SMU Area Reports
BADAKHSHAN
Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afghanistan
May 2001
Printed in Pakistan
The Army Press, Islamabad
Contents
1. Executive Summary....................................i
2. Introduction................................................1
The Strategic Monitoring Unit ......................1
The Area-based Studies ..............................1
Methodology ................................................1
Badakhshan.................................................2
3. Social and Political Profile........................4
The Broader Picture.....................................4
Current Political Situation ............................4
Social Structures..........................................4
Legitimacy and Governance ........................6
Keeping Going .............................................8
Support Systems .........................................8
Conflict Resolution.......................................8
Culture .........................................................9
Hopes ..........................................................9
Violence and Security ................................10
The Security Situation................................10
Freedom of Speech ...................................11
Conscription...............................................11
Situation of Women ...................................12
Economic Issues, Education and Social
Changes ....................................................12
The Affect of the Assistance Effort ............17
4. Livelihoods and Food Security ..............18
Historical Context.......................................18
The Rural Economy ...................................19
Land and Agriculture..................................19
Livestock....................................................22
Poppies......................................................23
Lapis ..........................................................24
Casual Labour and Migration.....................25
The City .....................................................26
Faizabad ....................................................26
Pressing Issues .........................................28
Environmental Issues ................................28
The Impact of the Drought .........................29
Quality........................................................35
Women and GirlsÕ Education .....................35
Health ........................................................36
Facilities and Service Utilisation ................36
Health Problems ........................................37
Health Interventions...................................40
Human Resources .....................................41
Environmental Health Issues .....................41
6. The Assistance Programme ...................42
Agency Activity ..........................................42
Co-ordination .............................................42
Impact ........................................................43
Constraints.................................................46
7. Key Recommendations ...........................47
Overall .......................................................47
Livelihoods.................................................47
Education...................................................47
Health ........................................................47
Donors .......................................................47
8. Appendices ..............................................48
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Population ...........................................48
District Profiles ....................................50
Agency Profiles ...................................58
Health Facilities ...................................60
Average Land Size ..............................61
Village Questionnaire ..........................62
Exchange Rates ..................................65
9. Tables .......................................................66
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Livelihoods ..........................................66
Land Patterns ......................................68
Yields...................................................70
Livestock Patterns ...............................72
Livestock Prices ..................................74
Labour Rates.......................................76
Assets..................................................77
Wealth and Poverty .............................79
Environment ........................................81
Population Movements........................83
Literacy and Education........................85
Water and Sanitation...........................87
Pupils at School...................................89
Summary of Schools ...........................90
5. Education and Health ..............................32
10. Maps..........................................................91
Education...................................................32
Access to Health Facilities.........................91
Importance and Access .............................32
School Attendance.....................................33
Higher Education .......................................34
Acronyms and Abbreviations .....................92
Glossary.....................................................93
Bibliography ...............................................94
Executive Summary
Introduction
Badakhshan is the only province in Afghanistan still
fully in control of the United Front. Pockets of
insecurity caused by inter-factional fighting are a
problem in some areas and have inhibited agency
activity. Further instability has arisen as the frontline
has neared Faizabad. The Taliban capture of Taloqan
caused a wave of IDPs and increased the difficulty
of getting supplies into the region, with consequent
shortages and a steep rise in prices. Faizabad, the
capital, sees some of the highest prices in the county
Ð a product of its geographical and political isolation.
Social and Community Structures
The population is comprised mainly of Sunni Tajiks
but with a substantial minority of Ismaelis, mostly
concentrated in particular areas - Shegnan and
Eshkeshem are almost entirely Ismaeli and Wakhan
and Zebak more than 90% so. There are also other
small minorities. Relations between groups are
generally good.
The social relations of villages are rooted in the old
order and to a large extent the traditions have
survived the upheavals brought about by the
communist government, though traditional leaders
have less power than they once had. With the rise
of a military leadership, the old separation of military
and civil affairs has broken down. Taxes are no
longer systematically collected, and the government
structures that do still exist function at a very minimal
level and have almost no budget. Faced with a lack
of provision from the government, communities rely
on village-based traditional systems of support to
make sure that at least peopleÕs most basic needs
are met. Yet despite the strength of these support
mechanisms, there are fears that the drought of 2000
has in some places stretched them to breaking point.
Villages try to solve conflicts at a local level, and
then if this fails they invoke higher authorities.
Much of the areaÕs cultural heritage is under threat.
People spoke of how music and culture had stopped,
stories were not taught to children like they used to
be and Faizabad library no longer existed.
parts of Afghanistan. However, an increased
conservatism can clearly be seen and this most
affects urban women. Educated women were proud
of their heritage, the fact that women worked at all
levels and could even be elected to Parliament, and
they were aware of loss. The loss has come from
the gradual deterioration in opportunity brought
about by a worsening economic situation and an
increasingly conservative environment. Women
dislike having to wear the burqa, but it is not seen
as an essential issue. What is far more important is
that war has brought poverty and women have
suffered greatly from it, their lives reduced to an
endless quest to find enough food for their children.
Women worry too about the lack of education and
what this will mean for their children and for the
future. Yet for a few women the situation has also
delivered the right to work and with it an increased
self-esteem and greater rights within the family.
For rural women there has been little change.
Education opportunities are few because there simply
are not schools to go to. Health care in many areas
is non-existent. Life is basic and it is hard.
Security
The key factors to affect security in Badakhshan are
the nearness to the frontline and the relationship
between the local commanders - where major
commanders have good relations security is good.
Inter-factional fighting was often greatly resented
by the community, yet it did not seem to make a
great difference to their daily lives. In general people
felt they could travel safely and that the problems
only affected those connected with the factions.
The area around Keshem (which is close to the
frontline) was where people spoke most strongly
about security problems. People greatly resented
the fact that one of the schools was occupied by
soldiers and that the town was full of weapons. The
biggest issue, however, was the conscription of
young men to fight on the frontlines and many fled
the area to escape this fate. For those who had to
fight, mines were a major hazard and the greatest
source of injury.
Livelihoods and Food Security
Situation of Women
The situation of women in Badakhshan whilst by
no means good, is on the whole better than in other
Even in the 70s the economic situation in
Badakhshan was considered precarious and the
province has always been food insecure. The
i
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
combination of a low agricultural base, limited
returns on livestock and lack of other earning
opportunities has always meant that many families
struggle to survive. Agriculture is mainly subsistence
farming, people grow to meet their own needs and
have little to sell. Wheat is the main crop and rainfed
cultivation predominates. Livestock seem to have
diminished in importance, except in Wakhan. Very
few families can meet their food needs solely from
agricultural activities and casual labour is vital to
make up the deficit. For most families this means
leaving the village, often to Pakistan or even further
afield.
The growing of opium poppies has a long history
in the province but only some areas grow poppy,
whilst other areas equally suitable do not, and only
some areas have high levels of addiction. The areas
that grow and the areas that consume are not
necessarily the same. Production fell in 2000 due
to a number of reasons.
The Lapis mines present a potentially significant
source of wealth to Badakhshan but production
levels are currently low as primitive technology
means mines fill up with stones. Working conditions
are terrible.
The destruction of the environment is a major
concern in Badakhshan, with very direct and serious
repercussions for peopleÕs lives. Increased farming
of pastureland has led to degradation of the land
and reduced the ability of the slopes to absorb water,
with consequent increases in flooding. The reduction
in tree cover has resulted in the search for fuelwood
becoming a major undertaking and villagers reported
spending an extraordinary amount of time in this
activity.
markets also collapsed. The reduction in casual
labour was to some extent offset by FFW, but not
sufficiently. Drought not only affected crops but also
severely affected grazing. Many pastures grew poorly
due to lack of rain, dried out early, and were heavily
over-grazed. By spring 2001 Ragh and Shar-i Buzurg
were seeing hunger-related deaths and displacement.
There are also serious long-term problems as a result
of the drought. Many families have now lost all or
most of their assets and incurred new debts.
Badakhshan is also suffering from severe seed
shortage. At the time of autumn planting in rainfed
areas, many farmers did not have enough seed and
therefore either did not plant or were only able to
plant with poor quality seed. A credit problem has
developed with farmers unable to repay past loans
or obtain new loans for either consumption or seed.
Education
Education is highly valued in Badakhshan,
particularly amongst the Ismaeli communities, and
children will often walk for many hours to get to
school. The lack of education was often mentioned
as one of the biggest problems facing people. Yet
despite the positive attitudes to education, levels of
literacy are appallingly low Ð for women rates are
under 2%, and even for men they are rarely more
than 10%. Shegnan is the striking exception to this,
with a high level of literacy for both men and women,
which has nothing to do with agency involvement
as there has been little agency activity in this remote
district.
In 2000, what is generally recognised as being the
worst drought in living memory swept through
Afghanistan. Although Badakhshan was less affected
than some areas of Afghanistan, any reduction in
crop is serious in such a chronically food insecure
area, although just how serious did not become
apparent until spring 2001.
Like so many other things, education is the victim
of war. In Keshem, the area closest to the frontline,
one of the schools was taken over for IDPs, another
as a barracks Ð much to the disgust of the local
population. But it is not only on the frontlines that
there is a toll, the war has meant that government
departments no longer function and education is
no exception to this. Few teachers get any pay from
the authorities, and the few that do get little. Salaries,
or some form of remuneration, for teachers is one
of the major issues in terms of education strategy.
There are also major questions over the quality and
appropriateness of provision at all levels.
Reliance on rainfed production makes the province
very vulnerable to drought and in 2000 the problem
was exacerbated by the fact that the casual labour
Although theoretically girls can go to school, lack
of provision severely curtails access, especially in
rural areas.
Drought
ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Lack of opportunity beyond grade 12 is seen as a
serious problem, and this has got worse over the
years. In part this is due to aid agency policy, for
whilst a number of agencies will support primary
schooling and a few secondary, almost none support
tertiary. Tertiary education has also been hit by the
closing down of opportunities beyond Badakhshan,
particularly, but not only, for girls.
Health
Health services in Badakhshan are extremely limited.
Of the 45 villages surveyed for this report, only 11
had a clinic within an hour or less by donkey. For
eight it was 2 days or more. Many people simply
cannot reach the facilities. Even where there are
facilities, usage is low. Key health problems are
malaria, TB, respiratory infections, diarrhoea, measles
and whooping cough. Malnutrition was widely
acknowledged as a problem, and Faizabad had the
highest acute malnutrition rate of all cities surveyed
by ACF in 2000.
Health care for ante natal and post natal women is
extremely limited, women have frequent pregnancies
and often suffer from poor nutrition. Although
statistics are hard to come by, it would appear
common both for women to die in childbirth and
for there to be a high level of infant mortality.
Opium addiction is a problem in a number of places,
not only in itself but because it takes scare resources
away from meeting the need for food.
Access to clean water is extremely variable and
access to sanitation almost universally poor.
Agency Activity
There has been a long history of agency involvement
in Badakhshan, although the pattern is uneven with
some districts having virtually no activity. Despite
the fact that some agencies have made a deliberate
effort to work in remote areas, there is still overall
a concentration of activity in areas accessible from
roads.
Most agencies believed that information sharing
between agencies working in the province had
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
improved, but that there was still some way to go
in terms of real co-ordination. It is clear that (as in
most places) issues of agency profile have sometimes
got in the way of good co-ordination, and this is
true of both NGO and UN agencies.
Communication problems between the staff based
in the field and staff at the country programme office
have also been an issue for a number of organisations,
and this has compounded the co-ordination problem.
This is exacerbated by the fact that many
organisations do not have senior staff in the field in
Badakhshan. Different operational bases add to the
difficulty.
Lack of senior staff input into Badakhshan has had
an impact on quality. This has long been a problem
but in 2000 it was made worse by the scale of the
crisis in Afghanistan. Many agencies were overstretched and need proved beyond agency capacity.
On the whole agencies are seen as having a positive
impact on security. It is not clear, however, whether
this lasts beyond the immediate life of the project.
In terms of overall impact, the most worrying aspect
is that there is no agreed long-term strategy in any
of the key sectors (though individual agencies might
have their own). There is no coherent agricultural
strategy and work in this sector is piecemeal and
uncoordinated. The lack of co-ordination and
leadership will seriously inhibit recovery
programmes. There is also no clear strategy in
relation to environmental issues or to rangeland
management, no comprehensive policy in relation
to livestock, and very little understanding of how
the urban economy functions - and thus of what
opportunities there might be for intervention. Health
coverage, although good in places, is very uneven,
with many parts of the province having no provision.
Although recently increased support has been given
In terms of materials and teacher training, and this
is to be welcomed, there is as yet no overall strategy
for education. Key questions of the appropriateness
and quality of provision, and of support to, and
remuneration for, teachers urgently need to be
answered.
iii
Introduction
The Strategic Monitoring Unit
The SMU is an independent research unit with a
management board comprised of NGO, UN and
donor representatives. Its objectives, as agreed by
the Afghan Programming Board (May 2000), are to
undertake research and analysis in order to help the
aid community gain a better understanding of the
broad impact of its programmes in terms of:
Ð
Ð
Ð
improved livelihoods,
access to basic services, and
progress on human rights, including gender
rights.
The SMU was one of a number of ideas that arose
from the recognition that aid agencies were failing
to work together to address some of the root problems
of Afghanistan. The need for such an initiative was
recognised in the Strategic Framework (SF) and
Principled Common Programming documents (PCP).
The SMU was seen as the analytical capacity that
would monitor, from an independent standpoint,
the overall direction and impact of assistance
strategies in the country and whether or not the new
initiatives of the SF and PCP were in fact making
any difference.
The Area-based Studies
This study is the first of a series of area-based reports,
which aim to build an analytical baseline from
which to plan, and against which to chart, the
evolution and effectiveness of the assistance effort.
It is hoped that they will stimulate creative thinking
and greater co-operation amongst agencies on the
ground.
The work takes as its starting point the premise that
Afghans are, like all human beings, entitled to certain
basic rights: economic, social, political and civil.
Thus one important measure of the success of the
aid effort is the extent to which it helps Afghans to
realise these rights. The studies aim to pull together
information on the current situation regarding these
rights as a starting point from which agencies can
measure future progress. They suggest indicators
that can be measured, or at least assessed, but also
try to give enough of the history and context to
make these meaningful. Whilst data from earlier
years is patchy, the report attempts to identify trends
rather than just giving a snapshot. Although useful
now, the greater value will be realised once a number
of years of data have been built up and we can
more clearly trace changes and begin to understand
the relationship between them and the assistance
effort.
Methodology
In designing this study three factors were taken into
consideration:
Ð
Ð
Ð
the need to gain a reasonably accurate picture
of the key factors affecting the quality of life of
the inhabitants of the area;
the need to do this at a reasonable cost;
and the need to do this in a way that would lay
the basis for an ongoing system of data
collection.
Three main sources of data were used for this report:
published reports; unpublished records of agencies;
and the gathering of new data. The latter was done
between September and December 2000 and
covered 15 districts. Some districts were left out
because of their remoteness Ð it would have taken
15 days just to get to Darwaz centre and 4 to 6
weeks to complete a reasonable number of
interviews. Others were omitted because they were
small districts similar to others already being
surveyed.
Data in Afghanistan is notoriously unreliable. The
last census was in 1979 and was aborted part way
through because of the war and, as in most parts of
the country, there has been no attempt in Badakhshan
to do a systematic population survey since that time.
Any overall statistics are therefore at best guesstimates. For this study, population figures for villages
were obtained by multiplying the number of
households by the average family size of seven.
Numbers of adults were estimated as half of the total
population, as most informants considered half the
population to be under 15years. These assumptions
are in line with those generally used in Afghanistan,
but clearly only yield approximate figures.
The last province-wide report to be issued was the
UNIDATA report of 1992, but because of the war
this contained many omissions. Since then there
have been some attempts to get data at a local level
in Badakhshan but these studies are either topicspecific and/or only cover particular locations. What
1
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
INTRODUCTION
we have, therefore, is a patchy picture, giving us
insights into aspects of the problem but not an
overall analysis.
male and female, of different ages and from different
sectors of society. We cross-checked information
and our understanding of that information.
In drawing on data from other sources, problems
were encountered in comparing figures as district
boundaries have changed and different agencies
record different information in different ways.
Villages, and even sometimes districts, can go under
more than one name. These are noted at the back
of the report, along with abbreviations and local
terms. The measurement of land in particular is
complicated Ð although reports will often quote in
jeribs (one fifth of a hectare), and sometimes even
in hectares, these forms of measurement mean little
to farmers. Afghan farmers either measure their land
in terms of sers planted1 or use local local measures
which vary from place to place. Yields are normally
given as sers harvested per sers planted.
Badakhshan
A questionnaire (Appendix F) was completed on the
basis of village level interviews. The interviews on
average lasted between two and three hours. The
sample villages were chosen with care to reflect the
differences found within a district and findings were
cross-checked with the understanding of those who
knew the districts well. Even so, as the sample is
small (45 villages) great care must be taken in making
generalisations from the data and averages should
be treated as indicative rather than as absolute
figures. Although in general the data is presented
in the main report at a district level, at times it has
seemed more meaningful to show the range of
values to be found between villages in a district,
rather than averages. All the village level data can
be found in the tables. Village interviews were
supplemented by semi-structured interviews with
key informants at a district level.
Various indicators have been used to try and get a
measure of levels of poverty, of livelihoods, of health
and education, and of access to services. There has
also been an attempt to capture the civil and political
rights situation, including issues of governance and
of violence and security. These are harder to develop
indicators for as they are not well captured by
quantitative measurement and qualitative measures
are open to easy manipulation. Whose story do you
choose to tell? We tried to talk to a range of people,
1
Badakhshan is one of the most remote and least
developed provinces in Afghanistan. It is situated
in the extreme north east of the country, with external
borders to Tajikistan in the north, Pakistan in the
south east and, at the far end of the Wakhan corridor,
China. The border with Pakistan is open (and indeed
due to its long and mountainous nature would be
impossible to effectively close) as is the border with
China. The River Amu delineates the border with
Tajikistan and this is firmly closed to legal traffic in
people and goods and is patrolled by Russian border
guards. This closure has severe economic
consequences for the province, but smuggled goods,
particularly opium, cross in a highly organised and
lucrative trade.
Internally the province borders Kunar, Laghman,
Takhar and Kapisa. In the far north east the Wakhan
corridor, a mountainous tongue of land that juts out
from the rest of the country, is a relic of the British
EmpireÕs desire to separate its territory from that of
the Russian Empire. In the south the Hindu Kush
effectively cuts off Badakhshan from the rest of
Afghanistan, the only road being the steep Anjuman
Pass which leads over into the Panjshir Valley.
Strategically this route has become very important,
being the main supply route for MassoudÕs base in
the valley. Communications inside the province are
difficult due to the mountainous nature of much of
the terrain and although roads have recently been
much improved by numerous FFW projects, many
of them are still closed for up to six months of the year.
Faizabad is the capital of the province, an
impoverished city vulnerable to food supply failure.
Half a century ago it was very different; then it was
a place of trade and of culture with writers, poets
and musicians. The small population benefited from
a lucrative trade in carpets, silk, handicrafts and
pistachio. There was little agriculture and the
mountains were covered in forests. Then trade
declined, people moved into agriculture and started
to cut down the trees and to farm the rainfed land.
In Badakhshan the average seeding rate for irrigated land is estimated to be 5 sers per jerib and for rainfed land between 2.0 and
2.5 sers per jerib (Focus).
2
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
INTRODUCTION
commanders were, however, never part of a unified
force and were split by many rivalries, a pattern
which continues to this day.
The area suffered less direct damage from the war
than many parts of Afghanistan and relatively few
people became refugees. Nevertheless, the parts
controlled by the mujahedeen still saw frequent air
attacks and there was significant damage to buildings.
By 1990 it was estimated that only one third of
school buildings escaped damage and no health
centres were intact.2
Hermione Youngs
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, troops
were stationed in Faizabad and the city remained
under government control. It stayed this way until
the fall of the Najib government in 1992, though
by that time it was largely cut off from its hinterland
and was experiencing sporadic conflict. There was
also a Soviet garrison at Zebak, and close control
over some district centres, but with the exception
of those that bordered the Soviet Union most of the
rural districts had by 1990 gone over to mujahedeen
control. Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami were the
most important groups with Hizb-i-Islami controlling
most of the strategic areas in the early 90s. The
Buzkashi Faizabad
2
UNIDATA 1990
3
Social and Political Profile
THE BROADER PICTURE
Current Political Situation
Badakhshan is the only province in Afghanistan still
fully in control of the United Front and is the home
base of Rabbani. Since the mid 1990s the area has
largely belonged to Jamiat with pockets of Hizb-iIslami. However, internal tensions within Jamiat
between Rabbani and Massoud, and commanders
allied to one or the other, frequently give rise to
pockets of insecurity.
In December 1998 the chief commander of Argu,
Kheradmand, who had been appointed Governor
of Badakhshan was killed and this led to a period
of fighting. The Argu commander and governor
retaliated against the Faizabad military forces but
the Government forces proved to be stronger and
an uneasy truce has followed.
Further insecurity occurred in 1999 when Massoud
appointed two commanders to control the main
access area of Keshem. Both wanted sole control,
and the commander controlling Teshkan bridge, the
major route from Faizabad to Keshem and Taloqan,
was killed. This has resulted in a total split in support
and many of the minor commanders cannot move
around freely, although the TalibanÕs capture of
Taloqan in September 2000 has stopped it developing
into open fighting. Even more significant was the
killing in November 1999 of Najmuddin, the most
powerful commander in Badakhshan, on the outskirts
of Baharak. The resulting increase in instability is
still evident. Najmuddin controlled not only the
military personnel on the main access routes to
Tajikistan and Pakistan but also the flow of funding
from the revenue of the lapis mines. Since his death
there has been a noticeable increase in local interfactional fighting, especially along the lapis mine
control route.
Further instability has arisen as the frontline has
neared Faizabad. The Taliban first captured Taloqan
(in neighbouring Takhar Province) in August 1998,
but at that time they only held it for a few weeks.
They then took it again in September 2000 and have
kept it since, though they have lost some of the
surrounding territory they captured at that time. The
capture of Taloqan caused a wave of IDPs, some of
whom came to Keshem and others to Faizabad.
Assessing numbers was difficult as IDPs moved a
lot and mixed with the local population, whilst a
number of the local population tried to pass
4
themselves off as IDPs. Most of IDPs from Taloqan
were from the urban area and their situation varied.
Some were able to transfer their business to Keshem,
others were able at least to bring significant
household assets with them, whilst still others had
limited resources. They found shelter in local houses
and in schools, in public buildings and in temporary
shelter outside. Assistance programmes were
mounted to meet immediate needs. As the situation
stabilised many of them moved back, although some
tried to get to Tajikistan.
The capture of Taloqan and of a number of areas
on the Tajik border has increased the difficulty of
getting supplies into the region. The result has been
that whilst the military continue to get what they
need, especially fuel, communities go short and
prices have risen. Fuel continues to come over the
river from Tajikistan and food from Rustaq comes
by donkey, through Shar-i-Buzurg to Faizabad. As
so often, the issue is not so much that there is nothing
to buy but rather that prices have risen way outside
most peopleÕs reach. The borders with Tajikistan
and Pakistan are long and porous and supplies are
likely to always get through; but the harder it
becomes, the more essential supplies will get diverted
to the military, the more prices will rise, and the
more the civilian population will become
impoverished.
The long-term future of the area remains uncertain.
Throughout 2000 there were persistent rumours of
commanders in the area who might go over to the
Taliban. As so often in Afghanistan the flow of
money from out of the country is likely to be more
important in determining the future of the area than
any battles fought. In this respect sanctions, imposing
as they do a one-sided arms embargo, will clearly
have an effect on the balance of power Ð what
exactly that will mean for Badakhshan is as yet
uncertain.
Social Structures
The population is comprised mainly of Sunni Tajiks
but with a substantial minority of Ismaelis, mostly
concentrated in particular areas - Shegnan and
Eshkeshem are almost entirely Ismaeli and Wakhan
and Zebak more than 90% so. There are also
Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Nuristani and
Pashtun minorities but they are very small. Relations
between groups are generally good, despite
occasional attempts to use the ethnic card to drum
up support for the war.
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Hermione Youngs
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
Music Shegnan 2000
If some government people come to the schools,
immediately they start saying Pashtuns want to kill
all the Tajiks, they bring divide between the people
of Afghanistan. Some of the people here they listen
to them, and some they laugh. IÕm an Uzbek, I have
a lot of friends who are Pashtun and Tajik and I like
them very much. This kind of thing will have a very
negative effect on the minds of children. Now it is
dangerous for a man to say Pashtuns are our brothers
and we should live together. I am frightened. I have
36 years experience in education, and if itÕs
impossible for me to say this kind of thing to students
imagine how impossible it is for others.
In Baharak, where the district centre has a population
of about 10,000, one of the community leaders
described the situation:
Everyone is Sunni, Uzbeks are maybe 1000 families,
Pashtun, only in centre, 400 families, the rest are
Tajik. Since several decades they [the minority
groups] are here. One hundred years ago Pashtuns
3
came, and Uzbeks more than that; now they are
relatives, there are no problems, they think they are
Badakshi.
Other districts reported similarly, the lack of problem
perhaps being in part due to the fact that minorities
were so small that they posed no threat to the
dominant population:
ThereÕs a Tajik majority [in the province], also Uzbek
and Pashtun; but all are together. Also with Ismaeli
and Sunni, there are no problems. In the whole
district only 4 or 5 families are Uzbek and also very
few Pashtuns, they donÕt even count as a percentage;
99% are Ismaeli. (Eshkeshem)
The social relations of villages are rooted in the old
order and though the detail varies between Ismaelis
and Sunni Tajiks in essence the systems were similar.
Villages had an arbab3, who was the representative
of the community. The community was said to
ÔselectÕ the arbab, though in fact he always came
In other parts of the country these can be known as ÔkhanÕ or ÔmalikÕ, the role is the same
5
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
from a landed family. He was the link to the governor
and without the support of the arbabs it was
impossible for the central authorities to govern.
Some of the bigger arbabs were also elected as
members of parliament. Arbabs had responsibilities
for resolving disputes and undertaking negotiations
on behalf of the village, they also had a social
responsibility to provide a guesthouse where visitors
could stay and eat. The office was a secular one
(though the person inhabiting it would no doubt be
a practising Muslim). Mullahs in those days were
respected but had no power outside the religious
sphere.
With the coming of the communist government,
relationships changed. All across the country the
khans, maliks and arbabs were collected together
and killed, and Badakhshan was no exception. Their
land was distributed to the ÔpoorÕ - though in reality
this often meant to party people. In place of the old
system co-operatives opened up, but the head of
the co-operative, a party man, also acted like an
arbab and it brought little benefit to the people.
Meanwhile, a number of arbabs fled to the
mountains, from where they would demand that
the farmers brought all the produce to them or they
would be killed. According to informants many
farmers were killed in that way. To escape from the
tyranny some people fled to Pakistan and to the
border areas.
Yet, to a large extent the traditions have survived
the upheavals, though more strongly in Ismaeli
communities than Sunni ones. The Ismaeli
communities have their own structures, which run
parallel to state structures. There is a Shah, who
also has a religious role, and who in theory is
selected by the community, although often this is a
hereditary position. The Shah is a representative of
the Aga Khan and takes his words down to the
village level.
These systems have often been built on by assistance
agencies as ways in which they can reach
communities and deliver aid. There have been
attempts to build more permanent institutions on
the old, looser structures:
Some NGOs made community shura inside villages,
e.g. OPS, these are not related to government. People
4
agree with these, participate in meetings, talk about
work.
Yet although some of the structures and ways of
doing things have remained, travel and modern
communications have opened up peopleÕs horizons:
Another big difference is that in the past nobody
was interested in political issues, they didnÕt even
know who is governor, who is king. Now everyone
knows politics, what has happened in the world,
what has happened in Taloqan. Even the poor owners
of donkeys, they tell each other, Ôthis has happenedÕ,
they always know the political issues of every day.
Now even our children know. Around 30 years ago
parties made strikes, people listened, but they didnÕt
know, now they have radios. This is better, the
people know something, finally they will find the
right way to go.
Legitimacy and Governance
This shift is seen in the way traditional structures,
though largely nominally still in place, no longer
function in the same way, and in the rise of a military
leadership. The automatic granting of authority to
key figures in the social order no longer exists, a
feature many informants noted with regret - a
nostalgia for the past which is perhaps in part
response to the uncertainty of the present.4 One
respondent from Baharak described it thus:
In the past, when I was very small, a policeman
could go to a village according to the command of
the woluswal, and that single policeman could bring
all of the people to the governorÕs house. And when
woluswal was walking past everyone hid themselves.
Now there has been a lessening of respect. Now
itÕs not possible to call the community without a big
force to come here. Now it is possible for everyone
to come and talk to the woluswal.
Before the war things were seen as having been
regulated, with clear lines of responsibility stretching
from the community right up to the central
government. The woluswal was under the governor
of Badakhshan, who in turn reported to the Ministry
of Interior, who then was responsible to the Prime
Minister. The way of talking about it - Ôbefore the
coup, step by step everything was followed,Õ showed a satisfaction with a sense of order. People
Exactly the same sentiments were expressed in the Hazarajat study.
6
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Hermione Youngs
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
Food for work distribution
spoke of how every office had budgets and plans
and reported to the woluswal, and he in turn to the
governor. Taxes were paid to the government through
a tax office under the control of the woluswal; the
system was said to be ÔstructuredÕ. The districts (or
sub districts) had only one commander, who was
in the security office and under the control of
woluswal. Everything was seen to be done properly.
Before the coup taxes were collected on land, and
an office of tax collection was responsible for this:
30,00Afs per year per jerib, to the bank. It was set
against budgets, there was a system of reporting.
But now it all goes to private pockets.
Then there were functioning structures of
government, for public health, education etc, and
a separation of the civil and the military. Not any
more:
Now he who has most force wins; and everything
is mixed together, military and civil. Before if [there
was] fighting between two people, then the criminal
office would solve problem, now they cannot do.
They are jobless, just a nameÕ.
There used to be an amir, and when he ordered
people obeyed; and there was split between military
and civilian, the two were not connected and
ordinary people were busy and there was no
problem.
The changes started when the military and civil
were deliberately brought together as part of the
organisation of the fight against the Soviets. It was
not at that time seen as a bad thing:
Before the Islamic government this structure was
made to fight against the communists. All the
mujahedeen were under one control in south east
Badakhshan, civil and military, and the military
helped the civil.
The mujahedeen were generally seen to have
behaved properly in those days, unlike the
government of the day and unlike the present
situation:
In the past the different commanders of the
mujahedeen collected usher and used it properly,
but now the commanders donÕt use properly, they
just keep for themselves. But some give to poor
people. It started to change after the Russians. After
the Islamic revolution, after the mujahedeen took
7
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
the upper side, they sent a message saying that the
commanders should not collect. And I read this,
and after that the commanders did not take from
the people. But now commanders sometimes take
from the people by force. People tell the commanders
to go away: ÔI have nothing, I have an ox and you
have a kalash, let us go to the frontline together. I
have nothing else to give you (Keshem).
Mostly, though not always, the local commanders
are part of a loose chain of command going up to
Rabbani or Massoud. The situation, however, can
be extremely fluid and subject to rapid change.
Commanders are not necessarily seen as illegitimate,
rather their legitimacy depends on how they behave.
In any case, they are part of the structure of society
and little can be done without their agreement.
Although many are involved in illegitimate activities
such as the drug trade, they also need the support
of the people and can be initiators of positive
development projects, sometimes financing them
themselves and at others trying to attract the
assistance community. But although a few individual
commanders are seen to behave well, the overall
system is seen to be corrupt and self serving, with
most of the monies collected going for military
purposes and very little for running services.
Meanwhile, the government structures that do still
exist function at a very minimal level and have
almost no budget. This lack of resources for services
inevitably has an impact on the way officials are
viewed:
I am the governor, I have no resources to help the
people, all I can do is bring this NGO or that NGOÕ.
(Baharak)
And the legitimacy of the authorities is not helped
by the fact that people are rarely paid:
For six months, one year, people have not been
paid; then Rabbani comes and people hope for pay,
but then he will only pay the commanders.
KEEPING GOING
Support Systems
Faced with a lack of provision from the government,
communities rely on village-based traditional systems
of support to make sure that at least peopleÕs most
basic needs are met. If the needs cannot be met at
8
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
village level, then the system ensures that the problem
is sent up to the next level, although now agencies
are often seen as the giver of last resort, the final
backstop to the system.
In every village there is a representative; and that
representative will identify the poorest people and
send them to the woluswal, and if the woluswal has
resources he will help and if not he will send to
[Commander] Sadar, or ARC or FFW. (Baharak)
Between villages the support mechanisms vary,
sometimes they seem to work in a horizontal fashion
with support going directly between villages, at
other times higher authorities are involved.
In Rabat village a bad flood came and destroyed
the irrigation channels, and they sent bulldozers
and rice, wheat and ghee. And in Khush Darya,
again a flood came, and the woluswal sent rice to
help re-build the intake. Or in some cases they will
write official letter to governor of Badakhshan to
help. For example, in this area people are very poor,
and they wrote to governor, who wrote to ICRC and
they brought FFW. At the moment they [the
authorities] have very limited resources, they are a
link between the community and supporters.
(Baharak).
Yet despite the strength of these support mechanisms,
there are fears that the latest drought has in some
places stretched them to breaking point. Now even
the ÔwealthyÕ have nothing to give.
Conflict Resolution
Villages try to solve conflicts at a local level and
then if this fails they invoke higher authorities,
including commanders.
First the elders will try to solve. If they cannot
manage, then it will go to woluswal and then finally
to the court, or maybe the commanders.
If there is a problem between two families in the
village then there is a good system for solving the
problem. First the elders come together, then if they
cannot solve it then the khalifa, then the shah Ð and
shah absolutely will solve. (Eshkeshem).
It was felt by some that there was a strong will at a
local level to avoid problems, and it was this that
led people to accept the decisions of the elders:
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
In every village there are some elders, and the people
of Keshem they are calm people, they donÕt want
to raise problems, so they will accept the idea of
the elders. For example, some days ago in Sarai
village there was a big problem and one or two
mawlawees went and discussed and finally they
succeeded Ð because these people they donÕt want
to make problems.
In Faizabad, however, informants said there was:
no solving of conflict - itÕs all military.
Culture
Hermione Youngs
Shared traditions help bind societies together but
these have been under attack, especially in the
urban areas. Music in particular has suffered:
Men singers donÕt sing in Faizabad, but in the villages
they do. In Faizabad it is only at weddings, and then
they need an order from the government. People
still tell stories but they donÕt teach songs; children
still draw.
Music in particular has suffered
Music and culture have also stopped. [In the past]
people would listen to musical cassettes, have
videos; now they are not even taught musical
instruments, before they had groups at school. Stories
are not taught to children like they used to be.
Family involvement in poetry, stories, music and
songs is decreasing. Though it may not be as strict
as the Taliban, nevertheless, the Ôpresent Islamic
state does not encourage musicÕ. Poetry and writing
seemed a little more acceptable. Poverty has also
taken a toll and often people spoke of how, Ôwhen
people are hungry, they do not have time for musicÕ.
Although buzkashi, partridge fighting and dog fighting
continue, the public library that once existed in
Faizabad is now destroyed. Elderly people in
Faizabad spoke of how the arts and stories from the
Pamir were all gone, how once people shared stories
and poems but poverty and lack of employment
had destroyed it all:
Now the kalashnikov has replaced music.
Hopes
Yet despite all the problems people continue to
believe in a better future, even if they cannot see
from where it will come.
After the dark God promises two lights, we are
waiting for the light to appear.
They [the people] know absolutely that peace will
come, but they donÕt know when, maybe 10 or 15
years.
And, somewhat amazingly given the history of the
last 20 years, there was still a faith that the outside
world could help:
It depends on the developed countries, on the UN
and the neighbour countries. If they want to solve
it, it will be solved, but if they leave it to the people
of Afghanistan it is not possible. We hope they will
come here to solve this problem. But this direct
involvement should be honest. If they bring the king
back he is a very old man but people accept him.
If they bring technocrats from the West, the fighting
will solve in one week. Most of the people value
Zaheer Shah. The past traditions are alive, as much
as before. Both women and men have traditions.
With wedding parties they both have their own
traditions, singing songs etc, and with death also.
9
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
For the praying men and women come together.
People know Zaheer Shah is Pashtun but they know
he will not be driven by ethnic issues, people will
get jobs because of skills, not because they are a
brother of a Pashtun. Now family members with
guns support the commander, but if Zaheer Shah
comes, people will stop their support for the
commander and the commander is finished. But
now they support the commander because otherwise
they think things will be worse, more dangerous.
There is still a plea:
Bring peace to this country, stop this disaster in
which we live.
VIOLENCE AND SECURITY
The Security Situation
Interviewing about security, one became aware of
a whole mixture of sometimes conflicting opinions.
The key factors that affect security are the nearness
to the frontline and the relationship between the
local commanders Ð where there are good relations
between major commanders security is good, where
there are problems it is not. Yet what was interesting
was the extent to which people said security was
good,5 despite the existence of inter-factional conflict.
It seemed that in talking about security, people drew
a clear distinction between security for ordinary
civilians and the insecurity that affects those
connected with the various party factions. The interfactional fighting was often greatly resented by the
community:
People donÕt like it, they hate it, they would kill the
commanders if they could.
Yet the resultant problems were largely seen to affect
people with connections to the parties rather than
ordinary citizens.
It is all very peaceful except for going to Kalafgan,
where sometimes people loot. Before the revolution
also this road was not safe. For ordinary people it
is safe to travel, even for women; it is only a problem
for the commanders.
Also, even in villages where there had been recent
5
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
fighting, such as Hazrat-i-Sayyed in Jurm district,
interviewees generally said security was good. What
they meant was that security for outsiders was good;
village disputes that sometimes resulted in people
being killed were not, it seemed, viewed as
ÔinsecurityÕ but just as village tensions. Yet these
tensions significantly affect agency work. For
example, NAC could not implement its 2000
education programme in Jurm because the two sides
of the town were fighting, nor could they undertake
projects in Khash and Darayam because of insecurity.
The area around Keshem (which is close to the
frontline) was where people spoke most strongly
about security problems. Security breakdown was
generally seen as a product of war, both in relation
to the immediate fighting and the pattern of the last
20 years:
Before there was a proper system for the controlling
of the community, but when the fighting started,
after that some problems occurred. Now in Keshem
centre there is security commander, but just in the
centre they control, not one kilometre further.
People worried about bombardment, about the
possible arrival of the Taliban, the fact that one of
the schools was occupied by soldiers, and about a
town full of weapons.
People are afraid of the gunmen in the town. Schools
are closed because they are used as barracks. Soldiers
come wanting to ÔhireÕ boys. The boys donÕt want
to go but they threaten the family with guns at night,
saying, Ôwhere are your boysÕ?
The (mis)use of the school outraged people. It Ôwas
changed to a military bastionÕ reported one. This
more than anything else was seen as an unacceptable
infringement of the military on the civil rights of
ordinary people.
Yet for all the problems, security was often said by
local people to be better than other parts of
Afghanistan:
Compared to other areas [of Afghanistan] it is better. Here
if someone wants to go somewhere there is no anyone
to make a problem or take money from him. In some
places there are armed men to take money by force or
kill. And no one makes problems for the shopkeepers,
this is true generally in Badakhshan.
Of the 45 villages surveyed, 16 said security was good, 23 that it had improved from last year, 4 that it was not good, and 2 that
it had got worse since the previous year.
10
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
This perception is interesting because it is not an
accurate reflection of the situation. Certainly security
is better than in places actually caught up in fighting
(such as Shamali, or at times parts of Hazarajat),
but a number of districts of Badakhshan have actually
experienced worse security in the last few years
than most of Afghanistan. In part the perception is
probably due to biased radio coverage, and the fact
that bad news travels faster than good, but disinformation has also been used as part of mobilising
the war effort.
According to the human rights of people, there is
no security here.
Freedom of Speech
Most ordinary informants in the areas around the
frontline spoke of conscription as a major issue.
Although officials claimed that not many people go
to the frontlines and that those who did went
voluntarily, ordinary people told a different story:
Despite the official line that:
Here it is allowed for every person to say without
problem their ideas, no one will make problems for
them,
I have written a history of this place up until now;
but it is in a secure place, it is dangerous for people
to know. And all of my official clothes [from earlier
times] are inside a pillow.
Conscription
There are no volunteers, all are conscripted. No
one goes willingly from Faizabad.
The system of conscription works from the top.
Massoud sends for men for the frontline and the
instruction ripples down the line of commanders
and ends up in villages. If someone has money he
Hermione Youngs
people did not always feel they had freedom of
speech or action. One spoke of how no one was
able to talk openly about politics or the Taliban,
and that if the authorities got to know of such things,
big problems would follow. Another said:
And another:
Learning how to knit, Faizabad
11
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
can pay his way out, if not the only alternative may
be to flee the village. Few go willingly and in some
areas there is a refusal to send people to fight.
In the villages you can find few young people,
everybody went to Iran. In our village we have about
1000 young people in 300 families - some go with
their families but mainly it is the young people who
go; and 20 or 30 people they went for fighting, they
get about 20 laks. They are chosen by the
commander, if they donÕt go they have to pay money.
They go for 15-20 days. Families they wait for their
return, they pray. But since last year the village has
not sent anyone. People say, Ôwhen Rabbani was
here we had to fight but why should we fight now?Õ
They will provide food, but not send people to the
front line.
Every village has to send people, maybe five or ten.
Many people are escaping to Iran, 15 year old boys,
too young to grow beards (Keshem).
In theory, those who go to fight should get paid but
often they are not.
They should be paid, but those who come from
villages they are paid a little, and the rest the
commanders put in their pockets.
Last year from Keshem went a lot of people, not so
much this year. Men have not gone willingly but by
force. Last time they took my son they didnÕt pay
him anything.
One interviewee (a basic grade NGO worker, not
a wealthy man) described the situation:
They take young people, 15 years, 16 years. One
[of my sons] escaped and went to Baghlan and the
other to Wakhan. And the other, last year they took
him by force. They come at night and take them by
force. First they send messages, and he will escape
and hide. Then finally they come to the house, and
they will surround the house and surround him.
Most of the young boys have escaped from the
village to Pakistan or Iran. Some families have heard
from their sons, others not. My son was for two
years in Iran and I looked after his wife and child.
Sixty or 70 young men have gone from my village
of [120 families]. This year is a very bad year, the
harvesting is not good and the young have gone, so
families are in a very bad situation. Drought is an
excuse for the people, it is because of the fighting
they go.
12
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
And this year I released him from the commanders.
To release I did not pay but implored the commander
to release my son, and I sent some labourers to work
for the commander. My son was in Iran and when
he came back, every day the commanders sent a
message for him to come and join them, [they said]
we will appoint you to be a commander. And he
said, ÔI have an old father, I want to look after himÕ.
Sometimes to the commander, to keep him quiet,
I will send someone to work in the house or on the
land; and if they [the commanderÕs men] make
problems I will send him [my son] to Iran. All the
families in the village are doing this.
For those who have to go to the frontline, mines are
a major hazard. They are laid by both sides and
young people are often injured by their own sideÕs
mines - the people who initially plant the mines
know where they are, but the new group of fighters
coming in do not. In the clinic in Keshem, a skinny
17 year old who had been fighting for a year had
just lost his left leg to a mine. Like others who were
injured he was waiting to go by helicopter to
Tajikistan for treatment. When he was better, he told
us, he would go back. Surprised, we asked whether
this was what he wanted: ÔNoÕ, he said, Ôbut I will
be taken by forceÕ.
The war demands not only fighters but, other support
to the war effort. Whilst we were conducting
interviews in Keshem in autumn 2000, the governor
was announcing that people must assist the war
effort, that they had to give cattle, or if they had no
cattle to give one lak, and also food and firewood.
One interviewee spoke of how:
They came to collect bread and Afs, four, five days
ago. We have nothing, how do you think we
provided this? It was by force.
SITUATION OF WOMEN
Economic Issues, Education and Social Changes
The situation of women in Badakhshan, whilst by
no means good, was generally felt by informants to
be better than in other parts of Afghanistan. Whether
it has got better or worse over the last couple of
decades is more difficult to answer.
For rural women there has been little change:
There has been no change in womenÕs lives. Here
it is a very local life, here are no education facilities
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Hermione Youngs
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
For rural women, life has changed little
for women. And they have very independent lives,
with husbands and brothers they do harvesting,
everything. They are the heads of the families and
they have the right to go to the houses of relatives,
there is no limitation. Inside the village they go
alone, if the destination is far then 2, 3, 4 women
can go together, or if she is alone her husband will
take her. (Ragh, male interviewee)
salt tea and mulberries. During the afternoon, house
duties are undertaken. Cleaning, washing, sewing,
weaving etc. Supper is prepared in the late afternoon
and eaten before sunset. Most families cannot afford
kerosene for lanterns and go to bed as soon as it is
dark.
A recent NAC report described a typical rural
womanÕs day:
For urban women, however, the years of war have
undoubtedly destroyed a number of gains that they
had made by the late 70s, the time one woman
called, Ôthe golden age for womenÕ.
The women normally rise at sunrise, pray and then
go out into the orchards to harvest the fallen
mulberries. Breakfast for the family is prepared. If
any nan remains from the evening supper it is given
to the children, if not they have tea and mulberries.
After breakfast the women go out into the fields to
collect grasses, graze the animals, collect fuel and
carry out their agricultural work. The women return
home at noon to prepare lunch Ð again normally
Then there were all kinds of opportunities for girls,
for women to work. Women worked in offices, took
part in elections, in general meetings, gave speeches
in public gatherings. We had freedoms, we had
rights in those times. Then came the revolution, day
by day instead of growth of Afghan culture and
heritage there was an alien culture imposed. Key
people were killed, sought refuge abroad. So it was
shattered, materially and spiritually. Currently we
13
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
are in a position where we have no control; so many
hands, so many manipulations, and no one cares.
We are women of the world, yet every year children
cannot make it to school, they lose the chance to
become even literate. And today the great majority
of the Afghan population, they have no future.
Urban educated women were proud of their heritage,
the fact that women worked at all levels and could
even be elected to Parliament. They were aware of
loss:
There are lots of educated women in Badakhshan,
doctors, teachersÉ there were lots graduating from
the pedagogical institute, there was even a woman
sheriff. But when the mujahedeen captured Kabul
this stopped, and now we are jobless.
Unlike when the Taliban took Kabul, here it wasnÕt
a sudden change but rather a gradual deterioration
in opportunity brought about by a worsening
economic situation, an overall deterioration in the
level of services, and an increasingly conservative
environment.
When the mujahedeen first came we were in the
office for three or four years, but there was no pay
and slowly staff left and got other jobs and the office
closed.6 Economic problems made people leave,
staff got one lak pay a month - nothing. The
economic situation of women has got much worse
in last ten years. Men are jobless, and some women
get jobs in projects but it is difficult for women to
support the whole family.
Before the mujahedeen the girls had a much better
life, they could be anything; after the mujahedeen
things became very bad, now it is a little better.
The effect of increased conservatism is seen not
only in the edicts of commanders but in social
pressure from family, friends and neighbours. One
female worker wanting to go to Islamabad on her
own to attend an agency-run course - and supported
by her husband in this - was forced by the wider
family to take her brother with her as mahram
because of Ôwhat the neighbours might sayÕ.
Urban women were very aware that a take-over of
the area by the Taliban would place even more
limitations on their lives:
6
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
They have very strict rules. Here women are working
with men, the Taliban would make a lot of problems
for us, we donÕt want them. But we are not able to
move from here, to go where? We would be like in
a jail.
But they were also aware that the conservative trend
was not limited to Taliban controlled areas. They
worry about uneducated children and worry for the
future.
The Taliban brought a lot of limitations on women.
And when the Islamic government came, at that
time they also brought some limitations. Before
when Najib was president, the life of women was
very good. Now, the life of women has become
lower, there are limitations on education, and maybe
after this we wonÕt have any women doctors or
teachers. At the moment my daughter is in 12th
grade and I want for her to extend her education,
but where? This is impossible for her.
The increased conservatism, and corresponding loss
of freedom for women, was related to the war and
to the increased influence of commanders. It varies
from place to place, and from time to time,
depending on the attitudes of those with influence.
For example, it was observed that when Rabbani
was in Faizabad, women felt a greater degree of
freedom, were more to be seen on the streets.
In Keshem, by contrast, there was preaching in the
mosques that women must not go to the bazaar and
must not be seen outside the house. Keshem is close
to the frontline and in general women are seen less
on the streets at times of insecurity, both because
of their own fears for their safety and because of
the dictats of men.
In Argu the situation of women was said to be, by
Badakhshan standards, quite good:
Women can move around and you get women
teachers, nurses, doctors. They [the authorities]
brought teachers and their families and set them up
so they could teach. During the Jihad time a decision
was made to encourage womenÕs activities, and
families with educated women moved from Faizabad
and Shegnan.
Other informants suggested that it was also that the mujahedeen took the top jobs for themselves.
14
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
In Baharak, however, women cannot even be seen
to go to the bazaar, whilst in Shegnan both men
and women appear to be much more equal. Women
there join in discussions, can be seen by men they
are not related to and can talk with them with little
problem. However, major decisions are still made
by men and Òwomen do as they are toldÓ.
Nevertheless, the open approach for education and
active encouragement of female teachers to move
to other areas is radical for Afghanistan.
In Faizabad women spoke of how:
Here the Ôweapon-menÕ they make the women wear
the burqa. I feel terrible about it. Before, educated
women never wore the burqa; then the mujahedeen
captured the town, announced that everyone had
to wear it, and everyone did.
And:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
very much scared of the bad winter. So far there is
no source of help, even the rich people now have
become poor, and what can the poor contribute to
other poor people? In the past people helped the
destitute, now they too have nothing. Parents are
panicking for when the school year finishes in
December and the food distribution with it.7 What
will they do for the winter? Poverty has been so
general, even the rural people are in a desperate
situation. And the villagers come to the city because
of the poverty.
The pattern of the last 21 years has not, however,
been all one of loss, sometimes women have been
able to wrest gains from the situation. A number of
informants spoke of how education for girls was
better than before, a fact largely attributable to
agency support for female education. Sometimes
the very poverty that caused so much suffering had
also delivered the right to work, and with it an
increased self esteem for women:
Ever since I was a girl I had not worn the chador
until the Islamic revolution, then this change took
place. And when we talked to the authorities they
said, Ôa lot of our soldiers were raised in rural areas
and when they see a woman without chador it
creates a problem, so for the time being it is better
to be coveredÕ. But we donÕt agree with this
justification, because in rural areas there is no chador.
Although the imposition of the burqa is not liked,
it is not seen as an essential issue:
The concept of freedom for us is education and the
opportunity to go out and develop something; it
does not matter if to walk on the streets we have to
wear a veil. A chador cannot stop a woman from
education or work. It therefore has not been a major
problem.
The poor women, they have a very bad life. One
person can afford to have only one nan, and for the
remaining part of the day there is nothing else to
eat. That bread is not enough to feed one child. I
have surveyed district 2 [in Faizabad] and I have
seen women that have spent days starving, they
have no income and no livelihood, and they are
7
Hermione Youngs
What is far more important to women is that war
has brought poverty and that they have suffered
greatly from it, their lives reduced to an endless
quest to find enough food for their children:
Ismali woman. Wakhan
This is a reference to the FFE scheme
15
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
But most of families they have economic problems,
so husbands make them [the women] go out, to
wash clothes, to bake bread.
Men canÕt say anything. He should be satisfied if I go
morning and evening to work; he looks after kids.
ItÕs getting better for women: thatÕs about work, itÕs
because of the economic situation for our families.
In the first days it was unacceptable that women
went to foreign offices and worked with men, but
now they accept it. Though men find it difficult to
accept women having jobs and they get too much
angry and nervous, but they canÕt afford to say no.
In the past men were very cruel but now women
have more rights, they can say, ÔI go out, I support
my family, you cannot hit me. Fifty years ago it was
just a few women working, 8 years ago it was a lot.
It is worth noting, however, that all these quotes
come from Faizabad; and even here the gains are
fragile and resented by the commanders:
Two girls were explaining about the food distribution,
and the commanders got angry, they said, Ôyou
should be telling about religionÕ. But the mullahs
donÕt have a problem, it is the commanders.
Women feel that few men will defend them, that
the social pressures will prove too strong:
Men, they are happy to go with whatever society
wants, or else people will say there is something
wrong with that family.
And an AfghanAid report noted how despite the
fact that they could clearly see many women working
on fields, male respondents told them, ÔMen do
most of agricultural work, women contribute littleÕ.
An example, as they rightly point out, of how easily
womenÕs work goes unacknowledged.
In talking to women the sense was always that the
overwhelming concern was the economic, the basics
of survival, and that other things were secondary.
But women did also talk about other things. They
said they felt safe to travel but that they should have
someone with them, another women or a child.
Although travelling for work, for example as teachers
or health workers, was different; then, they said,
they could go on their own. Indeed the general
feeling was why would women want to travel, except
to see relatives, unless it was for work?
16
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Sometimes womenÕs comments were contradictory,
reflecting the fact that things are different for different
people. Women spoke of how they were not formally
allowed to participate in menÕs meetings on
community affairs but at home they discussed with
men. At the same time others spoke of how they
didnÕt have influence in political life, or often even
in households. Generally it was felt that educated
women have some influence, non-educated women
none.
Women spoke of legal rights and how in practice
the situation could vary:
Different families have different ideas, in some
families women have their legal rights, in others
not. We have the right to meet you, to go to our
office, our husbands bring the money to us and we
spend it. The son gets one right, the daughter gets
a half: it is our culture. When there is a distribution
the mawlawee comes and gives half to the daughter,
one to the son. It is not usual that a woman divorces
a man, but the other way. But if a woman wants a
divorce she goes to her fatherÕs house and makes
her husband divorce her. And when she has a baby
breast-feeding, then it stays with her until he or she
becomes seven years, then it will go to the father.
As we remember it is the same, it is according to
Islam, some changes were made by the Soviet
government but the people didnÕt accept them.
Women also talked about culture, but that too was
very tied up with work:
Before the war women played a significant role,
half the culture, half the economy. But that process
is also shattered, because now there is no export,
no import. All these arts and crafts have been
destroyed.
Leisure was not really a concept:
What do women do for pleasure? Nothing. Poor
women have no spare time, from 8 until 4 they
wash clothes, then they go home and look after the
children. In the past we had films, concerts, TV. In
Faizabad we have TV but it is no good. The
government stopped the concerts; but in Faizabad
it was not common, even before, they came from
outside. Since 8 years ago the women singers went
to other countries, they were not allowed to sing.
Women also recalled how the youth union organised
sports for women but now it no longer exists.
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
The Affect of the Assistance Effort
For some educated women at least, the assistance
effort has brought opportunities for work. But it has
not been easy, agencies have experienced problems
in trying to get permission for women to work or
be involved in agency activities. For example, Merlin8
noted how Ôtraditional and newly defined restrictions
imposed on womenÕ had limited their involvement
with NGOs and had been partly responsible for the
high drop out rate in the training of village health
workers. Oxfam, working in Shar-i-Buzurg,
experienced similar difficulties. However, with
patient negotiation and a bit of flexibility and
imagination, these problems can usually be
overcome. NGOs do, however, feel they have to
be careful, they donÕt have women going to offices
very often - although they did say that the situation
in 2000 was easier than in the years immediately
previous. And women themselves say it is getting
easier, with more women working for NGOs. The
NGOs and UN were seen as useful by the women
mainly because they provided jobs and other forms
of income support.
Both NGOs and the UN have given support to
womenÕs organisations. AfghanAid support a
womenÕs centre in Baharak, though it is unable to
do work in the communities and all of the activities
have to take place inside the centre. UNOPS have
been active in supporting a womenÕs organisation
in Faizabad, although the situation there is confused
and this organisation would appear to be in
competition with another similar group that was set
up five years earlier. Both have different political
affiliations, though they claim not to be political.
Since 5 years there has been a womenÕs organisation
established, it is not a political organisation but a
society, but no one has stopped us. Faizabad has
60 parts and in each we have one representative,
chosen from a meeting of women. Her role is to
sort problems, but the most problem is the economy.
8
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE
Representatives come and say, Ôyou should take
poor womenÕ. They chose because they know better
than us.
And we have womenÕs councils in 6 city districts.
We invited 100% of all of the women in the districts
to take part in the elections and this was how the
council was set up. During the meeting we discussed
about the objectives of the council and candidates,
we gave a biography and activities of these
candidates. In district 2 there are 13 mosques and
13 neighbourhoods, and they each sent their
representatives to participate Ð13 representatives.
When the representatives were elected they came
and had a meeting and 3 persons were elected as
Chair, President and Deputy, based on qualifications
of women and popularity of women. The first election
was in district 2, in spring 1997.
We have been going to villages to form village
councils. I personally have travelled to 21 villages
and we have established councils, and the village
welcomes it. Travelling is no problem in Badakhshan,
even they co-operate with us. For example, I wanted
to establish a community centre and I just walked
in to see the President and he was very helpful and
said go ahead.
Overall what comes across through talking with
women is the struggle, but also that through it all,
for educated women at least, that there are still
hopes and dreams.
I am not hopeful for the future. Each day the political
situation gets worse. But it can become better if we
struggle.
Girls still think to become a doctor, a teacher; if you
ask them in class they still say this.
The challenge is to turn some of those dreams into
a reality.
Badakhshan Province, final report, Nov 1998, Merlin.
17
Livelihoods and Food Security
Historical Context
Even in the 70s the economic situation in
Badakhshan was considered precarious. In 1976
UNDP reported that an emergency situation existed
in the province and recommended a wide-ranging
development programme. It was not implemented
and war only aggravated the poverty. Faizabad city
became marginalised, a situation which was reflected
in price increases above those found in the rest of
the country: nevertheless, people say the standard
of living was better in those days.
The combination of a low agricultural base, limited
returns on livestock and lack of other earning
opportunities has always meant that many families
struggle to survive. In August 2000, NAC surveyed
Shegnan and found that the staple diet of the majority
of people consisted of shawr chai (salt tea) with
mulberries for breakfast, shawr chai with
nan/mulberries for lunch, and buquli soup (broad
beans dried and the flour made into a spaghetti),
for supper. Those who could not afford black tea
cut and dried a certain type of grass for use as a
beverage. Rice and meat were only eaten on special
occasions, such as weddings. Even during Eid the
normal ÒspecialÓ food was sweets made with dried,
ground mulberries and sweet tea. In remote areas
Hermione Youngs
The province has always been food insecure. Before
the war local agricultural production only met 50%
of needs, and the situation worsened during the war
years. By 1990 it was estimated that local produce
was only enough to meet the needs of one third of
the population, whilst animal husbandry Ð second
only to agriculture in its importance - lost 40% of
production because of the war.9 Whilst the war
undermined rural production, the Soviet withdrawal
led to an increase in food prices and loss of earning
opportunities in Faizabad town. Any industry was
always only small scale - woollen mats, leather
products, a carpet industry in some locations, some
stone quarrying and the production of reed mats,
lapis in Keranomanjan.
Local transport
9
In 1990 the UN estimated that out of a total land area of 7403 sq km, the total cultivable land was f450,000 hectares, of which
192,000 was actually cultivated. Only 33,000 hectares of this were under irrigation and due to shortage of water land was
cultivated on a rotation basis, with about 40% of land lying temporarily fallow. Pastures were over 122,000 hectares and
forests over 96,000
18
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
such as this, poor families are not part of the cash
economy and meet their basic needs by barter.
Those families dependent on the market for part of
their food suffer from the fact that Badakhshan has
some of the highest wheat prices in the country, a
product of geographical and political isolation
combined with low levels of local production. At
times the poverty is so desperate that one worker
recorded how:
Men bring wheat home from away and they mix
sand with it to make it go further.
The main source of cereal supply is the bread basket
area of Kunduz and Takhar. Cereals are not normally
imported from Pakistan or Tajikistan, the first because
the cost of donkey transport over from Chitral is so
high, the second because Tajikistan itself is a cereal
deficit area and has high prices.
The level of poverty is reflected in the number of
people in debt and the number dependent on charity.
In Darayam, Keshem, Shegnan, Shohadda and
Teshkan more than 30% of families were said to be
in debt and in Wakhan 61% - though the latter is
almost certainly related to the high level of opium
use. Argu, Jurm, Shegnan, Shohadda and Wakhan
all recorded more than 10% of families dependent
on charity. Poor families survive bad years by
increased labour migration, credit, charity, and by
selling off their few assets, including if desperate,
selling or mortgaging their land. Inevitably, in the
process they become yet more vulnerable. Often
farmers are forced to commit their next harvest in
exchange for wheat or cash. Focus reports rates of
return to the lender being as high as 500 or 600 per
cent per annum on such deals.10
Wheat prices fluctuate greatly over the year, not
only due to the season but also to the availability
of wheat from outside. Access to markets is mainly
by donkey, as even along the roads few people have
the possibility to use vehicles. For villages off the
roads barter is the means of exchange rather than
cash, and even along the main roads barter is not
uncommon. Villagers along the Wakhan Eshkeshem
road, for example, would use travelling traders to
exchange their poplar beams for tea and salt.
10
11
12
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
THE RURAL ECONOMY
Land and Agriculture
Agriculture is mainly subsistence farming, people
grow to meet their own needs and have little to sell.
The situation has long been like this Ð in 1990 an
SCA report noted that due to food shortages, 99%
of all sales were made immediately after the harvest
and that on average only 19% of farmers sold wheat,
and they only sold on average 12% of their crop.
Whilst the majority of farmers in all districts reported
wheat deficits, this ranged from 68% of farmers in
Keshem, the best-off district, to 100% in Shar-iBuzurg.
Farms are small11 and very few families can meet
their food needs solely from agriculture. In the
interviews done for this study, only in one village
(in Keshem, the richest agricultural district) did any
families meet their food needs in this way, all others
used a variety of strategies. Land patterns vary greatly
from district to district. The sample surveys done
for this study showed that less than 10% of families
in Eshkeshem, Shar-i-Buzurg and Shegnan were
landless, whereas in Argu and Keshem more than
half the households were landless. Shar-i-Buzurg,
Shegnan and Shohadda all had large numbers of
small farmers, whereas villages surveyed in Teshkan
and Yaftal had less than 10% of households in this
category. Whilst relatively few families rent land to
or from others sharecropping is common, although
its practice varies greatly from district to district.12
AfghanAid found that in the four villages surveyed
in Zebak 76% of households were owners, cultivating
95% of the total area, whilst in Warduj and Argu
sharecropping was more common. From the villages
visited for this report, district averages varied from
0% to 38% and some villages had as much as 50%
of families engaged in sharecropping. Both the
landless and small landowners can act as
sharecroppers for others, and there are circumstances
in which poor farmers are forced into accepting
very oppressive contracts.
Over the years, several forces have acted to change
land ownership patterns. The first is the inheritance
distribution amongst families, where sub-division
Stepping out of Poverty, Focus, 1998.
This has long been the case, for example, the SCA survey (1990) showed that the most common farm size in 1978 was less than
5 jeribs; and above 15 jeribs it was usually all rainfed land.
For example, FAO surveying Faizabad district in 2000, found that the majority of farmers cultivated their own lands and only a
few leased to or from others; whilst in 11 of the 15 districts covered for this study none of the villages surveyed had any tenant
farmers.
19
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
and drought have disrupted this equilibrium with a
loss to small landowners and an increase in
landlessness.
Patterns of cultivation vary between districts and
have changed over time. Rainfed farming is
predominant throughout the province but some
western areas have a mix of rainfed and smaller
amounts of irrigated land, whilst the upland areas
of eastern Badakhshan have no rainfed land and
only small amounts of irrigated land, which can
only be single-cropped. Communities here are
generally food deficient. The 1990 UNIDATA report
claimed that Darwaz14 had the least cultivable land
of all districts and all of it was used for orchards,
whereas Baharak, Keshem and Ragh all had more
than 80% of their cultivable land given over to
seasonal crops. In all areas wheat was the
predominant crop, but whereas in Ragh it was 100%,
in Keshem 31% of the land was given over to rice
cultivation. In Darwaz and Shegnan mulberries were
second only to wheat and in Zebak barley was
important. It would appear that like other upland
Hermione Youngs
results in a decrease in large landowners and an
increase in smaller landholdings as the land passes
down through the generations. Acting in the other
direction is the increasing impoverishment of small
landowners which has caused them to sell or
mortgage their land.13 As there are few opportunities
to earn money, even land temporarily mortgaged
tends to become a permanent sale. The number of
landless is therefore growing. This process has been
exacerbated by the drought, which has increased
the tendency to sell land and to use the money for
the short-term imperative of securing food. If forced
to sell, landowners prefer to lose their rainfed lands
rather than irrigated ones, both because they are
less productive and because strong ownership
documents are often not in existence for these lands.
Most rainfed lands were former pastures and the
right to cultivate them has at times been disputed,
with money collected as fines for pasture cultivation.
Prior to the war, the forces acting on land-ownership
were believed to have largely balanced each other
out, so an equilibrium was reached in terms of farm
size. In the last twenty years, however, both war
Wakhan after irrigation
13
14
The latter refers to the practice of taking a loan against the land; the provider of the money gains the right to use the land on a
temporary basis, and if the loan is not repaid within the agreed time becomes the permanent owner of that land.
Focus (1998) also spoke of shortage of land as a major issue in Darwaz.
20
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
parts of Afghanistan, there has been an increase in
wheat production and a decline in the growing of
barley. According to SCA, in 1978 rain fed barley
was grown by 79% of farmers, irrigated wheat by
77%, and rainfed wheat by 64%. By 1986 irrigated
wheat had become the most important crop, grown
by 74% of all farmers, whilst only 26% grew rainfed
barley and 28% rainfed wheat. At the same time,
however, it appeared that the average area per
farmer under irrigated wheat declined, whilst those
that did plant rainfed crops were sowing greater areas.
The SCA survey also showed that yields of all crops
had declined continuously between 1978 and 1985.
After 1985 there was some recovery, particularly
for barley. Figures collected for this report suggested
that in a normal year yields for irrigated wheat varied
from 25:1 in Keshem (the equivalent to 100 sers
per jerib)15 to as little as 4:1 or 5:1 in some parts of
Eshkeshem and Wakhan. For rainfed wheat the
returns varied from 13 or 14:1 in Keshem to 4:1 in
villages in Argu, Teshkan, Shegnan and Darayam.
In 2000, the drought reduced irrigated yields to 16:1
or 17: 1 at best (Argu and Keshem) and rainfed
yields were often as low as 1:1, or even less (i.e.
farmers reaped less than they planted).
All rainfed lands are single cropped. Double cropping
of irrigated land is done if water is available and
the climate warm enough. Improved varieties are
sometimes grown on irrigated land, depending on
availability, but rainfed land is sown almost entirely
with local varieties.
As well as cereals, farmers grow some fruit and
vegetables but these usually occupy very small
amounts of land and are mainly for the familyÕs own
use. Of the districts surveyed by AfghanAid the
number of trees was highest in Warduj, but the
amount of land given over to fruit was still small
compared to the major fruit growing parts of country.
Trees are often planted along ridges so that they
donÕt compete with staple grains. Interviews for
this study showed that the only districts where fruit
trees were significant as a commercial crop were
Ragh (9%) and Keshem (8%). However, in a number
of districts there was significant growing of fruit trees
for family use: Eshkeshem, Jurm, Keshem and Shari-Buzurg all had 35% or more of families growing
fruit trees for their own use; and the Shegnan villages
15
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
visited averaged 82%, a reflection of the importance
of mulberries. Black cumin grows as a wild herb on
the mountains and fetches a high price in the bazaar.
Liquorice also grows wild, although it is no longer
collected.
AfghanAid (2000) found that crop rotation was
commonly practiced on irrigated as well as rainfed
land in Argu and Warduj but mainly on irrigated
land in Zebak. Most of the crops cultivated were
dual purpose, the grain being used for food and the
stalks for animal fodder. Some alfalfa and clover
were grown just for animal feeding. Corn is planted
after wheat for green feeding if irrigation is available
Ð generally it is planted densely and thinned for
feed, leaving the rest to harvest as grain. More than
90% of the corn planted is planted after wheat, only
10% on fallow lands. Mung is also grown after
wheat, for food and straw, and is considered excellent
for animals. In general, reports indicate that farmers
are well aware of the benefits of crop rotation and
when they do not practice it this is due to intense
pressure on the land.
Agriculture in eastern Badakhshan is almost entirely
dependent on irrigation. Other parts of the district
have a mix of irrigated and rainfed land but irrigated
land is always predominant. Springs are the most
common source of irrigation waters, with rivers
important in some districts. Lack of irrigation water
and rainfall were seen to be the biggest impediments
to agriculture followed by lack of inputs, particularly
improved seed and fertilizer. The SCA report of 1990
found that 20% of farmers considered lack of good
seed to be a major impediment to farming, whilst
the use of chemical fertilizer had declined greatly
during the war and its lack was considered by 12%
of farmers to be a serious problem. Since then,
however, the political isolation of Badakhshan has
meant that access to fertilizer has declined markedly.
What is not clear from the reports is the extent to
which fertilizer was only ever an option for richer
farmers in more accessible locations. Use of animal
dung as fertilizer is limited as most of it is burnt as
fuel. Lack of farm power was seen as less of a
problem because farmers had taken to sharing oxen
to compensate for decline in numbers. The drought,
however, has changed this situation as large numbers
of oxen have been sold. Tractors are hardly used and
are not suitable for small and often isolated farms.
Farmers generally measure yields as the number of sers harvested for 1 ser planted.
21
Access to inputs depends on location and wealth.
AfghanAid found that in Argu farmers seemed to
have reasonable access to fertilizer - 40% applied
DAP and 76% urea, 24% applied animal manure;
whilst in Zebak only 18% applied DAP and urea
and 72% animal manure. Chemical fertilizer is
mostly applied to improved varieties with few farmers
using it on local varieties and the dosages used are
low. This access is, however, partly due to the
(subsidised) programmes of agencies and figures
would be very different if farmers had to rely solely
on the market. FAO, surveying Faizabad district in
2000 (unpublished report) found commercial
fertilizer or agrochemicals were either not available,
expired, or very expensive. Of the 38 farmers
interviewed 37 said they had no access to improved
fodder seeds and the other one had ÔpoorÕ access.
Thirty three had no access to agro-chemicals and
34 no access to tractor power, 10 said they did not
even have access to oxen and a further 11 described
their access to oxen as poor. Twenty six said they
had no access to animal manure. The only input
that seemed at all reasonable was water, with only
two having no access, 20 poor access and 16 fair
or medium access. Wells, water pumps, karezes
and achats did not exist in the area, though achats
could be used as the Kokcha river is close.
Numerous plant diseases, weeds and insect pests
were reported. Absence of improved seed was cited
as the biggest problem, followed by the shortage
and high price of both commercial fertilizers and
animal manure.
In general, rust and smut are major problems. Locusts,
which used to be a major source of damage, are no
longer a problem due to a large programme of locust
eradication in the early 1990s. Pistachio forests
suffered damage from the increased number of
porcupine in 2000, although overall the pistachio
harvest was excellent.
Livestock
In the UNIDATA report of 1990, animal husbandry
was quoted as being second only to agriculture in
importance, and in the mountainous districts it was
said to be of primary importance. However, by 2000
only in Wakhan and Eshkeshem did animal
husbandry make up 30% or more of peopleÕs
livelihoods, and only in these two districts and Ragh
did it count as more important than casual labour.
This may, however, have been partly due to the
drought. Between 1999 and 2000 sheep prices often
fell by 25% and sometimes by as much as 40%.
22
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Dr Eqbal
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
Boys collecting animal dung - an imporant source of fuel
Prices for cattle fell even more steeply, with a cow
often fetching only half - and sometimes less than
a third - what it would have done in 1999. In a
number of villages people simply said they could
not sell their animals because no one wanted to
buy. Given that livestock are sold to make up the
wheat deficit, what is even more important is the
change in terms of trade between livestock and
wheat. Whereas in 1999 a sheep would purchase
between 7 and 21 sers of wheat, depending on
location, in 2000 the maximum was 8 sers (in Brogil
in the Wakhan corridor) and in many villages it was
as little as 3 sers. By March 2001 this had dropped
still further, to only 2 sers in many villages in Ragh
district.
In all districts surveyed except Eshkeshem, Shar-iBuzurg, Shegnan, Yamgan (and Wakhan if one omits
the data from the district centre, Khandud), a third
or more families had no sheep or goats at all, and
in Baharak, Darayam, Jurm, Keshem and Shohadda
60% or more of families had none. Moreover, the
families that did have livestock generally only had
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
a few - owning more than 5 sheep or goats was rare
except in Eshkeshem, Keranomanjan, Ragh, Shari-Buzurg, Shegnan and Wakhan. Cattle ownership
is even lower. In 6 of the 15 districts surveyed more
than half the households had no cattle at all, and
most of the others had only one or two. However,
animals still have a social importance and are a
valuable source of fuel and dairy products.16
The quality of livestock is generally poor and
productivity low; diseases and parasites are common.
Animal husbandry is largely reliant on pastures,
supplementary feeding is done rarely in late spring
and autumn and a little more often in early spring
and winter, but high prices limit its possibility for
most farmers. Those farmers who have more irrigated
land usually put a small part of their land under
fodder crops (alfalfa and clover), which makes them
more secure. Landowners also use mulberry trees
as fodder.
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
can only lead to further destruction of a fragile
environment.
Poppies
The history of poppy cultivation in Badakhshan
stretches back several centuries, with the crop
believed to have been introduced by Chinese traders
as a medicine. The resultant addiction created a
market and led to systematic growing of poppies
and the province has the highest level of drug
addiction in the country, though production levels
are nowhere near as high as areas such as Helmand
and Nangahar.17 The patterns of both production
and addiction are patchy and no one quite
understands why they have developed in the way
they have. Only some areas grow poppy, whilst
other areas equally suitable do not, and only some
In almost all villages everyone has access to the
village grazing grounds but these are often
inadequate to meet demand and those who have
the money will rent additional grazing. The pastures
of Badakhshan are important not only to the
livelihoods of the province but to a much wider
area. Shewa is the biggest pasture, in northeast
Afghanistan and flocks from Kunduz, Takhar and
Baghlan, as well as Badakhshan itself, will come
there for summer grazing. Over-grazing has caused
degradation of many pastures, and this is a particular
problem at springtime when the young plants are
unable to establish themselves. Since 1992 there
has been an increasing tendency to plough parts of
Shewa in order to plant wheat, a practice which
16
17
UNDCP
Marketing of fodder crops is very limited, only wheat
straw is available on the market and its price varies.
It is normally cheapest in August and very expensive
in March, April and May. However, the drought
meant that in 2000 the cost of wheat straw was
always extremely high Ð 400,000 per 10 sers, as
opposed to a previous 20,000. Hay is rarely found
in the market but fresh alfalfa can be obtained in
Faizabad, though not in the villages. Other fodder
crops are produced by farmers for their own use in
winter and are not found in the bazaar.
Poppy head
areas have high levels of addiction. The areas that
grow are not necessarily the areas that consume,
and vice versa. The areas cultivating tend to be
Tajik and Sunni (though not exclusively so), those
using are usually the Ismaeli communities Ð although
Ismaeli communities in other parts of Afghanistan
are not generally opium addicts. The Aga Khan has
recently issued a decree that poppy should be neither
grown nor consumed and this has led to a reduction
in cultivation in Ismaeli areas and some reduction
in use.
Meat is rarely eaten except on ceremonial occasions.
In 2000, opium poppy was grown on 2,458 hectares in Badakhshan compared to 42,853 hectares in Helmand and 19,747 in
Nangahar. Only 1 district (Faizabad) had more than 1000ha of poppy, and that only just. Afghanistan, Annual Opium Poppy
Survey, 2000, UNDCP.
23
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
Although people have used opium for many years,
it was only after the Saur revolution that mass
cultivation started. Several factories are now reported
to be producing heroin Ð one in Keshem and two
around Faizabad. In 2000, a number of districts
recorded significantly less poppy production than
in previous years.18 In Argu this was said to be
because of the drought, whilst informants in Wakhan
said it was due to alternative livelihoods being
provided through FFW. Whilst the latter is true, the
reduction was not entirely voluntary - the NGO
involved had the community contract include a
clause that poppy would not be grown. As the
worker noted, though it was verified that poppy was
not grown in these areas in 2000 there is no
guarantee that the community will not revert to
poppy growing in future years. Reduction in poppy
growing may also be because farmers in Badakhshan
are finding value of poppy resin decreasing because
of tightening Tajik border controls, decrease in
quality, distress sales and an over supply onto world
markets. Although fresh opium prices were higher
in Badakhshan than elsewhere in Afghanistan in
2000, (52USD/kg farm-gate price in Shar-i-Buzurg),
they were still lower than previous years.19 Yields
were also reported down because of the drought.
In Ismaeli areas, a further factor was probably the
18
19
Aga KhanÕs decree that poppy should not be grown.
Most of the drugs cross the river to Tajikistan, the
trade being highly organised and very lucrative.
Lapis
The Lapis mines present a potentially significant
source of wealth to Badakhshan but are currently
controlled by Massoud and his commanders.
Production levels are low as primitive technology
means mines fill up with stones - of the 60 or so
mines, only five were working in 2000. The mine
is sectioned off and each section rented out for
periods of time. The big commanders used to do
the negotiations on behalf of Najmuddin, since his
death Sadar is in control. Production is divided into
three: one third going to Massoud, one third to
Sadar, and one third to the main commander in
Keranomanjan. In 2000, the rent on a section of
mine was 24,000 laks (N.Afs) for one month. The
traders renting the sections will bring men from their
own village or family, up to 500 labourers at any
one time. Sometimes they are paid 150,000 N.
Afs/day (or 50,000 plus food), sometimes they get
a percentage of the lapis, sometimes they work the
Hermione Youngs
The opium poppy can be cultivated on both irrigated
and non irrigated land, will grow at altitudes of up
to 3000m, and does not require much water. As
such it is ideally suited to conditions in the province.
As well as extracting the resin (used for production
of opium and heroin), poppies are used as a source
of oil, winter fodder for animals, fuel and even soap.
Commercial growing of opium poppies is largely
concentrated in Faizabad, Argu, Keshem, Khosh
and Jurm, and it is a well-established part of the
cropping system. When asked, farmers say that they
grow it because it is so much more profitable than
wheat and because it requires little water. Not only
is it an important source of income in an area where
there are few other opportunities, but it is the only
crop from which farmers can easily obtain a loan
and many are held into patterns of production
because they owe money to the drug traders. Focus
reported farmers in Jurm and Khosh receiving cash
in February at one third of the value of the crop
when harvested in July. The cycle of indebtedness
thus entered into is hard to escape.
Lapis boy
UNDCP notes that Jurm had a 38% reduction, whilst NAC and Focus also quote observable reduction in the growing of poppy.
UNDCP 2000.
24
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
mines just for extra they can pick up and sell. Most
of the profit is said to go straight into the pockets of
commanders.
The mines represent a dangerous living for the
workers associated with them, usually young men
between 20-30 years old. Conditions are reported
to be dreadful. The mine has been described as a
Ôdark holeÕ, with a tunnel which goes up to two
kilometres into the mountain and is very dangerous.
How many are killed or sustain serious injuries is
difficult to determine, but numbers are certainly
high.
Outside the lapis mine resembles the old black and
white movies of gold towns, all men and no women.
The better off men (the commanders and traders)
have young boys to look after them and the bazaar
is more luxurious than the bazaars of Rawalpindi,
full of perfumes and creams. From Keranomanjan
the lapis goes to Pakistan, with yet more money
going in taxes to the commanders en route. Firstquality lapis sold in Afghanistan brings 100-200
laks/kg, medium quality 80-100 laks; and low quality
20-50,000. N.Afs. Poor people move the low-grade
lapis to Chitral and exchange it for soap or ghee.
In 1995, 10,000 sers of lapis was reported moving
over the Shah Saleem Pass on one day; by 2000 it
was said to be 15,000 a day in the summer months.
However, the quality is reputed not to be what it
was in the past. Prices in Pakistan for good grade
lapis are 10,000 -50,000 rupees/kg, for lower quality,
200-500 rupees/kg.
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
The reduction in casual labour was to some extent
made up by FFW. In six districts the category ÔotherÕ
accounted for 20% or more of livelihoods, and in
six more 10% or more. Although FFW was not the
only thing to be included under ÔotherÕ, it made up
the bulk of this category.
Life is hard enough that people will try almost
anything to make ends meet:
Our people are very active people, they can work
very properly. People are very clever here, only with
the shortage they cannot help themselves. People
search gold from the wash. (Ragh)
But usually work involves leaving the village:
In the upper valley most people are very poor. In
my village there were 3000 people, but 200 left
because they had no job. They have gone to Iran.
(interview in Keshem)
In centre no one has animals or land, they go to
Takhar to work or do small trade. In the last years
maybe 20% of people, whole families, have gone
to Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan in search of work.
And 70% of families send one or more family
members out for work at harvest time, but during
the time there is no work theyÕll stay here (Ragh).
Some of the work is found locally but mostly it
involves travelling outside the province, or even
outside the country.
There are also supposed to be emeralds in Shegnan
but these have not been mined for many years.
Some go to Pakistan and Iran, some go in harvesting
time to Kunduz to work. (Keshem)
Casual Labour and Migration
But families send someone to Iran, Pakistan, for one
or two years. A lot do this, from Baharak hundreds
have gone, they send money back and then after
one, two, three years they come back. The married
come back to see their families, and the single their
parents. Those who do not come back are very few.
From our village [120 families] more than 100 went
to Iran and only one did not come back; he married
an Iranian woman.
Casual labour has now become very significant in
making up the shortfall in food production, especially
for those who have neither land nor animals. In
seven of the 15 districts surveyed for this study
casual labour made up 20% or more of peopleÕs
livelihood, and in a further four districts it made up
10% or more. Moreover, this figure would be higher
in a normal year as the drought affected labour
opportunities both in Afghanistan and neighbouring
countries. Lack of demand brought down wages
and whilst in 1999 a worker had to labour for about
a day and a half to earn enough to purchase a ser
of wheat, in 2000 it was often nearer three days.
20
Whilst in a normal year20 relatively few whole
families move out of Badakhshan, many individuals
leave in search of work. The AfghanAid study (2000)
showed the percentage of male workers migrating
in search of casual labour varied from 10% in Argu
However, by March 2001 the drought had caused a substantial number of families to start moving from the worst affected districts.
25
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Hermione Youngs
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
Apprentice carpenter, Faizabad
to 23% in Zebak. Figures for this study were higher,
from 12% in Shegnan to more than 50% in Shar-iBuzurg, Jurm and Shohadda, and 70% in Yaftal.
Those who actually left the country, as opposed to
just moving outside the province, varied from 8%
in Argu to 39% in Eshkeshem.21
Finally, the location of Badakhshan, with borders
to China, Pakistan and Tajikistan means it is an
obvious conduit for the smuggling trade.
This year one family left. But lots Ð most - families
send people out. This year the number declined
because of FFW, it meant there were jobs for people.
(Wakhan)
THE CITY
Although it was normal practice in many areas,
migration was almost always seen as the means of
last resort - if there is another way to meet livelihood
needs that does not involve leaving the village then
people will take it.
The road will make a difference because if people
have jobs here they will never go out for work
(Ragh).
21
22
Smuggling, of course it happens, all those who are
powerful do (Wakhan).
Faizabad
Faizabad22 town has a stronger link to the hinterland
than exists in many cities and a significant number
of families fulfill at least part of their food needs
directly through agriculture. However, agriculture
is practiced by the richer households only, the most
vulnerable households get their food from the market
and/or begging. In 1998 WFP calculated the cash
needed to meet minimum food needs as being
4.75USD per person per month and any households
with income levels below this were considered
Ragh data has been discounted as many respondents said that although no one had gone at the time of the survey, people would
go later Ð which indeed proved the case.
Information is this section is largely from WFPÕs VAM report.
26
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
Ôextremely vulnerableÕ. The cash required to meet
minimum food and non-food needs was calculated
at eight dollars per person per month and families
falling below this threshold were considered
ÔvulnerableÕ.
following: land in the province; remittances; skilled
labour; working for NGOs/UN. Some members may
also work in unskilled work but average income
significantly higher than poor groups. Not vulnerable
to food insecurity.
Whilst both the price of cereal and of labour fluctuate
according to the season, the people of Faizabad
have seen an overall decrease in purchasing power
since 1998. Traders told VAM surveyors in Faizabad
that normally 30MT enter the city by truck every
day, falling to 5MT by donkey when the road closes.
This would be equivalent to an 85% ration for
64,000 people, though it is possible that the tonnage
is under-reported. What is clear is that due to a
combination of its dependence on the market, its
remote location, and its position as the last part of
Afghanistan outside the control of the Taliban, the
town is vulnerable to cereal supply failure.
Better off households: 5-10% of the population.
Own land in province and typically have family
members working in Gulf, Europe, or North America
and often receive remittances. Involved in commerce
or retail trade. Incomes high and income source
diversified. Not vulnerable.
In their 1998 VAM report on Faizabad, WFP
identified six household types:
Very poor displaced households without male
workers: 2 Ð 7% of the population. Landless, not in
receipt of remittances, who have moved to Faizabad
in last 12 months, mostly living in free housing
allocated by the committee of housing. Meet 97100% of their minimum food needs. Moderately
food insecure and vulnerable to further food
insecurity.
Very poor households without male workers and
no woman in employment: 3-6% of the population.
Meet 97-100% of minimum food needs, mainly
through gifts and begging, which account for 80%
of income. Moderately food insecure and vulnerable
to further food insecurity.
Poor households with one male worker: 20-30% of
the population. Urban households who lack skilled
workers, land or remittances but who do have one
man able to work in casual labour, agriculture or
poorly paid government sector. Can meet minimum
food needs but not also minimum non-food needs.
In general earn about 80% of total minimum income
needs. Not food insecure but vulnerable to food
insecurity.
Poor households with two male workers. 15-30%
of the population. Similar to above but with 2 men
able to work. Can meet minimum food and nonfood needs. Not food insecure and only moderately
vulnerable to food insecurity.
Average households: 30-40% of the population.
Receive income or food from at least one of the
WFP assessed that the majority of households in the
city were able to meet their minimum food needs
and believed that this was largely due to
redistribution, reflecting strong social networks. For
Ôvery poorÕ households, charity represented 60% of
total food consumed and assistance from WFP
contributed a further 12%. However, some NGO
staff believe that WFP has under-estimated the
importance of remittances to poor households.
All households in the Ôvery poorÕ category received
WFP assistance. Very poor households who were
IDPs profited less from redistributive mechanisms
but probably receive more international assistance.
It was noted that if very poor households lost their
access to aid they would go into food deficit. Whilst
it was believed that it might be possible for
households to make up some of this deficit by
increasing child labour and female labour this was
not clear. Poor households with one male worker
would shift expenditure from non-food to food items
if they did not get any form of food aid. All groups
ranked wheat as the dominant food source, providing
70-85% of total energy requirements. Consumption
of oil and rice was low compared to Kabul and
provided only about 5% of energy overall. Only the
poorest households eat maize and poorer households
will eat pulses, which are cheaper than wheat. Meat
and nuts are eaten irregularly, except by the poorest
households who donÕt eat them at all. Vegetables
and fresh fruit are rarely eaten. Because poor
households get their food largely from the market,
prices and earning power are crucial to FaizabadÕs
food security. WFPÕs calculations showed that prior
to WFP assistance the poorest groups were meeting
65% of income (food and non-food) needs, poor
families with one male worker were meeting 70%
and those with two male workers 90%.
Very poor households rely on women and children
to earn an income, mostly by begging and mostly,
but not entirely, in the form of food. The most
important form of cash income for such households
27
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
is zakat. Most non-poor families give zakat as a
religious duty, the gifts are personal and do not
appear to be regulated by the authorities. Women
in these households produce handicrafts for sale to
shopkeepers but the returns are very low, they also
work baking bread, washing clothes and sweeping.
Boys aged 11-14 also worked, usually at tea stalls
and in collecting firewood and plastic or rubbish
for sale. Income was also obtained by selling
household goods. Few families reported using credit,
though it was not clear whether this was by choice
or because facilities were not available.
PRESSING ISSUES
The Environment
The destruction of the environment is a major
concern in Badakhshan, with very direct and serious
repercussions for peopleÕs lives. Increased farming
of pastureland has led to the degradation of land
and reduced the ability of the slopes to absorb water,
with consequent increases in flooding. In 9 of the
15 districts surveyed for this study all of the villages
reported increased flooding over the last two years,
though a number noted that there had not been
flooding in 2000 because of the drought. Yamgan
was the only district where none of the villages
surveyed reported an increase in flooding.
The reduction in tree cover has resulted in the search
for fuelwood becoming a major undertaking and
villagers reported spending an extraordinary amount
of time on this activity, frequently with at least one
member of the family going out for most of every
day for nine months of the year. The problems of
Hermione Youngs
For poor households with one male labourer, this
labour constituted by far the most important source
of income/food. During the summer most men in
this group would normally leave for neighbouring
Takhar and Kunduz to work on the harvest, though
a few remain to harvest poppy or to do manual
labour in the city. In the winter the men try to find
labour in the city but most say they can only find
work one day in three. Government servants are
also included in the poor household group, as they
have seen their purchasing power drastically reduced
over the years and most also do casual labour.
Children from this group also work in similar ways
to the very poor families. Poor households with two
male workers work in much the same way but tend
to earn significantly more.
For all groups the food coming through the FFE
scheme will have had an impact on the household
food supply, but particularly for poor families.
Bare hillsides as a result of environmental degradation
28
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
finding fuelwood have meant that dung is now the
major source of fuel, thus depriving the land of a
valuable fertilizer supply.
In a number of the districts surveyed most of the
villages have seen an increase in trees planted over
recent years but few other environmental measures
have been undertaken Ð and the trees may have
been planted more for economic reasons than
environmental ones. Focus similarly note that
watershed protection projects, such as terracing,
contour bunding, and tree-planting on the upper
slopes, are rare. In Keshem, Baharak, Jurm and Argu
there are significant environmental programmes but
this is because of the work of NAC and AfghanAid.
Only in Shegnan does there seem to be an
environmental awareness despite little agency
involvement. An NAC report (2000) notes:
Shegnan is the only area that I have visited that is
Òenvironmentally awareÓ. Children are taught both
at home and in school on the importance of the
environment. Trees are protected from grazing
animals, watersheds are looked after, gardens are
kept clean, before a tree is cut down another one
is planted. There are no landslide areas, and
communities protect their water supplies. The river
is eroding the cultivated land along the riverbank,
this is mainly due to the protection walls that have
been built on the Tajik side of the river without any
consideration given to water flow etc.
The environmental changes would appear to be due
to both poverty and the breakdown of controls.
Khawrin, the environmentalist with NAC, explained:
Since 21 years Afghanistan has lost the owner; there
is no owner for the country and for any country
having no owner there is loss, devastation. The
problem of erosion is always there; snow in the
winter and heavy spring showers. We estimate we
have lost more than 85% of our forests, everything
was cut.
The area as a whole is very fragile mountain. There
are two types of vegetation: pistachio zone (lower)
and juniper zone (upper). Previously 2000 tonnes
of pistachio kernel used to be exported, now we
cannot export even 50 sers! Pistachios are good for
the economy, but they also good for the land Ð and
protection of the forests means the protection of
life. After the coup everything was lost, there used
to be a system for protecting the forests, now it has
gone. These were status jobs.
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
The laws protecting rangeland used to be very strong,
much stronger than forest laws, but now people try
to farm the best pastureland. They destroy it. Last
year animals stayed for 5 months, this year hardly
two or three. There is no carrying capacity, they
came late, and left early. The rangeland is destroyed,
animals destroyed. The government used to look
after animals, vets came to summer pastures and
stayed there. If rangeland decreases, animals decrease
and the poor suffer.
Now some people are replacing the trees, but there
is a lot of wrong thinking, they think if they put in
more trees it will mean more wood, there is a lack
of understanding that trees need space.
People wonÕt do things for the community, they are
too poor. All the rivers are eating their banks, the
natural vegetation is cut. People are not doing
anything about it. Those who have land, they try if
they can afford. People know things, but they cannot
do, they are too poor. We need to spend money to
do things. But a problem is that people have become
dependent on agencies
There is some understanding in the area,
commanders sometimes understand the need to
protect the forest. But what can a poor man do? He
has no other way of getting fuel, he has no option.
Sometimes kids go out with cans to collect the dung
the animals left behind.
The Impact of the Drought
In 2000, what is generally recognised as being the
worst drought in living memory swept through
Afghanistan. Although Badakhshan was less affected
than some areas of Afghanistan, any reduction in
crop is serious in such a chronically food insecure
area, although just how serious did not become
apparent until spring 2001.
The biggest threat to food security in the province
was always seen to be a decrease in terms of
exchange between labour and wheat. Reliance on
rainfed production and on the casual labour markets
in north Afghanistan were key factors in causing
vulnerability. In 2000 everything went wrong. The
price of wheat went up and the availability of casual
labour went down. The price of livestock also
tumbled, further undermining livelihoods. At the
same time as this was happening in Badakhshan,
yields in Takhar were severely affected by both
drought and conflict. As the Takhar surplus is
normally a key source of wheat for Badakhshan,
29
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
this badly affected food supply there. The problem
was exacerbated by the fact that the labour
opportunities in Takhar, normally a major source of
seasonal labour for the people of Badakhshan, largely
disappeared. Both poppy yields and farm-gate prices
for opium were also down, which further
undermined livelihoods in some areas. The food
security situation was made worse by the fact that,
unlike most of country, there was no cheap Kazak
wheat in the bazaars in the northeast and as a result
the area saw the highest wheat prices in the country
Ð 100,000 N.Afs/kg by spring 2001. This was
particularly significant in urban areas, where poor
households are very dependent on the market.
Because of the drought people are selling animals,
but no one wants to buy. In a normal year people
with 20 animals would sell all the babies and 2 or
3 big ones, this year situation is worse and they
have sold most of them. The price this year is
700,000 to one million afs, last year it was 1.5m
to 2m (Ragh)
Drought not only affected agriculture but also
severely affected grazing. Low and moderate
elevation pastures grew poorly due to lack of rain,
dried out early, and were heavily over-grazed. High
level pastures showed much lower growth rates
than normal, only 50-60% of 1999 levels. Because
Hermione Youngs
However, the drought did not hit all areas equally,
some irrigated areas had excellent harvests and the
pistachio harvest was one of the best ever. Rainfed
wheat suffered the most severe crop losses and in
some areas, e.g. Shar-i-Buzurg, farmers decided not
even to plant spring wheat because of the shortage
of moisture in the soil. They proved to be wise; in
many places the spring rainfed wheat was a total
failure and farmers did not even reap what they had
sown. Autumn planted rainfed fared only slightly
better (1:1 for most areas) and most communities
dependent on rainfed crops were only able to
produce enough to cover 2-3 months food supply.
The situation with irrigated wheat was variable, with
yields of up to 25:1, although most areas yielded
much less. Smut infestation was also high, up to
60% in some areas, and it was believed that none
of the wheat harvested would be of seed quality.
Sharecroppers were particularly badly affected by
the poor yields and most got less than they sowed.
Fodder shortages sent the price of livestock spiralling
downwards as people sold their animals in far greater
numbers than normal - fodder production was so
much reduced that few farmers expected to have
more than 3 months supply, compared to 9 months
in 1999/2000.
Food for work programme Kesham
30
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
the lowland pasture had suffered so badly, seasonal
movements of Kuchis from Takhar and Kunduz to
their summer pastures in Badakhshan started between
two to four weeks earlier than usual. They also
moved with 70-80% more animals than normal,
animals entrusted to them by non-Kuchis who do
not usually send animals to summer pastures but
did so in response to lowland pasture shortage.
Livestock health was reportedly poor with high
levels of disease. Most worrying was that foot and
mouth and anthrax were reported in Shewa, where
there are high concentrations of livestock over the
summer followed by dispersion in autumn. The
pressure on resources caused by the drought
exacerbated tensions between the local population
and Kuchis, and between different Kuchi groups. In
some areas, e.g. Shar-i-Buzurg, local authorities
allowed migrating Kuchis to pass but prevented
them from using pasture in order to conserve it for
local use. In parallel with their early migration,
Kuchis returned to the lowland areas earlier than
usual because the upland pastures became depleted.
PeopleÕs strategies to cope with the food shortfall
included eating mulberries (to the extent that in
many areas none were dried this year);23 liquidating
assets; sending their children to work for rich families;
mortgaging or selling land; and taking loans. Farmers
who earlier in the year took cash advances against
wheat they then did not produce were in a
particularly difficult position.
The various assistance programmes made a
significant contribution to offsetting the decline in
the local and regional labour markets; in a number
of villages people said they had not had to send
people out to Pakistan because of the amount of
work available under the FFW schemes. However,
this was probably also due to a pull factor: most
people had heard reports of the lack of wage labour
LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
opportunities elsewhere, so there was little incentive
to go in search of that which was probably not
obtainable. By spring 2001, it had become clear
that the food aid had not been sufficient to prevent
malnutrition and out-migration from the worst
affected districts, especially Ragh and Shar-i-Buzurg.
In 28 villages in Ragh surveyed by a joint agency
mission, 400 people had died in the three months
since Ramazan, mainly from a combination of
hunger, ARI and measles. Many people were said
to be surviving on wild foods.24 Villagers reported
livestock loss of between 80 and 90%. The district
commander estimated that about 15% of households
had already left and in some of the villages visited
it was around 50%. More said they would leave if
assistance did not come, and there seemed no reason
to disbelieve this.
There are also long-term problems. Not only have
many families lost all or most of their assets and
incurred new debts, but Badakhshan is also suffering
from severe seed shortage. At the time of autumn
planting in rainfed areas many farmers did not have
enough seed, and therefore either did not plant or
were only able to plant with poor quality seed. A
credit problem has developed with farmers unable
to repay past loans or obtain new loans for either
consumption or seed.
Seed is little, they have not enough, only 2-3% of
farmers have enough Ð but not improved seed, here
it is impossible to find that. If there is no help from
outside, some will sell animals to get from
neighbouring provinces, and some will not have
(Ragh).
It is clear that the consequences of the drought will
require a major re-think of agency strategy if there
is not to be yet more displacement.
23
Although it should also be noted that thequality this year was not good for drying.
24
Although wild foods are often eaten as a supplement to diet, this was clearly spoken of as much worse than usual.
31
Education and Health
EDUCATION
Importance and Access
Education is highly valued in Badakhshan,
particularly amongst the Ismaeli communities, and
children will often walk many hours to get to school.
The lack of education was often mentioned as one
of the biggest problems facing people:
All education facilities are closed down; one thing
that would help would be education (Wakhan).
People have a lot of interest in education and if we
had facilities there would be no illiterate people.
Some go out to study, to Faizabad, Kabul, Pakistan,
even Egypt, and some come back. Maybe around
700, 800 people in all of Ragh have secondary
education; around 60 have tertiary, but only 20 are
here, the rest are in Faizabad, mostly they are
teachers.
Sometimes there is an almost reverential belief that
it can deliver everything:
We know that when the level of education goes up
this will solve the problem of Afghanistan. And we
see the future of Afghanistan very dark because the
education is very poor at the moment. If the level
of education goes up, immediately educated people
will stop the war. If you think that a man who at the
moment is 28, 29 years old, and he doesnÕt know
the rules he just knows that if you want to be a
member of the government you must have a gun.
I think that if we donÕt improve the level of education
this war will go on for ever. (Eshkeshem)
Education was seen as bringing positive things into
an area:
There have been educated people who have returned
here because no work was to be found outside, and
this has been positive for the village. Education is
a positive force, it has improved womenÕs rights Ð
educated men think differently of their women.
(Yamgan)
Yet despite the positive attitudes to education, levels
of provision and of literacy are appallingly low. In
Keshem, informants estimated that maybe 4% of
women and 9% of men are literate. In Ragh
informants spoke of how:
Maybe 2-5% of women can write. Men,10%. Four
percent of these are from school, the rest from the
mosque or home.
In fact, although their estimate for men was not so
far out, figures collected for this study suggested
that for women the literacy rates were actually less
than 2%. With the striking exception of Shegnan
the pattern was much the same in all districts,
ranging from 0% in 7 of the 15 districts surveyed
for this study, to 5% in Eshkeshem. MenÕs rates were
a little better, ranging from 1.5% in Baharak up to
around 30% in a number of districts. Again, Shegnan
was an exception, with rates of about 90% literacy
for men; although the true district average is probably
lower than this as remote villages far from the Tajik
border have much lower literacy rates.
AfghanAid data25 for twelve villages in three districts
showed that only 28% of children of school age
were actually going to school. The data was not disaggregated by sex but it is fair to assume that given
the distances of the schools from the villages, a
rather small proportion of these will be girls.26
Literacy rates were strikingly low in all three districts.
Zebak, with a very active school, was the best at
10% and Warduj the worst at only 4%. Again the
data was not dis-aggregated, but given the lack of
access of girls to schools it is clear that girls will
make up a very small percentage of this indeed.
Like so many other things, education is the victim
of war. In Keshem, the area closest to the frontline,
one of the schools was taken over for IDPs and
another as a barracks. Staff worried about
bombardment and about having a school full of
soldiers and weapons. They had no idea what would
happen about the end of year exams, which were
due. They felt powerless:
When there is no formal education, people use nonformal provision:
We donÕt know, what can we do?
During 4 or 5 months of winter they go to mosque,
study the Koran, then to summer school. (Ragh)
At other times it was poverty that limited access.
Focus reported village schools where many children
25
AfghanAid, September 2000.
26
It is rare for girls to be able to travel outside the village to attend school.
32
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
could not attend because they did not have shoes
to wear for the long walk, whilst in Faizabad teachers
said that the inability to afford a chador stopped
many older girls going to school.
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
only support 45 schools out of a total of 243 and
the incentive is not enough to feed a family for a
month.
School Attendance
But although the education situation is bad, this is
not a new thing. Data in the 1992 UNIDATA report
is limited to eight districts, and even then it is not
complete, but it is enough to show that the education
situation a decade ago was poor. And bad as it is,
the education situation does seem to have improved
in the last three years, with increasing agency
support, especially for girls.
In Keshem people noted how:
For almost 14 years all the education for girls was
stopped here. Now it has re-started again and more
than 1000 women and girls are going to school in
upper valley. And in villages, before there was no
education for girls and now thereÕs some. (Keshem)
The increased interest seems to be due to a
combination of teacher training, supply of materials,
and interest stimulated by WFPÕs FFE programme.
Materials and teacher training have gone to all
districts but FFE is a pilot scheme, which started in
2000 and only operates in five districts and a total
of 50 schools. Whilst there is little doubt that people
appreciate FFE in those areas where it operates, it
also creates problems in adjacent districts which
do not receive FFE and do not understand why.
Here it can actually act as a disincentive to
attendance as people feel the situation unjust. People
interviewed in Keshem (a non-FFE district) spoke of
how pupils had enrolled in school in anticipation
of getting FFE and then dropped out later, when
they found it would not be forthcoming. Moreover,
its actual affect on education is far from clear. NAC
figures indicate that though it made a great difference
to initial enrolment rates, it has made no difference
to attendance rates, nor to exam pass rates. It does,
however, appear to have stopped girls dropping out
of school to get married, something that can happen
as early as age 13. In interviews it was often
mentioned that FFE was important because it was
a way to pay teacherÕs salaries; but it seems an
expensive and not very durable way of tackling the
salary problem. TeachersÕ salaries are, however, a
major issue. SCA are the only organisation to have
a long term commitment to tackling this, but they
27
In 2000 NAC collected comprehensive data on
education for UNICEF, but the patterns are difficult
to interpret as FFE has swollen grade 1 enrolments
and there are no reliable records from previous
years. Also the data relates to enrolment rates not
to attendance, and these can be significantly different.
What the data does do is highlight questions: why,
for example, are drop out rates significantly different
in different districts? There would be benefit in doing
some more detailed research to try and understand
more of the factors that affect school attendance.
In a number of districts, and not just FFE ones, the
number of pupils in grade 1 is significantly higher
than in grade 2 Ð sometimes as much as double.
However, this is thought to be due not to drop out
but to the fact that FFE and provision of education
materials and teacher training led to higher enrolment
rates in 2000 than in previous years.27
In all districts except Faizabad there are more boys
than girls enrolled in grade 1, but the proportions
can vary from being quite close to almost no girls
at all. For example, in Baharak and Jurm girlsÕ
enrolments are about 80% that of boys, whilst Ragh
has 671 boys and only 36 girls enrolled into grade
1, and Darayam no girls at all. Drop-out patterns
also vary. Some districts see girls dropping out at a
faster rate than boys, but not all. In Yamgan, the
girlsÕ enrolment rate in grade 1 is a little over three
quarters that of boys but by grade 5 they have drawn
level and in grade 6 there are 146 girls and only 59
boys. There tends to be a drop out of girls around
puberty, sometimes because girls are kept at home
to prepare for marriage, sometimes just because
families cannot afford a burqa. If they get past this,
then girls seem more likely to complete to grade 12
than boys. This may be because the economic
opportunity-cost of keeping boys in school is greater
than for girls. It may also be that some boys leave
the area to continue their education in places like
Peshawar, as standards are so poor in the higher
grades. The opportunity to leave home to continue
schooling is rarely available to their sisters, though
in Argu there is a boarding school for girls.
For example, Darwaz and Shegnan saw a big input of school materials in 2000, which led to an influx of grade 1 students and
raised expectations of more help to follow.
33
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Of all the districts, Shegnan stands out. Education
has been a major priority for the people here for
many years and there is a general expectation that
children will attend school. 28 Because of the
extremely high literacy rate in Shegnan, for women
as well as men, the district provides teachers for
other parts of the province. For example, Argu
brought teachers from Shegnan and they were
supported by the community, being given
accommodation, food, 50 sers of wheat and 50lak.
This high literacy rate has nothing to do with the
assistance effort, as until 2000 (when UNICEF and
NAC sent in large amounts of materials and provided
training opportunities), there had been very little
agency work in this remote district.
Higher Education
People in Shegnan spoke of how in the past graduates
from Grade 12 used to go to Kabul to gain further
education, but since the arrival of the Taliban the
authorities have closed the universities and colleges.
In 1996 the education authorities decided to open
their own teacher training college in the centre of
Shegnan. Today there are 57 female and 182 male
students attending the College. Twenty one teachers
teach a curriculum which includes english, chemistry,
biology, physics, geography, religious studies, history
and literature. Four of the teachers have MasterÕs
degrees from Kabul University, two from Moscow,
and the rest have graduated from grade 14. Students
attend the College for two years and on graduation
move into teaching positions throughout
Badakhshan. To date there have been three
graduations and 96 female and 136 male teachers
are now teaching in the districts of Darwaz, Baharak,
Argu and Ragh, as well as various villages in Shegnan.
Both the female and male teachers are willing to
move out of Shegnan to teach in other districts. As
with the teacher training college in Faizabad, the
college receives no support, has no facilities, and
relies on the personal inputs of the teachers. Students
support themselves through their families, and some
28
Geir Rodven
Lack of opportunity beyond grade 12 is seen as a
serious problem, and one which has become worse
over the years. In part this is due to aid agency
policy; for whilst a number of agencies will support
primary schooling and a few secondary, almost
none support tertiary. Tertiary education has also
been hit by the closing down of opportunities beyond
Badakhshan, particularly, but not only, for girls.
Taking education materials by donkey convoy
students cannot attend because their families are
too poor to support them. There have also been
requests from Eshkeshem and Darwaz for training
as there are no facilities there.
Faizabad has a Faculty of Medicine, which opened
two years ago after the Taliban took Mazar and
which receives direct funding from Professor
Rabbani. It has 284 students but the standard is
poor. None of the infrastructure or teaching staff
were transferred from Mazar and the faculty is not
supported by any agency. In the words of one
interviewee:
Pupils in the present Faculty of Medicine cannot
write their own names, how can they become
doctors?Õ
There is also a teacher training college for women
but it is barely functioning Ð there are not enough
According to Focus the head of education for the district claimed 55% of all children went to school.
34
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
textbooks or stationery and teachers have no salary.
There are 77 female students taught by 15 teachers
(2 male, 13 female). There is also a director and a
head teacher. Unlike the teacher training college
in Shegnan, once the students have graduated they
do not move out of the Faizabad city area. Presently
there is a surplus of poorly qualified female teachers
in Faizabad. This problem can only be addressed
by a big input of both practical and financial support
into the college. There is no teacher training facility
for male students in Faizabad.
Women and GirlsÕ Education
Quality
How far they really believed this is impossible to
judge, certainly for many women there were many
obstacles. As one women put it:
Issues of quality concern people as much as access.
This is not just in relation to the quality of teachers
and teaching materials but also in the crucial role
of education as a purveyor of values:
There are some schools running at the moment, but
there are no good teachers to teach the students
properly, to inform about the war, the disadvantage
of fighting. (Eshkeshem)
A key issue is lack of salaries for teachers. There is
almost no government support for schools; indeed,
when asked whether there was any government
support for education in his district, one respondent
replied:
Budgets from the government? No, never! They wait
for FFE.
In a few cases the district authorities pay minimal
salaries, but these are nowhere near enough to live
on. Communities support some teachers (often in
kind, with accommodation and food) but teachers
often teach without pay. As noted earlier, the only
NGO to have a long-term commitment to supporting
teachersÕ salaries has been SCA, but this is to a
relatively small number of schools.
Another issue is training. NAC train educational
staff from the districts, in the districts. Last year
approximately 400 teachers attended their sessions,
including teachers from Shegnan who walked for
three days to attend a three week course held in
Eshkeshem. SCA train up to 6th grade for the schools
they support, including a 15-day training for women
teachers, but all the training is in Taloqan and there
is no support beyond grade six.
29
30
31
In all of our interviews, local men defended the
right of females to education:
We are not against girlsÕ education here, if there are
facilities we will help our girls and women. ThereÕs
no education for women here, but some families
from Ragh are in Faizabad and they are educated
and could come. Here are some women who can
read or write, but they learnt at mosque or at home,
not school. (Ragh)
But some women they cannot, maybe their husbands
do not let them get educated, (Faizabad).
Some of the commanders were said to be unhappy
with females going to school, although we were
told that most ordinary people accepted it. But even
where social attitudes are not against it, for rural
women lack of access to schools substantially limits
this theoretical right. Girls donÕt travel, donÕt walk
beyond the village, and this makes an enormous
difference to what they can actually access. 29
AfghanAid looking at four villages in each of Argu,
Warduj and Zebak, showed that although only two
villages actually had schools in the village itself
(both in Warduj), three villages out of four in both
Argu and Warduj had boys schools within an hourÕs
walking distance of the village. The remaining village
in both districts had a school 1.5 hours away. This
meant that all boys could access schooling.30 (In
Zebak, boys would have had to walk much further,
up to four hours in one case.) For girls, however,
the story was very different. None of the villages
surveyed in Argu and Warduj had a girlsÕ school
within less than an hourÕs walk. This effectively put
education out of the reach of girls in those villages.
Five out of eight villages recorded no school for
girls with four hours. Khulkhan, in Zebak, was the
only village to have a (primary) school within
reasonable walking distance - 20 minutes.
For rural girls access has always been a problem,
but urban girls felt the narrowing down of opportunity
over recent years, as unlike their rural sisters they
once had possibilities.31 Despite this, some of them
manage to hold on to their aspirations:
Hazarajat data showed average distance girls would walk to school was 10 minutes.
At least in terms of distance, obviously other factors, such as poverty, could also limit attendence.
Though again, access for the poor was always limited.
35
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
In the past the girls had volleyball and basketball
in schools, but now there are no teams. Before the
mujahedeen the girls had a much better life, they
could be anything. After the mujahedeen things
became very bad, now they are a little better. Girls
still think to become a doctor, a teacher; if you ask
them in class they still say this. (Head teacher,
Faizabad)
HEALTH
Facilities and Service Utilisation
Health services in Badakhshan are extremely limited.
Of the 44 villages surveyed for this report, only 11
had a clinic within an hour by donkey. For 13
villages the nearest clinic lay between one hour and
five hours by donkey, for another 10 it lay up to 10
hours away, and for 6 it was two days. At the furthest
extreme, for Khandud it was three days by donkey
to Eshkeshem, whilst for Sarhad-i-Brogil it was three
days to Chitral or Gilgit, the last of which was by
road and was affordable only by the rich. In two
villages people simply said there was nowhere to go.
Poor services are not new. Although the amount of
information provided in the UNIDATA 1992 report
(four districts only) is too small to enable direct
comparisons, it clearly shows that service coverage
was not good. The number of clinics was small and
most clinics in rural areas didnÕt have trained doctors
and were poorly equipped. There were no special
facilities for treating women but female patients
were always at least equal in number to male ones,
and in Jurm significantly more. There were at that
time no arrangements for vaccination at any of the
clinics.
The only hospital in the province is in Faizabad.
MSF recently took over support of this hospital and
have had a major programme of improving and
extending facilities, of training staff and of upgrading
in-patient care. The hospital has 80 beds, with wards
for infectious diseases, medicine, surgery and
paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology and an
operation theatre. There is a general OPD, a malaria
and leishmaniasis clinic, a TB clinic and an MCH
clinic. There is a general laboratory, able to do basic
tests, a blood bank, X-ray, ECG and a small
physiotherapy centre. The hospital has the capacity
32
33
34
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
to be ready for any cholera outbreak.
In 2000, admissions to the hospital increased and
5,550 patients were treated. Bed occupancy averaged
90% but some wards still suffered from overcrowding
and the pediatric ward frequently accepted two
children in one bed. The average duration of stay
for a patient was between 3 and 4 days. Patients
often presented in the late stages of disease because
of difficulties with transport.
Currently there are 19 MoPH clinics in the province,
3 of them are supported by MSF, 11 clinics are
supported by SCA32 and the remaining obtain some
supplies through WHO. There are also a number
of private clinics. In addition there are five clinic
buildings that have been built by UNOPS but that
are not operational.33 UNICEF supports a fixed
vaccination centre and regional cold chain in
Faizabad. Within the province there are 11 fixed
EPI centres, some of which only started in 2000.
There are outreach programmes operating from
some of these fixed centres. According to the Director
of MoPH34, they are hoping to start another eight
centres before the end of 2001 but as yet none of
these have happened.
The MSF-supported clinic in Baharak has 18 inpatient
beds, a delivery room, laboratory and pharmacy.
They run male and female OPD and have an
emphasis on MCH, they also run a nutritional
programme and a TB clinic. Last year the two male
and two female doctors attended between 60 and
100 consultations per day depending on the season.
In OPD, 22,950 persons were treated of which
4,920 were children under 5 years (21.5%). Five
hundred and nine persons were hospitalised. MSF
note that the ratio of female patients was high
throughout the year, an indicator that access to
medical care for women and girls is well accepted.
The clinic in Eshkeshem, also MSF supported, has
general OPD and an observation room. They report
that the number of consultations increased
progressively during the year 2000, from 660
consultations in January up to 1600 consultations
in December. From 40% to 50% of patients are
female; the increase in consultation for females
being mainly due to the presence of a female doctor
since November 2000.
MSF pay incentives in these clinics but MoPH pay the salaries, whereas in SCA-supported clinics the salaries are paid by SCA.
Two in Keshem, two in Argu and one in Yaftal.
Interview October 2000.
36
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Of the SCA supported clinics three are C1, with
doctor and laboratory, and six are C2, staffed by
mid level health workers. Medair reports that staff
in the SCA supported clinics which they visited were
supplied with medicines once a year, which they
divided up into 12 portions. Medicine usually lasted
about 15 days, after which they would give private
prescriptions until the following month. The doctor
in Shegnan also reported that the clinic there had
an insufficient supply of medicines. Support visits
to SCA-supported clinics seemed somewhat variable,
the clinic in Ragh was meant to have visits every
three months but at the time of the Medair visit the
last SCA visit had been six months earlier. The clinic
saw 40-60 patients a day, mostly men and children.
Women presented very late in illness. Seriously ill
patients are referred to Faizabad. AfghanAid reported
three of the medical centres covered in their survey
had no trained medical personnel.
With at best one clinic per district, many people
simply cannot reach the facilities. For example,
according to the doctor in charge in Shegnan, only
50% of the districtÕs population have access to the
clinic. Even where people can reach facilities, service
usage is low Ð ACF found Faizabad to have one of
the lowest utilisation rates of all the cities they
surveyed in 2000.35 The proportion of mothers who
delivered their last child at home was very high and
the rate of post natal visits lower than Kabul or
Herat, though similar to Kandahar, where there are
also very few health services.
Charging policies are variable. Consultations at
Faizabad hospital are free but a small charge is
made for services, such as X-rays or blood tests. If
patients can afford it they are asked to pay 10,000
N.Afs per night, which is distributed as duty
allowance for the night staff. In Eshkeshem, Baharak
and Zebok, the price of a consultation was fixed at
10,000 N.Afs, drugs were free of charge. The money
collected on a monthly basis is used towards paying
the staff incentives, and in Baharak also for taxis for
referring patients to Faizabad. Most rural clinics
charge 5000 N.Afs for a consultation. SCA-supported
clinics charge 2000 N.Afs, plus 40% of the cost of
drugs. In rural areas, families will quite often pay
35
36
37
38
39
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
for medical advice and drugs with food rather than
cash.
Despite the fact that these costs are not high, in
many remote rural areas poor people simply do not
have money, as they use barter rather than cash to
obtain their basic needs. As a result many people
say they cannot afford to go to the clinic and herbal
remedies are used by all families to treat such things
as coughs, colds, gastritis and rheumatism. These
herbs are gathered from the hills and fields and
distilled at home. Knowledge of herbal remedies
seems common.
Health Problems
The paucity of health information for Badakhshan
makes it difficult to comment with any degree of
certainty on the health situation of the population.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a general agreement
that key health problems are malaria, TB, respiratory
infections, diarrhoea, measles and whooping cough36
Chronic malnutrition was widely acknowledged as
a problem, as were problems associated with
childbirth. Infant and maternal mortality is commonly
thought to be high and all the anecdotal evidence
supports this, although there is, as always, an absence
of statistics.
Several districts experienced outbreaks of measles
in 2000, resulting in deaths. Of the measles cases
or post-measles complications presenting at Baharak
clinic, 62% were children under five. The AfghanAid
survey of Zebak, Warduj and Argu districts reported
measles and whooping cough as major causes of
death, but also noted that people themselves often
do not know the cause of death. In about 50% of
cases of child deaths the respondents were unable
to name the cause of death.37 There was also an
outbreak of a virulent strain of influenza in Darwaz
that led to a number of deaths at the beginning of
2000.38 In March 2001 the district of Ragh saw
many children and elderly people dying because
of a combination of measles, ARI and lack of food
due to the conditions brought on by the drought.
An joint agency assessment mission in late March
200139 found that in one village of 100 households
ACF, Faizabad 2000
See for example MSF, Medair and AfghanAid reports.
In about 50% of cases of child dealts the respondents were unable to name the cause of death and in the first year of life the
unspecified catagory Ôchildhood diseasesÕ took another 15%, leaving th erest victims of whooping cough (14%) or measles (7%).
In response, WHO and SCA went in by helicopter and MSF and Medair from Tajikistan.
MAC Mission report, 29/03/01.
37
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
60 people, mostly children, had died since Ramazan
(three months earlier) and in a number of other
villages around one third of families had lost someone
over that time period.
MSF hospital data shows a seasonal pattern for a
number of diseases. Numbers of malaria cases were
very high between August and October (though MSF
question the reliability of the laboratory services). For
diarrhoea the high was in July, and for ARI it was over
winter. Of the diarrhoea cases, 70% were children
and between 25% to 40% of the cases were bloody
diarrhoea. Respiratory infections mostly affected
children under 5 years (from 40% to 50% of cases)
and increased greatly in winter - from 10% hospital
cases in summer, up to 40% in winter. If a child arrives
too late to the hospital, pneumonia and bronchitis
cases can be fatal.
Hermione Youngs
Health care for ante natal and post natal women is
extremely limited. It is common for women to have
frequent pregnancies and to suffer from poor
nutrition. Many women die in childbirth - although
reliable figures are limited, the overall picture told
by agencies is consistent. In Shegnan, NAC report
that the infant mortality rate was very high - according
to the women there at least 50% of children die
before they reach the age of 3 years, and people
spoke of having 13 children and keeping only four.40
Focus reports that in the villages where they did
interviews, families had lost on average 2 to 3
children in early childhood, compared with 4 to 6
who survived.41 Out of 20 households interviewed
in Eshkeshem, Wakhan and Zebak, with a total of
148 children, 39% of the children had died, plus 4
mothers. In Baharak MSF statistics showed between
30% to 50% of pregnant women are at risk, either
because of former complicated deliveries or having
had more than six deliveries. Although they ask
such women to come to the clinic for delivery, the
tradition of women delivering at home is strong and
women rarely come to the clinic until after a
complication has occurred. MSF noted that 70% of
women coming to the Baharak clinic had a goiter
and about 15% had anaemia.
Girls at School
40
41
NAC 2000.
Focus, Stepping out of Poverty, 1998.
38
Malnutrition amongst children is cited by almost
everyone as a major problem. Interviewing in
Shegnan, NAC recorded how both the doctor and
the women expressed concerns at the degree of
malnutrition amongst the children. All the children
observed were stunted in their growth: Ômost 8
year-olds looked four.Õ The AfghanAid report found
child mortality high in all three districts they surveyed,
with more than a quarter of children in all districts
dying before age 13. Rates were particularly high
in the first five years, with almost one child in five
dying before reaching age six. Focus has undertaken
monitoring alongside its distributions in 10 districts
and reports 5% moderate malnutrition and 1.2%
severe malnutrition. The worst figures are found in
Wakhan, with 6.2% moderate malnutrition and 71%
stunting. On the other hand, MSF in Eshkeshem
said that the nutrition situation did not give cause
for concern.
In September 2000, ACF undertook a nutrition survey
in Faizabad.42 The global acute malnutrition score
was 8.9%, a higher rate than that found in other
cities. This they believed was related to three factors,
the first concerned with the time of survey Ð which
was conducted at the end of the summer, a time
when diarrhoea and associated malnutrition always
increase in Afghanistan - the other two concerned
general living conditions in Faizabad. The first of
these other factors relates to the precarious food
security situation in the province, believed to be
one of the most food-insecure in the country. The
second concerned the overall health environment,
the lack of primary health care facilities, low
vaccination rates, low use of maternal and child
health services, lack of education about basic hygiene
and a poor sanitation situation. The rate of chronic
malnutrition (severe stunting 19.7%, stunting 47.0%)
was similar to Herat and lower than Kandahar and
Kabul, but was nevertheless extremely high. Child
feeding practices were seen as another problem,
with weaning foods introduced too early and children
given insufficiently balanced foods and foods not
well adapted to the age of the child.
Opium addiction is a problem in a number of places,
not only in itself but because it takes scare resources
away from meeting the need for food. Informants
in Wakhan calculated that ten days supply of opium
costs three sers of wheat at the beginning of the
year, one ser immediately before harvest, and half
42
43
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
a ser at harvest time. In 1995 AfghanAid calculated
that even a light smoker would in a year consume
the equivalent of 485kg of wheat, enough to feed
an average family for three to four months.
Serious addiction occurs in Wakhan, Shegnan,
Eshkeshem and Zebak and amongst certain
communities in Darwaz. A 1995 UNDCP survey
estimated that there were between 7,000 and 9,000
opium addicts in Badakhshan, using on average
four grams a day. Other estimates suggest the amount
consumed is higher than this, from one tooli
(18.5gms) a day to one tooli every three or four
days. A conservative estimate is that at least half
the households in Wakhan and two thirds of those
in Eshkeshem and Shegnan have at least one member
who is an addict. Estimates go as high as 90% of
all adults in some villages.43 Children sometimes
become addicted in infancy due to the use of opium
as a medicine or to quieten children. The Focus
report spoke of praise for the ORA detoxification
clinics, but the people we interviewed all said that
Dr. Eqbal
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
Women & children have to walk several days to get to
the nearest Health Care Centre
ACF, Faizabad 2000.
Focus 1998.
39
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
most people returned to the habit. This seems not
unlikely given that they are returning to the same
social conditions that gave rise to the habit in the
first place.
Focus also reports an increase in heroin users in
communities bordering Tajikistan. This is a new
problem and was not evident even six years ago.
Health Interventions
MSF support two main activities in the Faizabad
hospital Ð outpatient MCH service and the in-patient
service for children and women. The outpatient
activities are comprised of consultations for
pregnancy and family planning for women, and the
clinic also provides a nutritional intervention. Iron
and drugs to treat complications due to pregnancy
are provided, along with contraception. MSF report
that the attendance is increasing even for family
planning (from 70 to 100 women per month). On
the in-patient side there is a delivery room which
deals with normal deliveries (20 to 30% of cases),
complicated deliveries (10%), and post-delivery
complications like placenta retention, incomplete
abortion and post partum infections and bleeding
(25% to 45% of cases).
In addition to these services in the hospital, MSF
also supports the clinics in Baharak, Eshkeshem
and Zeebak. MSF reported that having a female
obstetrics and gynaecological doctor and a midwife
was a real breakthrough for the womenÕs health
activities. Consultations for pregnant women were
scheduled twice a week, with a focus on health
education and the identification of complications.
Systematic referral to the vaccination roomÊof
UNICEF is done. Post-natal care and requests for
family planning happen every day. New protocols
were started in order to improve the follow-up of
pregnant women. Systematic distribution of iodine
started in May, as well as systematic detection of
goiters.
In Baharak approximately one thousand pregnant
women benefited from the services in 2000. There
was an increase in women having more than two
consultations during pregnancy - a good indicator
of a better understanding of the use of a proper
follow-up. However, the number of post-natal
consultations was still low; women were staying
44
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
home 40 days after delivery and would only move
to the clinic with severe signs such as bleeding,
high pains, fever, showing placenta retention and/or
genital infection - by which time they often had to
be referred to Faizabad.
MSF completed a TBA training program in Eshkeshem
and has established a programme of a regular follow
up of the TBAs, with a field visit from the nurse in
charge, a monthly refresher course/meeting at the
clinic, and records of activity. In general, though,
the availability of TBAs was very variable and there
was no information on their level of training. People
said that some of the older women act as ÔdiasÕ but
that they were not trained. Most problems during
birth are taken care of by relatives or by the mullah,
who would give amulets or written verses from the
Koran. MoPH reported major problems with earlier
WHO training of TBAs. Over five years 260 were
trained but there was reportedly a lack of followup and it is not now known how many are practising.
MoPH say they wish to have a programme of phased
training for TABs with regular follow-up but that
their Ôhand is emptyÕ and they are reliant on what
the international community brings. They also have
plans to increase the number of MCH clinics in the
province Ð at present there are five, they plan to
have ten.
Vaccination activities are supervised by WHO and
mass vaccination campaigns for polio and measles
are run in collaboration with UNICEF. The AfghanAid
report states that in Argu, Warduj and Zebak,
immunisation rates for BCG, DTP, OPV and measles
were high (between 75 and 93%), but the percentage
of women vaccinated against tetanus was low
(between 48% in Argu and 27% in Zebak). However,
the recent deaths in Ragh and Shar-i-Buzurg suggest
that this state of affairs is not typical. ACF also noted
low immunisation coverage for measles (for children
above nine months) and for tetanus for mothers.
MoPH noted that staff in Keshem had reported a
decrease in malaria this year because of distribution
of bed nets.44Ê
There has been a TB programme running since 1996
and supported by WHO, but there are major
problems in follow up for patients coming from
remote rural areas, with doctors reporting that most
patients did not return to Faizabad to complete TB
WHO supplied the bednets and SCA administered the programme, supplying bed nets through their clinics.
40
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
treatment. The commitment of the authorities
towards the TB programmes was thought to be good,
although they did not have many resources to offer.
Most anti TB drugs are easily available in the bazaar.
In terms of nutrition programmes, Focus has recently
started to give dry rations to children in 10 districts,
accompanied by measurement of children. MSF
also has programmes running out of its clinics in
Baharak and Eshkeshem. In Eshkeshem the number
of defaulters are low, but MSF are unsure of the
success of the programme in Baharak as weight
gains are below recommended figures and the
default rate is high. They have started a programme
of research to try and understand the reasons for
defaulting.
EDUCATION AND HEALTH
The SCA clinics will have female doctors in their
MCH clinics, male doctors in their C1clinics, and
mid level health workers in their C2 clinics.
Merlin (who worked in Badakhshan until 1998) had
supported the training of nurses when there was a
nursing school attached to the hospital. The support
was material and technical. This school trained
mostly young women from the city and did not
contribute to the district female health manpower.
Many young men did come from the districts. The
nursing school had been run by the authorities and
the teaching staff were all doctors who had no
knowledge or experience of teaching nurses. There
is no new training of any of the other cadres.
Environmental Health Issues
The AfghanAid survey reported that health education
had been provided to 41% of the population in
Zebak, 34% in Argu and only 1.5% in Warduj.
Health education did not seem to make much
difference to immunisation rates, increasing them
only by about 10% in Zebak and 6% in Argu. In
some cases a negative correlation was experienced
for which no explanation was given. Levels of
familiarity with ORS as a treatment for diarrhoea
were low and did not appear to be significantly
improved by health education.
Human Resources
The medical cadres in the province include male
and female doctors, mid level health workers, nurses,
midwives, laboratory technicians, X-ray technicians,
physiotherapists and pharmacists. Most of the skilled
staff are concentrated in Faizabad and the 'specialists'
are all working in the city. These specialists are not
necessarily those who have undergone the
recognised training, rather most have had short
courses and/or some experience. There is a senior
physician and obstetrician in the hospital. All of
these people have been trained in earlier years.
Some new graduates from the University of Balkh
have come to the province; however, there has been
little development of new health manpower in the
whole of Afghanistan. The policy of the authorities
not to allow the doctors to leave has kept many of
them in the area, though this has relaxed a bit recently.
Access to clean water and to adequate sanitation
are important determinants of peopleÕs health. In
Badakhshan access to clean water was extremely
variable. From the 45 villages surveyed for this
report, figures ranged from 11 villages claiming 95100% of the population had access to clean water
to 24 villages saying zero percent had access.
AfghanAid reported that spring water was the major
source of drinking water in the villages they surveyed
but that in only in three villages had springs been
improved. Urban areas generally have very poor
water and children in Faizabad and Keshem can
regularly be seen fetching drinking water from filthy
ditches. UNOPS have supported a well digging
programme in Keshem town, but the high water
table has caused problems with pollution.
Even when water is clean at source, lack of sanitation
means that it may well become contaminated before
use. In only six of the villages surveyed did more
than half the population have access to sanitation,
and even then the latrines are often not used. In 15
villages there was no sanitation at all. Frequent use
of drinking water sources by animals also means
that it is likely to be contaminated. In 2000, the
drought created a further problem, with a general
reduction in availability of water. Springs in Yaftal
and Shar-i-Buzurg, for example, gave only 25% of
their normal output.
The clinics have differing staffing patterns. The MSF
clinics in Baharak and Eskeshem have female doctors.
41
The Assistance Programme
Agency Activity
some emergency grants.
There has been a long history of agency involvement
in Badakhshan, although the pattern is uneven with
some districts having virtually no agency activity.
Furthermore, despite the fact that some agencies
have made a deliberate effort to work in remote
areas, there is still overall a concentration of activity
in areas accessible from roads.
ICRC do not have a major long term presence in
the area, preferring to work through their partner
ARCS, but they do have the capacity to gear up
quickly in case of emergencies and they mounted
major programmes in response to the earthquake
and IDPs. This has sometimes created tensions
between them and agencies with a longer-term
presence.
Agencies themselves have very different patterns of
working. From the UN side, WFP is by far the largest
player, distributing 9,729 MT of wheat in 2000
(compared to 4,709MT in 1999). A clear policy
decision was taken in 2000 to avoid free wheat
distribution and go for FFW because of the difficulty
of targeting the right beneficiaries and a wish not
to undermine FFW by handing out free food. Lack
of NGO implementing capacity has been a problem
and WFP pioneered community-implemented FFW
schemes, some of which worked very well whilst
others were less successful.
Focus is the other agency to have a large amount
of wheat and they both undertake free food
distributions (which are untargeted)45 and give wheat
to other NGOs for FFW.
A large amount of the FFW has gone on road
construction. In 2000 alone 490 km of roads were
improved through FFW schemes. Acted, AfghanAid,
Oxfam and NAC all implemented road improvement
schemes with FFW, in addition to some schemes
which WFP undertook directly with the community.
Of the other UN agencies, UNICEF supports
education throughout the province by the provision
of educational materials, resources for teacher
training and provision of an educational database.
It also supports work in the health sector. WHO has
a small local staff to support health activities and
FAO also have a small presence, with a local staff
member working in Faizabad district but with few
resources. The UNOPS programme seems somewhat
problematic. They have worked with community
organisations in Faizabad and Keshem areas, but in
Faizabad the womenÕs organisation they set up
parallels another womenÕs organisation set up several
years earlier (and still active), though both have
different political allegiances. They have also built
a number of clinic buildings which still stand empty.
UNOCHA provide overall co-ordination, flights and
45
Of the NGOs working in the area, NAC and
AfghanAid have been there longest and, along with
Focus, have the biggest programmes. Both NAC and
AfghanAid have multi sectoral programmes and
work in a number of districts. Focus supports its
programmes from the Tajikistan side; so far these
have been largely geared to distributions, although
there are plans to move more into FFW and even
longer-term development. They have also steadily
increased the districts in which they work. SCA has
a small agricultural programme in Keshem and
undertakes health and education work in a number
of districts. Oxfam has a substantial programme in
Shar-i-Buzurg but does not work in any other districts.
Acted is mainly working over the border in Takhar
but does undertake some emergency and rural
rehabilitation work in Badakhshan. Concern has a
few small projects in a number of districts, ORA is
specifically focused on drug rehabilitation and MCI
is very new to the area. Medair has plans to begin
health work in 2001.
Co-ordination
Most agencies believed that information sharing
between agencies working in the province had
improved, but that there was still some way to go
in terms of real co-ordination. It is clear that, as in
most places, issues of agency profile have sometimes
got in the way of good co-ordination Ð and this is
true of both NGO and UN agencies.
Communication problems between the staff based
in the field and staff at the country programme office
have also been an issue for a number of organisations,
and this has compounded the co-ordination problem.
This is exacerbated by the fact that many
organisations do not have senior staff in the field in
Badakhshan.
Different operational bases add to the difficulty.
Focus, for example, operates its Badakhshan
Focus staff say that they intend in 2001 to move away from general distributions to targeted FFW.
42
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
programme out of Khorog in Tajikistan, which
increases the problems of co-ordination with other
agencies who are Peshawar/Islamabad based. The
other side of this coin is, however, that this base
enables Focus to reach areas that other agencies do
not have access to. The problem of coordination
with Focus was exacerbated by the fact that its main
office for Badakhshan was in Baharak, whilst all
other agencies were Faizabad based. Focus staff
were aware of the problems and moved their office
to Faizabad last September and are appointing senior
staff to work from there; they believe that this will
greatly improve co-ordination.
Impact
Whilst it is not within the remit of this study to
evaluate individual agency programmes, it is clear
that any assessment of overall impact can only be
derived from looking at the work on the ground.
In doing this, it becomes clear that despite some
very good work there are also some serious problems.
There are a number of reasons for this.
Secondly, the capacity did not exist last year in
Badakhshan to meet the scale of the needs. In general
the agency response to conflict-related IDPs was
seen to be good, with primary responsibility
remaining with the authorities, in conjunction in
Dr. Eqbal
One is that lack of senior staff input into Badakhshan
has clearly had an impact on quality. AfghanAid
has suffered particularly because its reliance on Dfid
funding has meant that for more than two years it
has been unable to send expatriate staff into the
country. It is, however, by no means the only
organisation to have been unable to support its
Badakhshan work adequately. The scale of the crisis
in Afghanistan in 2000 meant that many agencies
were over-stretched and did not have the staff to
give proper support to programmes. WFP and
UNOCHA were the only UN organisations to put
senior staff resources into Badakhshan last year. In
particular the lack of senior staff, and thus of
leadership, from FAO and UNICEF were noted with
regret. NAC and MSF were the only NGOs last year
to give serious expatriate support to their Badakhshan
programmes. This is not to argue that programmes
necessarily need resident expatriate managers, but
they do need adequate levels of support (both
technical and managerial) and this does involve
spending time in the province.
Afghan Aid Workers
43
THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
some areas with ARCS. Medical facilities were
deemed satisfactory, with SCA and MSF strengthening
their medical assistance. However, the scale of the
drought proved beyond existing agency capacity.
Although areas were covered to the best extent
possible, and this relieved pressure of people moving
into Faizabad town, by spring many people in the
worst affected districts had completely run out of
food.
Road improvement schemes were the major way
by which FFW was delivered and these were
considered to be of great benefit by community
leaders, opening up access to bazaars (with
consequent reduction in prices), to health care, and
to education, especially for senior boys. Roads also
lower the cost of other projects and can increase
agency activity in the more remote parts of the
province.47 How much they help the poorest and
how much they help women is more open to doubt.
It is also unclear what their negative effects might be.
On the whole agencies are seen as having a positive
impact on security, notwithstanding some of the
problems mentioned earlier in relation to leakage
of wheat. A number of agencies spoke of using
their influence as resource-providers to negotiate
for better security. For example, in Hazrat-i Sayyed,
NAC found that girls from one side of the village
were unable to attend the NAC-supported school
because of insecurity. At the time they were part
way through another project and by refusing to
complete it unless the dispute was solved they
managed, after two days of negotiations, to get the
commanders to make an agreement to resolve the
46
47
Dr. Eqbal
FFW helped reduce poppy cultivation in some areas
(or at least to offset the loss in income caused by
not growing)46 and reduced the pressure to migrate
in search of paid labour Ð which, in any case, was
not much to be found in 2000. On the negative
side, however, there was sometimes a significant
loss of wheat to commanders, this being a particular
problem where there was inadequate supervision
of projects. Major FFW schemes can also be
detrimental to development programmes, and there
were a number of reports of situations where people
had refused to undertake community participation
because they were working on FFW schemes.
NGO Worker
dispute. The girls from both side of the village
finished the educational year and the project
implementation continued with no more problems.
Focus also spoke of using food to leverage better
security, clearly saying to communities that they
could not work unless there was peace and stability.
It is not clear, however, whether that impact lasts
beyond the immediate life of the project.
The most worrying aspect in terms of impact is that
there is no agreed long-term strategy in any of the
key sectors, though individual agencies might have
their own strategies.
In health, relations with the authorities seem good
but lack of an overall strategy means impact is not
as great as it could be and there is a very uneven
level of provision across the district. MSF does some
high quality work but it reaches only a small
percentage of the population and other parts of the
province have been left with a fairly low level of
It is difficult to make a clear link as several things were happening at once: the Aga KhanÕs edict, NGOsÕ negotiating that they
would only do FFW if poppy growing was stopped, the fact that the drought made 2000 a bad year for poppy growing, the
general fall in prices caused by over-supply, and tightening border controls.
For example a noticeable increase in agency interest in Ragh has been observed since the road was undertaken.
44
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
support, if anything. A much more comprehensive
coverage of basic health care is needed. This should
include health education and community based
services, including much more training of TBAs.
The latter will, however, need to be properly followed
up and supported, otherwise it will be of little use.
Systems will need to be developed to refer people
to clinics where appropriate. Levels of immunisation
could be much improved, especially in the remote
areas Ð as evidenced by the number of children
who died of measles over the winter. Currently,
apart from Baharak, emergency obstetric care is not
available in the clinics and caesarian sections are
only performed in the provincial hospital. With the
logistical problems the province faces, development
of emergency obstetric care is necessary to reduce
maternal mortality and morbidity.
It is clear that agency support to education is greatly
valued, it is less clear what it achieves. Again, the
lack of an overall strategy is a major problem, and
UNICEFÕs decision to put resources into this area in
2001 is to be welcomed. There are clearly issues
about the quality and appropriateness of provision.
More of the same is not the answer. Children learn
to read and write in situations where, with the
exception of the few villages that have box libraries,
there are no materials to keep literacy going. They
do not learn the basics of health care or how to
protect the environment. The curriculum from grade
7-12 includes 14 subjects, but there are no qualified
teachers to teach them and virtually no materials.
The quality of both secondary and tertiary education
is extremely low. Teacher training is insufficient,
there is little classroom support and no coherent
strategy for supporting salaries. There has been little
development of alternatives to formal schools even
though many children, particularly girls, cannot
access the formal system. There is no agreement as
to what children are being educated for, of how
education relates to culture, or of what constitutes
quality. There is little understanding of why children
go to school, or why they drop out. Yet there is an
enormous community enthusiasm for education that
could be harnessed.
Perhaps most worrying is the livelihoods situation.
Although exacerbated by the drought, the problems
of Badakhshan are deep-rooted and if not tackled
in a systematic way they will continue to recur as
48
THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
serial crises. Yet it is not clear that the assistance
effort has as yet had much impact on long term
poverty. At present we know little about how people
cope and how the various components of their
livelihoods fit together, either at a household or a
village level. There is no coherent agricultural
strategy for the province, nor the understanding
upon which to build one. A number of agencies
undertake some work in agriculture but it is
piecemeal and uncoordinated. This lack of coordination and leadership will seriously inhibit
recovery programmes. It is clear that there has been
a major loss of assets and an associated increase in
vulnerability; it is not clear what the solution to this
is. Although there is discussion of the need for a
seed programme, there appears to be no analysis
of how this might work for different sections of the
community, who might benefit and who might be
impoverished, what effect it will have on social
relations. There is also no clear strategy in relation
to environmental issues or to rangeland management,
nor is there a comprehensive policy in relation to
livestock.
Urban areas pose even more of a problem as there
is very little understanding of how the urban
economy functions, and thus of what opportunities
there might be for intervention. There are certainly
skill shortages but no one as yet has done anything
about addressing this issue, nor at looking at the
role of credit in either the urban or rural economy.
Given the usurious rates extracted by those offering
loans linked to poppy production, this is clearly a
major issue.48
As noted at the beginning of this section, despite
the efforts of a few agencies, activity tends to cluster
along roads. In particular, the districts of Darwaz,
Khwahan, Ragh, Shegnan, Wakhan (except along
the Eshkeshem to Khandud road), Shar-i-Buzurg,
Darayam, Teshkan and Upper Keshem Valley have
seen very little agency work. The smaller pockets
of Khosh, Sarghilan and Shohadda are also neglected
but are likely to remain a problem because of the
poor security situation in these districts.
Some agencies are still very Peshawar based and
this is both an expensive use of resources and renders
them unable to operate in uncertain security. It was,
for example, noticeable that when the Taliban first
took Taloqan some agencies withdrew not only their
There is solid experience in other areas of Afghanistan which could be drawn to develop appropriate interventions here, for
example SC-USÕs long running credit programmes in Mazar and north Afghanistan.
45
SMU AREA REPORTS BADAKHSHAN
THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
expatriate staff but also their senior Afghan staff (as
their base was Peshawar) and effectively ceased to
function for many months at a time of emergency.
Constraints
The difficulties of working in Badakhshan are many,
but they are not insuperable.
The isolation of the province is a problem. Better
flight access would help: at present agencies have
a choice of very irregular ICRC flights or very
expensive UN ones, or they charter Pactec.49 But
most of Badakhshan is far even from Faizabad and
it is necessary for agencies to develop ways of
working that fit with a remote area with a long
winter season. More recruitment of, and investment
in, local staff is needed.
and it is a problem that has become worse since
the Taliban took Taloqan Ð the main supply route
for most goods. Better co-operation amongst agencies
in accessing goods from Tajikistan would help in
this regard.
Security is another problem, not just because of
inter-factional fighting but also because of the
nearness to frontlines. But it is rarely at a level that
stops work altogether and those agencies that have
invested in good local staff have been able to
continue working on a more or less continuous
basis.
Finding ways to work well in Badakhshan does
however require a long-term commitment to the
area and this in turn means funding. Lack of a secure
funding base has been a problem for a lot of agencies.
Hermione Youngs
Logistics are a particular problem given the
combination of remoteness and political isolation,
Relief aid going into Shar-i-Buzurg
49
A small NGO airline.
46
Key Recommendations
Overall
1. An agreed inter-agency strategy needs to be
developed for the province in the three key
areas of livelihoods, health and education. It
should have clear targets, be realistic and
achievable within 3- 5 years. It should clearly
focus on priorities Ð a comprehensive plan that
is outside the capacity of agencies to deliver,
or the willingness of donors to fund, will not
be helpful.
2. Working groups should be set up for the three
main areas of work. Each should have a lead
person who has the necessary time and skills
to give real leadership to the work in that sector.
3. Key indicators should be agreed to measure
progress, and a system set up for monitoring.
Livelihoods
1. Recognising that we have both an immediate
problem and a long term one there needs to be
a twin-track approach.
2. Research should be undertaken to understand
how different sectors of the community have
coped with the drought and how best to support
their recovery.
3. A recovery programme should be designed with
clear targets and indicators to match. It should
be monitored and information fed back in an
ongoing action-research process.
4. At the same time it has to be recognised that
people are hungry now and programmes have
to be put in place to meet these immediate
needs.
5. It may be that given the dual nature of the
problem, two lead people should be appointed,
one for the short term and one the long. It is,
however, important that they work closely
together so that the short term supports the long
and does not undermine it.
6. Roles for the different agencies, UN and NGO,
should be agreed in such a way that they
complement each other and maximise impact.
schools. All of this should specifically look at
the situation of girls as well as boys.
2. An education strategy should be developed
which looks at the range of issues identified in
this report, including materials, support to
teachers and salaries for teachers. The strategy
should take into account the fact that whilst all
children need skills for life, Afghanistan also
needs an education strategy that will allow some
to progress to be the professionals that the
country will continue to need.
3. As with livelihoods, targets and indicators should
be defined and an on going process of action
research entered into.
Health
1. A plan for more comprehensive coverage of
basic health care, including health education
and community based services, should be
developed. This should include more training
of TBAs - properly followed up and supported.
2. Systems will need to be developed to refer
people to clinics where appropriate.
3. Levels of immunisation should be improved,
especially in the remote areas.
4. MoPH should be involved in health planning.
5. Again, targets and indicators
developed.
should be
Donors
1. This work cannot be done without funding.
Donors need to take at least a medium term
view of the problem and to recognise that even
emergency interventions cannot be adequately
undertaken without an investment in
organisations and people.
Education
2. Donors should be asked to back the Badakhshan
plan on a 3-5 year basis, on the clear agreement
that targets will be set, indicators agreed, and
agencies hold themselves accountable to these.
1. Research should be undertaken into the quality
and appropriateness of provision, issues of
access and of drop out, community support for
education and the role of alternatives to formal
3. The plan should be considered a pilot and a
sum of money be set aside for an independent
evaluation process that will feed in findings in
a on-going way.
47