Paper to be presented at the Workshop “In the Engine Room. Linking Perspectives in the
Study of Intergovernmental Organizations as Actors” at ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops
29 March - 2 April 2015 in Warszawa.
Comparing the Autonomy of International Bureaucracies –
An Ideal Type Approach*
Jörn Ege, German Research Institute for Public Administration Speyer
Draft version as of March 14 2015 – Comments welcome
Please do not quote without permission
Abstract: In this paper, I develop and apply a new typology of international
bureaucracies that aims to capture the potential influence of these institutions on
IGO policy-making. First, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy is modified in
order to be applicable the working context and internal structure of IGOs. The
main argument is that if one wants to capture and explain the potential
autonomous behavior of international secretariats it is useful to distinguish
between their ability to develop autonomous preferences (autonomy of will) on
the one hand and the capacity to transform these preferences into action
(autonomy of action) on the other. Second, ideal types of international
bureaucracies are created by combining these two components of autonomy. In a
third step, suitable indicators are developed in order to measure each of the two
components and locate the secretariats of sixteen IGOs within the four-fold
typology. In the last step, my analysis of the autonomy data indicates that
mechanisms of member state control seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for the occurrence of bureaucratic autonomy, whereas the policy field
within which an IGO is active has important consequences for the autonomy
profile of its secretariat.
Contact
Jörn Ege
German Research Institute for Public Administration
Freiherr-vom-Stein-Str. 2, D-67324 Speyer
[email protected]
* This work builds on my PhD thesis submitted at the Humboldt University Berlin in October
2014. It is also part of the research unit ‘International Public Administration’ supported by the
German Research Foundation under Grant FOR # 1745 TP 02 BA 3658/5-1.
1
1. Introduction
Because most problems our society is facing today do not stop at the geographical borders of
nation states, international governmental organizations (IGOs) are created to meet these
transboundary challenges on an international or even global scale. Preventing the spread of
infectious diseases (WHO), securing global financial stability (IMF), or fighting poverty by
providing development assistance (World Bank) are only some prominent examples of the
core mandates of these organizations. The increasing policy-involvement of IGOs has not
gone unnoticed in social science research. Scholars of International Relations, Public
Administration and (Organizational) Sociology increasingly study IGOs as autonomous actors
in world politics (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Kim, Ashley, and Lambright 2014; Ness and
Brechin 1988; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998; Weller and Xu 2010). In their efforts to determine
the “actorness” of IGOs, scholars have shifted their analytical focus away from the properties
of member states toward the internal features of these organizations (Conceição-Heldt, Koch,
and Liese 2015). By and large, scholars study the organizational interior either in order to
explain variation and change or to shed light on the consequences of these features for global
policy-making. In the course of this development, the secretariats of IGOs have attracted
attention and are increasingly studied as separate units of analysis (see Ege and Bauer 2013;
Liese and Weinlich 2006). Despite notable developments within this debate especially
throughout the last decade, however, there is still relatively little comparative research on
international bureaucracies (but see Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a; Hooghe and Marks
2014; Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). Hence, a systematic assessment of the factors that
account for variation in international bureaucracies’ role in public policy development and
implementation remains difficult.
This gap is surprising for two reasons. First, studying the role of international bureaucracies in
policy-making helps to shed light on the classic question of “who governs”. Therefore,
explicating the complex internal interaction between government representatives and
international civil servants is an important precondition for a more differentiated assessment
of the accountability and legitimacy structures in global governance difficult (Buchanan and
Keohane 2006; Zürn 2004). Second, scholars have convincingly shown that the internal
structure of an organization has important consequences for public policies (Egeberg 1999;
Hammond 1993). Notwithstanding a few prominent exceptions (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore
2004; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a; Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Trondal 2011), the link
between the administrative basis and the quality of organizational output (such as
2
performance, pathologies, bureaucratic influence, etc.) is still under-researched when it comes
to policy-making above the nation state. While today most scholars agree that international
bureaucracies matter, we know little about the relative degree of this influence and how
(possible) variation of this phenomenon can be explained.
The paper contributes to this debate by focusing on the concept of bureaucratic autonomy in
the context of IGOs. The autonomy of international bureaucracies can be studied from the
point of view of their informal features or with an eye to professional expertise or other forms
of policy-making authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt
2012). In this paper, the primary focus is on structural autonomy in the sense of formal
administrative competences, rules, arrangements, and resources. This is not to say that
informal autonomy or other nonstructural characteristics are unimportant, rather that structural
autonomy is seen as the precondition for any autonomous bureaucratic action at international
level and thus as a natural starting point for comparative research.
The paper is structured as follows. After illustrating the role of international bureaucracies in
IGO policy-making (section 2), I show that it is useful to distinguish between two basic
features of international bureaucracies: their ability to develop autonomous preferences
(autonomy of will) and the capacity to transform these preferences into action (autonomy of
action) (section 3). In section 4, this two-dimensional concept structure serves as a basis for
theoretically distinguishing four types of bureaucracies: 1) autonomous bureaucracies, 2)
innovation hubs, 3) politicized bureaucracies and 4) managers of the status quo. Each ideal
typical configuration of autonomy does not only have specific implications for the policymaking capacity of the bureaucracy but can also be expected to be related to different causes.
Thus, I formulate expectations regarding the factors that may potentially account for the
variation within the four types of bureaucracies. In section 5, the typology and possible
explanatory factors are operationalized in order to allow for an application of the ideal typical
configuration of autonomy to the secretariats of sixteen IGOs. The results of the empirical
investigation of bureaucratic autonomy are presented in section 6, where I also confront the
theoretical expectations with empirical data. Section 7 summarizes the contributions of the
paper and provides an outlook on future research.
2. Setting the stage: international bureaucracies and policy-making
Some scholars have argued that “we need not focus on bureaucracies to understand IOs as
agents […] since many IOs have no meaningful staff, let alone autonomous bureaucracy”
3
(Thompson 2006, 229–54). This argument, however, has been increasingly contested in recent
years. Especially after the publication of the book “Rules for the World” by Barnett and
Finnemore (2004) bureaucracy-centered publications have mushroomed. This increasing
interest in administration above the nation state is not surprising because the more research
becomes an analysis of global public policy (Stone 2008), the more important it becomes to
systematically consider international bureaucracies as relevant actors (Ege and Bauer 2013,
136) and “to understand how people within an institution work and what impact they may
have on its processes and outcomes” (Weller and Xu 2010, 216). Such a conclusion begs the
question how we should conceive of the role of international bureaucracies in policy-making
at a more general level?
International bureaucracies are established to assist governments and other stakeholders of
IGOs in institutionalized multilateral negotiations about international norms and in their
application. Such a mandate includes a variety of tasks. International bureaucracies are
responsible, e.g., to give legal advice, provide language and translation services, prepare
meetings, write policy reports, and handle working relationships with the member states of the
organization. In this paper, I adopt a more narrow perspective and focus on the role of
international bureaucracies during the process of transforming societal demands into policy
solutions in form of organization decisions (see Stone 2008, 25–29). While international
bureaucracies play an important role during different stages of the policy cycle, they are just
one part of a differentiated system of several organizational organs. In order to study policymaking processes in this context, it is useful to apply a system-theoretical perspective and
conceive of an IGO as a political system (see Easton 1965) consisting of one or more
legislative assemblies, a political executive, and a secretariat with the Secretary-General on
top (see Rittberger, Kruck, and Zangl 2012).
The division of labor between these three organs is organized along similar lines as in national
political systems. The legislative assemblies, such as the General Assembly of the United
Nations, the OECD Council or the World Health Assembly, constitute the main deliberation
and decision making body of IGOs. The political executive is in charge of operational and
strategic tasks of the organization. This body coordinates between legislative and
administrative organs and is often equipped with limited decision making authority (MartinezDiaz 2009). The Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the Governing Body of
the ILO are good examples of these executive bodies. Finally, the international secretariat is
responsible for the day-to-day business of the IGO and supports the legislative and executive
4
bodies. The mandate of these secretariats can be limited to the headquarters of the
organization (e.g. in case of the WTO secretariat) or include far reaching field activities such
as OSCE or UN missions. The Secretary-General (or its functional equivalent) is the highest
civil servant of the IGO, represents the IGO externally, and chairs meetings of the political
executive.
These basic organs form the common governance structure of IGOs, which is relatively stable
across organizations (Rittberger, Kruck, and Zangl 2012, 87). Due to the research focus of
this paper, the prime interest lies in the secretariat and the degree to which it is autonomous
from the member states of the organization and politics more generally. Since bureaucratic
autonomy includes relational aspects, it is also crucial to consider the broader organizational
context in which the executive head and the secretariat (as the “bureaucracy”) are embedded.
Figure 1 summarizes the role of the three organs graphically by conceptualizing the IGO as a
political system.
Figure 1 The IGO as a Political System
(governments of
the) member states
NGOs and other
transnational actors
Input
(2) political executive
(1) legislative organ(s)
(a selection of member
state representatives)
(representatives of all member states)
SG
(3) secretariat
IGO
Output
Source: Authors’ compilation. Abbreviations: SG: executive head.
Viewing the IGO as a political system serves as a useful heuristic devise to approach the
question of bureaucratic autonomy. Seen from this perspective, inputs are demands and
support that primarily come from the environment of the IGO (i.e. from member states via
5
their representatives and transnational policy networks). Especially demands, however, can
also stem from within the bureaucracy itself (see Nay 2012). The output of an IGO is a
specific policy in form of a decision, which directly addresses the member states of the
organizations or leads to the establishment of operative programs such as UN peacekeeping
missions or development projects of the World Bank.
Looking at the specific mandates of international bureaucracies already indicates that the role
of these bodies during policy-making differs significantly between organizations. While the
role of some secretariats is indeed restricted to the provision of technical support, others are
delegated more far-reaching policy competences (Hooghe and Marks 2014). Formal
competences are, however, just one aspect of a bureaucratic organization’s potential to
influence policy output. In addition, their resources and internal structure are also found to
constitute important characteristics in this respect (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012). Thus, I use
the concept of bureaucratic autonomy, which goes beyond the formally delegated
competences, to compare the potential autonomous influence of international bureaucracies.
To achieve this objective, it needs to be clarified what it actually means for an international
bureaucracy to be autonomous and how varying qualitative types of this attribute can be
observed in real-world secretariats.
3. Theorizing bureaucratic autonomy as a hierarchical concept
The concept of bureaucratic autonomy is regularly used in the comparative study of
regulatory and executive agencies at both the national (Verhoest et al. 2004; Maggetti and
Verhoest 2014) and the European level (Groenleer 2009; Wonka and Rittberger 2010). In the
international context, the autonomy of IGOs (in the sense of the entire organizational system)
is considered a crucial institutional feature that explains why states act through these
organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1998) and to what degree they are able to wield
supranational influence (Tallberg 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that autonomy (and
independence) are prominent concepts applied in empirical studies of IGOs in both the
rationalist and the sociological tradition (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Reinalda 1998;
Reinalda and Verbeek 2011; Trondal 2011). Even though most of these studies rely—to
varying degrees—on intraorganizational and “bureaucratic” characteristics of IGOs as
observable implications of autonomy, the secretariats of IGOs are rarely conceptualized as
separate units of analysis. The studies that do concentrate on international secretariats and the
autonomy that these bodies possess can usually be found in the context of the European
6
Commission as the main administrative apparatus of the European Union (Ellinas and
Suleiman 2012; Trondal 2008). Comparative works that expand the focus to other
international bureaucracies are largely missing (Bauer and Ege 2014). Thus, we know little
about the (relative) extent of the autonomy of international bureaucracies and its causes.
As regards the comparative study of bureaucracies, there is no consensus with respect to the
concept’s precise definition or how varying degrees of bureaucratic autonomy are best
measured (see Kim 2008, 33). Maggetti and Verhoest (2014, 239) provide a minimum
common denominator by arguing that autonomy “means, above all, to be able to translate
one’s own preferences into authoritative actions”. Relying on such a general definition that is
also used in related fields of research (see Carpenter 2001; Nordlinger 1981, 361; Skocpol
1985, 9), the authors provide an understanding that seems “both complex enough to be
realistic and general enough to travel across historical and spatial contexts (Caughey, Cohon,
and Chatfield 2009, 2) without aligning it too closely to the working context of their unit of
analysis (see Verhoest et al. 2004). Based on such an understanding, it can be argued that in
order to wield policy influence, a bureaucracy requires both of the capacity to develop
autonomous preferences and the ability to translate these preferences into action. Thus, the
distinction between “autonomy of will” and “autonomy of action” is taken as point of
departure to develop a typology of international bureaucracies that is able to capture (and
systematically order) empirical features that are expected to make a difference for the policymaking capacities of real-world bureaucracies.
The distinction between the autonomy of will and action is still too abstract to allow for an
empirical observation of these features. Thus, the two subconcepts need further specification.
The next step is to ask what it actually mean for an international secretariat to possess the
capacity to develop an autonomous will? First, because bureaucracies are not individuals but
corporate actors, the capacity to develop an autonomous will is dependent on their ability to
overcome obstacles to collective action and to interact with political actors as a unified
organizational entity (Mayntz 1978, 68; Schnapp 2004, 93). Such an ability is referred to as
“administrative cohesion” in the course of this paper. International bureaucracies can be
expected to be cohesive if staff members have similar national backgrounds and stay with the
organization over a longer period of time. Second, the development of an autonomous will
requires that the people that work for the organization are able to form distinct
(administrative) preferences. In the constellation at hand, this means that the secretariat (or
administrative agent) is able to develop potential solutions to a given policy problem that are
7
not dictated by the (often short-term) interests of powerful member states but can be
independently developed within the administration itself. This ability is referred to as
“administrative
differentiation”.
Regarding
the
working
context
of
international
bureaucracies, independent leadership (Cox 1969) and independent research capacities (Haas
1992) are two important means by which administrative differentiation can be achieved. If an
international bureaucracy is equipped with both sufficient internal administrative cohesion
and administrative differentiation capacities, it is able to develop independent preferences that
may be used during the policy-making process.
International bureaucracies that possess an autonomous will can, on the one hand, be expected
to develop potential policy solutions that are geared toward the good of all members (Jordan
1991, 354). In other words, they are capable of developing a particularly pro-active policy
style, shield itself from external influence of powerful member states and possess a strong
capacity of “upgrading the common interest” of its community (Haas 1961, 369–71). On the
other hand, the prevalence of an autonomous bureaucratic will may also lead to an increased
vulnerability of the IGO to the pathological side effects commonly associated with
uncontrolled bureaucratic self-interest such as insulation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 424–
29), unresponsiveness or agency slack (Conceição-Heldt 2013).
This brings us to the second subconcept of bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. the autonomy of
action. What does it mean for an international secretariat to possess autonomous action
capacities? Within the conceptual framework at hand it means that the bureaucracy possesses
the ability to translate its (potentially distinct) preferences into action. In order to be attributed
this ability, delegation research and principal-agent theory highlight that the statutory powers
(i.e., formal organizational competences vis-à-vis political principals throughout the policy
cycle) and independent administrative resources are crucial (Brown 2010; Hawkins et al.
2006a; Hooghe and Marks 2014). The competences of the Secretary-General as the
organization’s highest civil servant are particularly important in this regard. These
competences concern his or her ability to insert independent proposals into the political
process but also the ability of the entire bureaucracy under the lead of the executive head to
sanction those who do not comply with organizational rules (Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek
2008). As a second condition for the autonomous administrative action, the resources of an
organization need to be sufficiently independent from the good will of its members. While
8
such an independence is formally guaranteed with regard to the staff resources of IGOs, 1
financial resources are often collected on a voluntary basis from member states. Agency
research in the national context has shown that these budgetary constraints renders
independent administrative action difficult and leaves the administration highly dependent on
the political principals of the organization (Verhoest et al. 2004, 116; Gilardi 2002, 883). In
the context of IGOs, a similar logic is at work (Brown 2010, 149; Weisser 2009).
To sum up, figure 2 provides a final overview the (hierarchical) structure of international
bureaucratic autonomy by distinguishing the two subconcepts and four dimensions of
autonomy as outlined above.
Figure 2 The Different Dimensions of Structural Bureaucratic Autonomy
concept
two subconcepts
four dimensions
1.1. administrative cohesion
1. autonomy
of will
bureaucratic
autonomy
2. autonomy
of action
1.2. administrative
differentiation
2.1. statutory powers
2.2. administrative resources
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Carpenter 2001; Caughey, Cohon, and Chatfield 2009;
and Verhoest et al. 2004.
Conceiving of bureaucratic autonomy as a multi-dimensional concept that consists of different
subconcepts and dimensions eventually leads to the (unavoidable) question of how the
different hierarchical level are related to each other. Usually, the question of how to best
aggregate different conceptual levels is solved by building some sort of index, where the
1
For instance, the United Nations' Charter (Chapter XV, Article 100) states that “[e]ach Member of the United
Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the SecretaryGeneral and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities” (see
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter15.shtml ) [accessed 20/01/2015]. Even in organizations outside
of the UN family, similar articles exist to protect the independence of the international staff.
9
(scores of the) different dimensions are added up or are weighted according to their relative
importance for the general concept. In his study on the de facto independence of agencies,
Maggetti for instance argues that “[f]inally, results concerning (i) the self-determination of
preferences, and (ii) the autonomy of the activity of regulation of agencies can be once more
aggregated by simply calculating the mean value of the two components to obtain one
measurement” (2007, 279). While such a procedure is one possible way of tackling the
question of aggregation, I will take a different approach in this paper. The next section shows
how the structure of the autonomy concept as outlined above can be used to build a fourfold
typology of international bureaucracies.
4. A typology of international bureaucracies’ autonomy
Classifying objects into qualitatively distinct types rather than ranking them in additive
indices is particularly useful if the concept under study is multidimensional. Building
typologies allows researchers to develop more fine-gained analytic tools that take into account
the multidimensionality of the underlying concept by making theoretically justified
assumptions about the relationships between the different conceptual dimensions (Goertz
2006). In the field of organizational studies, for instance, such an approach has been found
useful to organize the complex cause-effect relationships between structure and organizational
behavior (Damonte, Dunlop, and Radaelli 2014; Fiss 2011; Grandori and Furnari 2008). In
international relations, explanatory typologies have also proved valuable for guiding empirical
research of international politics (Elman 2005).
While bureaucratic autonomy is often seen as a genuinely multidimensional concept (Kim
2008; Yesilkagit 2011; Verhoest et al. 2004), the relationship between its varying dimensions
and “flavors” is rarely theorized or studied empirically. 2 The benefits of a typology approach
for studying the autonomy of international bureaucracies lies in its ability to link conceptual
reasoning (such as the distinction between autonomy of will and action as well as its
respective dimensions) to empirical observations. Viewing the subconcepts, dimensions and
indicators of autonomy as sufficient or necessary conditions (using the Boolean operators
AND and OR) and conceptualizing the effect of their presence and absence on bureaucracies’
policy-making capacities promises to provide a more differentiated account of the empirical
reality.
2
In the comparative study of executive agencies, however, the causal link between formal (de jure) and actual
(de facto) autonomy has been subject to empirical investigation (see Hanretty and Koop 2012; Maggetti 2007;
Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008).
10
Next, I make use of the hierarchical structure of the autonomy concept and theorize about the
relationship of the two subconcepts (autonomy of will and autonomy of action) with the
overall autonomy of a bureaucracy. Following Fiss (2011), I use an ideal type approach for
this purpose. “[I]deal types are analytical constructs for use as yardsticks for measuring the
similarity and difference between concrete phenomena” (Fiss 2011, 474). Thus, I understand
international bureaucracies’ autonomy of will and action as ideal typical concepts that can be
either absent (0) or present (1).
The theoretical reasoning behind the autonomy concept put forward in the previous section
already suggests that in order to be truly autonomous, an international secretariat needs to
possess both an autonomous will and the capacity for autonomous action. Thus, the presence
of each subconcept constitutes a necessary condition for an administration to be autonomous.
If one of the two attributes is absent, the bureaucracy may still be potentially influential, but is
viewed as qualitatively distinct from a truly autonomous bureaucracy. Hence, only the
common presence of both subconcepts constitutes a sufficient condition for an autonomous
bureaucracy. Combining the two subconcepts in a fourfold table illustrates that the common
presence of autonomy of will and autonomy of action characterizes just one particular types
of administration.
autonomy of will
Table 1 Four types of international bureaucracies
Combination: 1/0
Combination: 1/1
innovation hubs
autonomous bureaucracies
Combination: 0/0
Combination: 0/1
managers of the status quo
politicized bureaucracies
autonomy of action
Table 1 reveals that in addition to autonomous bureaucracies, there are three other ideal
typical combinations of the two subconcepts. Referring to the specific implications of these
bureaucracy types for organizational policy-making, I term them “innovation hubs”,
“politicized bureaucracies” and “managers of the status quo”. Innovation hubs are secretariats
that are characterized by a substantial autonomy of will but do not possess significant
11
autonomy of action. Regarding the role of these bureaucracies in policy-making, it can be
expected that their influence is particularly pronounced in the early stages of the policy cycle,
especially in problem definition and policy initiation. Innovation hubs are able to frame
discussions among member states, NGOs and the epistemic community at large (Haas 1992),
act as policy entrepreneurs (Nay 2012), engage in a pro-active administrative style (see e.g.
the paper presented by Schmidt et al. in this workshop) and offer particularly innovative
solutions to the challenges within the mandate of the organization. On the other hand,
however, the ability of these secretariats to influence policy outputs is highly contingent on
their ability to persuade member states in the legislative and executive organs of the IGO.
Once a innovation hub type of secretariat has been delegated the power to exercise certain
(executive) tasks, it may however be able to pursue them autonomously, at least as long as
there is no majority among the member states in favor of sanctions or withdrawal of these
powers.
International secretariats are considered politicized bureaucracies, if their autonomy of will is
absent, while possessing autonomous action capacities. I call these bodies “politicized”
because when it comes to policy development and implementation, administrative preferences
can be expected to be closely aligned to those of its political principals (for a similar
understanding of politicization see Bauer and Ege 2012). In contrast to innovation hubs, the
strength of this type of administration lies in the later stages of the policy cycle. Their
influence can be expected to be particularly strong with regard to the implementation of
organizational decisions either by monitoring the implementation in the member states or by
implementing policies themselves via organizational projects and field missions.
Finally, managers of the status quo show neither of the two subconceptual characteristics
developed above. This does not mean that these bodies are irrelevant for understanding
policy-making in IGOs. In contrast to the other three types, however, autonomous
administrative influence is even more context dependent, fragile and less likely in general.
While the type of truly autonomous bureaucracies combines the executive powers of
politicized bureaucracies with the independent preference formation capacity of innovation
hubs, managers of the status quo are mainly in charge of providing technical assistance to the
member states either at the IGOs headquarters or in the organization’s field missions and
offices.
But why are some administrations more autonomous than others and what factors can
potentially explain the differences between the four types? In this regard, the typology is
12
useful because it allows disentangling the underlying causal factors leading to different types
of bureaucracies. Next, I will formulate hypotheses regarding possible determinants of
international bureaucratic autonomy.
First, it can be expected that the field of activity of an IGO explains whether the autonomy
profile of the secretariat resembles the ideal typical configurations of innovation hub,
politicized bureaucracy, status quo managers or autonomous bureaucracy. Such an
expectation can be further differentiated into considerations about the salience of the specific
task of the bureaucracy for the members of the IGO and a functional explanation. According
to the logic of political salience, we would expect the members of an IGO to be concerned to
see powerful autonomous bureaucracies handling political matters which are of great
importance to them. Scholars have presented evidence that when it comes to activities within
the field of international security, countries are particularly reluctant to tolerate autonomous
secretariats because their involvement is perceived to violate decisive areas of the national
sovereignty of its members (see e.g. Cox and Jacobson 1973; Finkelstein 1974). Thus,
bureaucracies of organizations with a mandate in international security should not be expected
to be particularly autonomous with regard to both autonomy of will and action and thus reflect
the manager of the status quo type of administration. In order to explain the autonomy
intensities of bureaucracies that are active in other policy fields, a salience-based explanation
is difficult because in contrast to security matters, the political salience of the specific issue at
hand is difficult to evaluate in general terms as it varies within a given policy field (see
Biermann et al. 2009, 50).
As an alternative way of approaching this issue, I draw on a functional explanation that is
based on the reasoning that the functional requirements of a specific policy issue is reflected
in the problem-solving capacities of an organization (Haas 1964; for a recent application see
Hawkins et al. 2006b). In order to develop expectations regarding the link between the
requirements of a particular issue area and the autonomy type of an international bureaucracy,
I distinguish two broader fields of activity of an IGO: economic regulation on the one hand
and social and environmental regulation on the other. 3 An international bureaucracy in the
field of economic regulation is expected to require a certain level of autonomous action
capacities to be powerful enough to fulfil its mandate vis-à-vis its clients. This is true for
international (development) banks that are responsible to decide over loans and monitor the
3
This distinction is based on the reasoning that a regulation is “termed ‘economic’ when it deals with the price,
entry, exit and service of an industry, while it is termed ‘social’ when it concerns non-economic issues such as
health and safety” (Gilardi 2002, 891; see also Meier 1985, 5).
13
implementation of project in the member states and for headquarters-based organization that
regulate international trade. Since the decisions guiding these tasks are increasingly
formalized and “rule-based” (Gehring and Kerler 2007), a particularly pronounced ability to
develop innovation solutions is not required. On the contrary, member states may even fear
that an autonomous will allows these institutions to become “runaway agents” (Elsig 2007).
Hence, the bureaucracies of these organizations can be expected to follow the type of a
politicized bureaucracy. In contrast, the fields of social and environmental regulation, where
the requirements for new (technical) solutions are high (such as in the field of climate change,
migration or health regulation) and member states are less willing to invest their own
expertise and research capacities because they fear that new regulations might not be in their
(short-term) interest, an autonomous will is an important requirement for international
bureaucracies. Thus, one would expect an innovation hub type of administration as the typical
administrative arrangement in this policy area.
Finally, IGO scholars in the rationalist-institutionalist tradition argue that bureaucratic
autonomy mainly depends on the ability of member states to control the administration
(Abbott and Snidal 1998; Lake and McCubbins 2006). Similar to the principal-agent
relationship between national administrations and political actors (Damonte, Dunlop, and
Radaelli 2014; McCubbins and Schwartz 1987), the mechanisms of member state control over
the international secretariats and the decision-making in IGOs more generally can take very
different forms (Elsig 2011). In order to apply this logic to the question of bureaucratic
autonomy, I focus on two ways of how member states are able to exercise control within
IGOs: the establishment of mechanisms of internal oversight and the power of member states
to veto decisions within the legislative body of the IGO. With regard to the typology
developed above, the explanatory power of these two mechanisms is expected to be different
for international bureaucracies with a high degree of autonomous will (innovation hubs) as
compared to those with strong autonomous action capacities (politicized bureaucracies).
While innovation hubs should be characterize by mechanisms of internal oversight to
guarantee responsible administrative behavior and prevent malfeasance, member states may
instead rely on their veto power during actual decision-making if the preferences of the
bureaucracy are already in line with those of the political principals. Since veto powers are
highest under unanimity and qualified majority voting, these kinds of decision rules can be
expected in IGOs with a politicized bureaucracy. Truly autonomous bureaucracies, in
contrast, should be characterized by both internal oversight AND member state veto powers.
14
Table 2 summarizes the different the “independent variables” (or “conditions” in the
terminology of Boolean logic) that may potentially account for the shape of an international
bureaucracy with regard to its autonomy.
Table 2 Expectations about the predominant type of bureaucracy under specific conditions
manager of the
status quo
Condition
Policy field
Security
innovation
hubs
politicized
bureaucracy
x
Economic regulation
Control capacity of
members
autonomous
bureaucracy
x
Social and environmental
regulation
x
Internal oversight
x
x
Veto power
x
5. Application of the typology: Sampling and operationalization
In order to illustrate the applicability of the typology and to confront the factors outlined
above with empirical reality, the secretariats of 16 IGOs are selected from the population of
over 260 organizations listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of
International Associations 2013). When selecting these organizations, I do not apply a
particularly rigid sampling procedure. It has been taken care, however, that the sample covers
the most prominent “usual suspects” in the pertinent debate (Haftel and Thompson 2006,
254). Because it can be expected that the policy field is a relevant explanatory factor for the
type of administration, organizations operating in different policy fields are selected. Table 3
summarizes the characteristics of the organizations selected and provides additional
information on the year of foundation and membership size.
15
Table 3 Sample of international bureaucracies
headquarters
foundation
policy field
SEC
members
ECO
SOC
x
ASEAN
Jakarta
1967
x
ECB
Frankfurt
1992
x
EU COM
Brussels
1952
x
IAEA
Vienna
1957
x
IDB
Washington
1959
ILO
Geneva
1901
IMF
Washington
1944
IMO
London
1959
OECD
Paris
1961
OSCE
Vienna
1990
UN
New York
1945
UNESCO
Paris
1945
WB
Washington
1944
WHO
Geneva
1946
WIPO
Geneva
1967
x
185
WTO
Geneva
1995
x
155
x
10
17
x
27
158
x
48
x
x
183
188
x
170
x
34
x
x
56
x
x
193
x
195
x
x
188
x
194
Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: Three types of policy field are distinguished: security
(SEC), economic regulation (ECO) and social and environmental regulation (SOC).
Information as of 2014.
In order to measure bureaucratic autonomy, observable indicators need to be developed. In
line with the ideal type logic, I use dichotomous indicators that take into account if the
respective administrative traits are present or absent. Usually, each of the four theoretical
dimensions of autonomy (see figure 2) is measured by means of two indicators. Similar to the
question of how to make sense of different combinations of the subconcepts of autonomous
will and action, this fact highlights the necessity to specify rules for aggregation. 4 Depending
on the appropriate theoretical argument described in the course of the operationalization
process, I use the logical operators OR and AND (see e.g. Goertz 2006; Ragin 1989). A
4
For “administrative resources”, only one indicators is used to measure the underlying dimension. Thus, no
aggregation rule is specified.
16
combination with OR means that a dimension is coded “1” if at least one of the two indicators
of this dimension is present. In such a case, each indicator is seen as a sufficient condition for
the respective administrative feature (or outcome) at the dimensional level. Just as outline in
section 3, a combination with the logical AND is based on the notion of “necessity” and
means that in order for a dimension to be present, both indicators need to be present. In order
to further aggregate the dimensions into the subconcepts, a combination with a logical AND is
used just as for the aggregation of subconcepts into the overall concept (see section 4).
Administrative cohesion is an important aspect of bureaucratic autonomy because only
administrations that are sufficiently coherent will be able to overcome collective-action
problems and develop an autonomous will. An international bureaucracy is internally
coherent if administrative staff is both homogenous AND tenured. As regards the first
condition, scholars have pointed out that international bureaucracies are a lot more
heterogeneous than national administrations because their staff come from a variety of
countries and hence have different cultural backgrounds (Balint, Bauer, and Knill 2008, 681;
Liese and Weinlich 2006, 497). In general, low staff homogeneity undermines administrative
cohesion (Beigbeder 1988, 6; Michelmann 1978; Wille 2007, 43). While for some
organizations this inherent diversity may cause only minor challenges for internal coherence
because there is a sufficiently large common cultural basis for cooperation, bureaucracies of
IGOs with universal membership like UNESCO, WHO, or ILO are expected to have greater
difficulties to reconcile staff from over a hundred different countries. Thus, in order for an
administration to be considered homogenous, at least half of its personal must come from the
ten largest staff-contributing countries. 5 As regards the second (necessary) condition for
administrative cohesion, administrative longevity constitutes a classical resource of
bureaucratic influence and power (Weber 1978) that is also relevant for international
bureaucracies (Langrod 1963, 63). Because unlimited employment is less common in the
international civil service, a rather low threshold is applied for measuring this trait.
Administrative longevity is coded as present if at least 50 percent of staff of an IGO is
working on unlimited contracts.
In order to capture the capacity to develop preferences that are distinct from the political
principals in an IGO, administrative differentiation is operationalized by taking into account
5
Nationality-based homogeneity of staff is only one possibility to approach this phenomenon empirically. The
professional background (medical staff, lawyers, or economists) would also appear as a suitable to capture
internal cohesion (Momani(2005). Because it is difficult to gather comparative data on the varying professional
groups within IGOs, homogeneity is interpreted along national cleavages only.
17
the internal employment history of the executive head. The underlying logic is that the SG has
to fulfill a dual role as both a political and an administrative leader. If an external candidate is
“implanted” from outside into the organization (from the diplomatic service or high-ranking
political positions in the member states), as is the case in the OSCE or the EU, he or she is
expected to be committed to the political side of the job and less able to play an independent
role. To avoid a narrow focus on the incumbent SG, independent leadership is coded as
present, if at least one of the last five executive heads had previous working experience inside
the secretariat. Independent research capacities are a second “path” to administrative
differentiation. In-house research helps the secretariat not only to define potentially relevant
policy problems and develop its own solutions (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009b, 319), but
also serves as a way to legitimize these solutions based on their neural expert authority and
their moral standing (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Thus, the secretariat is attributed
independent research capacities if it has its own centralized research department at its
disposal. Because both indicators (independent leadership and independent research) are seen
as alternative ways to achieve administrative differentiation, the aggregation rule is based on a
logical OR.
As regards the capacity for autonomous action, the statutory powers of the IGO vis-à-vis its
member states are of crucial importance. To empirically capture this dimension, I distinguish
between agenda-setting and sanctioning competences of the secretariat. Agenda competences
are present if the SG possesses an explicit right of initiative during the meetings of the
legislative assembly. Second, the most powerful sanctioning competence available to an
organization is taken into account. Sanctioning competences are present, if the secretariat is
able to sanction non-compliant addressee of its policies (also via the political bodies of an
IGO). If the organization can only rely on mechanisms of “naming and shaming”, sanctioning
competences are coded as absent. As with the previous dimension, agenda-setting and
sanctioning are interpreted as alternative and equally important paths for an international
bureaucracy to be attributed administrative competences. Thus, a combination with OR is
used to move from the level of indicators to the theoretical dimension.
Finally, the independence of an IGO’s income to finance the execution of its mandate is
selected as (the only) indicator to measure administrative resources. While some IGOs are
completely self-financing (such as the IMF and the WIPO), independent financing is also
present if the secretariat can rely on mandatory contributions from member states (see
Amerasinghe 2005, 359–65). If the secretariat however is dependent on voluntary
18
contributions, independent financial resources are absent. For a better overview of the
different indicators, table 4 provides a final summary.
Table 4 Summary of indicators measuring the four dimensions
Feature and indicator
Variable
staff_homo
gen_dicho
COHESION
Homogeneity of staff (nationality-based)
Homogenous staff is present, if the ten
largest staff-contributing countries account
for a minimum of half the personnel of the
secretariat.
Administrative longevity
Longevity is present, if 50 percent of the
staff (or more) is tenured.
staff_perm
ratio_dicho
Independent leadership
Independent leadership is present, if at least
one of the last five executive heads had
previous working experience inside the
secretariat.
sg_internal
_dicho
Independent research capacities
Independent research capacities are present,
if the secretariat has its own centralized
research department.
research_d
icho
Agenda competences
Agenda competences are present, if the SG
possesses an explicit right of initiative.
sg_agenda
_dicho
Sanctioning competences
Sanctioning competences are present, if the
secretariat is able to sanction non-compliant
addressee of its policies (also via political
bodies).
sanctionin
g_dicho
Independent financial resources
Independent financing is present if the
secretariat can rely on mandatory
contributions from member states.
income_di
cho
Autonomy of Will
Dimension
Autonomy of Action
DIFFERETATION
COMPETENCES
RESOURCES
Combination
AND
OR
OR
-
In order to operationalize the factors that can potentially account for variation in the ideal
types, the information on the field of policy activity of an IGO is based on my own coding as
displayed in table 3. Information on the veto power is collected from the website and
documents of the organization and coded present if the regular decision rule in the highest
legislative organ of the IGO is unanimity or qualified majority. In case of simple majority, it
is coded as absent. In order to measure internal oversight, I rely on the data of Grigorescu
(2010), who collected information on oversight mechanisms (such as inspections, personnel
evaluations, investigations, and transparency requirements) within 73 international
19
bureaucracies. Internal oversight is coded present if, from a total of six possible mechanisms,
more than half of these functions have been installed within the secretariat.
6. Descriptive findings and analysis
After information on the different indicators has been collected, I am now able to locate the
sixteen international bureaucracies within the two-dimensional autonomy space. 6 To
summarize the results, each bureaucracy in the sample is placed in the cell that reflects the
specific configuration of bureaucratic will and action.
autonomy of will
Table 5 Correspondence between ideal types and empirical cases
innovation hubs
autonomous bureaucracies
WIPO, IMO
EU
managers of the status quo
politicized bureaucracies
OSCE, ECB, WHO, UNESCO, IAEA,
IMF, WB, WTO, IDB, OECD
ASEAN, ILO, UN
autonomy of action
The administration of the European Commission (i.e. the Directorates-General below the level
of Commissioners) is the only international bureaucracy in the sample possessing both
autonomy of will and autonomy of action. Truly autonomous bureaucracies thus seem to be a
particularly rare empirical phenomenon. The second interesting observation is that with an
empirical equivalence of only two secretariats (the administration of WIPO and IMO), the
ideal type of innovation hub is also not very common among real-world bureaucracies. The
cell indicating the absence of an autonomous will paired with autonomous action capacities
(politicized bureaucracies) is populated by the secretariats of IMF, WB, WTO, IDB, OECD.
Finally, with an empirical coverage of half of the cases in the sample, managers of the status
quo are the predominant type of bureaucracies. Bearing in mind that the organizations under
6
Information on structural bureaucratic autonomy is collected from the websites of the organisations or
requested directly from the secretariats. Depending on the specific indicator concerned, this included budget
reports, the organization’s constitution or founding documents, the rules and procedures of the organizational
bodies, the reports of the Secretary-General (or functional equivalent) to legislative and executive bodies, the
organization’s annual reports, staff manuals, and staff rules, as well as organisational charts, information from
the Yearbook of International Organizations, and other information available on the organisation website. A
table with the scores of the different cases at the level of indicators, dimensions and subconcepts can be found in
annex 1 at the end of this paper.
20
study cover the most prominent organizations, these findings indicate that structural
autonomy is not a very common characteristic of the international system altogether.
By and large, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy uncovers important empirical variation
within the sample. The next question is whether the “independent variables” outlined above
can explain the observed variance in the four autonomy types. In order to analyze the
empirical manifestation of the ideal types with an eye to the hypothesized expectations, I do
not apply a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) even though my dichotomous (crisp-set)
data would probably allow for such a formalized procedure. Since the data on sixteen cases is
relatively easily assessable, I will compare my expectations regarding the profile of a given
bureaucracy with the empirical manifestation under the specific (hypothesized) conditions
“manually” (see table 5).
According to the logic of political salience, it has been argued that bureaucracies of IGOs
with a security mandate should resemble the type of status quo managers. The empirical
results show that out of the four organizations active within the field of security, three are
managers of the status quo (IAEA, OSCE, UN), which constitutes confirmatory evidence for
my expectations. As the fourth IGO with a security mandate, the European Union with its
commitment to a “common foreign and security policy” constitutes an autonomous
bureaucracy and is thus a contradictory case. Since the EU is also highly active in the two
other fields and security policy is the area where its responsibilities are smallest, the empirical
findings can nonetheless be interpreted to support the salience explanation. Second, it has
been argued that bureaucracies with a mandate in economic regulation show characteristics of
a politicized bureaucracy. This expectation is fully in accordance with the data because all
organizations in the lower-right quadrant of table 4 are active in economic regulation. Except
for the OECD case, economic regulation even constitutes the only area of activity of these
organizations. Third, the functional logic would lead us to expect that bureaucracies active in
social and environmental regulation should resemble the ideal type of innovation hubs.
Because this type of bureaucracy is only covered by only two cases, the empirical basis to
assess this hypothesis is weak. While the case of the IMO is in accordance with the
expectation, the WIPO as an economic organization contradicts the functional argument.
Overall, the empirical findings show that the policy field within which an IGO operates
matters strongly for the shape of their bureaucracies.
21
The second kind of explanation is based on the rationalist assumption that the control
capacities of member states constitute the most important determinant of bureaucratic
autonomy.
Thus, we would expect international bureaucracies with the autonomy profile of an innovation
hub to be characterized by strong internal oversight. Due to the limited empirical diversity of
this ideal type, the possibility to put this explanation to test is restricted. As far as we can tell
from the case of IMO and WIPO as the only two types of innovation hubs in the sample, the
expectation cannot be confirmed because in both cases, oversight mechanisms are absent.
Regarding the last hypothesis, which postulates that member states control politicized
bureaucracies by means of decisional veto powers, empirical evidence is mixed. While the
OECD and the IMF secretariats as politicized bureaucracies do indeed feature a member state
veto, the other three empirical cases of this configurational type (WB, WTO, IDB) are
characterized by simple majority voting.
The results of the analysis of the five hypotheses are summarized in table 6. The general
finding is that the policy field within which an IGO is active helps to explain the type of
bureaucracy we observe. Especially for IGOs that are active in the fields of security and
economic regulation, empirical evidence of the application of the ideal types to the sixteen
cases has confirmed the initial expectations. On the other hand, the existence of internal
bureaucratic oversight and member states vetoes do not seem to bear explanatory value for the
configuration of autonomy of will and action in the respective secretariats.
Table 6 Correspondence between hypotheses and empirical data
SEC
ECO
SOC
oversight
veto
ideal type
ASEAN
0
1
1
0
1
managers of the status quo
ECB
0
1
0
no data
0
managers of the status quo
EU
0 (-)
1
1
1 (+)
1(+)
autonomous bureaucracies
IAEA
1 (+)
0
0
0
0
managers of the status quo
IDB
0
1 (+)
0
1
0 (-)
politicized bureaucracies
ILO
0
0
1
1
0
managers of the status quo
IMF
0
1 (+)
0
0
1 (+)
politicized bureaucracies
IMO
0
0
1 (+)
0 (-)
0
innovation hubs
OECD
0
1 (+)
1
0
1 (+)
politicized bureaucracies
OSCE
1 (+)
0
1
0
1
managers of the status quo
UN
1 (+)
0
1
1
0
managers of the status quo
UNESCO
0
0
1
0
0
managers of the status quo
22
WB/IBRD
0
1 (+)
0
1
0 (-)
politicized bureaucracies
WHO
0
0
1
1
0
managers of the status quo
WIPO
0
x
0 (-)
0 (-)
0
innovation hubs
WTO
0
1 (+)
0
0
0 (-)
politicized bureaucracies
Notes: 1: condition is present; 0: condition is absent; grey fields indicate that
an expectation has been formulated. (+): expectation confirmed; (-) expectation
not confirmed.
7. Conclusion and outlook
International bureaucrats are a group of actors whose influence on policy-making is likely to
grow under conditions of increasing internationalization and globalization. The influence of
these actors is determined by the characteristics of their organizational apparatus and also by
the quality of the relationships between the IGO’s bureaucratic apparatus and its political
actors. Proceeding on the assumption that autonomy constitutes the basis for bureaucratic
influence on policy-making, I have focused on the structural basis of the autonomy of
international bureaucracies in order to conceptualize, compare and explain differences in the
configuration of autonomy in sixteen international bureaucracies.
Overall, the paper has provided insights into the multifaceted concept of bureaucratic
autonomy and has advanced research in three areas, in particular. First, I have developed a
hierarchical theoretical conceptualization of bureaucratic autonomy that is applicable to the
context of international secretariats. Viewing autonomy as a concept that goes beyond the
competences and resources of the bureaucracy and takes into account the capacity of the
administration to develop autonomous preferences is an important supplement to the
conventional empirical focus on the relationship between the organization and its member
states in traditional IGO research. Second, the development of ideal types that serve as a
yardstick for measuring the similarity and difference in the ability of international
bureaucracies to develop autonomous preferences and the capacity to transform these
preferences into action offers interesting insights into the policy-making capacities
international secretariats and its causes. Operationalizing the typology and subsequently
applying it to sixteen cases, the paper thirdly uncovers empirical variation in international
bureaucratic autonomy and reveals that the policy field within which an IGO is active helps to
explain the type of bureaucracy we observe.
23
The paper has provided a valuable contribution to previous efforts of systematically studying
the black box of IGO secretariats and the consequences of these internal features for global
governance. It thus advances our understanding of bureaucratic autonomy in the international
context both conceptually and empirically. Yet, there are three areas where I see potential for
further conceptual, analytical and methodological specification of the approach of this paper
that should be addressed in future research.
First, the paper puts a strong conceptual focus on the relationship between autonomy of will
and autonomy of action, which served as a basis for developing the four ideal types. The
relationship between the different dimensions however has received less attention yet. Even
though it is justifiable to argue that cohesion and differentiation constitute necessary (and
jointly sufficient) conditions for an autonomous will,7 the hierarchical structure of the
autonomy concept promises further analytical leverage at the dimensional level. For future
research, it can be promising for instance to apply an ideal type approach at the level of
dimensions and theorize not only about instances where both cohesion and differentiation are
present (as in this paper) but also about configurations where one of the two conditions is
absent. Empirically, such a conceptual specification would allow researchers to more fully
exploit the potential the concept and investigate empirical variation within ideal types that so
far have not been conceptualized (within managers of the status quo type of administration
for example).
The second area that should be addressed in future research concerns the causes of autonomy.
While the distinction between the three policy fields and the two control mechanisms allow
for a first evaluation of the factors leading to autonomous bureaucracies, the analysis can
benefit from a further specification of the causal mechanisms. It would for instance be useful
to investigate in more detail the underlying problem structure within a policy area. Based on
Lowi’s classical typology (1964), one could distinguish between regulatory, distributional and
redistributional issues or, as Hawkins et al. (2006b) suggest, expect variation in autonomy
depending on whether the underlying problem is one of intergovernmental coordination,
collective action, arbitration, or credible commitment. Despite the general appear of these
suggestions, it must be highlighted however that the more differentiated the nature of the
policy issue is conceptualized, the more one needs to shift the analytical focus to the level of
individual policies. As regards the mechanism of member state control that turned out to be
largely irrelevant explanatory factors in the analysis, one could move beyond internal
7
The same argument can be made for autonomous action.
24
oversight and member state veto power and consider other ways of political control.
Furthermore, it can be concluded that I have formulated explicit expectation only about
certain combinations of conditions. The white cells in table 5 however have so far remained
outside the analytical focus. In order to evaluate further configurations of conditions of
bureaucratic autonomy, QCA would be an appropriate method that is also suitable to
empirically investigate ideal types (Fiss 2011; Hudson and Kühner 2013). If it is necessary to
this end to enlarge the sample of IGO secretariats, particular attention should be devoted to
meet the challenges posed by limited empirical diversity in order to increase the analytical
leverage of QCA.
Finally, the autonomy concept arguable provides a useful tool to investigate the consequences
of different types of administrations for specific instances of policy-making in form of
organizational decisions. Conducting policy studies that are based on the different intensities
or types of autonomy would allow researchers to include other relevant variables for
bureaucratic influence in order to study the complex interaction of political, situational and
bureaucratic factors that eventually determine the shape and content of global public policies.
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Dimension
staff_homo
gen_dicho
staff_permrati
o_dicho
combination with AND
Subconcept
DIFFERETATION
Total
COH
sg_intern
al_dicho
research_
dicho
combination with
OR
Total
DIFF
combination with AND
COMPETENCES
sg_agenda_
dicho
sanctioni
ng_dicho
combination with
OR
RES
Total
COMP
income_dic
ho
combination with AND
Total
Autonomous
Action
COHESION
IGO
Autonomous
Will
Annex 1 Autonomy scores of the sixteen bureaucracies and aggregated values
AUTONOMY TYPE
Total
OSCE
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
manager of the status quo
ECB
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
manager of the status quo
WIPO
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
innovation hubs
IMO
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
innovation hubs
WHO
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
manager of the status quo
UNESCO
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
manager of the status quo
IMF
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
politicized bureaucracy
IAEA
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
manager of the status quo
ASEAN
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
manager of the status quo
ILO
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
manager of the status quo
WB
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
politicized bureaucracy
WTO
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
politicized bureaucracy
EU
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
autonomous bureaucracy
IDB
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
politicized bureaucracy
UN
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
manager of the status quo
OECD
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
politicized bureaucracy
31
Annex 2 List of abbreviations
Abbreviation
Full name
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU
European Union
ECB
European Central Bank
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IGO
international governmental organisation
IDB
Inter-American Development Bank
ILO
International Labour Organization
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IMO
International Maritime Organization
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SG
Secretary-General
UN
United Nations
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WB/IBRD
World Bank Group / International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
WHO
World Health Organization
WIPO
World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO
World Trade Organization
32