Ethical Shopping: the consumer’s choice or a moral duty? Andrew Fagan University of Essex Introduction Can shopping help to alleviate global poverty and help to overcome global inequalities in wealth and opportunities? Can we as individual consumers significantly improve the lives of those who labour to produce the goods we consume through avoiding ‘unethical’ goods and opting instead for their ‘ethical’ counterparts? Furthermore, is shopping ethically thereby best understood as a moral duty, rather than a mere consumer choice, or individual preference? Given the opportunity ought we to shop ethically? This article presents an analysis of the emerging phenomenon of ethical shopping. I address the central question of whether there exists a moral duty to shop ethically by considering a number of relevant and significant obstacles and objections to this claim. Based upon the premise that understandings of social phenomena are integral to and fundamentally important in the development of such phenomena, I shall resist the impulse to take a particular side and opt instead to consider what effect these two very different conceptions of ethical shopping may foreseeably have upon the phenomenon itself. The act of shopping ethically can be evaluated in at least two, quite different ways. The development of this particular social form will be significantly affected by how consumers evaluate it and this, in turn, will have far-reaching implications for those who labour to satisfy our wants and desires. What is ‘ethical’ shopping? Despite the relative lack of academic interest in the subject, shopping is an absolutely indispensable feature of contemporary living. The range of goods and services available to those who populate the more affluent societies of the globe has grown exponentially over the last forty years or so and now defies imagination. We may not live to shop but shopping is an unavoidable feature of our lives. Some have even come to describe shopping as their principal leisure activity. Globalisation provides for a massive increase in the range of goods and services available. The assimilation of many regions of the world within a globalised capitalist market-place serves to extend the relationship of producer and consumer across an ever-increasing expanse. An increasingly inter-connected global economic framework serves to bring geographically remote populations into contact mediated through the exchange of goods and services. Production and consumption feed upon one another and their combined growth necessitates the maintenance and expansion of this relationship. In this way, consumer choices can have very real effects upon those who produce the goods and services consumed. Some consider this process to be invidious and necessarily harmful for those who populate the poorer regions of the world. The anti-globalisation movement, to cite the highest profile example, has taken up and developed upon the earlier Marxist conception of international trade and exchange as being, in effect, a perpetuation of imperialism in an economic form. On this view, the relationship is anything but the mutually reciprocal and rationally self-interested arrangement proclaimed by neoliberal policy-makers and economists. The global market-place is presented by the advocates of anti-globalisation as principally regulated by financial and trade institutions that are dominated by the more powerful nations of the ‘North’ and, as a consequence, systematically seek to promote their partial interests at the expense of the interests of the global commonwealth. In addition, the production and consumption of goods and services is conceived as being dominated by a relatively small but extremely powerful group of trans-national companies whose economic power restricts producers’ access to markets and is consistently exercised to reduce the prices producers receive for their exports. The principal beneficiaries of this state of affairs appear to be the share-holders of such companies and individual consumers who may benefit from the stable or lower prices that result from the exercise of such economic power. The anti-globalisation movement has sought to raise consciousness of the effects of this process by focusing upon phenomena such as the use of child labour in the manufacture of sporting goods, the exploitative terms of exchange which cocoa bean growers are systematically subject to, and the creation of economic ‘enterprise zones’ which seek to attract foreign investment through reducing or removing protective employment conditions and the additional costs they entail. These campaigns have been effective in drawing attention to how what we consume positively harms those at the other end of the exchange relationship. In this way, a moral dimension is attributed to consumption. A lack of concern for, or interest in, the conditions under which many commodities are produced is presented as part of the problem. Individual consumers living within affluent, mass consumer societies are characterised, in part, as subject to the manipulative practices of manufacturers who seek to stimulate and capitalise upon desires for largely superfluous goods and services, the continuing consumption of which is necessarily harmful, principally for those who produce these commodities but also, if slightly less overtly, for many of those who consume them. The tenor of the anti-globalisation movement is, therefore, primarily condemnatory. Globalisation is presented as an inherently capitalist phenomenon and capitalism is conceived as a systematically exploitative economic form, beyond reform or redemption. From this perspective, the claim that there might exist a form of ‘ethical’ consumerism appears positively oxymoronic. Ethical shopping shares the condemnatory impulse of its anti-globalisation counterpart. However, in stark contrast, ethical shopping is predicated upon the claim that it is possible to consume in a morally acceptable manner. Ethical shopping holds out the prospect of redeeming that part of globalisation maintained through the individual consumption of goods and services. Shopping need not, on this view, be inherently and unavoidably immoral. How, then, is ethical shopping to be defined and thereby distinguished from its ‘nonethical’ and ‘unethical’ counterparts? 1 Ethical shopping aims to identify and promote the consumption of distinctly moral goods and services through directing individual consumer choices towards them. By way of explanation, I do not think it is legitimate to define all that which is not ‘ethical’ as necessarily ‘unethical’. Unethical goods may be those which do cause harm to and where the harm caused is instrumental to the production, distribution and sale of the goods but isn’t perfectly possible for goods to have to be neither harmful nor beneficial? I assume so. 1 2 Ethical shopping subjects shopping to a form of moral evaluation or a moral audit: it moralises consumerism. It aims to promote and identify opportunities for consumers to act morally through shopping ethically. Against those who either reject or ignore the possibility, the very existence of ‘ethical’ goods and services appears to offer the promise of each consumer securing a degree of moral goodness through buying ‘right’. Self-declared ethical commercial enterprises such as the Fairtrade organisation have become prominent members of the ‘ethical’ market-place’. 2 Organisations such as; Friends of the Earth, the Soil Association, the Council for Ethics in Economics, and the Ethical Marketing Group aim to raise consumer awareness and influence policy across a broad range of consumer issues in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. The Ethical Consumer Research Association regularly publishes a magazine, entitled Ethical Consumer, which aims to inform its readers how to buy ethically through scrutinising the social and environmental records of those companies who dominate the high street, the shopping mall, and increasingly even cyberspace. Gaining an understanding of ethical shopping clearly needs to encompass the broad range of organisations and enterprises which fall within this compass but needs to start somewhere. A good, initial reference point is provided by an annual publication entitled The Good Shopping Guide, published by the Ethical Marketing Group and widely recognised within the United Kingdom and the United States as the most comprehensive and informative guide to ethical shopping currently available. It is, arguably, the closest thing we have to an authoritative compendium on the subject of ethical shopping. 3 The Guide provides a single, initial source for discerning the scope of ethical shopping, the content and basis of its principles, and a set of guidelines upon how consumers can actually go about shopping ethically. As such it provides both a formulation of what ethical shopping consists of and a determination of the range of goods and services that may be consumed ethically. The Guide defines ethical shopping as ‘buying things that are made ethically and by companies that act ethically – or in other words without causing harm to or exploiting humans, animals or the environment.’ (2003:11) The Guide seeks to empower ethically minded consumers to positively promote ethical commercial enterprises through buying their products and frustrating unethical enterprises through avoiding their products. To aid this process, it provides ‘ethicality scores’ for companies and products across a broad range of consumer goods and services, ranging from groceries and domestic appliances to building materials, health and beauty products and financial services. (2003:13) The ethicality scores are based upon companies’ environmental reporting, pollution, animal testing, factory farming, workers’ rights, and involvement in armaments and genetic engineering. The specific score each company attains is based upon the extent to which the manufacture and retailing of its products demonstrably cause harm to the environment, animals, and people. As a further aid to successful ethical shopping the Guide identifies fifteen ‘good shopping principles’ (2003:26-27). These include only buying brands positively endorsed by the Guide, to only investing money and banking with ethical financial There does exist an organisation which loosely regulates and endorses ‘genuine’ fair-trade products. The Fair Trade Labelling Organisation (FLO) is an umbrella organisation for all of the major fair-trade labels and has members in 17 countries. 3 The Ethical Marketing Group, The Good Shopping Guide, (London: Ethical Marketing Group, 2003). The reader is also advised to consult Duncan Clark, The Rough Guide to Ethical Shopping: The issues, the products, the companies (London: Penguin, 2004) 2 3 enterprises through to opting for fair trade products to practicing recycling. The final principle places an injunction against unethical brands and states ‘avoid the brands that do not score well in The Good Shopping Guide analysis – together we have the power to make companies change.’ (2003:27) Individual consumers’ adhering to the Guide appears to offer the prospect of shopping ethically. The ethical shopping movement aims to educate consumers about the effects of certain forms of consumption upon others and, increasingly, provides a market-place for the consumption of ethical goods. It aims, therefore, to utilise the power of consumer demand to affect supply. It does not, on the face of it, reject capitalist exchange relationships but places an onus upon individual consumers to alter our spending habits so as to improve the lives of those who produce the goods and services we consume. Consumption is presented as a potential force for achieving morally desirable ends. Ethical shopping and global economic justice What ethical shopping consists of should now be clear. The scope for ethically traded goods and services should also be clear: from groceries to electrical goods, from holidays to financial services there now exist ethical options to choose from. The ethically minded sovereign consumer can now fill his figurative basket with ethically traded goods and services and the range is progressively expanding. However, one must question to what extent shopping can help overcome global inequalities. Are the potential benefits so marginal as to have little positive effect upon the ongoing human tragedy of global inequality? Addressing this question requires gauging the scale of the problem and assessing the general impact of trade upon the global economy. The statistics and data paint a very dark picture. An estimated 2,800 million people (46% of the world’s population) live below the World Bank’s $2 a day poverty line. 4 1,200 million of these live on less than half that figure, ‘surviving’ on an income of less than $1 dollar a day. The consequences of this degree of absolute poverty are horrendous. Every year 18 million people die prematurely from poverty-related causes. That is 50,000 people each and every day. Of these, 34,000 are children under five years of age. When examined from a global perspective these 18 million povertyrelated premature deaths a year cannot merely be blamed upon inadequate resources. Absolute levels of global wealth are more than adequate for eradicating all absolute poverty. The immediate obstacle to pursuing this goal lies in the distribution of global wealth. Thus, in contrast to our absolutely poor counterparts who, for the most part, populate the southern hemisphere of the globe, the average income of citizens of the affluent countries of the ‘north’ has a market exchange rate value 200 times greater than that of our poor counterparts. While 2,800 million people share approximately 1.2 percent of total global income, 903 million people living in affluent countries share 79.7 percent of total global income. The combined assets and wealth of the world’s three wealthiest billionaires is greater than that of 600 million people living in the least developed countries of the world. Finally, the income gap between 1/5 of the world’s population living in the richest countries and 1/5 of the world’s population living in the poorest countries is 74-1. This last figure The statistics in this paragraph can be found in the introduction to Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) 4 4 has actually increased from the 1990 differential of 60-1, which confirms wider evidence pointing to an ever-increasing wealth gap between the globally affluent and the globally poor. Statistics like these present a profoundly disturbing picture of the suffering and misery endured by almost half of the world’s population whose principal misfortune is to have been born in the wrong place and, some might wish to add, the wrong time. Given the sheer extent and depth of human misery and suffering resulting from global poverty what possible benefit can shopping ethically have? Isn’t opting for fairtrade bananas, coffee or orange juice the merest and most insignificant drop in the ocean? The global trade in manufactured and agricultural products is a fundamental element of the global economic system. In 2004 the value of combined imports and exports of merchandised goods was in excess of 18,000 billion dollars. 5 In addition, the value of combined imports and exports of food and agricultural goods was 600 billion dollars. 6 At present, ethical goods’ share of the global market consists of a mere 0.1% of this volume of trade. 7 It would be unduly speculative and almost certainly unverifiable to conclude that 99.9% of global trade is thereby ‘unethical’ and positively harmful to those who produce the goods or sow and gather the crops. However, it would be reasonable to claim all of the following: that global trade is a highly significant element of the global economic system; that this system includes huge disparities of wealth; that there is extensive scope for an increase in ethically traded goods; and finally that realising the promise of ethical consumption will alleviate the economic burdens of those who labour for those concerns whose practices do not promote the well-being of their employees and producers. The importance of trade has been further highlighted by the development movement’s increasing focus upon trade rather than aid as providing the means for enabling poor countries to generate wealth and sustainable industries. 8 The higher political profile enjoyed by trade in this context serves to increase the importance of ethically traded goods and services. By itself, ethical shopping is not going to eradicate global poverty. However, it would appear to possess a huge potential for growth and with it the expansion of practices its supporters claim are beneficial, rather than detrimental to the welfare of those at the other end of the exchange relationship. On this view, shopping ethically can positively contribute to the cause of global economic justice. If one accepts that this is a reasonable claim, one is confronted by the fundamentally important question of whether shopping ethically is a moral duty, or merely an exercise of consumer choice. Free to choose? The ethical shopping movement represents an attempt to demonstrate the potential for forms of production and consumption that are not harmful to or exploitative of people, animals, and the environment. The central assumption is, therefore, that consumerism is not intrinsically or necessarily unethical or harmful. Ethical See WTO Annual report for global trade at www.wto.org See world report at faostat.fao.org 7See S.Fakir, Sustainable Trade, http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1400248 5 6 See Duncan Campbell, ‘African trade not aid coffee on sale’, The Guardian, Monday June 13 2005 8 5 shopping recognises and accepts the need we have for commodities, for buying things, beyond that which is necessary for mere survival and insists that it is possible to exercise our consumer choices in an ethically acceptable manner. The methods deployed by advocates of ethical shopping are, generally, quintessentially those deployed by consumer retailers everywhere. Ethical shopping retailers set their stalls out and encourage consumer interest and demand through publicising and advertising their goods. Shops selling ethical goods are now a recognisable feature of many high streets in the United Kingdom and operate in pretty much the same fashion as every other commercial enterprise in the market-place. In this way, ethical shopping appears consistent with the paradigmatic terms of the individual sovereign consumer. Individual consumers are free to exercise their personal choice and preference at two levels: first, in respect of the initial formation of desires and wants; second, in respect of those available options which correspond with these desires and wants. Commercial enterprises are legally entitled to seek to stimulate consumer interest in and demand for the goods they produce and spend very large sums of money doing so. 9 However, the laws and regulations governing commercial advertising and marketing have developed in accordance with the ideal of the sovereign consumer and the principle of avoiding the use of coercive measures or forms of duress that seek to usurp the will of the consumer. In theory, at least, the regulatory principles underlying mass consumerism are meant to accord with those principles upon which liberal democracy are based: each legally mature individual must be left free to choose how to furnish his or her own life. It would be fair to say that this particular conception of consumerism and the individual consumer enjoys a hegemonic status in contemporary mass consumer societies. It is not a universally endorsed view, as earlier discussion of the antiglobalisation movement indicates, but it remains dominant among mainstream consumer populations and regulators of the market-place. The ethical shopping movement generally accords with this perspective. On this view, ethical shopping seeks to extend opportunities for consumer choice by supplementing the range of existing goods with versions which more effectively meet the individual moral preferences of a certain minority group of consumers. Thus, fair-trade coffee or orange juice for example, are marketed not on the basis of being somehow better products than their counterparts: they are not advertised as being tastier or necessarily more nutritious. The value does not reside in the constitutive properties of the commodity but in the external effects upon the producers trading in these goods will have. A fair-trade cup of coffee is not presented as tasting any better than its non-fair-trade counterpart. It is generally not claimed that the consumer will enjoy such immediate and personal benefits but rather that the benefits accrue to someone else. This exchange might be described as being, to some extent, other-directed. It should not however be thought of as thereby purely altruistic. The principal value derived by the ethically-minded consumer consists in the satisfaction derived from complying with one’s moral preferences and commitments. The existence of ethically traded goods provides an opportunity for individuals who hold this particular preference to exercise their choice. To this extent, ethical shopping may be considered as enhancing individual consumer freedom through supplying a particular demand. Demand is stimulated and encouraged through publicity In 2003 £17.3 billion was spent on advertising in the UK alone. See http://www.prospects.ac.uk/cms/ShowPage/Home_page/Explore_job_sectors/Advertisin g_and_PR/As_it_is/p!elpkXe 9 6 campaigns and other forms of marketing in time-honoured fashion. The ethical shopping movement aims to increase the population of consumers motivated to buy ethical goods whilst simultaneously providing outlets for the exercise of this particular individual choice. We are free to choose to shop ethically, if we so desire. consumer capitalism to identify and satisfy consumer demand. The practice of ethical shopping appears to cohere with the established principles of consumerism generally. However, one should hesitate before concluding that the phenomenon itself is generally consistent with the wider economic system of trade and exchange within which it is located. Advocates of ethical enterprises will, for example, argue that the fundamental ends of mainstream and ethical enterprises differ significantly from their counterparts. Traditional capitalist enterprises exist to meet many ends but the principal point of business is to generate profit: making money is the principal point of the exercise. In contrast, many ethical enterprises conceive their fundamental end not to be the making of money per se, but developing commercial enterprises which principally benefit those who produce the goods through the establishment of sustainable industries and concerns. A focus is typically placed upon small-scale, community based projects that provide, amongst other things, fair terms of employment for members of the community and reinvestment of profits in the community infrastructure. On this view, making money is instrumental to the promotion of the well-being of those responsible for producing the goods that are traded. This is an important distinction and is one which often figures in ‘free-market’ criticisms of ethical shopping. (Ref. reqd.) However, my concern lies in a slightly different domain. While the practice of ethical shopping may appear largely consistent with established features of consumerism generally, its underlying rationale is significantly different as a direct consequence of its appeal to the notion of ‘ethical’. Identifying and advertising goods as ethical affects, in significant ways, one’s evaluation of the character of these goods and the underlying justification for their existence. This, in turn, has important implications for assessing the grounds for shopping ethically and the extent to which it is best understood as an entirely ‘free’ choice. The attribute ‘ethical’ in ethical shopping does not apply to the goods themselves but to the terms of the trading relationships which characterise it. It would be absurd to imagine that a fair-trade banana, for example, is somehow more intrinsically ethical than its non fair-trade counterpart. As such, ethical shopping is motivated to help rectify enduring and unjust trade relationships: it grows out of a perception of economic injustice. Furthermore, these relationships are condemned as unethical to the extent that they are the product of human action, not natural disasters. The desires, decisions and actions of distinct communities of people are responsible for the persistence of this form of injustice. It is not typically suggested that these decisions and actions are themselves the result of undue duress and coercion. Economic injustice is typically viewed as founded upon and maintained by individuals, variably located within the global economic system, pursuing their own perceived interests to the best of their abilities, given the resources available to them. Thus, to illustrate, the general price of a basket of groceries has remained extremely stable in many affluent societies over recent years. The reasons for this are, no doubt, multi-faceted and subject to a degree of national variation. However, there is an obvious and immediate causal link between the price consumers pay for their groceries and the price the producer of these goods receives: the maintenance of relatively low prices will have a direct effect upon the revenue and income of those at the other end of the relationship. Our desire for cheap groceries comes at the expense 7 of those who have little option but to sell their products at or around cost price. Freely exercising one’s preference for cheap groceries may prove harmful to others. Some have taken this claim further to argue that the affluent societies of the world and their populations are, in effect, morally culpable for the poverty induced suffering of our poor counterparts. Some theorists have argued, in effect, that levels of absolute affluence and absolute poverty are directly and interdependently related. Our level of material affluence is forged on the backs of the extreme material deprivations endured by our absolutely poor counterparts. This analysis radically alters one’s evaluation of the character of the moral relationship that exists between the affluent and the poor. On this view, it is not simply the case that affluent peoples are failing to do enough to help alleviate the suffering caused by poverty but that we are actively, if unintentionally, creating this poverty in the first place. We are held accountable for, not just failing to alleviate the suffering of the poor but for causing their poverty. Thomas Pogge, an advocate of this position, has recently stated ‘extensive, severe poverty can continue because we do not find its eradication morally compelling.’ (2002:3) The empirical basis to this attribution of moral responsibility is provided by the perception of increasingly interdependent and global economic relations combined with a claim that the principal regulative institutions of the global economy are dominated by, and promote the interests of, the affluent countries at the expense of their poor counterparts. The reality of economic globalisation cannot be disputed. Relations of trade and economic exchange are no longer, if they ever truly were, principally restricted by regional, national, or even continental boundaries. Corporations and companies operate on an increasingly trans-national basis and, in some cases, have greater assets and wealth than many of the countries they do business within. Those of us who reside in affluent countries are directly related to our counterparts in poor countries through, amongst other things, our consumption of the goods and, increasingly services, the poor produce: goods and services typically mediated by trans-national corporations. By themselves, individual governments cannot create or abolish economic markets. The role of national governments in the global economy is characteristically restricted to that of regulator. However, both at the national and international levels, the governments of affluent countries have been consistently criticised for imposing regulative regimes which are unfair and perpetuate historically unequal terms of trade between the affluent and the poor regions of the globe. Thus Thomas Pogge adds a condemnation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to his critique of global inequality. Pogge describes the WTO as being dominated by the representatives of the world’s affluent countries. This imbalance of power is best seen, he argues, in the consistently protectionist policies pursued by the WTO in, for example, the establishment and maintenance of economic tariffs imposed upon goods imported from poor countries. The immediate beneficiaries of these tariffs are the affluent countries’ producers of identical goods or produce who, in the absence of these tariffs, would have to compete, ironically in a ‘free-er’, market on price with their counterparts in poor countries. Pogge insists that the cost to the poor of these protectionist measures is often catastrophic and directly contributes to their misery and premature death. Given our representatives’ self-imposed mandate to protect our economic interests, Pogge writes, ‘our negotiators must know that the better they succeed, the more people will die of poverty. Our foreign and trade ministers and our presidents and prime ministers know this and so do many journalists and academics as well as 8 experts at the World Bank.’ (2002:20) Pogge insists that our economic and trade representatives actively seek to secure and maintain a global economy which allows us to continue to lead materially affluent lives characterised by our consuming high quantities of natural and manufactured resources which emanate from poor countries and for which we do not pay a ‘fair’ price but one protected and distorted by the imposition of tariffs and financial surcharges. Affluent countries’ dominance of organisations such as the WTO provides for our appropriation of the natural resources and wealth of poor countries. The poor are, in effect, subsidising our affluence with, in many cases, their lives. Pogge’s analysis is clearly motivated, in part, by a sense of moral outrage. However, it is also influenced by a particular account of genuinely ‘fair’ exchange. His critique is not founded upon some overtly anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation platform. Trade, and not aid, represents the most morally legitimate remedy to the problem. Indeed, Pogge acknowledges a distinct Lockean character to his critique and explicitly draws upon an account of individual property rights that originates within the tradition of natural rights in defending a claim that individuals possess certain inalienable rights to the fruits of their labour and the possession of requisite natural resources. Global trade constitutes a violation of these rights not by its very existence but by the terms upon which it proceeds. Pogge is certainly not ideologically opposed to free markets nor is he opposed to globalisation. Indeed, he explicitly rejects the view that global poverty is directly caused by the liberalisation of markets. The WTO is condemned, therefore, for its refusal to ‘open up’ markets, as witnessed in the continuing use of economic tariffs. The current terms of global trade are presented, in effect, as organised theft from which the affluent societies of the globe continue to benefit economically but unjustly. To this extent, the terms of global trade represent the triumph of might over right. Pogge’s critique of the global economy indicates the need for substantial reform and significantly altered practices, which extend to include not only highly powerful policy-makers but also individual consumers. If generally correct, his analysis identifies a fundamental failing of an approach to ethical shopping as simply an exercise of subjective preference formation. On the terms of Pogge’s analysis, continuing to opt for goods whose terms of exchange are unfair and detrimental to the poor is to incur some degree of responsibility for their continuing plight. He insists that practices such as this perpetuate economic injustice, the effects of which are, in many cases, catastrophic and for which we remain responsible. Continuing to prefer unethical goods over their ethical counterparts constitutes, all other things being equal, a moral failing. Pogge’s analysis shares, at the very least, the spirit out of which ethical shopping emerges. It implies, however, a somewhat stronger position on the question of whether individual consumers should opt for ethical goods where the choice exists. In contrast to the view which leaves the decision with the individual, so to speak, Pogge’s analysis implies the existence of a positive moral duty to assist the poor through the creation and maintenance of fair terms of exchange. There may not be ethical options for everything we purchase, but where such options do exist, to choose not to do so perpetuates economic injustice. On this view, adhering to the rationale of the claim that certain products are ethical entails a commitment to the view that there exists a moral duty to shop ethically. Identifying a product as qualitatively distinct because of its ethical attributes entails a commitment to the view that the morally correct thing to do, when confronted by the choice between an ethical and a non-ethical product, is to purchase the former. We have a 9 moral duty to shop ethically. The ethical shopping movement, therefore, draws back from the full force of its rationale when it refrains from marketing its goods in these terms. There may be well-founded pragmatic reasons for not alienating potential consumers by characterising their consumer habits as unethical: commercial enterprises are not given to blatant proselytization as a means for selling products. However, the rationale of ethical shopping suggests that the movement ought to understand its own value in these terms, at the very least. A moral duty? Many who choose to shop ‘ethically’ do so in the hope that their actions will contribute to, at the very least, minimising the harm suffered by those so much less fortunate than themselves. The motivation to alleviate suffering is, in instances such as these, not limited by national or continental borders. Ethical shopping holds that an increasingly global market-place establishes moral relationships between consumers and producers, irrespective of distance or cultural difference. Thus, ethical shopping can be understood as based upon the claims that human beings share certain basic and objective vital interests, that the interests of many human beings are adversely affected by their exposure to those aspects of the global marketplace that create and perpetuate unfair exchange and inequality, that the consumer choices we make directly contributes to this state of affairs, and, finally, by means of ethical shopping, we are able to minimise the harm suffered by those of our fellow human beings who are directly and indirectly affected by the consumer choices we make. Indeed, the benefits to the producers of ‘ethical’ products would, in many cases, appear to go beyond merely minimising the harm caused to the producer to positively contributing to his or her well-being. For example, so-called ‘fair trade’ coffee is typically produced by small-scale co-operatives working for themselves. Selling their coffee direct to ‘fair trade’ retailers ensures a higher return on their produce which, in turn, may positively benefit the wider community from within which the co-operative operates. Choosing to shop ethically is thereby presented as capable of both minimising harm and promoting well-being. This provides the principal ethical basis for the claims of ethical shopping. Ethical shoppers might be presented, in this light, as recognising and accepting a moral imperative that applies to consumption: avoid causing harm to those exposed to the choices we make. Is ethical shopping, therefore, best understood as a moral duty? If it is the morally correct thing to do to buy ethical goods where such options exist and where one has the capacity to do so, why wouldn’t this be a legitimate way of understanding the phenomenon? Conceiving of ethical shopping as a potential moral duty has a number of important implications. It would, all other things being equal, significantly extend the motive to buy ethical goods. It would stand as a condemnation of all those who, despite having the opportunity, continued to refuse to buy ethical goods. It would most likely significantly alter the manner in which consumer choice has been conceived and analysed: the moralization of consumption serves to introduce important limits and conditions upon the exercise of sovereign consumer choice in so far as some existing choices would attract moral condemnation. More nefariously, it would increase the likelihood of goods being re-branded as ‘ethical’ that do not satisfy the key criteria: some producers would have an interest in enjoying the attribute without incurring the additional costs entailed through practicing genuinely fair exchange. Before one can speculate more substantively on how such a moral duty might be realised and 10 policed, the very concept of a moral duty to shop ethically requires further scrutiny. There are a number of potential objections to the claim and a number of potential pitfalls to its possible realisation, ranging from the philosophical to the hardheadedly practical. The two principal philosophical objections consist of the claim, first, that ethical shopping is not a ‘rational’ choice for a consumer to make and, second, that the very substance of ethics does not allow for the existence of objectively compelling substantive ethical imperatives. An important practical concern centres upon the question of how an increasingly ‘ethical’ market-place might be foreseeably regulated. I shall consider each of these in turn and assess their bearing on the very notion of a moral duty to shop ethically. It is a common observation that ethical products cost more than their non-ethical counterparts: that it is simply more expensive to shop ethically than to simply shop. This raises a serious question over the economic rationality of shopping ethically. On the face of it, one might conclude that it is simply irrational to buy more expensive, ethical products. This is supported by the recognition that the value-added element of the ethical good rarely consists of a ‘better’ product: ethical goods do not necessarily taste better, or do a better job of removing stains, or offer a higher rate of return on your financial investments. What one pays for is the benefit gained by the producer of the good, the ‘happier’ herd, or cleaner environment. The benefits to the consumer are, at the very least, somewhat indirect and less tangible. Underlying this line of reasoning is the philosophical concept of homo economicus and the attendant vision of human nature it is associated with. The view that human beings can best be understood as purely wealth maximising, self-interested agents is subject to numerous criticisms, of course. It is not a particularly useful device for understanding many human actions and institutions that are more altruistically inclined. It would also, descriptively speaking, fail to adequately account for the fact that many people do opt for the more expensive ethical option. Many consumers (and not just ethical ones) fail to comply with the central tenets of economic rationality and the exceptions are morally important in this context. Such choices might still be described (dismissed?) as irrational in economic terms without this helping to understand why some opt to shop ethically and whether a moral duty to do so may apply far more widely. One might at this juncture make an ironic appeal to the ideal of consumer sovereignty and the liberty to buy what an individual desires so long as he possesses the means to do so. On this view, the terms of economic rationality have to be either set to one side or significantly reformulated to allow for individuals freely choosing to purchase more expensive items: to spend significantly more money on something than is necessary given the existence of cheaper equivalents. On this view the ethical shopper might be compared to a shopper who chooses to pay more for a commodity because of brand loyalty or identifying with some celebrity who endorses the good: crudely put, spending more makes both the ethical shopper and the ‘commodity fetishist’ feel subjectively better. Individuals have a right to dispose of their income in legally legitimate ways: both the ethical shopper and the commodity fetishist are exercising this right. This vision, of course, sits comfortably with an understanding of ethical shopping as consumer choice but is utterly incompatible with the notion of ethical shopping as a moral duty. For the latter, the range of legitimate choice is far more restricted and the criteria for determining correct choice far more exacting. However, it is important for pursuing a concern over the scope of any such moral duty. Here the issue of economic rationality may appear more pertinent the less 11 disposable income one has. Thus, an individual’s ability to comply with any such duty will be affected by his ability to pay more for his consumer goods. The financial surcharge of ethical goods is bound to have differential effects upon all those to whom the duty applies. At the lower end of the income scale and those in receipt of state benefits paying more for one’s groceries is more relatively expensive and prohibitive than it is for more affluent sectors of society. Leaving aside questions over how this might affect peoples’ attitude or disposition towards the principle of ethical shopping, it will almost certainly have some bearing upon the extent to which all sectors of society can consume ethically. This is inevitable. It will also have some bearing upon the question of what proportion of one’s shopping ought to be ‘ethical’ to satisfy moral requirements. Must one always opt for ethical goods where the choice exists, or is it enough to buy the occasional pound of coffee, bunch of bananas, or bar of chocolate? If one has an opportunity to buy goods which are not harmful in the operative sense and fails to do so, it would appear reasonable to conclude that, in that instant at least, one cannot legitimately lay claim to the ethical title. In this sense it will simply be easier for wealthier consumers to enjoy a greater, more consistent claim to the title, given higher levels of disposable income. Their poorer ounterparts, by contrast, may only feel able to afford the occasional ethical good as a kind of moral luxury! The force of economic rationality may appear to be greatest and most compelling the poorer one becomes. Any moral duty to shop ethically whenever the option existed would be more financially onerous for the poor to comply with. Furthermore, a failure to comply would attract greater approbation, whereas successful compliance would leave some poor people with significantly less disposable income than they already possess. Ironically then, an instrument for pursuing global equality might predictably increase existing inequalities within consumer societies. This does not, by itself, constitute an insuperable obstacle to establishing a moral duty to shop ethically as a credible moral principle. Many moral duties impact differentially upon those subject to them without, necessarily, detracting from their underlying justifications. However, it is an important concern in so far as it is likely to limit the potential compliance with a moral duty to shop ethically and thereby its credibility. The credibility of such a duty is also at the heart of the second philosophical concern. If shopping ethically is to be legitimately construed as a moral duty then advocates of ethical shopping have to argue that choosing to adhere to ethical shopping principles amounts to more than a morally valuable option, something one does if one happens to have a desire to be seen as a ‘morally good person’. Were it the case, individuals who did not share this desire would be under no such moral obligation. Advocates of ethical shopping consistently argue that the phenomenon is more than a particular lifestyle choice, in accordance with which some individuals choose to impose upon themselves the moral obligations this entails. The defence of shopping ethically typically implies the existence of some external, independently valid grounds for recognising the moral force and authority of the claims made for it. 10 The implication of the previous cited words Getethical.com, ‘given the choice how many people would choose not to buy products that are more ethical?’ is clear: to choose This is, of course, a deeply controversial position to adopt in contemporary moral philosophy. For examples of two advocates of this position see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good, (London: Routledge, 1991). Philippa foot, Natural Goodness, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). 10 12 not to do so is to reject the claims of morality. People choose to do this everyday, but that does not make it morally valid. Through the relatively banal consumer choices we make, we are in a position to harm or promote the well-being of others. Given the option, choosing to do the former appears intuitively wrong, at least, that is the view the advocate of ethical shopping as a morally objective good must hold to. A principal objection to the philosophical basis of ethical shopping takes issue with the purported objectivity of the underlying moral ‘goodness’ of ethical shopping. If there existed a moral duty to shop ethically it would have to be argued that the practice was morally valuable and thus legitimate even for those who do not subjectively value it. The moral value of ethical shopping cannot be reduced to the conscious states of individual consumers. This is the basis of its purported moral authority. Ethical shopping is characteristically defended as not just another lifestyle choice for relatively affluent people, but a morally compelling ‘good’. Those who opt for unethical products over their ethical counterparts fail to recognise, or may even be rejecting, the valid demands placed upon them by morality, rooted in the suffering of those exposed to our consumer choices and the unequal terms of exchange these are based upon. This view of morality has, of course, been the object of consistent criticism. For example, Bernard Williams has consistently challenged the epistemological basis of moral objectivity. For Williams there exist no legitimately ‘external reasons’ for our moral beliefs. There is no ultimate court of moral appeal which might adjudicate between a potential dispute between ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ consumers. 11 Others, such as Charles Larmore, have argued that the diverse and complex constituents of contemporary societies simply do not allow for the establishment of a single, morally objective regulative vision for governing relations between individuals. We each have an equal interest in securing our own moral commitments against external interference but this explicitly forbids demanding of others that they adhere to our vision. 12 Justifications for any moral commitments must therefore not exceed the conscious states of those who share them. Thus, one cannot demand of others that they share one’s own moral vision as a necessary condition of their claim to moral goodness. Moral philosophy does not, of course, consist entirely of sceptics and subjectivists. The argument that fairness is a central moral component for evaluating human relations has a long heritage, ranging from Kant to Rawls. Similarly, an appeal to property rights and notions of the illegitimate appropriation of others’ wealth stretches back as far as John Locke. Both of these philosophical perspectives are utilised by Pogge’s critique of the global economy and the institutions which regulate it. A detailed philosophical explication and defence of the existence of a moral duty to shop ethically would need to draw heavily upon resources such as these. However, Williams’ and Larmore’s perspectives do bear significantly upon one aspect of the present concern: the potential for ethical goods to conflict with one another, whereby a good may be perceived as ethical by an individual with one profile of moral ends but rejected as unethical by another individual with a different profile of ends and commitments. See his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, op cit. See also his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 12 See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 11 13 The stated ends of ethical shopping indicate that it is not an entirely homogeneous moral community of thoroughly like-minded consumers. What unites ethical shoppers appears to be a commitment to avoiding causing harm to or exploiting others through goods purchased. However, the community is divided by differing views as to who or what is a legitimate object of ethical shoppers’ moral concern. The definition of ethical shopping cited earlier refers to people, animals, and the environment as that which ethical shopping aims, at the very least, to avoid harming or exploiting. Each one of these objects of moral concern rests upon complex moral, philosophical, and ideological foundations. In important ways the commitments, assumptions, and forms of reasoning that comprise each of these foundations are significantly different and, in places, liable to come into conflict with one another. Thus, promoting the interests of people through ethical shopping is highly likely to involve, on occasion, disregarding others’ moral concerns for animals. The economic interests of a community may best be served by utilising animals in a manner others in the ethical shopping movement will find harmful and exploitative. Similar scenarios could arise in respect of the relationship between communities of people and the environment they inhabit whereby the only possible means of economic development will entail causing harm to the environment. The ends of ethical shopping entail that the movement cannot speak with one voice: it is not a wholly unified constituency and the differences are anything but trivial. Indeed, they are liable to confront ethical shopping with a series of moral dilemmas such as those canvassed above. The potential for such dilemmas demonstrates the falsity of ethical shopping’s apparent assumption that there might exist some ultimately holistic moral community and corresponding moral perspective, by means of which interests and ends may be reconciled. At times, ethical shoppers will have to choose between buying goods that promote their own particular object of concern to the detriment of some other ethical shoppers’ concern: at times, some forms of ethical shopping will appear positively unethical. One can resort to the sovereign consumer model of ethical shopping that would leave it up to individuals to purchase those goods that comply with their own subjective commitments and values but this is thoroughly incompatible with the notion of a moral duty to shop ethically. In this way, ethical shopping appears to simultaneously emerge out of and fall victim to moral diversity and moral incommensurability which philosophers such as Williams and Larmore insist prohibits the establishment of any singly substantive moral vision as capable of legislating for all. The final more hard-headedly practical issue for evaluating ethical shopping as a moral duty grows out of the previous two issues and concerns how such a duty could be effectively regulated. A growing acceptance of a moral duty to shop ethically would entail a likely expansion of the supply of goods to meet growing demand. At present, ethical goods occupy a very small part of the consumer marketplace and are relatively easy to regulate. However, a significant growth in the market would place demands on the existing ‘rubber-stamping’ organisations that currently exist. Effective answers would need to be provided for a wide range of questions and concerns. Market-regulators would need to offer reassurances that non-ethical and unethical goods would not be successfully passed-off as ethical without satisfying the necessary criteria. The existence of a moral duty to shop ethically would provide some with an economic interest in enjoying the attribute ‘ethical’ without incurring the higher costs this entails. Questions would arise over whether, and to what extent, ethical enterprises could make profits, rather than having to reinvest all surplus value in the enterprise itself. How would one define a ‘successful’ genuinely ethical 14 enterprise? Which bodies could play this general regulatory role? Would the members of such bodies be self-appointed, or elected? It is, of course, beyond the scope of this article to begin to suggest possible responses to such questions. Under the model of ethical shopping as sovereign consumer choice such questions are pertinent but not urgent: the market is accorded the role of resolving issues of transparency and misrepresentation. However, if shopping ethically is proposed on the basis of its purported moral legitimacy and superiority over its counterparts then it seems reasonable to suggest that shopping ethically is the morally correct thing to do, when given the opportunity. If this is the case, the proposal that there might exist a moral duty to shop ethically does not entail a leap of faith. If a moral duty to shop ethically is to be pursued then issues of how the market can be regulated in accordance with its principles do take on an urgency and would need to be satisfactorily resolved if the moral principle is to be practically realisable Summing up I have presented and discussed two different models of ethical shopping: as sovereign consumer choice and as moral duty. The phenomenon of ethical shopping serves to institutionalise the moralization of consumption and offers the prospect of buying goods and services that do not unduly harm and exploit. It appears to offer the potential for ethically inclined consumers to rectify some of the excesses of capitalism through, at the very least, mitigating some of the devastating effects of global inequality. Presently, consumers are encouraged to shop ethically where they can in terms wholly consonant with established consumer practices and the principle of consumer sovereignty. One is free to buy or not to buy ethical goods. However, the moral predicates of ethical shopping imply a different model of consumer action and motivation. Identifying some goods as ethical entails drawing a distinction between these and their lesser counterparts. Choosing not to buy ethical goods, while consistent with the principle of consumer sovereignty, must be seen as a morally inferior choice if ethical shopping is to have any force at all. A commitment to ethical shopping entails a commitment to the view that some consumer choices are morally superior to others. If it is morally correct to shop ethically when one can then it seems reasonable to argue that the recommendation to shop ethically can be developed as a moral duty to do so. If it is morally correct for some consumers to shop ethically why should some, similarly placed, be exempted from this moral principle? While the reasoning is sound ethical shopping has largely refrained from going down this particular route. I have discussed above potential problems with and objections to such a vision of ethical shopping. It is likely that ethical shopping will continue to market its goods in a way that encourages and invites, rather than morally commands, consumers to buy. This is, at least, consistent with central tenets and established practices of mass consumerist capitalism. However, despite the concerns discussed above, it does not seem entirely consistent with the moral force and motivations of ethical shopping. If one accepts the central premise that it is possible to alleviate suffering and exploitation through shopping ethically, why do relatively so few people do so? This cannot be accounted for purely in terms of economic reason and self-interest. Nor, given globalisation, can it be accounted for in terms that deny the existence of any moral relationships between geographically distant communities. The mass consumption of goods and services increases the potential both to harm and to help those at the other end of the exchange relationship. It presents individual consumers with an option to acquiesce in practices based upon exploitation or to actively promote genuinely fair terms of exchange. It accords a role 15 to individual consumers which previous generations did not enjoy. Ethical shopping needs to reflect upon itself and its principles. Does the phenomenon represent an opportunity for a few to salve their consciences or a force for genuine economic change and a serious challenge to the exploitative tendencies of global capitalism? 16
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