Ethical Shopping: the consumer`s choice or a moral duty

Ethical Shopping: the consumer’s choice or a moral duty?
Andrew Fagan
University of Essex
Introduction
Can shopping help to alleviate global poverty and help to overcome global
inequalities in wealth and opportunities? Can we as individual consumers
significantly improve the lives of those who labour to produce the goods we
consume through avoiding ‘unethical’ goods and opting instead for their ‘ethical’
counterparts? Furthermore, is shopping ethically thereby best understood as a moral
duty, rather than a mere consumer choice, or individual preference? Given the
opportunity ought we to shop ethically? This article presents an analysis of the
emerging phenomenon of ethical shopping. I address the central question of whether
there exists a moral duty to shop ethically by considering a number of relevant and
significant obstacles and objections to this claim. Based upon the premise that
understandings of social phenomena are integral to and fundamentally important in
the development of such phenomena, I shall resist the impulse to take a particular
side and opt instead to consider what effect these two very different conceptions of
ethical shopping may foreseeably have upon the phenomenon itself. The act of
shopping ethically can be evaluated in at least two, quite different ways. The
development of this particular social form will be significantly affected by how
consumers evaluate it and this, in turn, will have far-reaching implications for those
who labour to satisfy our wants and desires.
What is ‘ethical’ shopping?
Despite the relative lack of academic interest in the subject, shopping is an absolutely
indispensable feature of contemporary living. The range of goods and services
available to those who populate the more affluent societies of the globe has grown
exponentially over the last forty years or so and now defies imagination. We may not
live to shop but shopping is an unavoidable feature of our lives. Some have even
come to describe shopping as their principal leisure activity. Globalisation provides
for a massive increase in the range of goods and services available. The assimilation
of many regions of the world within a globalised capitalist market-place serves to
extend the relationship of producer and consumer across an ever-increasing expanse.
An increasingly inter-connected global economic framework serves to bring
geographically remote populations into contact mediated through the exchange of
goods and services. Production and consumption feed upon one another and their
combined growth necessitates the maintenance and expansion of this relationship. In
this way, consumer choices can have very real effects upon those who produce the
goods and services consumed.
Some consider this process to be invidious and necessarily harmful for those who
populate the poorer regions of the world. The anti-globalisation movement, to cite
the highest profile example, has taken up and developed upon the earlier Marxist
conception of international trade and exchange as being, in effect, a perpetuation of
imperialism in an economic form. On this view, the relationship is anything but the
mutually reciprocal and rationally self-interested arrangement proclaimed by neoliberal policy-makers and economists. The global market-place is presented by the
advocates of anti-globalisation as principally regulated by financial and trade
institutions that are dominated by the more powerful nations of the ‘North’ and, as a
consequence, systematically seek to promote their partial interests at the expense of
the interests of the global commonwealth. In addition, the production and
consumption of goods and services is conceived as being dominated by a relatively
small but extremely powerful group of trans-national companies whose economic
power restricts producers’ access to markets and is consistently exercised to reduce
the prices producers receive for their exports. The principal beneficiaries of this state
of affairs appear to be the share-holders of such companies and individual
consumers who may benefit from the stable or lower prices that result from the
exercise of such economic power. The anti-globalisation movement has sought to
raise consciousness of the effects of this process by focusing upon phenomena such
as the use of child labour in the manufacture of sporting goods, the exploitative
terms of exchange which cocoa bean growers are systematically subject to, and the
creation of economic ‘enterprise zones’ which seek to attract foreign investment
through reducing or removing protective employment conditions and the additional
costs they entail. These campaigns have been effective in drawing attention to how
what we consume positively harms those at the other end of the exchange
relationship. In this way, a moral dimension is attributed to consumption. A lack of
concern for, or interest in, the conditions under which many commodities are
produced is presented as part of the problem. Individual consumers living within
affluent, mass consumer societies are characterised, in part, as subject to the
manipulative practices of manufacturers who seek to stimulate and capitalise upon
desires for largely superfluous goods and services, the continuing consumption of
which is necessarily harmful, principally for those who produce these commodities
but also, if slightly less overtly, for many of those who consume them. The tenor of
the anti-globalisation movement is, therefore, primarily condemnatory. Globalisation
is presented as an inherently capitalist phenomenon and capitalism is conceived as a
systematically exploitative economic form, beyond reform or redemption. From this
perspective, the claim that there might exist a form of ‘ethical’ consumerism appears
positively oxymoronic.
Ethical shopping shares the condemnatory impulse of its anti-globalisation
counterpart. However, in stark contrast, ethical shopping is predicated upon the
claim that it is possible to consume in a morally acceptable manner. Ethical shopping
holds out the prospect of redeeming that part of globalisation maintained through
the individual consumption of goods and services. Shopping need not, on this view,
be inherently and unavoidably immoral. How, then, is ethical shopping to be defined
and thereby distinguished from its ‘nonethical’ and ‘unethical’ counterparts? 1
Ethical shopping aims to identify and promote the consumption of distinctly moral
goods and services through directing individual consumer choices towards them.
By way of explanation, I do not think it is legitimate to define all that which is not ‘ethical’ as
necessarily ‘unethical’. Unethical goods may be those which do cause harm to and where the
harm caused is instrumental to the production, distribution and sale of the goods but isn’t
perfectly possible for goods to have to be neither harmful nor beneficial? I assume so.
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Ethical shopping subjects shopping to a form of moral evaluation or a moral audit: it
moralises consumerism. It aims to promote and identify opportunities for consumers
to act morally through shopping ethically. Against those who either reject or ignore
the possibility, the very existence of ‘ethical’ goods and services appears to offer the
promise of each consumer securing a degree of moral goodness through buying
‘right’. Self-declared ethical commercial enterprises such as the Fairtrade
organisation have become prominent members of the ‘ethical’ market-place’. 2
Organisations such as; Friends of the Earth, the Soil Association, the Council for
Ethics in Economics, and the Ethical Marketing Group aim to raise consumer
awareness and influence policy across a broad range of consumer issues in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. The Ethical Consumer Research
Association regularly publishes a magazine, entitled Ethical Consumer, which aims to
inform its readers how to buy ethically through scrutinising the social and
environmental records of those companies who dominate the high street, the
shopping mall, and increasingly even cyberspace. Gaining an understanding of
ethical shopping clearly needs to encompass the broad range of organisations and
enterprises which fall within this compass but needs to start somewhere. A good,
initial reference point is provided by an annual publication entitled The Good
Shopping Guide, published by the Ethical Marketing Group and widely recognised
within the United Kingdom and the United States as the most comprehensive and
informative guide to ethical shopping currently available. It is, arguably, the closest
thing we have to an authoritative compendium on the subject of ethical shopping. 3
The Guide provides a single, initial source for discerning the scope of ethical
shopping, the content and basis of its principles, and a set of guidelines upon how
consumers can actually go about shopping ethically. As such it provides both a
formulation of what ethical shopping consists of and a determination of the range of
goods and services that may be consumed ethically.
The Guide defines ethical shopping as ‘buying things that are made ethically and by
companies that act ethically – or in other words without causing harm to or
exploiting humans, animals or the environment.’ (2003:11) The Guide seeks to
empower ethically minded consumers to positively promote ethical commercial
enterprises through buying their products and frustrating unethical enterprises
through avoiding their products. To aid this process, it provides ‘ethicality scores’ for
companies and products across a broad range of consumer goods and services,
ranging from groceries and domestic appliances to building materials, health and
beauty products and financial services. (2003:13) The ethicality scores are based upon
companies’ environmental reporting, pollution, animal testing, factory farming,
workers’ rights, and involvement in armaments and genetic engineering. The specific
score each company attains is based upon the extent to which the manufacture and
retailing of its products demonstrably cause harm to the environment, animals, and
people. As a further aid to successful ethical shopping the Guide identifies fifteen
‘good shopping principles’ (2003:26-27). These include only buying brands positively
endorsed by the Guide, to only investing money and banking with ethical financial
There does exist an organisation which loosely regulates and endorses ‘genuine’ fair-trade
products. The Fair Trade Labelling Organisation (FLO) is an umbrella organisation for all of
the major fair-trade labels and has members in 17 countries.
3 The Ethical Marketing Group, The Good Shopping Guide, (London: Ethical Marketing Group,
2003). The reader is also advised to consult Duncan Clark, The Rough Guide to Ethical
Shopping: The issues, the products, the companies (London: Penguin, 2004)
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enterprises through to opting for fair trade products to practicing recycling. The final
principle places an injunction against unethical brands and states ‘avoid the brands
that do not score well in The Good Shopping Guide analysis – together we have the
power to make companies change.’ (2003:27) Individual consumers’ adhering to the
Guide appears to offer the prospect of shopping ethically.
The ethical shopping movement aims to educate consumers about the effects of
certain forms of consumption upon others and, increasingly, provides a market-place
for the consumption of ethical goods. It aims, therefore, to utilise the power of
consumer demand to affect supply. It does not, on the face of it, reject capitalist
exchange relationships but places an onus upon individual consumers to alter our
spending habits so as to improve the lives of those who produce the goods and
services we consume. Consumption is presented as a potential force for achieving
morally desirable ends.
Ethical shopping and global economic justice
What ethical shopping consists of should now be clear. The scope for ethically traded
goods and services should also be clear: from groceries to electrical goods, from
holidays to financial services there now exist ethical options to choose from. The
ethically minded sovereign consumer can now fill his figurative basket with ethically
traded goods and services and the range is progressively expanding. However, one
must question to what extent shopping can help overcome global inequalities. Are
the potential benefits so marginal as to have little positive effect upon the ongoing
human tragedy of global inequality? Addressing this question requires gauging the
scale of the problem and assessing the general impact of trade upon the global
economy.
The statistics and data paint a very dark picture. An estimated 2,800 million people
(46% of the world’s population) live below the World Bank’s $2 a day poverty line. 4
1,200 million of these live on less than half that figure, ‘surviving’ on an income of
less than $1 dollar a day. The consequences of this degree of absolute poverty are
horrendous. Every year 18 million people die prematurely from poverty-related
causes. That is 50,000 people each and every day. Of these, 34,000 are children under
five years of age. When examined from a global perspective these 18 million povertyrelated premature deaths a year cannot merely be blamed upon inadequate
resources. Absolute levels of global wealth are more than adequate for eradicating all
absolute poverty. The immediate obstacle to pursuing this goal lies in the
distribution of global wealth. Thus, in contrast to our absolutely poor counterparts
who, for the most part, populate the southern hemisphere of the globe, the average
income of citizens of the affluent countries of the ‘north’ has a market exchange rate
value 200 times greater than that of our poor counterparts. While 2,800 million
people share approximately 1.2 percent of total global income, 903 million people
living in affluent countries share 79.7 percent of total global income. The combined
assets and wealth of the world’s three wealthiest billionaires is greater than that of
600 million people living in the least developed countries of the world. Finally, the
income gap between 1/5 of the world’s population living in the richest countries and
1/5 of the world’s population living in the poorest countries is 74-1. This last figure
The statistics in this paragraph can be found in the introduction to Thomas Pogge, World
Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002)
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has actually increased from the 1990 differential of 60-1, which confirms wider
evidence pointing to an ever-increasing wealth gap between the globally affluent and
the globally poor. Statistics like these present a profoundly disturbing picture of the
suffering and misery endured by almost half of the world’s population whose
principal misfortune is to have been born in the wrong place and, some might wish
to add, the wrong time. Given the sheer extent and depth of human misery and
suffering resulting from global poverty what possible benefit can shopping ethically
have? Isn’t opting for fairtrade bananas, coffee or orange juice the merest and most
insignificant drop in the ocean?
The global trade in manufactured and agricultural products is a fundamental
element of the global economic system. In 2004 the value of combined imports and
exports of merchandised goods was in excess of 18,000 billion dollars. 5 In addition,
the value of combined imports and exports of food and agricultural goods was 600
billion dollars. 6 At present, ethical goods’ share of the global market consists of a
mere 0.1% of this volume of trade. 7 It would be unduly speculative and almost
certainly unverifiable to conclude that 99.9% of global trade is thereby ‘unethical’ and
positively harmful to those who produce the goods or sow and gather the crops.
However, it would be reasonable to claim all of the following: that global trade is a
highly significant element of the global economic system; that this system includes
huge disparities of wealth; that there is extensive scope for an increase in ethically
traded goods; and finally that realising the promise of ethical consumption will
alleviate the economic burdens of those who labour for those concerns whose
practices do not promote the well-being of their employees and producers. The
importance of trade has been further highlighted by the development movement’s
increasing focus upon trade rather than aid as providing the means for enabling poor
countries to generate wealth and sustainable industries. 8 The higher political profile
enjoyed by trade in this context serves to increase the importance of ethically traded
goods and services. By itself, ethical shopping is not going to eradicate global
poverty. However, it would appear to possess a huge potential for growth and with
it the expansion of practices its supporters claim are beneficial, rather than
detrimental to the welfare of those at the other end of the exchange relationship. On
this view, shopping ethically can positively contribute to the cause of global
economic justice. If one accepts that this is a reasonable claim, one is confronted by
the fundamentally important question of whether shopping ethically is a moral duty,
or merely an exercise of consumer choice.
Free to choose?
The ethical shopping movement represents an attempt to demonstrate the potential
for forms of production and consumption that are not harmful to or exploitative of
people, animals, and the environment. The central assumption is, therefore, that
consumerism is not intrinsically or necessarily unethical or harmful. Ethical
See WTO Annual report for global trade at www.wto.org
See world report at faostat.fao.org
7See S.Fakir, Sustainable Trade,
http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1400248
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6
See Duncan Campbell, ‘African trade not aid coffee on sale’, The Guardian, Monday June 13
2005
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shopping recognises and accepts the need we have for commodities, for buying
things, beyond that which is necessary for mere survival and insists that it is possible
to exercise our consumer choices in an ethically acceptable manner. The methods
deployed by advocates of ethical shopping are, generally, quintessentially those
deployed by consumer retailers everywhere. Ethical shopping retailers set their stalls
out and encourage consumer interest and demand through publicising and
advertising their goods. Shops selling ethical goods are now a recognisable feature of
many high streets in the United Kingdom and operate in pretty much the same
fashion as every other commercial enterprise in the market-place. In this way, ethical
shopping appears consistent with the paradigmatic terms of the individual sovereign
consumer. Individual consumers are free to exercise their personal choice and
preference at two levels: first, in respect of the initial formation of desires and wants;
second, in respect of those available options which correspond with these desires and
wants. Commercial enterprises are legally entitled to seek to stimulate consumer
interest in and demand for the goods they produce and spend very large sums of
money doing so. 9 However, the laws and regulations governing commercial
advertising and marketing have developed in accordance with the ideal of the
sovereign consumer and the principle of avoiding the use of coercive measures or
forms of duress that seek to usurp the will of the consumer. In theory, at least, the
regulatory principles underlying mass consumerism are meant to accord with those
principles upon which liberal democracy are based: each legally mature individual
must be left free to choose how to furnish his or her own life.
It would be fair to say that this particular conception of consumerism and the
individual consumer enjoys a hegemonic status in contemporary mass consumer
societies. It is not a universally endorsed view, as earlier discussion of the antiglobalisation movement indicates, but it remains dominant among mainstream
consumer populations and regulators of the market-place. The ethical shopping
movement generally accords with this perspective. On this view, ethical shopping
seeks to extend opportunities for consumer choice by supplementing the range of
existing goods with versions which more effectively meet the individual moral
preferences of a certain minority group of consumers. Thus, fair-trade coffee or
orange juice for example, are marketed not on the basis of being somehow better
products than their counterparts: they are not advertised as being tastier or
necessarily more nutritious. The value does not reside in the constitutive properties
of the commodity but in the external effects upon the producers trading in these
goods will have. A fair-trade cup of coffee is not presented as tasting any better than
its non-fair-trade counterpart. It is generally not claimed that the consumer will enjoy
such immediate and personal benefits but rather that the benefits accrue to someone
else. This exchange might be described as being, to some extent, other-directed. It
should not however be thought of as thereby purely altruistic. The principal value
derived by the ethically-minded consumer consists in the satisfaction derived from
complying with one’s moral preferences and commitments. The existence of
ethically traded goods provides an opportunity for individuals who hold this
particular preference to exercise their choice. To this extent, ethical shopping may be
considered as enhancing individual consumer freedom through supplying a
particular demand. Demand is stimulated and encouraged through publicity
In 2003 £17.3 billion was spent on advertising in the UK alone. See
http://www.prospects.ac.uk/cms/ShowPage/Home_page/Explore_job_sectors/Advertisin
g_and_PR/As_it_is/p!elpkXe
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campaigns and other forms of marketing in time-honoured fashion. The ethical
shopping movement aims to increase the population of consumers motivated to buy
ethical goods whilst simultaneously providing outlets for the exercise of this
particular individual choice. We are free to choose to shop ethically, if we so desire.
consumer capitalism to identify and satisfy consumer demand.
The practice of ethical shopping appears to cohere with the established principles of
consumerism generally. However, one should hesitate before concluding that the
phenomenon itself is generally consistent with the wider economic system of trade
and exchange within which it is located. Advocates of ethical enterprises will, for
example, argue that the fundamental ends of mainstream and ethical enterprises
differ significantly from their counterparts. Traditional capitalist enterprises exist to
meet many ends but the principal point of business is to generate profit: making
money is the principal point of the exercise. In contrast, many ethical enterprises
conceive their fundamental end not to be the making of money per se, but
developing commercial enterprises which principally benefit those who produce the
goods through the establishment of sustainable industries and concerns. A focus is
typically placed upon small-scale, community based projects that provide, amongst
other things, fair terms of employment for members of the community and
reinvestment of profits in the community infrastructure. On this view, making
money is instrumental to the promotion of the well-being of those responsible for
producing the goods that are traded. This is an important distinction and is one
which often figures in ‘free-market’ criticisms of ethical shopping. (Ref. reqd.)
However, my concern lies in a slightly different domain. While the practice of ethical
shopping may appear largely consistent with established features of consumerism
generally, its underlying rationale is significantly different as a direct consequence of
its appeal to the notion of ‘ethical’. Identifying and advertising goods as ethical
affects, in significant ways, one’s evaluation of the character of these goods and the
underlying justification for their existence. This, in turn, has important implications
for assessing the grounds for shopping ethically and the extent to which it is best
understood as an entirely ‘free’ choice.
The attribute ‘ethical’ in ethical shopping does not apply to the goods themselves but
to the terms of the trading relationships which characterise it. It would be absurd to
imagine that a fair-trade banana, for example, is somehow more intrinsically ethical
than its non fair-trade counterpart. As such, ethical shopping is motivated to help
rectify enduring and unjust trade relationships: it grows out of a perception of
economic injustice. Furthermore, these relationships are condemned as unethical to
the extent that they are the product of human action, not natural disasters. The
desires, decisions and actions of distinct communities of people are responsible for
the persistence of this form of injustice. It is not typically suggested that these
decisions and actions are themselves the result of undue duress and coercion.
Economic injustice is typically viewed as founded upon and maintained by
individuals, variably located within the global economic system, pursuing their own
perceived interests to the best of their abilities, given the resources available to them.
Thus, to illustrate, the general price of a basket of groceries has remained extremely
stable in many affluent societies over recent years. The reasons for this are, no doubt,
multi-faceted and subject to a degree of national variation. However, there is an
obvious and immediate causal link between the price consumers pay for their
groceries and the price the producer of these goods receives: the maintenance of
relatively low prices will have a direct effect upon the revenue and income of those at
the other end of the relationship. Our desire for cheap groceries comes at the expense
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of those who have little option but to sell their products at or around cost price.
Freely exercising one’s preference for cheap groceries may prove harmful to others.
Some have taken this claim further to argue that the affluent societies of the world
and their populations are, in effect, morally culpable for the poverty induced
suffering of our poor counterparts. Some theorists have argued, in effect, that levels
of absolute affluence and absolute poverty are directly and interdependently related.
Our level of material affluence is forged on the backs of the extreme material
deprivations endured by our absolutely poor counterparts. This analysis radically
alters one’s evaluation of the character of the moral relationship that exists between
the affluent and the poor. On this view, it is not simply the case that affluent peoples
are failing to do enough to help alleviate the suffering caused by poverty but that we
are actively, if unintentionally, creating this poverty in the first place. We are held
accountable for, not just failing to alleviate the suffering of the poor but for causing
their poverty. Thomas Pogge, an advocate of this position, has recently stated
‘extensive, severe poverty can continue because we do not find its eradication
morally compelling.’ (2002:3)
The empirical basis to this attribution of moral responsibility is provided by the
perception of increasingly interdependent and global economic relations combined
with a claim that the principal regulative institutions of the global economy are
dominated by, and promote the interests of, the affluent countries at the expense of
their poor counterparts. The reality of economic globalisation cannot be disputed.
Relations of trade and economic exchange are no longer, if they ever truly were,
principally restricted by regional, national, or even continental boundaries.
Corporations and companies operate on an increasingly trans-national basis and, in
some cases, have greater assets and wealth than many of the countries they do
business within. Those of us who reside in affluent countries are directly related to
our counterparts in poor countries through, amongst other things, our consumption
of the goods and, increasingly services, the poor produce: goods and services
typically mediated by trans-national corporations. By themselves, individual
governments cannot create or abolish economic markets. The role of national
governments in the global economy is characteristically restricted to that of
regulator. However, both at the national and international levels, the governments of
affluent countries have been consistently criticised for imposing regulative regimes
which are unfair and perpetuate historically unequal terms of trade between the
affluent and the poor regions of the globe. Thus Thomas Pogge adds a condemnation
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to his critique of global inequality. Pogge
describes the WTO as being dominated by the representatives of the world’s affluent
countries. This imbalance of power is best seen, he argues, in the consistently
protectionist policies pursued by the WTO in, for example, the establishment and
maintenance of economic tariffs imposed upon goods imported from poor countries.
The immediate beneficiaries of these tariffs are the affluent countries’ producers of
identical goods or produce who, in the absence of these tariffs, would have to
compete, ironically in a ‘free-er’, market on price with their counterparts in poor
countries. Pogge insists that the cost to the poor of these protectionist measures is
often catastrophic and directly contributes to their misery and premature death.
Given our representatives’ self-imposed mandate to protect our economic interests,
Pogge writes, ‘our negotiators must know that the better they succeed, the more
people will die of poverty. Our foreign and trade ministers and our presidents and
prime ministers know this and so do many journalists and academics as well as
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experts at the World Bank.’ (2002:20) Pogge insists that our economic and trade
representatives actively seek to secure and maintain a global economy which allows
us to continue to lead materially affluent lives characterised by our consuming high
quantities of natural and manufactured resources which emanate from poor
countries and for which we do not pay a ‘fair’ price but one protected and distorted
by the imposition of tariffs and financial surcharges. Affluent countries’ dominance
of organisations such as the WTO provides for our appropriation of the natural
resources and wealth of poor countries. The poor are, in effect, subsidising our
affluence with, in many cases, their lives.
Pogge’s analysis is clearly motivated, in part, by a sense of moral outrage. However,
it is also influenced by a particular account of genuinely ‘fair’ exchange. His critique
is not founded upon some overtly anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation platform. Trade,
and not aid, represents the most morally legitimate remedy to the problem. Indeed,
Pogge acknowledges a distinct Lockean character to his critique and explicitly draws
upon an account of individual property rights that originates within the tradition of
natural rights in defending a claim that individuals possess certain inalienable rights
to the fruits of their labour and the possession of requisite natural resources. Global
trade constitutes a violation of these rights not by its very existence but by the terms
upon which it proceeds. Pogge is certainly not ideologically opposed to free markets
nor is he opposed to globalisation. Indeed, he explicitly rejects the view that global
poverty is directly caused by the liberalisation of markets. The WTO is condemned,
therefore, for its refusal to ‘open up’ markets, as witnessed in the continuing use of
economic tariffs. The current terms of global trade are presented, in effect, as
organised theft from which the affluent societies of the globe continue to benefit
economically but unjustly. To this extent, the terms of global trade represent the
triumph of might over right.
Pogge’s critique of the global economy indicates the need for substantial reform and
significantly altered practices, which extend to include not only highly powerful
policy-makers but also individual consumers. If generally correct, his analysis
identifies a fundamental failing of an approach to ethical shopping as simply an
exercise of subjective preference formation. On the terms of Pogge’s analysis,
continuing to opt for goods whose terms of exchange are unfair and detrimental to
the poor is to incur some degree of responsibility for their continuing plight. He
insists that practices such as this perpetuate economic injustice, the effects of which
are, in many cases, catastrophic and for which we remain responsible. Continuing to
prefer unethical goods over their ethical counterparts constitutes, all other things
being equal, a moral failing. Pogge’s analysis shares, at the very least, the spirit out of
which ethical shopping emerges. It implies, however, a somewhat stronger position
on the question of whether individual consumers should opt for ethical goods where
the choice exists. In contrast to the view which leaves the decision with the
individual, so to speak, Pogge’s analysis implies the existence of a positive moral
duty to assist the poor through the creation and maintenance of fair terms of
exchange. There may not be ethical options for everything we purchase, but where
such options do exist, to choose not to do so perpetuates economic injustice. On this
view, adhering to the rationale of the claim that certain products are ethical entails a
commitment to the view that there exists a moral duty to shop ethically. Identifying a
product as qualitatively distinct because of its ethical attributes entails a commitment
to the view that the morally correct thing to do, when confronted by the choice
between an ethical and a non-ethical product, is to purchase the former. We have a
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moral duty to shop ethically. The ethical shopping movement, therefore, draws back
from the full force of its rationale when it refrains from marketing its goods in these
terms. There may be well-founded pragmatic reasons for not alienating potential
consumers by characterising their consumer habits as unethical: commercial
enterprises are not given to blatant proselytization as a means for selling products.
However, the rationale of ethical shopping suggests that the movement ought to
understand its own value in these terms, at the very least.
A moral duty?
Many who choose to shop ‘ethically’ do so in the hope that their actions will
contribute to, at the very least, minimising the harm suffered by those so much less
fortunate than themselves. The motivation to alleviate suffering is, in instances such
as these, not limited by national or continental borders. Ethical shopping holds that
an increasingly global market-place establishes moral relationships between
consumers and producers, irrespective of distance or cultural difference. Thus,
ethical shopping can be understood as based upon the claims that human beings
share certain basic and objective vital interests, that the interests of many human
beings are adversely affected by their exposure to those aspects of the global marketplace that create and perpetuate unfair exchange and inequality, that the consumer
choices we make directly contributes to this state of affairs, and, finally, by means of
ethical shopping, we are able to minimise the harm suffered by those of our fellow
human beings who are directly and indirectly affected by the consumer choices we
make. Indeed, the benefits to the producers of ‘ethical’ products would, in many
cases, appear to go beyond merely minimising the harm caused to the producer to
positively contributing to his or her well-being. For example, so-called ‘fair trade’
coffee is typically produced by small-scale co-operatives working for themselves.
Selling their coffee direct to ‘fair trade’ retailers ensures a higher return on their
produce which, in turn, may positively benefit the wider community from within
which the co-operative operates. Choosing to shop ethically is thereby presented as
capable of both minimising harm and promoting well-being. This provides the
principal ethical basis for the claims of ethical shopping. Ethical shoppers might be
presented, in this light, as recognising and accepting a moral imperative that applies
to consumption: avoid causing harm to those exposed to the choices we make. Is
ethical shopping, therefore, best understood as a moral duty? If it is the morally
correct thing to do to buy ethical goods where such options exist and where one has
the capacity to do so, why wouldn’t this be a legitimate way of understanding the
phenomenon?
Conceiving of ethical shopping as a potential moral duty has a number of important
implications. It would, all other things being equal, significantly extend the motive to
buy ethical goods. It would stand as a condemnation of all those who, despite having
the opportunity, continued to refuse to buy ethical goods. It would most likely
significantly alter the manner in which consumer choice has been conceived and
analysed: the moralization of consumption serves to introduce important limits and
conditions upon the exercise of sovereign consumer choice in so far as some existing
choices would attract moral condemnation. More nefariously, it would increase the
likelihood of goods being re-branded as ‘ethical’ that do not satisfy the key criteria:
some producers would have an interest in enjoying the attribute without incurring
the additional costs entailed through practicing genuinely fair exchange. Before one
can speculate more substantively on how such a moral duty might be realised and
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policed, the very concept of a moral duty to shop ethically requires further scrutiny.
There are a number of potential objections to the claim and a number of potential
pitfalls to its possible realisation, ranging from the philosophical to the hardheadedly practical. The two principal philosophical objections consist of the claim,
first, that ethical shopping is not a ‘rational’ choice for a consumer to make and,
second, that the very substance of ethics does not allow for the existence of
objectively compelling substantive ethical imperatives. An important practical
concern centres upon the question of how an increasingly ‘ethical’ market-place
might be foreseeably regulated. I shall consider each of these in turn and assess their
bearing on the very notion of a moral duty to shop ethically.
It is a common observation that ethical products cost more than their non-ethical
counterparts: that it is simply more expensive to shop ethically than to simply shop.
This raises a serious question over the economic rationality of shopping ethically. On
the face of it, one might conclude that it is simply irrational to buy more expensive,
ethical products. This is supported by the recognition that the value-added element
of the ethical good rarely consists of a ‘better’ product: ethical goods do not
necessarily taste better, or do a better job of removing stains, or offer a higher rate of
return on your financial investments. What one pays for is the benefit gained by the
producer of the good, the ‘happier’ herd, or cleaner environment. The benefits to the
consumer are, at the very least, somewhat indirect and less tangible. Underlying this
line of reasoning is the philosophical concept of homo economicus and the attendant
vision of human nature it is associated with. The view that human beings can best be
understood as purely wealth maximising, self-interested agents is subject to
numerous criticisms, of course. It is not a particularly useful device for
understanding many human actions and institutions that are more altruistically
inclined. It would also, descriptively speaking, fail to adequately account for the fact
that many people do opt for the more expensive ethical option. Many consumers
(and not just ethical ones) fail to comply with the central tenets of economic
rationality and the exceptions are morally important in this context. Such choices
might still be described (dismissed?) as irrational in economic terms without this
helping to understand why some opt to shop ethically and whether a moral duty to
do so may apply far more widely.
One might at this juncture make an ironic appeal to the ideal of consumer
sovereignty and the liberty to buy what an individual desires so long as he possesses
the means to do so. On this view, the terms of economic rationality have to be either
set to one side or significantly reformulated to allow for individuals freely choosing
to purchase more expensive items: to spend significantly more money on something
than is necessary given the existence of cheaper equivalents. On this view the ethical
shopper might be compared to a shopper who chooses to pay more for a commodity
because of brand loyalty or identifying with some celebrity who endorses the good:
crudely put, spending more makes both the ethical shopper and the ‘commodity
fetishist’ feel subjectively better. Individuals have a right to dispose of their income
in legally legitimate ways: both the ethical shopper and the commodity fetishist are
exercising this right. This vision, of course, sits comfortably with an understanding
of ethical shopping as consumer choice but is utterly incompatible with the notion of
ethical shopping as a moral duty. For the latter, the range of legitimate choice is far
more restricted and the criteria for determining correct choice far more exacting.
However, it is important for pursuing a concern over the scope of any such moral
duty. Here the issue of economic rationality may appear more pertinent the less
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disposable income one has. Thus, an individual’s ability to comply with any such
duty will be affected by his ability to pay more for his consumer goods. The financial
surcharge of ethical goods is bound to have differential effects upon all those to
whom the duty applies. At the lower end of the income scale and those in receipt of
state benefits paying more for one’s groceries is more relatively expensive and
prohibitive than it is for more affluent sectors of society. Leaving aside questions
over how this might affect peoples’ attitude or disposition towards the principle of
ethical shopping, it will almost certainly have some bearing upon the extent to which
all sectors of society can consume ethically. This is inevitable. It will also have some
bearing upon the question of what proportion of one’s shopping ought to be ‘ethical’
to satisfy moral requirements. Must one always opt for ethical goods where the
choice exists, or is it enough to buy the occasional pound of coffee, bunch of bananas,
or bar of chocolate? If one has an opportunity to buy goods which are not harmful in
the operative sense and fails to do so, it would appear reasonable to conclude that, in
that instant at least, one cannot legitimately lay claim to the ethical title. In this sense
it will simply be easier for wealthier consumers to enjoy a greater, more consistent
claim to the title, given higher levels of disposable income. Their poorer ounterparts,
by contrast, may only feel able to afford the occasional ethical good as a kind of
moral luxury!
The force of economic rationality may appear to be greatest and most compelling the
poorer one becomes. Any moral duty to shop ethically whenever the option existed
would be more financially onerous for the poor to comply with. Furthermore, a
failure to comply would attract greater approbation, whereas successful compliance
would leave some poor people with significantly less disposable income than they
already possess. Ironically then, an instrument for pursuing global equality might
predictably increase existing inequalities within consumer societies. This does not, by
itself, constitute an insuperable obstacle to establishing a moral duty to shop ethically
as a credible moral principle. Many moral duties impact differentially upon those
subject to them without, necessarily, detracting from their underlying justifications.
However, it is an important concern in so far as it is likely to limit the potential
compliance with a moral duty to shop ethically and thereby its credibility. The
credibility of such a duty is also at the heart of the second philosophical concern.
If shopping ethically is to be legitimately construed as a moral duty then advocates
of ethical shopping have to argue that choosing to adhere to ethical shopping
principles amounts to more than a morally valuable option, something one does if
one happens to have a desire to be seen as a ‘morally good person’. Were it the case,
individuals who did not share this desire would be under no such moral obligation.
Advocates of ethical shopping consistently argue that the phenomenon is more than
a particular lifestyle choice, in accordance with which some individuals choose to
impose upon themselves the moral obligations this entails. The defence of shopping
ethically typically implies the existence of some external, independently valid
grounds for recognising the moral force and authority of the claims made for it. 10 The
implication of the previous cited words Getethical.com, ‘given the choice how many
people would choose not to buy products that are more ethical?’ is clear: to choose
This is, of course, a deeply controversial position to adopt in contemporary moral
philosophy. For examples of two advocates of this position see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty
of the Good, (London: Routledge, 1991). Philippa foot, Natural Goodness, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2003).
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not to do so is to reject the claims of morality. People choose to do this everyday, but
that does not make it morally valid. Through the relatively banal consumer choices
we make, we are in a position to harm or promote the well-being of others. Given the
option, choosing to do the former appears intuitively wrong, at least, that is the view
the advocate of ethical shopping as a morally objective good must hold to.
A principal objection to the philosophical basis of ethical shopping takes issue with
the purported objectivity of the underlying moral ‘goodness’ of ethical shopping. If
there existed a moral duty to shop ethically it would have to be argued that the
practice was morally valuable and thus legitimate even for those who do not
subjectively value it. The moral value of ethical shopping cannot be reduced to the
conscious states of individual consumers. This is the basis of its purported moral
authority. Ethical shopping is characteristically defended as not just another lifestyle
choice for relatively affluent people, but a morally compelling ‘good’. Those who opt
for unethical products over their ethical counterparts fail to recognise, or may even
be rejecting, the valid demands placed upon them by morality, rooted in the
suffering of those exposed to our consumer choices and the unequal terms of
exchange these are based upon. This view of morality has, of course, been the object
of consistent criticism. For example, Bernard Williams has consistently challenged
the epistemological basis of moral objectivity. For Williams there exist no
legitimately ‘external reasons’ for our moral beliefs. There is no ultimate court of
moral appeal which might adjudicate between a potential dispute between ‘ethical’
and ‘unethical’ consumers. 11 Others, such as Charles Larmore, have argued that the
diverse and complex constituents of contemporary societies simply do not allow for
the establishment of a single, morally objective regulative vision for governing
relations between individuals. We each have an equal interest in securing our own
moral commitments against external interference but this explicitly forbids
demanding of others that they adhere to our vision. 12 Justifications for any moral
commitments must therefore not exceed the conscious states of those who share
them. Thus, one cannot demand of others that they share one’s own moral vision as a
necessary condition of their claim to moral goodness.
Moral philosophy does not, of course, consist entirely of sceptics and subjectivists.
The argument that fairness is a central moral component for evaluating human
relations has a long heritage, ranging from Kant to Rawls. Similarly, an appeal to
property rights and notions of the illegitimate appropriation of others’ wealth
stretches back as far as John Locke. Both of these philosophical perspectives are
utilised by Pogge’s critique of the global economy and the institutions which regulate
it. A detailed philosophical explication and defence of the existence of a moral duty
to shop ethically would need to draw heavily upon resources such as these.
However, Williams’ and Larmore’s perspectives do bear significantly upon one
aspect of the present concern: the potential for ethical goods to conflict with one
another, whereby a good may be perceived as ethical by an individual with one
profile of moral ends but rejected as unethical by another individual with a different
profile of ends and commitments.
See his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, op cit. See also his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers,
1973-1980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
12 See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987)
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The stated ends of ethical shopping indicate that it is not an entirely homogeneous
moral community of thoroughly like-minded consumers. What unites ethical
shoppers appears to be a commitment to avoiding causing harm to or exploiting
others through goods purchased. However, the community is divided by differing
views as to who or what is a legitimate object of ethical shoppers’ moral concern. The
definition of ethical shopping cited earlier refers to people, animals, and the
environment as that which ethical shopping aims, at the very least, to avoid harming
or exploiting. Each one of these objects of moral concern rests upon complex moral,
philosophical, and ideological foundations. In important ways the commitments,
assumptions, and forms of reasoning that comprise each of these foundations are
significantly different and, in places, liable to come into conflict with one another.
Thus, promoting the interests of people through ethical shopping is highly likely to
involve, on occasion, disregarding others’ moral concerns for animals. The economic
interests of a community may best be served by utilising animals in a manner others
in the ethical shopping movement will find harmful and exploitative. Similar
scenarios could arise in respect of the relationship between communities of people
and the environment they inhabit whereby the only possible means of economic
development will entail causing harm to the environment. The ends of ethical
shopping entail that the movement cannot speak with one voice: it is not a wholly
unified constituency and the differences are anything but trivial. Indeed, they are
liable to confront ethical shopping with a series of moral dilemmas such as those
canvassed above. The potential for such dilemmas demonstrates the falsity of ethical
shopping’s apparent assumption that there might exist some ultimately holistic
moral community and corresponding moral perspective, by means of which interests
and ends may be reconciled. At times, ethical shoppers will have to choose between
buying goods that promote their own particular object of concern to the detriment of
some other ethical shoppers’ concern: at times, some forms of ethical shopping will
appear positively unethical. One can resort to the sovereign consumer model of
ethical shopping that would leave it up to individuals to purchase those goods that
comply with their own subjective commitments and values but this is thoroughly
incompatible with the notion of a moral duty to shop ethically. In this way, ethical
shopping appears to simultaneously emerge out of and fall victim to moral diversity
and moral incommensurability which philosophers such as Williams and Larmore
insist prohibits the establishment of any singly substantive moral vision as capable of
legislating for all.
The final more hard-headedly practical issue for evaluating ethical shopping as a
moral duty grows out of the previous two issues and concerns how such a duty
could be effectively regulated. A growing acceptance of a moral duty to shop
ethically would entail a likely expansion of the supply of goods to meet growing
demand. At present, ethical goods occupy a very small part of the consumer marketplace and are relatively easy to regulate. However, a significant growth in the market
would place demands on the existing ‘rubber-stamping’ organisations that currently
exist. Effective answers would need to be provided for a wide range of questions and
concerns. Market-regulators would need to offer reassurances that non-ethical and
unethical goods would not be successfully passed-off as ethical without satisfying
the necessary criteria. The existence of a moral duty to shop ethically would provide
some with an economic interest in enjoying the attribute ‘ethical’ without incurring
the higher costs this entails. Questions would arise over whether, and to what extent,
ethical enterprises could make profits, rather than having to reinvest all surplus
value in the enterprise itself. How would one define a ‘successful’ genuinely ethical
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enterprise? Which bodies could play this general regulatory role? Would the
members of such bodies be self-appointed, or elected? It is, of course, beyond the
scope of this article to begin to suggest possible responses to such questions. Under
the model of ethical shopping as sovereign consumer choice such questions are
pertinent but not urgent: the market is accorded the role of resolving issues of
transparency and misrepresentation. However, if shopping ethically is proposed on
the basis of its purported moral legitimacy and superiority over its counterparts then
it seems reasonable to suggest that shopping ethically is the morally correct thing to
do, when given the opportunity. If this is the case, the proposal that there might exist
a moral duty to shop ethically does not entail a leap of faith. If a moral duty to shop
ethically is to be pursued then issues of how the market can be regulated in
accordance with its principles do take on an urgency and would need to be
satisfactorily resolved if the moral principle is to be practically realisable
Summing up
I have presented and discussed two different models of ethical shopping: as
sovereign consumer choice and as moral duty. The phenomenon of ethical shopping
serves to institutionalise the moralization of consumption and offers the prospect of
buying goods and services that do not unduly harm and exploit. It appears to offer
the potential for ethically inclined consumers to rectify some of the excesses of
capitalism through, at the very least, mitigating some of the devastating effects of
global inequality. Presently, consumers are encouraged to shop ethically where they
can in terms wholly consonant with established consumer practices and the principle
of consumer sovereignty. One is free to buy or not to buy ethical goods. However,
the moral predicates of ethical shopping imply a different model of consumer action
and motivation. Identifying some goods as ethical entails drawing a distinction
between these and their lesser counterparts. Choosing not to buy ethical goods, while
consistent with the principle of consumer sovereignty, must be seen as a morally
inferior choice if ethical shopping is to have any force at all. A commitment to ethical
shopping entails a commitment to the view that some consumer choices are morally
superior to others. If it is morally correct to shop ethically when one can then it seems
reasonable to argue that the recommendation to shop ethically can be developed as a
moral duty to do so. If it is morally correct for some consumers to shop ethically why
should some, similarly placed, be exempted from this moral principle? While the
reasoning is sound ethical shopping has largely refrained from going down this
particular route. I have discussed above potential problems with and objections to
such a vision of ethical shopping. It is likely that ethical shopping will continue to
market its goods in a way that encourages and invites, rather than morally
commands, consumers to buy. This is, at least, consistent with central tenets and
established practices of mass consumerist capitalism. However, despite the concerns
discussed above, it does not seem entirely consistent with the moral force and
motivations of ethical shopping. If one accepts the central premise that it is possible
to alleviate suffering and exploitation through shopping ethically, why do relatively
so few people do so? This cannot be accounted for purely in terms of economic
reason and self-interest. Nor, given globalisation, can it be accounted for in terms
that deny the existence of any moral relationships between geographically distant
communities. The mass consumption of goods and services increases the potential
both to harm and to help those at the other end of the exchange relationship. It
presents individual consumers with an option to acquiesce in practices based upon
exploitation or to actively promote genuinely fair terms of exchange. It accords a role
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to individual consumers which previous generations did not enjoy. Ethical shopping
needs to reflect upon itself and its principles. Does the phenomenon represent an
opportunity for a few to salve their consciences or a force for genuine economic
change and a serious challenge to the exploitative tendencies of global capitalism?
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