Battle of Midway
Battle of Midway
The Battle of Midway (Japanese: ミ ッ ド ウ ェ ー 海 戦; Rōmaji: Middowē Kaisen) is widely regarded as the
most important naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II.[1][2][3] Between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six
months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the United States Navy
decisively defeated an Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) attack against Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on
the Japanese fleet.[4] Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of
naval warfare."[5]
The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic
power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War.[6]
The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' aircraft carriers into a trap.[7] The Japanese also intended to occupy
Midway as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. This
operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa.
The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions.[8]
Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the
forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser were sunk
for a cost of one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. After Midway, and the exhausting attrition of the
Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing
their losses while the U.S. steadily increased its output in both areas.[9]
Background
Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East
Indies (now Indonesia); the latter, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this,
preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were
strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's GHQ and
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, such that a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942.[10]
Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after
which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted.[11]
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he perceived as the
principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.[12] This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid (18
April 1942) in which USAAF B-25 Mitchells launched from USS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other
Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed
the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.[13][14] This and other successful "hit and
run" raids by American carriers, showed that they were still a threat although, seemingly, reluctant to be drawn into
an all-out battle.[15] Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S base at Pearl Harbor would induce all
of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers; however, given the strength of American land-based
air power on Hawaii, he judged that Pearl Harbor could no longer be attacked directly.[16] Instead, he selected
Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, some 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) from
Oahu. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the
Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.[17] The
U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed
submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi
(1,900 km). An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.[18]
1
Battle of Midway
Yamamoto's plan, Operation MI
Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's
battle plan was exceedingly complex.[19] Additionally, his design was
predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that USS Enterprise
and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers
available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In May 1942, during the Battle of
the Coral Sea, USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown was
so badly damaged that the Japanese believed her also to have been
sunk. The Japanese were also aware that USS Saratoga was
undergoing repairs on the West Coast after suffering torpedo damage
from a submarine.
However, more important was Yamamoto's belief the Americans had
Midway Atoll, several months before the battle.
been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six
Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the
foreground,
and the larger Sand Island is in the
months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S.
background to the west.
[20]
fleet into a fatally compromised situation.
To this end, he dispersed
his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be
unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers
would trail Vice-Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface
forces were intended to destroy whatever part of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's relief, once Nagumo's
carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel;[21] this was typical of the battle doctrine of most
major navies.[22]
Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans).
Yamamoto's emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the
only significant warships larger than destroyers that screened Nagumo's fleet were two battleships and three cruisers,
despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By
contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, and six cruisers,
none of which would see any action at Midway.[21] Their distance from Nagumo's carriers would also have grave
implications during the battle, because the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo's forces carried scout planes, an
invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo.[23][24]
Aleutian invasion
Likewise, the Japanese operations in the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could
otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas prior historical accounts have often characterized the
Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, recent scholarship on the battle has suggested that AL
was supposed to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway.[22] However, a one-day delay in the sailing
of Nagumo's task force meant that Operation AL began a day before the Midway attack.[25]
2
Battle of Midway
3
Prelude to battle
American reinforcements
To do battle with an enemy expected to muster four or five carriers,
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean
Areas, needed every available U.S. flight deck. He already had Vice
Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) task
force at hand, though Halsey was stricken with psoriasis and had to be
replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Halsey's escort
commander.[26] Nimitz also hurriedly recalled Rear Admiral Frank
Jack Fletcher's task force, including the carrier Yorktown (which had
suffered considerable damage at Coral Sea), from the South West
Pacific Area. It reached Pearl Harbor just in time to provision and sail.
USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbor days before the
battle.
Despite estimates that Yorktown would require several months of
repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were intact, and
her flight deck largely so.[27] The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock and in 72 hours, she was
restored to a battle-ready state,[28] judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required.[29]
Her flight deck was patched, whole sections of internal frames had been cut out and replaced, and several squadrons
were drawn from Saratoga; they did not, however, get time to train.[30] Nimitz disregarded established procedure in
getting his third and last available carrier ready for battle. Just three days after putting into dry dock at Pearl Harbor,
Yorktown was again under way. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship
USS Vestal, herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard.[31]
On Midway, by 4 June the USN had stationed four squadrons of PBYs — 31 aircraft in total — for long-range
reconnaissance duties, and six brand-new Grumman TBF-1 Avengers, the latter a detachment from Hornet's
squadron VT-8.[32] The Marine Corps had 19 SBD Dauntlesses, seven F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U-3
Vindicators, and 21 Brewster F2A-3s. The USAAF contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses, along with
eight B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in total 124 aircraft.[33]
Japanese shortcomings
Battle of Midway
Meanwhile, as a result of her participation in the Battle of the Coral
Sea, the Japanese carrier Zuikaku was in port in Kure, awaiting a
replacement air group. That there were none immediately available
was a failure of the IJN crew training program, which already showed
signs of being unable to replace losses.[34] Instructors from the
Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the
shortfall.[34] The heavily damaged Shōkaku had suffered three bomb
hits at Coral Sea, and required months of repair in drydock. Despite the
likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to
re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no
serious attempt to get her into the forthcoming battle.[35] Consequently,
Admiral Nagumo would only have four fleet carriers: Kaga and Akagi
forming Carrier Division 1; Hiryū and Sōryū as Carrier Division 2. At
least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been
constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including raids on
Darwin and Colombo.
4
Akagi, the flagship of the Japanese carrier striking
force which attacked Pearl Harbor, as well as
Darwin, Rabaul, and Colombo, in April 1942
prior to the battle.
The main Japanese strike aircraft to be used were the Aichi D3A dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2, which was
capable of being used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level attack bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast
and highly maneuverable Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero".[36] However, the carriers of the Kido Butai were suffering from a
shortage of frontline aircraft. For various reasons, production of the D3A had been drastically reduced, while that of
the B5N had been stopped completely.[37] As a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. This also
meant that many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late
November 1941; although well maintained, they were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable.
These factors meant that all carriers had fewer than their normal aircraft complement and few spare aircraft.[38]
Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese
submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers
reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[39] A second
attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle
(and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American carriers), part of Operation K, was also thwarted when
Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point — a hitherto
deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals — was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried out
an identical mission in March).[40] Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the
American carriers immediately before the battle.
Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This
information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at
sea on Yamato, did not dare inform Nagumo for fear of exposing his position and assumed that Nagumo had
received the same signal from Tokyo.[41] Nagumo's radio antennas, however, were unable to receive such long-wave
transmissions, and he was left unaware of any American ship movements.[42]
Allied code-breaking
Admiral Nimitz had one priceless advantage: cryptanalysts had broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25 code.[43] Since the
early spring of 1942, the US had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective
"AF." Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team at Station Hypo were able to confirm Midway as the target of
the impending Japanese strike by having the base at Midway send a false message stating that its water distillation
plant had been damaged and that the base needed fresh water. The Japanese intercepted this and soon started sending
messages that "AF was short on water."[44] Hypo was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5
Battle of Midway
5
June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.[43] Japan's efforts to introduce a new codebook had
been delayed, giving HYPO several crucial days; while it was blacked out shortly before the attack began, the
important breaks had already been made.[45][46]
As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the
Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships
into four separate task groups, all too widely separated to be able to support each other.[47] [48] Nimitz calculated that
the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four
carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast,
remained almost totally unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began.[24]
Battle
Initial air attacks
The first air attack took off at 12:30 on 3 June, consisting of nine B-17s operating from Midway. Three hours later,
they found the Japanese Tanaka's transport group 570 nmi (660 mi; 1,060 km) to the west.[49] Under heavy
anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Though hits were reported,[49] none of the bombs actually hit and no
significant damage was inflicted.[50] Early the following morning, Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru sustained the
first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY flying boat struck her around 01:00. This would be the only
successful air launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the entire battle.[50]
At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway
itself, consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N
torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. At the
same time, he launched combat air patrol (CAP), as well as his eight
search aircraft (one from the heavy cruiser Tone launched 30 minutes
late due to technical difficulties).
Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few
aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under
poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force.[51]
Yamamoto's faulty dispositions had now become a serious liability.[52]
Eastern Island under attack.
American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles and interceptors were soon scrambled. Unescorted
bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At
06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based Marine fighter pilots,
flying F4Fs and obsolescent F2As,[53] intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though they managed to
destroy four B5Ns and at least three A6Ms. Most of the U.S. planes were downed in the first few minutes; several
were damaged, and only two remained flyable. In all, three F4Fs and 13 F2As were shot down. American
anti-aircraft fire was accurate and intense, damaging many Japanese aircraft and claiming one-third of the Japanese
planes destroyed.[54]
The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway. American bombers could still use the airbase to
refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force; another aerial attack would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by
7 June.[55]
Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the
Japanese carrier fleet. These included six Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway from the Hornet's VT-8
(Midway was the first combat mission for the VT-8 airmen, and it was the debut of the TBF into combat), Marine
Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), consisting of eleven SB2U-3s and sixteen SBDs, plus four USAAF
B-26s, armed with torpedoes, and fifteen B-17s. The Japanese shrugged off these attacks with two fighters lost,
Battle of Midway
while destroying five TBFs, two SB2Us, eight SBDs and two B-26s.[56][57] The first Marine aviator to perish during
the battle, Major Lofton R. Henderson of VMSB-241, was killed while leading his inexperienced Dauntless
squadron into action and was later honored by having the main airfield at Guadalcanal named after him in August
1942.[58] One B-26, hit by anti-aircraft fire from Akagi, made no attempt to pull out of its run and narrowly missed
crashing directly into the carrier's bridge. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to
launch another attack on Midway, in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for
anti-ship operations.[56]
Nagumo's decision
Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the
time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two
squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers, the latter armed
with torpedoes, should any American warships be located. The dive
bombers were, as yet, unarmed.[60] As a result of the attacks from
Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation of a
second strike, at 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be
re-armed with contact-fused general purpose bombs for use against
land targets. Some sources maintain that this had been underway for
B-17 attack misses Hiryū; this was taken some
about 30 minutes when, at 07:40[61] the delayed scout plane from Tone
time between 08:00–08:30. A Shotai of three
signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east,
Zeros is lined up near the bridge. This was one of
although it neglected to describe the composition of this force. New
several combat air patrols launched during the
[59]
day.
evidence, however, suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting
report until 08:00, so the rearming operation actually proceeded for 45
minutes.[62] Nagumo quickly reversed his order and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the
American force, but another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in
the American force: this was one of the carriers from TF 16, the other carrier was not sighted.[63]
Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū),
recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on Sōryū and
Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[64] Nagumo's seemingly opportunity to hit the American ships,[65]
however, was now limited by the fact that his Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needing to land
promptly or ditch (as is commonly believed).[66] Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat
air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to "spot" (position) their
reserve for launch. The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive
fighters, or (in the case of Sōryū) fighters being spotted to augment the task force defenses.[67] Spotting his flight
decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30–45 minutes.[68] Furthermore, by spotting and launching
immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament; he had
just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down.[69] (In the event, poor discipline saw
many of the Japanese bombers ditch their bombs and attempt to dogfight intercepting F4Fs.)[70] Japanese carrier
doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and without confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force
included carriers, Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[71] In addition, the arrival of another American air strike at
07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to
land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed and ready.[72]
In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft that
would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was
the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: they followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.[73]
6
Battle of Midway
7
Attacks on the Japanese fleet
The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the
Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown, and
benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered
Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while
initially holding Yorktown in reserve should there be any other
Japanese carriers discovered.[74] (Fletcher's directions to Spruance
were relayed via Nimitz who, unlike Yamamoto, had remained
ashore.)
Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could
succeed and gave the order "Launch the attack" at around 06:00. He
then left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, to work out
the details and oversee the launch, which did not go smoothly. It took
until a few minutes after 07:00 before the first plane was able to depart
from Spruance's carriers, Enterprise and Hornet. Fletcher, upon
completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from
Yorktown.[75]
Ensign George Gay (right), sole survivor of
VT-8's TBD Devastator squadron, in front of his
aircraft, 4 June 1942.
Fletcher, Yorktown's commanding officer, Captain Elliott Buckmaster,
and their staffs had acquired first-hand experience in organizing and
launching a full strike against an enemy force at Coral Sea, but there
was no time to pass these lessons to Enterprise and Hornet which were
tasked with launching the first strike.[76] Spruance gave at this point his
Devastators of VT-6 aboard USS Enterprise
second crucial command, "Proceed to target" -- not to cast away
being prepared for take off during the battle.
precious minutes, waiting for the strike force to assemble fully, but to
proceed to the target as quickly as possible, since neutralizing enemy carriers was the key to the survival of his own
task force. Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as feasible was greater than the
need for a coordinated attack among the different types of aircraft (fighters, bombers, torpedo planes). Accordingly,
American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. The lack of
coordination was expected to diminish the overall impact of the American attacks as well as increasing their
casualties. However, Spruance calculated that this risk was worth it, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack
hampered their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese doctrine preferred fully constituted attacks), and he
gambled that he could find Nagumo with his decks at their most vulnerable.[75][76]
American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from
Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 263 degrees rather than the 240
heading indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers.[77]
Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8, from Hornet), led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, broke formation from
Ring and followed the correct heading. However, the 10 F4Fs from Hornet had run out of fuel and had to ditch into
the ocean,[78] when Waldron's squadron sighted the enemy carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed by
Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6, from Enterprise), whose Wildcat fighter escorts also ran low on fuel and had to turn
back,[79] at 09:40.[80] Without fighter escort, all fifteen TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down without being able
to inflict any damage, with Ensign George H. Gay, Jr. the only survivor. VT-6 met nearly the same fate, with no hits
to show for its effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their Mark 13 aircraft torpedoes;[81] senior Navy
and BuOrd officers never questioned why half a dozen torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers,
produced no results.[82] The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Mitsubishi A6M2 Zeros (which were both faster and
had greater endurance, enabling them to engage the bombers for longer)[83] made short work of the unescorted, slow,
Battle of Midway
8
under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping
their torpedoes, coming close enough to be able to strafe the enemy ships and force the Japanese carriers to make
sharp evasive maneuvers.[84]
The American torpedo attacks indirectly achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off
balance and unable to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, they pulled the Japanese combat air patrol
(CAP) out of position. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.[85] The appearance of a third
torpedo plane attack from the southeast by Torpedo Squadron 3 (VT-3, from Yorktown) at 10:00 very quickly drew
the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet.[86] Better discipline and employment of all
the Zeroes aboard might have enabled Nagumo to survive.[87]
By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons of American SBDs from Enterprise
and Yorktown, VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3 respectively, were approaching the Japanese fleet from the northeast and
southwest. They were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. However, squadron
commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr. decided to continue the search and by good fortune spotted the wake of the
Japanese destroyer Arashi. The destroyer was steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having
unsuccessfully depth-charged the U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship
Kirishima.[88] Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced.[89]
McClusky's decision to continue the search and his judgment, in the opinion of Admiral Chester Nimitz, "decided
the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway...."[90] The American dive-bombers arrived at the perfect
time to attack.[91] Armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as
refueling operations were hastily completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant bombs and torpedoes were
stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in the magazines,[92] making the Japanese carriers
extraordinarily vulnerable.
Enterprise's air group split up and attacked two targets. Beginning at 10:22, McClusky and his men scored hits on
Kaga, while to the north Akagi was attacked four minutes later by three bombers,[84] led by Lieutenant Commander
Richard Halsey Best. Yorktown's VB-3, commanded by Max Leslie, went for Sōryū, scoring hits. Simultaneously,
VT-3 targeted Hiryū, which was sandwiched between Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi, but achieved no hits. The
dive-bombers left Sōryū and Kaga ablaze within six minutes. Akagi was hit by just one bomb (dropped by Lieutenant
Commander Best), which penetrated to the upper hangar deck and exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft
there. One bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward and also
caused crucial rudder damage.[93] Sōryū took three bombs in her hangar deck, Kaga at least four, possibly five. All
three carriers were out of action and were eventually abandoned and scuttled.[94]
Japanese counterattacks
Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, wasted little time in
counterattacking. The first wave of Japanese dive bombers badly
damaged Yorktown with three bomb hits that snuffed out her boilers,
immobilizing her: however, in about an hour her damage control teams
patched her up so effectively the second wave's torpedo bombers
mistook her for an undamaged carrier.[96] Despite Japanese hopes to
even the odds by eliminating two carriers with two strikes, Yorktown
absorbed both Japanese attacks, the second wave mistakenly believing
Yorktown had already been sunk and that they were attacking
Enterprise. After two torpedo hits, Yorktown lost power and developed
a 26° list to port, which put her out of action and forced Admiral
Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser Astoria. Both
carriers of Spruance's Task Force 16 were undamaged.[97]
Yorktown at the moment of impact of a torpedo
from a Nakajima B5N of Lieutenant Hashimoto's
[95]
2nd chūtai.
Battle of Midway
News of the two strikes, with the reports each had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved morale in the Kido
Butai. Its few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard Hiryū, where they were prepared for a strike against what
was believed to be the only remaining American carrier.[98]
American counterattack
Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of dive
bombers (including 10 SBDs from Yorktown). Despite Hiryū being defended by a strong cover of more than a dozen
Zero fighters, the attack by Enterprise was successful: four, possibly five bombs hit Hiryū, leaving the carrier ablaze
and unable to operate aircraft. (Hornet's strike, launched late because of a communications error, concentrated on the
remaining escort ships, but failed to score any hits.) After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, most of the
remaining crew on Hiryū were evacuated and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing north-east in an attempt to
intercept the American carriers. Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours, being discovered early the next morning
by an aircraft from the carrier Hōshō, prompting hopes Hiryu could be saved and perhaps even towed back to Japan.
However, soon after being spotted, Hiryū sank. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, costing
Japan perhaps her best carrier commander.[99]
As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for
continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the
derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from
a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the
United States had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what
Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both
Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at
extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day,
Hiryū, shortly before sinking: this photo was
and persisted as night fell. Finally, fearing a possible night encounter
taken
by Special Service Ensign Kiyoshi Ōniwa
with Japanese surface forces,[101] and believing Yamamoto still
from a Yokosuka B4Y off the carrier
[100]
intended to invade,[102] Spruance changed course and withdrew to the
Hōshō.
[103]
east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight.
For his
part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching
eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, a cruiser raiding force was detached to bombard the island. The
Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance's decision to briefly withdraw
eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general retirement to the west.[104] [105]
Spruance failed to regain contact with Yamamoto's forces on June 5, despite extensive searches. Towards the end of
the day he launched a search and destroy mission to seek out any remnants of Nagumo's carrier force. This late
afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese
destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to order Enterprise and
Hornet to turn on their lights to aid the landings.[106][107]
At 02:15 on the night of 5/6 June, Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying some 90 nmi (100 mi; 170 km) west of
Midway, made the second of the Submarine Force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome. Sighting several
ships, neither Murphy or his exec, Ray Spruance, Jr., could identify them and, fearing they might be friendly,
Murphy held fire. He did, however, report the ships to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force,
Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), but neglected to confirm their course. This report was passed on by English to
Nimitz, who then sent it to Spruance. Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent
problem since PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance assumed this sighting was of the invasion force and
moved to block it while staying some 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km) northeast of Midway.[108]
The ships sighted by Tambor were the four cruisers and two destroyers Yamamoto had sent to bombard Midway. At
02:55, these ships received Yamamoto's order to retire and changed course to comply.[108] At about the same time as
9
Battle of Midway
10
the course change, Tambor was sighted and, during maneuvers designed to avoid a submarine attack, Mogami and
Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage to Mogami's bow: although the less severely damaged Mikuma slowed to
12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph) to keep pace.[109] This was the most damage any of the 18[110] submarines deployed for the
battle achieved. Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by
which time staying surfaced was a hazard, and he dived to approach for an attack. This was unsuccessful, and at
around 06:00, he finally reported two westbound Mogami-class cruisers.[111]
Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several strikes against the
stragglers. Mikuma was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses,[112] while Mogami survived further severe damage to return
home for repairs. The destroyers Arashio and Asashio were also bombed and strafed during the last of these
attacks.[113] Captain Richard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was killed while executing a glide bomb run
on Mikuma and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.[114]
Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo. In the late
afternoon of 6 June, however, Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes from I-168. There were few casualties, since
most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo struck and sank the destroyer
USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two with the loss of 80
lives, most due to her own depth charges exploding. Yorktown lingered until just after 05:00 on 7 June.[115]
Japanese casualties
By the time the battle ended, 3,057 Japanese had died. Casualties
aboard the four carriers were: Akagi: 267; Kaga: 811; Hiryu: 392;
Soryu: 711; a total of 2,181.[116] The heavy cruisers Mikuma (sunk;
700 casualties) and Mogami (badly damaged; 92) accounted for
another 792 deaths.[117]
In addition, the destroyers Arashio (bombed; 35) and Asashio (strafed
by aircraft; 21) both were damaged during the air attacks which sank
Mikuma and caused further damage to Mogami. Floatplanes were lost
from the cruisers Chikuma (3) and Tone (2). Dead aboard the
destroyers Tanikaze (11), Arashi (1), Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oiler
Akebono Maru (10) made up the remaining 23 casualties.[118]
A rescued airman on Midway.
Aftermath
After winning a clear victory, and as pursuit became too hazardous near Wake,[119] American forces retired.
Historian Samuel E. Morison wrote in 1949 that Spruance was subjected to much criticism for not pursuing the
retreating Japanese, and allowing the retreating Japanese surface fleet to escape.[120] Clay Blair argued in 1975 that
had Spruance pressed on, he would have been unable to launch his aircraft after nightfall, and his cruiser escorts
would have been overwhelmed by Yamamoto's larger and more powerful surface units, including Yamato.[119]
On 10 June, the Imperial Japanese Navy conveyed to the military liaison conference an incomplete picture of the
results of the battle. Chūichi Nagumo's detailed battle report was submitted to the high command 15 June. It was
intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and government, and was guarded closely throughout
the war. In it, one of the more striking revelations is the comment on the Mobile Force Commander's (Nagumo's)
estimates: "The enemy is not aware of our plans (we were not discovered till early in the morning of the 5th at the
earliest)."[121] The Japanese public were kept in the dark as to the extent of the defeat, as was much of the military
command structure. Japanese news announced a great victory. Only Emperor Hirohito and the highest Navy
command personnel were accurately informed of the carrier and pilot losses. Subsequently, Army planners continued
to believe, for at least a short time, that the fleet was in good condition.[122]
Battle of Midway
On the return of the Japanese fleet to Hashirajima on 14 June the wounded were immediately transferred to naval
hospitals; most were classified as "secret patients", placed in isolation wards and quarantined from other patients and
their own families to prevent the secret of this major defeat from getting out to the general populace.[123] The
remaining officers and men were quickly dispersed to other units of the fleet and, with no chance to see family or
friends, were shipped to units in the South Pacific where the majority died.[124] By contrast none of the flag officers
or staff of the Combined Fleet were penalized, with Nagumo later being placed in command of the rebuilt carrier
force.[125]
The Japanese Navy did learn some lessons from Midway: new procedures were adopted whereby more aircraft were
refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines
was adopted. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new
firefighting equipment. More carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques,
although the losses later in the war of Shōkaku, Hiyō and Taihō showed that there were still problems in this
area.[126] Replacement pilots went through an abbreviated training regimen, meeting the short-term needs of the
fleet; however, this led to a decline in the quality of training. These inexperienced pilots were fed into front-line
units, while the veterans who remained after Midway and the Solomons campaign were forced to share an increased
workload in increasingly desperate conditions, with few being given a chance to rest in rear areas or in the home
islands. As a result, Japanese naval air groups progressively declined in overall quality during the war.[127]
Allegations of war crimes
Three U.S. airmen, Ensign Wesley Osmus (pilot, Yorktown), Ensign Frank O'Flaherty (pilot, Enterprise) and
Aviation Machinist's Mate B. F. (or B. P.) Bruno Gaido (radioman-gunner of O'Flaherty's SBD) were captured by
the Japanese during the battle. Osmus was held on the Arashi, with O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara (or
destroyer Makigumo, sources vary), and it is alleged they were later killed.[128] The report filed by Admiral Nagumo
states of Ensign Osmus, "He died on 6 June and was buried at sea". Nagumo recorded obtaining seven items of
information, including the enemy's strength, but did not mention the death of O'Flaherty or Gaido.[129] O'Flaherty
and Gaido were tied to five-gallon kerosene cans filled with water and dumped overboard at an unknown date
several days or more after the battle.[130]
Impact
The battle has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific".[131] However, the Japanese continued to try to
advance in the South Pacific, and it was many more months before the U.S. moved from a state of naval parity to one
of increasingly clear supremacy.[132] Thus, although Midway was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese,
it did not change the course of the war in the same sense as Salamis; instead, it was the cumulative attrition of
Midway, combined with that of the inconclusive Coral Sea battle, which reduced Japan's ability to undertake major
offensives.[4] Midway also paved the way for the landings on Guadalcanal and the prolonged attrition of the
Solomon Islands campaign, which allowed the Allies to take the strategic initiative and swing to the offensive for the
rest of the Pacific War.[133] But most importantly of all, Midway bought the United States valuable time until the
new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of the year.[134] The loss of the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and
Hiryu reduced the number of operational carriers that Japan could use against the US which still had Enterprise,
Hornet, Wasp and Saratoga.
The battle showed the worth of pre-war naval cryptologic training and efforts. These efforts continued and were
expanded throughout the war in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Successes were numerous and significant. For
instance, the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane was possible only because of navy cryptanalysis.
Some authors have stated heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the
Imperial Japanese Navy.[135] Parshall and Tully, however, have stated that the losses in veteran aircrew, while heavy
(110, just under 25% of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers),[136] were not crippling to the Japanese naval
11
Battle of Midway
12
air-corps as a whole: the Japanese navy had some 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war.[137] A
few months after Midway, the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates at both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and
Battle of Santa Cruz, and it was these battles, combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons
campaign, which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.[138] However, the loss of
four large fleet carriers, and over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the
essential flight-deck crews and armorers, and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied by such highly trained
crew, were heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet.[138][139] The loss of the carriers meant that only Shōkaku and
Zuikaku were left for offensive actions. Of Japan's other carriers, Taihō was the only Fleet carrier worth teaming
with Shōkaku and Zuikaku, while Ryūjō, Junyo, and Hiyō, were second-rate ships of comparatively limited
effectiveness.[140] By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, while the Japanese had somewhat rebuilt their
carrier forces, the planes were largely flown by inexperienced pilots so the carrier fleet was not as potent a striking
force as it was before Midway. [141]
In the time it took Japan to build three carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light
fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers.[142] By 1942, the United States was already three years into a
shipbuilding program, mandated by the Second Vinson Act, intended to make the navy larger than Japan's.[143] The
greater part of USN aviators survived the Battle of Midway and subsequent battles of 1942, and combined with
growing pilot training programs, the US was able to develop a large number of skilled pilots to complement its
material advantages in ships and planes.
Discovery of sunken vessels
Because of the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle
(more than 17,000 ft (5,200 m)), researching the battlefield has
presented extraordinary difficulties. However, on 19 May 1998, Robert
Ballard and a team of scientists and Midway veterans from both sides
located and photographed (artist's rendering [144]) Yorktown. The ship
was remarkably intact for a vessel that sank in 1942; much of the
original equipment and even the original paint scheme were still
visible.[145]
Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was ultimately
unsuccessful. In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos
Corp. and the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the
Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in conjunction with the ship's log of the
submarine USS Nautilus, the expedition located a large piece of wreckage, subsequently identified as having come
from the upper hangar deck of Kaga.[146] The main wreck, however, has yet to be located.
Mikuma shortly before sinking
Battle of Midway
Remembrances
Chicago Municipal Airport, important to the war efforts in World War
II, was renamed Chicago Midway International Airport (or simply
Midway Airport) in 1949 in honor of the battle.
Waldron Field, an outlying training landing strip, at Corpus Christi
NAS as well Waldron Road leading to the strip, was named in honor of
the commander of USS Hornet's Torpedo Squadron 8. Yorktown Blvd
leading away from the strip was named for the U.S. carrier sunk in the
battle.
An escort carrier, USS Midway (CVE-63) was commissioned on 17
Midway Memorial with Laysan albatross in
background.
August 1943. She was renamed St. Lo on 10 October 1944 to clear the
name Midway for a large fleet aircraft carrier, USS Midway (CV-41),
commissioned on 10 September 1945 (eight days after the Japanese surrender). The latter ship is now docked in San
Diego, California and is in use as the USS Midway Museum.
On September 13, 2000, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt designated the lands and waters of Midway Atoll
National Wildlife Refuge as the Battle of Midway National Memorial.[147]
References
Footnotes
[1] "Battle of Midway: June 4–7,1942" (http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ faqs/ faq81-1. htm). Naval History & Heritage Command. 27 April
2005. Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20090302032014/ http:/ / www. history. navy. mil/ faqs/ faq81-1. htm) from the original on 2
March 2009. . Retrieved 20 February 2009. "...considered the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific."
[2] Dull, Paul S. Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-219-9. "Midway was indeed
"the" decisive battle of the war in the Pacific.", p. 166 (http:/ / books. google. ca/ books?id=SLfti-Dc1AcC& pg=PA145& lpg=PA145&
dq=Midway+ decisive+ battle& source=bl& ots=wRGD-EQNKv& sig=Qx7UryTe62zBfpbra_SQBu6w2mk& hl=en&
ei=B6-gSbTqE5HItQO3-ajdCQ& sa=X& oi=book_result& resnum=7& ct=result#PPA166,M1)
[3] "A Brief History of Aircraft Carriers: Battle of Midway" (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20070612040835/ http:/ / www. chinfo. navy. mil/
navpalib/ ships/ carriers/ midway. html). U.S. Navy. 2007. Archived from the original (http:/ / www. chinfo. navy. mil/ navpalib/ ships/
carriers/ midway. html) on 12 June 2007. . Retrieved 12 June 2007.
[4] U.S. Naval War College Analysis, p.1; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.416–430.
[5] Keegan, John. "The Second World War." New York: Penguin, 2005. (275)
[6] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun.
[7] H.P. Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin; Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 19–38.
[8] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin
[9] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 416–419.
[10] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp.13–15, 21–23; Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 39–49; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.
22–38.
[11] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33; Prange, Miracle at Midway, p. 23.
[12] In fact, U.S. submarines were more dangerous to Japan's efforts. Blair, Silent Victory passim; Parillo, Japanese Merchant Marine.
[13] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 22–26.
[14] Apparently, because of poor IJN ASW training and doctrine, the Japanese ignored the presence of American submarines off their coast,
beginning with Joe Grenfell's Gudgeon which arrived some three weeks after Pearl Harbor. Blair, Silent Victory, p.110; Parillo, Japanese
Merchant Marine; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun.
[15] Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 31–32.
[16] Parshall & Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 33.
[17] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 66–67; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 33–34.
[18] "After the Battle of Midway" (http:/ / www. fws. gov/ midway/ postwar. html). Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge. .
[19] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 375–379, Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp. 110–117; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 52.
[20] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 53, derived from Japanese War History Series (Senshi Sōshō), Volume 43 ('Midowei Kaisen'), p.
118.
[21] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 51, 55.
13
Battle of Midway
[22] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 43–45, derived from Senshi Sōshō, p. 196.
[23] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin.
[24] Lord, Incredible Victory; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin; Layton, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets.
[25] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 43–45, derived from Senshi Sōshō, pp. 119–121.
[26] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 80–81; Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, p. 37.
[27] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p.337.
[28] Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp.37–45; Lord, Incredible Victory, pp.37–39.
[29] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p.338.
[30] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin; p.337–40?
[31] Lord, Incredible Victory, p.39; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p.340.
[32] Charles L Scrivner, TBM/TBF Avenger in Action, p. 8.
[33] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 96.
[34] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p.101.
[35] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 65–67.
[36] The code names "Val", "Kate" and "Zeke", which are often applied to these aircraft, were not introduced until late 1943 by the Allied forces.
The D3A was normally referred to by the Japanese as Type 99 navy dive bomber, the B5N as the Type 97 navy torpedo bomber and the A6M
as the Type 0 navy fighter; it was colloquially known as the "Zero". Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword pp.78–80.
[37] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword p.89.
[38] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword pp. 89–91.
[39] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, p. 351; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 98–99.
[40] Lord, Incredible Victory, pp. 37–39; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 99; Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets.
[41] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 102–104; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin.
[42] Isom 2007, pp. 95–99
[43] Smith, The Emperor's Codes, p. 134
[44] "AF Is Short of Water" (http:/ / www. nsa. gov/ about/ cryptologic_heritage/ center_crypt_history/ publications/ battle_midway. shtml). The
Battle of Midway. Historical Publications. . Retrieved 6 September 2011.
[45] Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin.
[46] There are occasional references to "deception", notably in the film Midway, referring to the false traffic before Pearl Harbor; this reflects a
complete misunderstanding of the issue.
[47] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 409.
[48] This dispersal resulted in few fast ships being available to escort the Carrier Striking Force, limiting the numbers of anti-aircraft guns able to
protect the carriers.
[49] Admiral Nimitz's CinCPac report (http:/ / www. ibiblio. org/ hyperwar/ USN/ rep/ Midway/ Midway-CinCPac. html) of the battle. From
Hyperwar. Retrieved 13 February 2008.
[50] Interrogation of: Captain TOYAMA, Yasumi, IJN; Chief of Staff Second Destroyer Squadron, flagship Jintsu (CL), at MIDWAY (http:/ /
www. ibiblio. org/ hyperwar/ AAF/ USSBS/ IJO/ IJO-60. html) USSBS From Hyperwar. Retrieved 14 February 2008.
[51] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 107–112, 132–133.
[52] Willmott, Barrier.
[53] Stephen, Martin. Sea Battles in Close-up: World War Two (Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan, 1988), Volume 1, pp.166 & 167.
[54] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 200–204.
[55] Lord, Incredible Victory, p. 110; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 149.
[56] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 207–212; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 149–152.
[57] Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narrative: "MIDWAY'S ATTACK ON THE ENEMY CARRIERS" June 4 (http:/ / www. ibiblio. org/
hyperwar/ USN/ USN-CN-Midway/ USN-CN-Midway-6. html) retrieved January 28, 2012
[58] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 176.
[59] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword p.182
[60] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.130–132.
[61] Lord, Walter. Incredible Victory; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin; Fuchida & Okumiya, Midway
[62] Isom 2007, pp. 129–139
[63] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp.216–217; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.159–161 & 183.
[64] Bicheno, Hugh. Midway (London: Orion Publishing Group, 2001), p.134.
[65] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.165–170.
[66] Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway; Willmott, Barrier & the Javelin.
[67] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 231, derived from Senshi Sōshō, pp. 372–378.
[68] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.121–124.
[69] Prange, Miracle at Midway, p.233.
[70] Bicheno, p.163.
[71] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp.217–218 & 372–373; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.170–173.
14
Battle of Midway
[72] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp.231–237; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.170–173; Willmott, Barrier & the Javelin; Fuchida &
Okumiya, Midway.
[73] Willmott, Barrier & the Javelin; Fuchida & Okumiya, Midway.
[74] 1942 – Battle of Midway (http:/ / www. cv6. org/ 1942/ midway/ default. htm)
[75] Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp. 84–89; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 215–216; 226–227; Buehl, The Quiet
Warrior (1987), p. 494ff.
[76] Battle of Midway (pg 2) (http:/ / www. cv6. org/ 1942/ midway/ midway_2. htm)
[77] Mrazek, Robert, "A Dawn Like Thunder", testimony from surviving pilots
[78] Ewing (2004) p 71,85, 86, 307
[79] Ewing (2004) p. 71, 85, 86, 307
[80] Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp.91–94.
[81] Blair, Silent Victory, p.238.
[82] Crenshaw Jr., Russell S. ‘’The Battle of Tassafaronga’’, p.158.
[83] Thruelsen p. 186, 189, 190
[84] Battle of Midway (pg 3) (http:/ / www. cv6. org/ 1942/ midway/ midway_3. htm)
[85] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 215–216 & 226–227.
[86] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 226–227.
[87] Bicheno, Midway, p.62.
[88] "IJN KIRISHIMA: Tabular Record of Movement" (http:/ / www. combinedfleet. com/ Kirishima. html). Senkan!. combinedfleet.com. 2006.
Archived (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20070610144811/ http:/ / www. combinedfleet. com/ Kirishima. html) from the original on 10 June
2007. . Retrieved 6 June 2007.
[89] Tillman (1976) pp.69–73
[90] "Accounts – C. Wade McClusky" (http:/ / www. cv6. org/ company/ accounts/ wmcclusky/ ). cv6.org. . Retrieved 26 January 2012.
[91] Prange, Miracle at Midway, pp. 259–261, 267–269; Cressman et al., A Glorious Page in Our History, pp. 96–97; Parshall and Tully,
Shattered Sword, pp. 215–216 & 226–227.
[92] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 250.
[93] Other sources claim a stern hit, but Parshall and Tully in Shattered Sword, pp.253–354 and 256–259, make a case for a near miss, because
of rudder damage from a high explosive bomb.
[94] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.330–353.
[95] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, pp. 312–318.
[96] Ballard, Robert D. and Archbold, Rick. Return to Midway. Madison Press Books: Toronto ISBN 0-7922-7500-4
[97] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 318.
[98] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 323.
[99] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, pp. 328–329, 354-359.
[100] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 356.
[101] Potter & Nimitz 1960 p.682
[102] Based in part on a misleading contact report from Tambor. Blair, Silent Victory, pp.246–7.
[103] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 344.
[104] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, pp. 382–383.
[105] It was fortunate Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including Yamato, in the dark, and
considering the Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack tactics at the time, his cruisers would have been overwhelmed, and his carriers
rendered helpless.Blair, Silent Victory, pp.246–7, Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin. At that time, only Britain's Fleet Air Arm was capable of
night carrier operations, thanks in part to the slow speed of the Fairey Swordfish. Stephen, Martin. Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2
(Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan, 1988), Volume 1, p.34.
[106] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 364-365.
[107] Two years later Marc Mitscher, commanding Hornet would issue the same order as the carrier force commander under similar
circumstances during the Battle of the Philippine Sea.
[108] Prange, Miracle at Midway, p. 320; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 345.
[109] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, pp. 345-346, diagram 347, 348.
[110] Blair, Silent Victory, chart p.240.
[111] Blair, Silent Victory, pp.246–7.
[112] Allen, Thomas B. (April 1999). "Return to the Battle of MIDWAY" (http:/ / www. nationalgeographic. com/ midway). Journal of the
National Geographic Society (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic) 195 (4): 80–103 (p.89). ISSN 0027-9358. .
[113] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 377.
[114] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, p. 362.
[115] Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword, pp. 374–375, 383.
[116] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 476.
[117] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.378, 380.
15
Battle of Midway
[118] Japanese casualty figures for the battle were compiled by Sawaichi Hisae for her book Midowei Kaisen: Kiroku p. 550: the list was
compiled from Japanese prefectural records and is the most accurate to date.Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.114, 365, 377–380, 476.
[119] Blair, Silent Victory, p.247.
[120] Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942 – August 1942. (History of United States Naval Operations in World War
II), Volume IV, p. 142
[121] Chūichi Nagumo (June 1942). "CINC First Air Fleet Detailed Battle Report no. 6" (http:/ / www. ibiblio. org/ hyperwar/ Japan/ IJN/ rep/
Midway/ Nagumo/ ). .
[122] Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p. 449
[123] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p.386.
[124] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.386–387.
[125] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p.388.
[126] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.388–389.
[127] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.390–391.
[128] Robert E. Barde, "Midway: Tarnished Victory", Military Affairs, v. 47, no. 4 (December 1983), pp. 188–192.
[129] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 563.
[130] Parshall and Tully, pp. 320 & 566.
[131] Dull, p.166; Prange, p.395.
[132] Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin, pp.522–523; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.416–430.
[133] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 422–423.
[134] Michael D. Hull, World War II magazine, May 1998 issue
[135] Dull, The Imperial Japanese Navy: A Battle History, p.166; Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, pp.519–523; Prange, Miracle at
Midway p.395.
[136] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 432.
[137] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p.417.
[138] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp.416–417, 432.
[139] Because pre-war Japan was less mechanized than America, the highly trained aircraft mechanics, fitters and technicians lost at Midway
were all but impossible to replace and train to a similar level of efficiency.
[140] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 421.
[141] Shinano, commissioned on 19 November 1944, was only the fourth fleet carrier commissioned by Japan during the war, after Taihō,
Unryū, and Amagi.Chesneau (ed.) Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1922–1946 pp. 169–170, 183–184.
[142] "Why Japan Really Lost The War – War Production" (http:/ / www. combinedfleet. com/ economic. htm). combinedfleet.com. .
[143] Hakim, A History of Us: War, Peace and all that Jazz
[144] http:/ / www. amvetsww2. org/ Assets/ images/ docimage/ discovery_1-1. jpg
[145] "Titanic explorer finds Yorktown" (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ TECH/ science/ 9806/ 04/ yorktown. found/ index. html). CNN. 4 June 1998. .
Retrieved 1 July 2007.
[146] Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 491–493.
[147] Battle of Midway National Memorial (http:/ / www. fws. gov/ midway/ memorial. html). U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 2010-03-22. .
Retrieved 2012-03-10.
Citations
Bibliography
• Barde, Robert E. "Midway: Tarnished Victory", Military Affairs, v. 47, no. 4 (December 1983)
• Bergerud, Eric M. (2000). Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
p. 752. ISBN 978-0-8133-2985-7.
• Bicheno, Hugh. Midway. London: Orion Publishing Group, 2001 (reprints Cassell 2001 edition)
• Blair Jr., Clay (1975). Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
p. 1072.
• Buell, Thomas B. (1987). The Quiet Warrior: a Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press. p. 518. ISBN 0-87021-562-0.
• Cressman, Robert J.; et.al. (1990). "A Glorious page in our history", Adm. Chester Nimitz, 1942: the Battle of
Midway, 4–6 June 1942. Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial Histories Pub. Co.. ISBN 0-929521-40-4.
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945). US Naval Institute Press.
• Evans, David; Peattie, Mark R. (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
16
Battle of Midway
• Fuchida, Mitsuo; Masatake Okumiya (1955). Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story.
Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-372-5. A Japanese account; numerous
assertions in this work have been challenged by more recent sources.
• Stephan, John J. (1984). Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 0-8248-2550-0.
• Bix, Herbert P. (2001). Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: Perennial /
HarperCollinsPublishers. ISBN 0-06-019314-X.
• Holmes, W. (1979). Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War
II (Bluejacket Books). Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-324-9.
• Hakim, Joy (1995). A History of Us: War, Peace and all that Jazz. New York: Oxford University Press.
ISBN 0-19-509514-6.
• Isom, Dallas Woodbury (2007). Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway. Indiana University
Press. ISBN 978-0-253-34904-0.
• Layton, Rear Admiral Edwin T. (1985). And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway, Konecky and Konecky.
• Lord, Walter (1967). Incredible Victory. Burford. ISBN 1-58080-059-9. Focuses primarily on the human
experience of the battle.
• Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (new edition)). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to
Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-471-X.
• Parillo, Mark. Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute
Press, 1993.
• Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles,
Virginia: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0. Uses recently translated Japanese sources.
• Peattie, Mark R.. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. US Naval Institute Press. p. 392.
ISBN 1-59114-664-X.
• Potter, E. B. and Nimitz, Chester W. (1960). Sea Power. Prentice-Hall.
• Prange, Gordon W.; Goldstein, Donald M., and Dillon, Katherine V. (1982). Miracle at Midway. McGraw-Hill.
ISBN 0-07-050672-8. The standard academic history of the battle based on massive research into American and
Japanese sources.
• Scrivner, Charles L. (1987). TBM/TBF Avenger in Action. Carrollton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.
1987. ISBN 0-89747-197-0 Page 8: Photos of VT-8 TBF-1s, including sole survivor of VT-8's attack against
Japanese carrier fleet.
• Smith, Michael (2000). The Emperor's Codes: Bletchley Park and the breaking of Japan's secret ciphers, Bantam
Press, ISBN 0-593-04642-0. Chapter 11: "Midway: The battle that turned the tide"
• Willmott, H.P. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942.
United States Naval Institute Press. p. 616. ISBN 1-59114-949-5. Broad-scale history of the naval war with
detailed accounts of order of battle and dispositions.
17
Battle of Midway
Further reading
Books
• Bess, Michael (2006). Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
ISBN 0-307-26365-7.
• Chesneau, Roger (ed.) (1980). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime
Press. ISBN 0-85177-146-7.
• Ewing, Steve (2004). Thach Weave: The Life of Jimmie Thach. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
ISBN 1-59114-248-2.
• Hanson, Victor D. (2001). Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. Doubleday.
ISBN 0-385-50052-1.
• Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. ISBN 0-345-27894-1. First-hand account by Japanese
captain, often inaccurate.
• Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the
Internet. Scribner. ISBN 0-684-83130-9. Significant section on Midway
• Kernan, Alvin (2005). The Unknown Battle of Midway. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-10989-X. An account
of the blunders that led to the near total destruction of the American torpedo squadrons, and of what the author
calls a cover-up by naval officers after the battle.
• Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat
from August to November 1942. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-472-8.
• Morison, Samuel E. (1949). Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942 – August 1942. (History of
United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 4) official U.S. history.
• Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. U.S. Naval Institute Press.
ISBN 1-59114-794-8.
• Smith, Peter C. (2007). Midway Dauntless Victory; Fresh perspectives on America's Seminal Naval Victory of
1942. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime. ISBN 1-84415-583-8. Detailed study of battle, from planning to the
effects on World War II
• Stille, Mark (2007). USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942. New York: Osprey.
ISBN 978-1-84603-248-6.
• Thruelsen, Richard (1976). The Grumman Story. Prager Press. ISBN 0-275-54260-2.
• Tillman, Barrett (1976). The Dauntless Dive-bomber of World War Two. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 0-87021-569-8.
• Toll, Ian (2012). Pacific Crucible, War in the Pacific, 1941-1942. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co.
ISBN 978-0-393-06813-9.
• Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge U P.
• Willmott, H.P.. The Second World War in the Far East (Smithsonian History of Warfare). Smithsonian Books.
p. 240. ISBN 1-58834-192-5.
18
Battle of Midway
Articles
• The Course to Midway Turning Point in the Pacific (http://www.navy.mil/midway/), Comprehensive historic
overview
Historic documents
• The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/
Nagumo/), prepared by U.S. Naval Intelligence from captured Japanese documents
• Battle of Midway Movie (http://www.archive.org/details/BattleOfMidway) (1942) – U.S. Navy propaganda
film directed by John Ford.
• Victory At Sea: Midway Is East (http://www.archive.org/details/VAS_04_Midway_Is_East) (1952) – Episode
4 from a 26-episode series about naval combat during World War II.
• The Battle of Midway (1942) (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034498/) at the Internet Movie Database
• The Course to Midway Turning Point in the Pacific (http://www.navy.mil/midway/), Comprehensive historic
overview created by Bill Spencer
• Naval Historical Center Midway Page (http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/
midway.htm)
• "The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway" (http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/
Nagumo/) – ONI Review – Vol. 2, No. 5 (May 1947)
Miscellaneous
• Cook, Theodore F., Jr. (2000). "Our Midway Disaster". In Robert Cowley (ed.). What if?. London: Macmillan.
ISBN 0-333-75183-3. Counterfactual fiction has the Japanese winning.
• Schlesinger, James R., "Midway in Retrospect: The Still Under-Appreciated Victory", 5 June 2005. (An analysis
by former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.) Available from the Naval Historical Center, Department of the
Navy.
• WW2DB: The Battle of Midway (http://www.ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=6)
• After Midway: The Fates of the U.S. and Japanese Warships (http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/
articles/aftermidway.aspx) by Bryan J. Dickerson
• Animated History of The Battle of Midway (http://pacificwaranimated.com/Midway.html)
• Midway Chronology 1 (http://www.bartcop.com/midway.htm)
• Midway Chronology 2 (http://www.centuryinter.net/midway/appendix/appendixthirteen.html)
19
Article Sources and Contributors
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
File:Midway Atoll.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Midway_Atoll.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Cobatfor, Sebmol, Telim tor
File:G13065 USS Yorktown Pearl Harbor May 1942.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:G13065_USS_Yorktown_Pearl_Harbor_May_1942.jpg License: Public
Domain Contributors: Cla68, Cobatfor, Hohum, Jappalang, Makthorpe, Pibwl, Raul654, Ulflarsen
File:AkagiDeckApril42.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:AkagiDeckApril42.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Badseed, Cla68, 3 anonymous edits
File:Eastern Island Midway under attack 1942.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Eastern_Island_Midway_under_attack_1942.jpg License: Public Domain
Contributors: Cdr. John Ford, USNR
File:Hiryu f075712.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Hiryu_f075712.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: USAAF
File:Vt8-g-gay-may42.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Vt8-g-gay-may42.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: unknown. Original uploader was Felix c at
en.wikipedia. Later version(s) were uploaded by Hohum at en.wikipedia.
File:TBDs on USS Enterprise (CV-6) during Battle of Midway.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:TBDs_on_USS_Enterprise_(CV-6)_during_Battle_of_Midway.jpg
License: Public Domain Contributors: U.S. Navy
File:USS Yorktown hit-740px.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:USS_Yorktown_hit-740px.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: USN, photographed from USS
Pensacola (CA-24)
File:Hiryu burning.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Hiryu_burning.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: U.S. Navy (Donation of Kazutoshi Hando, 1970)
File:Midway survivor on PBY.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Midway_survivor_on_PBY.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Cdr. John Ford, USNR
File:Sinking of japanese cruiser Mikuma 6 june 1942.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sinking_of_japanese_cruiser_Mikuma_6_june_1942.jpg License: Public
Domain Contributors: USN
File:Starr 080604-6331 Unknown orchidaceae.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Starr_080604-6331_Unknown_orchidaceae.jpg License: Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 Contributors: Forest & Kim Starr
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