Briefing Note:
Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
by Rob Grace1
Introduction
The current state of armed conflict differs greatly from when the first Geneva Convention was adopted in
1864. Indeed, the first significant “test” of the Geneva Convention of 1864 was the Austro-Prussia War of
1866, a conflict that lasted just over two months.2 In contrast, in the 21st century, the world is rife with
protracted conflicts, many of which are non-international in character.3 The proliferation of protracted
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) has particularly defined the post-Cold War era, and as a result,
during the past two decades, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have become increasingly significant
actors with which humanitarian practitioners must perpetually engage in the field.
Aiming to assist in framing professional discussions related to frontline humanitarian negotiations with
NSAGs, this document offers a brief overview of relevant academic and policy literature. This document
is divided into three sections. Section I describes scholarly approaches to devising a typology of NSAGs
and offers comments on the scope of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs. Section II discusses several
key challenges that humanitarian practitioners have faced when negotiating with NSAGs. Section III
offers concluding remarks about professional discussions on these issues moving forward.
I.
Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups: Issues of Definition and Typology
The umbrella term “non-state armed group” can encompass a wide array of different types of
organizational entities.4 As two scholars write about this definitional difficulty:
1
Rob Grace is a researcher at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian
Action (ATHA). This document draws from previous ATHA publications on humanitarian negotiation, those
being: R. Grace (2015). Humanitarian Negotiation: Key Challenges and Lessons Learned in an Emerging
Field. Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action,
http://atha.se/presentations/negotiation/index.html; and R. Grace (2014). Preparatory Review of Literature on
Humanitarian Negotiation. Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action,
http://www.atha.se/sites/default/files/humanitarian_negotiation_literature_review_-_harvard_university.pdf.
For information about ATHA’s work on humanitarian negotiation, see: http://www.atha.se/policy-projectfrontline-humanitarian-negotiation.
2
See generally, for example, G. Wawro (1997). The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in
1866. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and H. M. Hozier (2012). The Seven Weeks' War: The AustroPrussian Conflict Of 1866. Driffield: Leonaur.
3
See A. MacLead (2016). Engaging Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes. Chatham House, pp. 7-8;
and A. Blin (2011). Armed groups and intra-state conflicts: the dawn of a new era? International Review of the
Red Cross 93 (882): 287-310.
4
See A. MacLead (2016). Engaging Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes. Chatham House, p. 8.
Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
A definition of non-state armed actors has proven difficult owing to their many types and
characteristics. Generally speaking, non-state armed groups are defined as distinctive
organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii)
not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police,
or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to
politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure. They may, however, be supported or
instrumentalized by state actors either secretly or openly, as happens often with militias,
paramilitaries, mercenaries, or private military companies.5
Despite the commonalities mentioned above (willingness and capability to use violence; separation from
formal state institutions; and political, military, and resource autonomy), NSAGs differ from one another
in various ways, including organizational structure,6 funding sources,7 degree of international political
support, military and political strength,8 and capacity to deal with detainees.9 What are the implications of
these differences? A typology devised by one scholar aims to explain the likelihood that a NSAG will
survive according to two factors: 1) whether the NSAG has a governmental safe haven, and 2) how the
NSAG is organized (centralized, decentralized, or fragmented). A table outlining a model for the
relationship between these variables appears below:10
Centralization
Decentralization
Fragmentation
Safe haven
Good chance of
survival
Poor chance of
survival
Poor chance of
survival
No safe haven
Poor chance of
survival
Good chance of
survival
Poor chance of
survival
To elaborate, this model is based on the notion that “[c]entralized organizations are much more capable
than non-centralized ones of taking the strategic initiative, and they have other advantages once they can
operate without the intrusive intervention of rivals.”11 A centralized NSAG that also has a safe haven “can
also transmit information from where it is produced to where it is needed, can accumulate knowledge, and
can centralize training with less fear of serious interruption.”12 Meanwhile, decentralized NSAGs “are
more resilient than centralized ones in hostile environments because their different components are more
autonomous and less dependent on co-ordination. They are not as vulnerable as centralized organizations
are to short-cuts such as decapitation or sophisticated strategies that aim to isolate the organization
because the rank and file are both fairly independent and well ensconced within the social structure.”13
5
C. Hoffman and U. Schneckener (2011). Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and
strategies. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (883): 2-3.
6
See generally A. H. Sinno (2011). Armed groups’ organizational structure and their strategic options. International
Review of the Red Cross 93 (883): 311-332.
7
See generally A. Wennmann (2011). Economic dimensions of armed groups: profiling the financing, costs, and
agendas and their implications for mediated engagements. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882):
333-352.
8
A. Blin (2011). Armed groups and intra-state conflicts: the dawn of a new era? International Review of the Red
Cross 93 (882): 287-310.
9
See generally D. Tuck (2011). Detention by armed groups: overcoming challenges to humanitarian action.
International Review of the Red Cross 93 (883): 759-792.
10
This table is modified from A. H. Sinno. Armed groups’ organizational structure and their strategic options.
International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 321.
11
Ibid, 319.
12
Ibid, 320.
13
Ibid, 318.
2 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
Scholarly attention has also been paid to the extent of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs. The below
figure details various objectives and activities that have necessitated engagement from various types of
entities (governments, humanitarian organizations, and development actors, etc.) with non-state actors:14
Acute
(conflict/emergency)
Conflict resolution
Operational services
Long-term
Norm diffusion
Public policy
Direct/purposeful
contact with NSAGs
Indirect contact
with NSAGs
This framework conceptualizes frontline humanitarian negotiation as an activity that occurs during acute
conflicts or emergencies, entails the implementation of operational services, and the nature of the
engagement “is selective and only with regard to a dispute or an emergency; the armed actors are means
to an end, as the services’ main focus is the population.”15 Two other authors concur that “[o]verall, the
international community’s engagement with NSAGs has been limited, and often focused more on
dialogue about humanitarian access and relief than on protection.”16 Indeed, a recent study of NSAGs that
have engaged in dialogue with Geneva Call suggests the need for access negotiations. The study finds,
“All of the ANSAs [armed non-state actors] surveyed feel they have a right to regulate humanitarian
access. They see themselves as governments in waiting, or as de facto governments of the areas they
control. Most have some form of policy or procedure in place, however loosely articulated, to regulate
humanitarian access.”17 Furthermore, according to another author, some humanitarian organizations might
shy away from engagement on protection issues due to the “fear that wider engagement would prejudice
their relations with the NSAG, impede access, endanger staff or compromise principles.”18
Still, other publications have emphasized various other objectives that engagement with NSAGs has
entailed, for example, to “protect civilians” and “facilitate armed groups’ compliance with international
14
This figure is modified from C. Hofmann and U. Schneckener (2011). NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors:
Improving Compliance with International Norms. Special Report. United States Institute of Peace, p. 3. This
figure also appears in C. Hofmann (2012). Reasoning with Rebels: International NGOs’ Approaches to
Engaging Armed Groups. SWP Research Paper. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, p. 9. For more on efforts of states and non-governmental organizations to
engage with NSAGs, see generally C. Hoffman (2006). Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian
Action. International Peacekeeping 13 (3): 396-409.
15
C. Hofmann and U. Schneckener (2011). NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors: Improving Compliance with
International Norms. Special Report. United States Institute of Peace, p. 3.
16
M. Keating and P. Lewis (2016). Towards a Principled Approach to Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups
for Humanitarian Purposes. Chatham House, p. 4.
17
A. Jackson (2016). In Their Own Words: Perceptions of Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Action.
Geneva Call, p. 16.
18
B. Saul (2016). Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Non-state Armed Groups. Chatham
House, p. 48.
3 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
humanitarian law.” 19 A United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) policy document
articulates various aims of negotiations with NSAGs, those being to: “advocate in favour of and to secure
access to populations in need for the provision of assistance;” “secure commitments on goals fulfilling the
rights of children in humanitarian emergencies;” “advance accountability for perpetrators of violence
against children, and to assist the United Nations Security Council in its work to combat grave violations
against children;” “mitigate risks to staff security;” and “pursue UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate in postconflict situations.” 20 One scholar notes that the space for engagement on issues of humanitarian
protection (in addition to access) can depend on what services the humanitarian organization has to offer
that might be beneficial to the NSAG: “Actors that provide material aid enjoy an advantage in engaging
NSAGs on protection issues because they can offer them concrete things. Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF), for instance, can provide expert medical assistance and facilities when NSAGs may not be able to.
The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] can provide medical assistance and first-aid
training; detainee visits; prisoner exchanges; family tracing; and repatriation, which can be used as entry
points for IHL [international humanitarian law] dialogue.”21
II.
Key Challenges
This section discusses five challenges that humanitarian practitioners have faced when engaging in
frontline negotiations with NSAGs. They are: 1) navigating engagement with governments alongside
negotiations with NSAGs, 2) grappling with negative perceptions that some NSAGs have of humanitarian
organizations, 3) the divide that sometimes exists between NSAGs’ interests and the objectives of
humanitarian engagement, 4) risks deriving from counter-terrorism regulations that proscribe engagement
with certain NSAGs, and 5) the fragmented nature of NSAGs that have a decentralized organizational
structure.
A. Navigating Engagement with Governments and NSAGs
The fact that engaging with non-state armed groups is not intended to bestow legitimacy on these entities
is widely acknowledged. As an Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) handbook
on humanitarian negotiations states, “Humanitarian negotiations do not infer any legal status, legitimacy
or recognition of the armed group.”22 However, governments often carry this concern nonetheless. For
example, in Afghanistan in 2008, the government endeavored to prevent humanitarian organizations from
engaging with anti-government armed groups.23 Concerns about engaging with NSAGs have also been
expressed by the United States, as described by a representative from ICRC:
Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memo to all the departments of defence: anything that the ICRC says or
writes to anybody, must be communicated to the Pentagon within 24 hours. They perceive us as a
19
D. Stenhoff (2009). Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-State Armed Groups.
Texas International Law Journal 45 (297): 297-322.
20
UNICEF (2011). Programme Guidance Note on Engaging with Non-state Entities in Humanitarian Action.
http://www.unicefinemergencies.com/downloads/eresource/docs/Engaging%20with%20NonState%20Entities/2011-11-21%20%20Programme%20Guidance%20on%20Engaging%20with%20NSE%20in%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf.
21
B. Saul (2016). Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Non-state Armed Groups. Chatham
House, p. 48.
22
G. McHugh and M. Bessler (2006). Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners.
OCHA, p. 14.
23
See G. McHugh and S. Singh (2013). Preserving the integrity of humanitarian negotiations. Humanitarian
Exchange Magazine, http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-58/preserving-theintegrity-of-humanitarian-negotiations.
4 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
bigger threat than we are. One problem is the legitimising of non-state actors. They do not
understand, we are too small, but we are perhaps bigger than we say we are.24
Concerns about the legitimization of armed groups can impact the entire tenor of humanitarian
negotiations, as occurred in Angola:
UCAH [Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit] had to be tactful in its dealings with the two
parties. The GoA [Government of Angola], having for the first time been elected in the 1992
ballot, insisted that its sovereignty, and UNITA’s [National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola] illegitimacy, be reflected in the tone and conduct of the negotiations. However, dealings
with UNITA, especially about such serious issues as security for UN [United Nations] flights and
staff, had of necessity to be formal in tone. The GoA did not object to UN officials travelling to
Huambo for talks with UNITA, but expected to be asked for permission for flights to UNITA
territory, and appraised of the contents of their discussions. While the GoA was consulted about
plans, UNITA was simply given the choice to say yes or no, without making alterations. This
often annoyed UNITA.25
How should humanitarian negotiators grapple with this fundamental aspect of engaging with NSAGs?
This question is particularly pertinent because one reason that some armed groups engage with
humanitarian organizations is to derive the very form of legitimacy about which governments have
expressed concern. This reality is expressed by the following passages:
•
•
•
•
“Armed groups may seek to use humanitarian negotiations to enhance their positioning in other
interactions (e.g. with political actors), and to misuse these negotiations as a vehicle for
supporting their claims of legitimacy. In case of doubts in this regard, humanitarian negotiators
should request a demonstration of commitment from the armed group before or during
negotiations.”26
“Armed groups may perceive compliance with international legal norms as enhancing their
credibility and their own perceived legitimacy with internal or external audiences, including their
own diasporas.”27
“[T]he RUF [Revolutionary United Front] leaders attached [importance] to [the] presence [of] aid
agencies for the purpose of their own credibility and legitimacy, according to one of the leaders
of the RUF: ‘to prove to the world we are not the beast we are held to be.’”28
“Armed actors may also be more mindful of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or willing to
permit aid agency access in the hope that doing so will earn them greater legitimacy among the
international community (as with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), for
example). Other groups may compel aid agencies to hand over relief items so that they can take
credit for their delivery (as with Al Shabaab). There are also instances where armed groups may
24
G. Loane (n.d.). Barriers to Negotiating Humanitarian Access: The Experience of the ICRC,
http://www.flyktninghjelpen.no/arch/_img/9108791.pdf.
25
A. Richardson (2000). Negotiating humanitarian access in Angola: 1990 – 2000. UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c9b.html.
26
G. McHugh and M. Bessler (2006). Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners.
OCHA, p. 14.
27
Ibid, 40.
28
M. Glaser (n.d.). Negotiated Access: Humanitarian Engagement with Armed Non-state Actors. Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy.
5 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
perceive that it is more beneficial to their interests to attack or expel aid workers than allow them
to work safely (as with Al-Shabaab and the Taliban).”29
As these passages suggest, humanitarian organizations—and negotiators, specifically—face a conundrum.
On the one hand, negotiators must assure governments that engaging with anti-government non-state
entities will not confer legitimacy upon these groups. On the other hand, the potential for legitimacy can
be one of humanitarian negotiators’ strongest selling points for drawing NSAGs into productive
negotiations. As a consequence, humanitarian negotiators find themselves caught between the
irreconcilable interests of governments and non-state actors. Indeed, in order to retain access, aid agencies
have sometimes avoided activities that could have been viewed with suspicion by the government, even if
this choice risked flying in the face of the need to abide by the humanitarian principle of impartiality. This
issue arose in the context of Sudan, as one author describes:
The reactions of aid agencies to this situation show some of the tendencies that it is hoped may be
addressed through a greater use of historical analysis. Some agencies have agreed to provide aid
to government areas even while access to areas under SPLM-N control remains blocked. Many
avoid activities the government may see as suspicious or offensive: some have chosen not to
provide aid in refugee camps for people from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile in South Sudan
for fear of being perceived by the government of Sudan as supporting the SPLM-N. While
SPLM-N frustration with the international community grows and many within the SPLM-N
believe that the UN has been infiltrated with government spies, some aid agencies hold out hope
that the government can still be persuaded through private advocacy or ‘good behaviour’ on the
part of aid agencies.30
B. Managing Negative Perceptions
In various contexts, humanitarian professionals have encountered outright hostility from NSAGs. For
example, in Afghanistan, “One Taliban fighter claimed he would never allow aid agencies into his area
because they all ‘work under the universal powers who drink the blood of Muslims’ and ‘have converted
people to Christianity.’”31 Furthermore, in relation to both Afghanistan and Somalia, “While UN data
shows the greatest humanitarian needs in southern Afghanistan and South-Central Somalia, aid agencies
are disproportionately concentrated in the more peaceful northern and central parts of Afghanistan and
work outside Al-Shabaab areas in South-Central Somalia. This disparity has reinforced resentment and
suspicion.”32
This hostility can manifest in the intentional targeting of attacks against humanitarian field workers, a risk
on which the humanitarian sector has increasingly focused in recent years. Discussing attacks that
occurred in Syria Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan, one author states:
Each of these attacks was targeted and intentional. None was a case of ‘wrong place and wrong
time’, ‘caught in the cross fire’, or just unlucky. The UN and its agencies, the ICRC and many
29
G. McHugh and S. Singh (2013). Preserving the integrity of humanitarian negotiations. Humanitarian Exchange
Magazine, http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-58/preserving-the-integrity-ofhumanitarian-negotiations.
30
A. Jackson and E. Davey (2014). From the Spanish civil war to Afghanistan Historical and contemporary
reflections on humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups. HPG Working Paper. Humanitarian
Policy Group, p. 10, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8974.pdf.
31
A. Jackson (2014). Negotiating perceptions: Al-Shabaab and Taliban views of aid agencies. HPG Policy Brief 61.
Humanitarian Policy Group, p. 2, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/9104.pdf.
32
Ibid.
6 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
other humanization organizations are being targeted by NSAGs precisely because they are
providing humanitarian aid or protection.33
The question is how humanitarian negotiators can make any successful negotiating inroads with entities
predisposed to distrust humanitarian organizations. In some contexts, as one author notes, success might
be difficult, or even impossible, to achieve:
For example, imagine you are operating in a city in which four armed groups of child soldiers are
active. You go to the local head of these groups and ask that they be disbanded. The overriding
interest of the local leader of the armed groups is to win a war, while the humanitarian concern is
to protect children from that war. Finding a creative way to reconcile this conflict of interests that
meets both the needs of the children and those of the military commanders may not be possible,
or legally and morally unsatisfactory from a humanitarian standpoint.34
C. The Divide Between NSAGs’ Interests and Humanitarian Objectives
A growing body of literature focuses on how norms of IHL can serve the interests of NSAGs. For
example, NSAGs that view themselves as “governments in waiting” have an interest in protecting the
civilians over whom they aim to govern, and adherence to norms of IHL could have a beneficial public
relations effect, feeding into perceptions of a NSAG’s legitimacy, both at the domestic and international
levels.35 Additionally, there are also potential reciprocal benefits, in particular, in relation to detainee
treatment. One author elaborates:
The treatment of prisoners is the area on which positive reciprocity has the greatest effect. Some
armed groups have found that their adversary can be influenced by the way in which they treat
their prisoners. If they treat enemies in their hands well, this may lead to improved treatment of
their own members in enemy hands. The enemy’s desire to ensure that its own combatants
continue to be well treated and the fear of repercussions on public opinion stemming from
disparity of treatment have sometimes enabled that objective to be achieved.36
Conversely, though, this literature acknowledges that NSAGs’ interests and humanitarian objectives do
not always align. The author cited above also notes:
Disregard for the rules of IHL may have a number of short-term military advantages. To give
some examples, perfidy may make it possible to attack a target that is too well defended for the
group to do so otherwise. Protected property (places of worship, hospitals) may be used as a
33
A. MacLead (2016). Engaging Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes. Chatham House, p. 10.
D. Mancini-Griffoli and A. Picot (2004). Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance
and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict. HD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 25,
http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/188HumanitarianNegotiation.pdf.
35
See generally O. Bangerter (2011). Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law
or not. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 353-384; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen (2011). Rules
of Engagement: Protecting Civilians through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors. Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights; and H. Jo (2015). Compliant Rebels. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
36
O. Bangerter (2011). Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not.
International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 366. For more on reciprocity and detainee treatment, see
generally J. Morrow (2014). Order Within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
34
7 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
military position because the enemy will be reluctant to attack it, especially if the international
media are keeping a close eye on the conflict. Giving no quarter may help to shatter the resistance
of a unit by creating a climate of terror. Pillaging may considerably facilitate a column’s logistics.
For a number of commanders of armed groups, freedom of action takes precedence over any
other consideration. However, it must be recalled that, in all those cases, the military advantage of
not respecting IHL is short-term and rapidly dwindles as soon as the enemy comes up with
counter-measures.37
A great deal of evidence also indicates that many NSAGs lack sufficient knowledge of IHL. Indeed, the
aforementioned Geneva Call study on perceptions of NSAGs of humanitarian action found that, even
NSAGs that expressed a belief in the importance of international norms exhibited substantial gaps in
terms of their knowledge of specific IHL rules.38 Thus, during frontline negotiations, integrating language
of IHL norms into the negotiation discourse might not be an effective negotiation strategy. Furthermore,
for groups perceiving that material benefits can be derived from violating IHL norms, efforts during
negotiations to frame issues of humanitarian protection in terms of the NSAG’s interests might be
similarly ineffective.
D. Risks Deriving from Counterterrorism Legislation
Additional challenges arise when humanitarian organizations negotiate with entities listed on domestic
and/or international terrorist lists. In such instances, engaging with these groups could lead humanitarian
organizations to face legal ramifications. Because of this issue, some humanitarian organizations adopted
an official policy of cutting off ties with Hamas.39 For humanitarian organizations operating in the context
of Somalia, this issue has led to the need for “new layers of staffing to oversee administration and
monitoring and significantly enlarged operational budgets.”40 Another context in which this issue has
arisen is Colombia, where “contact with guerrilla groups is prohibited by law.”41 In such environments,
the overarching dilemma is that laws have been enacted at the national and international levels that seem
to criminalize impartial humanitarian action. Overall, this issue has led to an environment of uncertainty
about what activities a humanitarian organization may pursue without exposing itself to legal risks.42
37
O. Bangerter (2011). Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not.
International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 371.
38
A. Jackson (2016). In Their Own Words: Perceptions of Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Action.
Geneva Call.
39
G. McHugh and S. Singh (2013). Preserving the integrity of humanitarian negotiations. Humanitarian Exchange
Magazine, http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-58/preserving-the-integrity-ofhumanitarian-negotiations.
40
A. Jackson and A. Aynte (2013). Talking to the other side: Humanitarian negotiations with Al-Shabaab in
Somalia. HPG Working Paper. Humanitarian Policy Group, p. 8, http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Humanitarian-Negotiations-with-alShabaab-in-Somalia.pdf.
41
M. Glaser (n.d.). Negotiated Access: Humanitarian Engagement with Armed Non-state Actors. Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy.
42
For in depth analysis of this issue, see generally HPCR (2011). Humanitarian Action under Scrutiny:
Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement. HPCR Working Paper. Program on Humanitarian Policy and
Conflict Research at Harvard University,
http://c0186748.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/HPCR%20CHE%202011.pdf; HPCR (2012). Countering
Terror in Humanitarian Crises: The Challenges of Delivering Aid to Somalia. Program on Humanitarian Policy
and Conflict Research at Harvard University,
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Somalia%206-30-12%20final.pdf; N. Modirzadeh,
D. Lewis, and C. Bruderlein (2011). Humanitarian engagement under counter-terrorism: a conflict of norms
and the emerging policy landscape. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (883): 623-647, and D. Lewis, N.
Modirzadeh, and G. Blum (2015). Medical Care in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and State
8 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
E. Fragmentation of De-Centralized Armed Groups
Existing literature on humanitarian negotiation suggests the importance—as well as the challenges
inherent in—assessing and effectively engaging with interlocutors during humanitarian negotiations.
Indeed, a successful negotiation often hinges on developing a strategic understanding of the interlocutors’
interests and forging a personal connection with these negotiating partners. According to one author:
Personality assessment is another key judgement that humanitarian negotiators need to make as
they seek to persuade people. Understanding what makes a person tick is essential to gauging
how best to tick with them. Is your interlocutor essentially a loner or gregarious? Is he or she
intrinsically happy or sad? Is she or he driven by power, insecurity, ideals or circumstance? What
and who are important to his or her life? What makes them laugh and what makes them angry?
Are they trustworthy? Are they sane?43
However, negotiators often must operate in a rapidly evolving on-the-ground environment. Even if a
negotiator makes a personal connection with an interlocutor, control of the relevant territory can quickly
change hands, meaning that the negotiator will have to begin negotiation efforts anew with a different
individual. As one paper states, “NSAGs are often fragmented—for example, it is estimated that between
1,000 and 6,000 NSAGs are operating in Syria. While some, particularly the larger groups, are highly
sophisticated, others have little command and control structure or unity of purpose.” 44 In such
environments, it might also not be clear which interlocutor within the NSAG actually wields decisionmaking power.
III.
Concluding Remarks
How can the humanitarian sector most effectively grapple with the challenges mentioned throughout this
document? Much of the literature on humanitarian negotiations mentions barriers that have hindered the
professionalization of this field. One policy document mentions that “no common negotiating culture”
exists,45 and overall, the humanitarian sector has also been slow to appreciate the important role that
negotiations play in the success of humanitarian operations.46 Additionally, the confidential nature of
negotiations has evidently served as an impediment to sharing experiences and lessons learned across the
sector.
In negotiations with NSAGs, these issues can become magnified. In particular, the aforementioned
sensitivities of governments and the legal risks of engaging with NSAGs identified on terrorist lists can
further increase the need for confidentiality, thus inhibiting processes of sharing experiences about past
professional practices. Indeed, in certain complex environments where sensitive negotiations with NSAGs
occurred, frontline negotiators did not even inform superiors within their own organization about ongoing
Responses to Terrorism. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657036.
43
H. Slim (2003). Marketing Humanitarian Space: Argument and Method in Humanitarian Persuasion. HD Centre
for Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 14, http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/219-Marketing-HumanitarianSpace.pdf.
44
M. Keating and P. Lewis (2016). Towards a Principled Approach to Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups
for Humanitarian Purposes. Chatham House, p. 2.
45
G. McHugh and M. Bessler (2006). Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners.
OCHA, p. 50.
46
For an assessment of how this factor affected humanitarian negotiations in Iraq, see Claudia Rodriguez (2007).
Negotiating the legitimacy of humanitarian action in Iraq. In Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and
Their Craft. Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds.). Tokyo: United Nations University, 125.
9 Briefing Note: Frontline Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups
negotiation efforts.47 Nevertheless, given the prevalence of NIACs throughout the world today, and the
need to engage with NSAGs on issues such as access and humanitarian protection, it will be important for
the particular challenges examined throughout this document to feature prominently in professional
discussions about further research efforts on humanitarian negotiation, forging professional networks
between negotiators across organizations and contexts, and crafting a body of policy literature that builds
on the foundational guidance that already exists.
47
A. Jackson and A. Aynte (2013). Talking to the other side: Humanitarian negotiations with Al-Shabaab in
Somalia. HPG Working Paper. Humanitarian Policy Group, p. 10, http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Humanitarian-Negotiations-with-alShabaab-in-Somalia.pdf.
10