Neoclassical realist and Innenpolitik perspectives on
the political economy of U.S. grand strategy, and its relationship with China,
in 1993-2008
Paper prepared for the 4th ECPR Graduate Conference, 4-6 July 2012 (Bremen)
Draft (29 June 2012): do not circulate or cite.
Michiel Foulon ([email protected])
Department of Politics and International Studies
The University of Warwick
Abstract
This paper aims to address important aspects of the United States (U.S.) grand strategy in 1993 –
2008 to better understand the position of the U.S. in contemporary international politics. More
precisely, this paper will look into the two main areas that shaped U.S. grand strategy in the
period of 1993 – 2008: Iraq and China, and how the invasion of the former was a means to
control the economic rise of the latter. To this end, this paper will adopt a neoclassical realist
framework and compare this with insights from schools of thought that focus on domestic
politics such as the Innenpolitik school.
First, this paper discusses the idea that controlling economic resources that fuel the economic
growth of a country is key to preventing that a country expands too rapidly, not only in economic
terms but also militarily. It is this very logic, deducted from the malign early 20th century
European order that can now be observed, mutatis mutandis, in U.S. grand strategy in the early
21st century. Next, this paper will provide an analysis of the emergence of the U.S. grand strategy
in 1991 – 1996, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Third, this paper will analyse how
U.S. leaders reassessed the international order and the emerging political economic imbalances
with China around 1996 and until 9/11. I will discuss that this reassessment redirected the grand
strategic focus of the U.S. towards the economy and away from the dominance of the military.
Fourth, and lastly, this paper will discuss how U.S. grand strategy again got revised after 9/11.
Once again international conditions changed and the assessment of this by U.S. leaders created
the proclaimed rationale for the Iraq and Afghanistan invasion. This paper puts this rationale into
question since U.S. strategy in the region was seen as ineffective in achieving its goals.
Moreover, the U.S. strategy of sending large number of ground troops into the Middle East, and
especially into Iraq and Afghanistan, did not serve a U.S. grand strategic goal. Rather, the paper
argues that the rationale for U.S. presence in the Middle East and especially in Afghanistan post
9/11 sought to gain political and economic control over resources that China so needs for its
expanding economy. The paper concludes that by controlling economic resources in the Middle
East the U.S. aimed (and still aims) to control the Chinese economy. Furthermore, this strategy
seems to be an anticipatory or ‘pre-emptive’ action to control resources before a country would
develop into a veritable economic and military threat.
1
Introduction
The early 20th century showed that controlling economic resources are key to peace in the
international order. After all, resources fuel the economic growth of a country and are key to
preventing that a country expands too rapidly, not only in economic terms but also militarily.
Indeed, the state of the domestic political economy and how economic growth can be
transformed into power determines whether and how quickly an emerging power can turn into a
veritable danger. It is this very logic, deducted from the malign European context of the early
20th century that can now be observed, mutatis mutandis, in the United States (U.S.) grand
strategy in the early 21st century.
First, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union the U.S.
turned out to be the sole superpower. Neorealist thinkers argued that the U.S. should use its
unique economic and military lead to (re)shape the post-Cold War order. Security and military
issues dominated the U.S. foreign policy agenda. However, these very same adherents of the
neorealist school are left with highly important but unanswered questions. They wonder why it is
that while a country that emerged as the sole superpower in the world only two decades earlier,
we are now discussing, both in the academic world and beyond, that the U.S. is in decline.
Next, I argue that a first step in understanding the position of the U.S. in contemporary
international politics is to look at the changing international political economy of the mid 1990s.
U.S. leaders reassessed its political economic relations with East Asia and with China in
particular. Given that its bilateral political economic imbalances with China were quickly
expanding, U.S. leaders reassessed the “time frame” (Brawley, 2010, p. 21) and the urgency of
addressing the emerging imbalances with China. The number 1 item on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda was now no longer security as the economy came to the fore. Adherents of schools of
thought that focus on domestic politics would argue that these changes in U.S. grand strategy
were instilled by domestic factors. Neoclassical realist thinkers, however, understand that it was
a reassessment of the international context, and more concretely the “time frame” (Brawley,
2010, p. 21) to address the imbalances with China, that prompted changes in U.S. grand strategy
around the mid 1990s.
2
Finally, the events on 9/11 prompted U.S. leaders to reassess the international context yet
again. U.S. leaders redirected the focus of their foreign policy towards the Middle East and to
Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. I argue that these operations were not only unsuccessful but
also that the large numbers of ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan did not serve U.S. grand
strategic interest. This leads us to inquire what the very rationale of U.S. presence in the Middle
Eastern region is. I argue that the alleged logic of providing a “public good” (Leverett, 2010) for
the world economy in terms of energy security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf does not
hold stand. Rather, I argue that U.S. developed a strategy of controlling the Chinese economy via
controlling its economic resources. This allowed the U.S. to act proactively before the perceived
China threat developed into a veritable danger. After all, China’s economic and military rise
depended on the availability of oil and mineral resources. I argue then that the rationale for the
U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is that it allows the U.S. political and economic control
over the resources in the region and thus also to control China’s economic growth.
The aim of this paper is to examine the changing position of the U.S. in contemporary
international politics. First, I will look into the lessons that the Western international community
learned from the malign early 20th century environment. The next section deals with the
emerging U.S. grand strategy in the early post-Cold War years from 1991 - 1996. Section three
elaborates on the changes in U.S. grand strategy around the mid 1990s until 9/11. Finally, the
fourth section of this paper will look at changes in U.S. grand strategy between 9/11 and 2008
and how the military presence in the Middle East, and more concretely in Iraq and Afghanistan,
aimed at gaining political and economic control over resources and thus control over China’s
expanding economy.
1. Controlling economic resources to prevent conflict: a lesson well learned
History taught the West, including the U.S., the lesson that resources for a country’s
economic base are key to prevent a possible threat from developing into a veritable danger. The
early 20th century saw the rise of an economic power that later turned into military dominance
3
during 1940 and 1945. When the Second World War came to an end it was acknowledged that in
order to prevent another power from resorting to military dominance, the economic basis of a
potential threat should be addressed. A few years after the Second World Wars ended, a Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty), also known as the Treaty
of Paris, that aimed at serving that very goal of peaceful relations was signed in 1951 (European
Union, 2010)1. Some may argue that this treaty itself does not explicitly elaborate on this
objective as the treaty indeed is overloaded with economic aspects and methods regarding,
amongst others, “economic expansion”, “the standard of living” and market prices2. However, as
it is the case with many (if not all) legal documents such as an international treaty the very ratio
legis cannot be found in the legal text itself. Rather, it is the preparatory documents and events
preceding the treaty that reveal its broader societal aim. More precisely, it is the declaration by
Robert Shuman, then-French foreign minister and one of the main initiators of the ECSC Treaty,
on 9 May 1950 that reveals the very rationale of the treaty. The aim of what would later be
referred to as the “Schuman Declaration” (Schuman, 1950) was
‘to prevent for conflict between major powers to emerge by targeting the “vital resources
needed for a country to wage war” (Biedermann, 2012, emphasis added). The ultimate
goal of controlling economic resources was to make conflict “not merely unthinkable, but
materially [thus economically] impossible” (Schuman, 1950; The Schuman Project,
2000)’.
After all, it was the economic resources that were key to unreasonable military development that
could make a possible threat into a veritable danger. Consequently, it was agreed that controlling
economic resources became “indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations” (Schuman,
1950; The Schuman Project, 2000).
1
For the full text of the treaty, please refer to the Treaty of Paris (Treaty constituting the
European Coal and Steel Community) (1951).
2
See e.g. the Treaty of Paris (Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community)
(1951, Articles 2-4).
4
The remainder of this paper will discuss how U.S. grand strategy changed over three
different periods from 1993 - 2008. While in a first phase (1991-1996) the military was dominant
in U.S. strategy, during the subsequent phase the economy became the most important as a
potential threat in the international political economic sphere emerged from China’s economic
rise. In the third and last phase (2001 – 2008) the military took over again. However, contrary to
common beliefs, this paper will argue that U.S. military deployment and invasion in Iraq and
Afghanistan aimed at controlling economic resources in order to control the Chinese economy.
2. U.S. grand strategy in the immediate post-Cold War years (1991 – 1996)3
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the sole superpower in the
world (Deng, 2001, p. 151). For decades the Soviet Union and the U.S. were both superpowers
with just “a degree difference within the same class” (Xuetong, 2006, p. 30), until at the end of
the 20th century the U.S. emerged as the world’s sole superpower. American leaders were left
with a new world order where it was unclear whether this unipolar moment would last (Hentz,
2005, p. 1563). For part of the 20th century the U.S. had a clear realist recipe for its foreign
policy and grand strategy to easily identify and address potential threats from Europe as well as
selecting the allies it could rely on to avert international threats. Consequently, the U.S. was left,
for the first time in many decades, with an international order where there was no immediate
threat from Europe or Asia (Mearsheimer, 2011). Therefore, given the U.S. power status its
leaders sought to come up with a new grand strategy for the post-Cold War era.
A dominant view about U.S. grand strategy in the post-Cold Ward period was that the
U.S. needed to “use that tremendous advantage that [it] had over other countries [since the end of
the CW] to basically reshape the world in America’s image” (Mearsheimer, 2011). Put short, the
U.S. should use its power status – and preferably its military lead over other countries - to
reshape the world. After all, they referred to a balance of power theory to predict that the U.S.
unipolar moment would soon be over (See Dueck, 2004, pp. 197-198). Two decades later,
3
This title and that of the subsequent two sections of this paper are inspired by Brawley (2010,
pp. 15-28).
5
however, a multipolar order has not emerged and questions on “American decline or
disengagement were premature” (Dueck, 2004, p. 198). Moreover, looking back at the past two
decades these very same neorealists are left with unanswered questions. A leading scholar in this
school of thought summarized it as follows:
“How is it that the United States of America who seemed to be at the top of the world in
1989 is in such serious trouble now? Why is it that people all over the world are talking
about America in decline? That’s actually quite remarkable (…) that [the U.S.] has
screwed up so badly.” (Mearsheimer, 2011)
To understand U.S. grand strategy in the early post-Cold War years, it is important to
look at the different priorities for U.S. foreign policy prior to 1991 and thereafter. For a large part
of the 20th century the priorities of the U.S. were, firstly, Europe, and to a lesser extent, East
Asia, the Middle East (Mead, 2005, p. 591) and Latin America. However, with the defeat of Nazi
Germany in 1945 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, European security basically
had “become less a concern for the United States and is no longer the most prominent item for
U.S. grand strategy” (Andrews cited in Ellis, 2009, p. 371). Consequently, the disappearance of
an immediate threat from Europe brought East Asia and the Middle East ipso facto to the
forefront in U.S. grand strategy. However, the fact that, in the absence of a Soviet threat, East
Asia and the Middle East came to the fore is only part of the story.
One of the first designs of U.S. grand strategy after 1991 was written down in the draft
1992 Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) (U.S. Department of Defence, 1992). The document
revealed the very U.S. foreign policy objectives for the coming years:
“Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival (…) and requires that we
endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would
(…) be sufficient to generate global power.” (U.S. Department of Defence, 1992, I.B.§2,
emphasis added)
6
This “post-Cold War agenda”, so to speak, was explained to be a lesson learned from the 20th
century allowing proactive or pre-emptive action “to shape circumstances before crises emerge,
and to meet threats before they come dire” (Right Web, 2008). Nevertheless, then-member of the
opposition Joseph Biden summarized the 1992 DPG as an agenda for a plain ‘Pax Americana’
(Right Web, 2008).
Advocates of schools of thought that focus on domestic interest groups and domestic
4
factors would argue that this course of direction of U.S. grand strategy was a result of a downup process where the U.S. people and its domestic interest groups triggered policy decisions
(Brawley, 2010, pp. 19-20, 46). However, there does not seem to be decisive proof for this. First,
with clear but limitative priorities in the DPG where East Asia and the Middle East came to the
fore (Rice, 2000, p. 46) U.S. leaders also implicitly acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy post
1991 could not meet the wishes of all people and domestic interest groups. Second, the public
controversy emerging from the publication of the leaked draft of the DPG showed that the
formulation of U.S. grand strategy post 1991 was not instilled by a domestic social basis (Right
Web, 2008). Consequently, it could be argued that U.S. grand strategy in the early years after the
Cold War was not a bottom-up process where state leaders that formulated the state’s foreign
policy priorities reflected domestic interests (Brawley, 2010, pp. 15-28).
Neoclassical realists’ focus on international factors, however, provides a better
explanation for U.S. grand strategy in the early post-Cold War years. Brawley (2010, pp. 6, 21)
focuses on the “time frame” (Brawley, 2010, p. 21) for a state to respond to a threat in the
international system to explain a state’s grand strategy. The U.S. no longer had a major threat
coming from Europe in the near future and enjoyed an economic and military lead over other
countries. Consequently, the U.S. had “the freedom to pursue any number of policies which
might position it well for fronting [a] (…) future threat” (Brawley, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, U.S.
leaders came up with a strategy that had a new order of geographic priorities centred upon East
Asia and the Middle East, where it aimed to avoid or hinder that a possible “new rival” would
gain enough “resources” to dominate a region (U.S. Department of Defence, 1992). This was
4
By this I do not only mean the Innenpolitik school, but also theories such as analytical
liberalism.
7
seen as the best way to confront – or at least slow down – rising powers such as China in the
more distant future5.
U.S. leaders set a clear agenda for its post-Cold War grand strategy, but realist scholars
tend to agree that, as Mearsheimer said, “looking back at the past 20 years, things have certainly
not worked out the way people wanted it to work out. The past 20 years have been disastrous”
(2011, emphasis added). During this period the U.S. has tried to deal with issues concerning
nuclear power in North Korea and Iran, the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, Iraq, China, and so forth
– all with little success. To understand how U.S.’ foreign policy record in 1993 – 2008 came to
be, the remainder of this paper will focus on the two priorities of U.S. grand strategy in this
period. In the next section I will start with an analysis of the international political economy of
U.S. grand strategy towards East Asia, and more precisely China, from 1996 until the attacks on
the 11th of September 2001. After all, China’s military drew a lot of attention and the Chinese
economy, that was the then-third largest in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)
(The World Bank, 2012), became more and more intertwined with that of the U.S.
3. U.S. assessment of the time frame changes: emerging political economic imbalances with
China (1996 – 9/11)
International political economic trends in the benign environment of the 1990s prompted
U.S. leaders to reassess U.S. grand strategy. The Clinton Administration rejected the 1992 DPG
marking “a significant departure from his predecessors’ more conservative agenda” (Jannuzi,
2001, p. 317). However, it wasn’t until February 1996 that U.S.’ reassessment of the
international system was formalized by The White House in the National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement (The White House, 1996). President Clinton and his staff
members did not abandon all of the U.S. foreign policy issues such as North Korea, and the
Middle East, nor did they neglect the variety of key areas of U.S. grand strategy on issues such
as non-proliferation, terrorism, human rights, the environment and democratization. In different
5
This analysis is based on Brawley (2010, pp. 1-14).
8
sections of the document, the authors elaborated on their vision on each of these issues that
remained part of U.S. grand strategy6.
What changed was U.S.’ assessment of its political economic relations with China, as can
be seen from the fact that the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement was
overloaded with statements about U.S. economic relations with China. The trade deficit with
China grew during the years after President Clinton first took office in 19937, and the vast
increase in FDI in China especially coming from the U.S. prompted U.S. leaders to reassess the
international context (Hart-Landsberg, 2010). While the U.S.’ trade deficit with China was still
13 billion USD in 1991 this figure more than tripled by 1996 to 40 billion USD. During that
period the U.S. also became the second largest source for FDI in China after Hong Kong (Fung,
Iizaka, & Tong, 2002). In 1992 U.S. FDI to China accounted for less than 5 % of total FDI to
China, but by 1996 this increased to more than 8 % of total FDI in China8. Indeed, the National
Security Strategy of Engagement en Enlargement stated that “As U.S.-China trade continues to
grow significantly, [the U.S.] must work closely with Beijing to resolve remaining bilateral and
multilateral trade problems” (The White House, 1996). These international political economic
considerations about China prompted a reassessment of U.S. grand strategy, as it became clear
for U.S. leaders that the 1990s was no longer the benign environment absent of a threat that they
thought it had become after the end of the Cold War.
One might argue that this explanation is not consistent with U.S. leaders’ assessment of
the U.S. – Japan economic conflict in the late 1960s until the 1980s when other security concerns
remained the number 1 priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Indeed, this bilateral
economic issue was also centred upon, amongst other things, bilateral trade imbalances. The U.S.
– Japan trade deficit was about 3.5 billion USD in 1972, became 16 billion USD in 1981 and
neared 50 billion USD at the end of the 1980s (Bergsten, 1982, p. 1060; United States Census
Bureau, 2012). Furthermore, this situation caused “rhetoric and frustration” about exchange
6
Different approaches to U.S. grand strategy come with different orders of priority. One
approach “usually emerges as the dominant one in a given period” while “the others never
completely fade away” (Miller, 2010, p. 29).
7
See attachment 1 for figures on the U.S. – China trade imbalances.
8
See attachment 2 for figures on FDI in China.
9
rates, “unfair” competition, ‘free riding’ and protectionism in both countries (Bergsten, 1982, pp.
1059-1060). This led to an “obvious spillover onto the reemerging issue of security relations
between the two countries” (Bergsten, 1982, pp. 1059-1060). Consequently, it could be argued,
then, that the argument in this paper would say that this U.S. – Japan conflict would have topped
the U.S. foreign policy agenda. However, it is important to acknowledge the different context in
which the U.S. – Japan economic conflict took place.
First, the U.S. and Japan faced the same security threat from the Soviet Union that
dominated their foreign policy agenda. The basis for this ‘alliance’ during the Cold War was
already written down in the ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
States and Japan’9 in 1960 that committed both countries to “seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and (…) encourage economic collaboration between them”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012, Article II). Second, in spite of the economic conflict
between the U.S. and Japan their bilateral agreements survived other major crises in the East
Asian region such as the war in Vietnam, and ultimately even the Cold War. All in all, while
heated economic disputes between the U.S. and Japan certainly existed in the 1960s until the
1980s, these issues did not dominate the U.S. foreign policy agendas because security concerns
arising from the Soviet Union were the number 1 item on the agenda. Moreover, it could be
argued that over time the U.S. remained firm against economic threats emerging from East Asia.
While economic disputes aroused from the U.S. – Japan relationship in the 1960s until
the 1980s, during the first few decades after the Cold War it appeared to be another East Asian
country that became cause for economic conflict as from the 1990s: China. It could be argued,
then, that the difference between the two economic conflicts lies in the fact that with the end of
the Cold War, the problematic bilateral economic imbalances that U.S. was suffering were no
longer secondary to an international security threat. As the Soviet threat disappeared, political
economic issues with China were elevated to the number 1 item on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda and led many scholars to conclude that it could have “very important influences on SinoUS relations” (Canrong, 2001, p. 309).
9
The text of this treaty can be found via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012). An online version of the treaty is available via
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
10
U.S. leaders reassessed the “time frame” (Brawley, 2010, p. 21) and the urgency of
addressing its political economic relations with China, given that the bilateral imbalances with
China were quickly expanding. Indeed, the U.S. – China trade deficit more than tripled and U.S.
nominal FDI to China quintupled in a matter of a few years10. Consequently, U.S. leaders judged
that it should now focus on how this relationship could be rebalanced. To that end, the U.S.
economy became the number one priority in U.S. grand strategy. After all, U.S. political
imbalances with China were seen to be caused to a certain extent, by “the industrial hollowing
out of the (…) U.S. econom[y]” (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 2005, p. 439). Consequently, for its
foreign policy, the Clinton Administration put the economy first and the focus was now on
“economic renewal at home” and “beating the deficit” (Canrong, 2001, pp. 312-315; Kitchen,
2011).
A number of events in that time indicated the new priority of the economy in U.S. grand
strategy. First, there was the creation of the National Economic Council, already in 1993 (The
White House, 2012), which is considered to be “the equivalent of an early [National Security
Council] for foreign economic policy” (Garrison, 2007, pp. 176-177). Another indicator of the
relative decline of importance of the military in this period are the cuts in defence budgets,
initiated by President George H. W. Bush11 and further deepened by the Clinton Administration
(Rice 2000, p. 50). Compared with the Cold War era there was not much going on in U.S.
foreign security policy throughout the 1990s until 9/11. The issues that did occur, such as
Somalia in (1992 – 1993), the Balkans conflict (1995) and Kosovo (1999), were all dealt with via
multilateral fora such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Miller,
2010, pp. 42-43). Furthermore, U.S. leaders’ assessment of the international order showed that
“in the new era, military power would not be as important as before” (Canrong, 2001, p. 311).
After all, “[U.S.] military primacy was a plain fact” already and, consequently, “the United
States was able to reduce the defence spending as a portion of GDP from 6 to 3 %” (Kitchen,
2011). Moreover, the U.S. GDP grew at an annual average of more than 4 % between 1995 and
10
See attachment 2 for full details.
11
To avoid confusion, President Bush the elder is referred to with his full name of George H. W.
Bush and President Bush junior is referred to with his full name of George W. Bush.
11
1999 (Kitchen, 2011)12. Both the inception of the National Economic Council and the cuts in the
defence budgets emphasized that the economy now came first in U.S. grand strategy.
The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement did not only reveal U.S.’
reassessment of the “time horizon” (Brawley, 2010, p. 19) about problems sourcing from
bilateral political economic imbalances with China. Novel means to meet the new U.S. grand
strategic objectives were also paramount in the document. In line with the argument of this
paper, U.S. foreign policy shifted after U.S. leaders observed new threats in the international
political economic sphere. To address the newly exposed issues sourcing from its political
economic relations with China, the National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement
stated that the U.S. wanted a “stable, open, prosperous and strong China” that “will provide an
expanding market for American goods and services” (The White House, 1996). After all, more
goods and services sold from the U.S. to China could bring solace to their bilateral trade
imbalances. The document went on arguing that “China’s accession to the WTO is also an
important objective for the United States. The United States [has] made it clear that China must
join the WTO on commercial terms” (The White House, 1996). Furthermore, U.S. leaders stated
in the document that the U.S. would put efforts “to engage in productive relations with China
across a broad range of issues, including (…) trade”, seeking “a strategic relationship with
China, advancing [U.S.] national interests in key areas (…) that is the hallmark of determined
diplomacy” (The White House, 1996). In the mid-1990s not only did the renewed U.S. grand
strategy was shaped, it also outlined the very means and ways to reach the novel grand strategic
objectives.
Theories that focus on domestic politics and interest groups would try to explain changes
in U.S. grand strategy “through changes emerging among domestic factors” and domestic
interests (Brawley, 2010, p. 19). Such an approach would suggest that the changes in the course
of direction of U.S. grand strategy in the mid and late 1990s was a result of a down-up process
where the U.S. people and its domestic interest groups triggered policy decisions. However, I
12
It is said that “most of that actually comes from growth in GDP, rather than cuts in military
spending” (Kitchen, 2011). However, it should be noted that even while GDP grew steadily at an
annual rate of up to 4,5 %, the military budget decreased at an annual average of more than 3 %
(see attachment 3).
12
argue that the international system operated as a “selector” of the most pressing issues (Miller,
2010, p. 29). After all, it was U.S. leaders’ reassessment of the international political economy of
the mid 1990s, and especially its bilateral political economic imbalances with China that
prompted changes in U.S. grand strategy. It would be hard to argue, then, that domestic factors
and interest groups were reflected in state preferences (Brawley, 2010, pp. 15-28).
Neoclassical realists’ focus on international factors provides a more adequate explanation
for the changes in U.S. grand strategy around the mid 1990s. “The neoclassical realist
assumptions emphasize the planning and decision-making that flow from the state downward
onto society” (Brawley, 2010, p. 25) instead of a process that works down-upwards. The Clinton
Administration did not reject the 1992 DPG because of opposition from domestic interest groups,
but rather because of a reassessment of the international political economy – put short, “the
answer [lays] (…) in systemic change” (Brawley, 2010, p. 84).
The moment when President Clinton took office coincided with other events in the
international political economy: large flows of FDI that went into China and the emergence of
the U.S. – China trade imbalances. U.S. leaders therefore felt they were no longer in a vacuum
where there was no pressing international issue and China emerged on the radar screen of U.S.
grand strategy. The “top-down nature” (Brawley, 2010, p. 104) of the changes in U.S. grand
strategy becomes even clearer when it is noted that China was considered the bête noire of U.S.
foreign policy over different administrations.
Adherents of theories that focus on domestic factors would have expected that “as the
parties in power shift, policies change to reflect their different bases of support. In this
perspective, government changes should cause realignment of foreign policy” (Brawley, 2010, p.
104). It could then be expected that U.S. grand strategy would dramatically change when
President George W. Bush took office. Yet, this didn’t happen until another international event
prompted U.S. leaders to once again reassess the international sphere after the 11th of September
2001.
13
4. U.S. grand strategy revised and time horizons re-evaluated: resource rich countries in
the Middle East and skyrocketing imbalances with China (9/11 – 2008)
U.S. grand strategy changed again after 9/11 when U.S. leaders once again redirected
U.S. foreign policy’s priorities towards the Middle East and to Iraq and Afghanistan in
particular. President George W. Bush initially “did not show much interest in regime change or
in any military action against Saddam” (Miller, 2010, p. 52). Furthermore, authors such as Miller
argued that “Had terrorists not attacked America on September 11, Iraq would likely have
remained a secondary issue in American foreign policy” (Daalder and Lindsay cited in Miller,
2010, p. 52). Yet, due to international factors, U.S. grand strategy was revised, even though there
was no significant change in the international balance of power.
While the Middle East was considered a ‘manageable’ region, the attacks on 9/11
prompted U.S. leaders to reassess the international context yet again. While the time frame of the
alleged threat from China was relatively distant, a much more urgent and pressing security issue
had arisen from 9/11. President George W. Bush believed that U.S. efforts and military should be
directed towards the “axis of evil” in order to secure “the peace of the world”, as he famously
declared in his 2002 State of the Union Address (Bush, 2002).13 Moreover, Condoleezza Rice
already in 2000 argued that “Saddam Hussein [had] no useful place in international politics” and
that the U.S. “must mobilize whatever resources it can (…) to remove him” (Rice, 2000, p. 60).
Immediately after 9/11, as adherents of theories that focus on domestic politics would argue,
President George W. Bush’s approval and popularity rates of 75 % and higher showed that U.S.
leaders’ redirection of its grand strategy was according to domestic interests (BBC, 2012).
U.S. strategy, as outlined by the 2002 National Security Strategy was actually a contested
modus operandi to address the “axis of evil” (Bush, 2002). U.S. strategy returned to foreign
policies that put military action above the economy. The new focus on military invasions in
Afghanistan and Iraq prompted vast increases in U.S. defence budgets. The defence budget
totalled 382 billion USD in 2000 and increased to a total of 433 billion USD in 2002 and 630
13
For President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy, see The White House
(2002).
14
billion USD by 2008 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). However, as the
George W. Bush Administration unrolled its new strategy, the very rationale of this revised focus
on military deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan was questioned.
First, it was put into question whether the U.S. was effective in achieving its goal of
peace, stability and democratization in the region. Furthermore, as Leverett pointed out, “[e]ven
for countries outside the region like China it has called into question whether [the U.S.] really
[is] providing a public good, say in energy security” (Leverett, 2010). Moreover, it has been
argued that “the way the U.S. has acted militarily in the region over the past several years is
actually more of a threat to Chinese security then it is a help – at least in [China’s] perspective”
(Leverett, 2010). Consequently, the U.S. is seen as an actor that creates instability and
jeopardizes China’s energy security in the region.
Second, President George W. Bush’s military strategy of sending large numbers of
ground troops to the Middle East and especially into Iraq is evaluated as not serving a “positive
long-term strategic purpose for the United States” (Leverett, 2010). Already before 9/11 and also
thereafter, U.S. taking up a responsibility of protecting energy security as “a public good” never
really was about energy security for the U.S. in the first place but for the world economy
(Leverett, 2010). Consequently, it has been argued that the U.S. should return to its strategy with
an “over the horizon posture” of off-shore balancing, thus managing a threat from the homeland
with a naval presence in the region allowing to send in troops when deemed necessary (Leverett,
2010).
It has been put into question what purpose U.S. presence in the Middle East is serving,
especially since the invasions after 9/11. Even though a strategy of off-shoring would be an
option that is financially much more viable for the U.S., it opted to keep an exceptionally large
number of ground troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, already in 2000, Condoleezza Rice
stated that “the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively”
(Rice, 2000, p. 61). Yet, the U.S. did not undertake such action during the following decade.
These events and considerations prompted scholars to raise the question of the very rationale of
U.S. presence in the Middle Eastern region.
15
Scholars have been wondering what U.S.’ rationale of ‘ensuring energy security’ in the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf implies. The U.S. earlier reassessed the international political
economy since the bilateral imbalances with China that emerged around 1993 now skyrocketed.
While the U.S. trade deficit with China was less than 40 billion USD in 1996, this increased to
83 billion in 2001 and exploded to almost 270 billion USD in 2008. FDI in China totalled 58
billion USD, stayed more or less steady until 2001 and had then more then tripled by 2008.
China’s foreign exchange reserves equalled 44 billion USD in 1991 and increased to 212 billion
USD by the end of 2001 (Chinability, 2012). The U.S. realized, however, that it only had to
respond to a Chinese military threat in the future since the U.S. was keeping an economic and
military lead over China. Earlier attempts to address the political economic imbalances via
bilateral dialogues that were created to address the bilateral political economic imbalances were
unsuccessful14. With China’s economic and military rise, U.S. leaders were prompted to come up
with a strategy to “act against (….) emerging threats before they are fully formed” (Bush cited in
Miller, 2010, p. 48).
The U.S. had learned a lesson from the Western experience in the early 20th century:
resources for a country’s economic base are key to prevent a possible threat from developing into
a veritable danger. It is economic resources that are key to military development (and possibly
conflict) that could turn a country from a possible threat into a veritable danger. The economic
and military rise of China was only sustainable when it had access to sufficient raw materials and
resources. This concern led China to engage with resource rich countries, especially in Africa
and South America (Krasner, 2008). However, China also showed to be interested in mineral
resources in countries such as Afghanistan (Khokhlov, 2010). The proclaimed rationale of U.S.
invasion in Iraq and Afghanistan has been questioned, especially since the U.S. does not
necessarily need resources from Iraq and Afghanistan, because large ground troops don’t serve a
U.S. grand strategic interest (Leverett, 2010) and because U.S. is unsuccessful in its goals of
14
These official bilateral dialogues are the U.S. – China Joint Economic Committee (as from
1980), the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (as from 1983), the Economic
Development and Reform Dialogue (as from 2003), the Strategic Economic Dialogue (since
2006) and the U.S. – China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (since 2009). For more on this, see
e.g. Garrison (2007, pp. 178-182) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (2004).
16
security and democratization. Indeed, it made scholars such as Khokhlov inquire why the U.S.
“invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that [are considered] to be the richest ones in
mineral resources” (Khokhlov, 2010). Given that China started looking in many parts of the
world for “resources for its [expanding] economy” (Khokhlov, 2010), it could be argued that the
U.S. grand strategic goal under the post-9/11 George W. Bush Administration (and subsequent
Obama Administration) turned out to be “to protect the two [mineral] richest countries in the
world such as Iraq and Afghanistan, so [the U.S.] will be able to control [the] Chinese economy”
(Khokhlov, 2010). In other words, rather than sticking to its recipes of the 1990s and 2000s that
focussed on formal bilateral talks that were seen as ineffective (Garrison, 2007, p. 182), the U.S.
sought political and economic control over resources that China needs for its expanding
economy.
Advocates of theories that focus on domestic politics and domestic factors would argue
that these variables prompted changes in U.S. grand strategy. According to these schools of
thought, the “causal chain” (Brawley, 2010, p. 19) would start from changes in the preferences of
U.S. domestic interest groups. Upon closer inspection, however, adherents of neoclassical
realism seem to be able to provide a more adequate account for the redirection of U.S. strategy.
U.S. leaders reassessed the international context of that time and re-evaluated the time frame of
the political economic threat emerging from China. These time frame observations showed that
the U.S. only needed to address a Chinese military threat in the relatively distant future.
Consequently, U.S. leaders could come up with a strategy that that focused on China’s domestic
political economy. By allowing history into the analysis, our neoclassical realist framework
shows how new insights can be observed in U.S. grand strategy during the period of 9/11 – 2008.
U.S. leaders not only observed changes in the time frame of an emerging threat but also looked
into domestic political economic aspects: China’s need of resources for its expanding domestic
economy. From our neoclassical perspective we can then see how by controlling these resources
in what are considered to be the mineral richest countries, U.S. grand strategy was aimed at
controlling China’s economy and thus its overall economic and military rise before it becomes a
veritable threat.
17
Conclusion
This paper has started with an explanation that the early 20th century showed that
controlling economic resources is key to peace in the international order. The initiators of the
Treaty of Paris understood that resources fuel the economic growth of a country and that
controlling these resources is therefore key to preventing economic and military conflict. I have
argued that this logic can now be observed in U.S. grand strategy in the early 21st century.
First, I have argued that the U.S. emerged as the sole superpower after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. It was argued by neorealist scholars that the U.S. should use its economic and
military preponderance in the international order to (re)shape the post-Cold War international
order. Two decades later, however, these same neorealist thinkers are left with the question of
‘what went wrong’? How come the U.S. was a unique economic and military superpower two
decades ago, while it is now discussed as a power in decline?
I have argued that it were changes in the international political economy of the mid
1990s, and in particular U.S.’ relations with China that prompted U.S. leaders to reassess U.S.
grand strategy. Given that U.S.’ political economic imbalances with China were expanding
rapidly, the economy became the priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The neoclassical
realist perspective understands that it was a reassessment of the “time frame” (Brawley, 2010, p.
20) to address the imbalances with China that prompted changes in U.S. grand strategy around
the mid 1990s.
Finally, I have argued that the events on 9/11 prompted U.S. leaders to reassess the
international context yet again. The military operations in the Middle East, and especially the
large numbers of ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, did not serve a U.S. grand strategic
interest. I have argued, then, that the alleged logic of providing the world economy with energy
security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf does not hold stand. China is looking all over
the world, from Africa to South America, for resources to fuel its economic (and military) rise.
Not all too surprisingly, China also became interested in resources from mineral rich countries
such as Afghanistan. I have argued that the strategic aim of the U.S. in the Middle East is to gain
18
political and economic control over the resources in that region, in order to gain control over the
Chinese economy. After all, the U.S. understood that controlling such resources is a way to act
proactively before the perceived China threat develops into a veritable economic and military
danger.
19
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Attachments
Attachment 1: U.S. – China trade imbalances in 1985 – 2011(*)
500 400 U.S. exports to China 300 U.S. imports from China 200 U.S. ‐ China trade imbalance 100 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 ‐100 1985 0 ‐200 ‐300 ‐400 U.S.
exports
to China
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
U.S.
imports
from
China
4
3
3
5
6
5
6
7
9
9
12
12
13
14
U.S. China
trade
imbalance
4
0
5
-2
6
-3
9
-3
12
-6
15
-10
19
-13
26
-18
32
-23
39
-30
46
-34
52
-40
63
-50
71
-57
U.S.
exports
to China
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
13
16
19
22
28
34
41
54
63
70
69
92
104
U.S.
imports
from
China
U.S. China
trade
imbalance
82
-69
100
-84
102
-83
125
-103
152
-124
197
-162
243
-202
288
-234
321
-259
338
-268
296
-227
365
-273
399
-295
(http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#1985)
(*) All figures are in billions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless
otherwise specified. Rounded to nearest billion.
23
Attachment 2: U.S. FDI to China in 1992 – 2000 (*)
Nominal
FDI in China
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
58
111
83
91
73
51
52
41
62
69
83
115
154
189
200
(http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/2097/1116/1/XiaobaoDang2008.pdf)
(*) All figures are in billion USD and are rounded to the nearest billion.
24
Attachment 3: U.S. military budget (and U.S. GDP growth rate) 1991 - 2011 (*)
15 % increase in U.S. military budget 10 U.S. GDP growth rate (%) 5 0 ‐5 ‐10 % increase in
U.S. military
budget
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
5,66
-5,26
-6,09
-5,42
-5,44
-0,52
-2,25
0,25
3,87
0,81
U.S. GDP
growth rate (%)
-0,30
3,40
2,90
4,10
2,50
3,80
4,50
4,50
4,90
4,20
1,10
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
(U.S. military budget data: http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4)
(U.S. GDP growth rate data:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=1)
25
% increase in
U.S. military
U.S. GDP
budget
growth rate (%)
12,28
1,80
13,82
2,50
8,99
3,60
4,77
3,10
1,55
2,70
2,62
1,90
7,40
0,00
8,02
-3,50
2,75
3,00
-1,24