TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN WEST AFRICA :
ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARM CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
Rt. Lt-Col. Seth Ohene-Asare | Félix Aklavon | Théonas Moussou | Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe
UNREC
TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN WEST AFRICA :
ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARM CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
Editors
Simon Asoba
Rodger Glokpor
Authors of Country Reports:
Ghana, Rt. Lt-Col. Seth Ohene-Asare
Togo, Félix Aklavon
Bénin, Théonas Moussou
Nigeria, Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe
First Edition
Abuja December 2014
Editorial Team
Simon Asoba
Roger Glokpor
Colby Goodman
Karl Wagner
Christina Arabia
Nancy Mua Nsih
Design and Layout:
Samson Nnah, [email protected]
Printed by Single Vision Limited, Abuja, Nigeria
[email protected]
© Copyright with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or recording current
known or later invented without prior approval of the holders of the copyrights. Short
excerpts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged. The views
expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and are in no way an official
position of the institutions that commissioned the studies.
ISBN: 978 - 978 - 944 - 801 - 4
V
Table of Content
About the Authors
VII
Preface
Introduction
VIII
X
Part One: Summary of Results and Recommendations
1
Origin of Illicit SALW
1
Internal and External illicit SALW Trade Routes
1
Illicit SALW concealment tactics
1
Status of Craft Production of SALW
2
Types of the most trafficked SALW
2
correlation between armed violence and illicit SALW trade
Demand Factors for SALW
3
The challenges faced by the government in controlling the illicit
trade of SALW
3
Part Two: Country studies on routes and illicit arms caches
between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria
5
A - Routes and Illegal Arms Caches in Ghana
6
Chapter 1: Background and Problem of SALW in Ghana
6
Chapter 2: Research Approach and Methodology
13
Chapter 3: Observations on the Study and Results
21
Chapter 4: Availability of Small arms and Light Weapons
29
Chapter 5: Local Craft Manufacture by Blacksmiths
35
Chapter 6: Ghana Legislation on Small Arms and Light Weapons
39
Chapter 7: Recommendations
43
B - Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Togo
47
Introduction
51
I - Background and Justification of Study
51
VI
II- Methodological Framework
53
III-Presentation and Interpretation of Data
57
Conclusion and Recommendations
65
C - Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Benin
67
Introduction
71
I - Background
70
II- Methodology for the Study
71
III-Presentation and Interpretation of Results
81
IV-Way Forward and Recommendations
84
Conclusion
88
D. Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Nigeria
91
Executive summary
95
Introduction
96
I- Methodology
99
II- Proliferation and ownership structure
102
III- Sources of SALW
103
IV- Patterns and dynamics of salw trafficking
110
V- Regulatory frameworks
116
VI- Findings
VII- Recommendations
119
120
Conclusion
122
VII
About the Authors
Rt. Lt. Col. Seth Ohene-Asare is Chairman of the National Commission on Small
Arms Ghana since August 2009. In this capacity, he oversaw a team of the
commission that conducted this study. He was for several years an instructor in the
Ghana Army, and has held numerous leadership positions including Director of
Security Services.
Félix Kokou H. Aklavon is an independent consultant on small arms. He was a
former Vice-Chairman of WANEP TOGO (West African Network for Peacebuilding),
Chairman of the Action Network on Small Arms (RASALT), Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the National Association of Civil Society Organisations Togo (CNSC) and is
currently a member of the International Advisory Committee of the International
Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).
Théonas Moussou, a graduate of Political Science, is an independent consultant on
human rights and development issues. He has conducted several field studies
including the study on improving techniques for the clearing of mines,
decontamination, and destruction of SALW.
Prof. Augustine O. Ikelegbe teaches Public Comparative Politics at the University of
Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. He has several publications to his credit on militia and selfdefence groups and the scourge of siphoning oil in Nigeria.
VIII
Preface
Dear reader, no doubt you are so used to reading several reports on the now common
subject of small arms and light weapons that you are inclined to consider this
document as yet another one!
We¹ have pledged to overcome this indifference, and to renew your interest in the
current realities of this global problem of collective security which fosters terrorism
and organised crime. The study in your hands tackles the problem from a new angle: a
surgical operation into the heart of the network of circulation of SALW in West Africa.
Rather than reading another negative account of the consequences of the
proliferation and circulation of illicit small arms, you will embark on a trip along the
routes of the traffickers and into the caches of the artisanal manufacturer who is
becoming increasingly ingenious; you will see first-hand the strategies arms
smugglers use to hide their weapons; you will experience what is known as “porous
borders” and the poor border control services; finally, and without being exhaustive,
you will experience some of the motivations driving illicit arms trafficking.
The circulation and manufacture of illicit SALW is as much a source of livelihood for
ordinary citizens as it is the cause of much blood shedding and bereavement for
several others. Somewhat regrettably, our resources do not allow us to extend the
scope of our study beyond four neighbouring countries in West Africa - Ghana, Togo,
Benin and Nigeria. The facts described below, however, may very well reflect the
situation all over the sub-region.
1. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC) jointly commissioned the “Study on Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Illicit Routes and Caches
between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria”.
Ÿ
UNREC was created by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution A/res/40/151/G) and estab-lished
since 1986 in Lomé, Togo, with the mandate to “provide, upon request, substantive support for ini-tiatives
and other efforts of Member States of the African region towards the realization of measures of peace,
arms limitations and disarmament in the region” www.unrec.org for more details.
Ÿ
FES, a German political foundation committed to social democratic values, was established in 1925 and has
more than one hundred offices all over the world. The Abuja office, in charge of the “West Africa Security
Policy Project” is working to strengthen the interface between democracy and security policy. Thus it
facilitates policy dialogue platforms on threats to security and their responses Cf.
www.fes-westafrica.org for more details.
IX
At the end of this expedition, you may very well arrive at the same observations and
recommendations as the authors of the four country reports: the social tragedy of
arms trafficking is no doubt complex and disturbing but far from being irremediable
and desperate. With a measure of political will, internal organization and
international cooperation, if member States take realistic measures within their
sovereign powers and their international commitments in the area of arms control,
they can overcome or at least reduce illegal arms smuggling significantly.
Dear reader, this report was compiled at the end of a long process, with the
contributions and assistance of several actors, to whom we are deeply grateful. We
hope you will derive as much pleasure as lessons to build your capacity, harmonize
and coordinate your efforts with those of all those who are working to prevent,
combat and eliminate the proliferation and circulation of illicit small arms and light
weapons in West Africa.
Marco Kalbusch,
Director, UNREC,
Lomé, Togo
Felix Henkel,
Coordinator, FES
Regional Office, Abuja, Nigeria
X
Introduction
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) between Benin, Ghana,
Nigeria and Togo has been considerable for some time². Although in recent times the
security situation in the Sahel and the diversion of modern weapons from the Libyan
State's stocks and its consequences to peace and security in the Sahel have
dominated the discussions in West Africa, the proliferation of locally crafted weapons
throughout the Gulf of Guinea States has featured just as prominently.
The illicit trade in weapons between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo is fuelled by
more demand by the people for self-protection, as a result of the feeling of insecurity
throughout the region³. This regional demand is being met by forgers principally in
Ghana but also in Togo, whose local revolvers, shot guns and rifle type weapons flood
the arms markets of the sub-region.
Ghana has had a traditional weapons industry since pre-colonial days, when locally
produced weapons were sold to slave traders and raiders. However the arms industry
was criminalized under the successive Danish and then British colonial authorities
who saw the local arms industry as a threat to colonial power. Production has since
become more informal, with the national legislation of Ghana heavily regulating the
industry and driving it further underground. Independence presented new
opportunities for Ghanaian producers. As the political and economic situation
improved, the market for more reliable or sophisticated weapons flourished.
Ghanaian gunsmiths have been producing ever more reliable arms in response to
market demands. This enhanced technical skill was sought after by Togolese
gunsmiths during the political instability of 2005.
Following the death in 2005 of President Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, political
instability ensued between Togo's security forces and the opposition, usually taking
the form of armed violence. Consequently, the Togolese public's need for arms was
more than Ghanaian forgers could meet. They therefore provided technical support
2. Florquin, Nicolas and Berman, Eric G.(eds) “Armed and Aimless: ARMED GROUPS, GUNS, AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE
ECOWAS REGION”Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005
3. Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi in Florquin, Nicolas and Berman, Eric G.(eds) “Armed and Aimless: ARMED GROUPS, GUNS, AND
HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ECOWAS REGION”Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005, Pg 82
XI
and exchanges to Togolese forgers to enable them to produce enough arms to meet
local demand. However, the demand for SALW diminished with the restoration of
stability. Togolese forgers then turned their attention to West Africa's largest market,
Nigeria.
Prior to the onset of the current series of attacks by Boko Haram, the proliferation of
arms in Nigeria was encouraged by the instability on account of social-political
divisions, which in turn derived from continued ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflict.
Violence also played a part in struggles to gain political power or access to resources.
Despite the myriad political factors explaining the proliferation of arms in Nigeria,
national legislation regulating arms ownership does not provide for civilians to
possess arms under any circumstances. In 2007, the Small Arms Survey estimated that
between one and two million small arms where in circulation throughout Nigeria. Due
to the national legislation, most of these arms are procured and owned illegally.
Regardless of national legal limitations, socio-political tensions throughout the
country made ownership of illicit arms justifiable and worth the risk in the eyes of the
civilians.
Despite its democratic transition in 1991, Benin is considered a transit country for
arms coming from Ghana and Togo to Nigeria. There are concerns that some of these
trafficked arms remain in Benin and are implicated in highway robbery, but experts
insist that they are not sufficient to warrant serious attention.
This compilation of essays is written by arms control experts from Benin, Ghana,
Nigeria and Togo. The authors share their insights and personal analysis of the
prevailing arms trade situation within the sub- region, including the social factors that
contribute to this trafficking. They also describe the public perception of the arms
trade.
They give an overview of the physical and technical environment of these four
countries. He argues for greater regional integration of legislation with sub-regional
and international mechanisms as the best way to counter illicit arms flows and cross
border trade.
The in-depth country studies provide insight into the conditions within the countries.
Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe details the realities and social factors that make Nigeria the
end destination for arms. He maintains that social conflicts, youth marginalization
and high youth unemployment contribute to the demand for arms. He further argues
XII
that porous borders, weak law enforcement capacities and the current firearms
legislation facilitate the accumulation of SALW, including locally produced weapons
by non- State armed groups.
Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Seth Ohene-Asare reviews the production of craft weapons in Ghana
with particular focus on the northern regions where inter clan conflict drives the
demand for arms. In addition he mentions current trends fostering arms proliferation
in Ghana such as the rising demand for self-protection by the citizenry, and the need
for arms for traditional or customary use. Lastly he shows how porous borders aid the
eastward movement of arms produced in Ghana.
Théonas Moussou, provides insight into the production of craft arms in Benin, which
is slightly less than that of Ghana. He explains that even though a transit state, arms
coming in from Ghana, Togo and Nigeria meet the national demand, particularly for
criminal, hunting and traditional purposes.
Dr. Félix Aklavon comments on local production in Togo and how the secrecy
surrounding the profession of gunsmith hampers the efforts of the national
authorities to control the production and smuggling of arms eastwards to Benin and
on to Nigeria.
The four authors identify the same needs: updating national surveys on arms
ownership, instituting a national registration programme and maintaining a
database. Lastly they highlight the need to update existing firearms legislation in each
country and harmonize them with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms. This
collection of opinion pieces should contribute to current and future efforts by all
stakeholders to counter illicit arms trade between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.
This publication aims to contribute to the on-going debate in West Africa on illicit
cross border arms trade and also to alert the UN to the need for continued efforts by
all relevant actors to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects.
Summary of Results and Recommendations / 1
Summary of results of the Study and recommendations
The analysis of the field reports from the four countries highlighted eight key
elements: the origin of illicit SALW; internal and external illicit SALW trade routes; illicit
SALW concealment techniques; status of craft production of SALW; types of SALW
most trafficked; correlation between armed violence and illicit trade in SALW; SALW
demand factors; and finally the challenges facing the government in the control of
illicit trade in SALW. The analysis ends with some recommendations.
SUMMARY
1. The scope of the illicit trade in SALW
The survey was not able to provide exact figures on the average number of small arms
and light weapons in circulation between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, but the
four contributions are unanimous about the origin of arms found in illicit cross-border
trade.
These weapons are either produced by local artisans or smuggled or imported from
neighbouring countries. In addition, some tourist activities such as game hunting and
movement of businessmen tend to facilitate access to SALW.
It was also observed that arms sold come either from public stocks, or were lost,
misappropriated or stolen by defence and security officials. In Ghana and Nigeria, for
example, it was found that soldiers returning from international peacekeeping
operations sold the weapons given to them for their mission.
2. Internal and external illicit SALW trade routes
The routes most used by smugglers of SALW between Ghana, Togo, Benin and
Nigeria are the major border towns, forests, mountain areas, lakes, rivers, sea
(ports), and airports.
3. Illicit SALW concealment tactics
In investigating the mode of operation of SALW smugglers, the researchers were
particularly interested in the most common concealment techniques. The reports
showed that to go unnoticed, traffickers of illegal arms and ammunitions concealed
the weapons in jute bags, passenger vehicles, containers and shipments chartered by
national and international companies, diplomatic missions, government officials or
private individuals.
2 / Summary of Results and Recommendations
For their part, local manufacturers hide their weapons in the ceilings of their houses,
inside mattresses on their beds or in caches dug in the ground.
4. Status of craft production of SALW
The reports show that small-scale production of arms is officially authorized in the
four countries studied in this volume. Thus, several blacksmiths earn a living from their
craft and are registered as such. In Benin, for example, they are more than 350 craft
manufacturers, and subject to demand, the average production of a blacksmith is two
weapons per week. In Ghana, artisan manufacturers are found in all the ten
administrative regions; their expertise is sought in neighbouring countries.
The Ghana report reveals that 80% of the small arms used for criminal purposes are
manufactured by local craftsmen.
5. Types of most trafficked SALW
According to the reports, the illicit trade involves both craft and industrially
manufactured SALW. While the former are more common in Ghana, Togo and Benin,
industrially produced arms are in the majority in Nigeria.
The most trafficked local SALW are:
Handcrafted pistols;
Handcrafted hunting guns;
Handcrafted baikal hunting guns; and
Locally produced ammunition (cartridges, gunpowder, etc.).
The modern SALW most frequently seized from smugglers are:
Assault rifles AK-47, AKM, AR-70, Mag-4 and G3;
SMG rifles;
Light machine guns;
Shotguns;
The double-barrelled shotguns;
Revolvers;
Automatic pistols;
Grenade launchers RPG-7V1 Mukha 'Fly' type; and
Explosives such as dynamite, plastic explosives and grenades.
6. Correlation between armed violence and illicit trade in SALW
In their contributions, all four experts note that illicit trade in SALW fuels armed
violence in the countries studied. With access to illegal guns, crimes such as armed
robbery, physical assault and murder, as well as cases of minor delinquency are
recorded frequently in both urban and rural areas.
Summary of Results and Recommendations / 3
The general observation is that armed violence is growing exponentially with the illicit
trade in SALW.
7. Demand factors for SALW
The reports show that in Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria illicit small arms and light
weapons are needed mainly for hunting and farming, the need for self-protection
given the prevailing insecurity, criminal activities, some cultural and traditional
practices, and the activities of private militias and armed non-State groups.
8. The challenges faced by the government in controlling the illicit
trade of SALW
Having analysed the national responses to the trafficking of illicit SALW, the reports
noted the institutional and operational weaknesses that limit the effectiveness of
State action. Among these are:
§ the slow pace of legislative reforms and harmonization of national legislation to
control SALW;
§ inadequate border controls in terms of appropriate strategy, proper equipment
and qualified personnel;
§ poor data systems and inadequate tools for information gathering and sharing,
record keeping, identification and tracking of SALW; and
§ lack of operational coordination between key players involved in the fight against
the illicit trade.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The authors made recommendations aimed mainly at strengthening legal measures
as well as operational and technical capacity for SALW control. They include:
§ Safety and security of State depots and stockpiles of small arms and ammunition
by the national police, gendarmerie and defence services. This recommendation is
in strict conformity with the provisions of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW
(Article 16) and international standards, including the International Small Arms
Control Standards ISACS (05.20) on the management of stockpiles;
§ Collection, seizure and destruction of illegal small arms on the initiative of the
National Commissions on SALW, in collaboration with relevant national agencies
(security and defence forces, judiciary, civil society) and international partners,
particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Regional
4 / Summary of Results and Recommendations
Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC). This recommendation is
based on articles 17 and 23 of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW and
international standards, including the International Small Arms Control Standards
ISACS (05.50) on destruction of weapons;
§ Management of border security which should be modernized by the
Governments of the subregion under the leadership of ECOWAS. This
modernization will be based on a regional approach to border security, which will
define the thresholds of tolerance as well as adequate functions to achieve set
objectives. Several provisions of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW, including
those dealing with marking and tracing (articles18 and 19), brokering (article 20),
harmonization of legislation (art. 21) and the strengthening of border controls
(article 22) provide the legal basis for government action in this direction.
In summary, the illicit trade in SALW as described by the authors is not limited to the
four countries of Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. It goes far beyond. A broader study
could help to track illicit trade routes more comprehensively and further elucidate the
networks of actors. Moreover, illegal trade continues to fuel the uncontrolled
proliferation of illicit SALW, the misuse of which poses a serious threat to security and
development in the countries studied and in the entire sub-region. All this
underscores the need to eradicate the illicit trade in all its forms. The recommendations proposed to this end emphasize the importance of implementing regional and
international instruments and initiatives adopted to curb illegal arms transfers, such
as:
§ The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit
§
§
§
§
§
§
Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(2000);
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects (2001);
UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their
Parts and Components and Ammunition (2005);
The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition
and Other Related Materials (2006);
African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and
Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (2011); and
Arms Trade Treaty (2013).
PART TWO
Country studies on routes and illicit arms caches
between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria
ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARMS CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
THE SITUATION IN GHANA
Coordination:
Lt. Col (Rtd) Seth Ohene-Asare
with the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms, NACSA Team
Table of Content /THE SITUATION IN GHANA / 7
Table of Content
ABBREVIATIONS
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
10
1. INTRODUCTION
11
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
13
2. 1 . Field Visits
13
2.1.1 Interviews
13
2.1.2 Focus discussion groups
13
2.2 The Selection of Sites and Respondents
14
2.2.1 Selection Criteria for Towns and Communities:
14
2.2.2 Selection Criteria for Organizations, Institutions, and Individuals:
14
2.3 Document review and data collection
2.4 Limitations of the study
15
19
2.4.1 Research Constraints
19
2.4.2 Challenges to Information Gathering
20
3. SOURCES OF SALW IN GHANA
21
3.1 Illicit SALW in Ghana
3.2 Illicit local manufacture by blacksmiths
21
23
3.2.1 The Situation of Illicit Production of Arms in Ghana
26
3.2.2 Policies to Limit the Number Illicit Local Producers
28
4. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW FLOWS
29
4.1 Trafficking Routes of illicit SALW
4.2 Mode of Trafficking
29
32
5. GUN CRIMES IN GHANA
35
5.1 Armed Robbery
35
5.2 Murder
37
8 / Table of Content
6. SALW LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
39
6.1 Background
39
6.1.1 The Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972, NRCD 9
39
6.1.2 Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L.I.200
40
6.2 Enactments citing Arms and Ammunitions in Ghana
41
6.3 weaknesses in the current Ghanaian legislation
41
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
43
7.1. General
7.2 Mechanisms for Small Arms Control
43
43
7.3 Necessary Laws to address the legislative deficit
44
8. CONCLUSION
45
REFERENCES
46
Abbreviations / 9
Abbreviations
BNI
Bureau of National Investigation
CEPS
Customs Excise and Preventive Service
CSO
Civil Society Organisation
ECOSAP
ECOWAS Small arms Control Programme
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
FES
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FGD
Focus group discussions
GAFS
Ghana Armed Forces
GIS
Ghana Immigration Service
GNPC
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation
GPRTU
Ghana Private Road Transport Union
GSGDA
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
NADMO
National Disaster Management Organization
NASCA
National Commission on Small Arms
NPoA
National Programme of Action on Small Arms
RCC
Regional Co-ordinating Council
SACP
Small Arms Control Project
SALW
Small Arms and Light Weapons
UNHCR
United Nations High Commission on Refugees
WR
Western Region
WRHC
Western Regional House of Chiefs
10 / Executive Summary
Executive Summary
West Africa has witnessed prolonged armed conflict over the last two decades and
as a result, the region has an estimated seven to ten million illicit small arms and light
weapons (SALW) in circulation in West Africa (Small Arms Survey 2007). SALW
circulate within the sub-region through porous international borders and are used
to facilitate criminal activi-ties such as robbery, money laundering, drug trafficking,
and other violent acts. Even though Ghana is generally peaceful, there remain
numerous chieftaincies, land and other resource related disputes across the country,
which disturbs the country’s peace and se-curity. These conflicts thrive and are
prolonged by the easy availability of illicit SALW.
In view of the above challenges and more, the Ghana National Commission on Small
Arms, in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and
Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) conducted this
research on arms trafficking in Ghana.
The research team conducted numerous field visits to towns and communities
selected based on their relevance to illicit SALW issues. The field visits included onsite inspections, interviews, focus groups discussions, data collection, and follow-up
surveys. Additionally, the team carried out an extensive desk review to supplement
and verify the primary data.
The study reveals that illicit manufacture of artisanal weapons is a major factor that
ac-counts for the illicit proliferation of small arms in Ghana in particular, and within
the West African Sub-region in general. These weapons move out of Ghana to the
neighbouring countries while industrial weapons move from countries in the region
into Ghana. Wide and porous borders with numerous unauthorized routes make it
extremely difficult for security agencies at border posts to effectively check arms
trafficking. Many personnel of the security agencies lack the necessary capacities
and equipment to effectively monitor and clamp down on the activities of arms
traffickers. Additionally, corruption and bribery amongst security officials facilitates
illicit SALW flows. This reason, coupled with inefficient legislation has led to many
legal arms being diverted to illicit circulation.
Without effective legislation and security mechanisms the trafficking and
production of illicit arms will continue unabated in Ghana further destabilizing
conflicts within the coun-try and in the West African sub-region.
Introduction / 11
Introduction
Ghana is often described as a relatively peaceful country, though it is arguably
bedevilled with pockets of conflicts, armed violence, and other social problems that
give rise to the high demand for small arms. Similarly, the proliferation and easy
availability of small arms in Ghana has facilitated armed violence and other forms of
criminal activity. These developments coupled with the instability in the sub-region
and the potential of resource conflicts with oil recently discovered in the Western
Region are issues of concern because of their ultimate impact on peace, security,
and development.
Many people in Ghana often acquire arms illegally for several reasons. In conflict
prone areas, especially in the Northern and North-eastern parts of Ghana, some
people acquire arms as a means to protect themselves in the event of attack. Others
use arms to commit crimes such as robbery. Guns also feature prominently in the
socio-cultural rights of Ghanaians. Arms are used to mark special occasions such as
festivals, funerals of eminent personalities, and rituals such as the installation of a
new chief.
Among some cultures like the Akan, Gonja, and Dagombas ethnic groups, owning a
gun is a sign of attainment to manhood. Among the Gonja of Northern Ghana, a
gun is fired when a male child is born. In almost all of the Ghanaian festive occasions
guns are fired as part of the celebration. The death of prominent persons like chiefs
is announced with the firing of guns. In some parts of the Northern and the Upper
East and West Regions, guns are fired to announce the marking of long-standing
funerals.
The true magnitude of small arms availability and the main sources of these
weapons in Ghana are not accurately quantified and thus, many of the effects are
difficult to measure. There is no dispute, however, that small arms have had a
devastating effect on the development, governance, and the everyday lives of
Ghanaians. In the absence of any empirical data on the actual flow of arms and the
analysis on the conditions that facilitate this phenomenon, no concrete or decisive
legislative action can be enacted to fight effectively against this scourge.
The porous nature of the country's international borders presents a significant
challenge in the fight against the proliferation of small arms. Frontline security
personnel such as personnel of the Ghana Immigration Service who man the
12 / Introduction
country's borders are ill-resourced and have limited capacity to effectively check
illicit trafficking of arms across borders in an era where illicit arms traffickers have
become more sophisticated. Ghana is surrounded by countries such as Côte
d'Ivoire, Togo, and Burkina Faso, which have in one way or the other experienced
armed conflict or mutiny. Since people of the various countries are interrelated
especially along border communities and are only separated by imaginary artificial
borders, the spill over of arms into Ghana remains a difficult challenge.
The study, therefore, investigates the phenomenon of illicit arms proliferation in
Ghana, with particular emphasis on the local craft production of arms and use of
illicit SALW. The report begins with the main objectives of the study followed by the
methodology section, which outlines the different means by which the research
team obtained their data as well as challenges and constraints they were faced with.
Thereafter, the report goes into depth on the observations and findings of the
research team beginning with the sources of illicit SALW in Ghana and with a major
focus on local weapon production and alternative livelihood schemes for current
blacksmiths. The report also examines the routes and modes of SALW trafficking as
well as the role of illicit SALW in armed violence in the country. The report discusses
current legislation and mechanisms for SALW control as well as their weaknesses.
Finally the report identifies factors in which the Government of Ghana could put in
place to improve upon for prevention and the fight against the illegal trafficking of
SALW in Ghana.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
2.1 Field Visits
During field visits the team conducted personal interviews with security personnel,
heads of relevant institutions, chiefs, blacksmiths, arms dealers, convicts, opinion
leaders, frontline agents, and civil society organizations (CSOs) at the Eastern
Frontier border towns namely: Aflao, Akanu, Nyive, Leklebi, Nkwanta, Alavanyo,
Nkonya, Ho, Kpando, Hohoe, Tamale, Bolgatanga, Yendi , Bawku, and ZabzuguTatale. The team also conducted personal interviews in the Greater Accra Region,
Tema Harbour, and the Kotoka International Airport. In each town focus group
discussions or interviews were conducted with selected groups of people and
blacksmiths.
The team carried out on-site inspections and photo documentation of certain
locations in the communities, including the areas of alleged active illegal
manufacture of arms such as the Alavanyo and Nkonya area.
Research Methodology and Approach / 13
After gathering data the research team visited the agencies again to verify the
information obtained or observed by the team. This was done to ensure that the
data collected was of utmost integrity.
The team also gathered and consulted available statistics from relevant government
agencies such as arms related crime and weapon seizure data from the Ghana Police
Service, Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Ghana Immigration Service,
and the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms.
2.1.1 Interviews
Interviews were conducted during field visits to organizations, institutions, towns,
and communities as well as desk-based (telephone) interviews. The team consulted
over 100 individuals, organizations, and institutions selected on the basis of their
knowledge, participation, and experience in SALW issues, political and chieftaincy
roles, and the general residents of the study area (See Table 1). The study focused on
people's awareness and knowledge of the incidence of the use and trafficking of
SALW.
2.1.2 Focus Group Discussions (FGD)
The FGD method proved especially useful with local blacksmiths in the communities
where they were willing to share their experiences and knowledge of SALW and the
general socio-economic activities in the study area. The focus group sessions were
facilitated by the study team with a set of key discussion points.
FGD with security personnel, heads of relevant Institutions, chiefs, blacksmiths,
arms dealers, convicts, opinion leaders, frontline agents, CSOs, youth groups,
farmers, community leaders, informants, and inhabitants in the towns along the
Eastern and North Eastern border frontiers allowed the research team to delve into
the relevant issues in considerable depth.
The FDGs, just like the individual interviews, allowed for issues to be explored in
considerable depth from first-hand knowledge. In all, the team conducted 10 FGDs
with 20 institutions and organizations including CSOs in particular.
14 / Research Methodology and Approach
[Figure 1: Focus group discussion with Officials at the Border]
To gather further information from those not interviewed by the team, a semistructured questionnaire was distributed from the research consultants.
2.2 The Selection of Sites and Respondents
The selection of towns, communities, organizations, and institutions in the study
area was a critical step in the study; thus, a purposive sampling method was used to
select the communities and organizations from which information was gathered.
The criteria below were used for the purposive sampling:
2.2.1 Selection Criteria for Towns and Communities:
•
Presence of corporate and institutional offices
•
Border towns
•
Presence of arms dealers
•
Presence of Ghana Police Service Arms Clerks
•
Known activities of illegal arms manufacturing
•
Reported cases of SALW related incidences
•
Known cases of armed conflicts
•
Location of blacksmith
2.2.2 Selection Criteria for Organizations, Institutions, and Individuals:
•
Role of institution in relation to SALW
•
Chieftaincy institution
•
Political role or administration in the study area
•
Civil society organizations
•
Past and present dealings with the National Commission on Small Arms
Research Methodology and Approach / 15
2.3 Document Review and Data Collection
The study team reviewed documentation received from the project consultants,
experts on SALW in Ghana and the ECOWAS sub-region, as well as reports and
articles obtained from newspapers and internet searches. The primary materials
gathered during field visits were used to supplement this documentation. The
research also utilized a large number of secondary sources including past
documentation on SALW and mission reports and reviews from different
organisations. In addition to the general document review, the study team
undertook a separate desk review focused on the experience of borders areas in the
east in terms of reported and documented incidences of violent crime involving
SALW.
Table 1: Individuals, Places and Institutions Visited
Cities/Towns/
Communities
Aflao
Nkwanta
Institution/Organization/Individuals Contacted
Arms Dealers
Ghana Police Service
Assembly Members for the area
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigations
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Armed Forces (Military Intelligence)
Ghana Immigration Service
Informants
Inhabitants at the Border Towns
Local transport Services Operators
National Security Council
Police Arms Clerks
Suspects involved in arms related crimes
Bureau of National Investigation, BNI
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service, GIS
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at the Border Towns
16 / Research Methodology and Approach
Nyive
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigation, BNI
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service, GIS
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at the Border Towns
Opinion Leaders
Akanu
Bureau of National Investigation, BNI
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service, GIS
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at the Border Towns
Ho
Arms Dealers
Assembly Members for the area
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigations
Chiefs and Opinion Leaders
Civil Society Organizations
Convicts
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Armed Forces (Military Intelligence)
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Police Service
Informants
Inhabitants
Local transport Services
National Security Council
Operators
Police Arms Clerks
Suspects involved in arms related crimes
Youth groups
Research Methodology and Approach / 17
Shia
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigations
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at border towns
Opinion Leaders
Honuta
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigations
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at border towns
Opinion Leaders
Lekelebi Dafour
Blacksmiths
Bureau of National Investigations
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Police Service
Inhabitants at border towns
Opinion Leaders
Alavanyo
Hohoe
Blacksmiths
Chief and Elders
Ghana Police Service
Women assembly
Arms Clerks
Arms Dealers
Blacksmiths Farmers
Ghana Police Service
Informants
Opinion Leaders
18 / Research Methodology and Approach
Nkonya
Blacksmiths Farmers
Ghana Police Service
Informants
Opinion Leaders
Accra
Arms Dealers
Bureau of National Investigations
Headquarters
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Convicts
Ghana Armed Forces Headquarters
Ghana Immigration Service Headquarters
Ghana National Commission on Small Arms
Ghana Police Service Headquarters
Ghana Police Service Regional Headquarters
Headquarters
Informants
Ministry of the Interior Arms and
Ammunitions Desk
National Security Council Secretariat
Police Arms Clerks
Suspects involved in arms related crimes
Kotoka
International
Airport
Aviation Security
Bureau of National Investigations
CEPS Clearing agents
Customs Excise and Preventive Service,
Ghana Armed Forces
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Police Service
National Security Council
Tema Harbour
Bureau of National Investigations
Clearing agents
Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS
Ghana Police Service Tema Regional
Headquarters
Ghana Armed Forces
Ghana Immigration Service
Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority Security
Informants
National Security Council
Research Methodology and Approach / 19
Tamale
Ghana Police Service Tamale Regional
Headquarters
Informants
Yendi
Ghana Police Service
Informants
Bawku
Ghana Police Service, Bawku Divisional
Command
Zabzugu-Tatale
Customs Excise and Preventive Service Ghana
Immigration Service
Bolga
Ghana Police Service, Regional Headquarters
Cenkasse
(Polimakom
Border Post)
Customs Excise and Preventive Service
Ghana Immigration Service
Informants
2.4 Limitations of the Study
2.4.1 Research Constraints
Most respondents required notification in advance prior to their scheduled
interviews to enable them to prepare adequately. The semi-structured
questionnaires were developed and sent ahead by the projects operational team to
community focal points, however, in some towns they were not widely circulated
and thus were not completed by all the relevant individuals. The translation of the
questionnaire from English to local languages also proved problematic as some of
the statements were difficult to understand and required further explanation to be
completed effectively.
In some of the towns visited the availability of key personnel was a challenge and in
others time constraints prevented visits; however, the number of communities
visited and the individual institutions and organizations interviewed formed a
representative sample for a meaningful conclusion to be drawn. Most people,
especially authority figures, were reluctant to speak openly once we introduced the
research team and the topic of research. This challenge was mitigated through
assurances that the information was for research purposes only and would not be
divulged without consent. Still most of the identified blacksmiths and arms dealers
20 / Research Methodology and Approach
were not willing to disclose critical information for fear of being identified.
Consequently, it took the team a great deal of time to assure the respondents and
get them to divulge the information required.
2.4.2 Challenges to Information Gathering
It seems common knowledge that blacksmiths and metal fabricators are abundant
in Alavanyo in the Volta Region and, as conversations with people in the community
revealed, they are very skilful and experienced. As a community they were aware
that it is known all over Ghana that there are skilful men in Alavanyo who can
manufacture weapons, however, only a few individuals publicly admitted to being
blacksmiths.
It was, therefore, extremely difficult to identify the blacksmiths and where they
operated. Based on the team's research and observations this difficulty stems from
the following:
•
First, most of the workshops in which they operated were destroyed as a result
of their role in a local conflict (the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict). The security
situation drove them underground making it difficult to trace any workshop in
any part of the community.
•
Second, due to the regular swoops by the military, blacksmiths have become
very vigilant because they are often time arrested. The community members,
therefore, regard anyone inquiring on the operations of blacksmiths as a spy or
national security agent. As a result, they are not willing to implicate any of their
relatives involved in the manufacture of SALW.
•
Third, there is some level of political undercurrent as the Alavanyo people
perceive the attempt to clamp down on illegal small arms a ploy to weaken
them in favour of their the Nkonyas. This is based on allegations that some
prominent Nkonya people are in the current government, which the Alavanyo
people suspect were influencing their opponents against them. The Alavanyo
have, thus, become very sceptical of anyone coming into the community.
Sources of SALW in Ghana
3. SOURCES OF SALW IN GHANA
The Ghana Baseline Assessment report on SALW points to the following as the main
sources of small arms proliferation: local blacksmiths engaged in the illegal
manufacture of small arms; gun trafficking and gun running which flourishes by
means of Ghana's porous borders; and leakages of legal arms from the armouries of
security agencies as a result of poor stockpile management and control.
The assessment also provides insight into the extent of Ghana's small arms problem.
The evidence shows that there are at least 220,000 small arms in civilian hands in
Ghana. Of these, at least 125,000 are illicit weapons, and 95,000 are currently
registered (Ghana SALW Baseline Survey 2004).
This baseline assessment of illicit small arms in Ghana conducted in 2004 by the
United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Ghana indicated
that about 34% of the illicit guns in circulation as of 2004 were illegally
manufactured locally. More recent statistics by the Ghana Police Service state that
local blacksmiths produce nearly 80% of the illicit guns in circulation4.
3.1 Illicit SALW in Ghana
The research team's assessment of illicit small arms in Ghana provided alarming
evidence regarding the leakages of arms into illegal hands. Many illegal weapons
were originally legal in Ghana but have crossed over into illicit circulation for a
number of reasons. Many civilians fail to reregister their weapons every year,
contributing to thousands of guns moving from the legal sphere into the illicit
market5. Oftentimes those with registered guns do not feel compelled to apply for
prompt renewal upon the expiry of their license. However, the intent is not always
malicious: some are not aware that a gun license must be renewed annually or that a
change of ownership requires new registration in the new owner's name.
There is also the issue of weapons being legally imported into Ghana and their
eventual end point. Legal annual shotgun imports in Ghana averages 20,000 units
and are dominated by seven major arms importers; however, there is a shortfall
between guns imported and those registered6. With weapons being imported but
4. Ghana Police Service
5. Ghana Police Service Firearms Bureau
6. Interview with an Informant at The Ministry of the Interior
/ 21
22 / Sources of SALW in Ghana
never registered, the question regarding the final destination of these weapons
arises. Some licensed arms dealers often under-report stocks with impunity as a
result of weak control by the government. For example, the police are supposed to
observe the receipt of arms imports and accompany the arms; however, the
performance of the critical oversight functions has become increasingly lax over the
years. As a result, undetermined quantities of recorded stock sometimes disappear
without a trace, indicating that undetermined quantities of arms are either
smuggled out of Ghana or sold without police involvement as required by law7.
Another source of illicit weapons is leakages from state-owned stockpiles through
theft and corruption. Corrupt members of the security forces illegally lease or sell
their weapons and ammunition8. Others conspire with licensed arms dealers to
under-report weapons stocks in return for various favours; this makes it difficult to
trace arms that are sold illegally by arms dealers. Additionally, police arms clerks are
susceptible to error and human failings due to an over reliance on manual
intermediation in the process of registration and licensing transactions9.
Past military upheavals have also contributed to the leakage of large numbers of
arms in the country. In the 1980s, after leading his second successful coup d'état,
Jerry Rawlings' regime established and armed militias that were largely drawn from
his grass-roots support base: the People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers
Defence Committees (WDCs), later renamed Committees for the Defence of the
Revolution. Allegedly equipment made available to these groups included hundreds
of AK-47 assault rifles, the whereabouts of which are still unknown – although some
speculate that many could still be stored in caches10.
There is growing evidence supporting allegations that many of the Ghanaian
soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions buy guns, which they smuggle into
the country by dismantling them. Having dismantled them, they keep the parts in
separate locations. These guns are later reassembled when they arrive in Ghana and
subsequently sold to citizens11.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Interview with an Informant at the Ghana Police Service Firearms Bureau
Interview with the Ghana Police Service Anti Armed Robbery Division.
Interview with a Senior Officers at the BNI
Interview with a Senior Officer with the Ghana Police Service
Interview with a Senior Military Officer
Sources of SALW in Ghana / 23
Another source of illicit weapons, are from Ghanaians living abroad smuggling
weapons into the country by dismantling them and shipping them alongside other
goods. The dismantled weapons are often hidden in different consignment of
goods, and reassembled when the various consignments of goods arrive in the
country.
3.2 Illicit local manufacture by blacksmiths
Indigenous craft production is an age-old process in Ghana, dating back to the 15th
century when the Europeans first arrived to the Gold Coast, as Ghana was known
then. Still today, in some cultures such as the Alavanyo and Dagbon, gunsmiths are
integral members of society. These local artisans or blacksmiths were engaged in
iron-smithing and the production of a wide variety of tools for mining, farming,
weaving, pottery, etc. These blacksmiths were also specialists in making weapons,
arrowheads, guns, and bullets. These were produced mainly for the chiefs; however,
blacksmiths also shared the art of making these guns and knives with professional
hunters. Thus, over time, there was widespread growth of artisans in weapon
manufacturing. It has also been reported that during the Biafran war, a group of
Ghanaian blacksmiths went to train their counterparts in Nigeria (Small Arms Survey
2007).
The local production of guns was first banned in the colonial era for two main
reasons: first, the colonialists' wanted to avoid the spread of guns; and second, the
colonists felt that a gun in the hands of natives was a threat to their rule. Even after
the end of colonialism, however, the use of illicit guns and gunsmiths remains
widespread.
The manufacture and assembly of firearms is prohibited by the Arms and
Ammunition Act of 1962 (Act 118) as amended by the Arms and Ammunition
Decree 1972 (NRCD9) and the Arms and Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996.
This law, however, legalized the repair of guns upon acquiring a license to do so. As a
result this legislation has created more gunsmiths because over time the repairers
acquired and perfected additional skills in manufacturing guns. These gunsmiths
have then gone further to train others to manufacture guns. Today, blacksmiths in all
of Ghana's ten regions possess the skills to produce small arms, although the cost
and prices vary across the regions.
24 / Sources of SALW in Ghana
Hunting is an integral part of the rural economy of Ghana particularly in the three
Savanna Northern Regions, which experience a dry season for most of the year.
During the dry season in these regions farming activities are brought to a halt and
hunting becomes the main economic activity. The demand for guns by hunters is
high in this part of the country. Additionally, a large percentage of peasant farmers
use guns to protect their farms from animals, which usually destroy their crops.
These farmers purchase the locally manufactured guns from gunsmiths who are
familiar with them and live in the same communities.
Craft weapons from Ghana serve customers from all over West Africa, especially
Nigeria. The high demand within the sub-region by criminal networks for guns
made in Ghana encourages the local artisans to carry on with their trade and adds to
the illicit arms trade problem. These gun makers are located in places such as
Lamashegu and Subaunjida-Machelene in Tamale in the Northern Region, Alavanyo
in the Volta Region, Suame – Magazine (known as the technical hub of gun
manufacturing) in Kumasi in the Ashanti Region, and Techiman in the Brong Ahafo
Region (known as the regional trade center).
The study revealed that blacksmiths produce guns upon demand from a potential
buyer. The purchase of such weapons is facilitated by “middlemen” who actually
approach blacksmiths to produce the weapons for their clients. It was also revealed
to the study team that large quantities of weapons, normally wrapped in sacks
together with other goods, especially food stuffs, are transported at night to
neighbouring countries through unapproved routes along the borders. In some
cases these weapons together with other goods are left at locations along the
border at night for agents waiting on the other side of the border to come and pick
up at a later time.
Sources of SALW in Ghana / 25
[Figure 2: Map of Ghana showing major production areas of illicit weapons by
Blacksmiths/ Source: Field Survey]
26 / Sources of SALW in Ghana
3.2.1 The Situation of Illicit Production of Arms in Ghana (Volta Region –
Alavanyo and Nkonya)
The Nkonya – Alavanyo land dispute and the resultant clashes started in 1923 and
the two communities have seen renewed clashes over the years with the most
heightened ones occurring in 1983, 1990, 2003 and 2004 resulting in loss of
human lives and property.
The blacksmith and metal work trade is predominantly practiced in Alavanyo with a
few located around Nkonya, Kpando, and other neighbouring villages. As
previously mentioned, the industry dates over 150 years and has been in existence
long before the emergence of the Nkonya – Alavanyo land dispute and the
consequent wars.
The recurring clashes of the two communities over the past two and half decades
have necessitated the tightening of security as well as regular swoops in the area in
order to do away with small arms and other sophisticated weapons. These measures
have led to the migration of the artisans out of the community while the remaining
ones have resorted to covert manufacturing of illicit arms in fear of being arrested.
Prior to these disturbances, there were over two hundred (200) blacksmiths
operating in Alavanyo, as indicated by opinion leaders of the community.
In 2003 a major swoop by the security agencies destroyed the shops of the
blacksmiths and their tools and equipment were seized in the process. As a result,
many of these artisans have moved to other parts of the country such as Ashanti,
Brong Ahafo and the three Northern Regions of Ghana to practice their trade.
Others have resorted to farming and a few remain operating in hideouts around
Alavanyo and Nkonya.
It was observed that generally blacksmiths obtained their skills in craft gun making
from their fore bearers with an average working experience of about 30 years. These
skills are not formally acquired and much of the craft is learned through
apprenticeship. Of the participants interviewed, about 60% had basic education
(that is, at the primary level), 20% had Middle School Living Certificates (MSLC) and
20% had Junior High School Certificates. Based on the sample interviewed, 15%
were self-acquired and 45% acquired the skills through parent or family training.
Almost all the participants were motivated to become blacksmiths as a relatively
good source of income and a means of livelihood. About 50% of the participants
Sources of SALW in Ghana / 27
and blacksmiths interviewed owned blacksmith shops, 5% were apprentices and
about 25% other family members.
The blacksmith workshops in Alavanyo and Nkonya are mostly located underneath
buildings and caves of mountains. Currently, an average of four (4) employees can
be found in the underground workshops and about eight (8) found in each cave.
The products manufactured by these local artisans in various quantities are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Types, quality and quantities of selected items produced by
blacksmiths / Source: Field Study
Type of Item
Perceived Quality
Quantities / Month/
Workshop
1. Hoes
Excellent
20
2. Go to hell
Very Good
10
3. Hand cuffs
Good
5
4. Mattock/Pick Axe
Very Good
18
5. Hand Bells
Excellent
5
6. Riffles (including
repairs)
Very Good
3
7. Single Short
Pistols
Very Good
2-3
8. Revolver Pistols
Very Good
2
9. Bullets and
Cartridges
Very Good
-
10. Incubators
Very Good
6
28 / Sources of SALW in Ghana
3.2.2. Policies to Limit the Number Illicit Local Producers
A potential solution to the number of illicit local products is to redirect the efforts
and skills of the blacksmiths and subsequently strengthen the relationship among
the communities in which they live. Most of the participants indicated that farming
and meal fabrication in industries are alternative skills they could resort to if the
opportunity avails.
The identification of Alternative Livelihood Schemes (ALS) and related economic
opportunities is a principal mechanism for redirecting artisanal weapon production
skills. It was evident from the research that the blacksmiths are highly skilled and
competent in the fabrication of tools and equipment such as keys, pruners, maize
shredders, equipment for breaking firewood into pieces, handcuffs, corn mills,
welding machines, car door locks, vises, carbide pot nozzles, motor crutch levers,
spark sprockets and press button machines. A strong relationship with ALS and the
broad acknowledgement of the economic benefits that may be derived is the best
incentive for local artisans including blacksmiths.
Specific alternative livelihood schemes that were identified by the blacksmiths
include: production of tools and equipment other than arms through revolving fund
mechanisms; undertaking farming activities; sustainable income generation to
enhance biodiversity conservation – plantation development programmes; and
direct employment by Ghanaian security agencies.
However, the lack of a readily available market for the production tools and
equipment, as well inadequate financial support makes harnessing their skills
ineffective; conditions without which any attempt at providing alternative livelihood
will be unsustainable.
Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows / 29
4. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW FLOWS
4.1 Trafficking Routes of illicit SALW
Through field research and interviews the research team identified various routes of
trafficking in Ghana and the West African region. Table 3 shows some selected
information of weapons seized by various security agencies in Ghana form 2001 till
date.
From Table 3 it can be inferred that Ghana serves as a centre for production, a transit
point, and a consumer for smuggled arms to and from the West African region. In
one instance from February 2012, a large cache of arms and huge quantities of
ammunition concealed in cola (soft drinks) Nigerian truck was seized in Ghana by
the Ghana Police, which the suspect said was bound for Nigeria. The source of these
weapons is still not known, however, it is clear that the weapons and ammunition
were not made in Ghana but were imported from an unknown source12.
In May 2012, another quantity of AK-47 assault rifles with yet another unspecified
quantity of ammunitions concealed in an articulated truck loaded with cola-nuts
from Cote d'Ivoire was intercepted by the Ghanaian Security Agencies in Kumasi,
the second largest city in Ghana13.
This gives an indication that artisanal locally manufactured weapons move illicitly
from Ghana into neighbouring countries and industrial manufactured weapons
move into Ghana, especially in the conflict prone northern parts of Ghana.
Weapons are easily smuggled across Ghana's porous and poorly demarcated
borders. Some parts of Ghana's border run through communities, households, and
farms, creating artificial divisions of families and ethnic groups. Inhabitants from
Togo cross the borders at various points to attend school, funerals, and other social
gatherings and vice versa. To make SALW smuggling detection even more difficult
the areas surrounding the borders usually consist of untamed bush, which is a haven
for smugglers.
12.
13.
IGhana Police Service SITREP
Ghana Police Service SITREP
30 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows
Table 3: Selected Weapons Seized by the Security Agencies Since 2001
till 2012 / Source: Ghanaian Security Agencies
Date
Seized
weapons
Likely itinerary
Origin of
traf ickers
Transport
27/08/
2001
1 Artisanal
pistol
Kumasi-TechimanTamale
Ghanaian
SUV
30/01/
2002
4 hunting
ri les
Mossberg
and 19,000
rounds of
ammunition
Accra-Ho-Lagos
Ghanaian
Bus
25/09/
2002
3 packs of
ammunition
N/A -Tema PortN/A
N/A
Vessel
05/10/
2002
7 one shot
Kantamanto-Accra- Nigerian
hunting ri les A lao-Lomé and some
Cotonou
ammunition
04/04/
2003
6,000 rounds Accra-Nyive-Lomé
of
ammunition
for hunting
ri les
07/11/
2003
13/01
2004
300 rounds
Accra-Menuso
of
Tamale
ammunition
Red Star for hunting ri les
Truck
Ghanaian
Truck
Ghanaian
Truck
N/A
Truck
2,260 rounds Accra-Ho-Lome
of
ammunition
Red Star for
hunting ri les
Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows / 31
20/02
2004
2,000 rounds Accra-Nyive-Lome
of
ammunition
Red Star for
hunting ri les
N/A
Truck
18/04
2004
1 one-shot
artisanal
pistol
Accra-MenusoTamale
N/A
Truck
15/08
2004
1,584
explosif
pieces Goma
et Eco / 2
ignition
mechanisms
Control post
KumasiTamale/Yape Bolgatanga
Ghanaian
Truck
13/04
2005
1 charger
with 15
rounds of
munitions of
7,62mm
OseikojokromEssem-Kumasi
Ghanaian
Truck
13/05
2005
1 artisanal
pistol
N/A-Tamale-N/A
Ghanaian
Carried by a
person
20/05
2005
1 artisanal
pistol
Control post
Ghanaian
AsawubsiDadieso/Antokrom
-Cô te d’Ivoire
10/01
2012
Considerable Accra-Nigeria
(unspeci ied)
caches of
weapons and
ammunition
Ghanaian/Nigerian Truck
07/05
2012
18 artisanal
pistols
Ghanaian
N/A
06/06
2012
9 AK47 ri les, Cote D ‘Ivoire
1 pistol and
Kumasi
its
ammunition
Ghanaian/Ivorian
Truck
Bogoso-Sakondi
Truck
32 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows
[Figure 3: Major Routes of Weapon Trafficking in Ghana/ Source:
Field Survey]
4.2. Mode of Trafficking
As mentioned earlier, there seems to be growing evidence that supports the
allegations that many of the Ghanaian soldiers returning from peacekeeping
missions buy guns, smuggle them into the country by dismantling them, keeping
the parts in separate locations and then later reassembling them for sale when they
arrive in Ghana.
It was observed through focus group discussions with the security agencies that due
to the volatility of areas in the Northern region, where much conflict has occurred,
there is a general ban on the civilian ownership of guns. This notwithstanding, there
have been incidents of sporadic shooting in some of the communities that result in
Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows / 33
the temporal displacement of people. According to police officers, people often arm
themselves for personal protection, especially against reprisal attacks.
An informant in Tamale hinted to the research team that arms are concealed in
trucks used to transport goods from Burkina Faso and other neighbouring countries
into Ghana. Some of these weapons are also transferred from the southern part of
the country to the north, most of which are imported industrial guns and not the
ones manufactured by local artisans in Ghana.
At the Zabzugu-Tatale border post, officials of Ghana Immigration acknowledged
that because of the numerous unapproved routes that people use to and from the
Republic of Togo the borders were very difficult to patrol. In fact, they informed the
team that there is no record of arrest of people smuggling arms. In response to the
patrol challenges a Close Circuit Television (CCTV) camera was being mounted to
help monitor the movement of persons across the borders. According to the
officials, the Zabzugu-Tatale area is not a conflict zone hence the rate of civilian
ownership of weapons is on the low side.
An informant from the same area also shared information that a few people,
including him, possessed arms purposely for hunting game and performing
traditional ceremonies. According to him, they acquired the arms with the
assistance of friends and relations from Accra or Kumasi. The informant also told the
research team that there were no blacksmiths in the community.
The Ghana Immigration Officer at the same border post, however, informed the
team that an arrest was made some 5 years ago involving the illicit trafficking of a
pump-action gun from the Republic of Togo into Ghana.
The Bawku Divisional Command of the Ghana Police service also informed the team
that illicit proliferation of arms in the area was primarily the result of conflict in the
area. According to the officers, citizens feel insecure; hence, they acquire arms for
self-protection. Some of the guns that are seized from residents include AK-47
assault rifles and pump-action guns. Asked whether such weapons are trafficked
from Togo, the officers were sceptical as they were under the impression that the
Togolese did not use such guns. Rather they suspected that the guns were acquired
from Nigeria. According to police, there were no blacksmiths in the area that engage
34 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows
in the manufacture of local artisanal guns, however, many people are skilled in
customizing AK-47s into a portable weapon that can be hidden under clothes just
like the pistol.
At the Pulimakom border post (Ghana-Togo border) around Cenkasse, Officers of
the Ghana Immigration Service indicated that even though there were no arrests for
illicit trafficking of weapons, they could not rule it out completely. According to the
officers, it was difficult to identify small arms in concealed goods since they do not
have scanners or metal detectors. The officers also point to the numerous
unapproved routes littered in the vast savannah stretch of land between Ghana and
Togo that make it difficult to monitor all border activity.
According to officers from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service, smuggling
goods was very common, but there had been no arrests made involving arms
trafficking in recent years. They informed the research team that a suspect was
arrested in 2008 but freed due to lack of evidence.
Gun crimes in Ghana / 35
5. GUN CRIMES IN GHANA
Ghana's experience in armed violence has been relatively mild. Information available
from the Criminal Investigations Department Statistics and Information Technology
Unit of the Ghana Police Service points to the fact that the number of reported
armed violence cases have generally been decreasing since 2004. However, recent
developments in some parts of the country point to the fact that there is the need to
intensify the fight against the proliferation of small arms and armed violence.
[Figure 4: Types of weapons used in committing crimes in Ghana between
2005 and 2011 / Source: Ghana National Commission on Small Arms Media
Incident Report Database]
Although crime statistics are available to some extent, current methods of
classification do not make it easy to determine what proportions of reported crimes
were committed with firearms. This section, however, uses armed robbery and
murder as representative indicators of the frequency of armed violence incidences in
Ghana.
5.1 Armed Robbery
According to the Ghana Police Service, the number of reported armed robbery cases
has decreased from a high of about 1,949 in 2006 to a low of about 1,235 in 2011
(Figure 7). This implies that a total of about 7,444 and an average of about 1,489
armed robbery cases per year were reported nationwide between 2006 and 2011,
which is nearly four armed robbery cases reported daily nationwide between 2006
and 2011.
36 / Gun crimes in Ghana
The types of weapons most commonly used in armed violence, in non-conflict
situations to commit crimes, are locally made guns. These are the most common in
cases of armed robbery and murder.
[Figure 5: Total armed robbery cases reported nationwide between 2006 and
2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]
[Figure 6: Total Regional Distribution of Armed Robbery Cases between
2006 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]
Gun crimes in Ghana / 37
5.2 Murder
The research also revealed that armed related murder increases during election
years. Below is a chart to illustrate the correlation.
[Figure 7: Total Number of arms related murder cases reported nationwide
between 2004 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]
The above data indicates a significant increase in reported murder cases during
election years as manifested in the period between 2004 and 2008. Even though
post 2008 murder cases were equally high, they were still lower than 2004.
It is a widely held notion that guns are used to intimidate political opponents during
election campaigns and on the election itself, which may account for the high
number of murder cases during election years. The very high figure in 2004 is
confirmed in a reported statement made by a former Member of Parliament for
Bawku Central, the late Hawa Yakubu, that guns were used to intimidate a lot of
voters during the 2004 elections.
In 2008, as evidenced by the chart above, there were several reported cases of
armed violence, especially in the northern part of Ghana where houses were burnt
and lives were lost. These incidents had a rippling effect in similar clashes in Accra
between members of the two main political parties in the country, the New Patriotic
38 / Gun crimes in Ghana
Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which resulted in several
injuries and the murder of about four people.
[Figure 8: Regional distribution of Arms related murder cases in Ghana
between 2004 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]
SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks
/ 39
6. SALW LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
6.1 Background
The main legislations on the subject are the Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972,
NRCD 9 as amended by Act 519 of 1996 and Act 604 of 2001, and the Arms and
Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L. I. 200 as amended by LI 277 and LI 315 of 1963.
The 1972 Arms and Ammunitions Legislation provides civilians with the possibility
of acquiring single and double-barrelled shot guns, single and double-barrelled
garden guns, pump-action shotguns, pistols, rifles, air pistols, and revolvers upon
application to the Minister of the Interior, subject to certain qualifications. The Arms
and Ammunitions Decree of 1972 was an expansion of the Arms and Ammunitions
Act 1962. It elaborates further on the processes involved in the registration of
firearms, including renewal methods and periods. It also prohibits the production of
arms but makes provision for persons interested in the production of arms to apply
to the government for a license to do so; however, no such license has ever been
granted.
In spite of the above legal and regulatory regime, Ghana's gun-related laws are
blatantly flouted due to ineffective monitoring mechanisms. The National
Commission on Small Arms (NACSA) in collaboration with other agencies and its
partners has undertaken several activities including the development of a national
plan of action on small arms control. The plan has five key strategic thrusts namely:
Public Education and Sensitization, Stockpile and Inventory Management, Border
Control Management, Small Arms Control (policy, legislation, infrastructure and
capacity) and Alternative Livelihoods.
On a more sub-regional level, article 17 (3) of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW
calls on Member States to promote and/or carry out programmes for the voluntary
handing in of weapons. In line with this, the Ghana Police Service embarked on a
weapons amnesty programme between March and October 2005. The Weapons
Amnesty Programme enabled the Police to regularize a total of 1,129 civil
categorized weapons. 51 of these weapons were seized and are currently kept in
the police exhibit store. Some of the seized weapons were surrendered voluntarily
but did not fall within the category of civil weapons.
6.1.1 The Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972, NRCD 9
The Arms and Ammunition Decree, NRCD 9, by its legislative scheme, seeks to
monitor and control the possession and use of arms and ammunition through a
40 / SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks
registration process, and to further regulate their export/import, manufacture and
ownership. The Decree therefore focuses on the following areas:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
Mode of registration
Condition of change of ownership
Expiry of permit
Manufacture of arms and ammunition
Control of public display of arms or ammunition
Seizure and forfeiture
Control of export and import
Database through control Register
Offences and Regulations
Additionally, NRCD 9 repealed some enactments including:
i.
Explosives Ordinance (Cap. 254)
ii.
Explosives (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956 (No. 9)
iii. Sections 1 to 5, 15 and 22 (2) of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1962 (Act
118)
Also, the Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Law, 1993, PNDCL 71 was repealed
by section 4 of the Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Act, 1996, Act 519.
Further, section 12 of NRCD 9 saved the Explosives Regulations, 1970 (LI 666) as
subsequently amended notwithstanding the repeal of the Explosives Ordinance
(Cap. 254).
6.1.2 Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L.I.200
The Arms and Ammunition Regulations, L.I.200, on the other hand, contains details
on the mode of implementation NRCD 9 and addresses the following:
i.
Ports of Entry and authorized personnel
ii.
Modes of Export and Import and licensing
iii.
Public warehouses, landing, conveyance, packing and storage
iv.
Safety, Store ledger, confiscation of firearms, etc., not withdrawn
v.
Delivery and Withdrawal process from Public warehouses
vi.
Examination of Stock books and certification
vii.
Private warehouses, classes, licensing, Stock and Sales Books
viii. Permits to purchase ammunition or gunpowder, or use ammunition
ix.
Inspection and Penalty
x.
Licences to bear arms of precision, flint-lock or cap gun
SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks
xi.
xii.
xiii.
Qualification for issue of licences and, possession
Surrender, transfer of licence and prohibition
Disposal upon forfeiture
6.2 Enactments citing Arms and Ammunitions in Ghana
The following primary and secondary legislations contain provisions that cite arms
and ammunitions (see details in Appendix).
i.
Africa Defence (Ghana) Act, 1965, Act 313 in Section 3(2)
ii.
Armed Forces Act, 1962, Act 105 in Section 98
iii. Public Order Act, 1994, Act 491 in Section 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
iv.
State Secrets Act, 1962, Act 101 in Section 15
v.
Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993 (PNDCL
330) in Sections 274 and 340
vi. Criminal Code, 1960, Act 29 in Sections 192 and 209
vii. Ghana Railway Corporation Decree, 1977, SMCD 95 in Section 27
viii. Juvenile Justice Act, 2003, Act 653 in Section 60
ix. Prisons Service Decree, 1972, NRCD 46 in Section 46
x.
Unclaimed Property Decree, 1969, NLCD 371 in Sections 1 and 2
xi. Customs Regulations, 1976 (LI 1060) in Regulation 21
xii. Police Service (Private Security Organisations) Regulations, 1992, LI 1571 in
Regulation 11
xiii. Wildlife Conservation (Amendment) Regulations, 1983, LI 1284 in Regulation
7(3)
xiv. Imports and Exports (Classification of Importers) Regulations, 1980 (L.I. 1247).
Second Schedule 571-400
xv. Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods) Rules, 1974, LI 971 in First Schedule
1(c)
xvi. Trade Marks Regulations, 1970, LI 667 in First Schedule.
6.3 Weaknesses in the Current Ghanaian Legislations
The nature and scope of the current legal regime is too restrictive, as it does not
contemplate certain concepts that are inherently vital in dealing with SALW in
contemporary times. The prevailing legal regime provides little avenue and
encouragement for disclosure and the open interaction amongst interested persons
or parties in possession of SALW.
Current legislation does not provide a rejected applicant the opportunity to appeal
against a previous decision. Although this is not consistent with contemporary
/ 41
42 / SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks
notions of human rights, it more importantly compels a rejected applicant to acquire
weapons illegally without recourse to the law.
There are also many gaps in the current legislation. The law does not address or
provide for the fate of the firearm or projectile being registered when the application
to register is rejected. That is in cases where the individual has acquired the arm
before going forward to regularise the acquisition. Also, when someone is being
assessed and vetted as a person able to own a firearm the current law does not
provide for the authorities to “question” the mode of acquisition of the firearm
brought to be registered.
The laws in their current state do not indicate number of arms or the amount of
ammunition an individual can acquire at any given period. There is no requirement
under the law for a competency test or training of prospective owners of firearms
prior to licensing of a firearm. Similarly, there is no legal regime for the provision of
facilities for such testing or training nor is the private sector involved in such
engagements.
The current law does not mandate the arms retailers to “retire “their allocations or
provide records of sales information (whom they have sold the arms to, their contact
addresses and their licenses enabling them to purchase, etc.) before they are given
new allocations.
Legislation should take into consideration certain practices that are unavoidable
such as providing for certain category of licenses like those for conducting a
business as gunsmith. Given that about 80% of guns used in armed robberies are
locally manufactured, it is important to consider licensing the gunsmith and his
workshop subject to pre-requisites.
As it is, the laws on local manufacture of SALW do not indicate whether a request for
a permit from the Minister of the Interior is to be granted to Artisanal manufacturers
or local Industrial manufacturers, and even though none of the artisan
manufacturers dotted all over the country have applied for a permit to manufacture,
they are carrying on with their trade illegally.
Ghanaian law should also consider the possibility of granting accreditation for
sports-shooting and hunting purposes.
Recommendations
/ 43
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 General
There is the need for governments to implement policies that will help reduce the
demand for small arms. When employment opportunities are created and citizens
are employed, conflicts and criminal activities will reduce thereby reducing the
demand for small arms.
Security agencies should be specially trained and adequately resourced and
remunerated to check and monitor arms trafficking. Such agencies can be equally
equipped with special purpose vehicles, communication equipment, metal
detectors, and scanners to facilitate their work. Security agencies must also be given
an adequate number of personnel, who will help to efficiently patrol the numerous
unauthorized entry and exit points to and from Ghana.
Licensed arms dealers should be closely monitored for compliance with the law.
Again, there should be a review of legislation to address current challenges in arms
trafficking and proliferation.
There should be adequate public education to encourage the general public to
volunteer information on arms traffickers.
There should equally be effective international cooperation between countries
within the sub-region in terms of exchange of information as well as marking,
tracing, and stockpile and inventory management.
It was clear from the interviews that blacksmiths have other skills that can be
harnessed into alternative livelihood strategies. The production of tools and
equipment can be implemented effectively through two (2) major approaches:
•
•
Setting up regional Training Workshop Centers;
Individual Workshop Support (Financial and Technical) Schemes.
7.2 Mechanisms for Small Arms Control
Political commitments and action are equally essential to resolve the underlying
causes of conflicts and disputes in various parts of the world. National programmes
and laws to combat SALW need to be matched by strong legally binding
international instruments. Financial and technical assistance from international
partners should allow to put together actionable programmes, which will reduce
44 / Recommendations
the illicit proliferation of SALW. Developed countries should provide more financial
resources to developing countries and foster partnerships for capacity-building.
Sound planning and effective implementation strategies are also vital.
Agencies working on illicit arms trade, terrorism, organized crime, and drug
trafficking should have innovative strategies to address the close interrelationship
among these activities.
It is essential that a national computerized database to provide a network for
licences and registered arms and facilitate monitoring is established. Another
important mechanism is to introduce sanctions and appropriate minimum
sentences for SALW crimes and the carrying of unlicensed SALW. In addition,
registering and ensuring strict accountability and effective control of all SALW
owned by private security companies is recommended.
7.3 Necessary Laws to address the legislative deficit
Elements that need to be addressed in SALW legislation include:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.
xv.
xvi.
Registration, mode of registration
Condition of change of ownership
Expiry of permit
Manufacture of arms and ammunition
Control of public display of arms or ammunition
Seizure and forfeiture
Control of export and import
Database through control Register
Offences and Regulations
Dialogue with Manufacturers and Suppliers
Brokering
Strengthening of Border Controls
Public Education and Awareness Programmes
Collection and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Transferring
Tracking
Recommendations
CONCLUSION
Considering the enormity of the challenge in the fight against the illicit proliferation
of small arms and its concomitant devastating effects on the social, economic and
political progress within the West African sub-region, it is critical to adopt a
multifaceted approach in addressing these challenges. International, regional and
sub-regional cooperation and concerted effort are required among States if the
battle against cross-border illicit transfer of weapons is to be won.
This research has clearly shown, together with other pieces of evidence, that
whereas weapons mainly local artisan manufactured ones move from Ghana into
neighbouring countries through the numerous unapproved routes, industrially
manufactured small arms illicitly flow from these countries into the Northern parts
of Ghana.
Efficient law enforcement, modernized data and efficient record keeping using ICT,
and effective marking will enhance tracing and stockpile management. Similarly, it
was noted that if the energies and skills of the blacksmiths could be channelled into
the production of other equally viable tools then they may not resort to the
production of arms and thus, reduce the illicit SALW in circulation.
Effective public education, prompt and peaceful resolution of conflict, capacity
building and resourcing security agencies to deal effectively with the menace, as
well as legislation and policies on SALW are required to ensure the proper
management of the SALW menace. Interventions should also be tailored towards
addressing the remote causes of demand and supply of SALW. International
cooperation is also critical in this regard.
If these interventions are effectively implemented, the illicit trafficking of arms and
the local production of arms will reduce, thereby helping to promote peace, security,
and sustainable development within the West African sub-region.
/ 45
46 / Recommendations
References
UNDP and Government of Ghana (2004): Illicit Small Arms in Ghana - A Baseline
Assessment
Small Arms Survey (2007): Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria:
The Niger Delta in Perspective,
United States Institute for Peace (2010): Trends in Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan
Africa
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and
other Related Materials (2006).
Ghana Police Service Reports (2004 - 2011).
ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARMS CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
THE SITUATION IN TOGO
Félix Kokou AKLAVON
Table of Content /THE SITUATION IN TOGO / 49
Table of Content
INTRODUCTION
51
I. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
53
1. Organisation of the study
53
1.1 Identification of target groups
53
1.2 Distribution of target groups by socio-professional category
53
1.3 Field survey
53
1.4 Data collection method
54
1.5 Sampling and selection criteria
54
1.6 Literature review
55
II. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
57
1. State of trafficking in the country
57
2. Scope of the phenomenon in Togo
58
3. Distribution of arms manufacturers nationwide
59
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SEIZED AND THEIR
STATISTICS OVER THE PAST YEARS
60
1. Supply or manufacturing zones, routes, destinations and end-use
60
2. Causes of trafficking in SALW
61
3. Consequences of trafficking in SALW
62
IV. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
62
1. Actions of State
62
1.1 Institutional framework
62
1.2 Legal framework
62
2. Actions of Civil Society
63
3. Regional and international institutions
63
50 /
Table of Content /THE SITUATION IN TOGO
V. WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS
63
1. Government
63
2. Civil society and national actors
64
3. International and bilateral partners
64
CONCLUSION
65
REFERENCES
66
Introduction
/ 51
Introduction
Togo is a small West African country. It has borders in the east with Benin, in the west
with Ghana, in the north with Burkina Faso and in the south with the Atlantic Ocean.
With a surface area of 56,785 km2 and five major economic regions, in 2011 its
population was estimated at about 6 million inhabitants. Togo has about forty ethnic
groups but the two major national languages are Kabyè and Ewé.
Togo had a very low crime level and virtually no record of organized crime or armed
robbery prior to the 1990s. The end of the cold war, the advent of democracy and the
emergence of armed conflicts in West Africa were accompanied by the proliferation
of small arms and light weapons (SALW) which has contributed to the growing
insecurity in the country today.
A study conducted by Cambridge University reveals that close to half of the 875
million weapons circulating in the world are found in sub-Saharan Africa, with nearly
40% in West Africa.
This uncontrolled proliferation of SALW has become a cause for concern and is a daily
preoccupation of the highest national and even sub-regional authorities.
Togo therefore joined the different regional and international processes aimed at
combating this phenomenon, which constitutes a threat to national and regional
security if nothing is done about it.
In 2001, Togo, in response to the ECOWAS Programme for Coordination and
Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), set up the National Commission
to Combat the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL). Studies
were also conducted at national level to have not only a global view of the situation
but also to know the actual craft manufacturing capacity in the country.
Laws have been passed, agreements signed, and regional and international protocols
and pacts ratified. Civil Society Organizations under the umbrella of RASALT (Togolese
Action Network on Small Arms), are increasing capacity building actions for the
communities and the population is being sensitized.
All of these actions did not succeed in eradicating crime. The people continued to
experience armed robberies, holdups and inter-community attacks which the
52 / Introduction
population on a daily basis, although the phenomenon reduced in intensity. Togo is
still searching for a way to restore national and sub-regional peace.
What is the impact of this phenomenon on the day-to-day life of the people? How
does this phenomenon manifest? What is the actual local manufacturing capacity of
weapons? What is the route of these weapons in our country? Who are the end
users? What control strategies have been developed in the country? All of these
questions are essential for an understanding of the phenomenon of SALW
proliferation in Togo.
This study will provide detailed information on the illicit proliferation of small arms,
which will contribute to the development of efficient and effective strategies to
control the phenomenon and strengthen national and regional security.
The report will cover three essential items:
Ÿ Methodological framework of the research
Ÿ Presentation and interpretation of results
Ÿ Guidelines and recommendations.
Methodological framework of the research
/ 53
I. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
1. Organisation of the study:
Preliminary survey
A preliminary survey was conducted to ascertain the level of understanding of the
interview guide and to rephrase some questions to make sure they agree with the
objectives of the study.
1.1 Identification of target groups
As regards the identification of target groups, the traditional heads of shortlisted
villages were contacted, and they did the preliminary work to facilitate our
assignment. We also made use of some resource persons within the law enforcement
forces to provided us with essential information on the phenomenon.
Thereafter we were able to set the following targets:
1.2 Distribution of target groups by socio-professional category
Table 1:
Targets
Number
Forces of law and order
28
Blacksmiths
20
Farmers
22
District heads
12
Drivers
8
Nurses
5
Others
5
TOTAL
100
1.3 Field survey
We spent four days in the northern region and three days in the Maritime, thereby
covering all the shortlisted locations namely Boadé, Goukonssi, Sinkassé, Mango and
Dapaong in the Savannah region; Bandjeli and Kara in the Kara region; Atakpamé and
54 / Methodological framework of the research
Adeta in the Plateaux region; Lomé and Aného in the Maritime region. One-on-one
and collective interviews were conducted to gather information from the targets.
1.4 Data collection method
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to collect data in the
communities shortlisted for the study. In addition, we carried out a literature review of
existing documentation on the phenomenon.
An additional tool, the interview guide, was developed and validated by the research
team before the commencement of the study.
1.5 Sampling and selection criteria
The study covered two villages per region: Boadé and Goukonssi in the Savanes
region, Bandjeli and Kara in the Kara region. These areas are villages bordering Ghana
and Burkina Faso. We also met the Commissioners of Police and Gendarmerie Officials
in Sinkassé, Dapaong, Atakpamé, Lomé, Aného, Kpalimé, Mango and Kara.
The mission retained 100 persons considered to be involved directly or indirectly in
small arms trafficking, as samples of persons to be interviewed.
Table 2: Distribution of the surveys nationwide
Region
Locations
covered
Savannah
Dapaong
Number of persons
interviewed
1
Sinkassé
Boadé
Goukonssi
Mango
1
Kanté
4
Kara
Bandjeli
Plateaux
Maritime
Total
13
7
Kara
5
5
14
Atakpamé
7
Adé ta
8
Lomé
25
Ané ho
10
100
Methodological framework of the research
/ 55
1.6 Literature Review
Much has been written on SALW in Africa in general and West Africa in particular. At
national level, however, very few publications exist on the scourge. Since 2000 Togo
has been part of the sub-regional initiatives aimed at adopting common positions on
the proliferation of SALW. Some studies were carried out on it. In one of these studies
on National arms production capacities in Togo, published in 2005, Amonaou
KATAKA14 15 studied craft small arms manufacturers nationwide and the origin of
these arms in the country. He observed that a process should be put in place to have
an ongoing, up to date inventory of firearms manufacturers. In the field, it is easy to
see that there is a considerable flow of arms from abroad. These arms came mainly
from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria via Benin, Mali, war zones or ceasefire zones
following the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes.
In 2009 the National Commission on SALW conducted a general survey on SALW. This
survey took stock of the overall situation of the proliferation of small arms in Togo with
a view to developing national action plans to control it. SIMBIA Kpatcha16, in a similar
study, indicated that statistics on local arms manufacturers and the flow of weapons
of war recorded in the sub-region and in all gendarmerie and police units in Togo
show that actions undertaken seem to be inadequate and ineffective. He then
proposed that given the scope of the trafficking, there is a need for a global approach
involving all States.
Furthermore, in the absence of empirical documentation on the illicit trade in arms
and on account of the upsurge of crime in Togo, many media professionals took an
interest in the phenomenon, and published articles on it. Sylvio COMBEY17 wrote that
the extremely serious nature of the situation in Togo led the government to set up the
National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLPAL) in 2001. It
must be admitted, however, that the results have been below par, in spite of the
sensitization drive. The authorities were no longer able to bring the situation under
control due to the porosity of borders, absence of a regulation on conventional arms
transfer and their manufacture, sophistication of locally manufactured arms, endemic
poverty crowned by growing insecurity.
14. Amonaou Kataka (2005) , Study on the national production capacity of light weapons and small arms and
ammunition Togo, Mission Report
15. Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity in
West Africa : Case of Togo.
16. Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity
in West Africa : Case of Togo.
17. Sylvio Combey , (2009 ) Article published on http // sylviocombey .wordpress.com / 2009 /08 /08
56 / Methodological framework of the research
Difficulties and Limitations of the Study
The proliferation of illicit small arms is a very sensitive subject in Togo.
It is shrouded in suspicion, which limits information gathering. Even though some law
enforcement officers accepted to participate in the interview, not all the questions
contained in the guide developed for the purpose were answered.
Most of the blacksmiths manufacturing arms were reticent, denying that they were
arms manufacturers, even though they were found with weapon parts to be repaired.
The farmers who accepted to answer our questionnaire clearly had no information on
some critical points such as the identification of traffickers, the relationship between
traffickers and the communities, the management of stockpiles as well as the
institutions responsible for controlling the phenomenon.
The general ignorance of the population about small arms proliferation considerably
limited the scope of our study.
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 57
II. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
1. State of trafficking in the country
Insecurity has become a major challenge for the Togolese authorities. Recurrent
incidents of burglary, highway robbery, local and trans-border crimes and armed
robbery have traumatized the population in both rural and urban areas.
In Togo, the general belief is that only the army should possess arms, which explains
why the phenomenon of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is not
well-known. Data on SALW is the exclusive preserve of the State. As a result, the
population does not have exhaustive data on the phenomenon. Few civil society
organizations operate in the field. The following table was prepared with information
drawn from the CNAPAL 2009 national report on the control of the illicit proliferation,
circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and from the National
Directorate of Judicial Police and Gendarmerie:
Table 3: Number of arms and ammunition seized between 2003 and 2009
CATEGORIES
WEAPONS
OF 2003-2004 20052006
20072008
2009
Total
Craft hunting guns
9335
Sophisticated
hunting guns
99
Weapons of warfare
475
TOTAL WEAPONS
9909
Hunting ammunition
697382
War ammunition
1846
TOTAL
AMMUNITION
699228
This table presents the overview of weapons seized from 2003 to 2009 in Togo in
preventive police or judicial operations.
58 / Presentation and interpretation of results
In 2009 alone, more than 400 weapons and 1000 ammunitions were seized. The
traffickers ranged between 18 and 40 years of age according to CNLPAL18. This shows
that the renewed spate of trafficking is being perpetrated by relatively young actors.
2. Scope of the phenomenon in Togo
The persons interviewed in Bandjeli, a town located at the Togo-Ghana border in the
Kara region highlighted the extent and violent nature of armed attacks and gunfire
exchange with the security forces at the border. There were several incidents at
Kabou, Malfakassa and Bassar. These weapons were used in Inter-community
conflicts; such was the case in 2009 with the Brakpabé and Bkatchebe (Bassar
prefecture) communities on both sides of the Togo-Ghana border.
Farmers and blacksmiths interviewed in Boadé and Goukounssi admit that armed
bandits create terror when they attack traders or rob vehicles. Border communities
experience the phenomenon on a daily basis. Thirty-nine 39 out of the 50 persons
interviewed confirm the existence of the worrisome phenomenon in Togo. Whilst
putting the insecurity caused by the illicit proliferation of small arms in Togo in
perspective, the security forces admit that the phenomenon is causing increasing
concern19.
Graph 1 : Perception of the scope of the phenomenon in Togo
100%
80%
0.78
60%
40%
20%
0.2
0%
Disturbing
Not very
disturbing
Source: Field survey data, January 2012
18. 2009 Annual Report of CNLPAL
19. Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity
in West Africa : Case of Togo ."
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 59
3. Distribution of arms manufacturers nationwide
The sporadic crackdown by the security forces led to mistrust on the part of the
blacksmiths who all claim that the majority of weapons come from neighbouring
countries. Our documentary research however showed the existence of local
manufacturers in all the regions of the country (General Report on SALW in Togo)20. In
the Savanes regions, eleven (11) arms manufacturing blacksmiths were recorded,
with 10 from the Sinkassé community alone. This community has borders with
Burkina Faso and Ghana. Consequently, the vibrancy of this geographical location
exposes it to all manner of trafficking and insecurity.
The analysis of the report and surveys conducted indicate that the most highly
represented region is the Plateaux region with over thirty (30) manufacturers of which
26 are found in the Dayes prefecture alone. This community also has a border with
Ghana.
Graph 2: Distribution of manufacturers per region
63%
50%
0.48
38%
25%
13%
0.17
0.16
0.11
0.08
0%
Savanes
Kara
20. Rapport général sur les ALPC au Togo, CNPAL, 2009
Centrale
Plateaux
Maritime
60 / Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SEIZED AND THEIR STATISTICS OVER THE
PAST 5 YEARS
According to information gathered from interviewees, arms seized include several
hunting guns (Salaga, duplex, cabis), 8-mm and 12-mm calibre pistols as well as
sophisticated weapons. The report of the general survey on SALW in Togo conducted
by the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (CNLPAL) presented the statistics of arms and ammunition seizures carried
out from 2003 to 2009 (See Table 3 above).
It is not easy to compare the information provided by interviewees with the one
contained in the CNLPAL report. There are no statistics of arms seizures for the past 5
years. Civil society representatives reported the reluctance of the different target
groups to provide information.
1. Supply or manufacturing zones, routes, destinations and end-use
Most of the persons interviewed admitted the existence of arms in the country, but
believe that Togo is just a transit zone for all categories of small arms bound for
neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Benin and Nigeria. Thirty-nine percent
(39%) of the interviewees are of the opinion that Togo is a transit country, whilst 31%
believe that it is a destination country. However, 30% of the interviewees state that
arms are manufactured in the country. Togo may therefore be cited among the
countries that produce small arms locally.
Among these arms producing States, Ghana is the major supplier of arms bound for
Togo. Northern Ghana is well known for its expertise in manufacturing craft SALW.
As the manufacturers get better at their trade and increase their stock, they have to
find outlets for them. Since Togo has not yet authorized local manufacture of arms,
the blacksmiths work in secret and and have not yet reached the level of expertise of
other countries. With the increased demand, it is easy to understand how the country
has become a transit zone as well as a destination centre for locally manufactured
arms from other countries.
The porosity of Togo's borders with neighbouring Ghana, Benin and Burkina Faso
facilitates trafficking, particularly among the communities living on both sides of the
border who share the same languages and cultures. Since the traffickers are relations
of the transporters, or belong to the same ethnic groups with them, their movement
does not raise any suspicion. They dismantle the arms into pieces before taking them
across borders, often without the knowledge of the transporters. Among other
Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years
/ 61
methods, they hide the dismantled parts inside grains or herbs used in traditional
medicine. This was confirmed by a brigade chief who claimed to have once arrested a
trafficker with arms hidden in herbs used in traditional medicine.
All this goes to show how difficult it can be to identify an arms dealer and raises the
thorny problem of monitoring our borders, systematic identity control and training of
law enforcement officials. According to one senior gendarmerie officer, it is not easy
to catch a smuggler, although an intuitive, well-trained officer can recognize all forms
of smuggling.
Togo, Burkina Faso and Benin are the major destinations for arms in transit. They are
used in all sorts of activities, hunting, security protection, burglaries, armed robberies
and inter-community conflicts. Hunters, farmers, robbers, cattle breeders and the
masses use these weapons. It should be pointed out that Togo has not experienced
the phenomenon of terrorism.
With regard to the routes used, according to a traditional leader, smugglers often pass
through the Dayes community (Plateaux region). They leave Ikpa, a border village with
Ghana with weapons hidden in grains. They move down towards Adéta in Kloto
before going up towards Notsè in the Haho community to come out in Azové in Benin
via Tohoun.
Kokoumbo and Gando are towns located in the Kara region and close to Ghana and
Benin. These places are the departure areas with Benin as destination.
Goukonssi and Boadé, towns located at the Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso borders
are the other points of departure towards Burkina Faso.
2. Causes of Trafficking in SALW
Five main causes can be adduced of the trade:
•
Poverty: most of the youths involved are either unemployed or low income
workers, and are therefore lured into this very profitable business by the need to
survive.
•
The absence of strong coercive laws creates a legal vacuum thus giving free rein
to trafficking in Togo.
•
The absence of an official market for the sale of modern arms paves the way for
craft manufacture and illicit trade. The opening of a State controlled arms store
would be a solution to illicit trafficking.
•
Arms are also used for personal security and hunting.
• The illicit circulation of SALW responds to market demand and supply.
62 / Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years
3. Consequences of trafficking in SALW
The consequences of this phenomenon are many;
• Insecurity of goods and persons;
• Threat to civil peace ;
• Slowdown of economic activities ;
• Increased violence due to inter-community conflicts ;
IV. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Many actions have been taken as part of an institutional framework to control the
proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Governmental and nongovernmental, national and international institutions are working to check the
phenomenon nationwide.
1.
Actions of State
1.1 Institutional framework
The State established the National Commission to Control the Proliferation,
Circulation and Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) to effectively
control the proliferation of SALW, sources of transnational crime, armed conflicts
and/or terrorism. In 2006 the Commission prepared a draft bill on arms control in
Togo, which recommends:
Ÿ
Ÿ
the creation of the Committee on Defence and Security within the National
Assembly;
the systematic destruction of any arms and ammunition seized.
1.2 Legal framework
Togo is signatory to several regional and international agreements. Thus it
participated in the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and
Development (PCASED) which was replaced by the ECOWAS Small Arms Programme
(ECOSAP), now merged with the Small Arms Division of ECOWAS. It is also involved in
the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms in All its Aspects, signed in 2001.
Togo is also party to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in 2001, as well
as the ECOWAS Convention. It has also signed the Arms Trade Treaty.
Even though Togo participates in many international treaties and mechanisms, its
Legal and institutional framework: Strengths and weaknesses
/ 63
situation is far from enviable. The major obstacles to the control of the circulation of
SALW are economic, social, cultural, legal and political.
Economically, the underdevelopment of the people who lack adequate means to
meet their daily needs this prompts them to undertake illegal and illicit activities.
Socially, the population is generally uninformed, especially due to low level of
awareness. The few sensitization activities do not have the desired impact.
Politically, the instability resulting from the endless political crises and the absence of a
clear policy have created mistrust with respect to the control of SALW proliferation.
1. Actions of Civil Society
The network of civil society organizations working to control the phenomenon in
Togo, RASALT, NGOs and Associations conduct sensitization, capacity building and
advocacy activities on SALW. Yet, the phenomenon is far from being under control
because all the actions turn out to be inadequate for a fast-growing phenomenon.
2. Regional and international institutions
UNREC and ECOWAS provide technical and/or financial support for capacity building
and sensitization. They give considerable support to State institutions and to civil
society organizations.
V - WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations may contribute to reducing significantly the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Togo:
1. Government
Discussions with the forces of law and order as well as the populations revealed
inadequacies in the strategies to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light
weapons. We therefore recommend:
Ÿ Capacity building for all actors involved in controlling the circulation of SALW;
Ÿ Building the operational capacity of the forces of law and order ;
Ÿ Endowing the relevant agencies with appropriate and effective means for better
control of borders;
Ÿ Adopting arms regulations;
Ÿ Reviewing the provisions on the possession of SALW ;
Ÿ Regulating and monitoring the importation of police and security equipment by
private security companies;
Ÿ Cooperation between the Customs and both public and private security forces.
Real involvement of the border communities would be an asset.
64 / Way forward and recommendations
2. Civil society and national actors
Civil society organisations generally operate in the area of capacity building and
sensitization of the populations. Field surveys revealed that the people know very little
about the matter. It is therefore absolutely essential for civil society organisations to :
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
be more involved in actions to control the circulation of SALW;
build their capacity on human security and the circulation of SALW;
raise the awareness of the populations on the tragic consequences and trauma of
SALW;
sensitize the populations on national laws and regional/international conventions
on SALW;
promote a culture of peace and non-violence;
involve the populations actively by having branches at community level;
involve health care providers whose intervention is often required during intercommunity conflicts;
3. International and bilateral partners
The proliferation of small arms and their consequences should be controlled at
international level. It is thus essential for international and bilateral partners to be
more involved in the control of SALW proliferation by supporting the actions of
Governments and especially Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) so as to scale up
activities in the field. CSO actors should also enjoy more material and financial
support.
The United Nations Organization and international partners have a major role to play
in formulating strategies involving countries which fuel the illicit trade in small arms.
They should also draw up instruments which shall be binding on all countries.
Conclusion
/ 65
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the conflicts which rocked the African continent were the most deadly
in its entire history. Today there exist many hotbeds of tension with the most barbaric
atrocities committed, as is the case in Nigeria. Even if Togo has been spared armed
conflict so far, it has experienced its own moments of tension, the considerable
human consequences of which should not be forgotten. Rather, all actors involved in
controlling the proliferation of SALW should constantly bear this in mind.
The study revealed that the extent of the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons in the country is a cause for concern. Most of the actors involved in data
collection recognize the dangerous nature of the traffic in Togo.
All the actions of the forces of law and order to date have not succeeded in curbing
the phenomenon.
Smugglers continue to carry out their trade easily either through the borders with the
complicity of other actors, or through the forest or unmanned routes.
Small arms and light weapons continue to circulate and facilitate the perpetration of
criminal acts, armed robbery, holdups, and highway robberies.
The phenomenon is deeply entrenched due to the vulnerability of the youths and
smugglers who support the crime and all its consequences. The porous borders and
the inadequate control equipment, the obsolete nature of legal instruments, the
cunning of the smugglers and its geographical position make Togo a country of illicit
production and transit of SALW.
66 / References
REFERENCES
•
Ÿ
Ÿ
Amonaou KATAKA, Etude sur la capacité nationale de production des armes
légères et de petit calibre et des munitions au Togo, Rapport de mission, 2005
[Study on the national craft production capacity of SALW and amunitions in
Togo, Mission Report, 2005]
SIMBIA Kpatcha (2009), « La circulation anarchique des armes légères et de petits
calibres, source d'insécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest: Cas du Togo. [The anarchical
circulation of small arms and light weapons, source of insecurity in West Africa:
the case of Togo]
Rapport national de l'année 2009 de la CNLPAL [CNLPAL National yearly Report
2009]
ILLICIT ARMS ROUTES AND CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
THE SITUATION IN BENIN
Théonas MOUSSOU
Table of Content /THE SITUATION IN BENIN / 69
Table of Content
Introduction
70
I. Background and justification
71
II-
71
Methodological framework of the research
2.1. Preliminary survey, identification of target group and survey
71
2.2
Method of data collection : samples and selection criteria
72
2.3
Conduct of the Survey
72
2.4
Data Processing and Analysis
73
2.5
Difficulties and limitations of the study
73
III- Presentation and interpretation of results
73
3.1
State of trafficking of SALW in Benin
73
3.2
Characteristics of seized arms and their statistics over the last 5 years
73
3.3
Supply or production zones, circulation, caches, destinations and final use
76
3.4
Existing legal and institutional framework : Strengths and weaknesses
79
3.5
Actions of regional and international institutions
83
IV- Way forward and recommendations
84
4.1 To the State
84
4.2 To civil society and national non-state institutions
86
4.3 To international and bilateral partners
87
4.4
87
To the United Nations
Conclusion
88
70 / Introduction
Introduction
Situated in West Africa and on the Gulf of Guinea, Benin is bordered in the north by
the river Niger, in the north-west by Burkina Faso, in the west by Togo, in the east by
Nigeria, and in the south by the Atlantic Ocean. It covers an area of 114,763 Km2. The
population, estimated at 8,497,827 according to the 2009 figures of INSAE (National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis), has an annual growth rate estimated at
3.25%. The distribution of the population by age group shows that 46.7% are less
than 15 years old, 47.9% are aged between 15 and 60 years old and 5.3% are over 60
years old. This shows that the Beninois population is predominantly youth.
Benin is made up of 12 departments, 77 communes, 546 arrondissements and 3,747
villages and city-quarters. It has more than 3,000Km of borders with four countries
including Nigeria. The towns and villages along these borders are sparsely populated.
Following its independence, Benin's development was slowed down by political
instability caused by a succession of coups d'état. But as from 1990, it embraced a
multi-party system and liberal economy. Thereafter, many institutions of the republic
guaranteed and legalised freedom, social justice, social and economic welfare, press
and religious freedom etc. These are the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court,
the High Audio-visual and Communication Council, Economic and Social Council,
which are governed by the December 11, 1990 constitution. Thus, Benin adopted a
presidential system and instituted democratic checks and balances, whilst respecting
the principle of separation of powers. Since 1991 the country has been experiencing
relative stability with successive democratic dispensations.
Security is a fundamental right and the responsibility of the State. Article 15 of the
December 11, 1990 Constitution is clear on the issue of security, providing that each
individual has the right to life, to freedom, to security and to personal integrity.
But each day that passes, the Beninese are faced with increasing insecurity. Crime
abounds in cities and highways. The Beninese have not forgotten the repeated armed
robbery attacks at Dantokpa market.
Petty crimes and attacks are frequent both in the cities and on the roads. Cases of
roadblocks followed by armed robbery also occur. The crime and insecurity have a fear
relationship with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as shall be
demonstrated by this survey.
This climate of insecurity and crime affects all West African States. Armed conflict has
aggravated the insecurity and destabilized some ECOWAS States, bringing in its wake
the proliferation of small arms.
Background and justification
/ 71
I – BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
The Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria corridor is a transit zone for a huge quantity of
arms in West Africa. This seems to be the origin of the proliferation of the illicit arms
trade which provides weapons for Coup d'état, rebel movements, civil wars and other
forms of organised crime and armed violence which ravage the sub-region. The
frequent seizure of small arms and light weapons in some ports of the coastal
countries and in some of their land borders tend to confirm the assumption.
Given that the extent of the phenomenon and its mechanisms are not yet fully
understood, and in the absence of empirical data on the actual flow of arms (actors,
types of arms, role of craft production) and of an analysis of its causes and enabling
conditions, advocacy actions and indeed legislation on the menace have not achieved
the desired results.
II- METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
The approach chosen is essentially qualitative and is based on individual or group
interviews.
2.1 Organisation of the study: Pre-survey, identification of target groups,
survey
Before the field study, data collection tools were developed and a literature review
was completed.
2.1.1 Development and validation of data collection tools
Two sorts of tools were developed: a discussion guide and a data collection chart.
With the aid of the interview guide, service officials, organised groups and resource
persons were interviewed. A data collection chart was also developed and used to
harness information from database sources.
2.1.2
Literature review
With the literature review, we were able to obtain available information on the SALW
situation in Benin, from documentary resources and from the internet.
To this end, we consulted the library of the National Commission for the Control of the
Proliferation of Small Arms. This Commission has already conducted surveys, the
results of which are available and were useful for this mission. They include the 2009
report of the national survey on the proliferation of small arms in Benin. We also
consulted the papers presented at the conference on “Security and Proliferation of
Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS: the situation in Benin” organised in
Cotonou by the Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (IRIES) of the
72 / Methodological framework of the research
Benin Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung (FES).
Internet search engines also enabled us to appreciate the international dimension of
the problem of SALW in Benin.
2.2 Data Collection Method
The study concentrated on sensitive zones. These zones are considered to be crime
prone on account of two major factors: proximity to Nigeria and the high level of local
arms fabricating activities.
The study was done in with the involvement of the immigration, gendarmerie and
customs at major border posts between Benin and Nigeria: Seme-Krake, Owode,
Igolo, Kilibo, Chikandu, Neganzi.
Certain agencies, responsible for seizure, centralisation, destruction or securing of
intercepted arms were also consulted, in order to obtain the approximate number of
arms seized during a given period. They were:
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
The Customs and Immigration Services at the Cotonou free port.
The Customs and Immigration Services at the Cotonou airport.
The Directorate of Public Security
The National Directorate of the Gendarmerie
The Directorate-General of Forestry and Natural Resources
The Directorate-General of Customs
In addition, special attention was given to some important border posts such as those
between Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo, particularly Ouake and Porga.
Lastly, some local gunsmiths were selected in Gogunu, Bembereke, Kouande,
Copargo, Lokossa, Applahoue, Misserete, Ketou, Agbangnizoun and Abomey to fill
the questionnaire. The survey took place from February 10 to March 20 2012.
2.3 Data Processing and Analysis
The data collected were classified according to different sections of the research.
Quantitative data were processed by zone and by centre of interest in order to
generate a national trend.
Qualitative data served to back up the major conclusions which stemmed from the
quantitative analysis and vice versa.
Methodological framework of the research
/ 73
2.4 Difficulties and limitations of the study
The major difficulty of this study is that the data on arms seizure was not easily
accessible. It was not possible to determine the countries of origin of persons arrested
for the possession and illegal use of SALW. That constituted a significant limitation to
the study which was expected to determine the countries of origin of traffickers and
the transit countries for SALW. Unfortunately such data was not available to enrich
the observations and analysis.
III. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
3.1. State of trafficking of SALW in Benin
Security is assuming importance in public and private, individual and collective
opinions, both in big cities where there is a growing perception of insecurity and on
the highways.
Apart from cases not reported to the police and to the gendarmerie, between 2009
and 2011, Benin experienced a total of 335 armed attacks on 246 persons, with 20
motorcycles, 61 cars, close to 180 mobile telephones and more than FCFA 943,
270,335 stolen. More than 191 persons lost their lives as a result of those armed
attacks.
Most of the crimes mentioned above were committed with the use of small arms and
light weapons. This shows a correlation between insecurity and the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons in Benin.
3.2 Characteristics of seized arms and their statistics over the last 5 years
A close look at seized arms shows that they are of two categories: locally made craft
weapons and modern ones that come from outside the country.
3.2.1 Locally made craft arms in Benin
Craft arms are made by both Beninese gunsmiths and artisans from other parts of
West Africa.
In Benin, there are more than 350 local artisans who engage in arms production. The
last count organised by National Commission for Fight Against Proliferation of Small
Arms, CNLCPAL, dates back to 2006.
In 2009, a study by the CNLCPAL on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
revealed that on the average, a Beninese artisan makes two arms per week. This
74 / Presentation and interpretation of results
research confirms that trend, as 87 out of the 120 artisans interviewed said they were
able to make no more than two arms per week; 14 claim to make two to three per
week while the remaining 9 could not make more than one per week.
It should be noted, however, that arms are not necessarily produced on a weekly basis.
Production varies according to demand.
The main clients for local makers of arms are hunters and all those who have
expressed the desire to own arms. 92% of the 120 craft gunsmiths interviewed said
that hunters were their major clients. 76% replied that people desiring to be armed
for personal protection patronise them. Herein lays the complexity of local arms
manufacturing. For the local gunsmiths, arms manufacturing is a means of providing
for their families, but some observers consider this trade a threat to peace and
security. According to these observers, the absence of a mechanism to control local
arms manufacturing and the inability to trace their clients are elements that can only
fuel crime and insecurity.
A close look at the types of arms made by local artisans reveals two types. There are
shotguns and handguns which are generally automatic pistols. The seizures also
revealed the existence of Baikal (from the former Soviet Union) among craft arms in
Benin.
In response to the enquiry as to why local artisans were not satisfied with producing
only shotguns, 85% of them justified their attitude by referring to the desire to “test
their genius” and win prices at shows that exhibit indigenous know-how and
technology.
3.2.2 Modern arms
Illicit modern arms seized in Benin at border posts and other checkpoints in the big
cities are post-cold War weapons. Indeed, the arms manufacturing technology and
developed significantly since the end of the Second World War. Consequently
countries of both the North and the South have been able to strengthen their military
might by setting up arms manufacturing industries. With the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, and the breakdown of State structures in the torment East Bloc
countries, the industries of the North were transferred easily to the countries of the
South, particularly Africa.
With regard to the loss of arms, discussions with the high military command and
police and gendarmerie officials show there are very few losses from the national
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 75
stock. They acknowledge, however, that this assertion should be qualified because of
the occasional loss recorded among body guards. Some defence and security officers
also lose their government issued weapons, while there are some cases of theft in
some garrisons.
Although unable to give figures, they consider the losses insignificant, in light of the
scope of the phenomenon.
3.2.3 Types and statistics of seized arms over the last 5 years
The table below provide an idea of the characteristics and statistics of seized arms and
ammunitions. It should be noted however, that the picture is incomplete due to the
absence of some data such as statistics from the customs services.
This table shows that there really exists illegal circulation of small arms in Benin.
Notably, locally made arms are more in number and it is important to draw some
lessons from that. The real issue is to know where the modern arms come from, their
caches and the means of circulation employed by the traffickers.
Department
Weapons
Homemade
weapons
ATACORA
DONGA
BORGOU
ALIBORA
MONO
COUFFO
ZOU
COLLINE
ATLANTIQUE
LITTORAL
OUEME
PLATEAU
Handguns
Number
Modern
weapons
Ammunitions
Number
Types
10
Caliber 12
8mm cartridge
Shotguns
31
Handguns
11
Shotguns
50
Baikal
01
Handguns
67
AKM
13
Shotguns
09
SMG rifles
01
Pump rifles
05
Revolver
01
Automatic
pistols
06
TOTAL : Confiscated arms and
ammunitions
Number
179
26
All calibers
(12- 7,8-7,62- 9,
ect.)
05
3678
3683
76 / Presentation and interpretation of results
3.3 Supply or production zones, routes, caches, destinations and final uses
Apart from locally owned arms workshops, Benin has no official arms manufacturing
factory. It is therefore clear that modern arms which are in circulation in Beninese
territory come from other countries and cannot come in except through zones which
are not monitored, hence the need to trace their routes.
3.3.1 Mode of penetration and routes of small arms in Benin
Generally, arms come into Benin by air. The seizures reveal that a significant number
of sophisticated arms also come by sea through the Cotonou free port. Since 2005,
the special arms monitoring unit established by the CNLCPAL has intercepted
weapons carefully concealed in containers and used vehicles which arrive at the
Cotonou port by ship.
Other modes of SALW penetration exist as well. The rivers Oueme, Mono and Niger,
are the main channels of transit. Some land routes are also used. They include the
areas along the borders with Togo (Hillacondji, Tohoun, Athiémé, Tchetti, Ouaké,
Kprèkètè, Agouna) ; with Burkina-Faso (Porga, Concombi, Kérémou, Kabagou) ; with
Niger (Malanville, Karimama) ; and with Nigeria( Sèmè-Kraké, Owodé, Ifangni, Igolo,
Illara, Pobè, Kétou, Kaboua, Kilibo, Kabo, Sandilo, Chikandou, Néganzi).
These towns are the main points of penetration of small arms and light weapons into
Benin. Illicit arms in circulation are also found in zones designated as crime-prone.
They are towns with a tendency for crime, not only on account of the development of
crime with the use of small arms, but also they have craft arms workshops. Such town
include Natitingou, Bassila, Porga and Tanguiéta in Atacora and Donga departments;
the towns of Ouidah, Abomey-Calavi, as well as Hwlacondji, Akpakpa dodomè ,
Zongo quarters in Cotonou in the Atlantique and Littoral departments; Ségbanan,
Kandi, Malanville, Tchaourou, Parakou, N'dali, and Banikoara in Borgou and Alibori
departments; the most notorious towns are Aplahoué, Klouékanmè, Comé, Dogbo
and Lalo in Mono and Couffo departments; Sakété, Dangbo, Sèmè-Kpodji, Banigbé,
Ifangni, Avrankou, Adjara, Akpro-Missérété, Pobè and Kétou in Ouémé and Plateau
departments; and Djidja, Agbangnizoun, Kilibo, Zakpota, Sèto, Agonlin,
Zangnanado, Zogbodomey, Massi, Dassa-Zoumè, Savalou, Bantè, Abomey, Ouèssè
and Savè.in Zou and Collines departments.
The border posts have not been able to take any successful measures to trace the
routes from the neighbouring countries into Benin. However, at all borders with Benin
arms have been seized, either coming from or going into the neighbouring country. It
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 77
is evident, then, that Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and indeed, Benin, are transit
countries for illicit SALW.
Moreover, since 2009, piracy has been developing on the maritime coasts of Cotonou
which could well favour the proliferation of small arms.
3.3.2 Arms caches
The different types of organized arms caches were identified in the course of
information gathering. First there are the caches discovered during searches at border
posts or airports. Arms and ammunitions seized at border posts are often concealed in
baggage inside 4 wheel or 2 wheel vehicles, or on motor cycles, or even by pedestrian
porters. Sometimes coffins transporting corpses from one country to the other are
used as caches for arms and ammunitions. Inside the vehicles, the arms are hidden
under the seats.
In the case of arms and ammunitions seized at the Cotonou Port, it was observed that
second hand vehicles and containers were used as caches.
Out of the 125 local arms manufacturers interviewed, 57% hide arms in the ceiling of
their houses and 33% under the bed. 10% dug holes in the ground to conceal arms.
The analysis reveals that the local artisans are well aware that trading in arms is
prohibited, which is why they know that they cannot openly sell the arms they
produce.
3.3.3 Final Destinations and end users
Final destinations and end uses also vary. In Benin, small arms and light weapons end
up in the hands of three categories of persons: hunters, those who want to ensure
their own security and criminals.
Local gunsmiths were asked about the profile of their clients. 77% of the 125 persons
interviewed said that their main clients were hunters, 21% believe that their usual
clients are those who buy for their own security. No percentage was recorded for the
variable “criminal use”. It follows that the end uses indicated in the present study are
hunting and self-defence. To the extent that no measure has been put in place either
for tracing buyers or for marking locally made arms, the reasons given for acquiring
arms from local artisans are not always true. Obviously craft arms are used in criminal
activities. Many of them are generally used for criminal purposes. Between 2009 and
2011, 211 armed attacks were officially recorded in the country.One can only imagine
the number of cases not declared to the police or gendarmerie.
78 / Presentation and interpretation of results
Apart from criminal purposes, the seizures by the national gendarmerie provide
insight into other destinations and end users. They include conflicts resulting from
transhumance, armed robbery assassinations, violence, poaching. Indeed, out of 34
reasons for seizing small arms, 7 are related to transhumance conflicts, 8 to armed
robbery, 15 to murder, and 15 to other forms of violence (threat, deliberate assault
and battery etc.)
3.3.4 Causes and consequences of trafficking in SALW and profile of
traffickers
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has social, economic and
environmental consequences, in addition to increasing the spate of insecurity.
Socially the people live in fear and insecurity, because certain places and times are
known to be unsafe. The night is considered unsafe and places such as the beach,
Dantokpa market, neighborhoods such as Akpakpa, Dodome, Wlakodji in Cotonou,
as well as banks, commercial centers and classified forests in Ouidah, Zogbodomey
and Setto etc.
It has been observed that people hesitate to buy luxury cars. Also there is an increasing
tendency towards self-defence with the acquisition of weapons (tear gas, portable
electric shock device, pen knife) and sometimes SALW.
The use of SALW is also an impediment to social cohesion. In Benin it has resulted in
constant conflict between farmers and nomadic livestock breeders.
Economically, it has been observed that economic operators are reluctant to invest in
an environment where one might attract the attention of miscreants. Similarly, the
reluctance to buy cars, motor cycles or to invest in a bank or a commercial centre
create an impediment to economic growth. Car snatching along the highways reduce
the level of financial investment and therefore slow down the development of the
country.
Environmentally, the proliferation of small arms has consequences for biodiversity. It is
a threat to the survival and growth of fauna, and upsets the ecosystem.
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 79
3.4 Existing legal and institutional framework: strengths and
weaknesses
3.4.1. Legal framework
The State of Benin has responded to the circulation of illicit small arms and its
consequences. But there is room for improvement. The responses relate to the legal
and institutional framework put in place to control the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons.
3.4.1.1 Presentation of legal framework
Decree no. 61/39/PR/MI/AM of February 7, 1961 sets forth the regime of arms and
ammunitions and the provisions of the criminal code which constitute the legal
framework for small arms in Benin. It covers all firearms, ammunitions and related
materials for personal use, but excludes firearms and ammunitions for the use of
troops, police or any other public law enforcement agency.
The decree provides for the acquisition, importation, surrender, manufacture,
transfer, possession and carrying of arms by individuals. Strict prohibition is the
principle that governs firearms in Benin. Under clearly defined conditions, however,
individuals may be granted a waiver. The surrender, transfer, exchange, loan, loss, as
well as importation, exportation, and possession of ammunitions and other related
materials from one individual to another, or from one territory to another, are
regulated. Article 14 of the decree of 1961 provides that nobody may surrender, free
of charge or for a fee, any arms or ammunitions of whig he has legal possession
without special authorization of the Minister of Interior.
The decree provides that an individual or an enterprise wishing to invest in the
manufacture, export, marketing or warehousing of arms and ammunitions, shall
apply first to the Minister of Interior and Public Security.
Trading in all categories of sophisticated arms is prohibited in Benin except for
businesses that wish to serve as intermediary for orders made outside the country by
persons who have received prior authorization to import and possess such arms.
Importation and transportation of ammunitions and related materials are also subject
to prior authorization by the Minister of Interior under clearly defined conditions.
80 / Presentation and interpretation of results
Ÿ
Ÿ
With regard to warehousing, the decree distinguishes between warehousing in
the government powder magazines - the conditions of operation of government
powder magazines are kept secret for strategic and sensitive reasons;
Warehousing in commercial warehouses.
3.4.1.2 Strengths of the Benin legal framework
The decree has the following strengths:
Ÿ The basic principle of the regulation is prohibition. It is the manifestation of a
strong desire to control, as contained in regional agreements:
Ÿ The decree on quota restrictions seems to be an effective instrument of control;
Ÿ A priori, the principle of control is a good intention in that surrender, exchange,
transfer, loss, loan and inheritance are often monitored and subject to prior
authorization;
Ÿ Manufacture and marketing are delicate activities subject to control;
Ÿ There is no succession in the matter of arms (article 9 of the decree of 1961)
3.4.1.3. Weaknesses of the Benin legal framework
Decree no. 61/39/PR/MI/AM of February 7, 1961 regulating arms and ammunitions in
the Republic of Benin does not conform to current realities.
It is observed that the sanctions prescribed - deprivation of liberty and fines - are no
longer applicable. The provisions of the Decree are weak and do not match the gravity
of the related criminal offences. Article 55 of the 1961 decree provides that violations
of the Decree are punishable by either a fine of 1 to 1,200 Francs or 1 to 5 days in
prison or both. Second offenders are always punished by a prison sentence. There is
insufficient provision for arms tracing, marking, and transit, ammunitions and related
materials, nor for brokerage.
3.4.2 Institutional framework
The institutional mechanism put in place to combat the proliferation of SALW is made
up of a certain number of key actors; in particular this refers to the state through the
CNLCPAL among others, which act as the national coordinating body, and the civil
society among others.
The role of the State is perceived through the intervention of some ministries which
network provides security structure. The latter is made up of four structures which
ensure national territorial defence and integrity and three paramilitary bodies which
ensure the missions administrative policing, maintenance of order and judiciary
policing. But some weaknesses undermine the institutional framework.
Presentation and interpretation of results
/ 81
3.4.2.1. Presentation of institutional framework
The following agencies are responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of the
nation:
Ÿ The Directorate-General of the National Gendarmerie (DGGN)
Ÿ The Army Headquarters (EMAT)
Ÿ The Naval Headquarters (EMFN)
Ÿ The Air Force Headquarters (EMFA)
The paramilitary agencies are:
The Directorate-General of the National Police (DGPN)
The Directorate-General of Forestry and Natural Resources (DGFRN)
The Directorate-General of Customs and Excise (DGDDI)
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
All these agencies perform their statutory functions, which in this case relate to:
protection of the national arms stock
collection, seizure and destruction, where applicable, of surplus, obsolete or
illegally transported arms on Benin territory
Ÿ management and control of borders.
Ÿ
Ÿ
The country's stock of weapons as well as the zones in which they are stored, known
as Sensitive Military Zones, are well protected today, thanks to the dynamism of the
agencies mentioned above. Military officers responsible for the security of the
weapons and their stores have also received specialised.
In addition, managing the national stock means keeping a general inventory made up
of permanent documents such as registers, accounting vouchers and circulars (tax
and payment advice) and supporting vouchers.
Finally, the administrative and technical supervision of weaponry takes the form of
periodic reviews and visits. In accordance with the terms of these reviews, arms not in
use or declared useless are disassembled and decommissioned.
Four agencies, the Police, the Gendarmerie, the Coast and Forest Guards and the
Customs are responsible for the collection and seizure of illicit arms trafficked in
Benin territory. Between 2009 and 2011, the Police and the Gendarmerie seized more
than 215 arms of which 181 were manufactured locally. More than 1505
ammunitions were also seized by the Gendarmerie 21 . As regards border
21
Confer statistics of arms and ammunitions seized during the 2009-2011 period by the Directorate-General
of the National Gendarmerie and the Directorate-General of the National Police
82 / Presentation and interpretation of results
administration and control, effective measures were taken to acquire modern
equipment and train human resources.
Some tangible results have also been achieved in the fight against crime. In effect,
progress has been made by the security and defence forces in pursuing and arresting
armed robbers.
At regional level, Benin collaborates closely with other states in the area of border
administration and security. To that end, constant exchanges of information and
strategies take place between joint patrol units as well as INTERPOL services.
In addition to these efforts to control the proliferation of SALW, a National
Commission for the Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLCPAL) was
established in 2003 and it has contributed to improving the results in the fight against
the proliferation of SALW through:
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Capacity building for different categories of people (military and paramilitary,
journalists, NGO's, local arms manufacturers, etc.) on different topics relating to
the phenomenon, legislation, and techniques of detection, marking, tracing and
destruction;
Organisation of exchanges of experiences between the National Commissions of
neighbouring countries;
Participation in local intervention missions in arms and ammunitions seizure;
Establishment of an arms and ammunitions surveillance and seizure unit at the
Cotonou free port;
General census of local arms manufacturers;
Organisation of public information and awareness campaigns through radio
programs, road shows, etc.
Finally, more and more civil society groups are working in collaboration with CNLCPAL
to reduce the proliferation of SALW. They include RASALEB, ALCRER, WANEP, and the
Network of Journalists.
3.4.2.2. Some weaknesses of the institutional mechanism
An analysis of the problems hampering the success of the strategies revealed the
following weaknesses:
Ÿ
Seized arms are scattered throughout the various services (port, gendarme
barracks, police stations, coast and forest guards departments, court registries,
customs offices, etc.). They are not always stored in secure conditions.
Presentation and interpretation of results
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
/ 83
Today there is no up-to-date database on the number and types of arms seized
because there are no statistics available for analysis and projections.
Existing licenses are not managed efficiently and so cannot provide up-to-date,
reliable statistics or information on the identity of holders.
Local authorities (city councils) are not involved in policies to control the
proliferation of light arms.
The time spent studying applications is generally long (about two years); the
result in attempted fraud, illegal possession and trafficking of arms.
The low level of NGO involvement in the fight against SALW slows down
sensitisation of the grass root population.
3.5 Actions of regional and international institutions
West Africa's international priorities are based on the action of the United Nations
and continental and regional organsations. A lot of initiatives to control the illicit
proliferation of SALW have been taken since the early 1990s, either in
implementation of international standards, United Nations recommendations or
continental resolutions, or in the application of specific provisions of regional
agreements.
The prevailing situation in Africa at the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975, was
dictated by the Cold War. There were persistent threats to the stability of States. Very
quickly peace and security were seen as major challenges that ECOWAS had to tackle
in order to promote the economic development of the sub-region.
The internal conflicts which have been on the increase in some ECOWAS countries in
recent years as well as the illicit circulation and trafficking of light arms have given rise
to several initiatives taken to establish a defence, peace and security policy. Among
them are:
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters;
The 1998 moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small
aArms.
The 1999 Lome Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution;
The establishment in 2000, of National Commissions for the Control of the
Proliferation of Small Arms, at the instance of ECOWAS.
Moreover, the inauguration of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP) in
Bamako was a follow-up to the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security
84 / Way forward and recommendations
and Development (PCASED). The objective of this program is to contribute to
strengthening the capabilities of ECOWAS States to develop a global approach and
response capacity to small arms and light weapons, in a context of conflict prevention,
development and good governance in West Africa. In spite of the end of the ECOSAP
programme, these initiatives show the strong motivation of the West African regional
organisation to be part of the process, hitherto driven by local actors and some
NGO's, for border cooperation for economic development, mobility, enhanced
security and closer ties among peoples.
Finally in 2006, ECOWAS member states decided to transform the ECOWAS
Moratorium into a “Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their
Ammunitions and other Related Materials”. That convention was adopted on June
14, 2006 in Abuja by the Heads of State and Government of member States. It was a
demonstration of the political will and determination of States to achieve the
objectives of the Moratorium Declaration and in the Code of Conduct for the
Implementation of the Moratorium.
With the coming into force of the ECOWAS convention on SALW in 2009, a process
was created within member States not only to harmonise their national legislation
with this sub-regional instrument, but also to synergise national strategic action plans
and ensure greater convergence at regional level, to better fight the illicit circulation
and use of SALW in the ECOWAS region.
IV- WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The extent and consequences of illicit circulation of light arms call for certain
recommendations, the urgent consideration of which could contribute to reducing
the phenomenon significantly. Four (4) groups of recommendations can be proffered:
Ÿ improving the legal framework;
Ÿ providing greater security for armouries;
Ÿ relaunching joint arms monitoring patrols along Benin's borders with its
neighbours;
Ÿ increasing State commitment.
These lines of action are directed towards different actors involved in the fight against
the phenomenon.
4.1 To the State
The recommendations to the State include:
Way forward and recommendations
/ 85
4.1.1 Improving the legal framework on arms in the Republic of Benin
It devolves on the State to improve the legal regime. In view of the numerous
consequences of illicit arms trafficking on social and economic life, it is important that
the government take steps to pass a law on the legal administration of arms in Benin
to replace the 1961 Decree which has been obsolete for many decades. The process
started recently at the National Assembly, but has stalled at the point of passing the
law. Instructions should be given to the Minister of Interior, Public Security and
Religious Affairs and his counterpart of Defence to resume work on the draft bill in
collaboration with the CNLCPAL, and find appropriate ways and means of lobbying
for the law to be passed without major hitches.
Among other things, the bill should increase the penalties and sanctions for offenders
violating different legal provisions and contain special provisions to regulate the craft
arms manufacturing sector.
4.1.2 Re-launching and maintaining joint arms monitoring patrols along
Benin's borders with its neighbours
It was observed that most illicit arms come into Benin by land and sea. This is as a
result of the limitations of State land border surveillance policy. The State is unable to
control the porosity of borders, and can only count on the efforts of the law
enforcement officers at the border posts. It is hoped, however, that the Benin-Nigeria
joint patrols meant to discourage arms traffic in sensitive zones along the border
localities between Benin and Nigeria where the phenomenon is most visible, should
be resumed and reinforced and even extended to other neighbouring countries such
as Niger, Burkina Faso and Togo.
4.1.3 Providing greater security for armouries
It has been observed that the administration and security of stocks in Benin are so well
organised that loss of arms is considered insignificant, but at the same time the
present condition of arms depots does not guarantee total security. Indeed, some of
the existing armouries date back to the colonial era and are not totally secure. The
arms warehouses also serve as living quarters for the personnel in charge, which is a
threat to human safety. Besides, the arms warehouses are not equipped with facilities
for the day to day needs of the guards who are forced to go off their duty posts for
washing, feeding, communication, etc. This explains the occasional theft of arms
which occurs once the guard is distracted by other human needs.
86 / Way forward and recommendations
It would be necessary to build modern arms depots able to provide greater security,
and separating the arms depot from the living quarters of the guards.
4.1.4 The need to increase State commitment to the control of illicit
circulation of SALW
The State has signed nearly all international instruments relating to the control of illicit
circulation of SALW. It has established a national commission for the control of the
proliferation of small arms to which it allocates an operational budget. All these
actions no doubt reflect commitment and strong political will. However, given the
extent of the phenomenon, more needs to be done to sensitize the masses, local arms
makers, defence and security forces, hunters etc. on the dangers of illicit circulation of
small arms and light weapons. It should also adopt a more efficient method of
organizing and supervising local artisans. But it follows that government commitment
should increase, not only in terms of decisions to be taken to facilitate the
implementation of strategies to reduce the phenomenon, but also in terms of
financing for such strategies. The present level of State commitment is insufficient to
guarantee the smooth development of all these strategies. This is why it is desirable
that advocacy be addressed to the State to raise its level of commitment.
4.2. To the Civil Society and non-State institutions
The civil society is conspicuously absent from the fight against the proliferation of illicit
SALW. This is understandable the danger of proliferation of small arms is still too low
to fully mobilise civil society organizations and even technical and financial partners.
The Benin civil society should be mindful of the danger of illicit circulation of small
arms as it is of certain evils such as child trafficking, violence against women and
children etc. The actions of the few NGOs working in the area of SALW go almost
unnoticed. The work of these NGOs should be visible nationwide so that
governments and technical and financial partners can pool efforts to ensure its
elimination. RASALEB, which is already working in that direction, could reach out to
other associations and enlarge its scope of action in such a way as to establish:
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
a network of craft manufacturers of SALW;
a network of journalists against the proliferation of SALW;
a network of local representatives against the proliferation of SALW in their
respective constituencies
All these networks could mobilise their respective communities, especially during
awareness campaigns, to surrender illicit arms for destruction and also conduct
Way forward and recommendations
/ 87
advocacy towards local manufacturers, and towards the State and technical and
financial partners in favour of greater attention to the problem of SALW in their
intervention programmes.
4.3 To international and bilateral partners
The issue of SALW is a rallying point for all mankind today. Nobody can remain
indifferent to the consequences of illicit circulation of SALW, considering that security
has become a serious, cross cutting developmental issue. By way of example, water
shortage in a community can cause uprisings during which arms are used. Another
example is the increasingly frequent clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers
over grazing land. International and bilateral cannot afford to remain on the sidelines
of this problem, knowing that the proliferation of SALW is a clear menace to their
actions in the country. That is why it is recommended that they:
Ÿ
Ÿ
accept to expand their scope of operations to include the control of the
proliferation of illicit SALW;
collaborate with the State and civil society organizations in organizing
programmes to combat the proliferation of SALW.
4.4.
To the United Nations
The international community seems to have lost its authority over fundamental issues
including the trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In spite of the international
legal instruments regulating the manufacture, transfer and circulation of arms, the
number of arms in circulation rises daily. This shows that the directives of the
international community are not always followed and more stringent measures will
need to be taken to ensure that international standards are respected. Sanctions
should be applicable to States that violate the standards.
Performance indicators on the reduction of illicit circulation of SALW should be
developed and applied to every country, in much the same way that standards exist to
measure the human development index, the level of governance or the freedom of
the press in a country.
88 / Conclusion
CONCLUSION
Trafficking in SALW exists in West Africa. Being neither an arms producing country nor
a country in crisis means there are virtually no arms caches beyond the traditional use
for hunting or personal protection. The few caches that exist are in private homes.
However, homes or workshops of local gunsmiths and criminals and robbers using
these weapons can also be considered as caches.
Land routes are essentially the means through which arms come into Benin on
account of the porous nature of the borders. The seaways also being used more and
more.
Illicit arms circulating in Benin are used in social conflicts (farmers and herdsmen, selfdefence and hunting).
In all cases, arms trafficked in Benin come mainly from local production and
appropriate solutions need to be found to that. The consequences on the socioeconomic life and human safety call for the State to commit fully to waging a
relentless war against the phenomenon. Such a commitment should result in putting
in place an appropriate legal framework and mobilizing necessary resources for the
development of strategies for the eradication of the phenomenon. It is also important
that the civil society and technical and financial partners play an active role alongside
the government to implement the various strategies.
References
/ 89
REFERENCES
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Kisito Marie OWONA ALIMA; La prolifération et la circulation illicite des armes
légères et de petit calibre en Afrique Centrale: Etude du phénomène et analyse
critique des mécanismes de contrôle de ces armes, Université de Yaoundé 2 Master en stratégie, défense, sécurité et gestion des conflits et catastrophes 2007
(The proliferation and circulation of Small Arms and Light weapon in Central
Africa : study on the phenomenon and critical analysis of the control mechanism
of arms, University of Yaounde 2, 2007)
Statistics of arms and ammunition seizures during 2009-2011 by the
Gendarmerie Nationale and Police Headquaters
Chabi Dramane Bouko : La circulation des armes légères et de petit calibre en
Afrique de l'ouest: contribution à une étude au programme de désarmement,
2004. (Small Arms and Light weapon proliferation in West Africa: contribution to
the disarmament programme), 2004
ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARMS CACHES BETWEEN
GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA
THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA
Augustine Ikelegbe Ph. D
With the Assistance of
Joseph Ochongwu, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja
TowmwarriEgeran, University of Benin, Benin City.
Surulola Eke, University of Benin, Benin City.
Table of Content /THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA / 93
Table of Content
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
95
1. INTRODUCTION
96
1.1 BACKGROUND
97
2. METHODOLOGY
99
2.1 CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL ISSUES
99
2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
99
3. PROLIFERATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
3.1 THE ECONOMICS OF SALW: DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND PRICES
102
102
3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
102
3.3 TYPE AND DISTRIBUTION
103
4. SOURCES OF SALW
103
4.1 ARMS CACHES
104
4.2 ILLICIT CRAFT PRODUCTION
105
4.3 ARMS RE-CIRCULATION
107
4.4 ARMS AGENTS AND DEALERS
108
5. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW TRAFFICKING
110
5.1 SALW TRAFFICKING IN NIGERIA
110
5.2 REGIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING
112
5.2.1 Land Borders
112
5.2.2 Maritime Borders
113
6. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
116
6.1 REGULATORY POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT
116
6.2 COLLECTION AND DESTRUCTION
117
6.3 RETRIEVAL AND INTERCEPTIONS OF ILLICIT SALW
118
6.4 DISARMAMENT
118
94 / Table of Content / THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA
7. FINDINGS
119
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
120
8.1 TO THE GOVERNMENTS
120
8.2 TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND CITIZENS
121
9. CONCLUSION
122
REFERENCES
124
APPENDIX
129
Executive Summary / 95
Executive Summary
This paper examines the phenomenon of the proliferation, use, and trafficking of illicit
small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Nigeria as part of an overall study on SALW
trafficking in West Africa. Particular emphasis was on the sources and methods of
SALW flows, and the existing regulatory policies and frameworks for SALW control.
In the last two decades, Nigeria has been particularly plagued by violent conflicts
including inter-communal and intra-communal and ethnic conflicts, ethno-religious
conflicts, inter-regional tensions, religious riots, and political conflicts. Nigeria has
become a huge market for domestic, regional, and international arms dealers and
syndicates; a major destination of SALW flows; and a centre of illicit trafficking. With
the government unable to provide security for its citizens in certain regions, many
have resulted to taking up arms and thus, driving the largest proliferation and use of
SALW in Nigeria's peacetime history.
The research team conducted a number of interviews with relevant persons as well as
conducted extensive desk research. The study utilized the country's six geo-political
zones and the federal capital territory as units for the research, which were selected
on the basis of centrality or relevance to SALW trafficking, production, and use. Based
on its findings the research team estimates that the number of illicit SALW in Nigeria
has at least doubled since the 2000-2003 estimates between one and three million to
between three to six million. The research team estimates that about 1 in 50 Nigerians
(mainly male, youth, middle and upper socio-economic classes) possess illicit arms.
The demand for SALW has risen in the last decade and with a consistent domestic
market and constant inflow, arms are widely and easily available. With an increase in
the arms-bearing groups and a rise in armed conflict and violent criminality major
conflict points in the country have extended. Legal SALW for official use have been
diverted to illegal use, mainly through leakages from unsecured official stockpiles of
security agencies. Illicit craft production in Nigeria is growing in sophistication and
provides more affordable arms. There is massive illicit SALW inflow through the
maritime borders, from Sahelian Africa through very porous northern borders, and
from West Africa through the South West borders.
Without effective controls or methods of deterrence, the already high levels of SALW
proliferation in Nigeria will continue to increase as will insecurity amongst citizens.
The existing laws need to be reviewed, as they are weak and inconsistent with the
current security challenges. There should be strict enforcement and compliance with
all firearms laws. A national arms control strategy must be adopted and accompanied
with an aggressive arms mop-up operation in conflict zones. Safeguarding Nigeria's
borders must also be a priority.
96 / Introduction
Introduction
With a population of over 167 million, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa.
The nation has vast human resources, enormous oil and gas reserves, expansive arable
land, and huge export earnings. After a period of prolonged military rule, democratic
presidential rule was instituted in 1999. The country faces the threat from terrorist
armed groups, violent crime and huge inequalities. It is estimated that there are 20
million unemployed youth (ECOWAS Commission 2011), which has been associated
with incidences of youth violence and participation in crime and conflict.
In the last two decades, the country has been particularly plagued by violent conflicts.
There have been inter-communal and intra-communal and ethnic conflicts, ethnoreligious conflicts, inter-regional tensions, religious riots, and political conflicts.
Different types of non- state actors (NSA) such as militias, religious groups, vigilantes
and youth groups often initiated conflicts. Armed criminal groups have taken to bank
robberies and kidnapping, and the federal government is facing challenges managing
its national security environment with large areas of the country lacking adequate
policing. As a result of these circumstances, insecurity has been a huge concern to
citizens.
The abovementioned situation has created a fertile ground for small arms and light
weapons (SALW) proliferation and Nigeria has become a significant market for
domestic, regional, and international arms dealers and syndicates; a major
destination of SALW flows; and a centre of illicit trade. This paper, therefore,
investigates the phenomenon of illicit arms proliferation, possession, use, and
trafficking in Nigeria, with particular emphasis on the sources and methods of SALW
flows, trafficking, production, recirculation, and the existing regulatory policies and
frameworks for SALW control.
First, a background about the political and contemporary context to understand arms
proliferation in Nigeria will be provided, followed by the objectives of the study. The
methodology section outlines the research method utilized, the limitations
experienced, and a brief conceptual and analytical clarification. Thereafter, the study
examines SALW proliferation and ownership structures, the sources of SALW,
patterns and methods of SALW flows both domestically and regionally, and the
regulatory frameworks for SALW control. Finally, the findings, policy
recommendations and concluding comments are presented.
Executive Summary / 97
1.1 Background
Immediately following independence in 1960, Nigeria experienced political tensions
and violence. Between 1962 and 1966 different ethnic and regional groups began
acquiring illicit arms in anticipation of a national crisis. Arms proliferation, however,
did not become a serious challenge until the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). During
the war, both the federal troops and rebels received weapons from the West, Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, neighbouring countries, and arms dealers. In absence of an
arms collection programme after the war these weapons became the first source of
massive proliferation leading to the emergence of violent criminality.
Serving military regimes between 1985 and 1999, the country experienced a rise in
criminality, youth gangs, and other non- state groups in a number of universities and
towns. As a result, there was an increase in communal, ethnic, and regional tensions
and conflicts; street protests and riots; militant movements; pervasive corruption; the
militarization of society; and lawlessness. These conditions drove the demand for
SALW and fuelled SALW proliferation throughout Nigeria. Arms became widely
available with returning soldiers smuggling in weapons after peacekeeping
operations, the production of local illicit weapons, and transnational trafficking by
arms dealers and smugglers (Best and Von Kemedi, 2005).
Many Nigerians viewed the emergence of democratic rule in 1999 as a celebration of
freedom including the opportunity to resist oppression and marginality. During this
time numerous militant movements emerged and constructed a regime of violent
engagements within and between ethnic groups, communities, and regions as well as
against the State and transnational companies. Violent political and electoral
struggles immediately before the 2003 general elections along with a massive rise in
violent criminality and insecurity led to an increased demand for SALW. With such a
large market, trafficking and trade in SALW reached unprecedented levels.
In most of Nigeria's geo-political zones (North Central, South East, South South and
South West) communal, ethnic, and ethno-religious conflicts have been fought with
advanced arms and used by various militia groups. Between 1997 and 2009 in the
South South (Niger Delta), various armed youth groups engaged with the federal
government, law enforcement agencies, and transnational oil companies in a low
intensity war over oil benefits and control. In the South West, between 1999 and
2005, a militia confronted the police and various non- state actors. In the South East,
an armed vigilante group emerged across several states in resistance to violent
criminality. In the South East, South West, and South South (Niger Delta), a regime of
98 / Introduction
rampant armed and violent criminality created an enormous sense of insecurity. Often
times criminals numbering 30 or more and with very sophisticated arms have attacked
banks, operated on the roads, and confronted law enforcement agents (Interview,
Lagos 29/2/12).
The South South, North East, and North Central regions have experienced incessant
violent ethno-communal conflicts over struggles for ownership of land and water in
which both sophisticated and locally made guns have been frequently used. The
seeming inability of the government to manage these conflicts has left room for them
to continue unabated. In parts of the South West, South East, and mainly the South
South, an armed gang culture has emerged in which youth groups, gangs, and
criminal syndicates use and flaunt SALW freely (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).
In the North East and North Central armed fundamentalist movements have emerged
periodically since the 1980s and have taken a toll on civilians and law enforcement
agencies. Currently, these regions continue to suffer the worst form of internal
security challenges arising from sectarian violence, terrorism, and urban guerrilla-like
warfare (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).
The recent emergence of atrocious violence conducted by Boko Harm and associated
socio-political groups are fuelling new proliferation and the rapid build-up of arms
stocks across the nation. Non-state groups (NSG) in the South South, South East, and
South West as well as former militia members have begun to arm themselves and
acquire more weapons in response to the Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, Lagos
29/2/12).
Methodology / 99
METHODOLOGY
The study is based on two principal sources of data: primary and secondary. Primary
data was derived from direct interviews with a range of relevant persons identified.
Interviews have been conducted with members of national governmental bodies in
charge of law enforcement and security as well as with non- governmental
organizations. The former include members of the police, state security services,
military taskforces, customs, Immigration, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence
Corp (NSCDC)), the National Committee on SALW (NATCOM) and state
governments. The remaining interviewees belonged to different types of non-state
armed groups such as members of militias, vigilante and youth groups; religious
groups; community and political leaders; blacksmiths and artisans; professional
drivers and traders; and university students.
Secondary data was obtained through library and internet-based desk research and
drawn from literature, reports, documents, newspapers, and magazines.
The sampling technique for the selection of communities and persons was purposive,
based on relevance to the objectives of the research.
The study utilized the country's six geo-political zones and the federal capital territory
as units for the research. Cities, towns, and communities within the zones were
selected on the basis of centrality or relevance to SALW trafficking, production, and
use. Thus, among others, interviews were carried out in Abuja, Port Harcourt, Awka,
Owerri, Asaba, Warri, Lagos, Seme, Ibadan, Jos, Wukari, and Kamba (see Appendix
1). In the coastal communities of the Niger Delta interviews were held at Agge,
Ekeremor, Amabolou, Buguma, Kula, Ijetu, Peremobiri, Olokpobiri, Oboro, Tuomo,
Torugbene, Ojoba, Ogbe-Ijo, and Okerenkoko (see Appendix 2). In total, 133
respondents were interviewed. The exact spatial and organizational distribution of
the respondents is presented in Appendix 1 and 2.
The primary data were analyzed qualitatively. Some of the information derived has
been used to map the phenomenon, or as illustrating examples throughout the
report. The secondary data are presented in tables and diagrams throughout the
report.
2.1 Conceptual and Analytical Issues
SALW refer to the “cheap, simple, portable, durable and widely available arms; held
and operated by individuals or two to three persons; and used in violent conflicts,
100 / Methodology
armed violence and criminality. Small arms are used by one person while light
weapons are used by several persons working together” (Onuoha2011: 51).
Academics, as well as other local and international actors are paying considerable
attention to the relation between SALW and conflicts, including their occurrence,
recurrence, duration and intensity and the link between SALW and criminality as well
as (Duquet 2009). SALW pose a significant challenge to law and order and a high risk
to personal security (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The International Action Network on
Small Arms (IANSA) (2001: 1) observes that:
The proliferation and misuse of small arms is endangering personal security,
undermining good governance, contributing to violations of human rights, and
undermining social justice, development and peace in all parts of the world.
A major characteristic of illicit SALW is their movement through trafficking and
smuggling across national and regional borders. The end of the Cold War and the
deregulation of former state arms industries in Eastern and Central Europe led to an
aggressive search for new arms markets in the developing world. The illicit trafficking
of SALW is a transnational and global activity that has been able to operate outside
national and international regulatory institutions. In analysing how SALW enter into
the black market, Stohl (2005: 63) provides a graphic explanation:
… weapons become one part of an illicit network that deals in drugs, guns, jewels,
art, humans, and anything else worth trading through unofficial channels. While
some dealers may specialize in weapons, most are plugged into the general
international underground economy. These networks operate across borders with an
international cast of characters, staying one step ahead of [the] law. However, the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is central to many of these networks, and
in many cases, weapons are not only the desired commodity but also the method of
payment.
There are certain conditions that facilitate illicit trafficking and smuggling into a
country. Countries bordered by failed and conflict-ridden states face immense
difficulties in controlling illicit SALW flows as fundamentalist cells, cartels, mafias, and
syndicates infiltrate and supply them to sympathy groups. Conditions of insecurity,
violence, criminality, poverty, and unemployment create a situation where the
possession of SALW becomes a critical resource as well as a source of empowerment
and employment. SALW proliferation and use also has implications on the nature of
politics and governance. Both the politics of violence and the violence in politics in
Methodology / 101
Africa have led to proliferation of arms. Armed groups, governments, and political
leaders are all implicated in the formation and arming of NSG's in pursuance of
political interests (Ikelegbe, 2010).
2.2 Limitations of the Study
The study has several limitations. None of the law enforcement agencies studied uses
a system of centralized data collection, storage or analysis and a major share of the
data are classified. As a result, the data used in this study, including information on
SALW, are often disparate, inconsistent, and inaccurate. The available information on
the registering, sale, purchase, possession, use, stockpiling, production, and seizure
of arms is therefore insufficient and contains major gaps, resulting in an absence of
baseline data.
In addition, most Nigerians find it unsafe to discuss the topic or volunteer to disclose
information. Existing legislation and practice tend to directly link gun ownership with
armed robbery, which has rendered it a very sensitive issue. The highly sensitive nature
of the research subject has led to major problems regarding access and consent for
interviews as interviewees expressed doubt about the intentions and motives of the
research. This prompted the researchers to limit the range and substantive content of
questions. Researchers faced significant security risks, often limiting research
activities.
102 / Proliferation and ownership structure
3. PROLIFERATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
There are no accurate records or documentation on the number of SALW in Nigeria;
there are only estimates. In 2001, the Minister of Defence estimated there to be one
million illicit SALW in circulation (Agbonton-Johnson, Ebo&Mazal, 2004), 2004).
Other estimates state that about 70% of the eight to ten million SALW in West Africa
are in Nigeria (Bello, 2010),the majority of which are possessed illegally (Hazen and
Horner, 2007). In support of the evidence above, there are an estimated 1.5 firearms
per 100 persons and about 0.71 illicit firearms per 100 people (Karp, 2007).
3.1 The Economics of SALW: Demand, Supply, and Prices
Guns such as barrels, pistols, pump-action, and AK-47s are fairly easy to purchase
since there are ready markets for them. Other weapons that are commonly traded
include semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine-guns, and shoulder-fired rockets
(bazookas). The prices have differed across time and place, although prices were
generally higher about 10 years ago (Table 1). Weapons were readily available for
purchase in Warri at prices that ranged from around US$570 for a shotgun, US$850
for a Kalashnikov rifle, to US$2,150 for a 'bazooka' (Onuoha, 2011).
TABLE 1: Reported Prices of AK-47 Assault Rifles in Nigeria, 2003-07
Date of Purchase
Price (USD)
Late 2003
1, 700
December 2004
1, 000
May 2005
300
November 2006
1, 000 – 1, 500
December 2006
1, 500 – 2, 500
March 2007
400
Source: Von Kemedi (2006)
3.2 Ownership Structure
The information derived out of this research suggests that SALW are owned by a
variety of actors, including various non- state groups (i.e. youth groups and
vigilantes), criminals as well as certain businessmen, and politicians. It is estimated
that, at the least one out of every five active politicians in Nigeria possess a gun. In the
South East for example, data derived from interviews suggest that at least one in four
businessmen and politicians possess SALW, particularly pump-action, AK-47s,
imported rifles, and pistols (Interviews, Owerri, 10/2/12).
Sources of SALW / 103
3.3 Type and Distribution of arms and ammunition
The SALW that are commonly used include pump-action shotguns; locally made guns;
assault rifles, such as the AK-47, Mag 4 rifles, SA Vz.58, G3, FN FNC, and FN FAL; and,
light machine guns. (Interviews, Owerri 10/2/12).
Many wealthy Nigerians alledgedly use automatic rifles, imported pistols, and
customized arms. The foreign made double-barrel gun is common among public
servants and retirees. Most top public servants tend to have non-prohibited arms. It is
alleged that some businessmen possess arms for protection, only some of which are
licensed. It is alleged that some businessmen are often responsible for arming gangs
that perpetrate violence and criminality. Politicians also tend to possess many arms,
particularly AK-47s and customized pistols. (Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).
Campus groups and religious groups mainly use locally made pistols although they
also obtain foreign made pistols purchased from police and security agencies. Town or
street groups have more expensive arms such as locally made and imported riffles,
because they tend to have more patrons and money. The more sophisticated armed
groups and kidnappers often use rifles, AK-47s, MAG 4s, rocket-propelled grenades
(RPG), KPMGs, and rocket launchers while local criminals tend to possess barrels and
locally made pistols.(Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).
In the South East, Lagos in the South West, and the Edo and Delta states in the South
South, there are pockets of towns and cities with a strong presence of militias.
Members of those militia groups carry double-barrel guns and have access to arms
caches, which have reportedly been licensed and controlled by the police. However,
they often choose to carry pump-action shotguns.
In the South West, illegally possessed SALW are rampant among members of the
National Union of Road Transport Workers, who are often recruited and armed by
political 'godfathers' to further their political objectives (Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).
4. SOURCES OF SALW
4.1 Arms Caches
Information gathered from interviews (Coastal towns of Niger Delta, February 2012)
shows that SALW caches exist among non- state groups, criminals, politicians and
community leaders. Evidence shows that major stockpiles are abundant in the
conflict-ridden regions of Nigeria. In the Niger Delta, the fact that the militia
104 / Sources of SALW
resurgence has an abundance of arms demonstrates that they clearly have access to
major arms stockpiles.
Politicians and government officials allegedly acquire and stock arms prior to party
primaries and electoral competitions. In the northern cities, traders and others have
stocked arms in order to fight back against religious fundamentalists and rioters in
Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, and other towns. Traders and markets in the South East often
keep arms caches as a means to arm their vigilantes (Interviews, Coastal towns of
Niger Delta, 2012).
Many communities that have experienced or are currently experiencing conflict have
access to arms caches that are kept by community leaders and youth leaders to
protect against attacks from neighbouring communities and future communal and
ethnic clashes. This is common in the North Central, parts of the South East, and the
Niger Delta. The struggle to control community leadership and politics also drives the
demand for SALW. Community leaders and factions from Ojobo, Okpokonou,
Torugbene, Oboro, and Tuomor in Delta State and Agge, Ekeremor, and Amabolou in
Bayelsa state have all maintained arms caches as part of their struggles to control
community politics (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, February 2012).
During the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta (2009), SALW were not thoroughly
searched for nor were they recovered. Therefore, stockpiles of arms still exist in the
creeks and in remote communities. The evidence of un-surrendered arms is seen in
the discrepancy between the sophisticated arms in the militant armouries, such as the
G3, FAL, GMP, and RPGs, and those that were surrendered. The militias surrendered
mostly old arms and maintained newer ones. In the post-amnesty era many new arms
have entered into circulation, such as the K2 (Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12).
Some ex-militants still have arms caches and sell arms as indicated by interviews in
Koloama, Olokpobiri, Peremabiri, Ijetu and Agge in Bayelsa State and Okerenkoko,
OgbeIjo and Koko in Delta State. The dominant SALW stockpile are handguns,
revolver pistols, pump-action, AK-47s, submachine guns, Beretta automatic rifles,
assault rifles, Kalasil curves, GPMGs, FN rifles, RPGs, brandy guns, artillery guns, hand
grenades, 81 mm mortars, and ammunition.
There are also several militant groups, leaders, and militants that either did not
surrender at the initial stages of the amnesty or are aggrieved because of inequitable
distribution of amnesty benefits. New and splinter ex-militant groups are emerging
and being armed (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).
Sources of SALW / 105
4.2 Illicit Craft Production
Locally produced small arms or craft weapons are widely available in Nigeria. They are
inexpensive and robust copies of imported factory-made SALW such as revolvers,
short guns, and rifles. Simple and crudely produced weapons in small quantities are
rampant whereas more advanced ones are rare (Karp, 2007).
The industrial zones in the South East, such as Aba and Awka, serve as hotspots for
more advanced production (Onuoha, 2011). The craft production of weapons is not
entirely illegal in Nigeria. According to the 1959 Firearms Act, only the transfer of nonmarked firearms is illegal. Craft production on the other hand is legal when the
craftsman is licensed by the government, and thereby authorized to produce firearms.
According to Hazen and Horner (2007), attempts to bring craft weapons under the
legal framework in Nigeria have been partly successful by giving many of these
weapons an ad hoc serial number and licensing their owners. However, field evidence
suggests that a vast majority of locally produced small arms are still manufactured and
purchased without licenses. Difficulty in tracing points of production coupled with
frequent police harassment has kept the main local craft manufacturers
underground. In Awka, in the Anambra State, local production of SALW takes place in
hidden or underground shops under the cover of official business shops where they
produce and deliver to customers on request (Interview, Awka, 2012).
Figure 1
106 / Sources of SALW
Table 2: Locally-produced SALW in Awka
Weapon
Ammunition
Cost
Pocket single-shot handgun
Various calibres of shotgun NGN 4000/USD 32
cartridge
Four-shot revolver
9 mm, 7.5mm, or 8.5mm
Eight-shot revolver
Various calibre of shotgun NGN 10, 000 – 11, 000/ USD
cartridge
80 – 88
NGN 8, 000/ USD 64
Horizontal
shotgun
double-barrel Various calibre of shotgun NGN 25, 000 – 30, 000/ USD
cartridge
200 – 240
Vertical
shotgun
double-barrel Various calibre of shotgun NGN 45, 000/ USD 360
cartridge
Source: Karp, 2007
The predominance of craft weapon production in Awka is evidenced by the common
reference to craft weapons as 'Awka-made'. Awka has an artisanal history with
blacksmith and gunmaking skills being transferred through several generations.
Awka was a center of production of guns, bombs (Ogbunigwe), gun-powder but also
for repairs. It is also claimed to be the centerpoint of dissemination of these skills
across the nation. As an Awka blacksmith claimed, any gun or metal can be
reproduced as long as they are provided with a sample (Interview, Amawbia-Awka,
2012). There are associations that control the blacksmith business and there is a ban
on gun production. However, others who are non-natives in the villages around Awka
or that have been trained in Awka but live elsewhere still produce arms. Today these
blacksmiths continue to produce barrel guns, pistols, revolvers, rifles, gun-powder,
and local bombs (see Table 2). However, the industry is declining as it is no longer
popular among the younger generation and is becoming more of a trade for the poor.
The blacksmiths of Awka continue to transfer their skills to other parts of Nigeria
through apprenticeship (Onuoha, 2011).
Apart from Awka, there are several other centres of SALW production. In the South
East, Onitsha and Aba are key centres of production. In Rivers State, locally made
pistols, short guns, and double-barrels are produced in Eleme. In Benue and Aqua
Ibom States, some craftsmen are able to perfectly copy or replicate pistols and AK47s. Police have also uncovered evidence of local arms fabrication in Barkin Ladi and
Kuru within the jurisdiction of the Jos South local government in the area of Plateau
State (Onuoha, 2011:54).
Sources of SALW / 107
Local production is quite low in most states owing to the fact that the industry relies
on traditional blacksmiths. Even in states with limited arms proliferation, local
blacksmiths or craftsmen produce not only local guns for hunting purposes but also
more advanced ones that are to be traded beyond state borders (Interview, Kamba
3/3/12). In addition, there have been some police seizures of moulds for fabricating
arms, pipes, machine tools, and assorted instruments for manufacturing arms in the
North West and South West (Nigeria 2004, 78-92; Appendix 3).
In conflict zones, local craft production prospers. In the Jos conflict, some remote
villages were found hosting blacksmiths who specialize in manufacturing poisoned
bows and arrows as well as short, single, and double-barrels guns (Interviews, Jos,
2012).
There are currently no records on the amount of locally produced arms. According to
an ex-militant, there are about 30 blacksmiths in Awka, Aba, and Onitsha that supply
the illegal market, each capable of making up to 150 guns per year (Interview,
Southern Ijaw, 2012). It is known, however, that demand for locally made SALW was
high until the 1980s, but when patronage began to decline, a decline of production
followed. Locally manufactured or locally made pistols and barrels are mainly utilized
by those who cannot afford imported ones. Patronage, therefore, has been present
among various non- state groups, including hunters, cattle herders, vigilante groups,
and local criminal gangs. A September 2005 survey in Bayelsa State revealed that
locally produced SALW constituted 20% of the arms in possession by non-state actors
(Isumonah, Tantua & James 2005).
4.3 Arms Re-Circulation
There has been a fairly high incidence of flows from legal SALW becoming illicit SALW.
This includes seizures of state stock by militia and criminal group attacks on military
and police posts, stations, and checkpoints as well as direct confrontations with law
enforcement agencies. Arms from government stockpiles have been recovered in the
Niger Delta during the militia-military confrontations and also in the North East during
confrontations between Boko Haram and law enforcement agencies.
The major sources of arms deviation are the military and police armouries. In
November 2008 six Nigerian Army soldiers were convicted of selling over 7,000 SALW
to Niger Delta militants between January 2000 and December 2006 (Onuoha, 2011).
According to some ex-militia sources, on one occasion an official was paid N100
million and distributed thousands of arms illegally removed from the Nigerian military
108 / Sources of SALW
arms stocks including rifles, GPMGs, UMGs, and rocket launchers (Interview,
Southern Ijaw,March 2012). Police and military officers, particularly those in
armouries, often sell arms and escort customer purchased arms for fees. Short term
hiring or renting out of authorized SALW to criminals for a fee is another widespread
practice. (Interview, Abuja December 2011). The similarities between legal SALW
stocks and the types of SALW in the supplies of NSG's and the illegal arms market,
such as the G3, AK-47, and Beretta, provide further evidence of arms re-circulation
from state armouries. Certain guns, such as the AK-47 and MAG 4, are mainly from
the military stocks (Interview, Port Harcourt, 2012).
Leakages from state armouries into the illicit market are mainly the result of poor
record-keeping and stockpile management. State armouries are not strictly
documented, secured, monitored, controlled or managed. The discipline and
technical capacity of armoury officials are severely lacking. The breakdown of state
structures, lax controls over national depots and poor service conditions of security
personnel also account for the leakages from official stocks (Interview, Owerri 2012).
Legal weapons also find their way into the illicit markets through ex-military and
serving military personnel. Some rogue military and mobile police personnel are said
to be involved in the racket of sales, movement, and flow of the illicit arms to Jos
(Interview, Jos 2012). Some of these groups sell military type assault rifles such as the
AK-47, MAG4, and ammunition obtained from the Kaduna Military Training Schools
stocks (Interview, Jos, 2012). An incentive based SALW retrieval effort in Imo State,
that occurred between 2007 and 2011, found that the arms recovered originated
mainly from security agencies (Interview, Owerri 10/02/12).
Transnational criminal syndicates are also involved in the re-circulation of arms in the
region. Robbers sometimes come into Nigeria from Benin with weapons previously
trafficked into Nigeria and then returning them back to Benin after the robbery
operations (Interviews, Lagos, March 2012). An ex-militia general from Bayelsa State
allegedly used the Rio-Del route in Bakassi Peninsula to raid Cameroonian gendarmes
and soldiers and transfer seized guns and ammunitions through Calabar and IbinoIket to Bayelsa (Interviews, Southern Ijaw March 2012).
4.4 Arms Agents and Dealers
Illicit arms trade is undoubtedly a lucrative business in Nigeria. There is a fairly high
demand for arms and there are few sanctions because of weak law enforcement.
Moreover, the restrictive national policies on possession of arms have accelerated
Sources of SALW / 109
black market sales. The presence of foreign-made weapons in circulation, as
evidenced by the nature of arms seized by security personnel, indicates that imported
SALW are dominantly gaining entrance into the country (Alemika, 2011: 132-134;
(see Appendix 3-5).
Nigeria has a system of registered arms dealers that legally supply arms, explosives,
and tear gas to official sources and sell non-prohibited licensed firearms for gaming.
However, there are allegedly some that operate without a license and some licensed
dealers that are involved in illicit trade. In the 1990s a major arms procurement
company in Lagos had most of its licenses revoked because its dealers moved beyond
approved arms or dealt in both legal and illegal arms (Interview, Port Harcourt, 2012).
Some gun dealers are known to provide fake licenses for illegal guns; for instance,
licensing a pump-action gun with 12 cartridges as a barrel gun. Most SALW dealers or
traders in Nigeria operate on a small scale and in secrecy and many are located in the
South East and South South. Local dealers transport few units for sale across the
country at a time. The level of trading by the unlicensed arms dealers is indicated by
the seizures usually along the highways. Upon arrest, an illegal dealer based in the Edo
State was found to have sold about 68 pump-actions guns around Auchi, Benin, and
Abuja (Interview, Abuja, 2011).
In the Niger Delta, arms dealers operate on a large scale and supply assault rifles such
as the AK-47, G-3, FN-FAL, as well as machine guns, and RPGs to militias. In some
circumstances, arms dealers are sought out and patronized by government officials in
a highly clandestine matter. Information gathered from interviews revealed that past
political executives in Rivers State have purchased arms from traders based in Russia
and distributed them to party and political leaders as well as some militant leaders
(Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).
Herdsmen, who mostly migrate along largely un-governed West African cattle
grazing routes, are known to carry arms for protection and trading. There have been
allegations of herdsmen being involved in armed conflict and criminality in the North
East and North Central zones including trafficking arms from Chad,; Niger, Sudan
(Darfur), Central African Republic, and Chad (Interviews, Jos, 2012).
Criminal gangs are also engaged in trafficking and trading. In Jos, criminal gangs have
taken advantage of the crises to trade arms for profit and steal from the individuals
that patronize them (Interviews, Jos, 2012).
110 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking
5.
PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW TRAFFICKING
5.1 SALW Trafficking in Nigeria
Conflict prone areas are the main destination points for arms in the country. Arms
dealers from Onitsha and Nnewi in Anambra State, for example, bring in pump-action
guns with cartridges AA and BB calibre to conflict ridden areas of the North Central
and North East and in the Taraba and Plateau States. Traders from Saminaka and
Pambegwa in Kaduna State also transport and sell arms and ammunition alongside
other commodities in Jos. Guns are also brought in from Bauchi and the AbujaNasarawa axis. Some herdsmen have specialized in arms trafficking to remote villages
in the North Central and North East, where security presence is scanty Interviews, Jos,
2012 &Wukari, 2012).
In terms of use, the traders possess SALW with which they arm militias to protect the
markets. Criminal gangs are also known to move arms across states for criminal
operations. On November 20th 2011, two general multipurpose guns, 653 live
rounds of ammunition, and 416 live rounds in chains were intercepted by security
forces as they were reportedly being ferried from a neighbouring state into Anambra
State (ECOWAS, 2011).
The smuggling and trading in SALW in the South East is driven by business and linked
to the import/export trade. Businessmen import goods, including SALW, in containers
which are often not thoroughly checked by law enforcement agencies at the ports
and borders. Often these security officials are compelled to let in contraband goods
and even escort smugglers to their destinations. In fact, the South East is the haven of
SALW smugglers and dealers. The multitude of interceptions and arrests tend to
confirm this (Interviews, Awka 2012). In the South East, arms smugglers use
underground warehouses as arms dealing points which are indicated by signs that
only dealers can decipher. The city of Onitsha has become a main hub for importing
and trading in SALW. Abala, in Abia State, is also home to gun dealers and is
renowned for selling various types of arms.
The towns known for the high availability of weapons and presence of arms markets
include Asaba, Benin, Warri, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt.
Some of the weapons from these markets also move further north and towards other
regions, where they supply markets across the country. Aba, for example, plays a
central role in the supply of used weapons to the local Rivers State market.
Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking / 111
In the South South the level of arms users is high as a result of the presence of various
non- state groups, criminals and political violence.
The South West has a low presence of SALW, but is rather a gateway and transit route.
This region has an international airport, seaports, and busy borders, making Lagos
and the South West a major gateway for arms trafficking. Lagos serves as a stopgap in
the arms trade and smuggling chain for weapons in transit to the South East and
other regions. The dominant weapons in the region include barrels and pump-action
guns, which are used by vigilante groups (Interviews, Jos, 2012 & Wukari, 2012).
The western flank of the North West region has very low levels of arms proliferation.
Until recently, the arms used in the eastern flank of the region, such as around
Kaduna, tend to originate from outside the country, particularly the AK-47s from
Niger and Chad. With the Boko Haram insurgency and counter actions by nonMuslim natives in parts of Kaduna, the eastern flank is now experiencing extensive
SALW proliferation (Interviews, Jos, 2012 & Wukari, 2012).
SALW proliferation levels and usage also differ within the geo-political zones. For
example, more guns are available in Anambra than in Imo, which indicates that arms
flow from Anambra to Imo State (Interviews, Awka, 2012). In Kogi State, there is a
higher concentration of SALW around Okenne. Arms proliferation and use is also
higher in cities. This is most likely because of the high presence of politicians,
businessmen, criminals, underground business crimes, and vigilantes in major cities.
In the rural areas, SALW proliferation and use are rare except where criminality and
ethno-religious conflicts exist. Similarly, the vastness of rural areas often provides a
cover up for criminals and their arms stockpiles.
TABLE 3: SALW Entry and Distribution Points in Nigeria
Primary Entry Points
Idi-Iroko, Seme, Lagos, Warri, Calabar,
Maigatari, Nguru, and Mallam Falori
Primary Distribution Points
Onitsha, Nnewi, Owerri, Aba, Abala, Port
Harcourt, IkotEpene, Ikom, Awka
Secondary Distribution Points
Jos, Ilorin, Makurdi, Wukari, Takum
Craft Production Centres
Awka, Calabar, Kaduna, Katsina.
Source: Karp, 2007.
112 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking
5.2 Regional and Cross-Border Trafficking
The illicit arms trade is an extensive, planned, and secretly executed business. This is
one reason why official seizures and interceptions have been low. In addition, the level
of security alertness to effectively combat illicit trafficking has been poor. Nigeria's
lengthy and porous borders, high number of airports (local and international), and
numerous seaports along the southern coast have often been identified as facilitating
SALW trafficking.
The arms trade is not comparatively lucrative among Nigeria's neighbours; thus, the
outflow of arms from Nigeria is low. In regards to inflow, there are source and transit
countries from which arms eventually enter into Nigeria. Apart from neighbouring
countries, illicit SALW are sourced out of Nigeria from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, South
Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine as well as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia (Peel, 2005;
Hazen& Horner, 2007). Ikelegbe (2010) also identifies Benin, Cameroon, Niger, Chad,
Gabon, and Guinea Bissau as SALW trafficking routes.
Leading up to the 2003 elections, there were two prominent areas known as easy
entry points for illegal weapons. The first was the land borders through Idi-lroko in
Ogun State and Seme in Lagos State and the border with Niger and Cameroon in the
North East (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004). The second was the ports, coastal areas,
and surrounding communities, particularly Warri in the South South.
5.2.1 Land Borders
Cross-border trafficking by organized international arms dealers is a major source of
SALW inflow to Nigeria (Hazen and Horner 2007). Nigeria shares 1500km of land
border with Niger and Chad in the north, 1000km border with Benin on the west, and
1700 km border with Cameroon in the east (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004). Border
control at the borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are very weak despite the
presence of law enforcement agencies. It is alleged that in the neighbouring
countries, agencies tasked with maintaining border security focus more on illicit arms
trafficking in the border posts (Interviews, Seme, 2012), but despite this it is clear that
without a consistent, reliable, or strong border security Nigeria is left extremely
vulnerable to the trafficking of illicit goods, including SALW.
The SALW acquired by Boko Haram, which include pump-action guns, rifles, AK-47s,
RPGs, G3 rifles, double-barrel guns, and improvised explosive devices (IED), have been
traced back to Libya, Chad, and Sudan (Darfur). These SALW entered Nigeria from the
northern and north-eastern borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This can be
supported by an incident in June 2011 in which Nigerian security agents intercepted a
consignment of rocket launchers, grenades, and other arms along the Nigeria-Chad
border (Onuoha, 2011).
Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking / 113
The South West, the border with Benin, and the maritime borders were closely
monitored when the conflicts in the Niger Delta escalated. As a result, smugglers
shifted operations to the northern borders, which are vast, porous, un-manned, and
serve as a trading point for various goods between countries. Likewise, the North
Central and North East SALW supply originates mainly from the northern borders
(Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12).
At official posts, such as the Seme border post, there have been no major seizures
since 2009. During a few isolated incidents only single items,such as few units of
American and French manufactured pistols hidden in imported vehicles, have been
intercepted (Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12). With a heavy security presence at
large border posts, traffickers tend to use smaller and less known crossing points.
Small border posts on the border with Benin are important centers for cross- border
illicit trafficking to the Nigerian states of Oyo, Ogun, Kwara, and Niger. Some of these
points, such as Bokurun in Kwara State, are used for smuggling arms into Nigeria by
hiding them in vehicles (Adejo, 2005). Arms have been moved from Cameroon into
Benue, Cross River, and Aqua Ibom States through crossing points such as ManfeIkom
and Obudu. Weapons from Chad and Niger entered through northern land borders at
Maigatari, Nguru, and MallamFalori and mainly serve northern clients (Adejo 2005).
There are regional arms markets from which arms are trafficked into Nigeria.
Allegedly, Burkina Faso is used as a transit country by illicit traders in West Africa
where various non-state actors acquire SALW (Interview, Lagos, 2012). There is also
evidence of illicit trade in SALW through the Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria axis, with
source points in Ghana. The Tudu arms market in Ghana is reportedly an important
source for arms which are being trafficked into Nigeria through Togo and Benin (Olori,
2007).
Trafficking between Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria is allegedly conducted by
Nigerian businessmen and driven by Nigerian demand. A cartel operates the illegal
arms market and assembles the arms in Ghana. It subsequently smuggles arms to
illegal border posts and border villages by sea and road from where the Nigerian
contacts take over. These arms eventually arrive in Lagos for outward distribution.
(Interviews, Lagos, 2012).
5.2.2Maritime Borders
Nigeria has an Atlantic coastline of about 700km: without adequate or effective
surveillance also Nigeria's maritime borders are porous. The Atlantic Ocean coastal
flank is a black box, an area where ships and people from different countries berth.
114 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking
Smuggling through major seaports has been difficult and rare. Recent measures such
as scanning of containers by customs and consultants, physical examination of nonhomogenous goods, the offloading and bagging of grains at the ports, and the
physical examination of goods and containers by law enforcement agencies have
helped to reduce illicit goods importation through the ports. Illicit arms movement
through the ports has not been rampant; though occasionally port authorities
intercepted illicit arms (Interviews, Lagos, 2012). An extreme case occurred in 2010
when 13 containers of heavy arms were intercepted and the arms comprised various
mortar bombs, rockets, and hand grenades (Ohia, 2010).
The demand for small arms in the Niger Delta region of the country, coupled with its
vast and mostly unguarded waters makes it a logical place for the reception of
shipments. Weapons entering the south, especially the Niger Delta area, appear to be
acquired through more direct means such as cash payments or the bartering of oil for
arms between armed groups and offshore ships (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The Niger
Delta ports function as an important hub for local arms dealers. Illicit arms are
offloaded at the ports and then channelled through distribution networks,
particularly in Akwalbom and Anambra States. The availability of private jets in the
Niger Delta and other coastal areas has promoted smuggling and SALW trafficking.
Some shipping companies as well as pirates operating in the coastal and maritime
areas have allegedly been involved in transport of illicit SALW. The Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency has recently rang the alarm bell about incessant
pirate attacks and the influx of arms and ammunitions through the waterways (Oritse,
2012).
According to information obtained through interviews, international arms syndicates,
mostly of Eastern European origin, are operating in the maritime waters, and
exchange weapons for stolen crude oil. They mainly collaborate with militia groups
and business syndicates who steal crude oil in barges and tankers from pipelines and
pipeline intersections. The arms are transhipped from vessels standing off the Niger
Delta coast by militias in speedboats. Some of the barges, which are thought to be
filled with crude oil, are actually filled with arms. Trafficking of this kind has reportedly
increased since 1999 and may be the source of large-scale in-flows of SALW into
Nigeria (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, 2012).
After offloading, the arms are brought to Koloama and Ijetu, located at the mouth of
River Dodo. The weapons are then transported through the Forcadoes River to
Burutu, Warri and its environs, Agge at the mouth of River Raymos through to
Ekeremor, and Kula at mouth of Saint Nicholas River, which is connected to River Nun.
Numerous illegal crossing points to communities exist on these rivers, unknown to
Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking / 115
customs and other security authorities (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta,
2012).
Nigeria's maritime neighbours, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau, are also sources of SALW
smuggling. The major maritime smuggling hub is located in the Warri region, where
smugglers from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, and Cameroon reportedly use speedboats to
reach offshore ships and purchase guns. These weapons are then sold to communities
in Warri, where they are further trafficked to other parts of the country (Best and Von
Kemedi 2005).
It is also alleged that airline crews and shipmen are involved in illegal trafficking via
airplane or vessel. Guns such as pistols and customized arms are smuggled through
the ports (air and sea) by shipmen and aircrew via containers. These are sometimes
sealed in black rubber and cello taped to prevent detection by scanners. Also
Nigerians from the diaspora reportedly have entered the country with concealed
arms, but usually in small quantities (Interview, Ozoro, 2012).
Figure 2
116 / Regulatory frameworks
6. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
Different laws, policies, and regulations constitute the regulatory framework for the
control, retrieval, collection, and destruction of illicit SALW in Nigeria.
6.1 Regulatory Policy and Enforcement
The Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959, and its amendment of 1990, prohibit the illegal
possession, transfer, manufacture, assembly, repair, shortening, and trading of
personal firearms and prescribe a jail term of less than 5 years for infringement. The
Act also prohibits the illegal possession, manufacture, importation, and exportation
of non-personal firearms and prescribes a minimum of 10 years imprisonment for
infringement.
The Nigerian police are the central agency charged with enforcing regulations
concerning SALW. The police are responsible for issuing licenses for non- prohibited
firearms (single and double-barrels), and the licensing of gun dealers. Government
licensed dealers are allowed to sell non-prohibited firearms licensed for gaming such
as single and double-barrel shotguns and sports guns.
Apart from the Nigerian police, which are responsible for enforcing the Act, also the
Department of State Services and Nigeria Customs deal with SALW control. Other
agencies such as Nigerian Immigration and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement
Agency are also involved as they report incidences to the appropriate agencies in the
course of their duties. The National Civil Defence Corps registers and monitors private
security groups (PSG), which sometimes have or use licensed firearms.
In an attempt to curb SALW proliferation, regional, continental, and international
instruments have been developed. Among those instruments are the Economic
Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)'s Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Ammunition and other related materials (2006); the Bamako Declaration
on the Common African Position on Proliferation, Circulation and Illicit trade in
SALWs (2000); and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW (UNPoA). The ECOWAS Convention and ECOWAS
Small Arms Control Programme requires member states to establish commissions
which develop and implement national policies against SALW proliferation and illicit
circulation. In Nigeria, the National Committee on the Control of Small Arms and
Light Weapons (NATCOM) was established as a specialized institution for SALW
control. NATCOM, which is comprised of all security and intelligence agencies and
domiciled in the Ministry of Defence, has largely been inactive. Even the national
survey on SALW proliferation, embarked upon since 2010, is still at the national public
dialogue stage. The National Task Force to Combat Illegal Importation and Smuggling
Regulatory frameworks
/ 117
of Goods, Small Arms and Light Weapons (NATFORCE) is another institution
established to monitor, combat, and contain illegal cross-border flows.
Nigeria has yet to domesticate the conventions and agreements. NATCOM has yet to
transmute into a commission. Only recently, the Ministry of Defence closed
NATCOM's office and disbanded the committee (Interview, Nigerian Pilot,
13/08/2012). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently organized public dialogues
on SALW controls in the different Nigerian geopolitical zones. The question of which
institution is responsible for managing SALW proliferation and control however
remains.
In 2004, the Government of Nigeria announced a ban on the all licensing of all
firearms as part of an effort to reduce the arms in circulation. This means that as a
result, the majority of arms and particularly those that have been trafficked, sold, and
possessed since 2004 are illicit (Iroegbu 2012).
The massive proliferation of illicit arms in spite of national laws suggests that existing
instruments for monitoring and enforcement are not effective. Current government
regulatory policies are compromised by the lack of enforcement and rampant
corruption. The internal mechanism of security agencies to combat illicit arms is also
poor as many agencies face various limitations and challenges. Culprits are rarely
prosecuted and are often freed after being caught with illicit arms. Efforts to control
and enforce infringements of the laws on possession and trade in illicit SALW are
often thwarted at the judiciary level where such offenders are released on bail. Since
government officials and political leaders are often complicit in the arms trade the
political will to control the proliferation and use of illicit arms can also be described as
non-existent. As a result of compromised security agencies, weak legal systems, and
the lack of political wil, larms dealers and smugglers are able to continue their
opperations throughout the country (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).
6.2 Collection and Destruction
The aim of government regulations has been to quickly reduce the quantity of illicit
SALW in circulation. During periods of intense inter-ethnic, communal, and group
conflicts, the Federal Government enacts certain programmes, either as a solution or
part of a peace process, for armed groups to surrender their firearms to the nearest
police stations or designated collection centres. There have also been periodic task
forces such as the Police Special Task Force on the Recovery of Arms, which was set up
in 2004. During the Jos crisis, the Special Task Force named 'Operation Safe Haven'
was responsible for calling on residents to surrender their guns. However, the efforts
of these government programmes and task forces have not yielded the desired results
as they were not sustained and the targeted groups hardly responded.
118 / Regulatory frameworks
When SALW are retrieved they are stockpiled for destruction. In July 2001, about 428
riffles, 494 imported pistols, 287 locally made pistols, and 48 Dane guns were
destroyed by the Federal Government. Between January 2002 and June 2003, about
1,902 assorted firearms and 13,271 rounds of ammunitions were collected for
destruction (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004).
Due to corruption the actual destruction of retrieved arms can however, not always be
guaranteed. When arms are ordered for disposal, they risk falling into the hands of
unscrupulous officers who may divert them for pecuniary individual, group, or
communal interests. Furthermore, poor documentation and data management on
disposals has created a loophole for the retrieved arms to be diverted and recycled for
illicit uses.
6.3 Disarmament
In most states where communal, ethnic, and ethno-religious conflicts have been
pervasive, there have not been disarmament programmes. Combatants return to
their communities with their arms and build individual and community caches. This
has been the case in conflicts in Taraba, Nasarawa, Benue, and Plateau States. After
the Plateau Peace Conference in 2004, efforts have been made to disarm
combatants, but the programme yielded little result as most people and communities
kept their guns.
In the Niger Delta, there have been several disarmament programmes. In 2004, the
Rivers State Amnesty programme offered payments for arms that were nearly twice
the prevailing cost of the surrendered arms. About 1,466 weapons were surrendered.
Taking advantage of this programme, the militia members profited by surrendering
old arms, and subsequently purchasing new arms with the money received through
the disarmament programme. For example, militants that surrendered an AK-47,
were paid about N150, 000. After receiving compensation they purchased a new one
for nearly N87, 000 to N100, 000, making a profit of about N50, 000. The profit not
only served as an incentive for militia members to continue buying more and
advanced arms but also empowered them to do so. In the 2009 Amnesty programme,
militants surrendered over 30,500 guns including some sophisticated ones. The
success was said to be contingent on the benefits attached. Some of the militants,
however, did not trust the amnesty but rather regarded it as bait and thus did not
submit all the arms in their possession. Some militants are still hesitant to submit their
arms, such as AK-47s, and others became involved in the arms trade (Interviews, Port
Harcourt, 2012).
Findings
/ 119
7. FINDINGS
The research team notes that besides some unsubstantiated estimates, there were
neither concrete baseline data nor a consistent record system upon which estimations
and extrapolations could be based. Desk and field research have allowed generating
data and patterns on SALW possession as well as on their seizure and surrender.
However, those data are largely inaccurate and severe gaps remain, making a
systematic and quantitative estimation of SALW difficult.
What is certain, however, is that the number of SALW in Nigeria has significantly risen
since 2000-2003, when the number was estimated between one and three million.
The evidence for this rests on the following:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
The demand for SALW has risen astronomically in the last decade;
The declining prices of SALW are the result of increased supply rather than a
decreased demand;
The extension of conflict points beyond the Niger Delta, in particular in the
North Central and North East, have resulted in increased demand and supply;
The increase in arms bearing non-state groups including armed street groups;
militias in the Niger Delta; vigilante groups in the South East and parts of the
South West; community and ethnic militias in the North Central; and a
fundamentalist terror group in the North East, have led to an increased demand
for SALW;
The rise in armed conflict and violent criminality has created rampant insecurity
resulting in the emergence of armed vigilantes and community militias and
thus, further driving the demand for arms;
As a result of weak stockpile management, diversion from official stockpiles has
become a major source of domestic supply of illicit SALW;
The growing production of illicit SALW with types ranging from low-budget
pistols to advanced weapons ,has been able to satisfy the SALW demand of the
poor and communities in conflict but also professional militias and terror
groups;
The massive illicit SALW inflow through the high seas and maritime borders;
through very porous northern borders from Sahelian Africa, and through the
Southwest borders from West Africa has contributed to the increased arms
proliferation.
Not only has there been an increase in proliferation but also a trend towards the use of
more advanced arms. This is indicated by the arms possessed by militias, as revealed
by disarmament programmes; the arms used by criminal in the South South, South
East, and South West as well as the arms possessed by civilians, with the AK-47
becoming increasingly common, particularly among politicians.
120 / Recommendations
Given the peculiar circumstance of SALW flows, it is reasonable to estimate that the
number of illicit arms has at least doubled and, therefore, currently ranges between
three and six million. Evidence from interviews moreover indicate that the possession
rate is particularly high among youth, businessmen, and the political class. The
research team estimates that about 1 in 100 Nigerians (mostly male, youth, and the
middle and upper socio-economic classes) possess illicit arms.
8.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 To the Government
Existing laws such as the Firearm Act needs to be reviewed, as they are weak and
therefore insufficiently address the current security challenges. There should be strict
enforcement and compliance with all firearms laws.
The Federal Government should adopt a national arms control strategy, which
Onuoha (2011) affirms, and further identify and eliminate the sources of inflow. It is
essential that the Government designs and enforces strategies for effective and
coordinated detection, tracking, and control of SALW flows.
Official stockpiles need to be properly managed, meaning that stockpile should be
documented, controlled, and monitored. Moreover, to prevent diversion from official
stockpiles, a centralized national register and database has to be established, based
on data derived from weapons marking and identification.
The NATCOM should be encouraged and equipped to undertake its comprehensive
national survey on SALW proliferation, which has remained in the national public
dialogue stage since 2010.
It is essential that a comprehensive SALW retrieval programme is enacted. A
moratorium period for Nigerians to turn in arms could be declared and enforced
(Interview, Shangisha-Lagos, 2012). This must be accompanied with an aggressive
arms mop-up operation in conflict zones such as areas involved in violent communal
conflicts.
Safeguarding the borders is another essential part of arms control. The technology,
equipment, capacity, discipline, and incentives of law enforcement agencies at the
borders, ports, coastal, and maritime therefore, need to be improved.
Nigeria should also collaborate with Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin on joint
security arrangements to prevent the smuggling, trafficking, and flow of SALW.
Recommendations
/ 121
Furthermore, addressing the underlying problems that lead people to take up arms is
an important step in tackling SALW proliferation at the source. Good governance,
human capital development, employment, and poverty reduction programmes
would help to reduce criminality, youth vulnerability and involvement in armed
violence. Effective and efficient management of elections as well as credible and fair
election results would be disincentives to SALW inflow during elections. Underground
economic, cross-border, and maritime crime must be contained as it is intertwined
with SALW trafficking networks. A strong and reliable security environment that does
not warrant arms usage must be created.
8.2 To the Civil Society and Citizens
As insecurity surrounding elections as well as political, communal, ethno-religious
and fundamentalist conflicts are driving the proliferation and use of SALW and are a
serious concern to all Nigerians, the involvement of civil society is essential to
sustainably tackle the issue of illicit SALW. Awareness raising and capacity building
efforts through sensitization, advocacy, training and research programmes on the
regulation and control of SALW could contribute to this. Moreover, civil society groups
and citizens should be encouraged to share information on illicit arms and their
proliferation among their own communities.
For this reason, the West African Action Network against SALW (WAANSA) Nigeria,
which was represented in NATCOM, needs to be strengthened.
Finally, youth, community leaders, members of armed groups, and citizens should be
increasingly involved in state-wide and national efforts to identify and retrieve illicit
SALW.
122 / Conclusion
9. CONCLUSION
Prevalent communal, ethno-religious, and resource conflicts; the proliferation of nonstate groups, rise in criminality -including pirating and smuggling-; political violence
and continuous insecurity have driven recent proliferation of SALW in Nigeria. Nigeria
is the end point of SALW flow and trafficking in West Africa as well as an area with a
high demand. Given the circuitous nature of SALW, their wide availability is highly
precarious. It is widely accepted that supply generates greater use, which drives more
demand and then again more supply (Duquet, 2009). As such, the proliferation of
SALW has directly contributed to a decline in human security across the country due to
rising criminality, the emergence of a gun culture, frequent factional fighting, and
other security threats.
Though there are local craft producers and gun manufacturers in Nigeria, the majority
of both licit and illicit SALW in circulation are imported or smuggled into the country.
However, criminals and militias to a great extent use locally produced arms of which
some have been diverted from government stockpiles. This might indicate that
imported and advanced arms are rather scarce because of limited availability or high
cost.
Though local production is limited, it is important to look beyond existing production
facilities and examine the knowledge, and technical capacity that exist to produce
assault rifles when the need arises. Nigeria possesses the capacity for local production
as it has technically equipped and experienced engineers, blacksmiths, and welders.
Local production has moreover been encouraged by continuous conflicts throughout
its territory.
The research team identified several actors involved in the illicit trafficking including
law enforcement agencies; various non- state groups (i.e. militias, youth groups,
fundamentalist Islamist movements and vigilantes); arms dealers, brokers and traders;
criminal syndicates; importers; corporate organizations; and the diaspora. Sympathy
groups outside Nigeria may also provide arms and ammunition to insurgent and
militia groups. The domestic flow within Nigeria is facilitated through the complicity
of retired and serving officers within various law enforcement agencies. Despite this
rampant corruption there is no solid structure to control government stockpiles and as
such curtail arms re-circulation. Additionally, Nigeria does not yet have a
comprehensive national database and register of SALW. There is no single inventory
system for official SALW nor are there regular audits of the existing stockpiles of the
different agencies.
Even though the law is clear on what is illicit, the problem remains that there is no
severe form of punishment for offenders. In other words, there is no effective
Conclusion
/ 123
mechanism in place to deter those who knowingly obtain illicit SALW. There is an
interlocking relationship between drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and
underground businesses and syndicates within Nigeria. In the context of such a
militarized society with rampant insecurity, SALW possession is a critical resource and
a form of empowerment.
Although Nigeria has a history of being an end point for trafficked SALW, the levels of
proliferation in the last one-and-a-half decade have been considerably high due to the
various conflicts within the country. Militias, rebels, Islamist militants, vigilantes, and
criminal organizations have thrived because of the availability of SALW. For this
reason, the inflow of arms into Nigeria has been extremely high and the outflow, if
any, has been very low.
Within Nigeria there are regional disparities in SALW proliferation, caches, and use of
SALW, just as there are disparities within demographic and socio-economic groups.
For example, the North West, just like the South West, is a transit zone for movement
of illicit goods and arms. However, the use and caching of SALW is concentrated in the
South South, South East, North East and North Central.
Without effective controls or methods of deterrence, the already high levels of SALW
in Nigeria have been increasing. Little attention has been paid to the source of arms
flow and trade. Concerted efforts to control the arms trade and prevent its
proliferation have been limited and in the instances they have been made, have not
been effective. Though there was an amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, which
included a disarmament programme, the availability of arms remains steady, which
clearly indicates that the disarmament was incomplete. Furthermore, the fact that
resurgent militia groups have not lacked arms indicates sustained availability and
access to new supplies. SALW interceptions are mostly ad hoc and may be a result of
non- compliance with corrupt practices of officials at the ports, borders, and
highways. It is mainly in response to the current Boko Haram insurgency that there is
an increased state of alert, which has resulted in border closures. The problem remains
that those who abuse SALW processes rarely, if ever are prosecuted even though
arrests are made.
The above mentioned findings indicate that high levels of SALW proliferation in the
past decades, the thriving arms market in the country, and the spread of rampant
insecurity, have resulted in parts of Nigerian society becoming deeply entrenched in a
gun culture. In addition to fighting arms proliferation at the known sources of inflow,
more attention needs to be focused on eliminating the causes of insecurity that are
driving groups to take up arm in the first place. Major political will by the government,
124 / References
civil society, and the international community is necessary in order to curtail
widespread corruption amongst political leaders and security agencies as well as to
break the patterns that are sustaining such high levels of arms proliferation.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1
/ 129
APPENDIX 1
TABLE 4: Fieldwork Interviews in the Six Geopolitical Regions (Excluding Coastal
Towns of South South)
S/N
Geo-political Regions
Towns
No. of
Respondents
Date/Period of
Fieldwork
1
North West
Kamba
15
March
2
North Central
Jos, Abuja
17
December2011,
February 2012
3
North East
Wukari, Ibi
19
February
4
South East
Owerri, Awka
5
South West
Lagos,
Ibadan
6
South South
Asaba, Ozoro,
Benin, Port
Harcourt,
Excluding
Orlu, 11
Seme, 12
9
Coastal towns
Total
Source: Fieldwork
83
March
February-March
February-March
130 / Appendix 2
APPENDIX 2
TABLE 5: Distribution of Respondents in the Coastal Areas of the South South
S/n
State
Local Government
Towns
No. of respondents
Delta
Warri South-West L. G area
Okerenkoko
5
Ogbe-ijo
3
Warri
3
Ojobo
3
Torugbene
3
Tuomor
2
Oboro
2
Okpokonou
2
Koloama
4
Olokpobiri,
5
Peremorbiri
4
Ijetu town
3
Agge
2
Ekeremor
3
Amabulou
3
Asaritoru L.G
Buguma
2
Degema
Kula
1
Burutu L.G area
Bayelsa Southern-Ijaw L.G area
Ekeremor L.G
Rivers
Total
Source: Fieldwork
50
Appendix 3
APPENDIX 3
TABLE 6: Selected Cases of Police Seizures of illicit SALW in 2004
Year
Location
Incidence
3 March
Obosi,
Anambra
Police encounter 1 SGM rif le, 2 locally made pistols, 24
with armed
rounds of cartridges, 3 rounds of 9mm
robbers
ammunition
9 March
Okene-Lokoja Police encounter
road, KogiState with armed
robbers
14 March Anthony
Village, Lagos
Police encounter
with armed
robbers
5 AK-47 rif les, 3 magazines and 3 rounds of
ammunition
6 locally assembled pistols, 12 partly
premises of
assembled pistols, 1 Berettapistol, 40
Engineer,Abubaka rounds of ammunitions, 25 rounds of 9.65
r Musa
mm ammunitions.
26 March Agbor-Asaba
road, Delta
12
AK-47 rif les, 2 magazines,
60 rounds of
Police search and
detection of PDP ammunition
chieftains
Akobo-Ibadan, Police encounter
Oyo
with armed
robbers
26 June
4 AK-47 rif les, 3 magazines, 3 rounds of
ammunition
Police search on
24 March Sokoto
3 April
Seizures
KatsinaState
Police raid on
criminal hideout
1 AK-47 rif le, 1 Berettapistol, 1 brownie
pistol, 6 AK-47 magazines, 224 rounds of
ammunition
Dane guns, 9 pistols,
43
1 revolver, 58
rounds of revolver ammunition, 6 pistol
magazines
10 July
Odupkani
Police stop and 8 pistols, 62 rounds of .9mm ammunition
Junction, Cross search operation
River
14 juillet
Okrika, Rivers
Police raid of
criminal hideout
37 assorted rif les, 1 general purpose
machine gun, 4 AK-47 rif les, 4 SMG rif les,
2 sterling rif les, 2 pump-action guns, 2 LAR
rif les, 2 Berettapistols, 1 double-barrel
gun, 458 rounds of assorted ammunitions,
155 cartridges, 137 rounds of 7.6 mm
ammunitions, 24 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunitions, etc.
14 juillet
Okrika, Rivers
Police raid of
criminal hideout
37 assorted rif les, 1 general purpose
machine gun, 4 AK-47 rif les, 4 SMG rif les,
2 sterling rif les, 2 pump-action guns, 2 LAR
rif les, 2 Berettapistols, 1 double-barrel
gun, 458 rounds of assorted ammunitions,
155 cartridges, 137 rounds of 7.6 mm
ammunitions, 24 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunitions, etc.
29
Bama and
September Gwoza
communities,
Borno
Police operations
against Taliban
religious
extremists
27 rif les and 500 rounds of ammunitions
19
October
Police encounter
with armed
robbers
8 AK 47 rif les, 14 magazines, 705 rounds of
ammunition
Kano-Bauchi
road, Bauchi
state
Source: Tabulations from Nigerian Police Annual Report, 2004
(E.E.O. Alemika 2011: 132-134)
/ 131
132 / Appendix 4
APPENDIX 4
TABLE 7: Cases of Interception of SALW Smuggling 2010
S/N
Cases
Place
Quantity/Type
Date
1.
Government
driver with
arms smuggled
from Cameroon
Maiduguri,
Borno State
25 AK-47s
August 2010
2.
Woman
DabarMasara,
smuggling arms Borno State
into Nigeria
from Cameroon
via boat
10 AK-47s
November 2010
3.
Seizure of arms Ibadan, Oyo
and
State
ammunition
from a
suspected bank
robbery squad 47 ri les, 103
AK-47
magazines, 1
assault ri le, 2
GMPGs
2010
4.
Lorry load of
arms and
ammunition
Onitsha,
Anambra State
18 October
2010
Appendix 5
/ 133
APPENDIX 5
TABLE 8: Seizures of illicit SALW by Nigerian Security Agencies, 2011-2012
Date
Agency
Location
Quantity and Type
January
2011
Nigeria
Customs
Lagos Port
13 containers containing a variety of weapons
such as RPGs and mortars.
February
2012
State Security NenweArin 56 single-barrel guns; 20 single-barrel long
Service
ri,Enugu
range guns; 3 single-barrel short range guns; 2
State.
locally-made double-barrel short range pistols;
1 double-barrel short Dane gun; 1 single-barrel
short range pistol; 5 long range engines; 19
engines with butt; 12 canons; 4 double-barrel
guns and 1 revolver barrel.
April 2011
Nigeria Police Lagos
3 locally madepistols; 1 double-barrel short
gun; 1 single-barrel short gun and 13 live
cartridges.
May 2011
Nigeria Police Lagos
3 locally madepistols; 1 sub-machine gun and 51
live cartridges.
June 2011
State Security Uromi, Edo
Service and
State
the Nigeria
Police Force
10 AK-47 ri les; live ammunition and 7 cut to
size single-barrel local guns.
June 2011
Nigeria Police Lagos
3 locally madepistols; 1 short gun; 2 live
cartridges and 30 rounds of 9mm calibre
ammunition.
November
2011
Nigeria
Aviation
Handling
Company
6 double-barrels; 1 pump-action; 1 Uzi; 2
magazines, 1 Berettapistol; 20 pieces of 5.56mm
calibre, 19 cartridges; 12/12;500 pieces of black
armoury; a sealedbox of cartridges and a
Becheverriapistol.
Lagos
Airport
134 / Appendix 1
January –
February
2012
Nigeria Police Makurdi,
Force
Gboko and
Otukpo
2 AK-47 ri les with 38 rounds of live
ammunition; 1 Smoke gunner with cartridges, 1
assault ri le with 34 rounds of live ammunition;
and 7 rounds of G3 ammunition.
January –
February
2012
Nigeria Police TerhemeSe
var
1 complete AK-47 ri le; 2 English AK-47
magazines; 1 locally-made AK-47 magazine; 1
locally-made Berettapistol; 1 Berettapistol
under construction; 2 AK-47s under
construction; 4 empty shells of Beretta
ammunition; 2 live AK-47 ammunition and
several tools for the construction of arms.