WhyAreInterestGroupsPoliticallyActive?
AnIncentiveTheoreticalFramework
NicoleBolleyer(Exeter)&FlorianWeiler(Kent)
DraftPaper,November2016–CommentsWelcome
Politicalactivityisconventionallyconsideredasaconstitutiveordefiningfeatureofinterest
groups (Truman 1951, Berry 1977), which sets them apart from inwards-oriented civil
society groups that focus on their membership without becoming politically active or
service-providing organizations that engage with the policy process, but in the output
(implementation) rather than the input (agenda-setting or decision-making) stage. What
motivatesmembershipgroupstobecomeinterestgroupsbyengaginginpoliticalactivityis
rarely asked or examined: as interest group populations are defined by political activity
‘non-political’groupsare–atleastintheory-leftasidefromthestart.Incontrast,whether
firms – whose primary function is making economic profit – become lobbyists or not
constitutesapuzzleandisactivelydiscussed(Bouwen2002;DeFigueiredoetal.2004).Yet
forinterestgroups,engagementinpoliticalactivityisconsideredcloselytiedtotheirraison
d’être(Lowery2007;Wilko2015).This,inturn,putsanemphasisonthestrategiesthrough
which groups try to exercise political influence, moving attention away from whether and
howintenselygroupsdofocusonthistypeofactivityinthefirstplace.
We look at political activity broadly conceived as ‘any attempt to influence the
decisionsofanyinstitutionaleliteonbehalfofacollectiveinterest’(Jenkins1987:29),which
notonlyincludeslobbyingofgovernmentofficialsorbureaucratsinthenarrowsensebut
also covers public education and protest activities. This is important as organizations can
consider themselves as politically active (e.g. engaged in awareness raising or education)
withoutnecessarilyperceivingthisaslobbying(BloodgoodandTremblay-Boire2016:2).
Empirically, boundaries between politically active and inactive groups are fluent as
highlightedbytheliteratureonhybridorganizations(stressinghoworganizationsreconcile
diverse and sometimes conflicting purposes) (e.g. Minkoff 2002; Hasenfeld and Gidron
2005).Interestgroupsmightperiodicallybepoliticallyinactive–andbestcharacterizedas
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latent interest groups (Berkhout 2016: 10). These can still survive due to other activities
generating support, as predominantly service-oriented charities that only periodically
engageinlobbyingactivitydemonstrate-bethisduetothenatureoftheirmission,dueto
legalconstraintsoramixturethereof.1AsAlmong-BarandSchmid(2014:15)pointoutina
reviewonresearchonnon-profithumanserviceorganizations:“Participationinadvocacyis
not limited to organizations that define themselves as “advocacy organizations” and thus
shouldbestudiedasanactivity,andnotasanorganizationalclassification”[italicsadded].
Similarly,Halpinhasurgedinterestgroupscholarshiptogobeyondafunctionalspecification
of interest groups and avoid the downplaying of other dimensions of group life as a
consequenceofdefininggroupsasactorsformedforthepurposeofinfluencingpublicpolicy
(2014:7; 28; see also Moe 1988: 1-2). Although the question which factors affect how
intensely voluntary membership organizations engage in political activity – and thus how
latent interest groups become active interest groups - is an important one, it is rarely
discussedorexaminedexplicitlyintheinterestgroupliterature.
Unlikefirmsorformalinstitutionssuchasgovernmentunitsthatlobbyindividually,
voluntary membership organizations2 face the constant threat of member exit (whether
membersareindividualsororganizationsthemselves).Thus,theyneedtomakeeffortsto
sustain member support and loyalty (Olson 1976; Wilson 1973; Hirschman 1970; Gray und
Lowery 1995). Lowery (2007) has stressed that all organizations – including those
predominantly aiming for policy influence – need to survive to start with to pursue any
other goal. Survival, in turn, depends on factors such as resources for organizational
maintenance(e.g.members,finances),possiblymoresothanonthesuccessfulexerciseof
policy influence. Thus, we consider political activity as possible instead of constitutive
featureofmembershiporganizationsthathaveformedtopursueasharedinterest.
Startingfromhere,followingLowery,whohighlightedthatinterestgroupbehaviour
should be theorized “from the perspective of the organization” (2007: 46), we adopt an
organization-centred-approachbuildingon‘incentivetheoreticalperspectives’ingroupand
organizationresearchtoaccountfororganizations’propensitytoengageinpoliticalactivity.
1
Charitablestatusisoftenlinkedtorestrictionsontheextenttowhichanorganizationcanengageinovertly
partisanorpoliticalactivitiessuchaslobbying(Salamon1997;O’Halloran2011).
2
We define voluntary organizations as organizations with a formalized infrastructure, that are private
(separate from government), non-profit-distributing, self-governing and membership-based (Salamon and
Anheier1998:216),membersbeingeitherindividualsororganizations(Jordanetal2004).
2
Specifically, we theorize how organizational elites sustain (rather than form) political
organizations–suchasinterestgroups–throughdifferentstrategiesofincentiveprovision
totheirmembers(e.g.ClarkandWilson1961;Salisbury1969;Wilson1973).Wearguethat
these strategies are fundamentally shaped by the nature of its membership (individual or
corporate) and its respective size constitutive for the organization and, more specifically,
theinfluencememberscanexercisewithintheorganizationduetotheirpositionwithinit
definedbyvoicemechanismsandtheirrelativecontributiontotheorganization’sresources.
Thesetwofundamentalaspectsarecentralfortheextenttowhichelitesconsiderpolitical
activityasinstrumentaltosustaintheirorganizationornot.
After having developed our incentive-theoretical framework on political group
activity,wetestourhypothesesusingdatafromtwointerestgroupsurveysinSwitzerland
and Germany conducted in 2011 (Jentges et al. 2012, 2013). While organizations were
included in the surveyed populations as ‘interest groups’ based on the expectation that,
giventheirprofiles,theyarepotentiallypoliticallyactive,respondentsdidnotonlyvaryin
theintensityofpoliticalactivity,butalsowhethertheyreportedthattheyarepoliticalactive
at all. To us, this variation opens a window of opportunity to study - based on our
theoretical framework - the determinants of the intensity of groups’ political activity and
thereby move beyond treating political activity “as an organizational classification” as
highlightedinrecentwork(Almong-BarandSchmid2014:15;seealsoHalpin2014).
Our findings substantiate our theoretical framework and underline the importance
of intra-organizational characteristics to understand how intensively organizations are
politically active and support our hypotheses derived from classical incentive theory that
highlight challenges of organizational maintenance (rather than theorizing interest
aggregationandgroupformation).Weexpectedthatorganizationwithindividualmembers
(compared to those with corporate members) to be less politically active. We further
expected that this only holds as long as its membership size remains below a certain
threshold. Above this threshold, so the argument, the balance of strategic incentive
provision changes and a growing number of individuals should start to strengthen an
organization’s propensity towards political activity, which is what we found. Importantly,
our findings hold even though we control for a range of ‘external’ factors (policy field,
external income sources, competition) that according to earlier works should affect
organizations’choicesandbehaviour.
3
More generally, our findings stress the usefulness to move away from political
activity as defining criterion for interest groups and treat it or as a puzzle instead. This
allows us to gain a more nuanced understanding of the factors that motivate voluntary
membershipgroupstoactlikeinterestgroupsina‘functionalsense’bytakingmoreserious
thepossibilitythatformanygroupspoliticalactivitymightbeoneofmanythingstheydo,
withoutnecessarilybeingconstitutivefortheiridentity.
AnIncentiveTheoreticalFrameworkonGroups’PoliticalActivity
When theorizing the behaviour of interest groups as one type of voluntary membership
organization, the nature of leader-member relationships is bound to be central for
maintainingsuchorganizationsascollectiveactors.Indeed,casestudyresearchoninterest
groups has stressed the importance of members and the resources they hold within the
organization for the extent to which leaders can or want to prioritize political over other
activitiesornot(Wilko2015:123-5;Halpin2014).Quantitativeresearch,incontrast,tends
to ignore membership-related factors and thereby often bypasses the intra-organizational
drivers of group activities (Jordan et al. 2002: 204; but see Binderkrantz 2009; Halpin and
Herschel 2012). In contrast, ‘incentive theoretical approaches’ prominent in group and
organization research deal with how organizations as collective actors sustain themselves
(e.g.ClarkandWilson1961;Wilson1973)ratherthandealingwiththequestionsofgroup
formationorinterestaggregation.Maloney(2015:99;seealsoJordanandMaloney1997)
has prominently argued that leaders tailor organizational activities to their members’
preferences to provide an incentive mix able to assure the organization’s survival. If so,
whetherinvestmentsinpoliticalactivitiesareworthwhileshouldbeassessedaccordingly.
Buildingontheseworks,weessentiallyarguethatorganizationalleaders’strategies
of incentive provision are fundamentally shaped by two aspects: the nature of its
membership (individual or corporate) and its respective size; and the influence members
canexercisewithintheorganizationduetotheirpositionwithintheasorganizationdefined
byvoicemechanismsandtheirrelativecontributiontotheorganization’sresources.
TheNatureofOrganizationalMembersandtheirConsequencesforIncentiveProvision
Which incentives (or mix thereof) are most effective to achieve organizational stability
dependsonthenatureofmembersaswellastheirnumber.Thedistinctionbetweengroups
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with individual members and those with corporate actors (e.g. institutions, firms or other
associations)iscrucialastheirmotivationfororganizationalmembershipareboundtodiffer
between them. These motivational differences can be expected to be central for which
incentive mix induces these members to stay and continue to support their organization,
which pushes leaders to provide distinct combinations of incentives respectively. These
combinations,inturn,caneithersupportorweakentheprioritizationofpoliticalactivityas
onemodeofincentiveprovision.
How do organizations composed of individuals differ from those composed of
corporate members in the role political activity might play in sustaining organizational
support? Considering different incentive types available, we can expect selective material
incentives that are by definition exclusively available to members (e.g. access to specific
services)(Wilson1973)tobeequallyrelevanttosustainmembershipirrespectiveofthetype
ofmember.Thisisbecausebothtypesofmembershipgroupsuffer–ceterisparibus3-from
the same free-rider problem regarding political activity generating policy influence, which
constitutes a collective incentive instead: even if, for instance, a favourable policy change
canbeachievedandtheorganizationcaneffectivelyclaimcreditforit,membershipinthe
organization is no prerequisite to benefit from this change, i.e. non-members with similar
interestscanequallyenjoyitsadvantages.Thisproblemofnon-exclusivitymakesselective
incentives exclusively accessible to members crucial for the maintenance of membership
organizationsgenerally(Olson1965).4
Weexpectthecentralimplicationofbeinganindividualmembershiporganizationto
lieintheroleofanothertypeofselectiveincentivethatisnon-material:solidaryincentives
thataregeneratedbythepersonalsatisfactionofmembersderivedfromassociatingwith
others(e.g.throughjointactivitiesstrengtheningmembers’belongingtothegroup)(Clark
and Wilson 1961: 134-5; see also Salisbury 1969). In contrast to individual members, to
membersthatarethemselvesorganizationsorinstitutionstheseincentivescanbeexpected
tobeoflittlerelevance.Thus,asfarasinternallyprovidedselectiveincentivesgo,corporate
3
‘Ceteris paribus’ implies that we don’t associate one type of membership group necessarily with a higher
numberofmembers(i.e.highercomplexity)whichisadifferentfactorwetalkaboutlater.
4
Note that the terminologies used for various incentive or benefit types vary to some extent in Wilson and
Clark(1961),Wilson(1973)andOlson(1965).Asforourpurposesthespecificdistinctionsbetweenselective
and collective incentives (whether material or not) and between solidary incentives (as one type of a nonmaterialselectiveincentive)andselectivematerialincentivesarethemostcrucial,westickwiththeseasthe
maintermsforthesakeofsimplicityanddon’tdiscussanyotherincentivetypespresentedintheliterature.
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members are bound to be prevented from free-riding by incentives exclusive to members
otherthansolidaryones.5Thisisbecauseeithertheyhavenoindividualvoluntarymembers
profiting from any activities strengthening feelings of group solidarity or because each
memberorganizationprovidessolidaryincentiveswithinitsownboundariestostabilizeits
own(individual)membershipbase(separatefromtheindividualmembershipsoftheother
corporate members). Consequently, membership organizations with individual members
face incentives to sustain support not only through the provision of selective material and
collective incentives (as corporate membership organizations) but also through solidary
incentivesgeneratinganon-instrumentalattachmentofmemberstotheorganization.
Activities generating each incentive type relevant to sustain an organization
generate their own costs (e.g. political activities generating (non-exclusive) collective
incentivesintermsofinfluenceongovernmentpolicy,jointsocialactivitiesformembersto
strengthen solidarity, service provision to generate selective material incentives for
members).Thesecostsrisethemorediversifiedincentiveprovisionwithinanorganization
are. As organizations generally have limited resources, we expect a trade-off between a
more diversified intra-organizational incentive provision and externally oriented political
activity (both of which generate organizational costs) (Wilko 2015: 125). Consequently,
organizationswithindividualmemberswill–ceterisparibus-havefewerresourcesleftto
investinpoliticalactivitythanthosewithoutindividualmembers,whicharenotexpectedto
providesolidaryincentivestomembersaswell,leadingtoourfirsthypothesis.
H1A (Individual Members Hypothesis) If an organization has individual members, it is less
politicallyactivethananorganizationcomposedofcorporatemembers.
This hypothesis, however, does not yet consider the role of membership size, which it
assumesasconstant,andwhichconstitutesaseparatefactoraffectingwhichincentivemix
is most cost-effective in building support from leaders’ point of view. So what happens
whenmembershiporganizationswithindividualmembersgrowascomparedtothosewith
corporatemembers?
Returning to Wilson (1973) focused on organizational maintenance (rather than
approachingtheengagementinpoliticalactivityasamobilisationoraggregationproblem,
5
These don’t have to be material in the narrow sense but could consist of status or special recognition as
derivedfromexclusivegroupmembership.
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see Olson (1965)) we can refine our initial hypothesis that rested on two arguments: all
membershiporganizationswillusetosomeextentselectivematerialincentivesenhancing
members’statusorgrantingmaterialbenefitstostabilizesupport;andindividualmembers
are less instrumentally driven than corporate members and therefor receptive to solidary
(internallydirected)activities.Ifthelatterargumentholds,individualmembersshouldalso
be receptive to collective outside activities that strengthen the attachment to the
organization’s cause tapping into individuals’ emotional attachments, targeting not only
membersbutsympathisersinsocietymorebroadly.Aslongastheorganizationisrelatively
small,wecanexpectsolidaryincentivestobemoreeffectiveasnon-memberscanbemore
effectivelyexcludedfromthem(which,inturn,shouldenhancethevalueofmembership).
Yet as individual membership grows, the following three simultaneous,
interconnected shifts take place, changing the incentive mix most effective to sustain
organizational support in such organizations: first, solidary incentives are more difficult to
provideeffectivelyinbigorganizationthatbytheirverynaturearemoreanonymous.Asfar
as investments in such activities are less effective in mass organizations, resources are
better invested in other activities. Second, political activities can serve as (second best)
‘substitute’tosolidaryincentivesasmechanismtostrengthenagroup’sidentity.Especially
the pursuit of political goals through outsider or public political strategies (e.g. media
campaigns) that are highly visible to members, media and sympathisers in society alike
(Beyers 2004: 213-14) can stress the importance of the organizations’ cause and thereby
strengthen group attachments. Again, individual members can be expected to be more
receptivetosuchactivitiesthanmoreinstrumentallydrivencorporatemembers.Third,the
provision of selective material incentives (which need to be made available to each
individual member) is bound to become increasingly costly the more members there are,
making strategies to generate incentives alternatively comparatively more (cost)effective
when attempting to sustain an organization, which again should release resources for
politicalactivities.Thesethreeshiftssuggesta‘thresholdeffect’whentheorizingtheeffects
ofindividualmembershiponpoliticalactivity.Wecanrefineourinitialhypothesisandadda
secondoneconsideringtheimplicationsofgrowingsize:
H1B(IndividualMembershipSizeHypothesis):Asindividualmembershiporganizationsgrow,
the more politically active they become as compared to corporate membership
organizationsofequivalentsizes.
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The latter hypothesis contrasts with arguments made in the interest group literature
expectingcorporatemembershiporganizationstobemoreactive,notless.Thesedifferent
expectations,however,wherebasedontheobservationthatindividualmembershipgroups
tend to be bigger and more complex than membership groups composed of corporate
actors(e.g.firms,associations,governmentunits).This,inturn,underpinnedtheargument
thatthenatureofinterestaggregationdiffersbetweenthesetwogrouptypes.Duetothe
higher complexity, individual membership groups are assumed to represent more diffuse
interestsascomparedtothemorespecificinterestsrepresentedbygroupscomposedofa
smallernumberoforganizations(Berkhout2010:46,Thrall2006).Consequently,ithasbeen
arguedthatindividualmembershiporganizations(astheyareusuallybigger)arelessactive
than corporate ones, as the higher number of members in organizations as such is
associated with lower political activity. This line of argument hypothesizes a combined
effectlinkingmembershiptypewithgroupsize.Oncedisentanglingthetwo,therationaleof
approachingtheabilityofanorganizationtoengageinpoliticalactivitiesasanaggregation
problem allows us to make the following argument about organizations with corporate
members.
This argument draws on Olson (1965), who considered interest aggregation as an
instrumentally driven process. Considering political activity as one purpose of such an
aggregationprocess,eachmembercanbeexpectedtobekeeninseeinghisorherinterests
consideredinwhateverpoliticalpositiontheorganizationfightsforandactualengagement
in political activity becomes the more difficult and demanding the more numerous,
heterogeneous and complex member preferences. Here it is important to consider that
political activity not only requires the formation of a common line reconciling member
preferencesassuch,butacommonlinewithwhichthemostormostimportantmembers
are happy. Especially the latter challenge suggests that political activity (if evaluated by
leadersintermsofwhetherithelpspursueindividualmembergoalsratherthanservingas
identify-strengtheningactivity)mightbecontroversialasmembersdisagreeoverwhatline
totake.Thismakesalternative,lesscontestedmodesofincentiveprovision(e.g.services)
more attractive to organizational leaders that are concerned about the organization’s
maintenance rather than driven by a particular political agenda themselves. As this
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argumentpresupposesthatmembersareinstrumentallydrivenandassesspoliticalactivity
accordingly,anassumption–asarguedearlier–thatappliesmoretocorporatemembers
than individuals, we arrive at our last hypothesis on the implications of membership type
andsize:
H2(CorporateMembersHypothesis):Themorecorporatemembershiporganizationsgrow,
thelesstheyarepoliticallyactive.
TheVariableInfluenceofMembersanditsConsequencesforPoliticalActivity
Although voluntary organizations are pressed to continuously maintain member support,
sincemembers canexitatanypoint(Wilson1973),Jordanetalhavestressedthatonlya
minorityofinterestgroupsareinterestedinorabletoenhancememberinvolvement(2004:
209). Indeed, group members might be perfectly happy to remain passive and not be
interested in actively shaping their organization’s priorities as long as the latter don’t
directly clash with their preferences, minding the costs of a more active involvement
(Maloney2015:102).Atthesametime,leadersneedtoreconcilememberdemandswith
externalpressures,whichcandisincentivizepoliticalactivitygenerallyorthesortdesiredby
members. Dependency on government funding, for instance, is often associated with a
moderatingeffectonpoliticalactivism–indirectlyifstringsattachedpushorganizationsto
investinprofessionalizationordirectlyifgovernmentswithdrawfundingfromgovernmentcriticalorganizations(BloodgoodandTremblay-Boire2016:4-5).Beingexposedtointernal
and external pressures often pulling in opposite directions, how responsive leaders are to
(internal)memberpreferencesgenerallyandtothoseinfavourofpoliticalactivitydepends
on the mechanisms within the organization that allow members to actively communicate
with them to receive the relevant information in the first instance. At the same time,
members with strong political views who desire specific policy changes are bound to care
most about having such channels to receive information from elites, while being more
inclinedtoactivelyusethemtocommunicatebacktoelites(ascomparedtomembersthat
predominantly enjoy participation in group life, joined for gaining access to the services
offered by the organisation and predominantly operate as ‘passive consumers’ or ‘check
book supporters’). If so, the pressure on the organization to actively pursue members’
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politicalinterests–eveninfaceofcounterincentivesoutsidetheorganization-shouldgrow
withthegrowthofavailablecommunicationchannels.
Theresponsivenessofleaderstomembers’demands(ascomparedtothoseofother
actors) can be further expected to vary depending on whether they are important
contributors to an organization’s budget (Wilko 2015: 123). While not all members are
necessarily active and interested in the organization being politically active, if as argued
earliermemberswithstrongbeliefscanbeexpectedtobemorevocalaswellasbeingmore
likely to leave when dissatisfied with the organization, financial dependency on member
feesshouldreinforcetheincentivesfortheorganizationtostressitsabilitytovisiblypush
for the members’ interests, including their political interests. This is why growing
dependencyonmembershipfeescreatesincentivesforleaderstoinvestinpoliticalactivity
asacollectiveincentiveasdemandedbypoliticallyactivemembers.
Thisleadstoourfinaltwohypotheseseachtheorizingafactorenhancingtheintraorganizational influence that active members can exercise within an organization, in turn,
pushingelitestoengageinpoliticalactivities:
H3 Member Communication Hypothesis: The more numerous and the more actively used
communication channels between leaders and members are in an organization, the more
politicallyactiveitislikelytobe.
H4 Membership Fees Hypothesis: The more dependent an organization is on membership
fees,themorepoliticallypoliticalactiveitislikelytobe.
DataandMeasurements
Following the method suggested by Wonka et al. (2010), a list of interest groups for
Germany and Switzerland was compiled using various sources. For Germany, two sources
registeringlobbygroupswereused.Thefirstisthe‘TaschenbuchdesöffentlichenLebens–
Deutschland 2010’ (Oeckl 2010), the second is the list of officially registered lobby
organisations with the German Bundestag (the so called ‘Lobbyliste’). In Switzerland, data
collection started with the ‚SchweizerJahrbuch des öffentlichenLebens’ (Schwabe 2009).
SincenoofficialregistryforinterestgroupsexistsintheSwissparliament,theparliament’s
‘Gästeregister’ (guest registry) for relevant organisations was used as a second source of
information.Finally,theSwisslistofinterestgroupswascompletedbycheckingthewebsite
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www.verbaende.ch for potentially relevant organisations not yet included in the list. The
differentlistsweremerged,andduplicateentriesweredeleted.Duringthiscodingprocess
the postal, Internet, and email addresses of each group’s central office, and (where
possible) the Internet and email addresses of the organisation’s communication
departments were recorded. These email addresses were used as the email-database for
theonlinequestionnaire.Datacollectionstartedinearly2011inSwitzerland,andinspring
2011inGermany.Theresponseratewas40%forSwitzerland(985of2475organisationsthe
questionnairewasmailedto)and23%forGermany(1246of5422organisations).However,
manyorganisationsleftinformationneededforthispaperblank.Forinstance,870interest
groups did not reply to the questions about their annual budget and the sources of this
budget – a much higher non-response rate than for any other question (only about 200
organisations did not reply to the questions about corporate/group membership – the
second highest non-response rate in the survey). These organisations are therefore
excludedfromtheanalysis,whichleavesuswith1034observations.However,becauseour
definition of interest organisation includes only membership groups, we also excluded all
groupswhodidreportedtohaveneitherindividualorgroupmembers.Thus,afurther95
groups were deleted from the dataset. Overall, we are left with 939 observations, and all
variables used in this article, further described below, are derived from this dataset (with
onenotableexception).484ofourobservationsarefromSwissinterestgroups,and455are
from German organisations. However, since we have so many missing observations, we
check all our findings presented in this paper using multiple imputation techniques. The
resultsusingtheimputeddatacanbefoundintheAppendixandsubstantiateourfindings.
OperationalizationoftheDependentVariable
To capture political activity we employ a variables derived from a survey question on the
frequency of political activity of interest organisations. In this question, respondent could
chose how often they are politically active from the following options: ‘Never’, ‘Rarely’,
‘Sometimes’,‘Often’,‘Veryoften’.Thisvariablethusencapsulesboththelikelihoodofbeing
politicallyactiveaswellastheintensityofthepoliticalactivityofinterestorganisations.We
find that 76 groups in our dataset (8.1%) are never politically active, while 174 groups
(18.5%) are rarely, 288 (30.7%) sometimes, 251 (26.8%) often, and 149 (15.9%) are very
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often politically active. The variable is coded in a way that positive coefficients in the
statisticalmodelsindicateahigherlikelihoodandahigherintensityofpoliticalactivity.
Survey questions can be problematic, because respondents might understand the
questions in various ways, or interpret the categories differently. As a check whether our
political activity variable captures what we intend to measure, we constructed a second
variablemakinguseofarangeofothersurveyitemscapturing(typesof)politicalactivity.
Wealsoaskedsurveyparticipantshowoftentheyengageinpoliticalactivitiestargetedat
specific audiences: the government, political parties, the media, and the general public.
Thesefourquestionsarealsoonafive-pointscalefromrarely(1)toveryoften(5),andwe
sumthesefourvariablesupasasecondmeasureofinterestgroupactivity.Usingboththese
activity variables as numerical variables, they exhibit a highly significant correlation
coefficient of 0.602. This is an indication that the general activity variable used as the
dependentvariableinthisstudydoesindeedcapturewhatweintended.
OperationalizationofExplanatoryVariables
Individualmembership:Tocapturemembershipofindividuals,twovariablesareincludedin
the statistical models below. First, we include a membership dummy which captures
whetheragrouphasindividualmembers(1)oronlygroupmembers(0).Ofthe939interest
organisationsinthedataset647doacceptindividualsasmembers(approximately69%).In
addition, survey respondents had to specify how many individual members their
organisations had. This variable is highly skewed, as many organisations have no or only
very few individual members, while there are also a few very large organisations (the
maximumis2.7millionmembersforalargeunion).Thisskewalsostronglyinfluencesthe
meanandthemedian,theformerbeing13350,whilethelatteris101individualmembers.
For this reason the natural logarithm is applied when this variable is used in the models
below.ThesetwovariablesareusedtotestH1A(IndividualMembersHypothesis)andH1B
(IndividualMembershipSizeHypothesis).
Corporate membership: Similar to individual membership, survey respondents were also
askedtoindicatethenumberofcorporatemembers(e.g.groupsandenterprises)arepart
of their organisation (H2 Corporate Members Hypothesis). Again, this variable is highly
skewed, with many groups having no group membership, while one interest group in the
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datasethas293,000suchmembers.Themeanis1210,andthemedian20,whichisanother
indication for the strong skew of this variable. To address this, we again use the natural
logarithm.
Internal communication with members: To operationalize H3 (Member Communication
Hypothesis) we use a measure that captures the channels for and intensity of
communicationbetweeninterestgroupsandtheirmembers.Toobtainsuchameasurewe
rely on several variables in the dataset that record how often organisations communicate
withtheirownmembersusingdifferenttypesofchannels.Forinstance,surveyrespondents
where asked how regularly they send out newsletters, or have direct meetings with
members.Intotal,thereareninesuchquestionsonmembercommunicationinthesurvey,
all of which could be answered on a five-point scale indicating that the specific form of
communicationhappened‘almostnever’(1),‘afewtimesayear’(2),‘afewtimesamonth’
(3),‘afewtimesaweek’(4),or‘daily’(5).Thenumericvaluesoftheseninevariableswere
summedup.Thus,thehigherthevalueoftheresultingvariableis,themoreintensivethe
communicationbetweeninterestgroupsandtheirmembers.Themaximumobservedvalue
in the dataset is 33 (out of a possible maximum of 45), while four organisations reported
that they almost never used any of the nine ways of communicating with their members.
Themeanis12.97.
Membership fees: Survey respondents were asked to provide the amount of money they
received through membership fees (as they were for other income sources such as state
subsidies),whichprovidesthebasistotestH4(MembershipFeesHypothesis).Asmentioned
previously, 870 organisations refused to answer these questions regarding their finances,
leading to a high number of lost observations. The mean value earned by the interest
organisations in our dataset who did answer the questions through membership fees is
620,300, with many groups earning very little (or nothing) through this source of income,
while the maximum is 56 million. The median for this variable is 71,100. In summary, this
budgetaryvariableishighlyskewedaswell,withmanyrelativelysmallorganisationsearning
onlylimitedamountsoffundsfrommembershipfees,whilefewlargeorganisationsreceive
largeamountsofmoney.Consequently,themembershipfeesvariableislogged.
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ControlVariables
Weincludevariouscontrolvariablesinthemodelstoensurethattheestimatesofourmain
explanatoryvariablesareunbiased.
Competition: The level of competition interest groups face is often mentioned in the
literatureasanimportantfactorinfluencinginterestgroupbehaviour(e.g.Baumgartnerand
Leech 2001, Weiler 2016). As the general level of competition also clearly correlates with
thecompetitionformembers(andmembershipfees),weneedtoincludethisvariableasan
important control. To capture competition between interest groups we rely on a survey
questiononthevisibilityofotherinterestgroupsinthefieldofactivityofanorganisation.
Again, survey respondents had to indicate on a five-point scale how visible other interest
groupsare,fromnotatallvisible(1)tohighlyvisible(5).Themeanvalueinthedatasetis
2.82, with 70 organisation selecting the lowest possible competition value, and 39 the
highest. This variable is included in the models below as a categorical variable, with the
lowestlevelofcompetitionactingasthebaselinecategory.
Group type: The type of interest group is also an important indicator for how interest
groups act and behave (e.g. Binderkrantz 2008, Klüver 2012, Weiler & Brändli 2015). The
literature proposed various ways to classify interest organisations (see e.g. Binderkrantz
2008,Klüver2012).Inthispaperwedistinguishbetweenpublicinterestandspecificinterest
groups.Theaimofpublicinterestgroupsistheadoptionofpolicieswhosebenefitsaccrue
tonon-membersaswell(Salisbury1969),whilespecificinterestorganisationsmainlycater
to the needs of a specified constituency. This definition of specific interest groups also
includes organisations interested in policies that benefit disadvantaged groups (such as
handicapped people or drug addicts), as they do represent a specific subset of society
instead of the (perceived) advantage of the general public. No question in the survey
allowed the identification of interest groups as being a cause groups or a specific interest
group.Therefore,allorganisationsinthedatasetwerehand-coded,and282groups(about
30%)wherefoundtobecausegroups.
State subsidies: State subsidies are another important form of income for interest
organisations,whicharguablehasanimpactonboththepoliticalactivityofgroups(Becker
14
1983),andalsohowtheybehavetowardstheirmembers(being,forinstance,moreorless
reliant on membership fees depending on the level of state subsidies they receive). Thus,
wealsoincludeastatesubsidyvariableinourmodels.604ofthegroupsinourfinaldataset
(about 64%) do not receive any state subsidies, while some organisation receive large
contributionsfrompublicfunds.Thebiggeststatesubsidyreportedwas€112millionfrom
aninternationalaidorganisation,yetisshouldbenotedthatmoneyallocatedtoaidproject
doesnot(oronlyindirectly)contributetotheadvocacybudgetoforganisations.Duetothe
skewednessofthisvariabletheloggedformisincludedinthemodels.
Issue area: The issue area is also an important determinant for the political activity of
interest organisations (Baumgartner and Leech 2001, Klüver 2011). Therefore, we also
includethemainissueofactivityintothemodels,asidentifiedbytheinterestgroupsinthe
surveys. Specifically, we identify the following six issues areas in our dataset: economics,
education,socialissues,environment,religion,andothers.
Age and country: In addition, we include two further variables in the statistical models.
First, to capture potential differences in lobbying and political activity stemming from the
length of time an interest organisation has already been part of the political system we
include the organisation’s age (logged). Second, our observations come from two distinct
political systems, Switzerland and Germany. To capture potential systematic differences
betweeninterestgroupbehaviourinthesetwocountries,weincludeacountrydummy.
EmpiricalAnalysis
ModelChoice
Inthissectionwepresenttheempiricalfindings.Giventhatthedependentvariable(interest
groupactivity)iscategoricalinnatureandonafive-pointscalewithaclearordering,weopt
fororderedlogitmodels.Table2presentsthemodels.Model1isthefullmodelincludingall
observations with complete information from the survey. In Models 2 and 3 we present
findings for Germany (Model 2) and Switzerland (Model 3) only, to check whether our
results hold true in both political systems, or whether they are driven by interest group
activity in one country only. In addition, to check if the big number of missing values is
problematic,wealsousemultipleimputationtechniquesandrunthesamemodelsagainfor
15
allinterestorganisationsinthesurveythatindicatethattheyhaveeitherindividualorgroup
members (excluding memberless organisations only). Thus, we almost double the number
ofobservationsfrom939to1780.However,theresultsarestablebothforthefullmodelas
wellasthetwocountrymodels,whichindicatesthatourmissingvaluesareindeedmissing
at random (see Appendix A for the imputed models). This increases our confidence in the
modelspresentedinTable2.
Table2:DeterminantsofpoliticalactivityofinterestgroupsinSwitzerlandandGermany
Individualmembershipdummy
Model2
Germany
Ord.logit
-0.77**
Model3
Switzerland
Ord.logit
-1.00***
(0.25)
(0.35)
(0.36)
0.10***
0.09**
0.13**
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
Corporatemembership
-0.03
-0.02
-0.02
Sizeindividualmembership
Membershipfees
Membercommunication
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.15***
0.10**
0.22***
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
0.06***
0.06***
0.05***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Competition(base=nocompetition)
Lowcompetition
1.30***
1.50***
1.11***
(0.26)
(0.41)
(0.34)
1.63***
1.81***
1.54***
(0.26)
(0.40)
(0.34)
2.03***
2.34***
1.69***
(0.28)
(0.44)
(0.38)
2.50***
2.69***
2.45***
(0.40)
(0.56)
(0.60)
0.69***
0.70***
0.57**
(0.15)
(0.21)
(0.22)
Statesubsidies
-0.01
0.02
-0.05***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Ageofinterestgroup
-0.14*
-0.21**
-0.07
Mediumcompetition
Highcompetition
Veryhighcompetition
Grouptype(base=specificinterestgroup)
Publicinterestgroup
Countrydummy
Issuearea(base=economicIGs)
Education
Model1
Fullmodel
Ord.logit
-0.84***
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.10)
0.45***
(0.13)
-0.67***
-0.76***
-0.64**
(0.20)
(0.30)
(0.27)
16
Religion
-1.21***
-1.24**
-1.05
(0.45)
(0.58)
(0.75)
Social
-0.27
-0.25
-0.40)
(0.19)
(0.27)
(0.27)
Environment
-0.28
-0.43
-0.13
(0.28)
(0.41)
(0.40)
0.11
-0.08
0.24
(0.17)
(0.27)
(0.23)
0.59
-0.2
1.05*
(0.47)
(0.70)
(0.63)
2.23***
1.26*
2.84***
(0.47)
(0.70)
(0.64)
3.83***
2.78***
4.57***
(0.48)
(0.71)
(0.65)
5.45***
4.39***
6.28***
(0.50)
(0.72)
(0.68)
AIC
2636.15
1296.33
1354.66
BIC
2742.74
1382.86
1442.48
LogLikelihood
-1296.07
-627.17
-656.33
939
455
484
OtherIGs
Intercepts
1|2
2|3
3|4
4|5
Num.obs.
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
Results
To discuss whether our incentive theoretical approach to groups’ political activity is
substantiated,westartwiththehypothesestheorizingtheimplicationsofmembershiptype
and size as important drivers of which ‘incentive mix’ leaders are likely to provide to
maintain organizational support. Following H1A (Individual Members Hypothesis),
organisation with individual members should be less politically active because providing
solidarity incentives through joint social activities, for instance, to individual members
generates costs for interest groups. Groups with only corporate members do not have to
bearsuchcosts,orforthemsuchincentivesareonlyoflimitedrelevance.Thesecosts,both
staff time and/or financial resources, in turn, reduce the resources organisations have at
theirdisposaltoinvestinpoliticalactivities.Indeed,botheffectsforourvariablescapturing
individualmembershiparehighlysignificant.Forinstance,thenegativeandsignificanteffect
of-0.84inModel1indicatesthatgroupswith(few)individualmembersaresignificantlyless
likely to be in the higher political activity categories than groups without individual
members. All else equal, the model predicts 47.7% of organisations without individual
membership to be politically active often or very often (the two highest political activity
17
levels),whileonly28.1%oforganisationswithindividualmembersareexpectedtoexhibit
suchhighlevelsofpoliticalactivity.
Some authors have claimed that groups based on individual membership
increasingly rely on ‘surrogate’ membership (see Hensby et al. 2011: 810), considering
individual members are mostly seen as ‘checkbook members’ (Hayes 1986: 134) without
themplayinganactiveroleintheorganization.Consequently,thereisnoneedformembers
to participate in the group’s activities from the point of view of such groups (Jordan and
Maloney 2007: 83). Yet there is also little demand for solidarity incentives from these
checkbook members, who form less loyal bonds with the groups and have high dropout
rates(JordanandMaloney1998:406-08).Ifthisviewiscorrectandholdsformostgroups
with individual members, we should not see any decrease in the general political activity
level of these groups, since no resources would have to be spent on solidarity incentive.
Consequently, our results challenge ideas around the declining relevance of solidary
incentives, echoing findings by Hensby et al. (2011: 816-19), who show that solidarity
incentivesdoplayarole.
As an organisation’s individual membership grows, our Individual Membership Size
Hypothesis (H1B) expects the intensity of political activity to increase. Again, our findings
support this expectation, as the positive and significant coefficients for the individual
members variable across all models indicate. The predicted effects in the models are
statistically significant and fairly strong. For instance, the coefficient of 0.10 in Model 1
translates,allelseequal,intoapredictedvalueof28.1%ofgroupswithveryfewindividual
membersbeingoftenorveryoftenpoliticallyactive(asshouldbethecaseasthisisinline
withthefindingspresentedinthepreviousparagraph).However,fromtherethepredicted
activity levels increase quickly. When organisations grow to 1,000 members, 43.6% of
organisations are expected to fall into the highest two activity categories. And when they
have about 10,000 members, more than 50% of organisations fall into the two highest
activitylevels.Thus,groupswiththatsizearepredictedtohaveovertakentheactivitylevel
ofmemberlessorganisations.Forgroupswiththehighestnumberofindividualmembersin
ourdatasetmorethan62%arepredictedtobeinthetwohighestactivitycategories.Thisis
evidenceforourargumentthatpoliticalactivitiescanstrengthengroupattachmentandact
asincentivesformembersof(particularlylarge)groupstostaywiththegroup.Additionally,
Jordan and Maloney (1998: 391) argue that group size influences political participation
18
positively because an impressive number of supports increases the attention interest
organisationsattain,andthusfacilitatesbothvoiceandaccessstrategies.Thisisinlinewith
Thrall’s(2006)viewthatalargermembershipbaseisbasicallyanotherresourcewhichhelps
groupstoincreasetheiractivitylevels,inparticularlywithregardstovoicestrategies.
Figure1summarisesthefindingsofH1AandH1Bandbringsthemtogether.Onthe
left hand side of the sub-plots we see the predicted values for organisations without any
individual members for the two highest activity levels. When moving from such an
organisation to one with only very few individual members, the figures show that the
modelspredictamuchloweractivitylevelforsuchgroups.Inotherwords,groupswithfew
individualmembersareexpectedtobemuchlessactiveandtendtobeintheloweractivity
categories more often. However, as the number of individual members increases, groups
become increasingly politically active. At around 3,000 individual members, their activity
levelsarepredictedtobeonparagainwithorganisationswithoutindividualmembers.From
thereonwards,politicalactivitylevelsincreasefurtherandlargergroupsareexpectedtobe
moreactive,andmoreintenselyso,thangroupswithoutindividualmembers,althoughthis
difference then only becomes significant when the membership size increases to over
(approximately) 50,000 individual members. These findings are similar irrespective of
whether the full sample is used, or whether the models for the two countries are run
separately.Overall,bothH1AandH1Bfindsupport,substantiatingourincentivetheoretical
approach.
Figure 1: Predicted values for high and very high political activity levels depending on
Prob. of very high activity level
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
With members
Memberless
0 1
10
100 1000 10k
Individual members
100k
1m
●
With members
Memberless
0.05
●
0.20
Prob. of high activity level
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.35
individualmembershipsize(including95%confidenceintervals)
0 1
10
100 1000 10k
Individual members
100k
1m
19
Next we turn to our Corporate Members Hypothesis (H2). Assuming that corporate
members are more instrumentally driven than individual members, we expected this to
affect their orientation towards organizational investments political activity as well. While
individualmembersareinterestedinawiderrangeofincentives(e.g.solidaryactivities)and
somemighthavelittleinterestintheorganization’spoliticalendeavours,corporatemember
areexpectedtobe–onaverage-keeneronseeingtheirinterestsconsideredinthepolitical
positiontheirorganizationfightsfor.Asthenumberofthosecorporatemembersincreases,
interestgroupsbecomemoredifficulttosteerbythegroups’leaders.Asfarasthereisless
consensus about the direction the interest group should take, finding agreement on a
commoncoursegetsmorecostlyandinvestmentsinpoliticalactivityassuchmightbecome
controversial, which results in less political activity. However, our models provide no
evidence in support of this hypothesis. The coefficients in all three models of Table 2 are
insignificant(althoughnegative,asexpected).
Havingdiscussedtheconsequencesofanorganization’scompositionontheleaders’
incentiveprovisionanditsrepercussionforpoliticalactivity,wenowconsidertheposition
thatmembershavewithintheirorganizationandhowthisincentivizesleaderstorespondto
member demands for pursuing their political interests. Communication with members,
according to the models in Table 2, is a strong predictor for the general level of political
activity,whichisinlinewithH3.Thesefindingsarehighlysignificant,andthemagnitudeof
theeffectifsubstantial.Organisationswiththelowestlevelofmembershipcommunication,
accordingtoModel1ofTable2,onlyhavealikelihoodof21.7%ofbeingpoliticallyactive
often or very often. This value increases to 65.9% for the organisations with the highest
levelofcommunicationbetweenorganisationalelitesandgroupmembers.Atthemeanof
thecommunicationvariable(12.97)approximately37.4%oforganisationsarepredictedto
fall into the two highest activity categories. This substantiates our Membership
Communication Hypothesis: when communication channels are available and used more
regularly, organisational elites must react to these demands by members and actively
pursuetheirinterestinordertomaintaintheirmembershipbase.Asmemberswithstrong
politicalviewsaremorelikelytobemorevocal,higherpoliticalactivityoftheorganizationis
enhanced (rather than more service provision to members). In addition, this finding is
20
evidenceinfavouroftheexchangetheoryofinterestgroupsproposedbySalisbury(1969).
Membersmustreceivebenefitsfromtheircontinuedparticipationinthegroup,andwhen
theymakedemandanddothennotseeactionbythegroup’sleaders,theyaremorelikely
toleavethegroup.Assuch,politicalactivityisanincentiveprovidedbyorganisationalelites
tosuchmemberstokeepthemintheorganisation.
Concluding with our Membership Fees Hypothesis (H4), a growing dependency on
membership fees indeed increases the political activity of groups. More reliance on
membership fees means that organisations are expected to visibly demonstrate that they
actively represent member interests and our findings suggest that the responsiveness of
leaders to members’ demands (as compared to those of other actors) vary depending on
whether they are important contributors to the organization’s budget (Wilko 2015: 123).
Investments in political activities are one means of preventing members from leaving or
switching to a competitor. As we can see in Table 2, the higher reliance on membership
feesindeedincreasesanorganization’sdegreeofpoliticalactivity.Thisfindingisbothvalid
inthepooledModel1includingalldata,andinthetwoseparatecountrymodels.Focussing
on the full model, the organisations with the smallest revenue coming from membership
feesinthedatasetarepredictedtofallintothetwohighestactivitylevels(‘often’and‘very
often’)‘only’inabout24.0%ofthecases,whilefortherichestorganisationsthisvaluerises
to over 62.5%. The effect for the full model including all 939 observations is graphically
depicted in Figure 2. It can clearly be seen in the plot that organisation generating less
revenue via membership fees are more likely to be never or only rarely politically active,
whileorganisationswithhigherincomefromthissourceofrevenuearelessandlesslikely
tofallintothesetwoactivitylevels,whiletheirpredictedvaluesofbeinginthetwohighest
activitycategoriesincrease.
21
Figure 2: Effect of membership fees on the level of political activity of interest groups
(including95%confidenceintervals)
Rarely
Sometimes
Often
very often
prob.X5
prob.X4
prob.X3
0.0
0.1
0.2
prob.X2
0.3
0.4
P(Political Activity Level
prob.X1| Membership fees)
Never
1k
10k 100k 1m 10m
1k
10k 100k 1m 10m
1k
10k 100k 1m 10m
1k
10k 100k 1m 10m
1k
10k 100k 1m 10m
Membership fees (total)
Having discussed the main findings in this paper, we briefly turn the attention to
some of the other effects in the models. These are in line with earlier work, enhancing
confidence in our main findings. First, the level of political activity increases when
competition among interest groups is higher. In other words, when interest groups are
faced with tougher competition in their field of activity, they react by increasing their
political activity levels. These findings corroborate the theoretical expectations from Gray
undLowery(1995,1996),andrecentempiricalfindings(seeMahoney2008,Weiler2016).
Group type as a predictor variable also influences the political activity of interest groups.
Public interest groups, according to our models, tend to exhibit higher activity levels than
specificinterestgroups.Thesecausegroups,accordingtoOlson(1965:126),areonlyable
to supply very few selective incentives to their members, compared to other types of
groups. As a consequence, in order to prevent members from switching to a similar – yet
competing – interest organisation, public interest groups only have the option to increase
their political activity levels to signal their utility to their members (also see Binderkrantz
2009,JordanandMaloney1998).Incontrast,thefindingsfortheothercontrolvariablesin
thepaper–statesubsidies,interestgroupage,andissuearea-arenotverystrong.
22
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the determinants of political activity of interest organisations.
More specifically, we apply an incentive-theoretical approach to take a closer look at the
politicalactivitylevelsofinterestgroups.Jordanetal(2004:202)havestressedthatgroup
scholars rarely study how political activities of interest organisations are linked to
membership-relatedandinternaldimensionofthesegroups.However,ouranalysisshows
thatthesefactorsareofcentralimportancetounderstandorganizations’propensitytoget
politicallyactiveandtheintensitywithwhichtheydoso.
Relyingonincentivetheory(ClarkandWilson1961;Wilson1973),weexpectintraorganisationalcharacteristicssuchasmembershipanddependencyonmembershipfeesto
playanimportantroleforgoverningthelevelofpoliticalactivityofinterestorganisations.
Wefindstrongevidenceinfavourofthistheory.Specifically,whetherorganisationsdohave
individual members, but also the number of such members, both influence the overall
politicalactivitylevelofgroups.Thebudgetderivedviamembershipfees,andthelevelof
communication between organisations and their members are also important factors
influencingtheintensityandthedirectionofthesepoliticalactivities.Itisalsoimportantto
note that organizational characteristics affected political activity while controlling for the
‘actortype’intermsofsubstantiveinterestrepresentedbygroups,echoingrecentfindings
that actor type and organizational background characteristics such as resources are less
stronglylinkedthancommonlyassumedbyexistinginterestgroupclassifications(Baroniet
al2014:156),stressingtheneedtotheorizeandanalysethemseparately.
Overall,ourfindingsstresstheusefulnessoftheincentive-theoreticalapproachto
understand interest group activities used in this paper. However, our research also
highlightingthecomplexityoftheconditionsthatmakegroupsactasinterestgroups(i.e.by
becomingpoliticallyactive),atopicthatdeservestobeexploredingreaterdetailinfuture
research.
Acknowledgements: Research for the paper has received funding from the European
ResearchCouncilundertheEuropeanUnion’sSeventhFrameworkProgramme(FP7/2007–
13)/ERCgrantagreement335890STATORG)andtheSwissNationalScienceFoundationvia
the interdisciplinary research project ‘NCCR Democracy’. This support is gratefully
acknowledged.
23
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28
Annex 1: Results with Multiple Imputations
Imputation 1
0.79⇤⇤⇤
(0.25)
Size individual membership
0.08⇤⇤
(0.03)
Size corporate membership
0.04
(0.03)
Membership fees
0.06⇤
(0.03)
Member communication
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Competition (base = no competion)
Low competition
1.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
Medium competition
1.70⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
High competition
2.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
Vey high competition
2.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.36)
Group type (base = specific interest group)
Public interest group
0.26⇤⇤
(0.13)
State subsidies
0.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Age of interest group
0.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.07)
Issue area (base = economic interest group)
Education
0.13
(0.18)
Religion
0.50⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
Social
0.59⇤
(0.36)
Environment
0.10
(0.17)
Other
0.20
(0.28)
Intercepts omitted
AIC
2738.53
BIC
2841.21
Log Likelihood
-1348.26
Num. obs.
982
Individ. membership dummy
⇤⇤⇤ p
< 0.01,
⇤⇤ p
Imputation 2
0.85⇤⇤⇤
(0.24)
0.07⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.08⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 3
0.82⇤⇤⇤
(0.24)
0.07⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 4
0.87⇤⇤⇤
(0.25)
0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 5
0.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.25)
0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.05
(0.03)
0.06⇤⇤
(0.03)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
1.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
1.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
2.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.30)
2.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.36)
1.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
1.73⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
2.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.30)
2.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.36)
1.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
1.83⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
2.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
2.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.36)
1.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
1.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
2.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
2.11⇤⇤⇤
(0.36)
0.53⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
0.02
(0.01)
0.11
(0.07)
0.09
(0.13)
0.02⇤
(0.01)
0.15⇤⇤
(0.07)
0.70⇤⇤⇤
(0.13)
0.01
(0.01)
0.17⇤⇤
(0.07)
0.59⇤⇤⇤
(0.13)
0.01
(0.01)
0.12⇤
(0.07)
0.12
(0.17)
0.60⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
0.68⇤
(0.36)
0.21
(0.18)
0.39
(0.28)
0.22
(0.18)
0.47⇤⇤
(0.19)
0.58
(0.36)
0.02
(0.17)
0.13
(0.27)
0.14
(0.17)
0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
0.67⇤
(0.36)
0.27
(0.18)
0.34
(0.27)
0.24
(0.18)
0.46⇤⇤
(0.19)
0.57
(0.36)
0.07
(0.18)
0.26
(0.27)
2717.91
2820.59
-1337.95
982
2735.81
2838.49
-1346.91
982
2709.80
2812.48
-1333.90
982
2726.84
2829.52
-1342.42
982
< 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.1
Table 1: Five multiple imputations for Germany only
29
Imputation 1
1.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
Size individual membership
0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
Size corporate membership
0.01
(0.03)
Membership fees
0.19⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
Member communication
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Competition (base = no competion)
Low competition
1.35⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
Medium competition
1.68⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
High competition
1.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
Vey high competition
2.83⇤⇤⇤
(0.42)
Group type (base = specific interest group)
Public interest group
0.20
(0.15)
State subsidies
0.03⇤⇤
(0.01)
Age of interest group
0.13⇤
(0.08)
Issue area (base = economic interest group)
Education
0.26
(0.18)
Religion
0.51⇤⇤
(0.20)
Social
0.58
(0.53)
Environment
0.02
(0.20)
Other
0.17
(0.32)
Intercepts omitted
AIC
2211.78
BIC
2310.10
Log Likelihood
-1084.89
Num. obs.
798
Individ. membership dummy
⇤⇤⇤ p
< 0.01,
⇤⇤ p
Imputation 2
1.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)
0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 3
1.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)
0.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 4
1.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.00
(0.03)
0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Imputation 5
1.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)
0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.04)
0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
1.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.25)
1.72⇤⇤⇤
(0.25)
1.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.28)
3.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.43)
1.28⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
2.93⇤⇤⇤
(0.43)
1.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.67⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.92⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
2.94⇤⇤⇤
(0.43)
1.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.26)
1.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
2.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.41)
0.61⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
0.12
(0.08)
0.22⇤
(0.15)
0.02⇤
(0.01)
0.16⇤⇤
(0.08)
0.33⇤⇤
(0.15)
0.02⇤
(0.01)
0.13⇤
(0.08)
0.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.15)
0.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
0.06
(0.08)
0.24
(0.18)
0.60⇤⇤⇤
(0.21)
0.90⇤
(0.53)
0.16
(0.20)
0.03
(0.33)
0.20
(0.18)
0.48⇤⇤
(0.20)
0.57
(0.53)
0.02
(0.20)
0.20
(0.32)
0.17
(0.18)
0.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
0.78
(0.53)
0.05
(0.20)
0.08
(0.32)
0.25
(0.18)
0.51⇤⇤
(0.20)
0.89⇤
(0.53)
0.09
(0.20)
0.00
(0.32)
2192.34
2290.67
-1075.17
798
2209.85
2308.18
-1083.93
798
2218.08
2316.40
-1088.04
798
2203.79
2302.11
-1080.89
798
< 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.1
Table 2: Five multiple imputations for Switzerland only
30
Iteration 1 Iteration 2
0.96⇤⇤⇤
1.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
(0.18)
Size individual membership
0.10⇤⇤⇤
0.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
(0.02)
Size corporate membership
0.01
0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
Membership fees
0.12⇤⇤⇤
0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
(0.02)
Member communication
0.06⇤⇤⇤
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
(0.01)
Competition (base = no competion)
Low competition
1.30⇤⇤⇤
1.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
(0.19)
Medium competition
1.68⇤⇤⇤
1.73⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
(0.18)
High competition
2.02⇤⇤⇤
2.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
(0.20)
Vey high competition
2.44⇤⇤⇤
2.50⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
(0.27)
Group type (base = specific interest group)
Public interest group
0.19⇤
0.58⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)
(0.10)
State subsidies
0.00
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
Age of interest group
0.15⇤⇤⇤
0.11⇤⇤
(0.05)
(0.05)
Country dummy
0.32⇤⇤⇤
0.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.09)
(0.09)
Issue area (base = economic interest group)
Education
0.20
0.18
(0.12)
(0.12)
Religion
0.48⇤⇤⇤
0.59⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
(0.14)
Social
0.62⇤⇤
0.79⇤⇤⇤
(0.29)
(0.29)
Environment
0.01
0.17
(0.13)
(0.13)
Other
0.05
0.24
(0.21)
(0.21)
Intercepts omitted
AIC
4946.81
4903.02
BIC
5067.47
5023.68
Log Likelihood
-2451.41
-2429.51
Num. obs.
1780
1780
Individ. membership dummy
⇤⇤⇤ p
< 0.01,
⇤⇤ p
Iteration 3
0.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
0.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Iteration 4
1.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
0.11⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Iteration 5
1.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
0.11⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.02)
0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
1.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
1.67⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
2.05⇤⇤⇤
(0.21)
2.50⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
1.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
1.74⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
2.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
2.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
1.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
1.62⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
1.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.21)
2.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
0.16
(0.10)
0.00
(0.01)
0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.05)
0.34⇤⇤⇤
(0.09)
0.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)
0.00
(0.01)
0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.05)
0.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.09)
0.67⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)
0.01
(0.01)
0.09⇤
(0.05)
0.27⇤⇤⇤
(0.09)
0.22⇤
(0.13)
0.47⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
0.64⇤⇤
(0.29)
0.02
(0.13)
0.00
(0.21)
0.16
(0.12)
0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
0.75⇤⇤
(0.30)
0.16
(0.13)
0.18
(0.21)
0.26⇤⇤
(0.13)
0.48⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
0.69⇤⇤
(0.29)
0.04
(0.13)
0.16
(0.21)
4937.50
5058.16
-2446.75
1780
4916.67
5037.32
-2436.33
1780
4915.63
5036.29
-2435.82
1780
< 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.1
Table 3: Five multiple imputations of the full model (Germany and Switzerland)
31