Report of the AV Bargaining Group: A Post Mortem of the Collective Bargaining process that yielded a
Tentative Agreement in December, 2012.
This report is a summary review of the experiences of the Bargaining Group in dealing with Treasury
Board, a summarization of lessons learned from this round of Collective Bargaining (2011 - 2012); and, a
list of recommendations to strengthen the Collective Bargaining process in subsequent Negotiations.
Submitted by: AV Group Executive Submitted: February, 2013
Submitted to AV AGM: June 1st, 2013
BACKGROUND
The AV Executive met in Montreal on January 25, 2012 to conduct a post mortem review of the current
round of collective bargaining negotiations. Such a review is a necessary Better Management Practice in
capturing lessons learned with a view to strategizing and implementing enhanced negotiating processes,
going forward. This particular review was deemed to be all the more compelling because of a number of
factors:
- The difficult posture demonstrated by Treasury Board, which can be characterized by any number of
adjectives and all negative, e.g. adversarial, arrogant, intractable... This round was perceived to go
beyond the norm for such employer- union negotiations; The potential for such a posture to be
perpetuated in future negotiations, as a result of anti-union sentiment in the Government of Canada,
which is trending in other western governments, as well; and, the acknowledged weak outcomes for the
membership, which resulted from this round of Collective Bargaining, as contained in the Tentative
Agreement signed on December 14, 2012.
Objective
The intent of this review and this report is to offer recommendations, based on current experience, to:
assist in improving the process and strengthening the outcomes for future rounds of Collective
Bargaining; share with and assist other bargaining groups within this Bargaining Agent (PIPSC), to
harmonize efforts with a view to strengthening the 'Collective' approach to Collective Bargaining. An
ulterior objective would be to have other bargaining groups undertake concurrent reviews so that and
all perspectives are captured and possibly a consolidated report can be prepared, summarizing the
lessons learned by all bargaining groups, which could be put before the PIPSC Board of Directors; assist
the leadership of this union in formulating a strategy for future rounds of negotiations, which is founded
on Better Management Practices; and share with and assist the leadership of other public sector unions
in entrenching a 'Brotherhood' or 'Collective' mentality / stance in dealing with a common employer, so
that mutually beneficial (and exponential) impacts can result for our memberships.
Frame of Reference
It is acknowledged that little was achieved and much was lost, as a result of the approximate, two years
of negotiations that gave rise to the December, 2012 Tentative Agreement. The 1.5% annual salary
raises, over the 3-years of this agreement, continue the austere pattern of annual pay raises that have
not exceeded 2% since 2008. Prior to 2008, pay increases did exceed 2%, but only once topped 3% since
the 1999 merger that created the AV Group. Suffice it to say, the collective bargaining success in this
basic and fundamental area, has been unimpressive.
During this period under review, i.e. since 1999, there have been major loss areas as well, with the most
recent being the loss of severance pay for the public service.
The requirement for change in our approach to Collective Bargaining is obvious and has been for some
time. In fact, it can reasonably be argued that the requirement for change is now critical.
Lessons Learned (Regarding PIPSC Practices and Procedures)
The review exercise quickly determined that many of the encumbrances to optimum negotiations are
inherent to PIPSC. These systemic weaknesses undermine the effectiveness of the AV negotiating team,
however, they are controllable and therefore changeable. Recommendations for change in this area
should be the easiest to achieve, if acted upon by the Institute. For this reason and because effecting
change in our own environment, should be more immediate and potentially more long lasting, the AV
group analysis focused primarily on this area and the recommendations are more tailored to this area.
As illogical and counterintuitive as it may seem, PIPSC pursues its Collective Bargaining mandate without
a formal Strategic Plan. Analogies were drawn to a business operating without a business plan and the
consequential effects this would have on bottom line performance, or on fighting a war without a plan
of attack and the battle field effects this would have. This is incomprehensible!
- The Board of Directors does not have a strategic committee for 'Negotiations'. There are eight (8)
committees of the Board that address topics such as 'Executive Compensation', 'Elections' and
'Consultation' but there is no high-level committee on Collective Bargaining - the modus operandi of any
collective bargaining agent!
- The absence of concerted effort and direction from PIPSC resulted in a disjointed and diluted support
effort
(i) the lead negotiator changed on four (4) occasions and ended with André Lortie, who started with the
process, but passed through Michael and David before coming back to Andre.
(ii) the staff resource allocation, i.e. pay analyst, was inadequate. This is a reflection of a number of
things, e.g. limited availability and unreasonable time line requests by interim negotiators.
The Institute, as it did with endorsing the early collaboration by all PIPSC groups in not accepting the
PSAC deal, should have taken measures to ensure the maintenance of this
pact. The Institute should not have allowed the groups to splinter and to break-off. By not acting to
protect solidarity, the Institute in effect condoned the 'by-the-each' (and weakened) approach to
collective bargaining and was therefore an architect of the weak outcomes.
The concept and practice of Group autonomy is undermining Collective Bargaining. Collective Bargaining
is defined in PIPSC practice as an oxymoron and this very powerful and constructive instrument of
unionism is being sacrificed; it is being hung out to dry in favour of autonomous units or bargaining
groups, pursuing special interest outcomes.
Group autonomy not only diminishes force and effect at the negotiating table, but it weakens the
strategic approach to bargaining. The lead negotiator, as staff employee of the Institute, is restricted in
speaking openly and freely to the group negotiating team. Maintaining employer confidences and
having to safeguard any awareness of other (autonomous) group demands /actions, truly diminishes the
effectiveness of proper planning and proper strategy for individual groups. This breakdown within the
Institute, which amounts to internal division, is mind boggling particularly when juxtaposed against the
employer's strategy of 'divide and conquer' in dealing with disparate groups.
The AV Group numbers some 5,000, which pales in comparison to the 55,000 or so Institute members.
The Insignificance of our stature is not lost on Treasury Board in its dealings with us, or in its behaviour
towards us.
Collective Agreements are now firmly entrenched. The template has been adopted in practice for some
time and the core ingredients are common and commonly known. A unified approach to collective
bargaining and agreement on required changes / pursuits within and between the various Collective
Agreements should be made all the easier because of this.
Communications at all levels, but particularly with the membership, is weak. Web updates have
improved, but are far from adequate.
Too much control is vested in the staff lead negotiator, particularly in consideration of the inability of
this resource to share information from PIPSC HO and from other bargaining groups. The attempt at
member feedback through a survey, while a worthwhile initiative to enable proper planning of strategy,
was administered improperly, with too many questions as well as poorly structured questions. The
survey was ignored by the bargaining team in planning strategy. Elections at the Institute are preemptive to effective negotiations. The buzz, excitement and preoccupation of participants in elections,
supplants the Collective Bargaining process, which gets lost in the proceedings! This is true too of the
small 'p' politics prevalent in the Institute, which can interfere with sound Collective Bargaining
decisions. Last, but certainly not least, the PIPSC mentality around this round of negotiations
inexplicably devolved and went from '... not taking it' to 'get what you can get'. The employer would
surely have picked up on this, in philosophy and in practice, i.e. in our conduct.
Lessons Learned (In Dealing with the Employer)
We are unprepared in dealing with the Employer in as much as we are not even aware of the decision
making process across the Table. Beyond knowing that it is a top down process, we are unaware of the
decision points prevalent on the other side! It would be trite to say that all roads lead to the minister.
We are frustrated in dealing with the team assembled across the table, knowing that the puppet master
lurks somewhere further afield. Decision making authority is not resident with the team at the table.
The employer's negotiating stance is taken from a position of strength (Cabinet / Treasury Board
authority) and that imbues an attitude of superiority and arrogance. It is not unexpected or uncommon
that three (3) days of planned negotiations are relegated to a 15 minute session!
'Divide and Conquer" is a recognized strategy of the employer, of which we are fully aware, but for
which we fail to counter (in favour of autonomous bargaining and potential parochial gains)! The
employer is masterful at using other Collective Agreements for / as precedents setting. Early meetings,
prior to the end of existing Collective Agreements, while worthwhile, need to be formalized, e.g.
Treasury Board started the current round with a request for expedited bargaining. This was lost in
practice and lost in translation because it was not captured in formal correspondence.
Per the above example re expedited bargaining, it is clear that the employer speaks with a forked
tongue! This cries out for proper record keeping, thorough documentation, and frequent follow-up
correspondence between the negotiating parties. There is no place for prior conditions in collective
bargaining negotiations. The mere mention of "Severance must go" (from the employer) should have
been met with 'and so must we!" (from PIPSC).
Lessons Learned (At the Table)
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Staggered starts and sequencing among bargaining groups lead to: un-orchestrated activity; self
serving actions unique to a group or groups that can be, and generally are, counterproductive;
and precedent setting decisions / agreements that impact / impede other groups and can be
destructive overall;
Faint hope or hopeless demands, e.g. removing the word sexual from the term 'sexual
harassment' is a waste of time and energy. If government's position is established, as it is with
this example, why do we revisit it in each round of negotiations?
Demands previously lost should not be unrealistically resurrected, e.g. having lost the demand
to go from a 37.5 hour work week to a 36 hour work week, should question the reasonableness
of putting the demand back on the table, in a subsequent round of negotiations, at a lower
level, i.e. a demand for a 35 hour work week!
Revisiting successes previously won, should be resisted, e.g. Overtime and Call back was not an
AV issue and had been satisfactorily settled in the previous round. To reopen is to risk loss! This
is unnecessary, with no upside potential.
We too easily accept the inevitable. When it becomes clear that a decision will go the way of the
employer, we are inclined to accept it status quo with no attempt at massage or re-profile, e.g.
faced with 1.5% P.A. pay increase, we accepted the allocation of the 0.75% increment in the
prescribed formula {1.75%, 1.5%, 2.0%) rather than pursue a Present value argument (2.0%,
1.75%, 1.5%).
Priority demands should be achievable in direct correlation with the selection process for
priority demands, i.e. if there is limited scope to negotiate or limited probability to succeed, we
should more fully deliberate the merits of tabling the demands at issue, e.g. the 'PG correction'
stood little chance of succeeding and being corrected and consumed a disproportionate amount
of time and effort. Anticipated setbacks such as this should weigh into prioritization exercises.
The process is imbalanced and the employer (Treasury Board in our case) carries the balance of
power. The experience is that the employer can effect changes it wants, whereas we cannot!
'Dead time' resulting from the sporadic attendance of the employer could have been better
spent with better planned contingency, group meetings.
Recommendations
The following recommendations result from the foregoing lessons learned. Many of the shortcomings in
PIPSC conduct of Collective Bargaining can be corrected with few, albeit substantial changes, but taken
as a whole, the recommendations laid out here will have a significant impact on the Collective
Bargaining process and therefore on the beneficial outcomes of that process, to the betterment of the
membership. The potential for gains, in and through the changed processes being advocated here, fully
justify any By-Law changes that would be required. To think simply that our By-Laws do not permit suchor-such an action would be unproductive and unacceptable. While the following list may not always
state that topics are being presented as recommendations, each and every one is being put forward as a
recommendation. In its entirety, the following list represents the AV Group contribution to a Bargaining
Protocol for the Institute to implement as a Collective Bargaining agent.
1) Collective Bargaining strategies should accrue to and flow from a Strategic Plan. The Institute should
operate under the direction of a Strategic Plan for Collective Bargaining, in similar fashion to a business
operating under the direction of a business plan. The plan is of paramount importance and should not
be incorporated into any other worthwhile initiative, such as the Strategic Planning Committee, nor
should it be buried in the broad mandate of the Advisory Council.
2) The Strategic Plan should be a fulsome approach to collective bargaining and could include strategic
approaches such as a 'War Room' or central command centre with dedicated leadership and stand-alone
resources. Collective Bargaining is a fundamental mandate item requiring fundamental treatment.
3) Group autonomy undermines the effectiveness of 'Collective' Bargaining and must be corrected, (i) It
is recommended that central, core demands such as economic increases, be bargained centrally across
all groups. Groups would be free to bargain their unique or special demands, but even these would be
vetted through the centralized bargaining team before any conclusive decisions were taken, (ii) This is
seen to be such a fundamental requirement for successful negotiations that it recommended that
bargaining groups enter into a signed contractual agreement to abide by the Institutes strategic plan (as
proposed) and the terms as set out in this 'Stand Together" or 'unison' contract.
4) More cooperation and collegiality regarding Collective Bargaining is essential and a proper step in this
direction is the formation of a 'Group Presidents Committee'. Essential products of this essential
committee would be the sharing of information, the adoption of a common, one-for all-all-for-one
mentality and the implementation of a unified front in dealing with the employer. This Committee
would identify the central bargaining issues, would agree upon selective group issues that fall within the
singular domain of the respective groups and, as well, would agree upon any non central issues,
possessing common benefit that could be bargained centrally, as well.
5) The Institute needs to be more analytical and strategic in resource allocation. As an example, 4 time,
3-person changes in lead negotiators is unacceptable during the one round of negotiations.
6) The Institute needs to be more forthcoming and more prompt with back-up information that is
relevant to the core topics / demands being negotiated.
7) Collegiality and Collectivism requires that Negotiators be free to exchange information among
themselves and with their respective constituencies.
8) The Institute needs to enhance its training for Collective Bargaining members, including in-depth
training of the employer process, with its many foibles and structured decision points.
9) The Institute needs to be better at acclimatizing to the terms of engagement. We may be experts in
Collective Bargaining but the playing field is never constant and ever changing. If the employer is
disrespectful of due process, e.g. attending for 15 minutes during a schedule 3-day period, then we
should extend similar treatment or, failing that, we should be prepared to document the inappropriate
behaviour in writing, for posterity and for ancillary actions, e.g. filing a Bad Faith bargaining complaint.
10) The Institute needs to be more proactive and ardent in the pursuit of recourse available to it, e.g.
lodging Bad Faith bargaining complaints.
11) The Institute needs to limit the number of demands and needs to focus on achievable priorities and
practicable changes to the existing Collective Agreements.
12) Knowing that the employer uses Collective Agreements to set precedent, bargaining team(s)
therefore need to be more thoroughly knowledgeable of 'All' Collective Agreements, both for precedent
setting ourselves, as well as to tackle the precedents anticipated by and from the employer.
13) The Institute needs to be more strategic in its awareness of Employer tactics, e.g. revisiting contract
areas in which the employer may not have achieved its full aims in previous rounds, e.g. the tried and
true 'Divide and Conquer' routine (in dealing with disparate bargaining groups).
14) The Institute needs to be more versatile in accepting inevitable outcomes. The example cited here is
the reallocation of known monetary increases to take better advantage of the present value of the
agreed upon increases.
15) The Institute should better utilize the Better Management Practices of fellow unions. The Ontario
Teachers Union is 'seen' (very high profile) and seen to be, very productive. At the very least, we should
be interviewing them to learn their best practices, but more practically, our 'War room' personnel
should be associating with this successful brother, so as to adopt similar style and productivity.
16) Further to the preceding point, Collective Bargaining effectiveness should be a priority area in which
to look to the CLC for leadership and direction. The CLC experience, combined with its potential to
broker a 'Collegiality Agreement' (for want of a better term) among the bargaining groups at PIPSC,
should make this the central theme of our membership in that body.
17) The Institute needs to strengthen its communications with respect to Collective Bargaining.
Information circulars and web updates should be more frequent and more open. It is recognized that
other prying eyes are privy to this information, so an element of the Collective Bargaining strategic plan
should be to address the members need to know and right to receive informative situation updates,
against disclosure that may be too open to the public domain. A Communications expert would
contribute to this decision process.
18) A Public Media campaign, not unlike that of the Ontario Teachers union, would have the combined
effect of informing the public with a view to winning their hearts and minds, while at the same time
exerting indirect pressure on the employers, who no doubt value the opinion of the voting public more
so than that of the public service.
19) The Institute needs to provide stronger support to the efforts of its bargaining team(s) whatever that
reconstituted team(s) become/s going forward. This will inevitably mean vesting more ownership and
authority in the bargaining unit(s) (as opposed to its staff person). Ideally, group presidents would have
more authority and potentially as much potency as the PIPSC assigned negotiator.
20) The Institute needs to pay more credence to survey results.
21) The Institute needs to administer its surveys differently. The recommendation is to be less open
ended in the question format, and more pointed in surveying a set of strategic priorities and sensitive
topics, e.g. strike action, with set response ranges, from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'.
22) The Institute needs to plan its planning meetings better, so as to make better use of dead time
created by employer absences from the negotiating table.
23) Table-setting meetings, ideally as early as 1 year before the expiration of existing Collective
Agreements, should not only take place, but should be formalized in its administration. Correspondence
should flow and particularly Follow-up letters to each and every meeting, which address the respective
perspectives and understandings from the meeting in question Far less should be left to chance and far
less should be conducted informally-we know through hurtful experience where this leads.
24) All planning, including all bargaining conferences, should be open to all bargaining groups, until such
time as the 'All' becomes the 'One' (or at least the one platform)!
25) If PIPSC never manifests itself into a singular Bargaining unit, at least it can evolve into a 'Single
Platform' Bargaining Agent, with all Bargaining Groups negotiating from the same written platform. The
prototypical model for this is the hotel operators in the province of Quebec. In this early stage of next
round negotiation, it is recommended that PIPSC have one or more of its staff negotiators study the
Quebec hotel model and submit a report on his / their findings.
26) Steward Councils and Regional Councils fall under the purview of the Branch side of our house,
however, Collective Bargaining is the central theme for both sides of the house and having this subject
as a central theme for these councils, would help ensure grass roots involvement and is a sure way of
putting this vitally important topic back to the membership.
27) Another sure way to secure grass roots involvement is to engage the members in the regions in
which they live. It is recommended that Group executive meetings be conducted outside the adopted
triangle, so as to be able to use tools such as the 'Lunch and Learn' program to inform and to engage the
membership. This is another means of strengthening communications, referenced above.
28) A starting point in the Collective Bargaining renewal being advocated here is for the president of the
Institute to write the presidents of all groups and convene a meeting on this one topic, which would
hopefully include the recommendations of this report in the agenda.
29) To become truly and optimally effective in negotiating with the Government of Canada, all public
sector unions should be unified in their approach. To this end, it is recommended that the president of
PIPSC release a letter to the presidents of other public sector unions to set the course for a 'Collective'
approach to the next round of negotiations.
Conclusion
There is much reason for concern with respect to the PIPSC current process for Collective Bargaining.
This report has laid out many observations, as seen through the eyes of the AV Bargaining team, during
a very arduous and drawn-out round (2011 - 2012) with Treasury Board.
The report lays out a plethora of recommendations - all necessary and all constructive in building a
stronger platform for optimal collective bargaining. No attempt has been made to consolidate or to
categorize our recommendations. Little attempt has been made to prioritize our recommendations,
largely because of their self evident nature. There are, none-the-less, key subject areas that warrant
immediate attention.
Why have we forsaken the fundamental precept of 'Collective' Bargaining in favour of autonomous
bargaining, i.e. why have we divided ourselves for conquer?
Why is there a sense of disenfranchisement and a sense of impotent support from PIPSC HO, e.g. lead
negotiators inability to share information?
While the imbalance of power in dealing with the employer is somewhat to be expected, why do we
ourselves exaggerate it, through our laid back approach, e.g. the employer's tactics and strategy are
clearly top down, while PIPSC's are bottom up and carved at the negotiating table (reactionary) and fed
by a members' survey (oftentimes dysfunctional or impractical)?
In attempting to answer these questions, the compelling need to approach collective bargaining
differently, becomes more obvious. The need to be more strategic! The need to be more concerted! The
need to be more resourceful! The need to be more supportive! The need to be more strident! And so
on... but more so than anything, perhaps, the need to be more 'Collective'!