EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP
21 December 2007
Translation from Finnish into English
EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP
Ambassador Antti Sierla
21 December 2007
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Contents
1. PREAMBLE.................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2. TASKS AND EVOLUTION OF NATO ....................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY .................................................................................................................................................. 6
2.2 FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF NATO ................................................................................................................................................ 7
2.3 NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION PROGRAMMES ........................................................................................... 8
2.4 ENLARGEMENT OF NATO ........................................................................................................................................................... 9
2.5 NATO'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 11
2.6 DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF NATO ....................................................................................................................................... 12
2.7 DECISION-MAKING AND ORGANISATION OF NATO.................................................................................................................... 13
2.8 ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN NATO.................................................................................................................................... 15
2.9 EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF NATO ............................................................................................................................... 16
2.10 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO ......................................................................................................................... 17
2.11 RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA .............................................................................................................................. 18
3. FINLAND'S COOPERATION WITH NATO ........................................................................................................................... 21
4. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ON THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVITIES..................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 FINLAND IN THE EU .................................................................................................................................................................. 24
4.2 FINLAND'S TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 25
4.3 FINLAND'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ..................................................................................................... 26
4.4 IMAGE OF FINLAND ................................................................................................................................................................... 27
4.4.1 Image of Finland abroad.................................................................................................................................................. 27
4.4.2 Mediation tasks................................................................................................................................................................. 28
4.4.3 Threat of terrorism ........................................................................................................................................................... 28
5. EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ON FINLAND'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES................. 30
5.1 EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ON THE DEFENCE OF THE FINNISH TERRITORY ....................................... 30
5.2 DEFENCE PLANNING .................................................................................................................................................................. 31
5.3 EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ON THE QUANTITATIVE LEVEL OF FINNISH MILITARY PARTICIPATION,
TROOPS AND CAPABILITIES IN NATO FORCE PLANNING .................................................................................................................. 32
5.4 CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM AND DECISION-MAKING ........................................................................................................................ 34
5.5 EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ON THE COUNTRY’S PARTICIPATION IN NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
5.6 ADDITIONAL COSTS CAUSED BY THE MEMBERSHIP ..................................................................................................................... 37
5.7 EFFECTS ON SECURITY OF SUPPLY.............................................................................................................................................. 39
5.8 ARMAMENTS COOPERATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 40
6. CENTRAL PRINCIPLES RELATED TO THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO .................................................................... 42
6.1 THE ALLIANCE STRIVES TO MAINTAIN ITS EFFICIENCY IN PERFORMING ITS CORE FUNCTIONS AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES . 42
6.2 MILITARY AND DEFENCE -RELATED EFFECTS OF THE ENLARGEMENT .......................................................................................... 42
6.2.1 Collective defence............................................................................................................................................................. 42
6.2.2 Command structure .......................................................................................................................................................... 43
6.2.3 Conventional forces - training and exercises ................................................................................................................... 43
6.2.4 Nuclear forces .................................................................................................................................................................. 44
6.2.5 Force structures................................................................................................................................................................ 44
6.2.6 Intelligence sharing .......................................................................................................................................................... 44
6.3 SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAMME ....................................................................................................................................... 44
6.4 ADMINISTRATION AND BUDGETS ............................................................................................................................................... 45
7. STAGES AND TIMEFRAME OF THE NATO MEMBERSHIP PROCESS......................................................................... 46
7.1 INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE ............................................................................................................................................................. 46
7.2 MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN ...................................................................................................................................................... 46
7.3 INVITING A COUNTRY TO BECOME A MEMBER ............................................................................................................................ 46
7.4 RATIFICATION OF THE ACCESSION PROTOCOL ........................................................................................................................... 47
8. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP.................................................................... 48
APPENDIX 1..................................................................................................................................................................................... 50
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1. Preamble
In the part of the Government Programme of Prime Minister Vanhanen's second Cabinet dealing with
foreign, security and defence policy, it is stated that the Government intends to prepare a new Report
on Security and Defence Policy based on a comprehensive concept of security. It is also noted that the
report will determine the long-term development plans and resources of the Finnish Defence Forces. At
the same time, an analysis will be made of the impacts of the security guarantees resulting from
Finland's EU membership, as well as the effects of military non-alignment and alignment of Finland on
the basis of which the country's military position will be assessed. As a part of this work, the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs has completed the present Report on the Effects of Finland's possible NATO
membership.
The expertise of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the National Emergency
Supply Agency and the Mission of Finland to NATO as well as NATO documents have been used in
preparing this report. The Report does not present an assessment of the security environment of
NATO or Finland, nor related threat scenarios, and it does not contain recommendations. The goal is
to contribute information and perspectives to the discussion on Finland's relations with NATO.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an intergovernmental organisation, which is influenced by
both the views of the member countries and developments taking place in the surrounding world.
Within NATO, decisions are made based on consensus deriving from political deliberation and
consulting. NATO has adapted to changes in its operational environment, a trend, which is likely to
continue.
A small country can attend to its national interests in NATO, but at the same time, members are
expected to take account of the interests of all the others. In this respect, NATO policies could be
compared to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: in both of them, the
working methods are intergovernmental, and decisions require the approval of all the member
countries. Individual countries can play an active role. As a member of NATO, it would be up to Finland
to determine what kind of member it would become.
The longer into the future the assessment spans, the more imprecise the assumptions will become.
During the past 20 years, NATO has changed considerably since the Cold War days. Preparing
against a threat of a massive attack from the outside has become considerably less important. Today,
NATO is first and foremost an organisation for Euro-Atlantic security policy and military cooperation,
conducting UN-mandated crisis management operations outside the territory of its member countries,
and contributing to security in Europe and its neighbouring regions using a range of military, political
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and other instruments promoting stability. In the future as well, NATO is expected to adapt to changes
in its operational environment in accordance with its own security interests.
Many issues related to Finland's possible NATO membership could be fully assessed only in the
process leading to membership in case a decision to start such a procedure were made. In respect of
the consideration of Finland's possible membership, the opinion of the general public is important.
NATO also considers it. Domestic considerations as well as the different stages in the membership
application process and the preparation for the membership in NATO would have an impact on the
timeframe within which Finland could possibly become a member. Even the most rapid timeframe
could not imply a NATO membership until in the next decade at the earliest. The assessments
presented in the present Report should therefore be updated in accordance with the circumstances
prevailing at that time.
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2. Tasks and Evolution of NATO
2.1 The North Atlantic Treaty
NATO was created through the North Atlantic or Washington Treaty in 19491. Article 5 of the Treaty
constitutes its very core by virtue of which the member countries commit themselves to the obligation
of providing mutual assistance:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the
Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."
Article 4 of the Treaty states as follows: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of
any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened".
The Treaty has proved to be strong and flexible. In the Cold War era, NATO was capable of adapting
to changing circumstances, but it has also been able to respond to the challenge posed by the
changed post-Cold War security environment and new threat scenarios. The NATO organisation was
established to create collective defence and as a response to a common threat, and it operated
successfully for four decades without ever having to resort to military power. The threat posed by the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was concrete and clear. At that time, the deterrence value of strong
defence was the key dimension of NATO's strategy. Later, both threat scenarios and the practical
functions of NATO have undergone considerable changes, but the North Atlantic Treaty has remained
the cornerstone of NATO.
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The text of the Treaty is appended.
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2.2 Fundamental Tasks of NATO
According to the North Atlantic Treaty, the fundamental task of NATO is to guarantee the freedom and
security of its member countries by political and military means. NATO safeguards and furthers the
Allies' common values of democracy, individual freedom, the rule of law, and the peaceful solution of
disputes. It provides a forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult together
on security challenges of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. Ever since it was
created, NATO has been an organisation for extensive transatlantic political cooperation.
The leading principle of the Alliance is the joint commitment and mutual cooperation of sovereign
states for the indivisible security of each and every one of them. Solidarity and cohesion within the
Alliance ensure, through daily cooperation in the political and military spheres, that no single member
country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in addressing fundamental security
challenges. NATO membership does not revoke the rights and obligations of the member countries to
assume national responsibilities on their security. However, the Alliance strengthens their security by
means of cooperation.
The fundamental tasks of NATO are defined in the Strategic Concept, which is revised when needed in
accordance with the changes taking place in the security environment. The Strategic Concept, revised
in 1999, commits the Allies not only to collective defence but also to peace and stability within the
framework of a broader Euro-Atlantic area.
In accordance with the Strategic Concept, NATO's fundamental task is to serve as a consultation forum
for addressing security threats, to prevent them and to defend the Alliance against them. In the EuroAtlantic area, the tasks also include conflict prevention and crisis management as well as fostering
partnership, dialogue and cooperation with the other states of the area.
The Strategic Concept emphasises the comprehensive concept of security, encompassing political,
economic, social and environmental factors. The Alliance's defence dimension includes factors such as
a strong commitment to transatlantic relations, the maintenance of the Alliance's military capabilities to
ensure the effectiveness of military operations, and the development of European capabilities within
the Alliance. Moreover, the tasks of NATO comprise the maintenance of adequate conflict prevention
and crisis management structures and procedures, as well as continuing efforts towards far-reaching
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. NATO also cooperates effectively with
non-member countries, observing a policy of open doors towards potential new members.
As a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 on American soil, NATO decided for the first time in its
history to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. An armed attack against one member was
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considered an armed attack against all. Under these circumstances, the United States invoked its right
to self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations, relying mainly on its national resources, with
the support of states willing and capable of lending support. For its part, NATO launched its Operation
Active Endeavour which at present is still in operation, and sent radar planes to survey the US
airspace.
Later, the governments of the Alliance member countries have adopted clear principles as regards
responding to security challenges after the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks. They have agreed to stay in
readiness to help each other in efforts to prevent and combat terrorism. This may also imply action
against terrorists and actors protecting them, as required and whenever the North Atlantic Council
adopts such measures by consensus. NATO may also support other organisations by providing them
with resources on a case by case basis. This new operational concept requires the constant
strengthening and renewal of defence capabilities, taking into account that threats against security and
stability do not remain unchanged.
NATO's original task, prevention of threats of an attack from the outside, is no longer as central in
NATO's daily functions as it used to be. Within NATO, it is estimated that, in the next ten years at least,
the Alliance will not face such a military threat which it would not be able to respond to. The Cold War
era having ended, NATO has focused its attention to contributing to stability in Europe and to military
crisis management. NATO-led military crisis management operations are under way outside the
European continent, too, for example in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO has become an important actor in
international crisis management. Nevertheless, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and its
commitment to collective defence remain the very core of the Alliance and the cohesive force that
keeps it together. In its defence planning, NATO still takes account of potential threats against the
territories of its members.
2.3 NATO Partnership for Peace and Cooperation Programmes
With the end of the East-West confrontation and the threat of a conventional military attack having
receded, NATO set out to create close cooperation relationships with former Warsaw Pact member
states and, later on, with other European countries. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC
was founded in 1991, and the Partnership for Peace, PfP, in 1994 to foster cooperation, with almost all
of the then OSCE members joining in.
In 1997, the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, comprising the
NATO member countries and the PfP-countries. The EAPC creates a contractual framework for the
cooperation between NATO and its partners. However, it has gradually lost some of its importance as
a forum for NATO partnership cooperation, partly because many partners have become members of
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NATO. At the same time, there has been an increase in the number of meetings between NATO
member countries and countries that contribute troops to NATO-led military crisis management
operations or support them in other ways.
The NATO-Russia Council, founded in 2002, serves as a framework for cooperation between NATO
and Russia. It replaced the Permanent Cooperation Council of NATO and Russia, set up in 1997. Ever
since 1997, cooperation with Ukraine has been carried out within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine
Commission. Both Russia and Ukraine are also members of the EAPC.
Furthermore, there is a cooperation forum under the Mediterranean Dialogue between NATO and
seven countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with
Persian Gulf countries. In recent years, cooperation has been stepped up with states participating in
NATO-led military crisis management operations or those supporting them, including Australia, Japan,
New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. NATO is also strengthening its cooperation with the EU and
international organisations, including the UN, the OSCE and the World Bank. The preparation of a
cooperation arrangement with the UN, which has lasted for a long time, is expected to become
finalised in the spring 2008.
All in all, more than 40 countries in Europe, Asia, Oceania, Africa and South America are currently
included in NATO partnership or cooperation programmes or official bilateral relations. With 26 NATO
member countries, NATO cooperation covers over 60 countries, which represents about one third of
the UN membership.
2.4 Enlargement of NATO
During the Cold War era, NATO underwent three enlargements. Greece and Turkey became members
in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain 1982. The aim was to increase stability and security in
Europe. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, NATO has accepted the membership of ten new
countries. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined in and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia become members in 2004. Today, NATO has
26 members, two of them from North America and 24 from Europe. 21 of the European member
countries are also members of the EU. Out of the six European Union member states which are not
members of NATO, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria are NATO's partner countries.
Any European country which promotes the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the principles of the
North Atlantic Treaty is eligible for applying for membership of NATO. Moreover, applicant states must
satisfy certain political, economic and military criteria before being entitled to receive a membership
invitation. At the moment, three Western Balkan countries Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav
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Republic of Macedonia, are taking part in the NATO Membership Action Plan. In addition, Georgia and
Ukraine have declared NATO membership as their objective.
Figure 1: NATO, EU and EAPC countries
After the Cold War, countries joining NATO sought support for their independence and made efforts to
strengthen their defence relying on the Alliance. For them, permanent U.S. presence in Europe has
been crucial. Moreover, military cooperation within the EU relies on NATO in a number of ways either
directly or indirectly. NATO plays an important role in European cooperation, in particular through the
collective defence and other military and related political cooperation. The majority of the people
working for NATO Secretariats and Headquarters are Europeans.
NATO has occupied and still has a major role in the reunification of Europe, too. The prerequisites that
have to be met by countries willing to become members of NATO, such as the democratic control of
armed forces and good relations with neighbouring states, have contributed to the enlargement of the
EU, too. The enlargements of NATO and the EU have taken place concurrently and shared parallel
goals. Both of them aim to enlarge the area of stability, security and well-being by means of
cooperation. Since the Cold War, the enlargements of both the EU and NATO have indeed
strengthened stability, also in Finland's neighbouring areas.
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2.5 NATO's Crisis Management Functions
The dramatic events in the Western Balkans during the past decade led NATO, for the first time in its
history, to take on peacekeeping tasks in conflict areas outside the Alliance territory. This opened a
route for NATO to become one of the key actors in multinational military crisis management, creating a
foundation for large-scale cooperation arrangements with other organisations.
Currently, a total of approximately 60,000 soldiers operate in NATO-led, UN-mandated military crisis
management operations on three continents. Moreover, NATO countries have a large number of
troops serving in other operations. At the moment, the only NATO-led operation in Europe is KFOR
(Kosovo Force) in Kosovo. However, NATO has headquarters in Sarajevo and Skopje, too. NATO is
committed to continuing its presence in Kosovo even after a solution on the status of the country will
have been reached. Thus, NATO is a key contributor to stability and security in the Western Balkans,
creating conditions for the development of the region.
The majority, or 45,000 of the soldiers assigned to NATO operations, serve in the International Security
Assistance Force, ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This is the most challenging operational task ever
taken on by NATO so far. The share of European military participation is a little over fifty percent. The
new procedures and tools of the Alliance are tested in practice in Afghanistan. The transformation of
the Defence Forces of the NATO members has been realised at a concrete level in field operations. In
this context, many states participating in the operation have come to realise that the interoperability
and performance of their Armed Forces should be further improved. This has become particularly
evident in their cooperation with the United States Armed Forces that have sophisticated capabilities.
The operation in Afghanistan has had a crucial impact on the development of the comprehensive crisis
management concept of NATO, currently applied to all crisis management. The concept aims at
promoting cooperation between civilian and military actors since experience has shown that stability
and development should be promoted hand in hand, by means of mutual support. This view has
accentuated the need for cooperation and coordination between international actors. The application of
the comprehensive crisis management concept is based on Denmark's initiative. This proves that even
a small country may make a major contribution to the activities of NATO.
It has been hard to get the ISAF operation to full strength. Actual fighting in the South of Afghanistan
and casualties to NATO forces have led many countries to discuss the acceptability of their
participation. The costs of operations in a far-away, sparsely populated country with poor transportation
connections are higher than in the missions in the Western Balkans. This has influenced the level of
contributions to ISAF. All NATO Allies do not regard the current burden-sharing as equitable, which
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has increased debate about solidarity. According to NATO estimates, it will take years, perhaps even
decades to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan.
Due to the rotation of troops, taking part in crisis management operations requires about three times
the number of troops actually deployed in the field. Some of the troops are in operations, some in
training, some taking time off to rest and some are engaged in other duties. This has become evident
both in the difficulty to satisfy all the requests for resources to NATO crisis management operations as
well as the implementation of the concept of the NATO Response Force, NRF. Generating the forces
and other capabilities required by the NRF has proved to be a bigger challenge than anticipated, in
particular to European NATO countries. At the same time, it has been considered improbable that
NATO would unexpectedly be compelled to despatch an entire NRF out to an operation. Foreseeable
missions requiring rapid response can be performed by considerably smaller forces. Therefore, NATO
has taken the decision to temporarily adjust the implementation of the concept by maintaining a
considerably smaller force in high readiness. NATO intends to resume the original practice and the
strength of 25,000 soldiers as soon as the demand for resources for simultaneous operations in the
world has diminished.
2.6 Development Prospects of NATO
During recent years, the evolution of NATO has been characterised by the fact that its operational
focus has been on crisis management. In addition to this, the importance of civilian emergency and
humanitarian tasks has increased alongside with military activities. Operating outside the Alliance area
has broadened the scope of security policy dialogue within NATO. NATO has become an increasingly
global actor. It does not, however, intend to become a global organisation. With threats against the
Euro-Atlantic area occurring further away from the Allied area, NATO has expanded its operational
environment further away and established new cooperation relations with countries also affected by
these new threats. Meetings with countries participating in operations are important in this respect as
well. Nevertheless, NATO still remains essentially an organisation for cooperation between North
America and Europe.
A study concerning the evolution of some international actors until 2030, commissioned by the Ministry
of Defence of Finland, contains estimates regarding NATO, too. Its European member countries are
estimated to develop their defence forces so that they will be better capable of assuming crisis
management tasks. The current dominant role of NATO in the planning and preparation of crisis
management operations will be challenged more strongly. This refers to the EU's reinforced role in
crisis management, which is likely in the light of current developments. However, for its European
member countries NATO is expected to remain the key actor in the process of transformation of their
defence forces as far as the provision of troops, the setting up of operational principles and technical
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solutions are concerned. As far as the development of the Alliance and its duties are concerned, there
may be differences in the views of its European members and the United States, with the European
views becoming stronger in NATO. The energy production areas in the Middle East and Central Asia
are expected to remain unstable and, consequently, to keep attracting the attention of NATO member
countries. Civilian activities are assumed to increase in parallel with military operations, and NATO's
enlargement is expected to be limited to Europe. As far as NATO's risks are concerned, the study
mentions the possibility of weak performance in operations and differing views of member countries
about burden-sharing. Western values and the western way of life might lose some of their popularity
in the world, which could limit the Alliance's possibilities to operate.
Within NATO, the member countries emphasize the duties of the organisation differently depending on
how they conceive the threats they may encounter. Some members see security in Europe in an
increasingly global context, while others view it from a more traditional perspective linked with their
neighbouring area. To some, NATO could be a more broad-based actor than it currently is while others
would like NATO to focus on its military core tasks and the EU to become stronger as an international
actor with a broad spectrum of capabilities.
In the next few years, NATO countries are expected to make an in-depth review of the security
environment of the Alliance, of the key duties deriving from it, and of its relations with its key
cooperation partners. This is likely to be done in connection with the revision of NATO's Strategic
Concept. As stated earlier, the current Strategic Concept dates from 1999, but a comprehensive
reassessment of the identity of the Alliance was last carried out at the end of the 1960s in connection
with the so-called Harmel Report. The end of the Cold War did not set off a corresponding process
since the enlargement, the establishment of partnerships, and the launch of crisis management
operations brought a number of new activities to NATO. The most important factor with an impact on
the activities of NATO since 1999 is the increased threat of terrorism.
2.7 Decision-making and Organisation of NATO
NATO is an inter-governmental organisation in which each member country retains its sovereignty. All
NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus; decision-making
requires that none of the members opposes it. NATO's most important decision-making body is the
North Atlantic Council, NAC, which consists of representatives of all the Allies at the level of
ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state or government.
Each member participates fully in the decision-making process on the basis of equality, irrespective of
its size or its political, military or economic strength. Thus, the Allies are free to act independently as
concerns common decisions or actions. Joint decision-making by the Alliance enables it to pursue
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coherent and consistent activities reinforced by political solidarity. NATO functions through
consultations. Negotiations are pursued until consensus is reached or it is concluded that a common
view is not achievable.
The North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (with
fewer meetings) constitute the main bodies of NATO. There are a number of advisory bodies and an
International Secretariat. The NATO Military Committee operates under the above-mentioned bodies
as a link between the NATO decision-making bodies and the military structure. In addition to the
Military Committee, two strategic commands make up the key components of the NATO Military
Structure, one for operations (Allied Command Operations) and one for the transformation (Allied
Command Transformation), as well as a Military Command Structure and an International Military Staff.
Figure 2: NATO's civilian and military structure
NATO has no operational forces other than those provided to it by the member countries or designated
to it by partner countries for a given mission. The NATO Force Planning and the resource development
process lay the foundations for the cooperation of the Alliance, for the political commitments to develop
better resources as well as for the military structure. The NATO organisation is responsible for the joint
planning of the use of the troops contributed by the member countries, joint military exercises and the
assignment of forces to operations under the leadership of NATO strategic commanders within the
framework of a jointly agreed force planning procedure.
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The operation commander is in charge of an operation. The member countries can set caveats for the
use of the troops they contribute although this is not preferable from the point of view of operational
effectiveness. Contributing troops to a NATO operation is always a national decision taken in
accordance with the national legislation of the country in question.
The member countries take responsibility for the majority of the costs arising from NATO activities, in
particular when they participate in operations. Also the partner countries cover their own expenses in
the operations in which they participate. NATO funds jointly only the use of NATO's Airborne Warning
and Control System and the acquisition of such systems related to the operations and communications
of national Air Forces that cannot be acquired by a member country. Some civilian functions and
activities of the Secretariats are also jointly funded.
2.8 Role of the United States in NATO
On account of its considerable resources, the USA is the most important NATO member among other
countries. Its membership provides NATO with superior military resources. The U.S. defence spending
is considerably higher than that of the other Allies put together. Moreover, the U.S. can make a
considerably greater part of its defence forces available for operations outside its own territory than the
European countries can. The common European defence relies, in many central sectors, on the
resources of the United States. Political decisions taken by NATO or the EU have not led to the desired
strengthening of military capabilities in most European countries. On the contrary, in some countries
defence spending is decreasing. Since the Cold War, European countries have cut their defence
spending by about two thirds.
Now that Europe has become more stable, also the United States has decreased the number of its
forces there. Meanwhile, however, U.S. armed forces have become much more mobile, so that major
resources can be projected to distant operational theatres in a short period of time. The overall
strength of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe has been announced to be currently about 95,000 with
40,000 of them in ground forces. Part of these forces may at times serve in operations outside Europe.
For the United States, Western Europe used to be primarily a partner and an object of security
cooperation. Today, more than ever, the United States conceives Europe as a cooperation partner and
an ally, also outside Europe.
Since the defence of most European NATO member countries builds partly on the involvement of the
United States, it is in the interest of these countries to keep the United States motivated to contribute to
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the defence of Europe. The contribution of many European countries to the fight against terrorism
reflects the importance they place on U.S. involvement in European defence.
The active and determined contribution of the U.S. to NATO gives the organisation direction and
integrity. Representatives of a number of small member countries have stated in discussions that the
United States is willing to listen to the concerns of small countries, too, and take them into
consideration. On the other hand, the views of the European member countries often serve as a
balancing factor in NATO decisions and activities. This has contributed to increasing the interest of
some third countries in engaging in cooperation with NATO.
The future of the U.S. NATO policy will probably be much influenced by whether international or
national issues characterise the political climate of any given time. Both trends have precedents in
history. In any case, the United States is likely to remain the only state capable of truly global action in
the foreseeable future. The U.S. has had a more permissive attitude towards the use of force and a
more selective approach to international law than has prevailed in Europe.
NATO is considered a central forum for transatlantic security policy cooperation by all Allies, including
the most pro-European countries. The war in Iraq brought about deep controversies within NATO, but
they have been overcome. The importance and status of NATO as a key international actor have
subsequently been strengthened by its role in Afghanistan.
2.9 European Member Countries of NATO
NATO is the foundation and operational environment of the collective defence for its 24 European
members of which 21 are Member States of the EU. This cooperation is widely endorsed by the people
of the countries participating in it. The idea of renationalising defence is supported neither in NATO nor
in the EU. Instead, the aim is to ensure the continuation of collective defence in all circumstances, an
aspect which also has an influence on the discussion on the development of the EU defence
cooperation.
As was stated above, the contribution of the United States to European defence remains significant.
NATO provides the organizational framework for this contribution.
NATO's European member states hold somewhat diverging views about NATO's tasks. These views
fall into three main categories. Each country is a case of its own, so such a classification can be
indicative only. The enlargement of NATO has widened the range of differing opinions.
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The Western and Northern coastal states in particular foster an Atlantist perspective. The strategic
interests of Europe and the United States are seen to be parallel to a significant degree and the threats
are seen in the global context. This is why they emphasize NATO-cooperation.
Several old member countries on the European continent consider that a military threat against them is
not probable. Threats exist in the world, but political, economic and civilian crisis management
instruments are both essential and needed alongside with military means. Therefore, it is the European
Union that is the most obvious channel for European crisis management. NATO is seen in a military
role mainly restricted to collective defence and to major crisis management operations.
Many of the new member states still see NATO's central task in its traditional role as a collective
defence organisation. However, participating in crisis management is important, especially because it
contributes to keeping the United States committed to European defence.
2.10 Cooperation between the EU and NATO
The cooperation between the EU and NATO in its current form dates from 1998 when the British Prime
Minister Tony Blair proposed that the EU assume a military crisis management role in cooperation with
NATO. At the end of that year, representatives of Great Britain and France met in St. Malo and
proposed that the EU use the possibility of conducting military crisis management operations with
recourse to NATO assets or autonomously. NATO made a decision on the principles of close crisis
management cooperation with the EU at the Washington Summit in the spring 1999. The European
Union was offered the possibility of having recourse to NATO planning and command systems and
capabilities in case the Alliance as a whole was not engaged in a given operation. These arrangements
are referred to as Berlin plus. The same year, the EU Cologne Summit agreed that the EU could
implement military crisis management operations autonomously, too, without recourse to NATO
assets. At the same time, the arrangement agreed in Amsterdam, according to which the Western
European Union, WEU, would have acted as the implementing organisation, was abandoned.
It is obvious that cooperation between the EU and NATO is necessary: 21 of the 27 EU member states
are members of NATO and 21 of the 26 NATO countries are members of the EU. The different
membership sometimes poses challenges to the cooperation. In the area of European military
cooperation, the countries that are members of both NATO and the EU are in the most advantageous
position. They have access to all the information made available to members by each organisation and
they may contribute to decision-making in both of them. This is important especially when the same
issues are simultaneously considered by both organisations.
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The cooperation between the EU and NATO has been hampered by the question of how NATO's
European members that are not EU member states could participate in military cooperation within the
EU. The accession of Cyprus and Malta to the EU has put a strain on the cooperation not only in the
EU but also in NATO. At the background, there is the political conflict between Turkey and Cyprus,
which directly complicates efforts to intensify the cooperation between the EU and NATO. As Cyprus
and Malta are not NATO PfP-countries, they are not involved in the cooperation arrangement in force,
enabling the EU to have recourse to NATO assets for military crisis management operations under its
command. Political collaboration between the organisations has been very limited whereas cooperation
between the Secretariats and in the field has usually worked well. However, the cooperation between
NATO and the EU as parallel actors in Kosovo and Afghanistan is hampered by these disputes.
Both NATO and the EU have set up civilian disaster relief organisations of their own. In practice, they
both rely on national resources.
The ideas expressed by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy as concerns the strengthening of the
collaboration between France and NATO and the possibility of France rejoining the NATO military
command structures could contribute to the cooperation between NATO and the EU, too. But finding
solutions to the disputes concerning Turkey, Greece and Cyprus is in any case required.
2.11 Relations between NATO and Russia
From NATO's point of view, Russia is the most important non-NATO actor in the Euro-Atlantic area
with an important nuclear deterrent and the biggest Armed Forces in the area. Ever since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Russia has not posed a direct military threat to NATO. However, the actions of
Russia have a considerable impact on security in the Euro-Atlantic area through, inter alia, the threat of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and environmental threats. Many NATO countries depend
on Russia for energy supplies, a fact that stresses the importance of Russia.
Russia is an important regional and global actor, which can influence NATO's activities either positively
or negatively in several sectors. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia
participates in the decision-making concerning UN mandates for NATO operations. Russia has
considerable weight in many issues relevant to the security of the Alliance in the long run, such as the
nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. The Russian influence in Central Asia and in Northern
Afghanistan is an important factor as regards NATO's ISAF operation. Moreover, Russia can influence
the possibilities of resolving the so-called frozen conflicts in certain NATO partner countries.
NATO has invested a great deal of efforts in building good relations with Russia. The best example of
this is the NATO-Russia Permanent Cooperation Council established in 1997 and the NATO-Russia
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Council, NRC, which replaced it in 2002. All NATO states and Russia are members of the NRC. The
Council takes decisions on the basis of unanimity. The NATO-Russia Council is mandated to conduct
political and security dialogue and to decide on joint initiatives based thereon, take joint decisions and
implement joint actions. NATO has set up an Information Office in Moscow in order to promote
cooperation.
The key areas of cooperation of the NATO-Russia Council encompass the following: cooperation
between the military and development of joint capabilities, counter-terrorist activities, civil protection
and emergency response activities, arms control, tactical missile defence, cooperation related to crisis
management operations, sharing of recognized air situation picture, and the transformation of defence.
Cooperation between NATO and Russia has varied depending on political conditions. During periods
of close relations between Russia and the West, also collaboration between NATO and Russia has
been good. On the other hand, more strained relations with the West have been reflected in Russia's
cooperation with NATO. However, NATO-Russia collaboration is rather diversified, and several
concrete cooperation projects continue even in more difficult times. To provide an example, Russia has
participated twice in the Operation Active Endeavour, launched under Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty as a response to the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001. This year, Russia has
ratified the Status of Forces Agreement concluded with NATO, opening up the road to possible joint
exercises and other joint activities in the future. One of the first concrete joint cooperation initiatives by
the NATO-Russia Council concerned the sharing of air situation picture between the NATO countries
and Russia. This form of collaboration aims at improving general aviation security including fighting
terrorism. The project has moved on from the planning phase to the initiation of its implementation.
At the moment, political relations are strained by a number of differences of opinion. These concern
specifically the enlargement of NATO to the territory of the former Soviet Union, the possible
independence of Kosovo and certain initiatives involving U.S. missile defence in Europe. The Russian
decision to suspend the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has
complicated the relations between NATO and Russia. On the other hand, the Agreement on
Adaptation of the CFE Treaty in Europe has not been ratified by any NATO country so far. However,
Russia values the NRC since it provides a forum for discussion on topical security policy issues,
including questions related to European security. Russia has felt that it has received more equal
treatment in the NATO-Russia Council than, for instance, in the OSCE.
According to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation, concluded in 1997, "the member States of NATO reiterate that they have no
intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any
need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future
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need to do so." The Charter also contains a long, detailed text on the Treaty on the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe.
NATO has strived to take the concerns of Russia into consideration in connection with the
establishment of its structures and forces in the territories of its new member countries. This has been
the case regarding, in particular, nuclear weapons, permanent troop deployments and permanent
bases.
NATO countries have differing views about the stand the organisation should take regarding Russia
and the country's more assertive politics. The question is whether to pursue efforts to engage Russia in
political dialogue and practical cooperation or whether to respond more firmly to Russia's actions.
All NATO countries have bilateral relations and cooperation with Russia, some more than others.
NATO's most recent enlargements have highlighted that joining the Alliance has not prevented a
country from continuing its good relations with Russia.
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3. Finland's Cooperation with NATO
Finland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC, as an observer in 1992. Finland has
participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme ever since the programme was launched
in 1994. Finland joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, which replaced the NACC when it
was founded in 1997.
All 26 NATO countries and 23 partner countries participate in the work of the EAPC. The Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council serves as a multilateral political and operational framework for Finland's activities
in NATO. The EAPC functions as an organ guiding the work done within the PfP framework and as a
forum for security policy dialogue. It convenes at the level of ambassadors every month, at foreign and
defence minister level every year and at heads of state or government level usually every two or three
years.
In parallel with the activities of the EAPC, NATO has started to organise operation-specific meetings
with countries contributing troops to its crisis management operations or supporting them in other
ways. Such meetings have been organised in particular in the ISAF format, including at the foreign and
defence minister level. An ISAF meeting is scheduled to be held at the head of state or government
level in the spring 2008. This has increased Finland's access to information and opportunities to exert
influence concerning operations in which our country participates. All intelligence information has,
however, not been made available to partner countries, even if improvement of the provision of
information has been promised. The member countries always conduct the most important discussions
and take the key decisions by themselves.
Within the framework of the bilateral Partnership for Peace Programme, Finland is free to choose
appropriate practical forms and sectors of cooperation in accordance with its own priorities. Our
partnership cooperation with NATO is broad-based. Finland participates in NATO-led military crisis
management, improves the country's military capabilities and participates in cooperation in the sector
of defence materiel and civilian emergency preparedness activities. Moreover, together with NATO,
Finland has supported NATO's activities intended to strengthen stability through the reform of the
security and defence sectors in countries and regions where NATO operates. Finland has lent support
to the disposal of small arms and light weapons, anti-personnel mines, ammunition and toxic fuels
through NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Funds. Finnish civil servants have been assigned to
several types of partnership missions in NATO Secretariat.
The tools provided through the PfP cooperation serve to enhance the international interoperability and
qualitative capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces as well as the ability to participate in international
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crisis management operations. These activities are carried out in the framework of the PfP programme
in particular by means of the partnership goals related to the Planning and Review Process, PARP,
and the Operational Capabilities Concept, OCC. The partnership goals designed to improve the
interoperability of crisis management troops declared for PARP are always concrete matters to be
developed, and they may range from simple to extremely demanding. Through the PfP cooperation,
Finland receives valuable know-how and experience that it can use to develop the national defence
capabilities.
Finland aims at improving its capabilities to participate in international crisis management operations
also by taking part in crisis management exercises organised within the framework of the NATO
Partnership for Peace Programme and in bilateral and multilateral exercises arranged in the spirit of
the programme. Within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Programme, Finland has also
hosted exercises and organised training events.
Finland has participated in NATO-led military crisis management mandated by the UN since the start of
the activities in 1995. At present, around 500 Finns are serving in NATO-led operations. Finns have
accomplished more than 10,000 tours of duty in NATO-led military crisis management operations.
Moreover, a Finnish general has commanded a brigade in a NATO-led crisis management operation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Finland was the first non-NATO country to have commanded a
multinational brigade in a NATO crisis management operation in Kosovo. When an assessment is
made concerning the relationship between international activities and national defence, it must be born
in mind that Finland has had up to almost 1,000 peacekeepers in NATO operations simultaneously; at
that time Finland was one of the countries (the member countries included) with the greatest per capita
number of land force troops. The Finnish conscription system provides for a reserve, which is an
advantage: recruiting can be broad-based. At the same time, national defence benefits from valuable
experience of demanding tasks.
NATO is developing not only its own activities but also its cooperation with partner countries. Together
with Sweden, Finland has participated actively in the development of the PfP cooperation. Decisions
have been made further to improve opportunities of cooperation between countries taking part in
operations. The PfP programme is so extensive that for the time being, Finland is not engaged in all
the activities open to partner countries. The Operation Active Endeavour and reinforcing participation in
the NATO Response Force are examples of activities open to partners, in which Finland is not
involved. In addition to the Army Land Forces, the Air Force could contribute aircraft and the Navy
could provide vessels to crisis management operations. More troops could be contributed to operations
and more officers sent on missions to NATO Headquarters. This would require more resources to be
allocated to international activities.
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Finland's cooperation with NATO is based on our objective to participate in the activities of international
organisations with relevance to our country. Our long tradition of participating in peacekeeping also
plays a role. For half a century, Finns have strived to make their contribution to stability and security
outside Finland's national borders, too. Engagement in military crisis management provides Finland
with valuable information and experience for enhancing its national defence. Moreover, it helps us
compare our expertise with the performance of other countries and to develop internationally
interoperable procedures. Taking part in crisis management is another way of proving to others our
high level of performance in a concrete manner. Cooperation is a means of laying a foundation for
mutual solidarity. Through participation we demonstrate our readiness to lend support to others and
assume our part of the responsibility for our common security.
The development of military cooperation within the EU has highlighted the importance of Finland's
cooperation with NATO particularly after 1999. The EU cooperation to enhance military capabilities is
largely based on NATO's standards, concepts and procedures. Finland, as the rest of the EU member
states, develops capabilities mainly with NATO, either through the PfP programme or as a member.
Finland also participates extensively in Civil Emergency Planning open to NATO partner countries. For
us, the most important activities are security of supply cooperation in the transportation and
communication sectors as well as civil protection and disaster relief tasks. Cooperation with NATO in
the fields of health care, food supply and industrial and scientific cooperation have been very useful as
well. NATO's activities in the domain of Civil Emergency Planning constitute a growing part of the PfP
cooperation and the only sector in NATO almost completely open to partner countries, too.
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4. The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership on the
Country's International Activities
4.1 Finland in the EU
The effects of possible NATO membership on Finland's activities in the EU would mainly concern the
development of the EU security policy and participation within the framework of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy.
As a member state of the EU, Finland can participate in all the EU activities. Since the EU and NATO
collaborate extensively, it is important for the organisations to be able to exchange documents.
Currently, it is not possible to share all necessary documents among the EU member states, which
may in some cases restrict access to information for those EU member states that are not members of
NATO. Such restrictions may be made at the request of one NATO member.
NATO membership plays an important role in the EU's pursuit towards a common defence. According
to Article 27 of the Reform Treaty on the European Union signed in Lisbon, "The common security and
defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead
to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides." Article 27, para
7, defines the obligation of assistance for member states "if a member state is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory". The Article states specifically the requirement of consistency with the
obligations binding on the member countries of NATO. The wording referring to the obligation of
assistance implies no change in respect of the obligations the member states have toward each other
under the North Atlantic Treaty.
Within the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, a number of issues are dealt
with that are simultaneously considered by NATO. NATO provides a common forum for its members
for political and military discussion. The topics cover a wide range of issues. In particular, in the context
of international crises, discussions take place both in NATO and the EU. At the moment, issues of
topical interest include such matters as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and Darfur and, even more
widely, matters pertaining to peacekeeping in Africa. Furthermore, topics such as Russia, Georgia, the
Western Balkans, missile defence and weapons of mass destruction are addressed in NATO, and
these discussions have reflections on the dialogue pursued in the EU. Both the EU and NATO also
discuss, inter alia, the fight against terrorism and matters pertaining to energy security. However,
decisions are taken independently in both organisations.
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It is generally recognized that extensive cooperation in crisis management between NATO and the EU
is indispensable. The member states have only a single set of military forces, and this entails that
activities in NATO have a direct influence on the dialogue held in the EU concerning, for instance, the
launch of new crisis management operations. The standards and requirements set by NATO constitute
a key premise for the development of the EU's crisis management instruments. The same applies, for
example, to the dialogue on common funding in crisis management operations. When EU member
states negotiate matters that are based on arrangements agreed upon and discussed earlier in NATO,
an EU member state, which is also a member of NATO, is better informed than a non-NATO EUcountry. In practice, a group of insiders may emerge inside the EU in these matters, the importance of
which is difficult to estimate from the outside. EU decision-making is, of course, independent from
NATO, but decisions taken by NATO may provide for EU decision-making.
The security guarantees mentioned in the Reform Treaty of the EU are the subject of a separate study
under preparation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. From the point of view of the present Report it is
particularly significant that the EU does not exercise defence planning of its own, nor does it have a
comprehensive military command structure, but it relies on NATO for these capabilities. As far as crisis
management is concerned, the lack of capabilities continues to restrict the possibilities of the EU to
carry out large-scale operations. Through capabilities development, the EU seeks to find solutions for
the key shortfalls, such as transports by air and sea, command and communications systems, air-to-air
refuelling and helicopters. NATO also relies on the United States in respect of many key capabilities.
In total, the EU member states do have significant military capabilities even if there is room for
improvement in their deployability outside the European borders. According to the statistics of the
European Defence Agency, a total of 98,000 troops from EU member states participated in
international operations in 2006, including 34,000 from Great Britain. A great number of personnel with
experience in the field of international cooperation from EU member states are on secondments in the
NATO Secretariat and Headquarters. On the other hand, it is difficult to foresee a situation where the
EU would consider member states' obligation of assistance and aid because of an armed attack but
NATO would remain inactive.
4.2 Finland's Transatlantic Relations
NATO is the most important forum for transatlantic security policy cooperation. The 24 European
members of NATO and the representatives of the United States and Canada meet in NATO every day.
In particular, during the past couple of years, American politicians, senior public servants and military
officials have visited NATO on a regular basis. Discussions have dealt not only with the tasks of NATO
and the challenges it encounters but also wider issues related international security.
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NATO membership opens up an opportunity also for closer bilateral cooperation among the member
states. As far as most of NATO's European member countries are concerned, the distinction may not
be very important from the Finnish point of view because we are a member state of the EU. For NorthAmerica, the situation is different. NATO membership has concrete effects especially on bilateral
military cooperation with the United States, for instance in matters related to access to technology.
Since Finland has already given a strong contribution to the activities of NATO and attained the status
of a close partner, the difference between the present state of affairs and possible membership may
not be that big. In fact, to a great extent, things depend on how strong a contribution Finland will give
and how actively Finland wishes to participate in the activities of NATO and in transatlantic cooperation
in the future. Compared with membership, partnership still rests, however, on a more temporary
foundation, and is thus more susceptible to fluctuations in world affairs and to decisions by the member
states.
The United States still plays a pivotal role in the commitment to collective defence related to NATO
membership.
4.3 Finland's Relations with its Neighbouring Countries
Finland has good relations with all of its neighbouring countries. Finland's possible NATO membership
may have an impact on these relations depending on the relations of the country in question with
NATO. On the other hand, the relations of a member country with a third country may reflect upon
NATO. Each member country's own policy in NATO will undoubtedly play a key role in this matter.
NATO's relations with its neighbouring countries vary subject to circumstances. Therefore, it is difficult
to estimate the impact of these relations in the future.
The commitment to collective defence would be taken into account from both sides with the
neighbouring countries which are members of NATO. However, it is understood that NATO does not
do active defence planning in respect of Northern Europe since this region is not considered to pose a
military threat requiring such planning
As regards Russia, Finland would join the NATO-Russia Council through its NATO membership. The
impact of Finland's membership on the bilateral relations with Russia would naturally be up to the two
countries to a great extent. The experiences Finland has had with Russia during its membership in the
EU may give some indications both on the challenges and opportunities. In NATO, no doubt, Finland
would be considered an expert on Russia, and the good relations with the neighbour would be
appreciated.
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Russia has taken a negative position on NATO's enlargement to its neighbouring regions in particular.
This has not, however, prevented NATO from admitting new members. NATO's new member countries
have had different experiences of their relations with Russia. Some of them have had good relations
both before and after the membership, whereas there may have been problems with some others both
before and after their accession to NATO. However, joining NATO has been only one factor. As far as
Finland is concerned, several representatives of Russia have noted that they do not see any reason
why Finland should become a member of NATO, but they consider that it is Finland's own decision.
Russia pays attention to the changes in the balance of military power in Europe, brought about by
NATO's enlargement, and strives to maintain a balance. As a member of NATO, Finland would
probably be expected to accede to the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, provided that it is
in force at that time, even if these matters are not formally connected to each other.
A NATO country is entitled, on its own initiative, to restrict NATO's presence in its territory in normal
circumstances. For instance, Norway has declared that it will not accept NATO nuclear weapons or
NATO bases on its territory in peace-time. Furthermore, Norway will not organise NATO military
exercises within 40 kilometres of the frontier between Norway and Russia.
4.4 Image of Finland
4.4.1 Image of Finland Abroad
In addition to matters directly related to defence, membership of the Western defence Alliance may
have more general influence on the image of Finland abroad. Finland's EU membership had rather
considerable and wide-ranging impact on Finland's image. Membership of NATO would hardly have
as strong an influence. Within Europe, Finland is an exception among the 21 countries which have
decided to be members of both the EU and NATO. Military non-alliance may be interpreted in many
ways also outside our national borders. In any case, NATO is a community of Western democracies.
The image of Finland abroad is likely to be influenced to a great degree by the way the Finns see
themselves and their place in the world. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the membership would no doubt be
noticed, but in practice it would perhaps not matter that much. Joining NATO could have a bearing on
economic decisions, as is stated below in connection with the issues concerning security of supply and
the sector of armaments.
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4.4.2 Mediation Tasks
During the Cold War, Finland could make its good services available for major powers. Finns have
been seen in international mediation and negotiation assignments also after that. Could Finland still be
able to offer such good services as a NATO member country?
Many NATO countries serve in such roles with success. The example closest to us is Norway, one of
the great actors of international crisis prevention and peace negotiations. Membership of the EU has
brought Finns a number of important international mediation and negotiation assignments even if, in
that capacity, they have been seen as representatives of an EU country, too. The fact that our country
is small and has not been a colonialist power would seem to have a reflection on our image in the
world also as a member of NATO.
By its own actions, a country can contribute to its potential and preparedness as a provider of good
services. The decision to be prepared to such activities is essential. This decision should include, inter
alia, allocating funds for such activities and lending support to citizens having potential to qualify for
demanding international mediation tasks. The policies that a country pursues in this regard also
contribute considerably to the image of the country abroad.
There may not be a great deal that Finland could do about the relations between Russia and NATO if
our country is not part of the NATO-Russia Council. However, it is possible that the involvement of
Finland and Sweden, both non-allied, might have a favourable effect on the attitude of Russia in some
specific missions related to NATO-Russia cooperation.
The involvement of five Western states (Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland in addition to
Finland) in the PfP cooperation with NATO has contributed to the creation of a model for cooperative
relations and arrangements with NATO for a number of non-NATO partner countries. Being able to
provide such an example is becoming, however, less important as NATO keeps strengthening and
expanding its cooperation relations outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
4.4.3 Threat of Terrorism
Finland is part of the Western world to the extent that our country cannot be isolated from it. However,
by our actions and behaviour we can exert influence on how the outside world and other people see
us. In recent years, terrorism has turned into a tool in the combat against the Western civilisation. This
is influencing many conflicts starting from the Middle East and spanning also Europe, in particular
through some individuals of some Muslim communities in Europe.
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Fighting terrorism is high on the NATO agenda. Military efforts only have limited use in dealing with the
problem. Civilian authorities and the police, in particular, play a more crucial role in this matter. NATO
has capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and deal with the consequences of possible terrorist
acts. In these circumstances, cooperation with NATO in civil protection and emergency matters plays
an important role, and Finland is involved in these activities.
There may not be information based on research on the impact of NATO membership on the
probability of terrorist attacks, nor has it been cited as a reason triggering terrorism. However, the
NATO-led operation in Afghanistan has encountered opposition by means of terrorist acts in the
territory, and anyone working there may become a victim, including Afghan nationals as well as
foreigners, regardless of whether they are nationals of a NATO country or not.
In general Finland is not estimated to be a target of terrorist acts. However, isolated acts are always
possible.
The events following the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad show that measures conceived
to offend Islam may trigger very rapid movements in these times of global communication. However, a
country's memberships of an international organization may have little bearing on whether such
situations occur.
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5. Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership on Finland's
Military Activities
It is up to each NATO member country to reach a balance between its national sovereignty and its right
to independent decision-making, and its relation to common solidarity. As a member of NATO, Finland
could, ultimately, make its own decisions on its involvement in the activities of the Alliance. Our country
would thus have the possibility of organising its defence within the limits set by the defence budget as
we desire. The citizens' strong will to defend our country could be taken into account also if Finland
was allied. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that in our neighbouring countries Norway and Estonia, both
members of NATO, the will to defend one's own country is strong.
5.1 Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership on the Defence of the
Finnish Territory
Finland's possible NATO membership and the related resources of the Alliance would contribute to
deterring military pressure, the threat of an aggression, or the possibility of a military attack against
Finland. This would give Finland freedom of movement to enhance the country's own defence system.
Becoming a member would also make Finland better equipped to receive assistance.
Based on the principle of reciprocity, Finland would also participate in the maintenance of stability and
security in the territory of the Alliance in accordance with the NATO membership obligations. Our own
security would be part of the overall security of the Alliance in a more tangible manner.
In times of crisis, the availability of assistance would depend on the overall situation. The NATO
Response Force is deployable in rapidly emerging situations without detailed advance preparation. If
the situation becomes more critical, operational planning could of course be initiated. In this case,
Finland, in its capacity as a member, should strive to receive assistance on capability areas that are
essential for us. Probable capability areas in such a situation would be ISTAR support, long-range joint
fires as well as air and maritime defence. The total combined NATO capabilities in these areas are of a
completely different scale than those of Finland alone. Accordingly, the deterrent inherent in the NATO
membership would also be a consideration; any state that might consider exerting pressure would
have to judge whether it would be up against the defence capabilities of just one or several countries.
As a member of NATO, Finland would also participate in NATO's political activities. Finland would be a
party to consultations and assessments that form a part of the daily routines of the Alliance. In
situations of crisis - including in the event of the threat of a crisis - the other members of the Alliance
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would lend Finland their political support. Awareness of such assistance could have a major preventive
effect and ward off threats against Finland.
As a member, Finland would place, at the country's own expense, estimated 100-150 persons, mainly
staff officers, in NATO's military structures. These resources would not be simultaneously available for
domestic tasks. Instead, they would contribute to our national defence through NATO.
5.2 Defence Planning
In NATO's defence planning, each member country is expected to report the total of its armed forces.
In this declaration, NATO countries also group their Armed Forces into different categories as they see
appropriate. Three categories are available, and in the event of membership, they would apply to
Finland, too. The relevant criteria are as follows:
1) Which part of the forces has been allocated to territorial defence within the national borders of a
country or in its immediate proximity? Are these forces available and in which manner in an eventual
situation calling for collective defence?
2) Which parts of the forces are deployable in terms of performance capability, equipment and
interoperability to operations outside the country's national territory, and
3) What is the total number of troops the country concerned is able and willing to sustain at a time in
operations in accordance with its national level of ambition?
In practice, the number of the troops sustainable in operations is the most important consideration
since it is a major factor determining operational success.
Having first estimated the overall need of the Alliance in compliance with its political guidance, NATO
Force Planning will ask member countries to provide the number of troops and capabilities regarded as
a reasonable contribution in accordance with the principle of fair burden-sharing. In the case of some
member countries, the requested contribution is compatible with their national goal, but in the case of
some others it may exceed the capabilities maintained by that country. NATO strives to encourage
member countries to increase their contribution, especially in cases where the contribution offered
remains clearly inferior to the level expected by the NATO Force Planning. However, each member is
ultimately entitled to decide on the level of its contribution; reasons for the decisions will have to be
submitted to the Defence Planning Committee. The views expressed by the other member countries in
the hearing may prove to be valuable to the country concerned in the planning of the future
development of its defence forces.
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The capabilities declared in the NATO force catalogue are available for a country's national defence
operations provided they have not been made available to NATO operations.
In case Finland joined NATO, Finland’s cooperation with NATO on capability development would be
referred to the defence planning process of the Alliance. The goals of the capability development work
pursued with NATO would subsequently be agreed with Finland no longer as the Partnership Goals in
the current Planning And Review Process, but as Force Goals in the framework of the defence
planning process. They would apply to the force structure of the Defence Forces more widely than the
current goals for troops assigned to international missions.
5.3 Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership on the Quantitative
Level of Finnish Military Participation, Troops and Capabilities in NATO
Force Planning
The assessments presented below are based on the goals set by NATO on its member countries,
consultations with the representatives of the NATO Secretariat and Headquarters and the example
provided by some NATO countries. The assessment reflects the current situation as accurately as is
possible without membership negotiations.
In regard to Land Forces, Finland should strive to meet the usability targets set by NATO even if all
current members do not meet them fully. The goals are based on challenges posed by crisis
management operations. 40 per cent of the peacetime strength of the Land Force should consist of
troops that, after their formation, can be available outside the country's national borders.
Correspondingly, 8 per cent of the peace time strength of the Land Force should, in practice, be
assigned to and sustained in international crisis management operations for long periods of time.
Corresponding usability figures have not been established for the Air Force and Navy.
By way of indication, it may be estimated that in accordance with the calculation criteria of NATO, the
intended 40 per cent of Finnish Land Forces deployable to missions abroad would amount to about
6,000 soldiers, whilst the total strength of a force that would be sustained in crisis management
operations abroad would amount to approximately 1,200 soldiers. Finland would thus be expected to
contribute a force corresponding to approximately the size of a brigade or about 6,000 soldiers. The
figure corresponds to the level required from comparable NATO countries. The force may consist of
professional soldiers and troops called in from the reserve as, for example, Norway has done. In other
words, the force in question does not have to be made up of professionals except for high readiness
forces. A part of this force could also be made available to crisis management operations, which is why
an entire force does not have to stay in readiness at home.
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As for troops intended to be sustainable in crisis management operations (8 per cent), the goal
corresponds approximately to the average contribution that Finland has made to international crisis
management in recent years, which would be sufficient at least in terms of the number of troops. The
current contribution is, however, clearly inferior to the goal calculated in the manner described. The
troops contribution goals set by NATO could thus be met without considerably increasing the strength
of a force to be assigned to crisis management duties from the maximum contributed by Finland to
military crisis management as a non-Allied country. This would not require Finland to change its current
practices either.
Finland could influence the way in which NATO would interpret its calculation criteria concerning our
country. The main target would be the ability to contribute troops adequate for international missions in
terms of size and operability. The weight of involvement cannot be measured by numbers only.
Readiness to participate in demanding and challenging operations is significant.
NATO does not establish any objectives regarding how the troops are generated or in which manner
readiness is maintained. Therefore, also as a member of NATO, Finland could, if it so desired,
continue its current practice of composing and selecting troops to be sent to crisis management
operations.
To be prepared for collective defence operations, Finland could be expected to be able to contribute
interchangeable capabilities, which could be, for instance, a high-readiness brigade including its
supporting elements from the Army (primarily), a squadron with air-to-ground capability from the Air
Force (secondarily), mine clearing and coast guarding capabilities from the Navy (as far as possible).
Decisions regarding capabilities to be contributed to operations would be made on a case by case
basis. This would have a bearing on the contribution expected of Finland, depending on the nature of
the operation at hand. Depending on the situation, Finland could also be asked to make a contribution
to certain capability sectors. These could include such sectors as civilian-military cooperation,
intelligence, surveillance and tactical reconnaissance, forces specialised in and equipped for the
treatment of chemical, biological and radiological substances and nuclear material including the
management of the consequences of their use, mobile command systems or certain other capabilities
required in operations and available in Finland. Finland is not expected to have considerable difficulties
in meeting these expectations as a member of NATO.
With regard to command arrangements for possible operations related to Finland's national defence
operations, the command structures of air and maritime defence would possibly be subject to change
in case Alliance capabilities were used or prepared to be used as part of Finland’s air or maritime
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defence. When developing joint capabilities with NATO, Finland should adopt NATO standards and
norms more extensively. NATO has about 1,200 STANAGs (Standardisation Agreement) which are
modes of operation governing interoperability at the level of procedures and technical detail, and 500
Allied Publications. Finland has officially adopted about 30 STANAGs. It is estimated that in practical
activities and initiatives concerning armaments, about 300 STANAGs are applied. Little by little, new
member countries adopt the standards they consider useful. It can be estimated that Finland would
consider approximately 500-700 STANAGs for approval and adoption, thus doubling the current
number. In time, this would require some extra work. However, Finnish Armed Forces are already
technically quite compatible with NATO.
5.4 Conscription System and Decision-Making
Finland is one of the Western countries which consider it necessary to maintain sizeable defence
capabilities in case of a possible military threat in the future. For this reason, organising our national
defence constitutes an important dimension when assessing our country’s relation to a possible NATO
membership. As a member state of the EU and through Nordic cooperation, Finland has quite a good
picture of the defence-thinking of most European member countries of NATO, too. Geographical
location plays an important role, since the smaller a threat against the national territory is considered
the greater emphasis seems to be placed on crisis management at the expense of collective defence
in the thinking of many NATO countries.
Finland’s share of the total number of people who belong to the European member countries of NATO
and the EU member states is about one per cent. Finland's share of their defence spending amounts to
the same. Even if the Finnish defence system is cost-effective and the majority of the people are highly
motivated to defend their country, the rapid growth in armaments costs especially as a result of
technological development combined with the aging of the population and the effects of global
economic competition make the maintenance of credible defence capabilities a challenging task.
In Finland, there is an active debate about whether our country could keep its system based on
conscription and the defence of the entire country also as a member of NATO. The current trend in
Europe favours professional armies. Nine NATO countries still have conscription systems of their own,
and NATO does not require its members to abandon their own systems. Turkey and Greece have a
system comparable to that of Finland. In Norway, about 38 percent of the men in the relevant age
group do their military service. In Denmark, Germany and Estonia, the share of those doing their
service is 10–20 per cent of the age group. Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria have decided to give up
conscription. Experiences of crisis management operations requiring long-term commitment have
revealed weaknesses in professional armies that seem to have dissipated some doubts concerning the
conscription system.
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It is essential for each member country to participate in joint efforts with a contribution commensurate
with their weight and capability. In this respect, the way in which the capability to participate is acquired
is of secondary importance. The contribution of each country to the activities of NATO is based on its
national decision. NATO has no supranational power over its members. This applies to both defence
planning and operations. Of course, the members of the Alliance require mutual solidarity and burdensharing. Participation is jointly assessed.
5.5 Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership on the Country’s
Participation in NATO Crisis Management Activities
Finland has participated in NATO-led UN-mandated military crisis management from the very
beginning. Currently, about 500 Finns are serving in NATO operations taking place in Kosovo and
Afghanistan.
Finland's input has raised it to a special status together with Sweden as one of NATO’s most important
partner countries. Finland’s contribution still represents at least the level of good average by NATO
standards. These contributions are part of the efforts made by the Western community, so Finland’s
contribution also corresponds to the expectations directed to countries such as Finland. To a great
extent, based on initiatives made by Finland and Sweden, NATO has created possibilities for countries
taking part in operations to have access to information concerning the planning and command of
operations that enable cooperation to be pursued reasonably well even without membership as long as
NATO is motivated to do so. A partner country is not, however, entitled to participate in the political
assessment of situations, general dialogue on security, or exchange of information within NATO.
Currently, Finland takes part in the EU battle groups. NATO standards, exercises and certification tools
are utilised in the capabilities cooperation related to EU battle groups due to the fact that the EU
possesses no corresponding mechanisms of its own. This does not, however, result in an automatic
approval from the part of NATO even if the same standards and procedures apply in practice. Finland
and other PfP-countries that meet NATO requirements have been offered an opportunity to take part in
the NATO Response Force with a supplementary contribution. In this way NATO wants to make sure
that interoperability can be kept up to a high standard with the troops of NATO countries in the future
as well, which is important especially in crisis management operations.
Within NATO, the NRF is seen as a central tool for the transformation of military capabilities. NATO
members are expected to take part in the Response Force in some manner. NATO is considering the
reform of the system so that it would better correspond to the current needs and opportunities. For
example, in the context of a previous NRF, Norway was prepared to participate with a battalion-sized
Land Force unit and certain elements from the Navy and Air Force. Participation in both the NATO and
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EU rapid reaction forces may be planned on a long-term basis in parallel with participation in
operations.
Would greater crisis management expectations be directed to Finland as a member than as a partner?
Much would depend on the kind of role Finland would decide to assume as a partner or as a member.
Involvement in the activities of NATO always depends on the country’s own decision both as a partner
and a member. A general trend seems to be that countries that consider the role of NATO to be central
to their security strive to give a considerable contribution, relative to their strength, to NATO’s
operations.
As stated above, NATO aims at an 8 percent Land Force contribution by its member countries to be
sustainable in long-term operations. In Finland’s case, the figure would represent approximately 1,200
soldiers for all the operations abroad combined. This corresponds approximately to our contribution at
the beginning of the current decade, but it would be clearly superior to Finland’s current participation in
military crisis management.
Finland’s involvement in NATO-led crisis management has in practice represented a level of good
average by NATO standards even as a PfP-country, which is why membership would not necessarily
bring any major changes. In terms of numbers, our contribution in Afghanistan is, however, clearly
smaller than what it has been in the Western Balkans. According to statistics from November, about
20,000 European soldiers served in the ISAF operation. One per cent of this figure would amount to
200. At the moment, the total strength of the ISAF operation has, however, gone up to almost 45,000;
figures change. As a member, Finland would probably be expected to assume responsibility for training
Afghan soldiers or commanding a Provincial Reconstruction Team; such wishes have been expressed
even now that Finland is still a PfP-country - and because Sweden has already assumed responsibility
for corresponding tasks. Participation together with NATO in activities such as air operations would be
possible even now. This would naturally lead to considerable expenses.
Membership obligates to closer cooperation than partnership does. On the other hand, a PfP-country's
right and opportunity to participate are conditional upon participation. A PfP-country also has to assess
its involvement from the point of view of the burden-sharing expectations directed to it by its own
reference group.
On the other hand, a NATO member, too, is entitled to consider in what way it will participate in the
activities at hand. If the activities of the Alliance are considered to contradict an important national
interest of a country, the country is entitled to constructive abstention. Greece may be mentioned as an
example: it did not participate in the operation undertaken by NATO to impose sanctions on Kosovo,
but it did not prevent the others from going ahead.
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As concerns NATO's current activities in Northern Europe, exchange of air situation pictures between
NATO and Russia could be of significance for Finland - which for NATO would imply giving access to
Eurocontrol data. Another relevant issue could be NATO's possible request to participate in the Baltic
States' air policing. However, the Baltic States have plans for acquiring air-space surveillance
equipment of their own starting from 2017.
5.6 Additional Costs Caused by the Membership
The additional costs arising from NATO membership would be caused from contributions to the NATO
budget and secondment of personnel to NATO’s command structures, on the one hand, and from
participation in NATO’s field operations on the other.
NATO’s common funding covers the organisation’s civilian and military budgets and the Security
Investment Programme. In addition to regular common funding, some NATO countries may decide to
implement multi-national initiatives within NATO by means of joint funding arrangements.
The budget of NATO totalled approximately 1.76 billion euros in 2006. The share of the civilian budget
was approximately 181 million euros, the share of the military budget approximately 934 million and the
NATO Security Investment Programme approximately 640 million euros.
The contributions payable by the member countries are determined based on the countries’ gross
national product, established by the statistics of the World Bank. Finland’s share of the contributions
payable by the member countries would have been about 1.2 per cent in 2006, amounting to about 21
million euros (Denmark: 1.3 per cent and Norway: 1.4 per cent). The majority of the salaries of the
personnel of the NATO Secretariat come from the NATO budget. However, the costs for the staff in the
NATO military structures are paid by the sending state. Sending one person on such a mission abroad
would cost approximately 120,000 euros annually on top of domestic salary costs. Assigning about 150
persons to the NATO command structures would imply extra costs amounting to the total of about 18
million euros. Since secondment of personnel from a new member country to NATO's command
structures would take place gradually, the related costs would spread over several years.
It is not possible to make relevant estimates of the spending related to the development of defence
materiel in this context. The Defence Forces would have to redraft and reschedule some plans related
to the development programmes.
All in all, these additional costs caused by membership would have totalled approximately 39 million
euros, or less than 2 per cent of our defence budget.
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To arrive at a cost estimate regarding the personnel eventually to be assigned to NATO structures, the
above estimate was based on the higher end of the 100-150 -person contribution range. Currently,
there are ten Finns serving in the NATO military structures at our costs and, in addition, a few people in
NATO’s civilian organisation. These contributions would decrease the total of the supplementary
funding by about one million euros. Secondment of more than one hundred personnel to international
duties is bound to strengthen the international expertise of our country’s Defence Forces. The persons
in question would remain in their NATO duties as part of the Finnish Defence Forces and would
transfer know-how to Finland when returning home. On the other hand, when working on international
assignments, they would not be available for domestic duties. This Report has not, however, gone into
other impacts of secondments abroad than estimating the additional costs arising from secondment.
As has been noted above, the estimated, recommended NATO target level calculated for Finland
would be about 1,200 persons' contribution sustainable in crisis management operations. In case
Finland strived to meet this recommendation in full, it would cost more than Finland’s current
contribution. Offering specialised capabilities or resources, such as, in particular, aircraft or helicopters
in support of operations would also result in extra costs. It is also possible that as a member, Finland
would be expected, occasionally, to give a somewhat bigger contribution to the NATO Response Force
than our contribution would be if Finland decided to make a supplementary contribution to NRF
operations as a PfP-country.
As concerns the usability of troops, it was estimated above that a brigade-level contingent from the
Land Force, or approximately 6,000 soldiers, would be expected of Finland. These forces would be
formed when needed. In this Report it has been estimated that maintaining readiness would not lead to
considerable extra costs. In case the share of the commissioned and enlisted personnel would be
increased from the total of current arrangements, the costs would be higher, too.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion within NATO about the need to increase
common funding for crisis management operations. However, this initiative is not endorsed by all the
member countries; so at least in the near future, we are not talking about very great sums of money.
PfP-countries, too, might be offered a possibility to contribute to such common costs.
Since NATO membership would significantly upgrade the strength of our national defence, the costs
would not necessarily have to be regarded as additional costs but, instead, as an alternative allocation
of appropriations.
NATO has set its member countries the goal of allocating 2 per cent of their gross national product to
their defence budgets. This goal was reached or exceeded by only six NATO countries in 2006. Using
the defence cost formula applied by NATO, Finland’s defence budget share would amount to
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approximately 1.4 per cent. Eleven NATO countries are at the same level or under it, with Iceland
excluded. Fourteen NATO countries have a higher budget share. Using the formula applied by Finland,
the share allocated to the defence budget amounts to 1.3 per cent. Budget goals are set for the
purpose of ensuring that sufficient appropriations are allocated to upgrading the defence forces of the
member countries in line with the development of their duties and military technology. The crucial
factor is how fully each member country is capable of participating in the operations of NATO, and in
this respect the situation of Finland is estimated to be quite good. Finland also invests a bigger share
than average of its defence spending on materiel procurement. Improved technology and military
know-how is bound to increase spending regardless of the defence solution that the country will adopt.
5.7 Effects on Security of Supply
The NATO countries' military security of supply is organised within NATO. NATO has a Maintenance
and Supply Agency, NAMSA, and eight committees related to security of supply in the civilian sector.
The PfP-countries are also free to participate in some functions of these committees, excluding those
related to collective defence. For Finland, the committees dealing with land, sea and air transports and
telecommunications are the most important.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finland has been developing international contractual arrangements
to complement our national security of supply. The security of supply provided by the EU is very
important, but the measures required by EU legislation are implemented at national level. Mutual
responsibility relies on national solidarity alone. Finland’s possible NATO membership would mean that
the security of supply arrangements used in the framework of the Alliance would apply to Finland, too.
NATO countries deal with most of the essential issues related to security of supply as part of the
activities of the Alliance. The Allies do not have to maintain national readiness at as comprehensive a
level as the non-Allied. A member country can exert influence on the activities of the Alliance and bring
up interests central to it. To Finland, ensuring maritime transports represents such a central national
interest. According to Article 8 of the Washington Treaty, the member countries undertake not to enter
into any international engagement in conflict with the said Treaty. As a member of the Alliance, Finland
could make more reliable bilateral security of supply agreements because reservations provided for by
Article 8 applied currently by NATO countries would not be required.
The defence industry would benefit from the membership because its customers could be more certain
about its capacity to honour supply contracts in crisis situations. The importation of components for the
defence industry from other member countries would require less export monitoring.
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A crisis anywhere in the world is bound to result in an excessive demand for certain supplies, such as
many components and some crisis-specific medicines, antidotes and anti-toxic substances. As a
country outside the Alliance, Finland could become a target of export licence restrictions, and supplies
to Finland could be delayed until the mutual needs of the Allied were clarified and met.
It must be anticipated that in the event of a crisis
threatening Europe, the credibility of a small country
which is not a member of the Alliance might be compromised. In that case, for example, the level of
investments might deteriorate because of real or perceived reasons. In particular, corporations having
international activities might move their cash reserves and money transfers out of the country. NATO
membership would make it clear that Finland is part of the Western economy.
When faced with the threat of a crisis, protectionist measures tend to emerge as governments aim at
protecting national interests and the international commitments they may have. This entails a risk for a
country depending on international commerce. For example, the prices of cargo might rise and it would
be harder to find transportation capacity. This would weaken the application of security of supply
agreements. For instance, the implementation of the oil supply system in accordance with the
agreement on the International Energy Programme could come to a halt because of transportation
difficulties.
In circumstances of a severe crisis, the functioning of the EU internal market and the World Trade
Organization could encounter difficulties. Free trade in a number of products would be discontinued
and critical materials would probably end up under the control of the Super Powers. The operation of
international information systems and infrastructures based on them could be disturbed or even cut off.
NATO would probably be better equipped than individual countries to respond to such threats.
5.8 Armaments Cooperation
The aim of NATO's armaments cooperation is to improve the military capabilities of the Alliance and to
ensure the use of interoperable equipment in its operations. NATO capabilities are developed on the
basis of commonly agreed long-term capability goals both as concerns defence procurement and
defence research and technology cooperation. Air defence, cooperation in the area of C3 systems,
logistics, and the building of security-related infrastructure are part of the broad-based development of
the defence capabilities of NATO. NATO standardisation measures form the basis of international
interoperability and make it possible for the defence industry to develop systems compatible with the
set capability requirements.
Finland has had the possibility to participate in the areas of NATO's armaments cooperation that have
been made open to PfP-countries. To give an example, some of the NATO member countries and PfP40
countries have launched a joint initiative connected to strategic airlift capability carried out within the
framework of NATO. Finland participates in most of the NATO working groups open to PfP-countries
whereas several sectors of armaments cooperation are accessible to NATO members only. As a
member of NATO, Finland could participate extensively in the Alliance's research and industrial
cooperation carried out in the armaments sector and take part in joint procurement projects.
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, NAMSA, is used for purchases of spare parts and to
reinforce security of supply. Finland takes part in the NAMSA electronic trade and virtual stock
management programme and applies its nomenclature. For example, NAMSA is used to supply
Finland with spare parts, maintenance services and general systems control for heavy rocket launcher
systems and anti-tank systems. NAMSA also provides support to crisis management operations in
Afghanistan and Kosovo, among others.
Finland does not have a representative in the Board of Managers of NAMSA nor does it, therefore,
have the right to participate in decisions that guide the activities of the organisation. Finland has
access to all the programmes it needs, but it cannot participate in NAMSA's final decision-making as
an equal member. If Finland were to become a member, the Finnish industry would automatically have
access to the tenders called by NAMSA, provided it could offer the products concerned. At the
moment, Finland has access to tenders only if the Finnish Defence Forces participate in the
programme within the framework of which the tender is organised. According to the NAMSA principle
of reciprocity, each country's industries receive orders corresponding to the value of the services of
NAMSA that it has used. This principle of reciprocity does not apply to the cooperation pursued with
the PfP-countries. In crisis situations, NAMSA focuses its resources to support the members.
Replacing and renewing defence materiel is a slow process, and building interoperability takes years.
The interoperability requirements are described in standards and, in practice, the only military
standards with sufficient coverage have been developed by NATO (STANAG, Standardisation
Agreement). Finland and the European Union apply STANAGs to acquire new materiel. The partner
countries have at least two problems connected to the application of STANAGs that bring uncertainty
and delays into the building of interoperability: being excluded from the standardisation process and
not having access to some standards. NATO countries are not entitled in all cases to sell materiel
containing technology standardised by NATO working groups to a country to which the relevant
documents have not been made available.
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6. Central Principles Related to the Enlargement of NATO
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty lays the foundation for the enlargement of NATO:
"The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty." In addition, the Article contains provisions on instruments of accession.
The questions related to the enlargement of NATO are explained in detail on the NATO web pages.
The following provides a compact presentation of matters pertaining to the enlargement.
6.1 The Alliance Strives to Maintain its Efficiency in Performing its Core
Functions and Meeting New Challenges
When accepting new members, the Alliance wishes to ensure that it will be able to maintain its
capability to make important decisions rapidly by consensus and that, as an outcome of its
enlargement, the Alliance will be capable of fully performing both its core activities and its new tasks.
New members must fully adopt the commitments laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO has to
ascertain that all of its commitments and, especially the commitment of collective defence will be fully
carried out in the enlarged Alliance.
NATO has to also take into account a number of factors affecting its credibility in connection with its
enlargement project, which may call for detailed analysis. These factors are connected to the collective
defence, the command structure, conventional forces, nuclear forces, force structure, intelligence,
finance, and interoperability. In addition, effective consensus-based decision-making will have to be
guaranteed in an enlarged Alliance.
6.2 Military and Defence-related Effects of the Enlargement
6.2.1 Collective Defence
As stated in paragraph 38 of the NATO Strategic Concept,” the collective nature of Alliance defence is
embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and
resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the re-nationalisation of defence policies,
without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty". These arrangements are based on an integrated
military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include
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collective Force Planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of
forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and
reinforcement arrangements; negotiation procedures for consultation; common standards and
procedures of equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure,
armaments and logistics cooperation.
NATO wants to establish participation arrangements that would facilitate cooperation with new
members. According to the representatives of the NATO Secretariat, the organisation wants to avoid
selective membership arrangements, being ready to tailor the membership to suit each potential
candidate.
Against the background of existing arrangements for contributing to collective defence, Allies want to
know how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO's collective defence. For this purpose,
Allies will explore all aspects of this question prior to accession negotiations. A country’s capability and
willingness to contribute to security and stability will play a crucial role in the decision making of the
Alliance.
6.2.2 Command Structure
NATO has to make sure that the command structures and headquarters of an acceding country are up
to its requirements. A country-specific review of the requirements and costs should be undertaken prior
to a new member joining the integrated military structure.
Multinationality remains a key feature of Alliance policy. This would also apply to any new NATO
Headquarters that might be set up on the territory of a new member. New members will also have to be
represented at major headquarters, support elements, commonly-funded NATO Agencies, and on the
International Military Staff.
6.2.3 Conventional Forces - Training and Exercises
Individual Allies' policy on the stationing of other Allies' forces on their soil in peacetime varies
considerably. Decisions on the stationing of Allies' conventional forces on the territory of new members
will have to be taken by the Alliance in the light of the benefits to the Alliance as a whole and to
particular new members, the Alliance's military capacity for rapid reinforcement, the views of the new
members, the cost of possible military options, and the wider political and strategic impact.
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Multinational training and exercises on the territory of new members will contribute significantly to
maintaining Alliance military capability and effectiveness and enhance the ability of the Alliance to fulfil
the full range of its missions. New members should be expected to take turns to host training events
and exercises.
6.2.4 Nuclear Forces
The coverage provided by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including its nuclear component, will
apply to new members. There is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members. In light of both the current international environment and the potential threats
facing the Alliance, NATO's current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet
the requirements of an enlarged Alliance. NATO will retain its existing nuclear capabilities along with its
right to modify its nuclear posture as circumstances warrant. New members will, as do current
members, contribute to the development and implementation of NATO's strategy, including its nuclear
components.
6.2.5 Force Structures
The Alliance’s military strength and cohesion depends on its multinational forces and structures and
the fair sharing of risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits. The main characteristics of current NATO
force structure will remain valid in an enlarged Alliance. New members' forces would be expected to
take part in the full spectrum of Alliance missions to the extent appropriate to their capabilities.
Multinational forces have an increased political and military importance. The increasing need for
mobility, flexibility and inter-service and multinational interoperability in undertaking both defence and
new missions means that current Alliance policy on multinationality should apply when new members'
forces join NATO force structure.
6.2.6 Intelligence Sharing
Sharing of intelligence is based on mutual trust and cooperation. New members must be able to
safeguard NATO information according to the Alliance standards.
6.3 Security Investment Programme
Costs related to, inter alia, the NATO integrated command structure, communication and command
systems and the expenses resulted in the setting up of expensive critical military infrastructure are
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covered through the NATO Security Investment Programme. The Programme should be used to
accelerate the assimilation process of new members. The Security Investment Programme is funded
through NATO joint funding.
6.4 Administration and Budgets
New members joining the Alliance will lead to a need for increased resources. They will be expected to
contribute to the expenses incurred by the Alliance in accordance with their level of participation and
their allocated share of contributions.
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7. Stages and Timeframe of the NATO Membership Process
7.1 Intensified Dialogue
For a country willing to join NATO, the first stage on the road towards membership will be intensified
dialogue. This is a stage that may have taken some countries currently undergoing the membership
process several years. The purpose of the dialogue is to prepare potential members for the next stage,
the Membership Action Plan. Intensified dialogue provides a framework, inter alia, for political bilateral
discussions between NATO and the state willing to join it.
Finland has pursued intensified dialogue with NATO for several years without aspiring to membership.
The dialogue has been organised as biannual high-level staff talks between representatives of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Political Department of the NATO International Secretariat. These
discussions have addressed the tasks of NATO as well as the cooperation between Finland and
NATO. In 2006 and 2007, one of the discussions was held in Finland, and in this connection the
representatives of the NATO International Secretariat also had a number of other meetings and public
appearances.
In the case of Finland, this stage would probably be covered rapidly.
7.2 Membership Action Plan
Within the framework of the Membership Action Plan, each party would make sure that the country
willing to join NATO meets the membership requirements set by NATO. In Finland's case, this stage
might not last very long, since our country has cooperated closely with NATO for more than ten years
and participated in several NATO-led military crisis management operations during that time. In
Finland's case, an Action Plan taking some months, or about a year, might be expected.
The North Atlantic Council would be in charge of the decision-making concerning the launch of the
different stages. These are very important decisions, so they have normally been made at NATO
ministerial meetings organised on an annual basis.
7.3 Inviting a Country to Become a Member
Invitations to membership have usually been made at NATO Summits, organised every two years in
recent times. The next Summit is scheduled to be held in Bucharest on 2 -4 April 2008. NATO's 60th
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anniversary summit will be organised in the spring 2009, after which concrete schedules for
subsequent summits may not yet have been agreed. After being invited to join NATO, the future
members have been allowed to participate extensively in NATO's activities, excluding, however, the
right to participate in decision making.
7.4 Ratification of the Accession Protocol
In practice, accession to NATO is carried into effect by virtue of a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
which shall be signed and ratified by the NATO member countries. This process has usually taken
about two years. The Accession Protocol having entered into force, the Secretary General of NATO
shall invite the country concerned to become a Party to the Treaty. The accession shall enter into force
as soon as the acceding country has deposited its Instrument of Accession with the Government of the
United States acting as the depository of the Treaty. It is only after this that an acceding country shall
assume the status of a member along with its rights and obligations.
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8. The Legal Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership
Any decision to apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be considered
particularly from the viewpoint of the constitutional provisions on sovereignty, the duty of national
defence, and the status and competence of the President of the Republic in the system for decisionmaking on foreign and security policy issues.
Accession to NATO is a multi-stage process, the different stages of which would be subject to the
provisions of Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Finland concerning Finland's international relations. The
final decision on accession to the North Atlantic Treaty would be made by the President of the Republic
on the basis of a proposal by the Government, after approval of the Parliament. Especially Articles 5
and 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty have an effect on the consideration of sovereignty from the
constitutional standpoint. The North Atlantic Treaty can be presumed to have a bearing on the
Constitution in that the Parliament's approval of the decision to accede to NATO would require a twothirds majority of the votes cast.
According to the Act on the Defence Forces, the President of the Republic shall take decisions on
matters of military command on submission by the Minister of Defence or2 the Chief of Defence
(Cabinet submission). If Finland acceded to NATO, the decision-making system for matters of military
command and its contents would have to be revised.
Any decision on accession would also have to take account of the Convention relating to the NonFortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands (Treaty Series 1/1922) and the Agreement
between Finland and the Soviet Union on the Åland Islands (Treaty Series 24/1940).
There are certain other international treaties related to the North Atlantic Treaty to which a NATO
member country should be a party. These include at least the NATO SOFA (Status of Forces
Agreement) and the Protocols thereto. Through the NATO/PFP SOFA (Partnership for Peace Status of
Forces Agreement) Finland has accepted the obligations laid down in the NATO SOFA and its
Protocols, but as a member of NATO Finland should possibly also be directly a party to the NATO
SOFA. The NATO member countries are also parties to the Ottawa Agreement (1951) and the
Brussels Agreement (1994). The contents of the NATO Standardisation Agreements and their effects
on Finnish legislation and practices should be assessed.
If Finland should start preparations for accession to NATO at national level, it would naturally have to
analyse all legal questions concerning the accession in more detail. For preparing the accession,
2
The new Act on the Defence Forces 551/2007, effective as of 1 January 2008.
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Finland should not only analyse constitutional questions but also all key legislation on the defence
administration. This legislation includes the Act on the Defence Forces, the Military Service Act, the Act
on Voluntary Defence, the Act on Military Crisis Management, the Territorial Surveillance Act and the
Emergency Powers Act. The current legislation is based on the idea of national defence. In case of
Finland's accession to NATO, for instance the provisions of the Act on the Defence Forces concerning
the tasks of the Defence Forces and the competence necessary for performing them should be
formulated with due consideration to the accession. The same is true for the Act's provisions on the
organisation and the personnel of the Defence Forces. The cooperation obligations to be fulfilled by the
NATO members during emergencies should be taken into account in Finland's agreements on security
of supply and the national security of supply legislation. The impacts of the accession on the legislation
of other administrative sectors, too, should be assessed in more detail, particularly in respect of civilian
relief preparedness and securing the functions vital to society.
In political terms, NATO would expect Finland to accede to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe. Like the European Union, also NATO has a great number of established practices and
procedures built up over time that a new member should adopt.
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APPENDIX 1
The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and
security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:
Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international
dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international
relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the
principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and wellbeing. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage
economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual
and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
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Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the
Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .
Article 6 (1)
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an
armed attack:
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments
of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any
other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the
date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area
north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article 7
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other
of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to
enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
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Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider
matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able
to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in
particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the
implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
Article 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of
accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States
of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as
possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories
of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as
the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been
deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their
ratifications. (3)
Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of
them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the
factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of
universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after
its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will
inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
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Article 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by
that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol
to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian
Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become
inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all
signatory states.
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