Is Kyrgyzstan’s New Political System Sustainable?
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 210
July 2012
Shairbek Juraev
American University of Central Asia (Bishkek)
Speaking in July 2011 on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of Kyrgyzstan’s new
constitution, then-President Roza Otunbaeva declared that the key task for the Kyrgyz
citizenry was “to make a return to authoritarianism impossible.” Her comment
conveyed both a celebratory note about the eradication of the previous authoritarian
regime and pointed to the key threat going forward.
A multiparty parliament, a three-party coalition government, and a divided
executive with a significantly weakened presidency are the main features of
Kyrgyzstan’s new political system, now two years old. It is a set-up that the authorities
boldly call parliamentary rule. The June 2010 referendum on the constitution and
parliamentary and presidential elections in October 2010 and October 2011 passed
peacefully (contrary to many predictions) and generated some cautiously positive
assessments.
In light of the forceful overthrows of recent Kyrgyz rulers, however, and in the
context of post-color revolution developments in Ukraine and Georgia, one may wonder
whether Bishkek has achieved an equilibrium that will last or whether it has merely
reached a temporary stage in a revolutionary/authoritarian cycle. Looking at certain key
political features such as political fragmentation and elite dynamics, this memo argues
that the current regime can best be characterized as one of “feckless pluralism” (to
borrow a term from expert Thomas Carothers) and that this system can endure.
The Arrival of “Parliamentary Rule” to Kyrgyzstan
In contrast to post-March 2005 developments, when the Tulip Revolution replaced
President Askar Akaev with Kurmanbek Bakiev, the interim government that came to
power in April 2010 claimed it would eradicate the institution of a strong president and
develop a “parliamentary” system of government. Amid explicit skepticism about the
idea, expressed by many including Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, the leader of
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the interim government, Roza Otunbaeva, claimed that parliamentary rule was the right
way to prevent the usurpation of power by future presidents.
The new constitution, adopted via national referendum in June 2010, does not set
up a parliamentary system of government per se, however. The president is popularly
elected and still enjoys certain important executive functions. Nonetheless, the new law
has introduced some important changes aimed at preventing the emergence of a
dominant single political group.
First, the president has lost certain politically important executive functions,
including the power to nominate, appoint, and dismiss the heads of local governments
or to have any decisive role in ministerial appointments. These powers now belong to
the parliament. Moreover, the president only serves a single six-year term and must be
prepared to cooperate with a multiparty government. The president is still responsible
for national security, but he or she is expected to have a minimal role in economic issues
and a fairly limited role in foreign policymaking.
Second, the new constitution introduces a controversial clause forbidding any
political party from controlling more than 65 seats in the 120-seat parliament. While
potentially discriminatory, this emerged as a precautionary measure to prevent a socalled “party of power,” like Bakiev’s Ak Zhol (White Path) party, from monopolizing
control in the parliament in a manner similar to Russia’s United Russia or Kazakhstan’s
Nur Otan (Light of the Fatherland).
The October 2010 parliamentary elections provided a stark illustration of the
significance of the changed rules of the game. In contrast to the 2007 elections, when Ak
Zhol gained over 78 percent of the seats, this time five parties passed the electoral
threshold with a relatively even distribution of seats. The new system required a
coalition of no less than three of the five parties to create a majority (see Table 1). This
proved to be a challenging task. The initial coalition, consisting of the Social Democratic
party, the Ata-Meken (Fatherland) socialist party (both were active in the April 2010
mobilization), and the Respublika party, failed the system’s first test when some coalition
members defected during the voting process for the position of parliamentary speaker.
While this was a bad omen for the new system, the next coalition, with the Ata Jurt
(Fatherland) party replacing Ata Meken, created a strange, but apparently more
accommodating, mixture of parties that survived until late 2011.
The October 2011 presidential elections were the last step in legitimizing the new
political structure. With over 80 candidates initially registered, the main political
competition was between then-Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev and two rivals,
Adakhan Madumarov (Butun/United) and Kamchybek Tashiev (Ata Jurt). The
campaign offered up a contest along various dimensions: 1) preference for
parliamentary rule vs. a strong presidency, 2) the April 2010 winners vs. members of the
previous regime, and no less important, 3) northern vs. southern elite groups. In the
context of the April and June 2010 violence, many warned about a possible escalation of
the situation, especially in case of a second round of elections.
Despite these concerns, Atambaev won in the first round with 62 percent of the
vote, and virtually no public protests followed. Atambaev’s Social Democratic party
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immediately departed the parliamentary coalition, forcing its collapse. In its wake, a
new coalition was created that included four parties and excluded the main
“troublemaker,” Ata Jurt. The leader of the Respublika party, Omurbek Babanov, was
elected prime minister, in exchange for supporting Atambaev during the election
campaign.
The Pillars of Pluralism
The eradication of a strong presidency and the monopoly of a single group over political
power thus appears to have been well achieved. However, given the twists in the
political system of Kyrgyzstan over the past 20 years (and seeing processes currently at
work in Ukraine), one wonders how sustainable the current political system really is.
While forecasting is risky, one can reach some tentative conclusions by analyzing the
factors that support the current arrangement. Two in particular seem to feed the division
of power: social and political fragmentation and the interests of predatory political and
business elites.
One kind of fragmentation is evident through the strong ties that exist between
particular political leaders and their local constituencies. As political scientist Scott
Radnitz argued to explain the 2005 Tulip Revolution, under conditions of weak state
capacity, political and business elites maintain close clientelistic relationships with
particular localities (often their hometowns as well as electoral districts), eroding the
authority of formal state institutions. While some specifics of that 2005 situation no
longer apply, such as the majoritarian system of electing parliamentary deputies,
political elite connections to particular localities remain salient. As the 2010 elections
demonstrate, Kyrgyz parties continue to rely on particular party members’ work at the
local level to mobilize votes.1 In recent local elections, there was high competitiveness in
several towns, such as Osh and Balykchy, with no parties winning a majority, and local
parties successfully competed against national party organizations.
Another dimension of Kyrgyzstan’s political fragmentation is regional. While
generally considered highly sensitive and politicized, regional differences in voting
behavior provide interesting data. In parliamentary elections, the Ata Jurt party received
between 20-30 percent of the votes cast in southern regions (Batken, Osh, and Jalalabad),
but just 3-6 percent of votes cast in northern ones. In presidential elections, Almazbek
Atambaev received a full 80-94 percent of the votes in northern areas but only 29-44
percent in southern ones. The divide does not only run north-south. The Ar Namys
(Dignity) party received between 20-28 percent in Bishkek, Chuy region, and the city of
Osh, but just 4-6 percent in Naryn, Talas, and Batken. This may indicate an urbanrural divide and/or degree of ethnic homogeneity within populations.
The second factor that feeds the division of power into multiple centers is the
nature of the current political elite. The post-Soviet political elite in Kyrgyzstan
developed into a large predatory group that views the state primarily as a tool for
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This is best illustrated by the efforts of some party leaders to distribute parliament seats among members
based on votes collected in respective localities.
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private enrichment. Political scientist Johan Engvall has described the state as an
investment market, in which posts can be bought and sold. With severely limited state
resources and a large number of diverse elite groups who have tasted power in the past,
it is highly challenging for a president to safely manage resource distribution, as political
scientist Eric McGlinchey has illustrated in an analysis of the regime overthrow in 2010.
The efforts of both Akaev and Bakiev to create single pro-presidential parties left
important and powerful actors outside the “state” system, leading to the March 2005
and April 2010 events. The current multiparty parliament and coalition government, in
this context, appear to be an optimal solution for providing the largest possible number
of elites with some access to the “cake” (state resources). As observers have noted,
members of the current coalition government may have few agreements on policy issues
but this has not stopped them from agreeing on the distribution of positions, which so
far has been sufficient to maintain balance.
Conclusion
A political system that permits pluralism and political competition appears to be a good
match for Kyrgyzstan’s highly fragmented society. In turn, empowering fragmented
local elites is an important barrier against the monopolization of power within a single
center. Such a system may also create a more agreeable balance of power between
various political groups struggling for resources and reduce incentives for radical
change. It is still too early to make decisive assertions, but the factors discussed above
should remain salient barriers against a strongly consolidated system of authoritarian
rule. The past two rounds of regime change (2005 and 2010) are strong evidence of this.
However, there could still be setbacks. A deterioration of the socioeconomic
situation coupled with poor government performance could potentially erode support
for pluralism among the majority of society and/or create conditions conducive for a
reshaping of the regime. Also possible is the gradual strengthening of one political party
at the expense of others, which may eventually result in constitutional reversions,
similar to the situation in today’s Ukraine. In the end, there are also signs that the
current system is not really strengthening the rule of law or government accountability.
Kyrgyzstan’s pluralist system thus remains a rather “feckless” form of democratization.
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Table 1. Parties in Parliament (including the coalitions they have been a part of since
October 2010)
Party, Leader
Ata Jurt (Fatherland)
Kamchybek Tashiev
Social Democratic
Almazbek Atambaev
Ar Namys (Dignity)
Feliks Kulov
Respublika
Omurbek Babanov
Ata Meken (Fatherland)
Omurbek Tekebaev
Role in April 2010 events
Not active in April events; known for
ethno-nationalist claims and strong
support base in southern Kyrgyzstan;
often accused of links to Bakiev clan
and labeled as “revanchists”
Active
in
April
events;
active
opposition to Bakiev’s rule in the
parliament;
interim
president
Otunbaeva was a member
Not active in April events; strongly
supported by the Russian media on the
eve of elections; received most votes in
areas with significant ethnic minorities
Not active in April events; created after
April events; often referred to as a
party
of
oligarchs/businessmen;
includes many leaders of Ak Zhol
(Bakiev)
Active in April events; one of oldest
opposition parties; heavily attacked by
the Russian media on the eve of
elections
Total
Number of seats
28
(II)
26
(I, II, III)
25
(III)
23
(I, II, III)
18
(I, III)
120
© PONARS Eurasia 2012. The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. This publication was
made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely
the responsibility of the author.
www.ponarseurasia.org
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