E. Zürcher
The Chinese communes
In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 118 (1962), no: 1, Leiden, 68-90
This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl
I
THE CHINESE COMMUNES
v\-v-v,\y •
n the spring of 1958 there arose in China, under circumstances
which have never become quite clear, a new form of social
organization which by its comprehensive and radical character surpassed anything which thus f ar had been achieved in that field.
The new institution was named the "People's Common Association",
jen-min kung-she; in the West it has become known as "People's
Commune". 1 It claims to be "The basic unit of social organization, in
which industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military afïairs
have been combined and coordinated". Under the supreme authority
and supervision of the Central Government, the Communes moreover
function as units of local administration, as they have taken the place
of the former territorial division in townships (hsiang) and districts
(hsien). Since December 1959 practically the whole Chinese countryside
has been reorganized into such economical and political nuclei of great
size, and the formation of Communes in the cities has been carried
on simultaneously, though at a somewhat slower pace. Considerable
publicity has been given to the sweeping and ruthless character of the
communization movement, to its pernicious influence upon individual
and family life, and to those features by which the Commune most
obviously departs from the Russian model. Observers in both camps
agree in regarding the Commune as the most stupendous example of
social engineering known in history, irrespective whether they extol
it as "a glorious sunrise above the broad horizon of Eastern Asia" 2
or characterize it as an experiment in insectivized living.3
1
2
3
The name Jen-min ktcng-she has obtained official sanction in the Peitaiho
Resolution (PR 16-9-'58 p. 22). The name has been adopted by Mao Tze-tung
himself during his tour of inspection in the countryside in early August 1958.
Before that date various other names are said to have been proposed by
cadres, who thereby demonstrated their "lack of insight in the nature of
the Commune", such as "Collective agricultural society", "State Farming
society", "Communist Cooperative Farm", etc. (see T'an Ch'i-lung in HC
l-10-'58, p. 21-22). Some kind of relation with the Paris Commune of 1871,
at least in nomenclature, is feit (Teng T'o, "Thousand Years for the
Commune", in JMIVH 19S8, 10, p. 6), but seldom emphasized.
Wu-ch'ang Resolution, Chinese text p. 9, English p. 10.
E.g. Manchester Guardian, quoted in Free China Review IX. 1. p. 36.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
69
An adequate treatment of this subject is hardly possible at the
present stage of our knowledge. Reliable information is extremely
scarce, in spite of the huge amount of official statements, reports,
Marxist scholastics, and newspaper comments from both sides. The
"eye-witness accounts" given by Western visiting pundits without any
knowledge of the language are hardly more than touristic observations
which must be used with utmost caution. The panegyrics of the official
Chinese press sharply contrast with the very pessimistic descriptions
given by Chinese refugees, and the few authors who aim at a factual
account of the Commune movement face the hopeless task to build up
a coherent picture from sources which in every respect cöntradict each
other.4
In such accounts — including the present one — the author is
guided by a subjective choice between various "plausibilities" rather
than by unequivocal historical evidence, and the following pages are
merely the expression of such a preliminary opinion.
Marxism in its classical formulation starts from the assumption that
the world-revolution is carried out by the workers' class, the urban
proletariat. The revolution is conceived as the result of a natural and
unescapable process of growing tension and "class polarization" in the
highly industrialized capitalist society. The peasant plays a passive role:
the new age will dawn in the cities of the West, not in the countryside,
and still less in the feudal backwaters of "Asiatic Society".
It is therefore a surprising fact that in the Chinese revolution the
main role has been played by the peasants — the överwhelming
fnajority of the Chinese population — and not by the urban proletariat.
There is no doubt that this is due to the personal influence and
guidance of Mao Tse-tung, who since the late twenties developed the
strategy of the peasant revolution by adapting the Marxist-Leninist
doctrine to the Chinese agrarian environment, against the will of the
Komintern and of the more orthodox members of the Central Committee in those early years. Especially during and shortly after the
second world war it was the communist agrarian policy that won
the support of the överwhelming majority of the peasant population,
4
K.g. G. Hudson, A. V. Sherman and A. Zauberman, The Chinese Communes,
a documentary review and analysis of the "Great Leap Forward", London,
1960; R. Hughes, The Chinese Communes, London, 1960. Most publications
on economie and political subjects after 1958 devote some attention to the
Communes. Especially worth mentioning is Chao Kuo-chün, Agrarian Policy
of the Chinese Communist Party, London-New Delhi, 1960, p. 161-172.
70
E. ZÜRCHER.
and the immediate breakdown of Kuomintang rule and the almost
effortless unification of mainland China within one year (1948—'49)
are only understandable in the light of this policy.5
In 1949, after thé ascendancy to power, the first phase of the
agrarian program was launched. The distribution of grounds to landhungry poor farmers and tenants, such as had already been carried
out during the war in areas under communist rule, was now implemented on a nation-wide scale. Property rights, including those of
purchase, sale, and lease of land, were fixed and guaranteed by law,
and the treatment of middle class and even larger landowners was
rather tolerant. It was this surprisingly moderate program that induced
some Western observers around 1950 to represent the Chinese communists as an innocuous kind of "agrarian ref ormers" with very liberal
and only hazily Marxist inclinations. Even the most elementary knowledge of communist strategy would have been sufficient to disprove
this. Just as all other phases of the "continuous revolution", this "softand-fair policy" was no more than a tactical move, nor have the
Chinese authorities ever concealed the preliminary nature of this
program. 6
The final aim was, and is, the realization of the communist system
pur sang, with an intermediate period of progressive socialization.
The primary aim of the land reform had been "to set f ree the
productive forces of the country side", i.e. drastically to raise agricultural production in order to provide the new government with the
necessary means f or capital investment, and to pave the way f or China's
industrialization. However, by 1952, after the completion of the land
reform, a situation had been created which eventually could not satisfy
5
6
For the Communist agrarian policy in the years 1940-1948, see e.g. C. Brandt,
B.. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Comtnunism, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, p. 275-285, and Edgar Snow, Random Notes
on Red China (1936-1945), Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 34-42. A very detailed
account of Communist activities in a village in Shansi during the war is
given in Isabel and David Crook, Revolution in a Chinese Village — Ten
Mile Inn, London 1959. The value of the report is somewhat diminished
by the authors' unbridled admiration for the new government, and by their
uncritical acceptance of all official statements and slogans.
"Common Program" (adopted by the Chinese People's Politica! Consultative
Conference, Sept. 1949) article 34: "The People's Government... will guide
the peasants in gradually organizing various forms of mutual help and
cooperation in labour and production, according to the principle of free
choice and mutual benefit" (Chinese text in Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, Nov. 1949,
P- 9).
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
71
the demand of the new rulers, although it may have seemed most
profitable in the eyes of the individual small farmer. The fact that
the distribution of land had atomized the countryside into innumerable
tiny plots, and the rather primitive working methods, seriously hampered the speeding up of agrarian production, and made the base of the
state very vulnerable in view of the periodically occuring natural
disasters. From a political point of view the situation was unsatisfactory,
because it could lead, and in some cases actually had led, to further
difïerentiation and accumulation of landed property.
Early in 1953 the agrarian revolution entered its second phase,
starting with a huge campaign for cooperation and collectivization.7
The whole process is characterized by certain general trends which
clearly reveal themselves in this second phase, and culminate in the
third phase (that of the People's Communes) : the gradual levelling
down and proletarization of the rural population; the fusion of agricultural institutions into ever larger territorial units with an increasingly
complicated structure and with more and more f unctions; the increasing
regimentation of the life of the individual farmer.
In the f irst years the collectivization proceeded at a rather slow rate;
in was not until 1957 that the process was virtually completed. The
first step consisted of the establishment of "mutual help groups", based
upon the practice of pooling man-power and implements during the
busy seasons — a practice which in China (as in many other agricultural
societies) had existed since time immemorial, but which was now
rationalized and made into a permanent institution f unctioning throughout the year. The optimal "mutual help group" appeared to consist
of about ten families. The land remained divided into the original plots
and parcels which were tilled one by one by the whole group. Each
member was still in f uil possession of his land and other properties;
larger implements (such as carts) were collectively purchased by the
group as a whole, and leased to the members. This first sub-phase lasted
very long in some regions; it is probable that this one, rather than
the other forms of agricultural cooperation, was regarded as a useful
training for the collective life.
7
On the collectivization of agriculture see e.g. the excellent summary in T. J.
Hughes and D. E. T. Luard, The Economie Development of Communist
China 1949-1958, London 1959. Documentation in Chao Kuo-chün, Agrarian
Policies of Mainland China, Cambridge, Mass., p. 54-120, and, by the same
author, Economie Planning anf Organisation in Mainland China, Cambridge,
Mass., 1959, p. 113-178.
72
E. ZÜRCHER.
In the next phase the "mütual help groups" were persuaded to set
up a "lower agricultural cooperation" consisting of twenty to thirty
families. At this stage the peasant invested his land and draughtanimals in the cooperative farm, but he retained the right to withdraw
from the "co-op" with his property, and he received dividend in
proportion to the estimated value of his invested property. The system
was only in so far socialist in nature as it was based upon the principle
of "to each according to his labour". The distribution of dividend was
a disturbing factor, a relic of the capitalist past which was bound to be
eliminated in the next sub-phase, that of the "higher" or "fully socialist"
cooperative farm. The "higher co-op", which resulted from the merger
of several "lower" ones, virtually reduced the peasants to the status
of agricultural workers; the share of each member in the nett produce
was fully determined by his labour, expressed in "working points".
He was allowed to cultivate a small parcel for his own use. In most
cases one "co-op" comprised the population of a village; in some regions
several villages or hamlets were united into a single co-op.
The average "co-op" numbered 600 to 700 members. The peasant
did not receive dividend any more, but his original share in the
cooperative farm remained theoretically his own. It was defined as
a temporary investment which would be repaid to him with interest,
as soon as the circumstances would allow doing so.
' In the People's Commune the latter provision has also been cancelled.
All former investments have become collective property, as well as
all other possessions of the members except a few personal belongings
(furniture, clothes, a few small domestic animals, etc). In this respect
the Commune is simply a further step in the process of expropriation
and proletarization which started several years earlier. The essential
difference between the large "co-op" and the Commune concerns other
aspects: The combination of various economie actiyities, the organization of labour along military lines, its function as an administrative
area. The original features of the Commune may be characterized as
follows: (1) The Commune is larger than the "higher co-op", several
of which are fused together to form one Commune. The average size
varies from 10.000 to more than 40.000 members. (2) The Commune
is not only an agricultural institution, but, as stated above, a very
complex body in which industry, agriculture, commerce, education and
military affairs are internally organized and coordinated. (3) Daily life
in the Commune is highly "collectivized". (4) The Commune is not
only an economie but also a military unit. All adult members receive
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
73
military training and are permanently subjected to military discipline.
(5) The Commune is, moreover, an administrative unit, having taken
over all functions of the former townships and districts.8
It is hard to define the factors which have prompted the authorities
to take this new and revolutionary step. Several reasons have been
suggested; some of these are obvious, and some are merely hypothetical.
The first and foremost reason is purely economie: the need to
speed up the tempo of industrialization — the main motive behind all
major reforms in agriculture since 1950.
In the first years after the take-over the Chinese authorities had
striven for a rapid expansion of heavy industry, large units of
production, highly concentrated in key areas, to the neglect of small
workshops, "cottage industry", and other remnants of a feudal past.
They did so no doubt in imitation of the Russian model. But the
situation in China was much more unfavourable than that of Russia;
even in 1952 (at the eve of the first Chinese Five-Year Plan) the
total industrial and mining output was less in China than in Russia
in 1913! There was an overwhelming abundance of man-power and
an extreme scarcity of capital. The problems of communication and
transportation were f ormidable, and could only be solved in the course
of many years. Under these circumstances the leaders made a radical
change of policy: maximal dispersion and stimulation of light industry
and cottage industry, to be worked in situ by the rhasses of the peasant
population alongside with their normal agricultural occupations; remoulding of the farmer into a new type: the peasant-worker, who is
able to leave the plough in order to enter the factory, and vice versa.9
Maximal use of manual labour and lower forms of mechanization,
8
9
For a comparison between Cooperative Farm and Commune see Chang Chihwen, "What is'the People's Commune!" Shanghai, 1958, p. 1-4. In the
"classical" formulation (e.g. Wu-ch'ang Resolution, TL p. 9, and all later
official documents) the functions of the Commune are enumerated under two
headings: the economie aspect (combination and coordination of industry,
agriculture, commerce, education and militia), and the political-administrative
aspect (integration of Commune and township, the managing board of the
Commune taking over the functions of local government). Another stereotyped
series of four aspects (e.g. editorial of Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao, December
1958, TL p. 97)) :
(1) militarization of the organization, (2) "combatant working sprit", (3)
collectivization of life, (4) democratization of management.
Cf. the "Exegesis of the Wu-ch'ang Resolution" (TL p. 122) on the new
type of man that "goes into the fields as a peasant, and enters the factory
as a worker". In all enumerations of the advantages of the Commune system
the raising of industrial production is emphasized (e.g. Peitaiho Resolution
74
E. ZÜRCHER.
utilization of existing buildings, application of traditional techniques.
The bulk of the availablè labour was indeed to be f ound in the
countryside. It was estimated that male peasants in the large "co-ops",
due to the slack seasons in f arming, were no more than 200 days a year
engaged in productive labour. When in the course of the "Great Leap
Forward" the Government was recruiting millions of labourers for its
gigantic construction projects and, on the other hand, encouraged the
establishment of innumerable small local industries everywhere in the
country, it may have hit upon the idea of the Commune as the best
means of permanent and systematical mobilization of the whole population. It was a new and highly original conception which fundamentally dèviated from the Russian pattern. 10
The second motivation is of a political nature. Much less is known
about this aspect, and the current hypotheses are mixed with an ample
dose of wishful thinking. They are variations upon a well-known
journalistic theme, viz. the classification of Communist leaders into
"softs" and "hards". Such speculations are seldom convincing and
nearly always uncontrollable. Thé evidence is mostly very flimsy —
a slight indisposition of Mao-Tse-tung is sufficient to release a flood
of "critical commentaries" in the press, about the bloody struggles
of factions inside the Central Committee, and the imminent downfall
of the regime. In this case it is supposed x l that the Central Committee
is split up in two rivalling groups, both of which are overshadowed
by Mao-Tse-tung (whose position as founder and patriarch remains
unassailable) : the "hard" fanatics led by Lui Shao-ch'i, and the "soft"
advocates of a moderate program, headed by Chou En-lai. The "soft"
faction had been responsible for the liberal course of 195(5—1957,
10
11
PR 16-9-'S8 p. 21; Wu-ch'ang Resolution TL p. 4). In all sources the
Commune is in the first place represented as a product of the "Great Leap
Forward" — the crash program of "socialist reconstruction" which was
launched at the end of 1957, and in which industrial production is given
the highest priority.
The original character of the Commune, the "great creation of our country"
(HC 1959.1 p. 1), the "new initiative in the field of socialist disfribution"
(Wu-ch'ang Resolution, TL p. 25) — hence the deviation of the Russian
example — is duly stressed in the official documents. For the reactions in
Soviet Russia see Sherman, op. cit. p. 57-61.
See e.g. R. Hughes, op. cit. p. 37-40, and G. Hudson's introduction to The
Chinese Communes, p. 12-14. The importance of the political aspect appears
from the fact that the Commune is always characterized as the result of the
political-ideological "Rectification Movement", the large-scale action against
"rightist and revisionist elements" of 1957-1958. Cf. Chang Chin-wen, op. cit.
p. 11.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
75
known as the "Hundred Flowers Policy". This policy of more freedom,
open discussion and anti-dogmatism, which had originated in the
atmosphere of general relaxation after Stalin's death, became a failure.
After less than a year it had to be abandoned, and a long and very
virulent campaign against "rightist elements" was waged to stern the
tide of criticism and liberal thought (1957). This was the turning-point
which brought the "hard" party once more in power. In order to
consolidate their position, the "hards", supported by Mao-Tse-tung,
thereupon launched a new and even more drastical movement, designed
to bring the whole population under maximum Party control. The
Communes were the result of this counter-ofïensive of the radical
wing. Is this hypothesis anything more than guess-work? We do not
know, and very probably we never shall know.
A third possible motivation is furnished by the military aspect. 12
Each Commune f orms a unit of the national militia. According to recent
estimates, this provides the means for immediate mobilization of 30
million men and women, with a reserve of another 130 million. This
fact, coupled with the maximal dispersion of industry in the countryside, has important consequences. According to unofficial sources
Mao-Tse-tung in 1958 once alluded to the fact that China would be
able to survive an atomic war on account of this strategical and
industrial diffusion. The value of this report is open to doubt. The
military consequences of the Commune system are of course very
important, but we can hardly assume that it has been one of the
primary reasons for its establishment. The people's militia in the
Communes carries on the tradition of the peasant resistance groups
as had been organized by the communists during the war; in training
and armament they can in no way be compared with the regular army.
Was the Commune system a total innovation? Not quite. It appears
that some essential features existed before, as the result of a various
independent trends of development.13 The niilitarisation of labour
had already been practised in Communist-occupied areas during the
war, and the performance of corvee work by "labour armies" on large12
13
What the official documents have to say about the military aspect of the
People's Communes is restricted to vague generalities. For estimates of
numerical strength see Hughes, op. cit. p. 35-36, and Hudson, op. cit., p. 12.
Cf. also editorial in HC l-9-'58, and "Report from Hsushui", PR 30-9-'58,
esp. p. 22.
See Sherman, op. cit., p. 22-24; editorial HC 1959.1, p. 1; for the "labour
army" in Shansi see Wang Mu-yen in Pi? 26-8-1958, p. 13 sqq.
76
E. ZÜRCHEE.
scale objects (such as the building of highways and dams) under
military discipline was also known before 1958. It may be added that
forced labour for public purposes had been a regular institution in
China for more than twenty centuries. The new element in the Communes is not the militarization of labour, but rather its intensity, its
gigantic scale and its permanent character. As to the "collective life"
— this had more or less naturally developed in the larger "co-ops"
before the communization. Communal kitchens and dining halls, public
nurseries and kindergartens, laundries, etc. had there been established
as early as 1956, mainly as means to "liberate the women from the
household chores" and to engage them in productive labour. The "f ree
supply" system and its ideological by-products (see below) had, however, not yet developed. The building of workshops and small factories
had already started in 1957 in the collective farms throughout the
country. In May 1950 no less than 800,000 small industrial units had
been established, and the famous but partly abortive campaign to build
innumerable blast furnaces for local steel production was in full swing.
According to the official version, the Communes started as a
spontaneous peasant movement (probably in Honan in April 1958),
the farmers in an "upsurge of revolutionary enthusiasm" demanding
to be allowed to merge their co-ops into Communes, and the authorities,
after due deliberation, benignly granting their request. 14 It goes without saying that this is hardly more than a pious myth, designed to
justify a sweeping measure by referring to the "popular will". On
the other hand we must keep in mind that the Commune was not a
total innovation, superimposed in toto upon the population, but rather
14
The official version indeed seriously States that the first Communes have
been set up as the result of a spontaneous peasant movement without any
guidance from above. (cf. e.g. editorial in JMJP 3-9-1958; Wu Chih-pu,
"From agricultural co-op to People's Commune", in HC 16-9-1958 p. 7;
"Exegesis of the Wuch'ang Resolution", TL p. 95; editorial HC 1959.1 p.1).
Factual details about the first development are nowhere given — it is still
unknown where exactly the movement started. The first Communes seem to
have appeared in Hopei and Honan in the early spring of 1958, but the
subject does not appear in the press before August (Aug. 18. 1958 in JMJP;
aug. 26 in PK). The famous "Sputnik" (Wei-hsing) Commune in Sui-p'ing,
Honan, was founded in april 1958, and it seems to have been one of the
first (complete statutes in JMJP 4-9-1958). However, in an interview with
reporters from Hong Kong and Macao, T'ao Chu, provincial secretary of
the Kuangtung branch of the CCP, referred to a Commune in the very
South (Chang-shih Commune in Kuangtung) which, according to him, had
also been founded as early as April (interview of Dec. 27, 1958; text in
TL p. 77). It goes without saying that the offical version of the Com-
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
77
an intensivation and combination of elements which were already in
course of development.
As often is the case, we have the impression that in the first phase
(till the end of 1958) the campaign developed at a rate which escaped
the control of the central government. Small wonder, if one realizes
how the government in implementing its program had to rely upon
the exultant and no doubt often embellished reports of local cadres.
The communization and the exploitation of labour were driven to
excess. In the official directives the cadres are instructed that the
Commune members must have a reasonable night's rest and that they
must not work more than twelve hours a day; women must not perf orm
heavy labour shortly bef ore and af ter childbirth; husband and wife
must be allowed to dweil together, etc., 15 statements which indicate
the occurrence of such abuses as are implied in these instructions. The
repeated injunctions to pay due attention to the quality of the finished
products, and warnings against waste of material due to hasty and
careless work also indicate that cadres tended to rush up the production
by any means in order to fuif il, or if possible to surpass, the ambitious
targets, at the expense of the Commune members.
Darker still is the picture evoked by refugees in the first period,
in Hong Kong, Macao, and Formosa. 16 Truly inf ernal scènes: people
were toiling day and night without any sufficient rest, and yet were
starving. Husband and wife were separated and had to sleep in miserable barracks, after the peasants had been compelled to demolish their
own houses. The parents saw each other seldom and their children
hardly ever; marriage and the family had virtually ceased to exist.
15
16
mune's birth-story as a "spontaneous peasant movement" is very doubtful,
to say the least. In view of the complete control exercised by the Party
apparatus at all levels, and in view of the fact that the party leaders. appear
to be well-informed about even the most trivial happenings and local initiatives, it is unthinkable that local cadres (or groups of peasants) could and
would undertake such a far-going reform without the knowledge and permission of the authorities.
Wu-ch'ang Resolution TL p. 27-29 (English translation PR 23-12-1958
p. 15-16); proclamation of the CC of Dec. 19: "On questions concerning the
people's livelihood", TL p. 52. Official directives concerning the working
hours: normally eight hours of labour and two hours of "study" a day:
maximum (in the busy seasons) twelve labour hours a day; a night's rest
of eight hours must be maintained.
See e.g. "Die Volkskommunen", selection of articles from Free China Review
(Formosa), IX, no. 1, Jan. 1959. Cf. also the interview reproduced in Hughes,
op. cit. p. 23-26, according to which the Party directives fixing the working
hours (see previous note) had not yet been applied in South China no less
than five months after their promulgation.
78
E. ZÜRCHER.
The few spare hours were all occupied by military training and indoctrination. Since then it has become clear that this picture, though
being a fairly accurate description of the excesses of the system, was
not valid for the average Commune, and that there were considerable
regional variations. Even in the chaotic first months there were Communes where leisure was allowed in a reasonable proportion to working
hours, including military training (if we judge according to Chinese
and not to Western European standards), where husband and wife
were not separated, and where the children could be taken home by
the parents after work. During working hours the children were everywhere separated from the parents, but this had already been a general
practice before the establishment of Communes. The intensity of
"communization" and exploitation largely depended on the private
initiative of local cadres, with all the risks of "commandism" and abuse
of power which seem to be inherent in every totalitarian bureaucracy.
Since December 1958, during the "tidying up" of the Communes, rash
and over-enthusiastic cadres have had to undergo much criticism from
above, and the most glaring excesses were no doubt eliminated in the
course of 1959. It must be said that Western commentators in general
have tended to overstress these excesses by manipulating fragmentary
"quotations" from communist sources torn out of their context — a
well-known journalistic procedure which by its black-and-white simplicity is not only misleading but also to a dangerous extent based
upon, and leading to, wishful thinking. 17
Interesting are some ideological by-products of the Commune system.
It is a well-known f act that every major material innovation in China
is accompanied by widely propagated ideological reforms. Instead of
being content with the Marxist principle that the ideological superstructure automatically changes with the evolution of the material base,
he authorities try to accelerate this natural evolution by taking in tow
the ideology (and all the other aspects of intellectual and artistic life)
and by f orcibly adapting it to the economie circumstances. The strained
and unnatural character of this "planned production of things spiritual"
is best exemplified by a "Five-Year Plan for Philosophy" which was
recently initiated!
In the first place there is the creation of a new type of human being:
peasant-worker-soldier-intellectual merged into one, homo faber communalis universalis. By the introduction of the Commune with its multi17
Cf. Hughes' remarks in his introduction, op. cit. p. 7-8.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
79
ple f unctions, the boundaries between peasant, worker and soldier have
been broken through, and this amorphous proletariat will soon, by
study at the "Red and Expert Universities" (institutions of higher
education in the Commune), remove the last barriers between themselves and the intelligentsia.1^ This ideal, only partly realized but
actively propagated, has given rise to a remarkable cultural fusion
movement. Workers make collective paintings; farmers write books
and produce astronomical numbers of poems and songs; dock-workers
study philosophy whilst philosophers work the fields and poets turn
out electric wire; "schools are set up in factories, and factories in
schools". 19
The literary mammoth-action is especially striking. 20 The poems
of peasants and workers are no more counted one by one, but measured
18
19
20
Cf. e.g. Chang Chih-wen, op. cit., p. 22: "Due to the accelerated industrialization and urbanization of the village the peasants are also transformed into
workers and intellectuals"; the "merger of worker, peasant, merchant, student
and soldier into one person" mentioned in the Peitaiho Resolution (PR
16-9-1958 p. 21), and Tao Chu's remarks about the emergence of the
"Socialist New Man" by Commune education, in the interview mentioned in
note 14 (TL p. 83-84). According to Marxist-Leninist theory the transition
from socialist to communist society is effected by the gradual realization of
certain basic principles, which are elaborated at great length in the Chinese
documents on the Communes. It is stated that the Commune represents a
"higher phase" of socialism, and that it will remain the "fundamental unit
of social organization" even after the transition to a Communist society,
because certain features of the Commune seem to lead to the realization of
Communist principles (the much-debated "sprouts of communism" in the Commune system). The five basic principles in question are (1) transition from
collective ownership to public ownership of the means of the production;
(2) the disappearance of the antithesis between mental and manual labour;
(3) the disappearance of the antithesis between city and countryside; (4) free
supply of commodities "to each accoording to his needs", instead of "to each
according to his labour"; (5) elimination of all internal functions of the
state. Since August 1958 innumerable pages of Marxist scholasticism have
been devoted to this crucial subject. The fundamental "scriptural passage" is
Wu-ch'ang Resolution, TL p. 11, English translation PR 23-12-1958 p. 10;
all the rest consists ot glosses and paraphrase without any new points of
view being developed.
Wu Ch'uan-ch'i: "Communism seeh through People's Communes", JMJP
1-10-1958.
For this literary campaign see Chang Jen-hsia, "An outburst of Popular
Poetry", China Reconstructs VIL 10 (October 1958), p. 24-30; PR 21-10-1958,
p. 5; Chuang Kuang-nien in HC 1959, p. 23-29; S. H. Chen, "Multiplicity
in Uniformity: Poetry and the Great Leap Forward" CQ 3, July-Sept 1960,
p. 1-15. Cf. also PR 23-12-1958, p. 4 about the remarkable mass-action to
study philosophy, and the deluge of philosophical treatises (all dealing with
Marxist dialectics) written by workers in 1958.
80
E. ZÜRCHER.
by lou "basketful" and ch'e "cart-loads". The ch'uang-tsao kao-ch'ao
"creative spring-tide" sweeps over the country. In Shanghai 200,000
workers turn out no less than five million works in 1958 alone. A
smaller town, T'ang-shan in Hopei, in the same year turns out two
million pieces (mostly short poems and songs); the yield of whole
provinces must be expressed in hundreds of millions.
Peasants and workers are encouraged to write about the new life,
often in the form of traditional songs and ballads. It is difficult to say
if the themes are more or less prescribed, and in how f ar the products
undergo a finishing touch afterwards; suggestion certainly plays its
role. The products are very simple, and to pur judgement they almost
invariably appear to be monotonous, insipid and puerile. A peasant
from Shansi sings the following ballad: "Each year our production
increases; grain and cotton He high as mountains, hürrah! Eat the
grain, and don't forget the sower; the Communist Party is our father
and mother" (The pleasant rhythm is unfortunately lost in the translation) . Another rural bard begins his song with the words: "We adore
no God, we build no temple — far greater is the love of Chairman
Mao". Love, in a more conventional sense, also plays its role, but the
man does not conquer his sweetheart with languishing looks and billets
doux, but rather by working still harder than she does in order to
increase the production.
Folkloristic motives are found in many poems. One of the most
popular is the theme of the legendary Yü-kung, the "fooi", who planned
to move a whole mountain with his primitive digging implements: "Two
baskets I carry on my carrying-pole / how it bends under their weight!
/ But my dear wif e, come and see, / I'm carrying a mountain on either
end!" The most famous peasant song, many times cited and praised,
shows the iconoclastic attitude towards traditional belief s and cults:
"There is no Jade Emperor in Heaven / there is no Dragon King in
the Sea! / I am the Jade Emperor, / I am the Dragon King! / Oh, you
three (sacred) mountains and Five (divine) Peaks, / get out the way
— here I come!" 21. This literary action is a very interesting phenomenon. The Chinese leaders have consciously patterned it after a very
old Chinese tradition in which popular songs and poetry are interpreted
as a "mirror for the government", as is also indicated by the name
ts'ai-feng, "Ode-collectors", given to the cadres who have the duty
21
For a glorifying article about this doggerel see Hsiao I in JMWH
2-3.
1958. 8,
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
81
to gather the examples of popular literature — a venerable court-title
of hoary antiquity.
The cultural fusion movement is also spectacular in other fields. It
became a cult, complete with miracles, saints and martyrs. The miracles
— these are the inventions made by simple people without any schooling. 22 In a few years time, simple house-wives make more than a
million small inventions. Workers and peasants are exhorted by the
slogans "reject one-sided reliance upon experts", and "combine traditional with new methods". The new saints: a blacksmith without any
higher technical training who constructs the most complicated apparatus
with no other help than some blueprints; the workers in Harbin who
in their free hours build the most intricate engines of heavy industry.
The acupuncture and other branches of traditional Chinese medicine
are propagated, and many cases are quoted in which Chinese therapy
saved patients who had been given up by Western science.23
However comical or apocryphal such cases may seem to us, we must
not underrate the ideological effect nor the practical results of such
"a mass movement. In some fields, such as the improvement of
insecticides and chemical fertilizers, impressive results are reported
to have been achieved by such "mass experimenting", carried out by
an enormous number of untrained persons engaged in research. The
possibility must not be ruled out that sheer quantity — the huge
number of persons involved — to some extent makes up for the lack
of quality — the low level of training and specialization.
Even more remarkable is the political-ideological aspect which became very prominent in the first, overrenthusiastic, phase of the
Commune movement. As has been noted above, many large agricultural
cooperatives had already started tp supply their members with food
from communal kitchens, on the basis of free distribution, there being
no direct relation between the quantity or quality of the food obtained
by the individual member and the amount of work performed by him.
In some cases the communal kitchen merely supplied the staple food
(noodles or cooked rice), the peasants preparing, their own vegetables.
In the C o m m u n e this system of free distribution was considerably
expanded, with regional variations. In its most extensive form it
22
23
See e.g. Tsai Pang-hwa in China Reconstructs V I L 10 (Oct. 1958) p. 14-15;
T'ang Fang-chen ib. p. 20-23; W u Tzu-chien tb. I X . 5 ( M a y 1960) p. 2 - 5 ;
A. V. Sherman, op. cit. p. 35.
Many examples in Sherman, op. cit. p. 35-36. For an extreme example of
"miraculous healing" see China Reconstructs
V I I . 10 (Oct. 1958) p. 10-13.
Dl. 118
6
82
E. ZÜRCHER.
comprised the "Ten Guarantees": f ree meals, clothes, lodging, education, medical care, burial, hair-cutting, recreation, fuel, and money
for a wedding. 24 In addition the Commune member received a very
small sum of money as a salary. Now this "half salary, half free
supply" system, which was originally introduced for practical reasons,
soon acquired an important ideological significance. This is not surprising. It is well known that in the Marxist view the basic difference
between socialism and communism is constituted by the system of
distribution: socialism is based upon the principle of recompense
according to the amount of labour perf ormed, whereas in the communist
stage distribution takes place "from each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs". 25 Enthusiastic theoreticians soon realized
the ideological implications of the free supply system, and the magical
word was spoken: this meant the beginning of a purely Communist
way of distribution; this constituted "the first sprouting of Communism" on Chinese soil. In fact, this meant that China was ahead of all
socialist countries, for the Russian authorities had never claimed that
their country had reached the treshold of Communism, even during
the high-tide of Russian nationalism. Resistance against the further
extension of the free supply system was branded as "bourgeois mentality" and as "capitalist individualism". In the press many articles
appeared which advocated the f uil application of the free supply system,
its introduction into the cities, the abolition of graded wage scales,
premiums, piece-wages, and other relies of ' the past. The normal
phenomena: jubilating articles, success stories, accounts of spontaneous
meetings of workers demanding the abolition of piece-wages and of
^ Various lists of five, seven, and ten "guarantees" in Wu Chih-pu, "From
Agricultural Co-op to People's Commune", HC 16-9-'S8, p. 8.
25
This formula appears for the first time in the first section of Marx'
"Critique on the Gotha Program" (1875), in a passage which is repeatedly
quoted by Chinese theoreticians as "scriptural support" of their views: "In
a higher phase of Communist society, after the enslaving subordination of
the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis
between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has not
only become a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces
have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all
the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly — only then can
the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society
inscribe on its banners: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs V' (Engl. transl. from the edition of Lewis S. Feuer, Marx
and Engels — Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, N. Y. 1959. p. 199).
Needless to say that this passage was destined to play a great role in the
theoretical justification of the Commune system.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
83
the extra payment of overtime labour, and requesting the immediate
introduction of the free supply system. The atmosphere is permeated
with liberality and patriotism, and a Western observer (A. V. Sherman) aptly remarks that all this is hardly Marxist, but rather a new
and unexpected revival of the ancient Chinese utopian ideal which
made Virtue the driving power in society.26
The same optimism prevailed regarding the far-reaching consequences which the new system would have for the family.27 At that
time remarkable things were said. It was declared that "the institution
of the family as a productive unit will be replaced by the Communist
collective life". The education in the family is regarded as fundamentally wrong, since it forms a source of tension between the
Communist education in school and the non-Communist education at
home. It is pointed out that in the kindergarten the children from
the very beginning grow up in a collective atmosphere, and automatically acquire the right attitude: in these institutions there are very
few things which the child can call his own, for everything is "ours".
Thus the crèches and kindergarten develop from purely practical
instruments for allowing the mothers to engage in productive labour
into ideological hot-beds from which the New Man will arise. In spite
of all apocryphal stories from Formosa and elsewhere, the actual
abolition of the family has hever been propagated, and it is indeed
hard to see what the authorities would gain by stamping out the oldest
of human institutions. But the extreme collectivation of the early
Commune period tended to eliminate the most important social
functions of the family: "We have to regard other children as our
own", and "the love of society for the children is deeper and richer
than the love which any mother can give".
In December 1958, when the authorities in many respects made a
step backward, the collectivation of family-life was also slowed down.
Official statements emphasized that the attack was merely waged
against the obsolete, tyrannical and irrational patriarchal family system,
and that the Commune, far from eliminating the family, would lead
26
27
28
Cf. the examples mentioned by Sherman, op. cit. p. 4 1 ; the glorification
of "selflessness' in PR 7-10-'58, p. 5, and the very moralistic article by W a n g
Li, "Raise the Communist Working Spirit!", in HC 16-11-'S8, p. 25-28,
English version in PR 18-ll-'58, p. 6-8.
Sherman, op. cit. p. 4 2 - 4 5 ; interview of T'ao Chu on Dec. 27, 1958 (see
note 14), TL p. 81-85; Yang Kan-ling in PR 18-ll-'58, p. 9-11.
Wu-ch'ang Resolution, TL p. 30-32, Engl. version PR 23-12-'58 p. 17.
84
E. ZÜRCHER.
to the creation of the "true democratie family". The parents are
allowed to live together and to see their children whenever they like;
they do not have to take their meals separately, etc.
The same "slowing down" is observed as regards the expectation
of Communism in the near future. In the proclamation of December 10,
1958, the Central Committee expressly declared that it would take
several years to reach a high level of industrialization, that even then
many years would have to pass before the abundance of consumers'
goods would justify the transition from the socialist to the communist
stage, and that anybody who under the present circumstances speaks
about the coming of Communism "vulgarizes the great ideal and does
harm to the work of socialist reconstruction". 29 In addition the Central
Committee warned against further extension of the f ree supply system
in the Commune. 30
Thus the program was drastically curtailed in 1959, and in some
respects there appears actually to have been a return to pre-Commune
conditions, i.e. to the stage of the "Higher Cooperative". This was
certainly the case with the internal organization of the Commune, in
which we now find the subdivision into the "three leyels of ownership". 31 Under this system the Commune itself became the highest
level of organization. Under it, at the second level, there were a
number of production brigades, each of which was subdivided into
production teams.- The second level, that of the production brigade,
now became the "fundamental body" charged with the management
of the normal labour tasks. The Commune itself has a more general
function; it controls the division of labour, conducts the very large
projects which need central management and supervision, and is
charged with the financial administration of the Commune. This
reorganization resülted in a certain internal decentralization, which
29
Detailed exposition in Wu-ch'ang Resolution, TL p. 14-20 (Engl. version PR
23-12-'58, p. 11-13). Conclusion: the transition from collective to public
ownership will last three to six years (depending on the local situation); it
will take at least fifteen to twenty years to complete the process of Socialist
Reconstruction, and only then the situation will be ripe for the transition to
Communism. Cf. also the editorial in HC 1959. 1 : critical remarks directed
against over-hasty elements who pay no attention to the doctrine of revolutionary phases, and whose views suffer from a lack of "scientific analysis".
30
Lu-shan Resolution (16th Aug. 1959), PR l-9-'59, p. 7. This contrasts
sharply with earlier statements which envisaged a gradual extension of the
free supply system.
3 1 Lu-shan Resolution, PR l-9-'59, p. 8; Sherman, op. cit. p. 56-57; A. Zauberman in The Chinese Communes, p. 78.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
85
deprived the Commune of its monolithic character. It marks also the
end of the first stage of the communization campaign. In this modified
form the Communes have persisted in the country-side. It is too early
to say in how far the recent years of natural disasters and famine
have prof oundly afïected the Commune system, and, on the other hand,
in how far the effects of the famine have been mitigated — or aggravated — by the Commune system. The hypothesis that the difficulties
of the years 1959 and 1960 are not due to the f loods and drought, but
have actually been provoked by mismanagement and popular discontent
in the Communes, seems to be unfounded, to say the least.
Finally we have to devote some attention to the urban Communes.
In China, as everywhere else, Communism originally was a product of
the large cities. Peking, Shanghai, and Canton were the first centres
of communist activity, carried on by small groups largely consisting
of young intellectuals.
However, by the complete failure of the policy of collaboration
with the Kuomintang and the events of the fateful year 1927 (coupd'état of Chiang Kai-shek, persecution and massacre of Communists
and other leftish elements) the position of Communism in the cities
became seriously weakened. This, and the reorientation of Chinese
Communism f rom the urban proletariat to the rural population initiated
by Mao Tse-tung, resulted in the preeminently agrarian character of
Chinese Communism before the ascendancy to power in 1949. During
the war with Japan, the largest cities were either in Japanese or in
Kuomintang hands, whereas the communist bases were mainly situated
in the country-side. This of course does not mean that the cities were
centres of anti-Communism. Infiltration took place; Communism had
many adherents among both the intellectuals and the lower strata of
the population, and the situation was favourable to the spread of
communist sympathies. In the years 1946—1948 two leading sections
of the urban population — the intellectuals and the commercial groups
— became more than ever alienated f rom the nationalist government;
a contemporary English observer in Peking even speaks of "the wholesale desertion of the educated minority". 32 The Chinese businessman
was almost ruined by the wild inflation that broke loose in August
1948; the intellectuals moreover suffered f rom the "thought control"
and the political surveillance which the national government exerted,
32
C. P. Fitzgerald, quoted in S. B. Thomas, Government and Administration in
Communist China, N.Y. 1953, p. 13.
86
E. ZÜKCHER.
especially on the universities. It would be exaggerated to say that on
account of this the two leading groups were converted and threw
themselves into the arms of the communists. The alternative was forced
upon them by the historical situation, since there simply was no real
third possibility. In spite of the eloquence with which Carsun Chang
in his Third Force in China defends the idea that even then China
could have laid the foundations for a truly democratie government
after Western model, there remains the undeniable fact that only two
parties, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party had the
concrete means (in casu the military apparatus) to obtain and maintain
political power. Under such circumstances the majority among the
leading urban groups appear to have preferred the communist experiment to the known evils of nationalist rule, and to have joined the
communist "United Front". This United Front was comprehensive
enough: according to a proclamation of October 1947, it consisted of
"the workers, peasants, soldiers, students and commercial elements, all
oppressed classes, all popular organizations, all democratie parties and
groups, all overseas Chinese and other patriotic elements" 3 3 under
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
And so, after nearly twenty years of banishment in the country-side,
Communism in 1948 and 1949 came back to the large cities. Here it
was confronted with new problems which could not be solved by the
principles of agrarian strategy. In order to rule effectively it was
necessary to collaborate with, and to secure the support of, all those
elements which had the necessary administrative and technical knowledge, and these elements were obviously found among the urban key
groups of intellectuals, industrialists, merchants, etc. Hence the wide
range of the "United Front", and the extreme caution observed by
the new rulers in implementing their program of gradual socialization.
The treatment of private enterprise in the cities with its many stages
of slow expropriation, now and then interrupted by virulent campaigns
against tax-dodging and other economie offences, is a good example. 34
In general one may say that the development has been less spasmodic
in the cities than in the country-side. The changes have been striking
enough: large-scale industrialization, the building of huge residential
quarters, slum clearance, etc. However, these activities, spectacular
33
34
"Report of Chairman Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party", Thomas, op. cit. p. 17.
See e.g. Hughes and Luard, op. cit'. p. VIII.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
87
though they may be, are the symptoms of rapid modernization anywhere, and cannot be compared to the stormy campaigns of land
distribution and collectivization which in those same years transformed
the country-side beyond recognition. Social reorganization did take
place at the lowest level, that of the street. The inhabitants of each
hut'ung were organized into a kind of street-association under the
supervision of the local cadres who, inter alia, exercised political
control. Such a street-association is a social and political body, fundamentally different from the agrarian "mutual help groups", "production
brigades", etc. which primarily are units of labour organization and
consequently have an economie function. The latter type of organization
could only be realized in the cities by the concentration of workers of
the same, or of related, trades in the same quarters — a medieval
institution which does not appear to have been revived by the communist authorities. Thus, until 1958, the urban conditions remained
comparatively stable; we do not yet find traces of the urge to transform
the city into the image of the country-side.
In 1958 the rising tide of the communization reached the cities. 35
From the beginning the authorities have displayed some hesitance in
applying the commune pattern to the city. Official statements emphasize
the complicated structure of the city and the fact that the bourgeous
ideology still looms large in the minds of many intellectuals and
capitalist elements. 36 The urban Commune could well develop in the
suburbs, on the f ringe of the urban agglomeration, where the "classical"
Commune type with its combination of industry, commerce and agriculture could be maintained. In the city itself only three aspects of the
Commune appear to be viable, as far as we can see. In the first place
the decentralization of urban administration, which would be the
s5
36
Sherman, op. cit. p. 45-48; Hughes, op. cit. p. 29-33; D. E. T. Luard, "The
Urban Communes", CQ 3, July-Sept. 1960, p. 74-79.
In the Peitaiho Resolution of August 29, 1958, ho word is said about the
setting up of Communes in the cities, and the whole document shows clearly
that at that time the Commune was still regarded as a typically rural form
of organization. In the Wu-ch'ang Resolution (December 1958) the subject
is touched upon, but in rather cautious terms (TL p. 11-12; Engl. version in
PR 23-12-'58, p. 10-11). Three antitheses between city and countryside are
mentioned: (1) the situation in the cities is far more complex; (2) in the
cities public ownership is much more developed than in the countryside where
collective ownership still prevails; (3) due to the bourgeois mentality which
often obscures the thought of urban capitalists and intellectuals, there are
in the city many people "who still cherish doubtful thoughts about the establishment of Communes".
88
E. ZÜRCHER.
inevitable result of the division of a large city into a number of
Communes. A ward can obtain a certain measure of autonomy and
manage its own industrial production, education, commerce, building of
activities, etc. Secondly, the "free supply system" can be realized within
a ward, ör, at a lower level, within a street or a block; existing
localities (restaurants, schools, etc.) being turned into collective property. By the institution of crèches, kindergarten, and communal kitchens,
housewives can be made free for productive labour, and this aspect —
the récruitment of female workers — appears to have been very
important and may have been one of the primary motives for the
communization of the city. In the third place the existing home and
cottage industry can be further stimulated, with the maximal use of
traditional methods and lower forms of mechanization.
The other aspects of the Commune, notably the formation of
permanent local production-teams and brigades, and the military drill
in situ, can hardly be realized in urbal surroundings; in these respects
the situation is far from clear.
The first urban Communes were formed in autumn 1958 in Peking,
Tientsin and other cities; the)' seem to have been of an experimental
character. The .movement proceeded at a rather slow rate: one year
later 200.000 Peking housewives had been organized in 1750 production
teams, with 590 workshops in their own wards. In 1960 the communization grows in size and momentum: in April about one-fifth
of the total urban population (ca. 20 million people) had been organized
into Communes, and we may assume that at the present moment
(summer 1961) the process has virtually been completed.
There are three types of urban Communes: (1) the Commune
centered round one or more large industrial units, (2) those centered
round certain large government institutions (offices, schools), (3) those
which simply consist of an agglomeration of a certain size, hence in
37
The prophecy of August 29, 1959 (Peitaiho Resolution, PR p. 21) that the
communization wöuld practically eliminate the dangers of flood and drought
has proved to be premature; since then China has suffered from a whole
series of natural disasters, and the food situation has become precarious. In
this context it is interesting to note that in 1959 there were certain " "reactionary elements" who argued that the bumper harvest of 1958 was the result
of exceptionally favourable weather conditions, and not of the Commune
system (see Hughes, op. cit. p. 45). However, all this has not prompted the
government drastically to change the Commune ör to abolish it altogether.
On the other hand, the flood of eulogistic articles in the press has ebbed away,
and at present (July, 191) it seldom appears as front-page news any more.
For obvious reasons the subject seems to have lost much of its appeal.
THE CHINESE COMMUNES.
89
fact a ward made into a Commune. The normal size ranges from
20,000 to 30,000 members.
The whole series of "guarantees" of the free supply system is also
found in the urban Communes, probably even on a larger scale,
because the organizers had existing localities at their disposal. We f ind
dormitories, crèches and kindergarten, establishments for cleaning and
mending clothes, house-cleaning, hair-cutting, repair of bicycles, etc.
Many urban Communes have their own educational institutions, both
primary and secondary; courses in reading and writing for adults;
clubs; health and infant welfare centres; houses for the aged; libraries
and theatres. The municipal government and the urban Commune still
have their respective spheres of interest, but details about the relation
between these two are not yet available. It is not impossible that in
the future the Commune will completely replace the former ward
(ch'ü), just as in the country-side the former townships (hsiang) have
become Communes.
The most characteristic feature of the whole system is perhaps just
this tendency towards decentralization: the tendency to break up the
large body of the town into a number of smaller and semi-autonomous
units. Would it be too far-fetched to say that even here the old rural
China is encroaching upon its urban rival, and that the urban communization in fact has resulted in the transformation of the city into
a number of villages? In any case it is a tendency which will surprise
anybody who is accustomed to imagine the communist state as preeminently centralized and monolithic.
We shall not carry on our preliminary and very incomplete account.
The Communes are there, and we have every reason to suppose that
they are there to stay. About the future it is better not to speculate
— too many prophecies about China have already been belied by
the f acts.
E. ZÜRCHER.
Abbreviations ttsed in the jootnotes.
CC
CCP
CQ
CR
HC
JMJP
Central Committee.
Chinese Communist Party.
The China Quarterly, London.
China Reconstructs, monthly (in English), Peking.
Hung-ch'i ("Red F lag"), fortnigtly theoretical organ of the Central
Commitee of the CCP, Peking.
Jen-min jih-pao, ("People's Daily"), party newspaper of the CCP,
Peking.
90
E. ZÜRCHER.
JMWH Jen-min wen-hsüeh ("People's Literature"), literary magazine, Peking.
Lu-shan Resolution: "Resolution on Expanding the Campaign for Raising Production", adopted by the CC at its eighth plenary session. Lu-shan,
August 16, 1959. Chinese text in JMJP 27-8-'59 p. 1-2; Engl. translation
in PR, Sept. 1, 1959. p. 7-11.
Peitaiho Resolution: "Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes
in the Countryside", adopted by the CC at its seventh plenary session,
Peitaiho, August 29, 1958. Chinese text in JMJP 10-9-'58 p. 1; English
translation in PR, Sept. 16, 1958. p. 21-23.
Pi?
Peking Review, weekly (in English), Peking.
TL
Jen-min kung-she wen-t'i tzu-liao (^'Materials on Questions Concerning
the People's Commune"), collection of official documents and articles,
247 pp., Hong Kong, 1959.
Wu'ch'ang Resolution: "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's
Commune", adopted by the CC at its sixth plenary session, Wu-ch'ang,
December 10, 1958. Chinese text in TL p. 9-40; English translation in
PR, December 23, 1958, p. 10-19.
The titles of Chinese publications are mostly rendered in English translation;
for Chinese proper names the Wade-Giles transcription has been used.