The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone
The Business of War and
the Prospects for Peace in
Sierra Leone
DENA MONTAGUE
Senior Research Associate
Arms Trade Research Center, World Policy Institute
S
ierra Leone’s brutal decade-long war is finally over, according to the head
of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), General Daniel
Opande. More than 45,000 former combatants—mainly from the rebel
group Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—have handed over their arms to the
United Nations as part of a disarmament and demobilization program. The
brutal RUF waged a terror campaign against civilians, resulting in the dislocation
of over two-thirds of the population, mass accounts of mutilation, forced
recruitment of child soldiers, and widespread sexual assault. The RUF supported
its army with revenues from the sale of diamonds primarily located in the Kono
district in the eastern region of the country—the site of intense fighting for the
past decade. In the mid 1990s, Sierra Leone produced an estimated $300 to
$450 million worth of diamonds per year.1 Yet only a small fraction of diamonds
produced in Sierra Leone is exported for legitimate trade. In 1999, Sierra Leone
officially exported $1.5 million worth of diamonds; the diamond industry
estimated the real commercial value at $70 million.2 In addition to the official
trade, tens of millions of dollars worth of diamonds were illicitly exported by
the RUF, foreign troops, domestic and foreign smugglers. Much of the illicit
diamond revenue was used to purchase small arms.
As the war ends and international attention turns elsewhere, there is a
widely held belief that the successful disarmament of former combatants has
eliminated threats of renewed war and possible rearmament in the country.
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Unfortunately, the link between small arms proliferation and access to diamonds
has not been severed, and thus the structural elements that allow for a renewed
conflict remain intact. Sierra Leone is a weak and inefficient state, vulnerable to
agents attracted to mineral reserves, in a region saturated with small arms. It is
important to remember that the RUF was not alone in its contribution to the
proliferation of small arms in the country
the region. Agents allied with the
The RUF movement was and
central government to combat the RUF—
essentially a kleptocratic namely, the private security ser vice
effort cloaked in Executive Outcomes and the Nigerianled West African peacekeeping army,
revolutionary rhetoric.
ECOMOG—are also responsible for
exacerbating the small arms problem
while securing access to the country’s diamond reserves for exploitation. The
Sierra Leonean state was dependent upon these outside actors, who were
motivated by diamond access rather than the desire to liberate Sierra Leonean
citizens from the tyranny of the RUF:
In every respect, [Sierra Leone] squarely fits the description of ‘the soft state’—that is,
a state that lacks authority and is characterized by an absence of social discipline in
relation to the application and respect for laws, and where rules and directives are
deliberately ignored. The consequence is a perennial clash between rules and directives
espoused by the formal state and those inherent in the operations of a dominant
informal political economy [characterized by diamond mining].3
Thus, a constant threat of violence persists by agents with access to small arms
seeking economic and political empowerment through the diamond trade.
International efforts to enforce a moratorium on small arms and light
weapons in West Africa, an embargo on the trade of blood diamonds, and efforts
to build an effective and loyal Sierra Leonean army will diminish the presence
of small arms in Sierra Leone. Porous borders, however—particularly between
Sierra Leone and Liberia, which remains violently unstable—present a looming
threat to peace. Additionally, the fluid relationship between small arms
proliferation and diamond access as evidenced by the RUF, Executive Outcomes,
and ECOMOG operations point to Sierra Leone’s continued vulnerability to
“social indiscipline”4 and the lure of diamond wealth.
Patrimony, Diamonds and Military: Legacy of the Colonial State
The British-run colonial state—administered under indirect rule—established
a system of patrimonial governance that ensured the self-preservation of colonial
economic interests. The maintenance of the colonial state was assisted by a
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The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone
small elite community that administered colonial polices, which were drafted to
monopolize access to resources. With the discovery of diamonds in the eastern
region of Sierra Leone in the 1930s, European mining companies dominated
the diamond industry that was dependent upon cheap indigenous labor. Sierra
Leone’s shift from a colonial to a post-colonial state failed to integrate
economically marginalized peasants into a functioning economy. As a recent
work has said:
Eventually, the country became part of the international economic network of Britain,
a network in which it was designed to supply cheap raw materials for British industries.
With the international market as the dominant institution, what was produced in Sierra
Leone was determined not on the basis of Sierra Leone’s needs and capabilities but by
economic competition in the world market.5
The weak state—which spent little money on any bureaucracy, including the
military—relied on private foreign firms to protect Sierra Leonean resources,
giving rise to private armies supported by foreign firms to protect diamond
regions.
“The Kalashnikov lifestyle helps our business”6
In 1991, Liberian instability spread across the border into Sierra Leone. Liberian
President Charles Taylor supported the invasion of Sierra Leone by the
Revolutionary United Front, led by Foday Sankoh, in its efforts to subvert Sierra
Leone’s central government. The RUF acted as a proxy for Taylor’s efforts to
expand his power in Liberia and throughout the region and support his vision of
“Greater Liberia.”7 Integration of Sierra Leone’s diamond reserves was crucial
to the development of Taylor’s expansive commercial network, which relied
upon illicit mining of natural resources for the purchase of weapons, primarily
small arms.
The RUF movement was essentially a kleptocratic effort cloaked in
revolutionary rhetoric. It called for the return of diamond revenues from the
pockets of foreigners in order to benefit the impoverished people of Sierra
Leone. The movement’s anthem encapsulates its message:
RUF Anthem
Where are our diamonds, Mr. President?
Where is our gold?
RUF is hungry to know where they are,
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone
Our people are suffering without means of survival,
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All our minerals have gone to foreign lands.
RUF is hungry to know where they are,
RUF is fighting to save Sierra Leone.8
The RUF movement forcibly conscripted men and women from the Sierra
Leonean hinterland into the rebel movement. By 1992, the rebels successfully
occupied the diamond-mining area of the Kono District, thereby disrupting the
state’s access to revenue provided by the diamond trade.
Initially, the RUF used heavy weapons. But in response to a joint attack
by Nigerian and Sierra Leonean troops that successfully repelled RUF
movements—which forced the RUF to retreat back into Liberia—the rebels
regrouped and adjusted their strategy for an offensive guerrilla war. In their
words: “We dispersed into smaller units … We destroyed all our vehicles and
heavy weapons … We now relied on light weapons and on our feet, brains, and
knowledge of the countryside.”9 By 1995, the RUF had settled into key mining
areas and was marching toward the capital, Freetown.
An elaborate network of international arms smugglers and diamond
buyers freely exchanged goods in full violation of regional and international
law. Sierra Leonean diamonds labeled as Guinean, Gambian, or Liberian were
exported to Europe to finance
weapons shipments. Notorious
Lured by diamond money and ar ms smugglers, including
frustrated by the government’s Lenoid Minin, a Ukranian-Israeli
businessman; Victor Bout, a
inability to pay salaries, these veteran ar ms supplier to
soldiers became “sobels”: conflicts in Angola and the
soldiers by day, rebels by night. Democratic Republic of Congo;
Talal El-Ndine, a Lebanese
businessman; and Sanjivan
Ruprah, a Kenyan national, supplied or financed illicit weapons shipments
primarily originating from Eastern Europe.10 Libya was also a source of military
and financial assistance, providing weapons as well as direct financial aid.11 The
majority of weapons destined for Sierra Leone were funneled through Burkina
Faso, which acted as a major transshipment point for arms smuggling throughout
the war. The exchange of illicit weapons and diamonds was conducted with
apparent ease.
The weapon of choice for the RUF was the AK-47, but the rebel group
was also heavily armed with pistols, AK-74 rifles, G-3 rifles, FN-FAL rifles,
and SLR rifles. Their machine gun inventory included the British GPMG, Chinese
12.7 mm machine guns, and RPDs, and their sub-machine gun arsenal included
the British Sten and the Israeli Uzi. Grenade launchers, grenades, mortars, anti232
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personnel mines, surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and Katyusha 122
mm rockets were also part of the RUF’s arsenal.12
In addition to the international exchange of weapons, Sierra Leonean
government troops regularly collaborated with the RUF in diamond mining.
Lured by diamond money and frustrated by the government’s inability to pay
salaries, these soldiers became “sobels”: soldiers by day, rebels by night.
Diamonds for Sale: Private Armies Respond
Sierra Leone’s political and economic paralysis did not appear problematic to
the international community until the RUF occupied the diamond mines of
Sierra Rutile and Sieromco in January 1995, nearly ending the government’s
ability to repay IMF loans. One month into the RUF occupation of Sierra Rutile
and Sieromco, the government was pressured into seeking out an alternative
military arrangement. It contracted the private military organization Executive
Outcomes to drive the RUF out of diamond mining areas.
Executive Outcomes was partnered with Branch Energy Ltd., which
did not have a mining arrangement with Sierra Leone prior to Executive
Outcomes entry into the conflict. Tony Buckingham—senior executive for Branch
Energy and former British intelligence operative—worked closely with the
company’s principle shareholder, Michael Grunberg, on the Executive Outcomes
deal. Buckingham and Grunwald not only introduced the concept of Executive
Outcomes to the Sierra Leonean government, but were active in negotiating the
entry of Executive Outcomes.13 Sierra Leone’s ability to pay Executive Outcomes
for services rendered—to the sum of $1.8 million per month—depended on
Executive Outcomes forcing the RUF from diamond areas and implementing a
$30 million mining contract with Branch Energy.14
Executive Outcomes entered Sierra Leone with a small battalion of
approximately 150 soldiers. Their use of helicopter gunships, pre-assault mortar
barrages, and ground assaults proved to be extremely effective against the RUF.
Executive Outcomes swiftly removed the RUF from mining areas in Kono and
its environs.15
Although Executive Outcomes was successful in repelling the RUF from
these mineral-rich enclaves, its actions left much of the civilian population
vulnerable to continued RUF attacks. Executive Outcomes makes no apologies
for its interest in securing mining areas for its partner companies, as it explicitly
engaged in a “high-risk, high return strategy … [which] provides access to
potentially valuable areas otherwise out of bounds to companies lacking a
comparable security element.”16 Executive Outcomes operations come at the
expense of civilians residing outside of diamond mining areas, as the firm has
little interest in providing humanitarian services outside of financially lucrative
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areas. As has been noted, “civilians unfortunate enough to be living outside of
[mineral rich enclaves of Kono and the Kangari Hills] would have been foolish
to count on Executive Outcomes protection.”17 The strong link between private
security services and arms trafficking highlights the short term and selective
gain on behalf of the government. According to the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, “the use of usually small arms is integral to [mercenary]
activities and there have been many instances of Private Security Service
providers acting as arms brokering agents to transfer weapons into regions of
conflict.”18
Executive Outcomes provided training for traditional Mende hunters,
who had loosely organized as Kamajohs to protect their communities from RUF
attacks. Private security services have been criticized for providing military
training that “contributes to the demand for, and misuse of, weapons in the
regions they operate.”19 Although there were no incidents of weapons trafficking
reported during Executive Outcomes’ operations in Sierra Leone, tracking and
monitoring activities of private security companies is extremely difficult.
Additionally, Sierra Leone was, at the time, the most dangerous country in which
to operate for foreign journalists, thus preventing investigative inquiries into
Executive Outcomes operations.
Executive Outcomes remained in Sierra Leone until January 1997.
Branch Energy’s inability to begin mining operations due to a lingering threat of
RUF attacks undermined Sierra Leone’s ability to pay fees to the mercenary
group as well as to the IMF. The government owed $30 million to Executive
Outcomes and was additionally bogged down by a 10 percent reduction of
GDP and a 35 percent rise in inflation.20 Although Executive Outcomes covered
part of its expenses in Sierra Leone with profits from its operations in Angola,
the Sierra Leonean government lay in financial ruin, and Executive Outcomes
left after nearly two years of operations.
Less than 200 men had repelled thousands of RUF soldiers and then
departed at a relatively peaceful time in the history of the war. Their operations
were hailed by many as an unequivocal success. But in relation to the future
development of the government and the ability of the state to provide services
for its citizens, the Executive Outcomes operations reinforced the relationship
between diamonds and arms. A recent report has noted:
The problem is not the individual episodes, but the bigger picture which they help
form—of a world in which beleaguered and legitimate governments find little formal
international protection against internal predators and are forced into Faustian bargains
in order to survive … Closely connected to mining interests, the phenomenon [of
Executive Outcomes] however, is more than just a convenient way to let the international
community off the hook. It begins to look like a protection racket, with the payment
for assistance made in future mineral concessions—“concessions for protection.”21
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With future mineral concessions in question, the very survival of the state and
its citizens was at the mercy of questionable corporate players interested in the
protection of commercial interests. Although Sierra Leone experienced a positive
short-term gain, the partnership between Executive Outcomes and Branch
Energy undermined the central government’s right and ability to develop its
own resources, as the government is now tied to a mining deal secured in
desperation, leaving it tens of millions of dollars in arrears. Additionally, small
arms trafficking networks were most likely developed by Executive Outcomes,
a company experienced in the illicit transfer of weapons throughout Africa.
Abacha’s Troops in Sierra Leone
Prior to Executive Outcomes’ exit from Sierra Leone, the country held its first
presidential elections in more than ten years. The controversial elections
produced Tejan Kabbah as the leader of Sierra Leone in February 1996. In May
1997, Sierra Leonean army officers led by Johnny Paul Koroma staged a
successful coup, and President Kabbah fled to Guinea. Koroma, chairman of
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), invited members of the RUF
to join his junta; at the time, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG army was the only
military force defending
the interests of the
Kabbah administration. Imported from Guinea and Liberia
While in Guinea, Kabbah and then sold to the UN for profit,
reached out to familiar weapons are then bought again for
mining interests to
support his efforts for cheaper price on the black market.
reentry into Sierra Leone.
Two plans were devised to oust Koroma’s military dictatorship, each developed
by mining firms in exchange for promised diamond mining concessions upon
the return of Kabbah’s administration. Jean-Raymond Boulle, director of
American Mineral Fields, expressed interest in financing Kabbah’s return but
could not offer the substantial military assistance presented to Kabbah by
Sandline International, a London based security company run by Tony
Buckingham of Executive Outcomes. Boulle, discouraged by Sandline’s
partnership with rival company Branch Energy, dropped out of the arrangement.
Nigerian military officers and Sandline collaborated to plan an attack on the
Koroma junta. Thirty tons of arms—mainly AK-47s and ammunition—were
transported from Bulgaria through Nigeria, in violation of an EU arms embargo
against military dictator Sani Abacha’s Nigerian army.22 Nigeria and Sandline
continued joint operations throughout Sierra Leone until a highly publicized
scandal exposed Sandline’s questionable relations with Kabbah. In February
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1998, Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops entered Freetown and ousted the Koroma
regime. ECOMOG troops maintained control of Freetown and continued
operations against the RUF until a cease-fire was declared in 1999.
In October 1999, the United Nations established the UN Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to be led by Indian General Vijay Kumar Jetley.
ECOMOG was asked to incorporate some of its troops under the flag of the
UN and return others to Nigeria. The Nigerian army was reluctant to leave
Sierra Leone and dismantle its secret partnership with the RUF in an illegal
diamond-mining scheme. According to General Jetley, Nigerian Brigadier General
Maxwell Khobe allegedly received ten million dollars to permit RUF activities,
earning Khobe the nickname “Ten Million Dollar Man.” General Jetley detailed
the collaboration between Nigeria and the RUF in a letter to the UN, in which
he claimed ECOMOG and RUF formed a relationship over time:
... of non-interference in each other’s activities, the total absence of ECOMOG
deployment in RUF held areas is indicative of this. Keeping the Nigerian interest was
paramount even if it meant scuttling the Peace Process and this also implied that
UNAMSIL was expendable. To this end the Representative to the Secretary General
(SRSG) and Deputy Force Commander (DFC) cultivated the RUF leadership—especially
Foday Sankoh—behind my back.23
Although the war was winding down, the RUF continued to import small arms
and light weapons into Sierra Leone and export blood diamonds in a collaborative
effort with the Nigerian army. At the same time, members of the Nigerian army
sold weapons confiscated in Sierra Leone to criminal networks in Nigeria.24
Without serious analysis and an effort to break the ties that bind
militarism and the diamond trade, and considering the remaining threat from
Liberia (including its dependence on resources from its immediate region to
support its trade in arms), peace in Sierra Leone will remain fragile. Additionally,
disarmament threatens to create a new cycle of demand for weapons. Under the
UN disarmament program, former combatants are paid approximately $300 in
exchange for weapons. Combatants have imported weapons from Guinea and
Liberia, which are then sold to the UN for profit; weapons are then bought
again for cheaper price on the black market. As arms embargoes have a limited
impact on the small arms and light weapons trade and diamond smuggling is
nearly impossible to deter, new ways of thinking about disarmament and curbing
illicit diamond sales—beyond the realm of legislation—must be devised. Mining
companies and international institutions that encourage investment in the
diamond sector must recognize their role in profiting from a weak state that is
unable to enforce legitimacy in diamond mining. Furthermore, international
investors must assist in building a competent democratic state in Sierra Leone.
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This is a necessary step to avoid a massive re-arming of the hostile forces still
present in the region and thirsty for diamond wealth. WA
Notes
1. John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2001: 25
2. U.S. State Department, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Proposal for
Implementation of a New Diamond Policy and Operations “Diamonds and Armed Conflict in
Sierra Leone” Working Paper 05-08-00.
3. Earl Conteh-Morgan and Mac Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century:
History, Politics and Society, New York: Peter Lang, 1999: 100.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid: 3.
6. Andres Perez, “Sierra Leone’s Diamond War,” Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2000: 3.
7. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1998.
8. Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone “Footpaths to Democracy,” Sierra Leone Web
www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html .
9. Paul Richards, Fighting For the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: The
International African Institute, 1996: 61. (Quote by Foday Sankoh).
10. United Nations Security Council. United Nations Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone
Diamonds and Arms, December 2000: 17-18.
11. Eric Berman, “Arming the Revolutionary United Front,” in African Securities Review, Vol. 10
No 1, 2001: 4.
12. Ibid; United Nations Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms.
13. Michael Van Maanen. “Saving the Sum of Things for Pay: Executive Outcomes in Sierra
Leone;” Hirsch: 38.
14. Richards: 17.
15. David Shearer, “Dial an Army,” The World Today, August/September 1997.
16. Van Maanen: 6.
17. Ibid.
18. United Nations Economic and Social Council. “The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination
and its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation,”
March 2001.
19. Sami Makki, Sarah Meek, Abdel-Fatau Musah, Michael Crowley, and Damien Lilly, “Private
Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors” report.
20. Hirsch: 118.
21. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone,
Diamonds and Human Security, Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000: 6.
22. “Freetown Fracas,” Africa Confidential, 6 March 1998 Vol. 39 No 5: 8; Crowley, Michael
“Killing for Gain” Amnesty Magazine, July/August 1998.
23. Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, “Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone,” May 2000.
24. “Crime Upsurge Linked to Abacha,” PM News, 1 September 1999.
25. Berman: 8
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