DEFTA
Operational Tasks and Vignettes
WP1
Danish Defence Target Architecture (DEFTA)
Version 1.0
Released June 2011
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Abstract
This report is part of the Danish Defence Target Architecture (DETFA) for information and
communication technology (ICT) systems. The report describes operational views as a part of
DEFTA. The purpose is to form a basis for the further work of analyzing the requirements for the
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Systems of the Danish Armed Forces in a
number of generic tasks.
The tasks are formulated with a description, and a number of vignettes are described as examples
of the interaction between the tasks.
The focus is on the description of relevant tasks since they make it possible to formulate a limited
number of operational situations as the background for the functional requirements to the future
ICT Systems of the Danish Armed Forces.
The vignettes include the military defence, the total defence, computer network operations and
relations to other authorities.
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Summary
This report describes a set of representative operational tasks to be used as part of the Danish
Defence Target Architecture (DEFTA). DEFTA is a high-level architecture spanning 10-15 years
ahead, and DEFTA serves as the vision for evolutionary development of all information and
communication technology (ICT) systems to be used in Danish Defence. The vision includes
network and infrastructure development, sharing of information for operational and administrative
domains, and interoperability for network based operations (NBO). The work on DEFTA has been
divided into four work packages (WP):
• WP0: Strategic vision and concepts for NBO.
• WP1: Operational tasks and vignettes.
• WP2: Information in NBO.
• WP3: The technical architecture for the ICT systems.
The purpose of WP1 is to describe a set of representative operational tasks, which can establish
the basis for the analysis of information requirements in WP2. The operational scenarios cover the
Danish Armed Forces, which includes the authorities under the auspices of the Defence Command
Denmark.
The above mentioned purpose means that the tasks will be described in general terms relevant to
formulate which level of information exchange is required between different force elements. The
tasks will have a general character, which means that the overall task can be used as the basis for
requirements on other than ICT systems.
The NBO concept and vision seeks to achieve increased operational effectiveness through the
federation of networks, services and processes to enable better sharing of information. The key
desired outcomes of NBO are: improved decision support and information superiority, information
coherence and interoperability between users, and increased responsiveness and flexibility. Based
on this approach, a number of national concepts have been developed, and there has been a
special focus on the Danish Armed Forces ability to not only interoperate with military partners, but
also civilian actors, GO as well as NGO.
The Defence Commissions Report on Danish Defence Global Engagement was published in 2008.
It covers the period 2010 to 2025 and forms the basis for development of the subsequent 5 year
Danish Defence Agreement 2010 to 2014.
In the Danish Defence Agreement the overall conclusion is that the Danish Armed Forces must be
able to perform a wide variety of tasks and must remain able to participate in difficult and intensive
operations, including the continued contribution to the Danish engagement in Afghanistan in the
coming years in accordance with Denmark’s Afghanistan Strategy. However, the Danish Armed
Forces must also preserve and develop the ability to execute other types of stabilisation tasks and
international policing operations, including such mission types as the KFOR mission in Kosovo and
the operations against piracy off the Horn of Africa. The tasks are briefly described below.
National Tasks, Denmark
• Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty – Maritime and airspace
surveillance of the national territory, with the use of sensors and military capabilities.
• Civilian-oriented tasks – Search and Rescue (SAR) and maritime environment
protection.
• Emergency Services / Disaster Response – Military capabilities support civilian
agencies, normally the Police and Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA),
ranging from accidents, catastrophes to terrorists’ attacks.
v
•
Defence against a Cyber Attack – Defending the infrastructure and other cyberspace
related components in conjunction with other Danish capabilities, i.e. GovCert and
DKCert.
National Task, North Atlantic
• Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty – Maritime and airspace
surveillance of the national territory, with the use of sensors and military capabilities.
International Tasks
• Armed conflict (i.e. Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Peacemaking) – Military capabilities
using force to provide peace and providing training for local security forces, close
protection teams and assisting the reconstruction efforts.
• Stabilization / Peacekeeping – Military capabilities using force providing training for
local security forces, close protection teams and assisting the reconstruction efforts.
• Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction – Military capabilities training local
security forces and help rebuild local communities.
• International Maritime Policing / Operations against piracy – Military capabilities
patrolling in waters with known piracy.
• Disaster response / Humanitarian assistance - Military capabilities supporting civilian
agencies and organisations in cooperation with international organisations, such as
United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
Other Tasks
• Training and force production - Educate and train military capabilities to execute
national and international tasks.
• Support tasks – Functional services supporting national and international tasks.
To identify examples of information exchange requirements, three vignettes are created from the
tasks defined above. The three vignettes are:
• National – Describing a situation where Danish Armed Forces support the police at a Head
of State Summit.
• North Atlantic – Describing a situation where an explosion-like fire brakes out, causing a
major oil leak and the Canadian and Danish environmental authorities with the help of
military capabilities from Canada, Denmark and Russia help contain and combat the
disaster.
• International – Rescue operation in Afghanistan.
The new task set of the Danish Armed Forces and the technological development have led to
network centricity. Buried in this is the requirement of being able to act in non-anticipated
situations. This requirement for flexibility and agility must be reflected in the way the ICT systems
are organised. This is in contrast to the cold war scenarios, where predictability made it possible to
define the sorts of messages that were to be exchanged, and thus to reduce the richness of the
information.
The adoption of NBO sets some requirements for the network of networks. In principle, three types
of information are supplied and consumed via the network: sensor information, C2 information and
effector information, e.g. information for fire control. The network should in principle support the
exchange of all three types of information in spite of their different attributes.
According to the tasks in the national arena the generic requirements are:
• Mobility, both of infrastructure and hosting nodes
• Limited degree of information assurance, mainly communication security, to assure
availability and integrity. The exchanged data will have a limited life time.
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•
•
•
Some real time requirements and limited requirements for precision.
Robustness of all equipment, including the ability to operate under adversary physical
conditions.
Logical reach, including the ability to collaborate with a number of civil emergency
operators.
The information assurance requirements will in general be lower than for strictly military operations.
In the arctic arena the requirement are mostly the same, but geographical conditions, may require
separate solutions.
For the international tasks with military units, the generic requirements for national communications
are:
• Reach back from deployed headquarter to national strategic level
• Mobility and employability, both of infrastructure and hosting nodes
• Maximum interoperability with NATO CIS Infrastructure
According to NATO policies NATO and NATO nations must provide the C2 environment, which is
able to flex from a fully static mode in fixed facilities, to a fully deployed mode, and all variations in
between. To achieve this, the C2 environment must be structured to support operations ranging
from day-to-day business through the entire spectrum of crisis response operations to wartime
operations. This includes support of consultation activities. To enable political and military
leadership to flexible react on the unpredictable occurrence of threats, the following capabilities
must be made available:
• An appropriately protected working and life support environment to accommodate
commanders and staffs of the NATO Command and Force Structures through static and
deployable, survivable and sustainable Command Facilities (CFs), in support of a
combined/joint and single service Headquarters (HQs) and Operations Centres structure.
• Connectivity between all Headquarters/Operations Centres at static and deployed
locations, to include external communications, to facilitate timely and effective decisionmaking, functionally oriented staff work across all command levels, C2 of forces within and
beyond Alliance territory, and political and military consultation, as well as the nuclear
planning and consultation process. This requires Communication and Information Systems
(CIS) to directly support Command and Control with survivable, secure, flexible,
interoperable and Sustainable Information Processing and Exchange Services.
• Survivable, sustainable, secure, deployable and mobile, as required, and Data Acquisition
Services to enable commanders to be continuously aware of the developing battle situation.
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Table of Content
Abstract ...............................................................................................................................................iii
Summary ..............................................................................................................................................v
Table of Content..................................................................................................................................ix
List of Figures .....................................................................................................................................xi
List of Tables .....................................................................................................................................xii
1.
Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1
1.1
Overview of DEFTA............................................................................................................1
1.2
Objective and Scope of DEFTA/WP1 .................................................................................3
1.3
National Strategic Vision and Concept................................................................................4
1.3.1
1.3.2
1.3.3
Network Based Operations – Concepts and Plans ...................................................................................... 4
Defence Commissions Report 2010-2025 (DCR08)................................................................................... 4
Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 (DDA14)...................................................................................... 5
1.4
Methodology for Use of Tasks Descriptions and Scenarios ................................................5
The Physical Perspective and Main Tasks of Danish Armed Forces .......................................7
2.1
The geographical Area .........................................................................................................7
2.2
Background for the Tasks of Danish Armed Forces............................................................9
2.3
The major Tasks.................................................................................................................10
2.4
Task Description ................................................................................................................10
2.5
Summary ............................................................................................................................11
Description of Tasks ...............................................................................................................13
3.1
National Tasks ...................................................................................................................13
2.
3.
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.2
Task 1: Denmark – Monitoring of national Territory and Enforcement of Sovereignty........................... 13
Task 2: Denmark - Civilian-oriented Tasks .............................................................................................. 15
Task 3: Denmark – Emergency Services / Disaster Response.................................................................. 17
Task 4: Denmark – Defence against a Cyber Attack ................................................................................ 19
Arctic tasks.........................................................................................................................20
3.2.1
3.3
Task 5: Arctic – Monitoring of national Territory and Enforcement of Sovereignty ............................... 21
International Tasks.............................................................................................................22
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
Task 6: - Armed conflict / COIN / Peacemaking ...................................................................................... 24
Task 7: - Stabilisation / Peacekeeping / International Policing................................................................. 26
Task 8: - Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction .............................................................. 28
Task 9 - International Maritime Policing / Operations against piracy ...................................................... 30
Task 10 - Disaster response / Humanitarian assistance............................................................................. 31
3.4
Training and Force Production ..........................................................................................33
3.5
Support Tasks.....................................................................................................................34
3.6
Summary ............................................................................................................................34
Vignettes .................................................................................................................................35
4.1
Vignette – National Task – Denmark ................................................................................35
4.2
Vignette – National task – North Atlantic .........................................................................36
4.3
Vignette - International task - Afghanistan........................................................................37
4.4
Summary ............................................................................................................................38
4.
ix
5.
Conclusions and recommendations ........................................................................................39
5.1
General NBO related requirements for information exchange ..........................................39
5.2
National CIS Infrastructure................................................................................................39
5.3
NATO CIS Infrastructure...................................................................................................40
5.4
Final Remarks ....................................................................................................................41
References..........................................................................................................................................43
Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................................45
x
List of Figures
Figure 1-1: Overview of DEFTA work process and the WP contributions to NAF views................................................. 3
Figure 2-1: Map showing Denmark and her economic zone .............................................................................................. 7
Figure 2-2: Map showing Greenland and her territorial waters and economic zone .......................................................... 8
Figure 2-3: Map showing the Faroe Islands and her territorial waters and economic zone................................................ 8
Figure 3-1: Example of monitoring of national territory and sovereignty enforcement ................................................... 14
Figure 3-2: Example of civilian oriented tasks ................................................................................................................. 16
Figure 3-3: Example of emergency services and disaster response .................................................................................. 18
Figure 3-4: Cyber Warfare................................................................................................................................................ 19
Figure 3-5: Map showing the Arctic Area incl. selected capacities.................................................................................. 21
Figure 3-6: Map showing Afghanistan area incl selected capacities ............................................................................... 24
Figure 3-7: Map showing crisis area incl. selected capacities .......................................................................................... 26
Figure 3-8: Map showing crisis area incl selected capacities .......................................................................................... 28
Figure 3-9: Map showing Horn of Africa ......................................................................................................................... 30
Figure 3-10: Map showing South East Asia area incl selected capacities ....................................................................... 32
Figure 4-1: Head of State Summit. (OV1)........................................................................................................................ 35
Figure 4-2: Oil Tanker Burgas (OV1) .............................................................................................................................. 36
Figure 4-3: Afghanistan (OV1)......................................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 5-1: Information exchange levels .......................................................................................................................... 40
xi
List of Tables
Table 3-1: Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty ................................................................... 15
Table 3-2: Civilian-oriented tasks..................................................................................................................................... 17
Table 3-3: Emergency Services / Disaster Response........................................................................................................ 19
Table 3-4: Defence against a cyber attack ........................................................................................................................ 20
Table 3-5: Arctic – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty ..................................................... 22
Table 3-6: Armed Conflict / COIN / Peace Making ......................................................................................................... 25
Table 3-7: Stabilisation / Peacekeeping / International Policing ...................................................................................... 27
Table 3-8: Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction.................................................................................... 29
Table 3-9: International Maritime Policing ...................................................................................................................... 31
Table 3-10: Disaster Response / Humanitarian Assistance............................................................................................... 33
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this report is to describe the operational tasks and scenarios to be used as part of
the Danish Defence Target Architecture (DEFTA). The report is the result of work package 1
(WP1) of the DEFTA work
1.1 Overview of DEFTA1
The Danish Defence is heavily engaged in a transformation from platform centric operations
towards Network Based Operations (NBO). At the same time, the Danish public sector is moving
towards the digitized society. Therefore, there is a requirement to be able to share information not
only within the military operational and administrative domains, but also between coalition partners,
across ministerial boundaries, with international and local organisations, suppliers and even private
citizens. One of the most important prerequisites for NBO is the establishment of a networked
information infrastructure.
The Danish Defence Target Architecture2 (DEFTA) supports this transformation and is a vision for
the infrastructure development of the Danish Defence aimed for the future. Therefore, DEFTA is
the guideline for other architectural considerations which include development of system
architectures and planning of the acquisition and maintenance of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) systems. DEFTA is an overarching and high-level architecture spanning 10 to 15
years from now, and it serves as a vision for evolutionary development of ICT systems supporting
the mission of the Danish Defence, i.e. both its operational and administrative tasks. All ICT
architectures in Danish Defence must comply with DEFTA.
The main purposes of DEFTA are to contribute to the following goals:
• Ensure that present and future operational requirements on ICT systems can be met.
• Ensure that development of ICT systems is coordinated with Defence ICT-Strategy3.
• Ensure that ICT systems support the national strategic vision and concept for NBO and the
general perception of the developments in this area.
• Ensure that ICT systems support operational scenarios for the Danish Defence.
• Establish functional and technological requirements for the Danish Defence ICT systems.
• Ascertain system interoperability.
• Increase the quality of the combined systems-of-systems that forms the ICT infrastructure.
• Facilitate the use of open standards and COTS products.
• Ensure that acquisitions both from usability and technological point of views have a
reasonable life time.
• Make the acquisition and sustainment processes more straightforward, i.e. providing basis
for better coordinated and cheaper ICT development.
Another purpose of DEFTA is to provide a mean which encompasses essential main architectures
and principles of corporation partners. This generates some compliancy requirements for DEFTA:
1
Note that this section is common for all work packages of DEFTA.
The term “target architecture” is different from the similar NATO term, which describes a detailed, project
related system implementation target.
3
Current version of the Defence ICT-Strategy covers the period 2011-2014.
2
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•
•
•
No discrepancies with NATO Overarching Architecture or the major NATO Reference
Architectures.
Coordination with the architectures provided by the Danish digitized society, - in particular
regarding administrative ICT systems.
Compliancy with visions and target architectures of major coalition partners, e.g. USA and
GBR.
The DEFTA work has been divided into four Work Packages (WP’s), which provide a DEFTA
description being compliant with the NATO Architecture Framework (NAF)4. The overall DEFTA
work process is visualised in figure 1-1. The same figure also shows how the DEFTA architectural
components - identified in the four WP’s - contribute to NAF views.
•
WP0: Strategic Vision and Concept for NBO.
The objective of WP0 is to formulate the relations between the general policies and strategy
work on ICT development. It contains the initial analysis of the national strategic vision and
concept for NBO and the general perception of the developments in this area. Referring to
NAF, WP0 will mainly provide architectural components used in All Views (AV) and to some
extent Capability Views (CV).
•
WP1: Operational Tasks and Vignettes.
The objective of WP1 is to describe a set of overall operational scenarios, and describe a set of
representative vignettes which can establish the basis for the analysis of information exchange
requirements in WP2. Referring to NAF, WP1 will mainly provide architectural components
used in Operational Views (OV) and Capability Views (CV).
•
WP2: Information in Network Based Operations.
WP2 deals with information in NBO. The objective is to derive a number of functional and
technological requirements for DEFTA. The requirements are derived from the tasks and
vignettes of WP1. Referring to NAF, WP2 will mainly provide architectural components used in
Operational Views (OV) and to some extent Capability Views (CV) and Technical Views (TV).
•
WP3: The Technical Architecture for ICT Systems in Danish Defence.
The objective of WP3 is to describe the technical part of the target architecture. This technical
architecture is a high level vision of future ICT systems-of-systems. The WP3 report looks at
different technical aspects as they are expected to develop (evolve) in a 10-15 years of time.
WP3 describes the technical solution for the requirements from the other WP’s, in particular
WP2. Referring to NAF, WP3 will mainly provide architectural components use in System
Views (SV) and Technical Views (TV).
Each WP is documented in a separate report, thus DEFTA consists of four reports which should be
regarded as a unified whole. However, each of the four WP reports can be read independently of
each other.
Referring to NAF, DEFTA does not contribute significantly to Programme Views (PV) and ServiceOriented Views (SOV). However, service orientation is a key element of DEFTA, and DEFTA
provides contributions to SV and TV being a prerequisite for the technical implementation of
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The definition, taxonomy, and orchestration of actual
services to be provided in SOV must be with basis in doctrine, operational procedures and other
4
The NATO Architecture Framework (NAF version 3) specifies how architecture is described by use of
different views: Capability Views (CV), Operational Views (OV), System Views (SV), Technical Views (TV),
Service Oriented Views (SOV), Programme Views (PV), and All Views (AV).
-2-
business processes. This is outside the scope of DEFTA. In the same way, DEFTA does not define
programme portfolios and projects for PV. Some PV contributions may be found in the roadmap
part of the Defence ICT-Strategy.
DEFTA is an updated version of the Danish Defence Target Architecture5, and will be published as
an annex to Defence Command Denmark (DCD) directive for maintenance of architectures6.
Updates of DEFTA are set to be released every second year.
Figure 1-1: Overview of DEFTA work process and the WP contributions to NAF views
The DEFTA work is tasked by Information Technology Policy CIS Staff of the DCD and conducted
with the Danish Acquisition and Logistics Organisation (DALO) as lead. Most of the work is also
carried out by DALO; - however, major part of WP0 is made by DCD, and WP1 has substantial
contribution from Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC).
1.2 Objective and Scope of DEFTA/WP1
The objective of WP1 is to describe a set of representative tasks, which can establish the basis for
the analysis of information exchange requirements in WP2. The tasks cover the Danish Armed
Forces, which includes the authorities under the auspices of the Defence Command Denmark7.
This purpose means that the tasks will be described in general terms relevant to formulate which
level of information exchange is required between different force elements. The tasks will have a
5
The first version - denoted DEFCOMM - is from 2005 and consisted of three reports denoted WP1, WP2,
and WP3. In 2007, DEFCOMM was approved by the Defence Top Management as the vision for evolution of
the ICT systems in the Danish Defence.
6
The reference is FKODIR 380-2.
7
The scenarios will also include the Danish Home Guard and the Danish Emergency Management Agency
(DEMA) when relevant.
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general character, which means that they can be used as the basis for requirements on other than
communication and information systems.
1.3 National Strategic Vision and Concept
The objective of DEFTA/WP0 was to formulate the connections between the general policies,
strategy work and DEFTA. It contains the initial analysis of the national strategic vision and
concept for NBO and the general perception of the developments in this area. The conclusion of
WP0 focuses on NBO and is in accordance with Defence Commission Report (DCR08) [9] /
Danish Defence Agreement (DDA14) [8].
1.3.1 Network Based Operations – Concepts and Plans
At national level the ”Preliminary NBO Report” (from Dec. 2004) and the ”Follow-up NBO
Report”(from Oct. 2005) provides guidance for the national NBO activities. A number of more than
100 activities have been initiated, including the establishment of the ICT Target Architecture,
development of NBO-capabilities, and initial NBO Roadmaps.
The basis for the NBO development in Danish Armed Forces was primarily connected to the
development within NATO (the NNEC approach) and the developments at our strategic partners,
USA and GBR.
In NATO the Comprehensive Political Guidance [1] provides direction for NATO’s continuing
transformation and requires, amongst other things, effective arrangements for information sharing.
The NNEC Concept and Vision [2] seeks to achieve increased operational effectiveness through
the federation of networks, services and processes to enable better sharing of information. The key
desired outcomes of NNEC are:
• Improved decision support and information superiority,
• Information coherence and interoperability between users, and
• Increased responsiveness and flexibility
Based on this approach, a number of national concepts have been developed, and there are
special focus on the Danish Armed Forces ability to not only interoperate with military partners, but
as well as civilian actors, GO8 and NGO9.
1.3.2 Defence Commissions Report 2010-2025 (DCR08)
The Defence Commissions Report (DCR08) [6] with Danish Defence Global Engagement was
published in 2008. It covers the period 2010 to 2025 and forms the basis for development of the
subsequent 5 year Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014.
8
9
Government Organisations (GO)
Non-Government Organisations (NGO)
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1.3.3 Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014 (DDA14)
The Danish Defence Agreement (DDA14) [5] for the period 2010-2014 was signed in Copenhagen,
24 June 2009. DDA14 establishes the premises of national security policy, and the Danish Armed
Forces – aims and tasks, structure, future development, roles and conditions.
Concerning premises NATO, UN and EU are the cornerstones of Danish security and defence
policy.
DCR08 recommends that the present national level of ambition regarding the ability of the Danish
Armed Forces to contribute to international operations should be maintained at some 2,000
soldiers, sailors and airmen10.
The tasks of the Danish Armed Forces can be divided into national and international tasks, where
the national tasks comprise – besides monitoring of the national territory and enforcement of
sovereignty – a range of more civilian-oriented tasks in support of Danish society, such as search
and rescue operations, environmental tasks as well as providing support to a number of other
public authorities, such as the police, the emergency rescue services and the tax authorities.11
The international tasks will typically fall within the following main areas: armed conflict, stabilisation
tasks and international policing12.
In relation to the international tasks, DCR08 points out that the Danish Armed Forces’ deployable
capabilities in principle should be capable of being deployed globally. More technologically
advanced instruments of warfare, such as long-range rockets and missiles as well as cyberspace
attacks against computer systems, must also be expected to be used against Danish contingents
from all three armed services.
In DDA14 the overall conclusion is that the Danish Armed Forces must be able to perform a wide
variety of tasks and must remain able to participate in difficult and intensive operations, including
the continued contribution to the Danish engagement in Afghanistan in the coming years in
accordance with Denmark’s Afghanistan Strategy. However, the Danish Armed Forces must also
preserve and develop the ability to execute other types of stabilisation tasks and international
policing operations, including such mission types as the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the
operations against piracy off the Horn of Africa.
1.4 Methodology for Use of Tasks Descriptions and Scenarios
With reference to DCR08 and DDA14, the tasks of Danish Armed Forces are described in order to
establish the basis for analysis of information exchange requirements. Chapter 1 gives the
introduction to this.
10
This number (2000) recommended in DCR08 is likely to be reduced.
DDA14 [5] p.2
12
DDA14 [5] p.3
11
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In chapter 2 the operational environment of Danish Armed Forces is described. This includes the
physical and geographical area together with some common attributes which may be used to
characterize the operational tasks.
In chapter 3 ten major tasks are identified and described. Each of the major tasks is summarized in
a table with the common attributes.
In chapter 4 groups of tasks are summarized by selecting examples of vignettes which are
representative for information exchange requirements. A vignette may be regarded as a set of
scenario snapshots taken at specific points in time, where a scenario is characterized as a fictive
chain of events and actions.
Chapter 5 contains conclusions and recommendation for further analysis to be carried out in WP2.
-6-
2. The Physical Perspective and Main Tasks of Danish Armed
Forces
This chapter gives an introduction to the physical perspective which includes geographical
conditions and climate in the areas where units from the Danish Armed Forces are expected to
operate in the future.
Furthermore the chapter explains the background for the tasks. The different major tasks will be
described by a number of attributes so that it is possible clearly to distinguish between the tasks
and subsequently derive the requirement for information exchange from the individual task. The
tasks will be described individually in general terms followed by a table showing the attributes for
each scenario.
2.1 The geographical Area
The geographical areas13 in which the Danish Armed Forces in connection with other national
capabilities (i.e. police and emergency services) and/or international partners will operate, is the
national territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. This includes all parts of Denmark, Greenland, The
Faroe Islands, its national waters and airspace and neighbouring areas of national interest.
Figure 2-1: Map showing Denmark and her economic zone
13
The national territories reflects the current administration basis, but not an official pre-negotiated situation,
however for the territories of the Faroe Island an agreement of the common fishing between Iceland and
United Kingdom is found.
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Figure 2-2: Map showing Greenland and her territorial waters and economic zone
Figure 2-3: Map showing the Faroe Islands and her territorial waters and economic zone
-8-
Neighbouring areas of national interest include neighbouring countries that Denmark shares
infrastructure with (e.g. Sweden or Germany), but also the international waters surrounding
Denmark, i.e. The North Sea and the Baltic Sea.
In relation to the international tasks, the Danish Armed Forces’ deployable capabilities in principle
should be capable of being deployed globally. This means, for example, that the Danish Armed
Forces should have the ability to deploy forces in areas which feature demanding climate and
terrain conditions, such as desert and mountain areas14. Thus international mission areas could in
principal be anywhere on the globe.
2.2 Background for the Tasks of Danish Armed Forces
DCR08 [9] describes a future global security environment that is at least as uncertain and
unpredictable as the world we know today. It will therefore remain in Denmark’s interest to support,
partly through international military engagements, a development which sees the international
order; maintain its ability to counter the trans-national threats and risks in a coordinated and
multilateral fashion.
At the same time, a more integrated approach to conventional wars, the planning and
implementation of military and civilian efforts will be required. Military operations in the future are
expected to require the ability to conduct operations that are both long-term and periodically highintensive. Deployed units will therefore experience a mixture of the three types of tasks: armed
conflict, stabilisation operations and international policing operations.
This entails that the particular capacities and force elements, in order to perform their tasks, must
be designed to participate in all types of tasks when contributing to international operations. Also in
the longer term, the national tasks will reflect the absence of a conventional military threat against
NATO territory and the unlikelihood of general war breaking out in Europe.15
From a strategic perspective, Denmark’s sovereignty is secured through the NATO’s Article 5, the
commitment to collective defence of Alliance territory. Upholding Danish sovereignty and protecting
the country’s existence and integrity will, however, ultimately remain a Danish responsibility. There
will thus be a continued need to maintain capabilities for upholding sovereignty, such as
surveillance and early warning and the capability to repel violations of Danish territory. A higher
level of activity in the Arctic regions is expected as a result of climate change.
Other tasks for the Danish Armed Forces will be either pure regulatory tasks, such as the
operation of the national ice-breaking services, national maritime environmental surveillance, and
the state maritime pollution control, or tasks for which the national civilian capabilities in the
particular area are either inadequate or less well-suited than the national military capabilities.
Furthermore, the emerging global threats and risks mean that there is a continued need for military
capabilities to form part of Denmark’s emergency and disaster response management system,
dealing also with such extraordinary events as acts of terrorism and violent natural phenomena.
There will also be a need for Denmark to maintain its contributions to international efforts in
connection with major disasters, including military capabilities.
14
15
DDA14 [5] p. 3/38
DCR08 [6] p. 17-18
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In general, the role of the Danish Armed Forces in the national emergency and disaster response
management system, including homeland security, has changed however. Previously, the Total
Defence was led by the Danish Armed Forces. Today, the lead agency is the Danish Police, with
the Danish Armed Forces standing by to contribute with the means at its disposal, including military
resources16.
2.3 The major Tasks
The different operational tasks are developed in accordance with DDA14 [8]and DCR08 [9].
Furthermore the Danish MoD publication: “Danish Armed Forces: International Perspectives”
(DAFIP) [3] has been used. The tasks are chosen so that they represent distinctively different tasks
for the Danish Armed Forces both nationally and internationally.
The future tasks for the Danish Armed Forces are derived from DDA14 and will be divided into the
following 10 main tasks17:
National tasks, Denmark
1.
Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
2.
Civilian-oriented tasks (i.e. Environmental tasks, Search-and-Rescue)
3.
Emergency Services / Disaster Response
4.
Defence against a Cyber Attack
National tasks, North Atlantic
5.
Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
International tasks:
6.
Armed conflict (i.e. Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Peacemaking)
7.
Stabilization / Peacekeeping
8.
Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction
9.
International Maritime Policing / Operations against piracy
10.
Disaster response / Humanitarian assistance
2.4 Task Description
The different major tasks will be described by a number of attributes so that it is possible clearly to
distinguish between the tasks and subsequently derive the requirement for information exchange
from the individual task and vignette. The attributes are:
• Task type
The task is a national or international task, which will be executed in frameworks such as
Nordic, EU, NATO, UN or Coalition of the Willing (CotW).
• Theatre of operation
16
17
DCR08 [6] p. 19
DDA14 [5] p. 3
- 10 -
•
•
•
•
•
•
Theatre of Operation states the geographical area in which the individual task is foreseen to
take place. This will include special geographical challenges such as geography, size of the
area, climate other factors relevant for communication and ICT-systems.
Time span / time requirements
The time factor is important to distinguish between more permanent task and temporary
tasks as to which degree a permanent ICT infrastructure or more temporary solutions can/will
be available. Furthermore the necessary degree of sustainability (i.e. Logistic support) will be
of relevance.
Threat situation
The threat situation could vary considerably from task to task and also in an individual
scenario but generally there is a tendency towards a higher and more multifaceted threat in
international operations.
Typical missions
In this field typical missions for units from the Danish Armed Forces will be described. The
different tasks can include a wide variety of missions and it will not be possible to describe an
exhaustive list of missions but rather an overview of typical missions in the individual
scenario. These missions will be reflected in the different vignettes.
Capabilities (military and/or civilian)
This field is a description of the different military capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces as
well as relevant civilian capabilities of the Danish Government that match the typical
missions to be solved. Capability is ‘the ability of one or more resources to deliver a specified
type of effect or a specified course of action18, i.e. capabilities include technology,
organisation, doctrine and training.
Partners
Very few international missions are performed by one nation alone. The vast majority of
international missions are executed in close co-operation between allies and partners. The
high number of partners is one of the challenges when analyzing requirements for
information exchange due to differences in national requirements and national differences in
doctrine, organisation and technology.
Command structure
Every mission will have its own command structure and often both an international (NATO,
coalition etc.) command structure and a parallel national command structure.
The tasks will be described individually in general terms followed by a table showing the attributes
for each scenario.
2.5 Summary
This chapter gave an introduction to the physical perspective which includes geographical
conditions and climate in the areas where units from the Danish Armed Forces are expected to
operate in the future. Furthermore the chapter explained the background for the tasks. The
different major tasks are described by a number of attributes so that it is possible to distinguish
between the individual tasks.
18
NAF version 3 [4]
- 11 -
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- 12 -
3. Description of Tasks
In this chapter the tasks of the Danish Armed Forces are described. The tasks are divided into
national and international tasks.
The tasks will be described individually in general terms followed by a table showing the attributes
for each task.
These tasks are described in sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3; - yielding a total of 10 tasks that are used
to formulate 3 vignettes to be further analysed in WP2.
3.1 National Tasks
The national tasks comprise – besides monitoring of the national territory and enforcement of
sovereignty – of a range of more civilian-oriented tasks in support of Danish society, such as
search and rescue operations, environmental tasks as well as providing support to a number of
other public authorities, such as the police, the emergency rescue services and the tax
authorities19.
National tasks therefore require a traditional military command structure and comprehensive coordination with other non military actors in the situation.
As previously mentioned, the national tasks are as follows:
• Denmark – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
• Denmark – Civilian-oriented tasks
• Denmark – Emergency Services / Disaster Response
• Denmark – Defence against a cyber attack
• North Atlantic – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
3.1.1 Task 1: Denmark – Monitoring of national Territory and Enforcement of
Sovereignty
The peacetime tasks of the Danish armed forces are maritime and airspace surveillance and patrol
of Danish and adjacent waters and airspace.
Maritime surveillance is a purely national response and is performed with coastal radars,
observation posts and maritime patrol vessels. The Maritime Assistance Service (MAS) is an
integrated part of Admiral Danish Fleet functioning around the clock as a central maritime contact
point for shipping in and around Danish territorial waters. MAS is on 24-hour alert to deploy rapid
assistance and professional support for ships in connection with: Combating pollution, fire and
explosions on board, collision, grounding, and maritime security. MAS receives Ship Security Alert
System distress calls from Danish and foreign vessels in Danish waters.
MAS is responsible for Admiral Danish Fleet's mission as National Competent Authority for the EU
SeaSafeNet network. This network is in charge of distributing marine-related data to member
19
DDA14 [5] p. 2/38
- 13 -
country authorities. This means that Admiral Danish Fleet is informed about vessels carrying
dangerous cargos, thus optimizing the platform for effective intervention in connection with
accidents and pollution at sea20.
DK MIL Ship
Costal Radars
Civilian Ships
Fighter
Figure 3-1: Example of monitoring of national territory and sovereignty enforcement
Airspace surveillance is an integral part of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS)
and is performed using military and civilian radars in Denmark and other neighbouring NATO
countries to create a Recognized Air Picture. Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighter aircraft are used
to patrol the national airspace and international airspace adjacent to Denmark.
The above mentioned tasks are of a permanent nature and will generally be performed under low
threat conditions. The command structure is purely national for the maritime tasks and is
national/NATO for air tasks.
Task 1 – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time-span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
20
Characteristics
Remarks
National task.
Denmark and surrounding territorial and
international waters plus airspace above.
Permanent.
Low.
Maritime surveillance and policing, Air
surveillance and policing.
According to Admiral Danish Fleet web page
- 14 -
Task 1 – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
Subject
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
Sea Patrol, Air Patrol, QRA21 and
Ground Based Sensors.
Nil.
ASACS22 tasks performed by CRC Karup
and/or MACC23. Naval tasks performed by
Admiral Danish Fleet HQ.
Nil.
Co-operation with Norway, Germany,
Depending of situation and geographical
Poland, Sweden and Finland.
area.
C2 will be performed through the
Air space policing involves co-ordination
TACDEN24/CAOC125 (air) and
with the integrated military/civilian Air Traffic
AdmDanFleet (Navy). Co-ordination with Control Centre in Copenhagen.
local authorities and possibly allied units.
Table 3-1: Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
3.1.2 Task 2: Denmark - Civilian-oriented Tasks
The general rule is that the Danish Armed Forces’ perform two types of civilian-oriented tasks:
• Tasks of an authoritative nature that fall within the auspice of the Danish Ministry of
Defence, such as the operation of the national ice-breaking services, national maritime
environmental surveillance and the state maritime pollution control; and
• Occasional tasks for which the national civilian capabilities in the particular area are either
inadequate or less well-suited than the national military capabilities.
The civilian-oriented tasks in support of Danish society are such as search and rescue operations,
environmental tasks, and ice breaking in cold winters as well as providing support to a number of
other public authorities, such as the police, the emergency rescue services and the tax authorities.
Search and rescue service (SAR): The Danish Armed Forces’ helicopter rescue capability is used
predominantly to provide support to the civilian community. This helicopter rescue capability must
continue to operate and, in due consideration of its primary task, support the community through
performing tasks relevant to the helicopter capability. SAR is operated from the Joint Rescue
Coordination Centre (JRCC) at Admiral Danish Fleet maritime HQ
Maritime environment protection capability: The Danish Armed Forces’ overall maritime
environment protection capability, including the opportunities for further utilising the Danish Home
Guard’s capability within this area, must continue to be assigned priority, in that it must continue to
be ensured that the marine environmental protection task is planned and executed in the most
appropriate way in the future. In this connection with this, priority must also be assigned to improve
the benefit and effect of the airborne surveillance of the marine environment.
21
Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighter aircraft
Air Surveillance and Control System
23
Mobile Air Control Centre
24
Tactical Air Command Denmark
25
Combined Air Operations Centre
22
- 15 -
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS): The Danish Navy is operating the Great Belt VTS providing
assistance to all maritime traffic in the Great Belt with a special focus on protecting the Great Belt
Bridge.
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): MDA cover both the monitoring / enforcement of national
territories and civilian-orientated tasks, as described above. The Danish Navy has the following
definition of MDA: MDA is the effective understanding of all that can be associated with the
maritime domain and that has or can be influenced in relation to the broad concept of security.
There is agreement that the Home Guard’s maritime environment protection capability during the
Defence Agreement period must be strengthened. This is to be partly achieved by implementing
the recommendations of the capability study conducted of the maritime environment protection
capability, including:
• Improving the equipment of Naval Home Guard vessels in general with the aim of
facilitating the effective performance of environmental protection tasks.
• Examining the opportunities to enhance the Home Guard’s capability to perform
environmental protection tasks in the coastal zone, including oil spill recovery and detection
capability.
• Examining whether the Naval Home Guard fully or partially can man and possibly take over
responsibility for the Danish Armed Forces’ new shallow-water environmental protection
vessel.
• Utilising the Air Force Home Guard’s aircraft for maritime environmental surveillance, etc.
DK MIL
Ship
Environmental
surveillance
SAR Heli
Civilian
Ships
Icebreaker
Costal
Radars
Figure 3-2: Example of civilian oriented tasks
- 16 -
The Parties to the DDA14 have noted the use of, among other things, satellite imagery as a
supplement to airborne maritime surveillance. This and other similar measures must, where
possible, be implemented and developed with a view to improving the efficiency of operations in
the area26.
Task 2 – Civilian-oriented tasks
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time-span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
National task.
Denmark its territorial waters and
surrounding waters.
Permanent.
Low.
Environmental control, Search and Rescue,
Ice Breaking service, assistance to the
police and other Government agencies.
EOD27, Air Transport, Sea Transport, Land
Transport, Ice Breaking, Sea Patrol and
SAR.
DEMA28.
Danish Directorates of Fisheries.
Neighbouring Countries.
Through AOC29, TACDEN and
SAR missions through JRCC30.
AdmDanFleet.
Table 3-2: Civilian-oriented tasks
3.1.3 Task 3: Denmark – Emergency Services / Disaster Response
The Danish concept of Total Defence means that the focus in connection with civilian
preparedness planning must cover all accidents and catastrophes, including acts of war.
Total defence must ensure that Denmark has sufficient available capacity to contain threats
against the country and to handle large-scale catastrophes.
The Danish concept of Total Defence states that each participating unit is responsible for its own
asset and that the overall effort will be coordinated by the local police authority. In the event of a
large scale situation which involves a larger part of the Kingdom of Denmark a national operational
staff at the ministerial level will be established.
The Armed Forces will in case of accidents or catastrophes, including terrorists’ attacks, support
the civilian agencies. The support will normally be provided to the police and the Danish
Emergency Management Agency.
26
DDA14 [5] p. 20-21
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
28
Danish Emergency Management Agency
29
Air Operations Centre
30
Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre
27
- 17 -
The assistance will cover special military equipment, personnel with special training or units when
this is needed. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Home Guard have capabilities which
can counter terrorist acts and perform consequence management in support of the civilian
preparedness. This includes personnel which in addition to a basic military training is trained to
conduct rescue tasks, environmental tasks and fire-fighting tasks31.
SAR Heli
Environmental
surveillance
Police
Home Guard
Figure 3-3: Example of emergency services and disaster response
Task 3 – Emergency Services / Disaster Response
Subject
Task type
Characteristics
Remarks
National task.
Possibility of international cooperation with adjacent countries
depending on situation and location.
Theatre of
operation
Time-span /
requirements
Threat
Denmark and surrounding waters.
Typical
missions
Rescue services (Land/maritime), evacuation,
fire-fighting, Environmental protection.
31
Ad hoc / Case-by-case.
Low.
In the event of a terrorist attack threat
could be medium.
DAFIP [3] p. 16
- 18 -
Task 3 – Emergency Services / Disaster Response
Subject
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners.
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
Sea Patrol, SAR, Air Transport, Sea Transport,
Air Reconnaissance, Fire fighting, EOD, snow
clearing, evacuation.
DEMA, Police, local emergency and rescue
services etc.
Possible co-operation with United Kingdom,
Norway, Germany, Poland and Sweden.
Depending on the emergency
situation and its geographical
location.
C2 will be performed through TACDEN (air
units), AdmDanFleet (naval units) and Army
Operationel Comand (ArmyOC, army units).
Furthermore Home Guard Units will be
commanded by the Operation Commander (e.g.
Police, TACDEN, AdmDanFleet and ArmyOC).
Extensive co-ordination with Police and local
authorities will take place.
Table 3-3: Emergency Services / Disaster Response
3.1.4 Task 4: Denmark – Defence against a Cyber Attack
Like other parts of modern society, the Danish Armed Forces will become increasingly vulnerable
to, among other things, hacker attacks on their information and communications infrastructure.
Likewise, the use of cyberspace in general is rapidly gaining increasing importance in connection
with military operations. Cyberspace has, in other words, become a battle space. This
development therefore places increasing demands on the ability of the Danish Armed Forces to
take defensive and offensive measures in cyberspace.
Figure 3-4: Cyber Warfare
On this basis, there is agreement that a Computer Network Operations (CNO) capability under the
auspices of the Danish Ministry of Defence should be established with the aim of defending the
ministry’s own use of cyberspace and preventing opponents from exploiting it. At the same time
Cyberspace has become a battle space, and as such an offensive capability to exploit the
- 19 -
opponents is needed. Such a capability should be able to be put into action in support of both
domestic as well as international operations.
Furthermore, a CNO capability under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of Defence must possess
the ability to work in conjunction with other Danish capabilities in this area and with corresponding
capabilities in other countries. The elements of the CNO capability should be placed in one location
with the aim of achieving maximum possible synergy and establishing a technical environment that
is sufficiently robust and adequately dimensioned32.
Task 4 – Defence against a cyber attack
Subject
Task type
Characteristics
Remarks
National task.
Possibility for international co-operation (i.e.
NATO).
Theatre of
operation
Time-span /
requirement
Threat
Typical tasks
Cyberspace.
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Permanent surveillance of
cyberspace.
Low.
Monitoring of cyberspace and
Defence ICT infrastructure/-systems.
Surveillance, combating and
defending in Cyberspace.
Surveillance, combating and
defending in Cyberspace.
Co-operation with NATO Cert and bilaterally with allied Cert’s.
Through DDIS33 and CHODDEN34.
Intensity is expected inversely proportional to
duration of an attack.
If a situation develops exploitation or attack of
opponents ICT-system could be necessary.
MilCert.
GovCert, DKCert.
Table 3-4: Defence against a cyber attack
3.2 Arctic tasks
The Arctic is considered as a special scenario where Danish Armed Forces units will perform its
tasks under strikingly different conditions than in Denmark. The missions and tasks will in general
be the same as in Denmark but due to the very large geographic area, adverse weather and
climate conditions and a sparsely population, mission conditions will entail different requirements
for Danish Armed Forces ICT-systems.
The peacetime monitoring and maintenance of sovereignty in the North Atlantic area, in Greenland
and the Faeroe Islands and surrounding waters are a permanent national task which iaw. DDA14
[5] are likely to have increased importance in the coming years. The melting of the polar ice cap as
a result of global warming will open new opportunities for the extraction of raw materials and the
opening of new shipping routes. The rising activity will change the region's geostrategic dynamic
32
DDA14 [5] p. 11/38
Danish Defence Intelligence Service
34
Chief of Defence of Denmark
33
- 20 -
and significance and will therefore in the long term present Danish Armed Forces with several
challenges35.
This task is of a permanent nature and the Danish Armed Forces has naval units permanently on
patrol in the area. Regularly aircraft are deployed to patrol the fishing waters. In times of increased
activity in the area - e.g. other nations deploy units and/or forces to the area - it can be necessary
to build up Danish Armed Forces military presence in the North Atlantic/Arctic area in order to
safeguard Danish national interests. For this purpose an Arctic Response Force will be established
composed of units from all armed services that possess an Arctic capability36.
During the Defence Agreement period a comprehensive analysis of the future tasks of the Danish
Armed Forces in the Arctic is to be conducted, including an analysis of whether or not advantages
exist in entering into closer cooperation with other Nordic countries, the USA, Canada, Russia and
the UK regarding surveillance and other similar tasks. The analysis is also to establish whether or
not surveillance and other similar systems - such as exist in other maritime regions - could also be
implemented and further developed in regard to shipping near Greenland. The implementation of
such systems is expected to be able to improve the ability of the Danish Armed Forces to develop
an assessment of the situation in and around Greenland and thereby focus the deployment of
available operational capabilities37.
3.2.1 Task 5: Arctic – Monitoring of national Territory and Enforcement of
Sovereignty
SAR Heli
DK MIL
Ship
Costal
Radars
Sirius PTR
Civilian
Ships
ICECOMGREENLAND
Figure 3-5: Map showing the Arctic Area incl. selected capacities
35
DDA14 [5]
DDA14 [5] p. 12/38
37
DDA14 [5] p. 12/38
36
- 21 -
Typical task in the North Atlantic area will be maritime surveillance and patrol as well as airspace
surveillance and patrol. Here the RDAF and the RDN have several capable units. Furthermore the
north east Greenland is patrolled by the Sirius Patrol.
Task 5 – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Characteristics
Remarks
National task.
North pole, Greenland, Faeroe Islands and
surrounding waters and airspace above.
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Permanent.
Possibility for international co-operation.
Very large geographical area. Severe
arctic weather and climate can occur.
Magnetic storms possible.
Units deployed on a permanent basis.
Typical
missions
Maritime and Air Policing, Air Transport, Search
and Rescue, Environmental control, Fishery
inspection, support to local authorities.
Sea Patrol, Air Patrol, SAR, Sirius Patrol. Arctic
Reaction Force (ARF).
Local capabilities from Greenland and/or Faroe
Islands.
Possible co-operation with USA, Canada,
Russia, GBR and other Nordic countries (NOR,
SVE, FIN, ISL).
C2 will be performed through the new Danish
Arctic Command. Co-ordination with local
authorities and possibly allied units necessary.
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Low.
Risk of increased threat if national
interests collide.
ARF to be developed iaw. DDA14 [5]
Both societies are small and have very
limited local capabilities.
Analysis hereof to take place in the
coming years, iaw. DDA14 [5] (p. 14).
The Danish Arctic Command will be
established iaw. DDA14 [5] (p 14). Until
it is operational TACON38 will be
through ISCOM GLD or ISCOM FAR.
Table 3-5: Arctic – Monitoring of national territory and enforcement of sovereignty
Command
structure
The threat level is considered low during normal peacetime operations. If a situation develops
where the involved countries have opposite national interests, the threat level could rise to
medium.
Units in the North Atlantic will be under command by the new Danish Arctic Command and units
will have a requirement for information sharing with other Danish and allied units in the area as well
as a number of local civil authorities. Should international interest in resources around the Arctic
increase, it can be foreseen that further allied cooperation will take place in fulfilling these tasks.
3.3 International Tasks
The international tasks39 of the Danish Armed Forces will typically fall within the following main
areas: armed conflict, stabilisation tasks and international policing. In relation to the international
tasks, DCR08 points out that the Danish Armed Forces’ deployable capabilities in principle should
be capable of being deployed globally.
38
39
Tactical Control
DDA14 [5] p. 3-4/38
- 22 -
This means, for example, that the Danish Armed Forces should have the ability to deploy forces in
areas which feature demanding climate and terrain conditions, such as desert and mountain areas.
In addition, the Danish Armed Forces should be able to operate in areas with limited infrastructure
as well as in urbanised areas. Combined, these operational conditions will therefore place great
demands on the Danish Armed Forces’ personnel, equipment, training, logistical capability and
mobility, including for example strategic maritime and air transport capability.
In addition, DCR08 states that it is expected that the future operational environment will continue to
place great demands on the operational units of the Danish Armed Forces, with regard also to
training and equipment. Past developments and expected future developments within international
operations indicate, for example, that the future operational environment could be characterised by
a high threat level.
The accompanying need to protect personnel places great demands on the equipment, personnel
and training of contingents. At the same time, it is expected that the Danish Armed Forces, in
connection with international missions, must increasingly be prepared to encounter both
asymmetric instruments of warfare (e.g. improved explosive devices (roadside bombs) and suicide
attacks) and more conventional instruments of warfare (e.g. indirect fire from rockets and mortars).
More technologically advanced instruments of warfare, such as long-range rockets and missiles as
well as cyberspace attacks against computer systems, must also be expected to be used against
Danish contingents from all three armed services. At the same time, according to DCR08, the
possibility of having to conduct operations against more conventionally organised and operating
opponents still exist. The Parties to the Defence Agreement are in agreement that the Danish
Armed Forces must also maintain the ability to fight and win this type of conflict.
The Parties to DDA14 are also in agreement that the developments in line with DCR08 indicate
that the demand for Danish contributions to international operations will not diminish in the future
and that such operations will often be long-term in nature. This underscores the need for the
operational capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces – of all services – to be, as a whole,
sufficiently robust and capable of a sustained effort in order to support long-termed international
engagements. Moreover, in special situations Danish Armed Forces should possess the ability to
deploy additional or larger contingents for shorter periods of time as well as the ability to deploy
contingents at short notice in connection with crisis management, humanitarian disasters,
evacuation operations, demonstrations of solidarity or of NATO’s commitment, etc., which can be
ensured through, among other things, participation in NATO’s response forces.
DCR08 also states that in the future a growing need for Danish Armed Forces to be able to
contribute to military capacity building is foreseen, both preventively in order to prevent conflicts
and in parallel with, for example, performing stabilisation tasks during a conflict. At the same time,
it is expected that also in the future the objective of stabilisation operations – and to a certain
extent armed conflicts – can only be achieved by integrating military and civilian activities in the
area of operation.
This means, on the one hand, that the already initiated integration efforts must be maintained and
broadened. On the other hand, this aspect entails that the achievement of the goal of a military
operation is often dependent on civilian initiatives, such as reconstruction. In order to ensure future
military and overall political success in international operations, it is therefore in general also
necessary that the Danish Armed Forces continue to maintain a certain ability to contribute to
reconstruction efforts – particularly in areas of operation where civil reconstruction capacities are
unable or unwilling to operate due to an unstable security situation. This may typically occur in
- 23 -
cases where the security situation during a transitional period hampers the ability of the civilian
actors to operate.
It follows from the above that the Danish Armed Forces must be able to perform a wide variety of
tasks. The Danish Armed Forces must remain able to participate in difficult and intensive
operations, including the continued contribution to the Danish engagement in Afghanistan in the
coming years in accordance with Denmark’s Afghanistan Strategy. However, the Danish Armed
Forces must also preserve and develop the ability to execute other types of stabilisation tasks and
international policing operations, including such mission types as the KFOR mission in Kosovo and
the operations against piracy off the Horn of Africa.
Therefore the international tasks are divided into the following five areas:
• Armed conflict (i.e. Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Peacemaking)
• Stabilization / Peacekeeping
• Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction
• International Maritime Policing (i.e. operations against piracy)
• Disaster response / Humanitarian assistance
Although units deployed in INTOPS normally have two or more of the above tasks in one mission,
the tasks will be analyzed individually.
3.3.1 Task 6: - Armed conflict / COIN / Peacemaking
Fighter
Transport
Police
DNK Battle Group
Figure 3-6: Map showing Afghanistan area incl selected capacities
Since the previous Danish Defence Commission from 1997, the Danish Armed Forces have
participated in some 20 different international operations. Several of these operations have
contained elements of all three types of tasks – i.e. armed conflict, stabilisation tasks and
international policing – and several took place further away from Denmark than anticipated when
adopting the present DDA14 [8].
- 24 -
As a consequence, the equipment deployed on international operations has suffered significantly
more wear and tear in comparison with the use of similar equipment in the domestic structure. In
addition, the deployments to climate zones and terrain that differ significantly from Danish
landscape has led to the need to modify and procure equipment that can withstand extreme
conditions from heat, cold, mountains, stony deserts, marshlands, etc. Even in connection with
what are essentially stabilisation operations, there has been a predominant element of actual
combat. Both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the operations have been counter-insurgency in nature,
involving periodically high-intensity combat; whilst in the Balkans, the operations have been lowintensity in nature, involving, for example, the control of large-scale riots and the separation of the
conflicting parties.
The enemy that the Danish military contingents have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan has made
increasing use of asymmetric warfare. This has led to a need for the Danish force elements to
continuously adjust their tactics, techniques and procedures, including using a broader range of
protective measures. The consequence of these asymmetric threats is that force elements in
general need to maintain a high level of readiness, even in places that are perceived to be secure
from a conventional military perspective. At the same time, it is essential that force elements are
able to take appropriate self-protective measures regardless of the area of operation, including the
ability to eliminate or evade threats, and to distinguish threats from the normal picture of ordinary
civilian life.
Task 6 – Armed Conflict / COIN / Peace Making
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
Military
Capabilities
Characteristics
Remarks
International task.
Theoretically the globe. Most likely
Africa, Middle East, Asia, etc.
Prolonged missions must be
expected.
Medium/High.
Patrols, Clear-hold-build operations,
CAS41, Air transport, TTT42.
Danish Battle Group, Air Transport,
Air Effector, Air Sensor, SOF.
In a NATO or CotW40 framework.
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Civil advisors, International police
units.
Primarily co-operation with GBR,
USA, and other NATO forces.
C2 will be performed through a
National command performed through AOC
NATO/CotW Regional Command.
and/or TACDEN.
Table 3-6: Armed Conflict / COIN / Peace Making
Command
structure
Danish Armed Forces units will probably be
deployed for several years.
Depending on situation.
Other tasks could be Medical service, Airport
Service, Force protection.
MACC43, Aerial Port Squadron, Frigates and/or
Support vessels could contribute in a littoral
scenario.
Developments within stabilisation operations and counter-insurgency have led to the build-up of
new capabilities, such as teams for training local security forces, close protection teams or teams
for assisting in the local reconstruction efforts44.
40
Coalition of the Willing
Close Air Support
42
Tactical Troop Transport
43
Mobile Air Control Centre
41
- 25 -
Experiences from deploying Army contingents in international operations show that the Army
primarily deploys units of battalion size, to which elements of all the branches of arms of the Army
can be assigned: so-called battle groups. However, so far this fact has not been adequately
reflected in the Army’s operational structure, leading to a practice of Army units being broken up
and reconfigured from deployment to deployment in connection with international operations.
On this basis, there is agreement that the Army’s operational structure should be focused around
the battle group level and modified so as to meet the requirements of long-term deployments in
international operations. Furthermore, the areas where the present manpower level is too small are
to be strengthened, which in turn will enhance the ability to maintain the simultaneous deployment
of several contingents in long-term international operations and thus enable the Army to meet the
defined level of ambition.
Besides the ability to deploy battle groups, the Army must maintain an ability at longer notice to
deploy a brigade-sized formation. Support units must be modular and capable of being deployed
within the framework of battle groups. The Army maintains a fire-support capability that is designed
for deployment in international operations.
3.3.2 Task 7: - Stabilisation / Peacekeeping / International Policing
The increased Danish international engagement has emphasised the need to strengthen
cooperation between military and civilian efforts in conflict areas, in order to increase the overall
effect of the operation.
Transport
Transport
Police and
other civil
authorities
Figure 3-7: Map showing crisis area incl. selected capacities
44
DCR08 [6] p. 23-25
- 26 -
International crisis operations are not only a military task. Basic needs such as water, electricity,
transport, police, administration and business life are all fundamental to achieve this aim. For that
reason the entire Danish contribution encompassing both military and civilian assets must be well
coordinated, in order to stabilize and normalize the area as quickly as possible. This could also
create conditions for a shortened military presence in the area thereby securing the best possible
use of Danish resources.
The security situation may prevent humanitarian organisations and other civilian actors from
providing assistance in the area of operation. In such cases the military forces could be required to
carry out relief work including the re-establishing of local police and judicial system.
As the security situation improves, it is important that humanitarian organisations or contractors
with the necessary expertise take over the civilian tasks and it is essential that military involvement
in this connection is as limited as possible.
To further enhance civil-military coordination, the Government has set up a group of
representatives from the involved governmental institutions with the responsibility for the planning
and coordination of the Danish engagement - both military and civilian - in conflicts.
Task 7 – Stabilisation / Peacekeeping / International Policing
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
International task.
NATO, Nordic, UN, CotW or EU.
Theoretically the globe. Most likely
Africa, Middle East, Asia, etc.
Prolonged missions must be
Danish Armed Forces units or elements hereof
expected.
will probably be deployed for prolonged periods.
Low/Medium/High.
Depending on situation.
Patrols, Riot control, Support to police
units.
Danish Battle Group or elements
Battle Group can be created using capacities
hereof, Air Transport, Sea Transport,
from Army, Navy and Air force.
Air C2.
DMFA, International police units, civil
advisors, NGOs.
Primarily co-operation with Nordic,
Allied army units and later maybe EU
army units.
C2 will be performed through a HQ in Parallel national command structure.
Theatre.
Table 3-7: Stabilisation / Peacekeeping / International Policing
DDA14 brought with it an increased focus on integrating Danish military and civilian efforts, which
has, among other things, led to an enhanced general coordination of the overall efforts in the
mission areas. It has also led to cooperation between Danish military units and advisers posted by
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA) regarding local reconstruction efforts. Danish troops
have learned to handle these issues by virtue of the skills and competencies acquired through their
upbringing and school education as well as the focused, mission-specific training they undergo
prior to deployment45.
45
DCR08 [6] p. 25
- 27 -
3.3.3 Task 8: - Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction
The increased Danish international engagement has emphasised the need to strengthen
cooperation between military and civilian efforts in conflict areas, in order to increase the overall
effect of the operation.
Transport
Transport
Police and
other civil
authorities
Figure 3-8: Map showing crisis area incl selected capacities
International crisis operations are not only a military task. Basic needs such as water, electricity,
transport, police, administration and business life are all fundamental to achieve this aim. For that
reason the entire Danish contribution encompassing both military and civilian assets must be well
coordinated, in order to stabilize and normalize the area as quickly as possible. This could also
create conditions for a shortened military presence in the area thereby securing the best possible
use of Danish resources.
The security situation may prevent humanitarian organisations and other civilian actors from
providing assistance in the area of operation. In such cases the military forces could be required to
carry out relief work including the re-establishing of local police and judicial system. This kind of
duty is not a core task of the armed forces and will not be so in the future.
As the security situation improves, it is important that humanitarian organisations or contactors with
the necessary expertise take over the civilian tasks and it is essential that military involvement in
this connection is as limited as possible.
To further enhance civil-military coordination, the Government has set up a group of
representatives from the involved governmental institutions with the responsibility for the planning
and coordination of the Danish engagement - both military and civilian - in conflicts.46
46
DAFIP [3] p. 17
- 28 -
Military capacity building47 experiences from deploying the Danish Armed Forces in stabilisation
operations clearly indicate that the building of competent security structures locally, including
military training capabilities, is crucial for the success of an international mission. Therefore, there
is a substantial need for the Danish Armed Forces to have the capability of training and instructing
local security forces, enabling them to acquire the capability themselves to resolve local conflicts
and take responsibility for performing security tasks.
Task 8 – Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction
Subject
Characteristics
Remarks
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
International task.
Theoretically the globe. Most likely Africa,
Middle East, Asia etc.
Prolonged missions must be expected.
NATO, Nordic, UN, CotW or EU.
Danish Armed Forces units will probably be
deployed for several years.
Depending on situation.
Low/Medium/High.
Training of local security forces, rebuilding
of local communities.
Danish Battle Group, Air Transport, Sea
Battle Group can be created using
Transport.
capacities from Army, Navy and Air force.
DMFA, International police units, civil
advisors, NGOs.
C2 will be performed through a HQ in
Parallel national command structure.
Theatre.
Table 3-8: Nation Building / Capacity Building / Reconstruction
This task of providing training and instruction may encompass a wide variety of activities, ranging
from, for example, training foreign personnel in Denmark and deploying advisory and training staff
contributions to countries with military development needs, to deploying training teams in order to
train local security forces in the mission area before, during and after a potential conflict.
Danish Armed Forces has until now not had capacities dedicated to performing such tasks. In this
respect, the capability for performing such tasks has partly been limited and partly had to be
established from time to time by seconding personnel from other parts of Danish Armed Forces.
This has contributed to the strain placed on the personnel. Danish Armed Forces will to a certain
extent continue to participate in more traditional capacity building tasks, which are carried out, for
example, in the Balkans, the Ukraine and Georgia.
On this basis, there is agreement that the Danish Armed Forces’ ability to perform capacity building
tasks is to be strengthened, so as to enable the Danish Armed Forces in the future to contribute
further to the performance of this type of task internationally, particularly within the framework of
the UN. Therefore, capacities in the Danish Armed Forces are to be dedicated to capacity building.
Likewise, operational capacities in the three armed services and in the Danish Home Guard are to
remain able to perform capacity building tasks as and when required.
47
DDA14 [5] 1.3.3p. 10/38
- 29 -
3.3.4 Task 9 - International Maritime Policing / Operations against piracy
The Danish contribution to CTF 150 and CTF 151 has primarily comprised a ship of the ABSALON
class with a crew of 114 men, including a helicopter, an element from the Royal Danish Navy
Frogman Corps48 for boarding purposes, as well as military police, who also form part of the
boarding team. At times, the head of Danish Task Group49, with a staff comprising about 40
people, has also been stationed in the area, and functioned as Commander Combined Task Force
150 / 151.
Figure 3-9: Map showing Horn of Africa
Recommendations regarding measures on the part of Denmark:
• To participate at regional level in establishing and strengthening regional capacity –
particularly in the form of a regional unit, a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol (GHASP)
• To strengthen the boarding and landing capacity of the Danish Navy with the aim of
continuing to take part in international operations.
Denmark has experience of building up military and civil capacity that must be used actively in
establishing GHASP. As this will take time, a Danish maritime-military presence should be
maintained off the coast of Somalia. Experience from Flexible Support Ship ABSALON and the
Offshore Patrol Vessel THETIS mission’s shows that the use of helicopters combined with
boarding and landing elements from the Danish Navy Frogman Corps are effective in combating
attacks by pirates. Irrespective of whether there is a decision to act or react, the boarding and
48
49
Danish: Frømandskorpset
Danish: Søværnets Taktiske Stab
- 30 -
landing elements in particular should be strengthened. This would also strengthen participation in
future international operations, such as controlling ships, for instance50.
Task 9 - International Maritime Policing
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Typical missions
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
International task
Theoretically the globe. Currently
most likely Horn of Africa.
Missions up to a year possible.
In a NATO, EU or CotW framework.
Medium/Low.
Patrols, boarding, protection of
merchant traffic.
Sea Patrol, Regional HQ. Maritime Air
Survaliance.
-
Depending on situation.
Other CTF (e.g. NATO, EU) navies
and/or partners.
COM CTF, NATO MCC, NATO JFC
CHODDEN, ADMDANFLEET
Table 3-9: International Maritime Policing
3.3.5 Task 10 - Disaster response / Humanitarian assistance
A planning capability in relation to, for example, the UN51/humanitarian operations that can
encompass military contributions from all armed services and contributions from relevant civil
authorities, etc. is deemed likely to be in greater demand in the future, particularly within the
framework of UN operations.
On this basis, there is agreement that the tactical command staffs of the three armed services
should be made available for the UN as a planning capability in connection with UN operations,
including as a replacement for SHIRBRIG’s capability in this area. In this role, the command staffs
can be deployed individually or as a collective capability.
Rooted in this capability, the three armed services’ tactical command staffs are to be developed in
order to – as a collective capability – acquire the ability to plan and lead the deployment of relevant
capacities from the combined national preparedness capabilities , for example in connection with
humanitarian deployments, evacuation operations, etc., materialising in response to, for example,
natural disasters. Such tasks are anticipated to be undertaken either independently at a national
level, for example in the case of an evacuation operation, or as a contribution to a multinational
response.
50
51
DIMS Report: ”Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol” (GHASP) [7]
DDA14 [5] p. 11/38
- 31 -
On the basis of the Danish Armed Forces’ existing structure, capabilities and tactical command
staffs, the ability to configure a temporary Task Force that can prepare and deploy, depending on
the situation and the task, relevant capacities in connection with humanitarian deployments,
evacuation operations etc, is to be established. The ability to form this Task Force will both
enhance the Danish ability to carry out humanitarian deployments and evacuation operations, etc.
and enhance the Danish Armed Forces’ ability to plan and lead complex and joint operations.
Transport
DEMA, GO and
NGO
Transport
Flexible
Support
ships
Logistics and Aerial Port
Squadron
Figure 3-10: Map showing South East Asia area incl selected capacities
A central objective of The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) is to ensure that the
national rescue preparedness is optimised for rapid, flexible and efficient action abroad. Among the
emergencies in which DEMA may assist, are natural disasters and accidents; terrorist attacks;
technological or industrial accidents and complex emergencies in international crisis situations.
International operations thus have high priority; and a fully equipped operational task force
designed according to the specific type of disaster can be deployed within 12 hours, when a
disaster occurs. DEMA’s international capacity has root in a long standing tradition of providing
international emergency assistance bilaterally and in close cooperation with international
organisations, such as the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with neighbouring countries.
DEMA cooperates closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non-governmental humanitarian
organisations with regard to its international commitments. DEMA can be deployed abroad on
request either from individual countries or international organisations52.
Task 10 – Disaster Response / Humanitarian Assistance
Subject
Task type
Theatre of
operation
52
Characteristics
Remarks
International task.
Theoretically the entire globe.
DAFIP [3] p. 13
- 32 -
Task 10 – Disaster Response / Humanitarian Assistance
Subject
Time- span/
requirements
Threat
Typical
missions
Military
Capabilities
Civilian
Capabilities
Partners
Command
structure
Characteristics
Remarks
Expected to be relatively short
operations.
Low.
Evacuation, Humanitarian relief,
Rebuilding of infrastructure, Hospital
service, airport service.
Air Transport, Sea Transport, Aerial
Port Support.
DEMA teams, GO, NGO.
A wide variety of tasks is possible and will
depend on actual requirements.
Co-operation with local units and all
countries possible.
Table 3-10: Disaster Response / Humanitarian Assistance
3.4 Training and Force Production
Force Production is the general term used for preparing elements and units of the Danish Armed
Forces to execute the national and international tasks. This includes all activities from education
and training of the individual soldier to mission preparation training of complete units or force
elements.
The training of Danish Armed Forces units and capabilities will for the vast majority of units take
place in Denmark. If the situation requires so, some force elements and units can perform the final
mission preparation training integrated with allied units in areas more suited for this purpose
(special terrain, climate or special exercise facilities).
National force production and training activities does not by nature require special information
exchange requirement or special ICT-systems compared to the national and/or international tasks
to be performed. However training and force production will often include some artificiality: The
exact joint and/or combined force composition that are in place in a national or international
scenario will often not be available in a training situation. Therefore some force elements or units
will be played by other units to allow for a realistic training scenario.
Thus in a training scenario Danish Armed Forces units will from time to time have to play roles of
other allied units to allow for a realistic training scenario.
For example, when training the Danish Battle Group the Danish Air Force will play the roles of
allied Air assets to allow for realistic mission preparation. When the Danish Navy prepares for an
international mission the Danish Air Force will also play the roles of allied Air assets. And when
Danish air Force Units prepares for international missions units of the Danish Army and Navy plays
the role of allied naval and ground forces.
- 33 -
Although the Danish Armed Forces does not send joint force elements to international missions
and does not have the requirement of full joint interoperability as the Danish Armed Forces
achieves joint interoperability internationally through the “joint through combined” concept, the
Danish Armed Forces need a “joint playground” to train joint interoperability nationally for adequate
mission preparation.
Training and mission preparation does not always require units and/or force elements to be colocated. There are extensive possibilities in connecting units and force elements through secure
networks (i.e. CFBL-net53) and/or include the use of modern simulation systems. This allows for
interoperability training between international units while still in country and furthermore some units
can be simulated through interactive and distributed simulation systems. Thus very realistic
scenarios can be trained during mission preparation when using a combination of in-place forces,
forces or units from other countries and simulated forces in a realistic scenario.
3.5 Support Tasks
The Danish Armed Forces support structure consists of the Danish Defence Acquisition and
Logistics Organization (DALO)54, the Defence ICT Service55, the Danish Defence Personnel
Agency56 and the Defence Estates & Infrastructure Organisation57. This support structure supports
Danish Armed Forces units and forces during force production and actual missions with logistical
support, ICT service, personal service and infrastructure service. Therefore any Danish Armed
Forces unit in national or international operations has the requirement for information exchange
with the Danish Armed Forces support structure to allow for the timely supply of logistics, personal,
ICT-services, etc.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter the tasks of Danish Armed Forces were described. The tasks were divided into
national and international tasks and the individual task was described in a way that allows for
further analysis with regard to information requirements. Some comments about Training and
Force production and in the support-area were also made. These descriptions will be used as input
to the vignettes in chapter 4 that will be used in the analysis in WP2.
53
Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network
Danish: Forsvarets Materieltjeneste (FMT)
55
Danish: Forsvaret Koncernfælles Informatiktjeneste (FKIT)
56
Danish: Forsvarets Personeltjeneste (FPT)
57
Danish: Forsvarets Bygnings- & Etablissementstjeneste (FBE)
54
- 34 -
4. Vignettes
This chapter gives a description of three selected vignettes for the national and international tasks.
The vignettes are examples of how to describe situations involving one or more major tasks at the
same time. All together the three vignettes cover most of the major tasks described in the previous
chapter. The vignettes enable the reader to identify specific Information Exchange Requirements,
and the results will be used for further analysis in WP2.
4.1 Vignette – National Task – Denmark
LR
Police
Costal
Radar
SOF
HQ
Figure 4-1: Head of State Summit. (OV1)
A Heads of State summit is held in Denmark, with participants from many nations. Danish Security
and Intelligence Service58 have received a credible threat that a group of unknown terrorist will try
to kill a head of state at this summit. To help the Police the Danish Home Guard59, the national
SOF60, the Navy and the Air Force are tasked with securing the perimeter of the summit. The
Police will handle crowd control. All of this is coordinated from an operational HQ located within the
protected perimeter.
As soon as the summit was announced hackers have tried to hack into Police, Danish Armed
Forces and governmental computer systems. DK-Cert, GOV-Cert and MIL-Cert are all involved in
protecting the ICT- infrastructure.
58
Danish: Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)
Danish: Hjemmeværnet
60
Danish: Frømandskorpset / Jægerkorpset
59
- 35 -
During the summit different radical NGOs attempt to get access to the summit grounds by land,
sea and air. But all attempts are discovered and repelled.
An act of sabotage de-rails a commuter train close to the Conference Centre where the summit
takes places. This causes casualties as well as a major disturbance in the commuter-traffic
between Copenhagen and the airport. The Home Guard (additional units) and DEMA are activated
to help control and alleviate the situation. The assessment is that the purpose of this event is to
divert the attention of the authorities from the Head of State summit and cause a chaotic situation
that will enable the terrorist organisation to accomplish its intended assassination.
This vignette defines the following Information exchange requirements:
• Real-time data communication between sensor network (costal radars, mobile and long range
air-defense radars), Headquarters (National and summit) and units.
• Real-time voice and data communication between military entities, DEMA and the Police.
• Real-time voice and data communication between military entities (SOF, land, sea and air).
• Real-time voice and data communication between HQ and SOF units.
• The requirement for real-time network monitoring.
4.2 Vignette – National task – North Atlantic
Figure 4-2: Oil Tanker Burgas (OV1)
On September 12th a violent explosion-like fire broke out in the 156 thousand ton Russian oil
tanker Burgas. The ship was on its way through the newly opened north-west passage with a
cargo of crude oil from the Siberian Salym oil field intended for refining in the city of Garyville. The
- 36 -
fire in the ship caused a major oil leak that with the current wind and sea conditions seems bound
for Disko Bay. The crew had to abandon the ship and find themselves in two life rafts in the sea
(sea state 5). The Canadian, the Danish and the Russian environmental authorities are extremely
concerned about the situation and all three countries are sending ships and planes to the area.
Canada has two Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA) in the area and a marine environmental ship is
under way. To monitor the situation and help with the rescue of the crew, the inspection ship
THETIS, and a smaller patrol ship is on the way to the area. In addition, two F-16 fighters with
recce pods and a Challenger aircraft have been send to Sondrestrom Air base to assist in the area.
The disaster is followed very closely by the news media both in Europe and North America. The
Russian frigate Novik is expected to come to the area since it was on patrol between Greenland
and Iceland. Environmental organisations, including Greenpeace, have previously requested strict
rules for sailing these waters with large oil tankers, and have threatened blockades of ports and
actions against ships.
The Danish Minister of Defence and the Government of Greenland want to be constantly updated
on the situation. The Defence Minister has in a statement stressed the importance of a coordinated
and rapid response. There must, as soon as possible, be established an emergency organisation,
to prevent and possibly reduce the impact of the disaster on the vulnerable nature of Greenland.
This vignette defines the following information exchange requirements:
• Real-time Communication between MPA and recce aircraft from DNK and CAN.
• Sensor information in real time from Challenger to F16 and Thetis.
• Real-time Information for Thetis.
• Transfer of sensor information from the area to AdmDanFleet, CHODDEN and
Environmental Ministry.
• Data and images from field to Novik.
• TV and data from field to Danish MoD, Greenland and CHODDEN.
• Voice and data for NGOs (Greenpeace).
• Direct access to environmental and meteorological databases, including from DMI.
4.3 Vignette - International task - Afghanistan
Danish military units are involved in a NATO lead operation in Afghanistan. Main contribution is an
army battalion, organized as a part of a UK brigade. Main task is controlling and stabilizing an area
in southern part of Afghanistan. The battalion is supported by an Afghan National Army (ANA),
police, rescue preparedness unit from Danish Home Guard and other units from the Danish
government and NGOs. The battalion has established a main HQ and a number of smaller forward
operation bases where Danish and ANA military personnel work close together.
During a visit from the Danish Minister of Defence, where he was companied by a British general,
at one of the forward operation post, his convoy was hit by a road bomb, and two soldiers were
killed. The convoy was afterwards attacked by the enemy with small arms fire, machineguns, and
RPG. The VIP vehicle was hit.
Two wounded soldiers and a wounded Danish journalist from a major newspaper were picked up
by a British rescue helicopter.
Short after takeoff the helicopter was forced the make an emergency landing, and the British
helicopter crew and the Danish journalist were captured by the enemy.
- 37 -
A joint rescue operation was established, with participation from, British, Danish and Afghan army
units, reconnaissance and close air support aircrafts, UAV and SOF. National HQs in UK and DNK
are heavily involved with NATO HQ and Deployed Army HQ. The incident was followed very
closely by the media.
HQ
UAV
Figure 4-3: Afghanistan (OV1)
This vignette defines the following Information exchange requirements:
• Real-time data communication between sensor network (air-defense radars, UAV, aircrafts),
Headquarters (National and NATO) and Units (ANA, GBR and DNK).
• Real-time voice and data communication between military C2-units and political HQ.
• Real-time voice and data communication between military (SOF, land, sea and air).
• Near real-time communication between national HQs and the BTN HQ in Afghanistan
• Role based access to information – DNK and ANA personnel on same equipment, but with
different access to information.
4.4 Summary
Based on the Danish Armed Forces tasks description in chapter 3, this chapter gives a description
of three selected vignettes, one for the Danish Area, one for the North Atlantic Area and one for
Afghanistan. The vignettes enable the reader to identify specific Information Exchange
Requirements, and these results will be used fore further analysis in DEFTA/WP2.
- 38 -
5. Conclusions and recommendations
In this chapter the general requirements for information exchange are summarized, and some
recommendations for further work are given. Focus is set separately on the national Danish
Scenarios, the Arctic Scenario and the defined International Scenarios.
5.1 General NBO related requirements for information exchange
With the adoption of the NNEC philosophy, NATO changes it mantra from “Need to know” to “Need
to Share – Share to Win”. This is fundamentally a different level of Information Exchange
Requirement (need to share principle). Further this principle set some requirement in the area of
timeliness, information richness, information reach and in the area of information security.
5.2 National CIS Infrastructure
The new task set of the Danish Armed Forces and the technological development have led to
network centricity. Buried in this is the requirement of being able to act in non-anticipated
situations. This requirement for flexibility and agility must be reflected in the way the ICT systems
are organised. This is in contrast to the cold war scenarios, where predictability made it possible to
define the sorts of messages that were to be exchanged, and thus to reduce the richness of the
information.
The adoption of NBO sets some requirements for the network of network. In principle, three types
of information are supplied and consumed via the network: sensor information, C2 information and
effector information, e.g. information for fire control. The network should in principle support the
exchange of all three types of information in spite of their different attributes.
According to the tasks in the national arena the generic requirements are:
• Mobility, both of infrastructure and hosting nodes
• Limited degree of information assurance, mainly communication security, to assure
availability and integrity. The exchanged data will have a limited life time.
• Some real time requirements and limited requirements for precision.
• Robustness of all equipment, including the ability to operate under adversary physical
conditions.
• Logical reach, including the ability to collaborate with a number of civil emergency
operators.
The information assurance requirements will in general be lower than for strictly military operations.
In the arctic arena the requirement are mostly the same, but geographical conditions, may require
separate solutions.
For international tasks with military units, the generic requirements for national communication are:
• Reach back from deployed headquarter to national strategic level
- 39 -
•
•
•
Mobility and employability, both of infrastructure and hosting nodes
Maximum interoperability with NATO CIS or Coalition Infrastructure
Role based access to information – I.e. DNK and ANA personnel on same equipment, but
with different access to information
5.3 NATO CIS Infrastructure
According to NATO policies NATO and NATO nations must provide the C2 environment, which is
able to flex from a fully static mode in fixed facilities, to a fully deployed mode, and all variations in
between. To achieve this end, the C2 environment must be structured to support operations
ranging from day-to-day business through the entire spectrum of crisis response operations to
wartime operations. See figure Figure 5-1 This includes support of consultation activities.
Levels, capacity and information
Strategic
level
Operationel level
AllianceCapabilities
National
Civilian
Capabilities
Joint
capabilities
Landcapabilities
Maritime
capabilities
Air
capabilities
Tactical level
Figure 5-1: Information exchange levels
To enable political and military leadership to flexible react on the unpredictable occurrence of
threats, the following capabilities must be made available:
• An appropriately protected working and life support environment to accommodate
commanders and staffs of the NATO Command and Force Structures through static and
deployable, survivable and sustainable Command Facilities (CFs), in support of a
combined/joint and single service Headquarters (HQs) and Operations Centres structure.
• Connectivity between all Headquarters/Operations Centres at static and deployed
locations, to include external communications, to facilitate timely and effective decisionmaking, functionally oriented staff work across all command levels, C2 of forces within and
- 40 -
•
beyond Alliance territory, and political and military consultation, as well as the nuclear
planning and consultation process. This requires Communication and Information Systems
(CIS) to directly support Command and Control with survivable, secure, flexible,
interoperable and Sustainable Information Processing and Exchange Services.
Survivable, sustainable, secure, deployable and mobile, as required, Data Acquisition
Services to enable commanders to be continuously aware of the developing battlesituation.
5.4 Final Remarks
In this chapter the general requirements for information exchange are summarized, and some
recommendations for further work are given. Focus is set separately on the national Danish
Scenarios, the Arctic Scenario and the defined International Scenarios.
Further analysis on the findings will be done in WP2.
- 41 -
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- 42 -
References
[1]
Comprehensive Political Guidance, SG (2005)0918, dated 7 Dec 2005.
[2]
NNEC Vision and Concept, MCM-0032-2006, dated 19 Apr 2006.
[3]
Danish Armed Forces: International Perspective (DAFIP). Ministry of Defence.
[4]
NATO, NATO Architecture Framework version 3, AC/322-D(2007)0048.
[5]
Danish Defence Agreement 2010-14, Copenhagen, 24 June 2009.
[6]
The Defence Commissions Report: Danish Defence Global Engagement. Published 2008.
[7]
Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol, DIMS report, March 2009, Lars Bangert Struwe.
- 43 -
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- 44 -
Acronyms
AdmDanFleet Admiral Danish Fleet [in Danish: Søværnets Operative Kommando]
AOC
Air Operations Centre
ARF
Arctic Reaction Force
ASACS
Air Surveillance and Control System
AV
All View [from NAF]
C2
Command and Control
CAS
Close Air Support
CAOC
Combined Air Operations Centre
CF
Command Facilities
CFBL-net
Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network
CHODDEN Chief of Defence of Denmark
CIS
Communication and Information Systems
CNO
Computer Network Operations
COIN
Counter Insurgency
COTS
Commercial, off-the-shelf
CotW
Coalition of the Willing
CRC
Control and Reporting Centre
CTF
Combined Task Force
CV
Capability View [from NAF]
DALO
Defence Acquisition and Logistic Organisation [in Danish: Forsvarets Materieltjeneste]
DCD
Defence Command of Denmark [in Danish: Forsvarskommandoen]
DCR08
Defence Commissions Report (2010-2025)
DDA14
Danish Defence Agreement (2010-2014)
DDIS
Danish Defence Intelligence Service
DEFCOMM Defence Communication (used previous version of the Target Architecture)
DEFTA
Danish Defence Target Architecture
DEMA
Danish Emergency Management Agency [in Danish: Beredskabsstyrelsen]
DMFA
Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs
DMI
Danish Meteorological Institute
EOD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU
European Union
FBE
Forsvarets Bygnings- & Etablissementstjeneste [Danish for Defence Estates &
Infrastructure Organisation]
FKIT
FMT
FPT
GO
HQ
ISCOM GLD
ISCOM FAR
JRCC
KFOR
KGM
ICT
INTOPS
ITP
MACC
MAS
MPA
Forsvarets Koncernfælles Informatiktjeneste [Danish for Defence ICT Service]
Forsvarets Materieltjeneste [Danish for DALO]
Forsvarets Personeltjeneste [Danish for Danish Defence Personnel Agency]
Government Organisation
Headquarter
Island Command Greenland [in Danish: Grønlands Kommando]
Island Command Faeroes [in Danish: Færøernes Kommando]
Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre
Kosovo Force
Kattegats Marinedistrikt [Danish only]
Information and Communication Technology
International Operations
Information Technology Policy CIS Staff
Mobile Air Control Centre
Maritime Assistance Service
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
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NAF
NATINADS
NBO
NGO
NNEC
OV
PET
PV
QRA
RDAF
RDDC
RDN
SAR
SHIRBRIG
SOF
SOV
SV
TACON
TACDEN
TTT
TV
UAV
UN
WP
NATO Architectural Framework
NATO Integrated Air Defence System
Network Based Operations
Non-Government Organisation
NATO Network Enabled Capabilities
Operational View [from NAF]
Politiets Efterretningstjeneste [Danish for Danish Security and Intelligence Service]
Programme View [from NAF]
Quick Reaction Alert
Royal Danish Air Force
Royal Danish Defence College
Royal Danish Navy
Search and Rescue
Standby High-Readiness Brigade
Special Operations Force
Service Oriented View [from NAF]
System View [from NAF]
Tactical Control
Tactical Air Command Denmark
Tactical Troop Transport
Technical View [from NAF]
Unmanned Air Vehicle
United Nations
Work Package
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