilitarian choices among powerful people would be associated
with, and mediated by, feelings of responsibility, a sense of necessity and obligation. Hence, we
expect:
H4: High power individuals make more utilitarian judgments because they
experience a greater sense of noblesse oblige.
In line with Greene et al. (2001; 2004; 2008) personal dilemmas are often accompanied
by negative affect. As noblesse oblige is far from easy and comes with the realization that tough
decisions need to be made even if preferred to be avoided, we expect that, as opposed to
Hypothesis 3:
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H5: High power individuals will experience experience equal amounts of positive but
more negative affect, find the dilemma more difficult and take longer to make their
decisions than low power individuals.
The noblesse oblige account offers thus an alternative mechanism for why powerful
people might make more utilitarian decisions.
Study 1
Method
Design and participants. The aim of the first study was to find correlational evidence on how
people’s power relates to their moral choices. Participants were 63 students from the University
of Amsterdam (29 males and 34 females) with a mean age of 21.4 years. The students received a
course credit or €3.5 for participation.
Procedure. Participants were asked to take place in separate cubicles and answered on a
computer, questions about five, commonly used, moral dilemmas in three different blocks (see
appendix). Every block started with the presentation of the dilemma on the screen. Each question
appeared below the dilemma, in order to ensure participants were fully aware of the content of
the dilemma. The first block dealt with behavioral intentions (‘what would you do?’) and how
participants experienced making the judgment. The second block investigated participants’ moral
considerations on the dilemma (to what extent did they deem each action as appropriate and
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just). In the final block contained participants they rated how much power and status they had in
the dilemmas and how much noblesse oblige they experienced. The first two blocks were
counterbalanced across participants; the third block was always presented last. Within each block
the order in which the dilemmas were presented, and the order of the questions was randomized.
Participants finished with answering a general demographic questionnaire. The whole procedure
took approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
Materials and Measures. The materials used were five moral dilemmas, adopted from Greene
et al. (2008) and translated into Dutch (see appendix). The footbridge dilemma, presented above,
is an example.
To assess utilitarian (versus deontological) choice, in two of the five dilemmas
participants were asked if they would perform the utilitarian option (e.g. ‘Do you push the man
off the bridge’; yes/no). In the other three dilemmas participants were asked whether they would
choose to perform the deontological option (e.g. ‘Do you leave the man standing on the bridge?’;
yes/no). Accordingly, a preference for action was unconfounded from a preference for utilitarian
choice. The responses to the three deontological formulated dilemmas were recoded and then the
number of times people went for the utilitarian action were added. This created an index of
utilitarian choices (range 1-5).
Following their decision, participants indicated how certain they were about their
decision, how difficult it was to make their decision, how positive and negative they felt about
their decision and how much emotions they experienced during their decision making (on 7point Likert scales; always: 1=not at all, 7=very much). Also the time participants took to make
Noblesse Oblige 13
their choice was measured. To reduce the influence of outliers log transformation was performed
before the reaction times were analyzed.
In the moral considerations block participants rated the extent to which they experienced
several emotions (anger; pride; guilt; outrage, stress and indecision), and rated to what extent
they found both choice options appropriate and just (‘To what extent do you think it is
appropriate [just] to push the man from the bridge?’; always: 1=not at all, 7=very much).
In the final block participants rated how much power, status, regard and influence they
had in the dilemmas (always: 1=not at all, 7=very much). These ratings were averaged to create a
power index (Cronbach’s α=.71; range 1-7; see Figure 1).
To assess noblesse oblige participants rated the felt responsibility in the dilemma, the felt
necessity to act, the extent to which they could pass the choice onto someone else, the felt
amount of freedom to act and the felt right to act (always: 1=not at all, 7=very much). How these
variables are combined into an index of noblesse oblige is discussed in the results section.
Figure 1: Operationalization power about here
Results
The first hypothesis was that high power participants make different moral judgments
than participants with less power. A regression analysis confirmed this. The power index was a
significant predictor of number of times utilitarian choice (R2=.153, β=.392, t=3.324, p=.002; see
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also Figure 2). The higher participants rate their power the more utilitarian choices they make.
Hypothesis 1 is thus confirmed.
Figure 2: Regression Graph about here
Factor Analysis. A Principle Components Analysis with varimax rotation was used to examine
how the items included to measure noblesse oblige (felt right to act, felt necessity to act, extent
to which one can pass the choice to someone else and felt responsibility) related to each other
and to felt freedom to act.
The analysis yielded two factors with Eigenvalues >1 that explained respectively 39.71%
and 20.870% of the variance. The first factor consisted of felt responsibility, felt necessity, and
the extent someone can pass the choice to someone else. The second factor contained right to act.
A third factor, with an Eigenvalue of .938, that explained 18.75% of the variance contained only
felt freedom to act.
From this we concluded that our noblesse oblige variables differ from freedom to act;
that an index of noblesse oblige can be made consisting of the three items loading on the first
factor (Cronbach’s α=.73, see Figure 3) and that right to act should be analyzed separately.
Noblesse Oblige 15
Figure 3: Operationalization noblesse oblige about here
Power as approach and freedom. According to the power as approach and freedom account
high positioned people make more utilitarian decisions because they experience more freedom
(H2), accordingly they experience less negative and more positive emotions and find their choice
less difficult and make quicker decisions (H3). We examined the correlations between these
variables with the power index and the number of utilitarian choices (see Table 1). None of the
variables related significantly to power or utilitarian choice. Therefore, we conclude that these
factors did not play a significant role in how power influence moral judgments.
Table 1: Correlation with Position and Utilitarian Judgment about here
Power as Noblesse Oblige. The fourth and fifth hypothesis indicate that high power individuals
make more utilitarian decisions because they experience more noblesse oblige (H4), experience
equal amounts of positive emotions, more negative emotions, take more time to make the
decision and think the choice is more difficult than low power individuals (H5).
We found that the noblesse oblige index and right to act completely mediated the
relationship between position and the mean number of utilitarian judgments. This mediation
Noblesse Oblige 16
analysis was performed with the SPSS indirect effects macro of Preacher and Hayes (2008).
Figure 4 depicts this relationship. As is shown, when right to act and noblesse oblige are added
to the regression model as mediators the direct effect of positions on utilitarian judgments
becomes insignificant (B=.2534, SE=.2438, p >.05). Approximately 66.3% of the effect of
position on utilitarian judgments goes through our mediating variables. The indirect of noblesse
oblige accounts for 53.2% and the indirect effect of right to act accounts for the remaining
13.2%.
The indirect effect of right to act is marginally significant, since only the 90% confidence
interval excluded zero (see Table 2).2 The noblesse oblige indirect effect is highly significant, as
estimates for the 99% confidence interval clearly exclude zero. The contrast between the indirect
effects of noblesse oblige and right to act is marginally significant which suggests that noblesse
oblige is a stronger mediator than right to act. Hypothesis 4 is thus confirmed.
The results show that high power did not relate to thinking time; decision difficulty or the
amount of experienced emotions are more in line with the noblesse oblige perspective. This
supports Hypothesis 5 to a great extent and thus rejects Hypothesis 3.
Table 2 and Figure 4 about here
Conclusion. This study showed that power relates positively with utilitarian decision making. As
expected, when people perceive their position as higher they make more utilitarian judgments.
No evidence was found that utilitarian judgments relate to felt freedom to act, the amount of
Noblesse Oblige 17
positive and negative emotions experienced and decision difficulty. However, we did find that
utilitarian judgments relate positively with experiencing a sense of noblesse oblige. Nevertheless,
this correlational design does not exclude other causal interpretations. Therefore, in study 2
power was experimentally manipulated.
Study 2
Method
Design and participants. The aim of this study was to investigate experimentally whether and
how power affects moral judgments. Power was manipulated by varying participants’ position in
the dilemmas. This created three experimental conditions: ‘high position’ (N=28), ‘low position’
(N=27), and a neutral ‘control’ condition (N=27). Participants were 82 students from the
University of Amsterdam (26 males and 56 females) with a mean age of 22.2 years. The students
received a course credit or €3.5 for participation.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned into conditions and were asked to take place in
separate cubicles where they answered, on a computer, questions about the five moral dilemmas
that we also used in study 1. Before the start of the experiment participants received instructions
to project themselves into the positions mentioned in the dilemmas. The subsequent procedure
was equal to the procedure of study 1.
Materials and measures. The protagonists into which participants had to project themselves
were varied across conditions. In the high position condition the protagonist in the dilemmas had
Noblesse Oblige 18
a powerful position like a mayor, superintendent or a general. In the low position condition the
protagonists in the dilemma had a low power position like a cleaner, police-officer in training or
a seaman recruit. In the neutral condition the dilemmas were phrased in the same way as in study
1, and thus did not include any reference to a specific position (see appendix).
We used the same measures as in study 1. The number of utilitarian judgments is the
dependent variable (range 0-5). Participants’ ratings of their experienced levels of power, status,
regard and influence were combined into a power index (Cronbach’s α=.83,; range 0-7; see
Figure 1). Also, we again assess with a factor analysis if felt responsibility; felt necessity to act;
the extent to which participants could pass the choice onto someone else; the felt amount of
freedom to act and the felt right to act could be combined in to a noblesse oblige index. This is
discussed further in the results section.
Results
Manipulation check. There were significant differences between the conditions on the power
index, F(2,79)=54.949, p<.001 (see Figure 5). Planned contrast showed that participants in the
high position condition indicated to have more power (M=5.13, SD=.50), than participants in the
low position condition (M=3.66, SD=.52; t(79)=10.380, p<.001) or in the neutral condition
(M=4.59, SD=.56; t(79)=3.816, p<.001). Also, the low and the neutral conditions differed
significantly on power (t(79)=3.816, p<.001).
Noblesse Oblige 19
Figure 5: Position score per condition about here
Number of Utilitarian Judgments. Hypothesis 1 indicated that participants in the high position
condition would make more utilitarian choices than participants in the low or neutral position
conditions. This has been confirmed, F(2,79)=13.138, p<.0001 (see Figure 6). Planned contrasts
showed that participants in the high position condition (M=3.47, SD=.16) made more utilitarian
judgments than participants in the low position condition (M=2.30, SD=.163; t(79)=5.123,
p<.001) and the neutral condition (M=2.93, SD=.163, t(79)=2.361, p=.021). Participants in the
neutral condition also made more utilitarian choices than in the low condition (t(79)=2.737,
p=.008). The effect between the high and low condition can be summarized in an effect size r of
.964, which can be considered as high (Cohen, 1992). 3
Figure 6: Utilitarian Judgment per Condition about here
Factor Analysis. A Principle Components Analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the
items we included to measure noblesse oblige (felt right to act, felt necessity to act, extent to
which one can pass the choice to someone else and felt responsibility) all loaded on one factor
Noblesse Oblige 20
(Eigenvalue 2.155; 43.1% of the variance explained) and that felt freedom to act is a separate
construct which loads on another factor (Eigenvalue .953; 19.1% of the variance explained).
From this we concluded that our noblesse oblige variables differ from freedom to act and
that we can make an index of noblesse oblige consisting of the four items loading on the first
factor (Cronbach’s α=.657, see Figure 3). Note that as opposed to study 1, right to act is also
included in noblesse oblige.
Power as approach and freedom. Hypothesis 2 stated that high power individuals make more
utilitarian judgments because they feel freer. An ANOVA also shows that conditions differ on
freedom to act, F(2,79)=4.916, p=.010, with the high condition (M=4.40, SD=.76) differing from
the low (M=3.68, SD=.93; t(79)=2.962, p=.004) and the neutral condition (M=3.83, SD=.99;
t(79)=2.351, p=.021), while the low and the neutral conditions do not differ on freedom to act
(t(79)=.605, p=.547). Thus freedom to act might mediate the relationship between condition and
utilitarian judgment as stated in Hypothesis 2. This relationship is further examined in the next
section, when we also take noblesse oblige into account.
Power as Noblesse Oblige. In Hypothesis 4 we suggested that noblesse oblige mediates the
relationship between position and utilitarian judgment. Conditions differed significantly on
noblesse oblige, F(2,79)=13.041, p<.001, with the high position condition (M=5.05, SD=.47)
differing significantly from the low position condition (M=4.27, SD=.67, t(79)=4.920, p<.001),
but not from the neutral condition (M=4.86, SD=.62, t(79)=1.221, p=.226). The neutral and the
low conditions did differ significantly on noblesse oblige (t(79)=3.666, p<.001). So, noblesse
Noblesse Oblige 21
oblige might mediate the relationship between the condition and the number of utilitarian
judgments. This mediation is tested in a model that includes freedom to act (see Figure 7).
Hence, in this mediation analysis Hypothesis 2 and 4 are tested.
Figure 7: Mediation model about here
When freedom to act and noblesse oblige are added to the model as mediators the direct
effect of positions on utilitarian judgments is reduced (compare B=-.5837, SE=.1133, p <.01
with B=-.3403, SE=.1239, p <.05). Approximately 41.7% of the effect of position on utilitarian
judgments goes through our mediating variables (31.7% through noblesse oblige and 10.0%
through freedom to act). The indirect effect of freedom to act is small but significant: the 95%
confidence interval just excludes zero (see Table 3). The total indirect effect and the indirect
effect of noblesse oblige were highly significant, as even the bootstrapping estimates for the 99%
confidence interval clearly exclude zero. So, noblesse oblige and freedom to act partially mediate
the relationship between condition and utilitarian judgments. The contrast between the indirect
effects of noblesse oblige and freedom to act is marginally significant which suggest that
noblesse oblige is a stronger mediator than freedom to act.
Noblesse Oblige 22
Table 4: mediation analysis about here
Hypothesis 3 and 5 discussed how participants made their decisions. The correlations in
Table 4 show that power did not relate to the overall emotions experienced, or the amount of
positive and negative emotions participants experienced. If anything, high power individuals
found the decision more difficult (r=.169), but this difference between conditions is not
significant, F(2,79)=1.201, p=.306. Furthermore, the conditions differed on the average time
participants took to make their decision, F(2,79)=3.031, p=.054, with Tukey post-hoc tests
showing that participants in the high position condition (M=6969ms, SE=535) took longer than
participants in the low position condition to make their decision (M=5328ms, SE=534, p=.048).
All these findings oppose Hypothesis 3, which is thus again rejected. Except for the fact that
conditions did not differ on negative emotions Hypothesis 5 is supported.
Conclusion. We conclude that, both hypotheses two and four are supported. Nevertheless, there
is stronger support for the power as noblesse oblige account (H4) than for the power as freedom
account (H2).
Noblesse Oblige 23
Table 4: correlations with Condition and Utilitarian Judgment about here
Discussion and Conclusion
The two studies confirm correlationally and experimentally that high power individuals
make different moral judgments than people with low power. Namely, people in high positions
make more utilitarian judgments and decisions and thus less deontological judgments and
decisions than people in low positions.
We distinguished the power as approach and freedom account and the power as noblesse
oblige account. There is little evidence supporting the power as approach and freedom account.
The second study shows that high positioned people indeed feel more free to act and that this
feeling of freedom leads them to make more utilitarian judgments. Yet, this effect is only small.
All other evidence points into the direction of the noblesse oblige account.
The two studies clearly show that high power individuals experience a greater sense of
noblesse oblige, which in turn leads them to make more utilitarian judgments. High power
individuals experience just as much emotions during their decision making and find making a
choice at least equally difficult as low power individuals do. Moreover, they take more time to
make their choices.
So, it seems that high power individuals are not indifferent about their moral choices.
They do not want to make the utilitarian choice but noblesse oblige gives them the feeling that
they are obliged to make the utilitarian choice. Consequently, making more utilitarian choices is
Noblesse Oblige 24
not evidence for moral corruption. Utilitarian choices in high conflict dilemmas can stem from
complex feelings of responsibility and necessity to act.
Position, Goals and Moral Judgments
Future research should investigate when and why high positioned people will experience
noblesse oblige. We believe that some answers might lie in the goals high positioned people set
themselves. Powerful people are more goal oriented (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson &
Liljenquist, 2008); perform less behaviors that may distract them from obtaining their goal
(Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky & Van Dijk, 2008) and have a more variable behavioral repertoire,
which ensures that their behavior is in line with their goals and the situation (Guinote, Judd and
Brauer, 2002).
Accordingly, when the goals of the powerful align with group goals powerful people
behave pro-socially. For instance, powerful individuals contributed more to a common pool of
resources when the task called for that. However when the task called for taking resources from
the common pool, powerful people also took more for themselves (Galinsky et al., 2003: study
2). Moreover, goals can help powerful people overcome the tendency to view other people as
instruments (Overbeck and Park, 2001; 2006)
Thus when someone’s position highlights a goal that involves noblesse oblige (e.g.
responsibility), powerful people will notice and pursue such a goal. For example, the head of the
medical service in the vaccine dilemma takes an oath to help people. Similarly, such a goal can
be related to utilitarian judgments: the doctor wants to save as many lives as possible. Whereas
Noblesse Oblige 25
the nurse in the vaccine dilemma might not share that goal and therefore feels less sense of
noblesse oblige, and thus makes less utilitarian judgments.
The relationship between goals, noblesse oblige, power and moral judgments should be
investigated further. For example, the group membership of the people who need to be sacrificed
or saved could be systematically varied. This ought to influence to which extent noblesse oblige
is experienced and whether a utilitarian choice is in line with the goals that belong to the
position. Would, for instance, a general still experience noblesse oblige, and thus make a
utilitarian choice if the lives of soldiers from another country are at stake, or would a manager
feel responsible for the harm of employees from a different company?
Limitations of the Present Study
The present study provides first evidence on how power influences moral judgments.
Nevertheless there are several limitations of our design. Firstly, only behavioral intentions are
examined. Although, intentions can be seen as antecedents of behavior (Ajzen, 2002) in practice
the relationship between intentions and behaviors is often less univocal (eg. Sniehott, 2009;
Sutton, 1998). It would be therefore more powerful to investigate actual behaviors.
Secondly, the dilemmas in this study are very extreme and although they provide a very
clear distinction between deontology and utilitarianism, they do not relate well to everyday life.
It is worthwhile to expand our findings to less extreme and more natural dilemmas. Optimally,
these dilemmas would be presented to participants who could encounter these dilemmas in their
organizational roles. An example would be a dilemma of a manager who has to choose between
saving his company by committing fraud (the utilitarian option), or obeying the law resulting in
Noblesse Oblige 26
the bankruptcy of his company (the deontological option). Such a dilemma makes a less clear cut
between deontology and utilitarianism (e.g. committing fraud might also harm society) but we
believe investigating such dilemmas will be a fruitful avenue. The present study offers footing to
base such new research on.
Thirdly, even though conceptualizing power as position is more ecologically valid and
offers a more inclusive view of what power entails, it also comes with some drawbacks.
Positions include not only perceptions of power, but also, as we have seen, of status, influence
and regard. Even though the two studies did not support the notion that power and status operate
very differently4, it would be valuable to investigate more thoroughly how power and status
operate separately and in conjunction.
Conclusion
Lord Acton (1949) is famous for his quote that ‘power corrupts and absolute power
corrupts absolutely’. We tend to agree that absolute power corrupts – most people would act in
their unbridled self-interest if they had the power of Gyges. However, in reality most power is
constrained by people’s position in social hierarchy. High power positions often come with a
sense of noblesse oblige which drives powerful individuals to make tough choices out of
responsibility, not out of moral corruption.
Noblesse Oblige 27
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Noblesse Oblige 36
Appendix: Dilemmas used in the study
These dilemmas are adapted and translated from Greene et al. (2008). All the dilemmas are
presented in the following way:
Title
Percent utilitarian judgments:
Dilemma: You are [High Status /Low Status /Control ]
Note. The control is the neutral condition, so often there is no addition made in this condition:
this is indicated by (…).
Noblesse Oblige 37
1. Baby
Percent utilitarian judgments: Study 1: 58.7%; Study 2: 46.3% Greene et al. (2008): 60%
Enemy soldiers have taken over the village [from which you are the mayor / in which you
are a cleaner at city hall / where you live). They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. You
and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of the city hall. Outside you hear
the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house. A baby begins to cry loudly. You
cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will
summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, the child, and the others hiding out in the
cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother the child to death.
2. Bomb
Percent utilitarian judgments: Study 1:76.2% ; Study 2: 70.7% Greene et al. (2008): 90%
You [are the superintendent of the police, and you / are a police office in training and you
/ (…) get involved in negotiations with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set
off a bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that you have his teen-age son in your
custody. There is only one thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which
will kill dozens of people if detonated. To stop him, you must on television, in front of the
camera, break one of his son’s arms and then threaten to break the other one if he does not give
himself up.
3. Footbridge (Adapted from Thomson, 1985)
Percent utilitarian judgments: Study 1: 20.6% ; Study 2: 29.3% Greene et al. (2008): 21%
Noblesse Oblige 38
You work as [manager / holiday replacement / (…) ] at the shunting yard of a railway
company. A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five pedestrians who will be
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in
between the approaching trolley and the five pedestrians. Next to you on this footbridge is a
stranger with a large backpack. The only way to save the lives of the five pedestrians is to push
this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body and backpack will
stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five pedestrians will be saved.
4. Submarine
Percent utilitarian judgments: Study 1: 74.6% ; Study 2: 91.5% Greene et al. (2008): 91%
[You are a general of / a 3rd class marine on / You are located on] a military submarine
traveling underneath a large ice shield. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most of
your oxygen supply and has heavily injured one of the crew. The injured crew member is going
to die from his wounds no matter what happens. The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the
entire crew to make it to the surface. The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot
dead the injured crew member so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to
survive.
5. Vaccine
Percent utilitarian judgments: Study 1: 68.3% ; Study 2: 52.4% Greene et al. (2008): 79%
You [are the head of the medical service / are a nurse in training / work) at a hospital. A
couple of minutes ago some people were brought into the hospital that are infected with a deadly
Noblesse Oblige 39
virus. You have developed two substances in your home laboratory. You know that one of them
is a vaccine, but you don’t know which one. You also know that the other one is deadly. Once
you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can use it to save the lives of the people that
are brought in. You have with you two people who are under your care, and the only way to
identify the vaccine is to inject each of these people with one of the two substances. One person
will live, the other will die, and you will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine.
Noblesse Oblige 40
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Conceptualization of Power
Power
Status
.770** (.861**)
.841** (.898**)
Power
Index
.578** (.582**)
Influence
.729** (.878**)
Regard
Note. On the lines the correlations of the variables in study 1 (study 2) with the
power index. Reliability was α=.73 in study 1 and α=.83 in study 2. **p<.001
Noblesse Oblige 41
Figure 2: Regression of Power on Utilitarian Judgments
Table 1.
Correlations with Power (Times Chosen Utilitarian Judgment)
Freedom to act (H2) Emotions experienced (H3)
Positive feelings from choice (H3)
r=.130 (r=.149)
r=.231*( r=.106)
r=.212* (r=.044)
Difficulty (H3)
Time to make choice (H3:H4) Negative feelings from choice (H3)
r=.166 (r=.124)
r=.026 (r=.174)
*p<.10 **p<.05, H = hypothesis
r=.00 (r=.135)
Noblesse Oblige 42
Figure 3. Operationalization of Noblesse Oblige
Responsibility
Necessity
.829** (.806**)
.743** (.802**)
Noblesse
Oblige
.114ns (.635**)
Right to act
.783** (.643**)
Cannot pass
choice onto
someone else
On the lines the correlations of the variables in study 1 (study 2) with noblesse
oblige index. Reliability was α=.73 in study 1 and α=.66 in study 2. Note that in
study 1 right to act is analyzed separately and thus not a part of noblesse oblige.
**p<.001, ns=not significant
Noblesse Oblige 43
Table 2.
Indirect effects of Noblesse Oblige and Right to Act on Utilitarian Judgments.
Indirect Effects
Point Estimate
Se
95% Bootstrapped Confidence Interval
(B)
Lower
Upper
1. Noblesse Oblige
.4000a
.1611
.1438
.7860
2. Right to Act
.0991b
.0846
-.0096
.3267
Contrast 2-1
-.3009b
.1864
-.7171
.0236
Total Indirect Effect
.4991a
.1773
.1972
.9040
Note. Bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals, (10,000 bootstrap samples). aThe 99%
CI also excludes zero. bThe 90% CI excludes zero.
Noblesse Oblige 44
Figure 4.
Mediation analysis of power, noblesse oblige, right to act and utilitarian judgment
Power
Β=.7525(.2472)***
Β=.6047
(.1282)***
Noblesse
Oblige
Power
Β=.2534(.2438)NS
Β=.3370
(.1963)*
Right to Act
Utilitarian
Judgments
Β=.6615
(.2050)***
Utilitarian
Judgments
Β=.2941
(.1338)**
Note. Total Indirect effect is: .4991 (.1773), 95% CI [.1972 .9040]. Estimates based on
bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 bootstrap samples. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Noblesse Oblige 45
Figure 5. Manipulation check: power by condition
Noblesse Oblige 46
Figure 6: Utilitarian Judgment per Condition
Noblesse Oblige 47
Figure 7.
Mediation analysis of condition, noblesse oblige, freedom to act and utilitarian judgment
Condition
Β=-.5837
(.1133)***
Β=-.3904
(.0801)***
Noblesse
Oblige
Condition
Β= -.3403
(.1239)**
Β=-.3605
(.1213)***
Utilitarian
Judgments
Β=.4735
(.1481)***
Utilitarian
Judgments
B=.1624
(.0978)*
Freedom to
Act
Note. Total Indirect effect is: -2439(.0678), 95% CI [-.4078 -.1279]. Estimates based on
bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 bootstrap samples. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Noblesse Oblige 48
Table 3.
Indirect effects of Noblesse Oblige and Freedom to Act on Utilitarian Judgments.
Indirect Effects
Point Estimate (B) Se
95% Bootstrapped Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper
1. Noblesse Oblige
-.1848a
.0637
-.3281
-.0757
2. Freedom to Act
-.0586
.0380
-.1583
-.0006
Total Indirect Effect -.2434a
.0678
-.4078
-.1279
.1263b
.0800
-.0218
.2898
Contrast [2-1]
Note. Bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals, (20,000 bootstrap samples). aThe 99%
CI also excludes zero. bThe 90% CI excludes zero.
Table 4.
Correlations with Condition (Times Chosen Utilitarian Judgment)
Freedom to act (H2)
Emotions experienced (H3)
r= -.315** (r=.326)** r=.023( r= -.161)
Positive feelings from choice (H3)
r=.043 (r= -.085)
Difficulty (H3)
Time to make choice (H3:H4) Negative feelings from choice (H3)
r= -.169 (r=.062)
r=-.260** (r= -.038)
*p<.10 **p<.05, H = hypothesis
r=-.012 (r=.067)
Noblesse Oblige 49
Footnotes
1
This dilemma is also used in the two studies described below. For a full overview of the used dilemmas
see Appendix.
2
Bootstrapping estimates are used the assess the significance of the indirect effects, since, as opposed to
the Sobel test, bootstrapping does not rely on the unrealistic assumption that the indirect effects has a
normal sampling distribution (see Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2008 for a discussion).
3
The effect size when comparing the high and the neutral condition is r=.858, which is also high.
4
Power and status were closely related, and they related in same way, with approximately the same
magnitude to all key variables included in the study.