INTELLIGENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
by
Philipp Jund
A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in Diplomacy and Military Studies
at
Hawai„i Pacific University
July 2009
Abbreviations
AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System
CENTRIXS
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EW
Electronic Warfare
HUMINT
Human Intelligence
IMINT
Imagery Intelligence
IO
Information Operations
JMAC
Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC
Joint Operations Centre
MASINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OHR
Office of the High Representative
ORCI
Office of Research and Collecting Information
OSCE
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSD
Open Source Data
OSIF
Open Source Information
OSINT
Open Source Intelligence
OSINT-V
Validated OSINT
OSS
US Office of Strategic Services
RIMPAC
Rim of the Pacific Exercise
SACLANT
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SIGINT
Signals Intelligence
SITCEN
NATO Situation Centre
UN
United Nations
1
UNEF I
UN Emergency Force I
UNHCR
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM II
UN Operation in Somalia II
UNPROFOR
UN Protection Force
2
Introduction
The end of the Cold War brought about major changes in the world-wide power structure.
A fairly stable bi-polar world order dominated by two super powers, the USSR and the US,
turned into a less stable multi-polar world with only one super power left. Essentially, this
development lead to a decrease in conventional wars, but also to a sharp increase in small scale
conflicts and civil wars.
Those changes had major implications for the UN and its peacekeeping missions.
Traditional peacekeeping missions usually consisted of a UN mandated peacekeeping force,
establishing a “neutral zone” between the belligerents to keep them from fighting, while the
international community tried to mitigate between the parties and find a peaceful solution to the
conflict. This worked pretty well in most cases where both parties were open to outside
interference or yielded to the pressure applied by the super powers. In most of those conflicts the
UN troops had no problems establishing a buffer zone, because all sides of the conflict agreed to
their presence (Goulding, 1993, p. 456). In civil wars or ethnic conflicts (sometimes the same
thing, but not always) inside of a sovereign country, however, a separation of the warring
factions is much harder to achieve, because the lines between the parties will be blurred at best
and not completely identifiable at worst (Ali & Matthews, 1999, p. 276f). Additionally, it is
much harder to identify the intentions of the warring parties.
The overarching goal of this thesis is to examine and gain a better understanding of the
transformations UN peacekeeping underwent from the end of the Cold War into the 21st century.
However, the complexity of the topic and the limited scope of the paper require a focus on one
aspect of peacekeeping operations only. One aspect that is both crucial for the success of
3
peacekeeping missions and yet controversial is intelligence. To understand the importance of
intelligence for peacekeeping operations, the evolution of peacekeeping has to be traced first.
Without an understanding of the different forms of peacekeeping it is barely possible to
understand the importance of a single part of it.
There are many problems the UN faces in today‟s peacekeeping environment. Until the
end of the Cold War, the UN refrained from peacekeeping operations to be conducted inside of
sovereign states without being specifically asked to do so by the government of that country.
This is not because the international community did not want to contribute to stopping this kind
of conflict, but rather because of the principles the UN was founded on. The UN was founded on
seven principles, two of which state that “the Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members” and that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state (United Nations, 1996).” There is only one exception, which is a
Chapter VII resolution, allowing the use of force to “maintain or restore international peace and
security (United Nations, 1996).” Until recently, the UN strictly followed these principles and
did not interfere in the internal problems of a state. The growing number of internal conflicts
that had the potential to threaten peace and stability in the whole surrounding region (Bosnia, for
example) forced the UN to re--consider its stance however.
Starting with the end of the Cold War a growing number of so-called “failed states” like
Somalia, genocide or ethnic cleansing like in Rwanda and Bosnia and grave human rights
violations elsewhere convinced the general public, governments and the UN to rethink their
position on intervention in sovereign countries. Despite their reluctance to work together with
UN troops, NGOs realized the need for peacekeeping missions in conflicts that did not only
4
involve countries but also ethnic groups, or where no functioning central government existed any
more to restore peace and order, for example in Bosnia and Somalia (Carey & Richmond, 2003,
p. 26f).
The shift in the nature of conflicts poses additional challenges to the already very
complex task of a peacekeeping mission. Before the end of the Cold War, UN troops were sent
to crisis regions, because the opposing parties there asked for outside help in solving their
conflict or succumbed to the pressure of the super powers to accept UN intervention (Allen,
1996, p. 46). Even though there were some casualties on the side of the UN troops, they were
quite successful in establishing “neutral zones” between the warring parties, for example in
Cyprus, thus effectively ending the main hostilities. This does not mean, however, that all
conflicts were eventually solved. In the case of Cyprus, the UN troops are still there and the
situation is just slowly moving towards a solution (United Nations Department of Public
Information, 2009).
After establishing the belligerents‟ consent for a neutral UN peacekeeping force, the main
challenges that the UN faced were of logistical nature. Questions of who would send troops,
how to get supplies to them, how to finance the mission and how long the troops are supposed to
stay were prevalent. With the change in the nature of conflicts from conventional wars to rather
small scale conflicts like civil wars and/or ethnic tensions/conflicts, the requirements for the
missions became even more challenging.
Since every peacekeeping mission is essentially a military operation, intelligence has to
be part of the operation. On the other hand, many in the UN believe that the UN should not
engage in intelligence efforts (Jones, 1993, p. 17). To be able to still discuss the subject,
5
proponents reverted to call intelligence information instead (Villeneuve, 2006). In order to get
an idea of where the negative connotation of intelligence comes from, it is important to clearly
define what is meant by intelligence and what it is not. There is a clear distinction between
intelligence and espionage, for example.
Espionage is defined by the Encyclopaedia Britannica as a means to “obtain secret
information by means of spies, secret agents, or illegal monitoring devices. Espionage is
sometimes distinguished from the broader category of intelligence gathering by its aggressive
nature and its illegality (espionage, 2009).” This definition does give a hint as to why some
people within the UN do not want intelligence gathering to be a part of peacekeeping missions.
The success of peacekeeping operations depends heavily on the goodwill of all the parties
involved and espionage could very well compromise the overall mission by destroying this
goodwill. But espionage is not meant in the context of intelligence in peacekeeping operations.
Conducting effective espionage requires a network of spies and agents which is very time
consuming. The UN usually does not have that time, because there is no way to know where the
next conflict might break out. Therefore, for practical reasons, espionage is not an option for the
UN. This leaves it with intelligence gathering.
The gathering of intelligence is an essential part of every military operation. It helps the
commanders to make informed decisions which might save countless lives on both sides. The
collection of intelligence is the five step process illustrated in Figure 1, in which raw information
is turned into usable intelligence, called the intelligence cycle.
6
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle (Hughes-Wilson, 2004, p. 6)
Requirements for information or intelligence in peacekeeping operations are more
challenging than in “regular” military operations, because intelligence has to worry about more
than tactical issues (troop movements, order of battle, battles). They also have to worry about
the mood and state of the population, their perceptions of the peacekeeping operation, their
humanitarian needs, identifying criminal activity and separating it from cease fire violations or
the plans and intentions of the contending political and ethnic entities (De Jong, Wies, & Steele,
2003, p. 14). The challenge for intelligence is very similar to fighting an insurgency or counterterrorist campaign with the added complexity of not being able to state and/or identify anyone as
an “enemy.” Intelligence typically focuses on an enemy or threat. Officially, there are no
enemies in a peacekeeping operation, except in peace enforcing missions, and collecting
intelligence against the contending parties suggests that they are considered to be an enemy.
Furthermore, peacekeeping involves more restrictive rules of engagement than traditional
combat operations. Because of that, the troops need more detailed warning of contending party
7
intentions without presenting the image that they consider anyone to be hostile towards them
(Cowdrey, 1994, p. 16ff).
How this process works and how it might be integrated into UN peacekeeping missions
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this paper. Before the process of intelligence gathering
and support can be discussed, however, it is important to have a close look at peacekeeping in
general and the development it underwent from the 1950s until today. This is a necessary step,
because if there are different kinds of peacekeeping operations, the intelligence requirements will
also be different.
The changing nature of conflict also necessitated a change in peacekeeping. In Chapter 1
the development from first to wider or second generation to third generation peacekeeping will
be traced. The focus will be on the causes of change, on what changes were implemented by the
UN and the implications on intelligence requirements.
The changes in peacekeeping are not a straightforward process and there is quite some
discussion on how many different forms of peacekeeping exist and which peacekeeping
operations fall into what category. There is consensus on what first generation peacekeeping
operations are and what characterizes them. After that opinions start to diverge, which is most
likely due to the increasing complexity of the missions. With the increase in functions the
missions have to fulfill, it becomes more difficult to categorize them. Every additional function,
though, increases the amount of intelligence needed for a successful completion of the mission.
The main focus here will be on second and third generation peace operations, because
they are the prevalent form of peacekeeping today. Traditional peacekeeping can be excluded
here since it consists mainly of observer missions which by their very nature are intelligence
8
operations already. The question that arises from this fact is, though, how the UN developed
such an antipathy towards intelligence when its initial missions consisted almost exclusively of
military intelligence operations.
The third chapter of the paper will deal with the state of affairs on intelligence in peace
operations today. Recently there has been some movement towards acknowledging the need for
intelligence for the success of peace operations within the UN. Most of this came after the
problems and failures of the missions to Bosnia and Somalia were examined and compared with
successful missions like the one in Kosovo.
The intelligence problem in the UN is a multi-layered problem. It does not only pertain
to information within military operations. The lack of its own intelligence service also makes it
difficult for the UN to be able to mitigate conflicts before they escalate and to provide the troops
in the field with necessary intelligence. The problem with having an own intelligence service for
the UN would be to convince the member states that it is not intended to spy on them. However,
there are ways to mitigate those problems. One way would be to install an office that exclusively
focuses on open-source intelligence. The internet is a powerful tool to gather information on just
about everything without having to spy on anyone. Another possibility would be to incorporate
NGOs that are present in the crisis region into the intended solution of a crisis. NGOs usually
are already there before the conflict even starts and could thus be of great help to the
peacekeepers. A better coordination of the relief efforts of the NGOs by the UN would also
greatly improve the efficiency of help delivered to the crisis region. A third possibility is to
outsource the conduct of peace operations to a member country or to a regional international
organization such as NATO or the OSCE which the UN started to do successfully lately. These
possibilities will be examined in Chapter 3 of this paper.
9
Chapter 1
United Nations Peace Operations
“Peacekeeping stands out, as one of the Organization‟s most original and ambitious undertakings
in its efforts to control conflict and promote peace (United Nations, 1996).”
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali rightfully identified peacekeeping as one
of the UN‟s most ambitious activities. The United Nations defines peacekeeping as “the
deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with the consent of
the parties to the conflict in order to: stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a
peace agreement. (Leonhard, 2004).” In order to be successful, peacekeepers have to overcome
many obstacles, challenges and problems. One of those challenges is the ever changing political
situation.
Peacekeeping during the Cold War
Since World War II, the global political and power situation changed considerably. Right
after the end of the war, many people, including then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold,
thought that the time for an increased role of the United Nations in global security policies had
come. However, the start of the Cold War put an end to these aspirations. The Soviets insisted
that they would take care of problems arising in their sphere of influence and the Americans,
although to a lesser extent, said the same about the Western Hemisphere. The result of this was
that the UN could only engage in conflicts the two superpowers had no interest in getting
involved in (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2004). During the Cold War the prevailing form of
10
conflict was inter-state conflict and the UN was quick to adapt to this. These so-called
“traditional (Jett, 1999)” or first generation peacekeeping operations are all based on three
principles: (1) the consent of all parties involved in the conflict to the presence of the
peacekeepers; (2) neutrality of the peacekeepers towards the conflict parties; and (3) minimum
use of force and only as a last resort and in self-defense (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin; BoutrosGhali, 1992; Findlay, 2002).
The End of the Cold War
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the Cold War ended and many people thought
that this would be the beginning of a new era of prolonged global peace, stability and prosperity.
However, the disintegration of Yugoslavia after Tito‟s death and the fall of his oppressive regime
and the following civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia proved that the dream of prolonged peace and
stability would not come true. The new situation of fierce intra-state civil wars and genocide
came as a direct result of the shift in the global power structure. The step from a bi-polar world
with two dominating superpowers to a multi-polar system with only one superpower created a
power vacuum that was destabilizing and that allowed conflicts that had been suppressed before,
to erupt again. Those new intra-state conflicts were a new challenge for the UN and its
peacekeepers. Originally, the UN Charter as specified in articles 2 (1) and 2 (7) did not allow the
UN to get involved in conflicts that were considered “intra-state affairs (United Nations, 1996).”
11
The Brahimi Report
The disasters of the UN missions to Bosnia and Somalia as well as the genocide in
Rwanda in the 1990s made it clear to the UN that it had to change its peacekeeping doctrine in
order to overcome the challenges posed by the new reality of violent conflicts. SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali formed a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, headed by
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, to examine the existing peacekeeping doctrine and to come up
with recommendations on what needs to be changed (Durch, 2001, p. 2). The resulting report,
commonly known as the Brahimi Report, was published in August of 2000. The report
recommended drastic changes to the existing peacekeeping doctrine, redefining the basic
principles of peacekeeping operations for intra-state conflicts. The conflicts in Somalia and
Bosnia clearly showed that the consent of all local parties cannot be guaranteed in most intrastate conflicts, impartiality of the peacekeeping force cannot be ensured or might be exploited by
one of the parties (Mockaitis, 1999; United Nations, 2000, Executive Summary). Therefore, the
meaning of “impartiality” was changed from not taking any sides in the conflict to strict
“adherence to the principles of the Charter” of the UN and the mandate given to the
peacekeepers (United Nations, 2000). The report also suggested changing the rules of
engagement for the peacekeepers. In traditional peacekeeping, the use of force was only allowed
for self-defense. This strict rule should be widened to allow the peacekeepers to use force for
“defending themselves, other mission components and the mission‟s mandate (United Nations,
2000).” A third recommendation was that the peacekeeping force should be adequately armed,
implying that the provision for lightly armed troops needed to be replaced by a provision calling
for adequately armed forces (United Nations, 2000). The Srebrenica massacre was a cruel
12
reminder that lightly armed peacekeepers without armor could not fulfill their mandate to protect
civilians when facing heavily armed attackers using heavy artillery and battle tanks.1
The report also called for improvements in the command and control (C2) structure of the
peacekeeping force and the need for intelligence capabilities. However, the proposed solution to
the missing intelligence component was not suited for improving the situation of peacekeeping
forces in the field. It was rather an information tool for the UN leadership. The emphasis was
on the informational needs of the Secretary-General and members of the Executive Committee
on Peace and Security (ECPS). But considering the UN‟s long standing view that intelligence is
a bad thing which would undermine the credibility of peacekeeping forces, the acknowledgment
that an entity for information processing was needed was a big step in the right direction (Durch,
Holt, Earl, & Shanahan, 2003, p. 37ff).
Although the nature of peacekeeping operations had already changed during the 1990s to
include peace enforcement and peace building measures, the Brahimi Report and its
recommendations finally established an official, solid basis for the conduct of such operations by
carefully analyzing the status quo of peace operations and the resulting deficiencies that needed
to be addressed.
In order to show the urgent need for intelligence capabilities in peace operations it is
important to first consider the development of peace operations from traditional peacekeeping to
wider or second generation, to peace enforcement (Mackinley & Chopra, Summer 1992), starting
in 1956 with the establishment of UNEF I through the era of the Cold War to post Cold War
1
The 600 Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were equipped with .50 caliber heavy machine guns mounted on 8
armored personnel carriers and AT-4 anti-tank rockets placed at the observation posts in addition to their side-arms.
The Serbs maintained the siege of the city with 1000-2000 well equipped soldiers. They were armed with tanks,
tracked armored vehicles and mortars. For more information see: UN General Assembly, 1999, p. 52.
13
peace operations. Of major importance is the change in size of operations in respect to troop size
and scope of the mandate, and of course the changes in the geo-political environment and the
nature of conflicts.
Traditional Peacekeeping
Traditional peacekeeping is the form of peacekeeping originally intended when the UN
was founded. It is based on the idea that the international community should assist the parties of
a conflict (in this respect, countries) in resolving their issues through peaceful diplomacy and not
through violence. The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as:
the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within
states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and
maintain peace (Rikhye, Harbottle, & Egge, 1974, p. 11).
In order to achieve its primary mission, to stop armed conflict or to prevent its
recurrence, the UN tried to broker a cease fire between the warring parties and then established a
neutral zone between the enemies to prevent hostilities from breaking out again by deploying UN
peacekeepers into the area. Once the conflict parties were separated, the UN initiated
negotiations that would eventually lead to a peace treaty. After this treaty went into effect, the
peacekeeping troops were supposed to be replaced by a monitoring mission, which was intended
to make sure that all parties would adhere to the provisions of the peace treaty.
Initially, the UN got off to a very promising and successful start. Its first peacekeeping
mission deployed to Egypt and the Sinai in November of 1956 was an initial success (O'Neill &
Reese, 2005, p. 26). After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company and Israel attacked
14
Egypt in October of 1956, occupying Gaza and the Sinai, France and Britain landed troops in the
Suez Canal Zone to “ensure” safe passage of ships through the canal. A Security Council
resolution was not possible due to the veto powers of France and Britain, so the UN General
Assembly voted unanimously to call for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Egyptian soil. In order to ensure that those demands were met, the General
Assembly decided to dispatch the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to the region to
monitor the progress. The force arrived in the area in November of 1956 and the withdrawal of
French and British troops went smoothly and was completed by December 22, 1956 (US State
Department, Bureau of Public Affairs). The last Israeli troops pulled out of the territory they had
occupied in the Sinai and in Gaza by March 1957. Subsequently, the UN troops helped to clear
the Suez Canal, which had been blocked during the war, and were mainly patrolling the border
areas between Israel and Egypt in Gaza and the Sinai. Because of Israeli opposition to the
peacekeeping mission, the UN troops were only stationed on the Egyptian side of the border,
with the consent of the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. UNEF I was very
successful in maintaining the cease-fire along the Israeli-Egyptian border until its withdrawal in
1967 at the request of the Egyptian government (UN Department of Public Information, 2003).
This peacekeeping operation was a departure from earlier missions by the UN which
were solely observer missions, like the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO) to observe the cease-fire agreement in Palestine after the end of the Arab-Israeli war in
1948 and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which
was established after the First Kashmir War in 1949 to supervise the peace treaty mediated by
the UN (United Nations Association in Canada, 2007). For these earlier missions, the term
peacekeeping had not been used because they consisted only of a few unarmed military
15
observers that had no power to enforce the agreements, they could only report back to the UN if
one side violated the terms of the agreement.
With the establishment of UNEF I, the UN entered into a new era. It was the first time
that a UN sanctioned military force had been deployed to actively assure the compliance of all
sides to the cease-fire agreement.2 However, the use of the troops differed from what Chapter
VII, Article 42 specifies or would have allowed for. Chapter VII of the UN Charter would have
allowed the UN to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security,” which would have allowed the UN to send armed
troops to Egypt in order to enforce the resolution by the General Assembly (United Nations,
1996). However, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold decided not to go this route, because he
feared that no one would volunteer troops to fight Israel, France and Britain on behalf of the UN.
By going the non-violent way, Hammarskjold ensured the success of the mission and set a
precedent for the conduct of peacekeeping operations for the next 40 years. Those operations
were based on the three principles of consent of the parties affected by the conflict, use of force
only in self-defense and impartiality (Katayanagi, 2002). These basic principles were valid until
the early 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the changing nature of conflict from wars
between states to intra-state or transnational conflict forced the UN to rethink its position. The
transition to a wider, more inclusive form of peacekeeping was marked by Secretary-General
Boutros-Boutros Ghali‟s An Agenda for Peace, which contained recommendations and analysis
on “ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the
2
Although the decision to intervene in the Korean War was sanctioned by the UN Security Council, it cannot be
considered a UN peacekeeping mission, because the forces sent to Korea actively engaged in combat operations,
taking the side of the South Koreans and because the troops were effectively under US command and engaged in
enforcing American interests in the region (i.e. stopping the spread of Communism).
16
Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for
peace-keeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).”
Wider or Second Generation Peacekeeping
The shift towards this new form of peace operations contained a widening of the
definition of peace operations, thus the term wider or second generation peacekeeping
(Mackinley & Chopra). This new form of peace operations was achieved by “improvements on
the Cold War peacekeeping model by redefining the use of force by peacekeepers and the
consent and mandate concepts (Fleitz, 2002, p. 8).” Thus, UN missions were not only
peacekeeping missions any more, but so-called peace operations, which, in addition to
peacekeeping can also include peace enforcement, peace building, peacemaking and conflict
prevention (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999). This shift became necessary when the situations in both
Bosnia and Somalia deteriorated because the local conflict parties showed no interest in working
together with UN troops and tried use their presence for their own gain (Clark, 2002, p. 49) and
otherwise just ignored the presence of the peacekeepers. It was also counterproductive that
peacekeepers were sent into a situation in which there was no official cease-fire or peace
agreement. The lack of a clear mandate did not help either. However, even though there is
considerable agreement on the definition of second generation peacekeeping, opinions differ on
which UN missions would qualify for either second or third generation peacekeeping. Especially
UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia are categorized differently
quite often (Malan, 1998; Reichard, 2006, p. 13). This paper will consider both operations to be
17
third generation peacekeeping, because both were enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter (Katayanagi, 2002, p. 57).
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized these flaws in the concept of peacekeeping
and proposed wide-ranging changes. First of all, he tackled the issue of sovereignty, one of the
foundations of the UN system. He realized that sovereignty is not always easily established,
especially when a country falls apart into several different parts, all of which claim independence
but are not yet recognized by the UN (Krasner, 2001, p. 42; Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild, &
Zartman, 1996, p. 14). This problem existed in former Yugoslavia. The first two countries to
separate from Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, were internationally recognized shortly after
declaring independence (Burg & Shoup, 2000, p. 121). The UN mission to Croatia,
UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), was deployed after the Croatian government and the
Serbian-Croat leaders of the Krajina province agreed to a proposal by Cyrus Vance and Lord
Carrington to send UN forces (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 33). When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared
its independence from Yugoslavia, the situation was different. About equal parts of Bosnia were
inhabited by Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croatians and Bosnians Muslims. The Serbs wanted to join
Serbia and Montenegro for obvious reasons, the Croatians wanted their part of Bosnia to become
part of Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims were the only ones who truly wanted an independent
state.3
When civil unrest broke out all over Bosnia, the UN decided to widen the mandate of
UNPROFOR to monitor the peaceful secession of Bosnia from the former Yugoslavia, but to
maintain the structural integrity of the country. Unfortunately, the Bosnian Croats and especially
the Bosnian Serbs had no intention to let the UN stop them from reaching their goals. The
3
For further reading see Burg & Shoup, 2000; Finlan, 2004; Badsley & Latawski, 2004; Daalder, 2000.
18
European Union decided to formally recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state
on April 7, 1992 (Mellenthin, 1993), the UN followed suit and recognized Bosnia on May 20,
1992 (United Nations Security Council, 1992). They were hoping that this move would prevent
an escalation of the civil war. The reasoning behind this was that if all three parties would all of
a sudden find themselves in one and the same country, they would try to solve the problem
peacefully.
In the end, it turned out that the only party that was interested in an UN involvement and
in a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, when the UN decided to
widen the mandate of UNPROFOR to also cover Bosnia in June 1992 (Lahneman, 2004, p. 54),
the peacekeepers were drawn into a full scale civil war, even though up until that point, the
common view was that the UN would not interfere in the internal problems of a sovereign state.
The case of Bosnia was quite difficult, however.
First, Bosnia was not an independent, internationally recognized country when the civil
unrest started, but by the time the UN troops arrived, Austria and Germany had recognized
Bosnia formally, undermining the first basic principle of traditional peace operations, namely
that the UN would respect a country‟s sovereignty and would not interfere in its internal affairs.
Second, the UN disregarded the consent of the parties to the conflict. Only one group, the
Bosnian Muslims, wanted the UN to officially help end the conflict. The Serbs were absolutely
not interested in any outside interference and established the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina on January 9, 1992, which was changed to Republika Srbska later that year in order
to avoid confusion with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (US State Department, Bureau
of Public Affairs). The Croatians established an autonomous region of their own, called Croatian
Community of Herzeg-Bosnia in July 1992 (Mellenthin). These acts were followed by
19
systematic ethnic cleansing, a term preferred by the Clinton Administration in order to evade the
ramifications that calling the events in Bosnia genocide might have had. Both, Serbs and Croats,
systematically targeted other ethnicities, plundering their homes, setting them on fire, killing or
arresting the people. Their overall goal was to either become independent countries or part of
either Serbia or Croatia. However, neither of the two entities was ever formally recognized by
the international community.
What the UN peacekeepers were supposed to follow, though, were the remaining two
principles; impartiality and use of force in self defense only. This turned into a major nightmare
for the troops and basically rendered the execution of their mandate impossible. The first
widening of the mandate occurred in June 1992, when its troops were ordered to secure Sarajevo
airport (United Nations, 1992) and subsequently, in September 1992, the mandate was changed
to incorporate the protection of humanitarian aid efforts and civilian refugees in all of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (United Nations Security Council, 1992). On top of that, the peacekeepers were
also asked to protect the UN safe areas of Srebrenica (United Nations Security Council, 1993) on
April 16, 1993, and later Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa and Bihac (United Nations Security
Council, 1993). To protect those safe areas, the UN sent an additional 7,000 soldiers which were
explicitly allowed to use force in order to protect those safe areas from bombardments (United
Nations Security Council, 1993, §9). The UN even worked out an agreement with NATO that
NATO would provide air support if needed. However, this setup was a direct violation of
another principle of traditional peacekeeping, impartiality. The safe areas were established
exclusively to protect civilians from the Bosnian Serbs, which in turn amounted to the UN
choosing sides in the conflict opposing the Bosnian Serbs. In the end it did not take long until
the Bosnian Serbs realized that the threat of airstrikes was an empty threat and that without
20
those, the lightly armed peacekeepers were no match for their tanks and heavy artillery and they
attacked the safe zones (UN General Assembly, 1999).
The way the UN conducted its peace operations in Bosnia was not the most efficient way
to go about this. Like Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace noticed, it is
important that the peacekeepers have a clear and concise mandate they can follow. The lack of a
clear mandate, or rather the changes to the mandate of UNPROFOR from a small peacekeeping
force in Croatia to a peacekeeping operation covering Croatia and Bosnia (Greco, 1995-97, p. 2),
made it practically impossible for the troops to function effectively. The Srebrenica massacre
was arguably a direct consequence of the lack of guidance for the troops and the ignorance of the
UN Security Council. They believed merely threatening the use of force would be sufficient
even though there was more than enough warning before the massacre happened, that the
Bosnian Serbs would respect “only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it
(Holbrooke, p. 152).”
On the other side, the massacre also started the first successful attempt at peace
enforcement the UN undertook. As a response to the massacre, the UN asked NATO to start a
massive bombing campaign to bring the war to an end. NATO responded by implementing an
air campaign that only stopped when they ran out of targets (Holbrooke, p. 146).4 Thus, in the
end, the UN missions to Bosnia, UNPROFOR and its follow up mission IFOR (Implementation
Force), turned out to be the first major wider or second-generation peace operation conducted by
the UN. Some of the problems that were encountered in the course of the Bosnian war and
especially in Somalia showed that improvements were needed for this new kind of conflict.
Somalia showed the problems a peacekeeping force can encounter when there is no central,
4
For more details see also Daalder, 2000; Finlan, 2004; Owen, 2000; Ripley, 1999.
21
working government in existence and a massive nation building effort is needed to bring a
conflict to an end. This led to the creation of third-generation peacekeeping.
Third Generation Peacekeeping
Third generation peacekeeping goes one step further than second generation
peacekeeping. The goal of the latter is first and foremost to stop hostilities and to start a process
towards a normalization of relations among the conflict parties. Today, this process is generally
referred to as peacemaking (Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ,
2008) and usually culminates with the conduct of free, democratic elections to install a new
government that is acceptable to everyone. However, this concept does not solve the underlying
problems that are causing the conflict, be they ethnic, religious or cultural. Third generation
peacekeeping is intended to take these things into account and is thus a long term process to
ensure peace and security. Because of the longer duration of these missions, the UN is relying
more and more on the help of regional organizations such as NATO, the OECD or the OAU.
Examples for this outsourcing of UN missions are Kosovo or Darfur, where the UN asked
NATO and the OAU, respectively, to provide troops to fulfill the UN mandate.5
Third generation peacekeeping is also wider than any other form of peacekeeping before.
It can consist of various stages leading from conflict to a stable peace. Depending on the
situation in the country or region, this form of peacekeeping can start with peace enforcement,
i.e. sending in troops to stop the fighting by using force, continue with nation building or
5
For more information on the EU mission in Kosovo see Bilefsky, 2008; DW Staff, 2008; for more details on the
OAU mission in Darfur see Hanson, 2008; St. Pierre & Leaver, 2008 and United Nations Department of Public
Information, 2009.
22
rebuilding of failed states, if no working civil authority exists any more (Hanhimäki, 2008, p.
77). The last step is making sure that the results of the elections are respected. This process is
usually accompanied by efforts to improve the humanitarian situation, like delivering food and
potable water to the civil population, and by efforts to improve the human rights situation.
However, some aspects of third generation peacekeeping are not easy or almost
impossible to do. Forcing parties of a conflict to stop fighting by using force and without taking
any sides, for example, is highly problematic. Chances are that the parties the peacekeepers want
to stop fighting each other, all of a sudden start working together fighting the peacekeepers. An
example for this is the UN mission to Somalia, when the UN and American troops decided to use
force to reach the goals of the mandate (disarming the clans and enabling humanitarian
assistance) and the clans decided to work together to fight the foreign troops, which eventually
led to the withdrawal of the UN troops and the failure of the mission (United Nations, 1997).
Those clans are actually still holding most of the power in Somalia today, almost fifteen years
after the UN troops left (Fleitz, p. 14).
Despite the usually wider, multidimensional mandates that include, among others, the
separation of combatants; the disarmament of irregular forces; the demobilization and
transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army; assistance with reintegration
into civil society; the establishment of new policing systems and the monitoring of elections for
new governments (Riza, 1995, p. 17), the most recent UN missions were all smaller in size than
the ones in Bosnia or Somalia. The overall number of peacekeepers rose dramatically from about
10,000 in January 1992 to about 78,000 in July 1993 with the implementation of the UN
missions to Bosnia and Somalia (UN Department of Public Information, 2001). After their end,
the number fell almost back to the Cold War levels, before rising again from January 2000 until
23
it reached a new high of about 113,000 as of May 2009 (UN Department of Public Information,
2009). Even though the overall number of peacekeepers rose, the number of peace operations by
the UN increased, too. Between 1990 and 2000, the UN Security Council approved 36 new
peacekeeping missions and currently, there are 16 active missions (United Nations, 2009).
Some authors are already speculating about a fourth generation of peacekeeping (Malan,
1998), but after reviewing the literature on second and third generation peacekeeping, the
existence of a new form of peacekeeping seems unlikely. Most descriptions of second and third
generation peacekeeping are so similar that it is already almost impossible to differentiate
between those two, much less between them and a fourth kind of peacekeeping. The only
difference is that most third generation peace operations include a Chapter VII provision and
most second generation peace operations only a Chapter VI provision.
Problems with Peace Operations
Despite the development of peacekeeping operations over the years, peacekeeping
regularly suffered from setbacks or catastrophic failures. There are several reasons for the
problems peace operations encountered. Some of them are external, like a change in the geopolitical situation, the changes in the kinds of conflicts peacekeepers were sent to or the conflict
parties themselves (Jett, p. 115), and some are internal, like unrealistic expectations, outdated
doctrine or ideology. Many of those problems have been addressed over the years, but changes
were almost always ad hoc changes after something went wrong first.
Jett argues that the main external factor influencing the outcome of UN peacekeeping is
“the parties to the conflict and the degree to which they are committed to the peace process (Jett,
24
1999, p. 113).” In traditional peacekeeping, one of the basic principles for the dispatch of
peacekeeping troops was consent of the conflict parties. However, consent does not mean that
the parties really want peace. In some instances at least one of the parties, usually one on the
losing side, will agree for a peacekeeping force to be stationed in the country, because it will
give them the opportunity to regroup, rearm and after the UN troops leave, to continue hostilities
in much better shape than before. Examples for this are the civil wars in Angola, Liberia and the
Congo.6
An underlying reason coming into play here is also the change in the nature of conflict.
While during the cold war most inter-state conflicts were territorial in nature, the post Cold War
intra-state conflicts were about political power and in some cases about control over natural
resources or money (Jett, p. 113). In these cases the UN approach to stopping the conflicts was
not quite adequate. In a conflict over territory it is fairly easy to find a compromise all parties
can agree on. However, when two groups within a country are fighting for political power,
stopping the hostilities and holding democratic elections will most likely not solve the problem,
because in political elections, like in war, there is usually just one winner and in many cases the
losing side will have a hard time accepting the loss. Examples for that are the UN missions to
Angola (UNAVEM II & III). Only after long, arduous negotiations and several breaches of the
armistice by both sides of the conflict, did the UN missions succeed, mainly after the UN
established a follow up mission (MONUA) that focused exclusively on installing a working civil
administration, establishing an independent, neutral police force and helping the administration
to address and deal with human rights violations and humanitarian problems (United Nations,
2001). After these issues were successfully resolved and the election system was changed from a
6
For more information, see Klare, 2001, Chapter 8 and Jett, 1999, Chapter 6.
25
plurality or winner-takes-all system to a proportional representation system the conflict was
finally resolved after free, democratic elections were held that were recognized by all parties and
that gave everyone a piece of the cake.
An abundance of natural resources can also prolong a conflict or hinder peacekeeping
efforts. If those resources are easily exploitable, like diamonds in Angola, and there is a market
for them, control over the resources provides for enormous amounts of money that can be
invested in new weapons (Klare, 2001). In large parts of Africa the proceeds from sales of
natural resources are closely controlled by the ruling party with most of the money going into the
elite‟s bank accounts and towards the purchase of arms. Naturally, as long as they control the
resources, the ruling parties have no incentive to cooperate with the UN and to work on ending
the conflict. The same is true when a rebel group controls the area where natural resources are
located. They have no reason to give up that area freely.
These are some examples for external factors that have major implications on the success
of a peacekeeping operation and that the UN has only limited control over, the most important
being the true consent of the conflict parties. Additionally, there are also some internal factors
that have an influence on the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation.
Internal elements that can affect the outcome of a peacekeeping mission are
organizational factors, the kind of mandate the peacekeepers are given and how the mission is
planned. Organizational factors include the decision making process of how, where and when
the UN should get involved. Jett identifies three different ways, through Security Council
initiatives in response to wars, requests from local parties in response to local wars and requests
to help with the implementation of a peace agreement signed by the parties in a civil war (Jett,
26
pp. 35-36). After 1991, however, the first two ways disappeared almost completely and most
peacekeeping missions were initiated after someone asked for UN assistance in ending a civil
war. The implementation of peace treaties that are not brokered by the UN, though, is quite
difficult, because some of the provisions of the treaties might just be impossible to enforce,
which in turn can have negative effects on the outcome of the mission before it even started.
This is tied in closely with the second internal factor, the mandate.
Every peacekeeping mission stands and fails with the mandate it receives from the
Security Council. If the mandate requires the peacekeepers to do things that are not feasible,
chances that the mission will fail are quite high. For example, widening the mandate of
UNPROFOR to protect the UN safe areas in Bosnia destined that mission to fail because the
Security Council did not take into consideration that the peacekeepers were not adequately
equipped and it did also not realize that the agreement with NATO to provide air support could
not work the way it was supposed to because of two parallel chains of command where only the
top executives (UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and NATO Secretary-General de Hoop
Scheffer) were authorized to order the use of force. Unrealistic or vague mandates or changes to
existing ones were quite often the reason for failure of the mission. The latter is especially
critical when a mandate contains a Chapter VII provision that is actively used by the
peacekeepers. It is just not possible to reduce a mandate like this after force was used. It might
be possible to allow the troops to enforce their mandate if necessary, but only when it is possible
to send the necessary equipment and weapons. Otherwise, it could lead to a situation like in
Srebrenica. Also, trying to conduct elections in a failed state is quite unrealistic without
restoring a functioning civil authority and basic infrastructure first (see Angola).
27
Planning a peacekeeping mission is not an easy task. Many factors have to be taken into
consideration, some of which are quite difficult to solve. First of all, the Department for
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) needs to get the necessary troops for the task. Depending on
where the conflict is taking place or what is at stake, it is sometimes hard for the Security
Council to find countries willing to send troops. For example, the Security Council would like to
send a new peacekeeping force to Somalia for quite a while now, but after the fiasco of
UNOSOM II, no country wants to volunteer troops to be sent there. The United States, already
stretched by two wars and with the Mogadishu incident still fairly fresh in people‟s minds, will
not volunteer any troops for UN missions to Somalia or to conflicts that are not threatening US
national security. Other states simply do not think that the chances for success would be big
enough.
Another problem is to make sure that all the troops are adequately equipped. In recent
years, the countries that send the most troops do not have the funds to arm their troops the way
the European or US troops are. In 2007, eight of the top ten troop contributing countries were socalled third world or emerging countries with Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal taking the
top spots (Bah, Jones, & Tortolani, 2008, p. 2).
Directly linked with getting troops initially is the question of how many troops are
needed. In some instances there is time to send a fact finding mission to the place of interest first
and then, based on their report, the decision of how many troops are needed can be made.
Unfortunately, in most cases wars are not predictable and the conflict parties will not wait until
the UN has figured out how big of a peacekeeping force it will have to send in order to be
successful. If the UN is wrong in predicting the necessary troop strength, chances are that the
mission will fail before it even begins.
28
Overall, in order to properly plan a peacekeeping mission so that it has a chance for
success the planners need to be very well informed. They need to use all the information they
can possibly get and use all available sources. Ideally, the DPKO will be able to send its own
staff on a fact finding mission before sending in peacekeepers (Sutterlin, 2003, p. 21).
Additionally, they should interview all the NGOs that are already working there, if any,
and finally, they should ask the member states if they have any information that might be useful.
The bigger the area of deployment and the more parties are involved in the conflict, the more
information is needed. For the planning and organizing stage of a peacekeeping mission as well
as for formulating its mandate, the UN needs strategic intelligence of high quality, no matter how
uneasy they feel about using the term intelligence. No country would send its troops to a foreign
place without knowing exactly what it gets itself into. After it became clear in recent years that
the UN cannot count on unrestricted cooperation of all conflict parties any more it is imperative
to prepare the troops for a worst case scenario and not for the best possible one.
When setting up a peacekeeping force the planners should also consider giving the
peacekeepers the ability to collect tactical intelligence once they are in the target area. Since it
proved quite difficult for all the different countries involved in a peacekeeping operation to
effectively share the intelligence they collected with troops from other, non-aligned countries,
the UN might want to consider installing a neutral entity within the peacekeeping force that is
tasked with collecting intelligence for all troops, regardless of where they are from. In the end,
this might save countless lives on all sides.
Together with the capability to collect tactical intelligence while operating in the target
area, collecting strategic intelligence before sending the troops is a decisive factor for the success
29
of a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, the issue of intelligence in the UN and in UN missions
will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Two.
30
Chapter 2
Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations
Intelligence is a crucial element of every military operation. Quite often success or
failure in achieving the goals of an operation depends on the quality of intelligence the military
commanders have. Also, with increasing complexity of the mission, the intelligence
requirements increase too.
Intelligence is also not a new concept. The gathering of information on the intentions and
capabilities of an enemy has been done for centuries. The modern form of intelligence
developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. In order to understand the importance of intelligence
and its complexity, it is helpful to have a look at how it developed and the impact it had on
military operations.
Forms of Intelligence
Intelligence can be divided into strategic, operational and tactical intelligence analogous
to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. Strategic intelligence is required for
the forming of policy and military plans on the national or international level (Miller, 2009).
Operational intelligence is defined by the US Department of Defense as “intelligence that is
required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic
objectives within theaters or areas of operations (Keane, 2005, p. 145).” Tactical intelligence is
the intelligence field commanders need in order to make informed decisions on the battlefield
and to be successful in combat.
31
Intelligence Collection
Intelligence services, force commanders and troops in the field have a wide variety of
intelligence collection means at their disposal. According to the United States Intelligence
Community website, there are six basic intelligence collection disciplines. These are signals
intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence
(MASINT), human-source intelligence (HUMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT) and
geospatial intelligence (United States Intelligence Community, 2009). Geospatial intelligence is
sometimes considered to be a part of IMINT and not a discipline of its own. The following
figure illustrates the five disciplines as identified by NATO and their interrelations.
Figure 2: Open Source – All Source Relationship (NATO, 2001)
According to the NATO model, OSINT is the basis for all intelligence gathering efforts.
Today, most information that is needed is openly available in newspapers, on TV or on the
internet. After a thorough search of openly available sources, the gained intelligence can be
enhanced or corroborated by using other available collection methods.
32
The most basic and traditional form of intelligence collection is HUMINT. This can
include clandestine or covert operations or simply observations by government employees or
travelers. HUMINT can be gained by the use of spies, interviewing refugees or through
observations made by troops in the field (Johnson, 2008, p. 3). Today, HUMINT is usually
backed up with IMINT, using pictures taken from planes, drones or satellites, radar images and
infrared signatures (United States Intelligence Community, 2009). IMINT helps intelligence
officers to visualize reports gained through HUMINT or SIGINT, thus enabling them to get a
better picture of what is happening. SIGINT, traditionally the second form of intelligence
gathering,7 is the primary form of intelligence gathering on the battlefield. SIGINT targets
enemy communication and other electronic signals.
Historical Overview
Napoleon Bonaparte was the first military leader who used intelligence in major fashion.
He quickly recognized the advantages of always knowing about the enemy‟s movements and
intentions. After the French revolution, Napoleon reorganized the French cavalry even though
he was an artillery officer and no expert on cavalry tactics. John Elting states that Napoleon
nevertheless knew “how to organize and use cavalry effectively (Elting, 1997, p. 229).”
A staff officer of General Massena, Paul Thiebault, wrote a manual on how a general
staff should work and function, the Manuel général du service des états-majors généraux et
divisionnaires dans les armées (Thiebault, 1813). One of his major points for effective staff
work is that the staff officers always need the most up-to-date intelligence about the enemy. He
7
SIGINT was started by the French after the invention of wireless communications in the late nineteenth century
(Richelson, 1997).
33
argues that “reconnaissance must be conducted continuous to the front and flanks (Elting, p.
83).” Napoleon trusted mainly his cavalry to fulfill these duties and he even hired some
multilingual Polish to conduct deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines. He also insisted that all
intelligence gathered had to be brought to him directly, a feature that survived over time.
The start of the technological revolution at the end of the 19th century brought about big
changes in communications and as a result in intelligence gathering. In 1880, Thomas Edison
had invented the electric light bulb, already in 1876, Graham Bell successfully introduced the
telephone and in 1901, Guglielmo Marconi claimed to be the first person to send and receive
transatlantic radio transmissions. In 1908, the Wright brothers conducted the first official flight
with a motorized airplane in Le Mans. All those inventions were not only turned into practical
devices for the people, they were also very important for the military (Richelson, 1997). Soon
after the invention of the wireless, the French started to listen in to wireless communications,
thus gaining valuable information on the other European countries‟ intentions. The French and
the German armies also introduced the airplane into their forces, believing that their “most
significant impact on military operations would be in reconnaissance and communications
(Meilinger, Apr. 2000).”
In the course of World War I, military leaders on all sides learned quickly how important
it is to know what the enemy is doing and where his troops are. Lack of intelligence often lead
to catastrophic results like the battle of Tannenberg shows, where superior Russian forces were
almost annihilated by a much smaller German force mainly because the Germans were very well
informed about the Russian movements and intentions by effectively using signals, human and
imagery intelligence (Showalter, 2004).
34
Another reason for the growing importance of intelligence in military operations was the
growing size of armies. During the French Revolution, the French introduced the concept of the
levee en masse, which resulted in the formation of armies of unprecedented size. Elting (p. 55)
estimates that in the years “from 1804 to 1814, the total armed forces…reached an average of
more than a million,” making the French army the first ever to surpass the one million men mark.
Armies of this size enabled the commanding general to engage the enemy along an entire front
and at different places at the same time. For example, in 1805 Napoleon was able to fight the
Austrians in Germany and Italy at the same time.
Before, strategic intelligence was limited to preventing surprise attacks and to find out
where the opposing army was being assembled. To get this kind of information most countries
used spies that were sent to the opponent‟s court under some official pretext. Tactical
intelligence consisted of finding out the composition of the enemy‟s army and where the first
attack of the battle would be taking place.
The introduction of mass armies increased the need for information on the enemy
substantially. This increased the need for good intelligence, which in turn became more difficult
to obtain. Napoleon was the first to realize this and his successes in the early years of the
Napoleonic Wars proved just how important good reconnaissance was for military operations. A
very good example is the Battle of Ulm in 1805. Due to good strategic intelligence, Napoleon
was able to outflank the Austrian forces and encircle them in the city of Ulm. Because the
Austrians had not realized the importance of a systematic intelligence effort, they were
completely unaware of Napoleon‟s intentions and did not expect a French attack that early. In
the end they were completely taken by surprise and surrendered without a fight.
35
The increased mobility of armies was another factor for the growing importance of
intelligence. In the second half of the 19th century, most European countries started building
extensive railway systems. The railroad made it possible to move big armies in a matter of days
instead of months. Whereas it took Napoleon almost four weeks to march his Grande Armée
from Boulogne to the German border uncontested, at the beginning of World War I the Germans
were able to advance with 1.5 million soldiers to the outskirts of Paris within about one month
while fighting battles against Belgian, French and British forces (Blond, 2002). To leverage
against such rapid troop movements, an army needed excellent intelligence capabilities, which
the introduction of signals, communications and imagery intelligence made possible.
The First and Second World Wars also brought a huge challenge for the national
intelligence agencies, which was coalition warfare. In order to effectively use all troops in a
coalition, the command and control structure needed to be adjusted and the flow of information
between the members of the coalition had to be streamlined. In World War I the sharing of
information and intelligence between the French and the British was almost non-existent, which
lead to several lost battles or missed opportunities because one side had no idea what the other
was doing. The allied intelligence effort in World War II was much improved. Especially the
cooperation between the Americans and the British reached unprecedented levels and formed the
basis for intelligence cooperation until today. Because of that, some call this cooperation the
Intelligence Revolution.8 With respect to UN peacekeeping operations, the lessons learned from
this cooperation are only of limited use, because during World War II the intelligence
cooperation was so tight that Americans were actually working in the British Home Office.
Since the UN does not have an own intelligence service something like this would not be
8
For more details on the subject, see e.g. Andrew, 1988; Wark, Summer 1993.
36
possible. However, this example shows that if the threat is big enough, cooperation can happen
and it can be very effective.
The realization of the importance of intelligence for military operations lead to increased
spending on improving intelligence capabilities in most countries, especially in the US. The US
spent about $66 billion on its intelligence agencies in 2009. Unfortunately, that number is only
an approximate number, because the official numbers are classified and cannot be accessed
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2009).
Today, the US intelligence community consists of sixteen member organizations, ranging
from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004). Under the coordination of the Director of
National Intelligence, all those intelligence agencies are supposed to provide enough information
to US forces abroad as well as in the US to enable them to effectively pursue and safeguard
American interests. A recent publication on intelligence doctrine by the JCS stresses that
“intelligence that is anticipatory, timely, accurate, usable, complete, relevant, objective, and
available is a crucial enabler of decisive unified action and successful military operations (Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2004, pp. I-1).”
The Intelligence Cycle
The process of turning acquired information into intelligence and making this intelligence
available to policymakers, military commanders and other consumers is called the intelligence
cycle.
37
Figure 3: The Intelligence Cycle (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009)
The production of intelligence starts with the Planning & Direction stage. This step is
crucial for the outcome of intelligence production. At this stage, policymakers at the higher
levels of government file requests for intelligence on certain problems and in cooperation with
issue-coordinators determine what the core problems are and what kind of intelligence is needed.
This step directly influences how the next steps will look like.
The Collection Process follows next. In this step the intelligence services use the six
basic collection disciplines to get raw information that can later be processed into finished
intelligence. Without an adequate amount of raw data there will be problems in the Analysis &
Production stage. But first, in an additional step, the raw data needs to be transformed into
usable intelligence.
The third step in the intelligence cycle is the Processing & Exploitation step. In this step
the information gathered is turned into usable intelligence. This can be achieved by decoding
messages, translation of foreign language documents or by preparing the gathered information
38
for computer processing. Once this is done, the produced intelligence is handed over to the
analysts or directly to consumers.
The Analysis & Production stage is arguably the most important step in the intelligence
cycle, because here an analyst will decide what intelligence is important and what is not. The
analyst will compile and evaluate the intelligence and will create finished intelligence reports.
The US Intelligence Community distinguishes five different intelligence categories. These
categories are current, estimative, warning, research and scientific and technical intelligence.
The finished intelligence products then have to be distributed to the relevant persons.
The importance of the Dissemination Process is to make sure that the finished intelligence
actually reaches the right people, because the best intelligence is useless if it is given to the
wrong people. From this stage the cycle goes back to the first stage, because in most cases the
finished intelligence will cause more questions that need to be answered and the process will
start from the beginning.9
Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations
In order to find out why there is a lack of understanding for the need of intelligence in
peacekeeping, it is important to distinguish between the different kinds of peacekeeping
operations. The three different generations of peacekeeping feature missions of increasing
complexity and to answer the question why intelligence was basically a non-factor in
peacekeeping operations for years a close examination of the different kinds of peacekeeping
operations is necessary. In this analysis I will also include observer missions even though they
do not fit in with any of the categories of peacekeeping mentioned in the first chapter, but they
9
For an in depth description of the intelligence cycle, see Central Intelligence Agency, 2009; United States
Intelligence Community, 2009; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009.
39
preceded first generation peacekeeping and offer valuable information on intelligence gathering
in UN peace missions.
Observer Missions
Even though intelligence has a negative connotation within the UN system, the UN is
fairly accustomed to intelligence gathering. The first missions the UN ever conducted in the late
1940s were so-called observer and fact finding missions, thus preceding traditional peacekeeping
operations. In those missions, the UN sent unarmed military observers to watch the belligerents,
to supervise the truce or armistice the sides had agreed on and to inform the General Assembly
or the Security Council on new developments (UN Department of Public Information, 2005 &
2006). Usually, observer missions are relatively small because they are not intended to guard a
demarcation line or territory, their only function is to monitor all sides to the conflict and to
report back to the UN headquarters in New York.
The observer missions use various means to collect the data they need. The UN observer
mission to Israel (UNTSO) uses observation towers/posts, patrols and inspections to monitor
Israel‟s borders with Syria and especially Lebanon (Birgisson, 1993, p. 94). UNMOGIP, the UN
mission to India and Pakistan mainly started with using ground and air reconnaissance to monitor
the cease fire agreement of 1949. Later, the observers monitored troop movements and
investigated complaints about violations of the treaty on both sides.
However, the Security Council has not stopped using observer missions after the
establishment of peacekeeping operations. Today, there is still ample use of observer and
40
verification missions in various parts of the world.10 Some of them are actually part of bigger
peacekeeping missions, others are still only focused on one specific task.
Nevertheless, those observer and verifying missions are essentially intelligence
operations. They use many forms of open information collection that are also used in military
intelligence operations. Those intelligence operations also start with the collection of raw
information, sometimes using the same methods. After all, the processing of the collected
information in any way into useful reports is by definition called intelligence. So, even if the UN
is calling those activities information gathering, it is the same as intelligence gathering.
Traditional or First Generation Peacekeeping
In traditional peacekeeping missions two different forms of intelligence gathering have to
be distinguished. There was no need for intelligence on expected attacks on the UN troops,
because the principle of consent of the conflict parties to the presence of the UN forces made
sure that the UN forces did not have to worry about hostile intentions towards them. Their
neutrality ensured them relative security and since their main task was to make sure that the
warring parties would not start fighting again or that a peace treaty was not broken by any side,
the need for good tactical intelligence was basically non-existent since tactical intelligence “is
intended primarily to respond to the needs of military field commanders so they can plan for, and
if necessary, conduct combat operations (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009).”
Actually, the character of most traditional peacekeeping operations made them purely
intelligence operations monitoring both sides of the conflict with an attached, lightly armed
military force to act as a deterrent. UNEF I, for example, consisted mainly of reconnaissance
10
For a comprehensive list of past and ongoing UN peace operations, see UN Department of Public Information,
2008.
41
units.11 The Yugoslavian army, for example, sent a whole reconnaissance battalion which was
supported by elements of a Canadian light cavalry battalion (United Nations, 2009).
The nature of traditional peacekeeping as intelligence or reconnaissance missions would
suggest that the experiences gained in those missions would have prepared the UN for situations
in which one participant of a conflict would not be willing to fully cooperate. However, there
are major differences between a situation in which both sides are willing to cooperate and one in
which at least one group is not. In first generation peacekeeping the main job of the troops is to
conduct reconnaissance along a demarcation line to find out if someone tried to cross it or not.
In order to do this it is sufficient to patrol the line with soldiers on foot, by vehicle or by plane
and if the terrain allows for it, the establishment of lookouts. Those activities, though, are openly
visible to the conflict parties and are obviously not aimed at anyone in particular. One could also
call them defensive operations.
Other than to fulfill the mandate those troops had no need for increased, more offensive
intelligence capabilities, because the peacekeepers were respected and there was no danger of
hostilities directed towards them. The repercussions a country would have faced after attacking
peacekeepers were serious enough to keep anyone from doing so. On the other hand, the UN
troops were only in an area because they were asked to be there by the conflict parties. That
consent might change, and it did at times, but if one party felt that the peacekeepers were not
needed or wanted any more, they could just ask the UN for the withdrawal of its troops and the
UN withdrew its troops as soon as possible. UNEF I, for example, ended because the Egyptian
government asked the UN to withdraw its troops, claiming that they were not needed any more
11
UNEF I was established in 1956 to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of
the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to
serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces (UN Department of Public Information, 2003).
42
and after putting some pressure on the UN forces, the UN complied with the request (Lowe,
Roberts, Welsh, & Zaum, 2008, p. 181).
Second Generation Peacekeeping
The widening of responsibilities and mandates for peacekeepers changed the premises.
The peace operations were not just observer missions anymore, they were required to ensure that
humanitarian aid could be delivered, to prevent human rights violations and that functioning civil
administration could be installed to enable the conduct of free, democratic elections among other
things.
The changed geo-political situation also led to a different situation. In intra-state or
trans-national conflicts, the number of conflict parties increased and the distinctions between
those groups were vague at best.
These situations demanded a different approach to peace operations. It was not enough
to just react to a war and if called upon to send in some peacekeepers to ensure that the fighting
would not flare up again. Now the role of the peacekeepers turned into an active one and any
active military operation requires much more intelligence to succeed than a passive one.
The preparatory stage of the missions already required different planning. If troops are invited to
help but only perform passive, defensive operations in a clearly defined area, it is fairly easy to
evaluate the situation and to assess how many troops are needed to fulfill the mandate.
However, the situation the peacekeepers encountered in second generation peacekeeping
was different. It usually was a more fluid situation in which it was almost impossible to
determine where one sphere of influence ended and another one started. In a conflict like that,
the upfront preparations require a lot more information to ensure that, first, the mandate given is
43
adequate and, second, that the mission will succeed. In order to exactly assess the situation in
the conflict, good strategic intelligence is necessary. The planners of the mission need to know
what caused the conflict (ethnic, religious differences, access to natural resources, etc.), who the
parties in the conflict are, if there is a functioning central government, what the humanitarian
situation is like, what the groups are fighting for and, finally, if the conflict parties are interested
in UN intervention or not (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006, p. 6). Some of
these things are fairly easy to figure out, but for some a great deal of information is necessary.
And most importantly, if the planners get it wrong, the mission will most likely fail.
The mission to Bosnia (UNPROFOR) is a good example for a lack of planning ahead of
time. The mandate originally did not mention Bosnia at all, because the UN force was sent to
stop fighting and ethnic cleansing in parts of Croatia. This mission went almost as planned and
succeeded. Shortly before the troops were to be withdrawn, the conflict in Bosnia started and the
UN decided to use the troops already in the area to make sure that the civilian population in
Bosnia received humanitarian aid. However, the change of the mandate of UNPROFOR did not
take the actual situation in Bosnia into account. Because of a lack of information, the
determination of the Bosnian Serbs to succeed was gravely underestimated, as well as their
opposition to UN interference in the conflict. In the end, the peacekeepers were not able to
fulfill their new mandate, because the Serbs did not cooperate. In many instances the Serbs
would either not let the supply convoys pass or they just took the supplies for themselves. Even
after the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to take “all measures necessary to facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian assistance” under Chapter VII in August 1992 (United Nations,
1992) the situation did not improve. Most troop contributing countries, especially the British,
would not authorize their troops to use force for fear that this might endanger the troops.
44
The idea of establishing UN safe zones to protect civilians from ethnic cleansing was also
a good idea, but again, the lack of information from the ground and the disregard of previous
experiences led to catastrophe. Without proper preparation and equipment the UN troops were
tasked with protecting cities from Serbian attack. In addition, there was no attempt by the UN to
find out what the Serbs might think about such a move and what their reaction might be,
believing that the threat of airstrikes would keep the Serbian troops from attacking (Finlan, 2004,
p. 49). This might have worked if the UN would have been willing to show that this threat was
sincere and also by keeping the Bosnian Muslims from staging attacks on Serbian positions out
of those safe zones.
So, after all, second generation peacekeeping still suffered from a lack of intelligence
capabilities as well as the reluctance of the UN to acknowledge this. They still depended on the
intelligence provided to them by states participating in the mission. It seems like this might
work, since all militaries have intelligence capabilities, but there are also several problems
connected with that. Not all armies are on the same technological level, so the quality of
intelligence depends mainly on what countries are participating in a particular mission.12 With
the reluctance of the US to send peacekeepers since UNOSOM, the UN does not have access to
the best possible intelligence any more.
Another problem is the reluctance of countries to share their intelligence with troops from
non-aligned countries even if they are serving in the same mission. In Bosnia this became an
issue, when the commanding officer of UNPROFOR‟s intelligence unit was Swedish and his
subordinates from NATO countries received intelligence from their respective home countries
but could not share it with their commanding officer so that he might put it to good use (De Jong,
12
see e.g. Krishnasami, 2003, p. 34, for an account of Bangladesh‟s participation in UNOSOM II and the lack of
equipment of the Bangladeshi troops.
45
Wies, & Steele, 2003). As a reason for that most countries claim that they do not want to
compromise their sources or the level their intelligence capabilities are at. Generally, this is
understandable, however, if the unwillingness to share vital information might endanger the
overall success of an operation or the lives of UN personnel, it might be a good idea considering
the establishment of a UN entity that coordinates the intelligence gathering process and which
makes sure that no one‟s sources will be compromised. The question also remains whether it
might be possible to instill enough trust into the participants of a peacekeeping mission so that
they take intelligence from their partners without demanding to know where the intelligence is
from and how it was collected. After all, it is more important to have the necessary information
than to know its source.
UNPROFOR in Bosnia
Bosnia also shows that there are not only deficiencies in the way intelligence is generated
and shared, but also that there are major problems with the command structure of peace
operations, especially when it comes down to cooperating with non-UN entities. In Bosnia,
NATO was supposed to deliver support to the UN mission in several ways. NATO‟s tasks were
to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia and the UN arms embargo, provide air support against Serb
aggression and intelligence support to the troops on the ground (Finlan, 2004, pp. 47, 81). For
various reasons, all of those seemingly straightforward tasks could not be fully accomplished.
The enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia could have been an easy task for NATO.
They deployed AWACS surveillance aircraft into the region, watching Bosnian airspace and
were able to detect almost all violations. However, the enforcement of the no-fly zone was only
a partial success because it was ignored about 3,317 times during the war and as a result, only
46
four planes were actually shot down by NATO aircraft in almost 100,000 sorties flown from
Italy and aircraft carriers (Jackson, 1997, p. 14). This low number of downed aircraft can be
explained by the limited number of fixed wing aircraft available to the various parties,
amounting to about 35 in total (Clark, 2002), and the fact that neither party actually engaged
their planes in combat missions. The bulk of the flights within the no-fly zone were done by
helicopter, and by the time a NATO pilot was authorized to shoot the helicopter down, it was
usually already out of range or had landed.
The enforcement problem was that there were two parallel chains of command, one
within NATO, the other within the UN. So, in the case of the no-fly zone, a NATO pilot, after
having detected an airspace violation, had to ask his superior for permission to engage, who in
turn had to go all the way up the NATO chain of command and then NATO had to inform the
UN Secretary General in New York and get his permission to engage. By the time the
permission to engage came back down the chain of command, several hours had passed and the
NATO pilot had most likely already returned from his mission (Thomas, March 1995; Gawne,
1996, p. 2).
In general, two parallel chains of command would not have posed a problem. It had to be
expected because two international organizations were militarily engaged in the conflict and
neither would want to give up power over its troops. However, the cooperation between the two
organizations happened on levels that were too far up the chain of command to be effective. It
became apparent that neither side fully trusted the other which only allowed for cooperation at
the highest levels. Even though this way of cooperation made sure that military commanders on
either side would not make decisions the other side did not want them to make, it also greatly
diminished the efficiency of cooperation. A low level cooperation would have made more sense
47
in order to fulfill the mission. In the example of the no-fly zone, the enforcement would have
been much more efficient if the pilot‟s superior would have been authorized to make the decision
to engage without having to go all the way to the UN Secretary General. But the chain of
command was not the only problem the NATO encountered in its quest to help the UN. NATO
had to overcome some substantial internal obstacles first.
The mission to Bosnia marked the first time that NATO air and naval forces actively
engaged in hostilities. So the beginning of the mission was a test run for NATO structures itself.
No one knew for sure how and if the existing structures would work. Additionally, when
Yugoslavia started to fall apart, NATO was ill equipped for dealing with the problem in the first
place, because there was no information on Yugoslavia whatsoever.13 This seems odd at first,
considering that Yugoslavia was a socialist country, but NATO had fairly good relations with
Yugoslavia and therefore did not waste any of its intelligence capabilities on watching the
country. They were more concerned with the Eastern Bloc states. So, when the conflict on the
Balkans started, NATO at first had to get information from any source it could get. One of the
sources that were tapped by them, for example, was the website of a river barge owners‟
association in Yugoslavia, who had pretty accurate information on where fighting took place
along the Danube and Save Rivers in the area (Schuster, 1995). Another issue was that NATO
did not have any ground troops in Bosnia that could have collected intelligence. At the
beginning of the conflict, NATO established links with the International Red Cross and UN
Humanitarian Relief Organizations to get an idea of what was going on daily in Bosnia (Wentz,
1998).
13
Yugoslavia had been considered a neutral to friendly nation by NATO, excluding it from intelligence collection.
NATO‟s intelligence support mechanisms were still focused on war with the Soviet Union, thus the lack of available
intelligence for operations in the conflict. For more information see Schuster C. O., 2004.
48
Another way NATO gained intelligence was through interviewing refugees and
monitoring the mostly Serbian radio transmissions. NATO actually provided a daily intelligence
briefing for the UN troops in Bosnia, but the cooperation was so dismal that the briefings rarely
reached the UN commanders on the ground. For example, NATO intelligence knew about the
attack on Srebrenica several days before it happened, but in the upper command structure of the
UN no one believed it and by the time NATO could get someone to Srebrenica to warn the
peacekeepers there, the massacre had already happened.14 However, even with ample notice the
300 ill equipped Dutch peacekeepers could probably not have prevented the Serbs from taking
the city anyway.
The UN‟s experience in Bosnia and Somalia opened the eyes of quite some UN officials
to the fact that in order to conduct multilevel peace operations successfully, the UN needs to
change its stance on intelligence.
The UN Reaction to Bosnia and Somalia
The UN finally realized that reforms in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) were necessary and established a commission to examine the peacekeeping process and
to work out solutions to the shortcomings in the DPKO. The results were published in the
Brahimi Report, which was followed by several more reports on the progress of the reforms.
The main conclusion of the report was that the lack of a functioning global information
collection, processing and analysis capability was preventing the UN from successfully
conducting peace operations (United Nations, 2000).
1414
For a discussion of the role of intelligence before the Srebrenica massacre, see Wiebes, 2003, Chapter 8.
49
The aversion towards the word intelligence within the UN causes some serious problems.
The lack of accountability leads to the general notion that the UN cannot handle or collect
information efficiently or effectively. Because of this, the Secretary General has to rely on
informal information sharing from member states in addition to the information he might be
getting from UN fact-finding teams. However, this does not mean that the UN did not try to
formalize the process of information gathering.
Over the years, the UN had established over sixty UN Information centers around the
world. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar saw the need to improve the information
gathering capability of the UN. His attempt to streamline the flow of information from the
regional offices to the UN headquarters in New York failed, however, because the directors of
most of these offices had “no concept of the nature of political reporting (Sutterlin, 2003, p. 18).”
To improve the quality of information he was getting, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar
founded the Office of Research and Collecting Information (ORCI) in 1988 as a part of his
personal staff (Peck, 1998, p. 72f). ORCI‟s mandate was to collect, organize and analyze
political information to help the secretary-general improve the UN‟s preventive diplomacy
efforts. Unfortunately, the office never got the necessary funding and personnel and experienced
massive internal pressure from other UN offices. Subsequently, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali
succeeded Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar as secretary-general, he quickly shut ORCI down in 1992, after
only four years (Smith, 1994, p. 188).
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was intent on changing the structure of the UN
Secretariat and understood the need for good information. Therefore, he assigned the
responsibilities of the ORCI to the newly created Department of Political Affairs and organized a
formal training of the personnel. The training was done by the UN Institute for Training and
50
Research in Geneva in association with the International Peace Academy (Sutterlin, p. 19). For
the first time a UN training program was created whose main purpose was to train UN officials
in the collection and analysis of information.
Because the UN already has offices and field representatives in nearly every country in
the world, gaining information on political, economic or any other issue is no problem for the
UN. The UN only lacks the system to properly treat the information that is gathered and
incorporate it into an early warning system. Similar systems already exist within the UN
organization to track refugee streams and food and other humanitarian crises. All this
information that is already gathered could provide desperately needed strategic information for
either crisis prevention or preparations for peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, it is not
feasible to expect UN personnel like UNHCR staff operating in a crisis region to start collecting
information on the various factions of the conflict in addition to their original tasks. There is a
need for a different entity to coordinate the effort of collecting and especially organizing
operational and tactical intelligence (De Jong, Wies, & Steele, 2003, p. 329).
The UN has made great strides towards integrating intelligence operations into its peace
operations. One step in this direction was the recent introduction of the Joint Mission Analysis
Centre (JMAC) and Joint Operations Centres (JOC) in 2006. Both already come pretty close to
being intelligence entities. A DPKO policy directive describes the task of the JMAC to be
“integrated operations monitoring, reporting and information analysis hubs at Mission
headquarters to support the more effective integration of mission-wide situational awareness,
security information and analysis for management decision-making (UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 2006).”
51
The JMAC usually consists of experts in all the fields a multi-dimensional peace
operation might be concerned with. There might be political analysts, development and security
experts as well as humanitarian assistance and legal professionals working on the same team,
providing the operation‟s commander and the secretary-general with necessary information. The
JMACs are supposed to deliver intelligence on three different levels, operational intelligence
support for the conduct of peace operations, tactical intelligence to ensure the safety and security
of UN and other humanitarian assistance personnel and also strategic intelligence to support
decision making at the UN headquarters in New York in preparation of peace missions
(Cammaert, 2004).
The JMAC is an entity that streamlines the decision making and information sharing process
within the UN system. In most modern integrated UN missions at least several different UN
departments are participating. The JMAC might be used as a tool to avert a waste of resources
by decreasing redundancies. If the JMAC works properly it coordinates efforts between different
departments, thus minimizing the risk that any two departments are doing the same (UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006).
However, because the UN is an institution organized in departments according to their
function, the process of integration is not an easy task. Some departments are quite unwilling to
subordinate their interests to the interests of the overall organization. They fear that by doing so
they will lose importance and valuable resources (Pelz & Lehmann, 2007, p. 2). If these
problems are not resolved before the JMAC is assembled, there could be problems further down
the line.
52
Another issue the JMAC is facing is the way it is treated by the UN leadership. If the UN
leadership treats the JMACs as personal information tools, most of their potential is wasted,
especially once the mission is under way and the field commanders need information to
successfully conduct their operations (Franco, 2009, p. 7f). On the other hand, if the JMACs are
not equally accepted by all participating departments, their positive effects on the mission are not
utilized. There is definitely a tendency towards that, because the JMACs were created after the
DPKO demanded that they need better intelligence support (Ngulube, Hagglund, Erskine, &
Tubman, 1995, p. 20f). As a result, many civilian UN departments are reluctant to send
personnel to work in the JMACs.
In general, the JMAC concept has the potential to one day fulfill the role of an
intelligence capability for peacekeeping missions. So far, it has shown its potential within the
setting of a peace operation, but the task of also providing strategic intelligence for the upper
management level is likely to cause discussions of where in the chain of command the JMACs
should be located. If the location stays within the DPKO chain of command, the concept could
be further developed into an intelligence entity for peace operations. If the UN leadership
decides to take the JMACs out of the DPKO in order to make them more appealing to the
civilian departments their value for the commanders of the peacekeeping troops might be limited,
but the improved strategic intelligence for the upper management of the UN could lead to major
improvements in the planning process of peace operations. How the intelligence process within
the UN could be improved and the role open source intelligence (OSINT) might play in will be
discussed in Chapter 3.
53
Chapter 3
The Use of Open Source Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping Missions
For the UN, the problem with intelligence is twofold. On the internal level the use of
intelligence capabilities on all levels is controversial. On the tactical and operational level, the
field commanders are on their own, either having to use whatever intelligence their troops can
produce or being at the mercy of technological more advanced member states like the US and
their willingness for intelligence support. On the strategic level the members of the Security
Council have to rely on the information their own intelligence services produce which they
cannot or will not share with the other members for fear of compromising sources or collection
technologies.
Another issue here is the difference in intelligence capabilities. The US as the sole super
power left has the most advanced collection methods and invests the most money in its secret
services. However, after UNOSOM II, the US has not sent many troops to participate in UN
peace operations.15 After 9/11 with two wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, the possibility
for an increase in US participation in UN missions is basically non-existent. On the other hand,
countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan are sending the most peacekeepers, but their troops rely
mostly on intelligence support from more advanced countries. The question is whether countries
like the US are willing to divert their resources in assistance of foreign UN troops, giving those
countries basically a free ride.
15
According to numbers published by the Henry S. Stimson Center, US troop contributions to UN peacekeeping
missions at the end of 2005 totaled 308 (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2005).
54
One solution to this predicament could be Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), the use of
openly available information for UN purposes. The use of OSINT is not a new concept and it
has been used successfully in the past.
OSINT in a Historic Context
Openly available information has been used by military intelligence in the past. One
impressive example of this is the Japanese intelligence effort during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-05. At the outset of the war, the Russian Far East Fleet was outnumbered by the Japanese
Navy. Not only did the Japanese have superior numbers, their ships were also more modern. In
order to defeat the Japanese fleet the Russian leadership decided to send the Russian Baltic Fleet
to assist in the conflict. The Japanese were able to follow the movements of the Baltic Fleet all
the way from St. Petersburg to Vietnam by utilizing information readily available in British
newspapers. Those newspapers reported continuously on the advance of the Russian fleet after
the Russians mistook a British fishing fleet at the Dogger Bank in the North Sea for Japanese
warships, sinking several trawlers in the incident. Because the Japanese new exactly when to
expect the Russian fleet, they were able to prepare for their arrival and achieved a decisive
victory (Jukes, 2002, p. 72ff).
During World War II, the Japanese themselves were the victims of open source
intelligence efforts. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) used publications and broadcasts
of warship commissioning in Japanese media to get an idea of the size of the Japanese naval
forces due to a lack of agents and spies in Japan.
55
OSINT defined
Due to the availability of open source information, OSINT could be an easy, adequate
solution to the UN intelligence problem. But first the question what OSINT is needs to be
answered. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) defines open source
information as “publicly available information that anyone can lawfully obtain by request,
purchase, or observation. This includes almost all information on the internet, in newspapers,
scholarly or academic papers. OSINT is defined as intelligence “produced from publicly
available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2006, p. 8).”
NATO defines four different forms of OSINT. Open Source Data (OSD), Open Source
Information (OSIF), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and finally Validated OSINT (OSINTV), showing a progression of information through the intelligence cycle (NATO, 2001). OSD is
considered to be raw information from a primary source like photographs, tape recordings or
commercial satellite images. OSIF is considered to be generic information that is usually widely
distributed and already at least partially validated and filtered. OSINT describes the process of
information that has been “deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to a
select audience, generally the commander and their immediate staff, in order to address a specific
question (NATO, 2001, p. 2).” OSINT-V is the product of a validation process, either by using
classified intelligence sources or unquestionable open sources.
OSINT is not a process that stands by itself, it usually is part of an all-source intelligence
effort. In general, OSINT is considered to make up 80 percent of the information available to
56
intelligence analysts on developments outside of their home country (Hulnick, 2008, p. 3;
Deyevre, 2008). Considering this high percentage, the use of OSINT could be a viable option
for the UN to accommodate its need for intelligence without compromising its goal of neutrality.
OSINT can provide enough information on the political situation, the history of the
conflict, the conflict parties and regional powers to enable the Security Council to get a detailed
view of the conflict before drafting a resolution for a peace mission. Openly available
information can even enable the commander of the peacekeeping force to conduct what is called
„Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.‟ This is usually done to reduce “uncertainties
concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations (Fordham, 2000).”
With the tools available on the internet today, this can be achieved by using publicly
available information. For example, it is no problem to get detailed information on the terrain
the peacekeeping force will encounter in the target area. Geographic information such as maps,
infrastructure and terrain as well as and high-resolution satellite images are readily available
online for free or for a small fee on websites such as GoogleEarth. The fee for the commercial
version of GoogleEarth is currently US$400 (GoogleEarth: Explore, Search, and Discover,
2009). In connection with GPS systems, important buildings, crossroads or radio stations can be
easily found and marked before going in. Ten years ago, this could only be done by the US or
Soviet intelligence community which was the only entities with access to sufficient satellite
imagery.
57
Current Use of OSINT
Currently, OSINT is used successfully by various entities. The US intelligence
community and NATO, for example, are working hard on integrating OSINT into their allsource intelligence approach, thus recognizing the importance of utilizing public information and
making it possible to share parts of their intelligence with others.
The US intelligence community has always used OSINT to complement intelligence
gained by the traditional clandestine intelligence services. However, in 2006, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published a directive institutionalizing OSINT. The
directive established the position of Assistant Deputy Director of National Security for Open
Source, the National Open Source Committee and an Open Source Center (started in 2005). The
directive created a uniform open source strategy, policy and program guidance for the US
intelligence community. The Open Source Center creates reports, translations and analytical
products from publicly available information and makes those available to government officials
of all branches. It also assists other intelligence agencies to develop open source centers on a
smaller scale to improve their all-source intelligence approach (Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, 2006).
NATO is using OSINT to make intelligence sharing between its members easier. Up
until the end of the Cold War, most NATO members were fairly cooperative in sharing their
intelligence with other member states, because all of them had the same enemy and it was in
their best interest to let the other countries know what they deemed necessary. The fact that only
a few countries (Greece, Turkey, Western Germany and Spain) joined the organization during
the Cold War also helped in that respect. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO opened to
58
former Eastern Bloc states and in 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland “became the
first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO (NATO, 2009).” In 2004, seven more
countries joined the alliance, bringing the total number of members to 26.
Between the Cold War members and the new members a substantial technology gap
existed and still exists. The intelligence capabilities of the old members, especially the US and
the UK, were much better than those of the new members that were still in the process of
restructuring and modernizing their armed forces when they joined NATO. In addition, the US
Senate had an issue with the new member states‟ data security and counterintelligence systems.
The fear was that intelligence provided by the US could be compromised and might eventually
end up in the hands of hostile/enemy intelligence services (United States Congress, Senate,
2000). However, NATO leadership took and still takes the improvement of interoperability
seriously and works hard to improve it.
NATO held several exercises in 2005 and 2006 to test intelligence interoperability
between the member states. A Situation Centre (SITCEN) was established at NATO
headquarters in Brussels to fulfill three distinct functions. It is supposed to assist NATO
leadership in its consultation function, “to serve as a focal point within the Alliance for the
receipt, exchange, and dissemination of political, military, and economic intelligence and
information (NATO, 2002),” and to facilitate the sharing of intelligence between members. In
addition, NATO created a Intelligence Fusion Centre at the US airbase in Molesworth, UK, to
facilitate the sharing of intelligence between the US and the rest of the NATO members
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2006).
59
Another step to enhance information sharing between its members was the introduction
of the CENTRIXS system. The CENTRIXS system is an online platform aimed at enhancing
interoperability between multinational partners (Boardman & Shuey, 2004, p. 2). This system
gives military members of different countries a secure way of communicating. They can access
the system via satellite or by using an ordinary landline. It is also not only in use at NATO any
more. By August 2008, the system had been opened to various other countries (Brannon, 2006).
The US Navy, for example, uses it during its biennial RIMPAC exercise. In this exercise, navies
from all allied Pacific Rim nations usually take part.
However, the CENTRIXS system is not an OSINT system, but it has the potential of
being used in peacekeeping missions. The US Navy just introduced the Indonesian Navy to the
system with the goal of improving their logistics system in case of another natural disaster in the
area (McLendon, 2008), so the system probably does not give its users access to sensitive, top
secret material.
NATO also operates a peacekeeping section that is supposed to provide “conceptual and
technical strategic planning and advice on peace support operations (NATO, 2002).” It is also
tasked with developing a joint Alliance policy on peacekeeping. In those functions, the
peacekeeping section keeps in close contact with other international organization like OSCE,
UN, UNHCR and OHR.
The Use of OSINT in the EU and NATO
In the course of its unified security and defense policy, the EU Military Committee
installed an intelligence division to deal with intelligence requirements for EU-led security
60
missions. In case of security missions that are using any NATO equipment or assets, the default
location for the operations center will be at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe
(SHAPE) in Mons/ Belgium. The EU intelligence division is getting finished intelligence
products from EU member states which it turns into intelligence products that can be
disseminated EU wide. In order to produce the best, non-biased intelligence possible, the EU
intelligence division corroborates the intelligence it gets with openly available information from
the EU‟s Joint Situation Center, Policy Unit and the EU Commission (Vas Antunes, 2007).
However, OSINT only plays a supporting role.
At first glance, it does not seem clear why the UN should look at NATO in order to solve
its intelligence problem. NATO is a military alliance, the UN is not. However, being a military
alliance seemingly makes NATO an expert in all military matters, including intelligence
gathering, but surprisingly, NATO is not an expert in intel gathering at all. On the contrary,
NATO does not have an intelligence gathering capability of its own, just like the UN. NATO
leadership is also dependent on intelligence its members provide. In order to fill eventual
information deficiencies, NATO installed an OSINT system to utilize publicly available
information.
NATO has published three works on OSINT in 2001 and 2002 that could be used as a
guideline or basis for a future UN OSINT system. The main work is the NATO OSINT
Handbook (NATO, 2001).16 This publication explains all aspects of OSINT concerning military
use. This basic work was supplemented by two others, the NATO Open Source Intelligence
16
To access the Handbook online, go to http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/
030201/ca5fb66734f540fbb4f8f6ef759b258c/NATO%20OSINT%20Handbook%20v1.2%20-%20Jan%202002.pdf.
61
Reader (NATO, 2002)17 and the NATO Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet (NATO, 2002).18
The supplemental reader contains papers and articles from world-wide experts on how open
information can be integrated in an intelligence product. The third publication is the most
specific of the three as it exclusively deals with the exploitation of one source of open
information.
NATO officials recognized the importance of OSINT for their operations. They call it
the major new "force" in 21st Century Information Operations (IO) in connection with the
internet. A lesson learned from the NATO involvement in Bosnia also included in the Handbook
is that NATO acknowledges the fact that in post Cold War operations have changed dynamics of
command & control and information, especially humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. These
operations are most likely outside of the NATO sphere of influence and need detailed
information about “infrastructure, demographics, health, and other matters not traditionally
addressed by classified information collection operations (NATO, 2001),” but can be adequately
addressed through OSINT.
The Handbook also recognizes the importance of OSINT for coalition operations. It
enables all participants, insiders and outsiders to operate using a similar level of information.
According to NATO, OSINT is actually an integral part of an all-source intelligence model. The
SACLANT Intelligence Branch calls OSINT a “vital element of the all-source intelligence
process” that has been neglected for “too long (NATO, 2001, p. 36).” To illustrate the
importance of OSINT for the all-source intelligence process, NATO developed the following
17
The NATO OSINT Reader can be found online at http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/
030201/254633082e785f8fe44f546bf5c9f1ed/NATO%20OSINT%20 Reader%20FINAL%2011OCT02.pdf.
18
This work can be accessed online at
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/030201/1c0160cde7302e1c718edb08884ca7d7/
Intelligence%20Exploitation%20of%20the%20Internet%20FINAL%2018NOV02.pdf.
62
figure which depicts OSIF and OSINT as the basis for an all-source intelligence analysis. Using
the NATO model as a foundation, the UN could be able to form a proper working intelligence
capability. But as Figure 2 shows, there will still be the need for traditional intelligence
operations to complement the OSINT process and to provide the UN with the best intelligence
possible.
Figure 4: Open Source – All Source Relationship (NATO, 2001)
Intelligence Support for the UN
OSINT is something the UN could conduct by itself without having to rely on outside
help. Most of the information needed is readily available on the internet. OSINT might be able
to provide the UN with the necessary intelligence to warn of possible conflicts or humanitarian
catastrophes to give the UN enough time to intervene. It should also be good enough to assist
the UN leadership in planning interventions and peace or humanitarian operations. It can also
provide an enormous amount of information on the target area for the commander of the
63
peacekeeping force so that he can prepare his troops as best as possible. Once the troops are on
the ground, however, OSINT usually reaches its limitations. For the successful conduct of the
mission in the target area, more than OSINT is necessary.
With most peace operations so far, the UN has almost completely relied on outside help
for intelligence support of its missions. In most cases the troop contributing countries also
provided the intelligence for the commanders in the field. During the earlier peace operations
this used to be no problem, because the US, Britain, France as members of the Security Council
were not supposed to send combat troops. They provided the financial and logistical support,
including intelligence support, to peace operations (Baker, 1994). Because of this, it was no
problem for the combat troops to get the necessary intelligence support that they needed. But
things have changed, and today most troops in peace operations come from poor countries like
Bangladesh. Some of these countries send their troops to UN missions so that the UN will pay
for them and their home government can save the money. Generally these troops are also poorly
equipped and do not possess the ability to conduct intelligence operations other than patrolling or
interviewing refugees on their own. More than ever do they rely on countries like the US to
provide them with the intelligence they need.
In the light of these problems, the UN will have to think about how to get the necessary
intelligence support for its peace operations. With two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US will
probably not send any troops to peace operations again anytime soon. So, the commanders of
peacekeeping forces will not be able to rely on the American contingent among their troops to
conduct local intelligence operations for the rest of the force. Considering the reluctance of the
Russians or Chinese to actively engage in UN peacekeeping, it seems unlikely that they might be
willing to assists the UN in intelligence matters.
64
However, there are several possibilities that exist. The French, for example, suggested
that the UN get an intelligence satellite, paid for by the international community, so that it can
conduct its own intelligence (Herman, 1997, p. 364). Considering the sentiment against
intelligence within the UN, though, it seems highly unlikely that this idea will ever be realized.
And having one satellite to monitor the currently sixteen peacekeeping missions would probably
not be enough. The US was estimated to have about six imaging satellites in orbit before the
year 2000, but planned to increase that number by several dozens (Silber, 1999) and that before
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan even started. These numbers suggest that the best way for the
UN would be to cooperate with the US.
Improvements to the UN Intelligence Process
After the failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, the UN realized that there was a need
for better intelligence, but still called information. The first step was to establish the Lessons
Learned Unit within the DPKO. Its task was to examine past peace operations and to assess
what worked and what went wrong in order to improve future missions. The results were quite
obvious. Whatever went wrong in peace operations, it could almost always be traced back to a
lack of information, be it strategic for the planning process or operational/tactical for the conduct
of the mission. Most failures could be attributed to a lack of information.
The notion of a lack of information was further reinforced by the Brahimi Report. Its
main recommendation for the secretary-general was that the UN could not afford to act on barely
any information and that it needed to improve the quality of information at every level. A first
reaction was to establish JMACs and JOCs to improve the integration of all participating UN
65
departments in a particular mission and to streamline the process of information gathering. In a
second step, the UN needs to decide how it wants to get the information it needs. The decision
will probably be between intelligence support by member states, most likely the US, the
development of an own intelligence capability out of the JMACs by using OSINT or a mix of the
two.
But first, the UN has to decide where to get intelligence support for its missions from and
what kind of intelligence they need/want. Naturally, when it comes down to military matters, the
first look goes towards the militarily most powerful country, which currently is the US. The US
would be willing to provide intelligence support to UN missions, especially if the conflict is also
affecting US national interests. In order for a close cooperation to work, there are several issues
that the UN needs to work on beforehand.
The UN needs to create an entity within the institution that provides it with an adequate
intelligence basis, making sure that they do not solely rely on the US support. Using the NATO
model for OSINT and applying this model to the JMAC idea could lead to an effective solution
to that issue. A solid intelligence basis of its own would also help the UN to avoid creating the
impression that it is no longer neutral but a US run institution, which could happen if the UN
relied too much on US support.
For the US to consider supporting the UN with intelligence, the UN also needs to
improve its accountability, communications and information security system (Knutsen, 2008).
So far, consensus within the UN was that in order to show all parties in a conflict that the UN is
neutral all of its communications in the field had to be done over open, non-secure lines. The
reasoning behind this was that this would prove to the conflict parties that the UN was not taking
66
sides or spying on any of them. For the UN to receive sensitive information from the US, it has
to change that practice, because the US will not take the risk that its sources or technology might
be compromised in an UN operation. This could easily be done by providing the peacekeeping
troops with secure communication gear that is commercially available. Some of those
commercial communications gears are so secure that even the NSA is having trouble breaking
the codes and is thus actively involved in creating US encryption standards (Barker & Kelsey,
2007).
Additionally, the UN could introduce its own classification system for intelligence. For
example, sensitive information could be classified as secret and only the UN Secretariat and the
troop commanders in the field would have access to it and non-sensitive information and OSINT
could be classified as general information and be made accessible to everyone. The fear of
intelligence being compromised is a leftover from the Cold War, when the US did not want to
share its intelligence with the UN for fear that the Soviet Union might be able to figure out US
collection methods and technology and develop countermeasures. Even with the Soviet Union
gone, there is still much mistrust going around. The war in Bosnia is a good example for that.
There the US was even hesitant to share intelligence with some NATO allies. They feared, for
example, that the French would share information with the Serbs, because they traditionally had
closer ties to them than to the other conflict parties going back to World War I (Wiebes, 2003).
The US also feared that what the Serbs knew, the Russians would eventually get to know,
because they were the Serbs only ally and that had to be prevented, so, in the end, there was only
limited intelligence sharing between the US and the French.19 But if the UN would standardize
19
The fears that the French would share intelligence with the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbia proved to be justified. In
1998, a French army officer working at NATO Headquarters in Brussels was arrested on suspicions of spying for
Serbia, informing the Serbs on possible targets of NATO airstrikes (Truehart, 1998).
67
its treatment of intelligence and would increase the accountability, the US could share at least
some intelligence with the UN.
The US has already started to implement OSINT into its all-source intelligence plan.
Most intelligence agencies have established a capability to utilize OSINT to their advantage.
These capabilities could easily be used to help the UN with necessary intelligence. The DNI‟s
office officially coordinates the collection of OSINT within the US intelligence community and
should therefore have the newest and best intelligence available. The ODNI in this function
could also coordinate US intelligence support to UN peace operations. In certain cases, the
ODNI could also enhance the quality of the intelligence gained from openly available
information by including some intelligence that was collected otherwise without telling the UN.
Burying this intelligence in OSINT would enable the US to provide the UN with timely quality
intelligence without the risk of compromising important sources or technologies.
The newer forms of UN peace operations where the UN authorizes another international
institution or a regional power to conduct peace operations for them require a different approach
from the US. In this case, the US will have to amend existing bilateral treaties on information
sharing to include peace operations conducted by the country in question. It would not be
feasible in this instance to first share the information with the UN Secretariat, because the
Secretariat is not directly involved. However, this approach could also cause some resentment
within the UN Secretariat since the field commanders would have a better level of information
than the authorizing institution.
There are some issues the UN should take seriously, though. Using the US as its primary
partner and provider of intelligence means that the UN Secretariat will be walking on a thin line.
68
If member countries or parties in a conflict the UN is intervening in feel that the UN is too
dependent on the US, the principle of neutrality of the peacekeepers could be jeopardized,
endangering the troops. On the other side, as long as the US is the world leader in intelligence
production and basically the only country willing to help the UN, the Secretariat has little choice
than to depend on US support.
Forms of US Intelligence Support
There are several ways the US could help UN forces with intelligence support. They
could provide tactical intelligence for early warning to protect UN troops from attacks. The US
could provide operational intelligence to troop commanders helping them achieve their mission
objectives easier and with minimal casualties.
Tactical intelligence for the UN troops on the ground could help them achieve the goals
specified in the mission mandate easier. For example, the British troops in Bosnia that were
charged with protecting UNHCR supply convoys could have used this kind of intelligence to
their advantage. The effective use of ground radar, SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT could have
helped them avoid roadblocks or troop concentrations and they could have planned to evade
unwanted encounters much easier and more supplies would have reached the people in need with
much less casualties.
This approach also has a positive side effect. If countries are contemplating whether to
send additional troops to assist a peace operation or not, news that the troops already there are
able to effectively and, more importantly, safely conduct their missions could very well
determine whether those countries will send troops or not. The US is able to provide this
69
intelligence without difficulty. Most US military detachments have their own SIGINT/EW
group assisting with warning of imminent hostile operations.
The US could also provide remote sensor equipment such as drones. These drones are
currently used successfully in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to track down insurgents in remote
parts of the countries. The use of these drones would greatly enhance the possibilities of UN
peacekeepers to monitor their designated area of operation. In connection with aerial
reconnaissance/ patrols and IMINT conducted by satellites huge areas could be covered in
relatively little time without endangering any of the peacekeepers. The peacekeepers would only
have to put themselves at risk if the monitoring of the area records suspicious activity that needs
to be verified or stopped. Also, if the UN troops are supposed to do convoy duty delivering
humanitarian aid, the commanders could plan the routes the convoys should take around possible
obstacles like enemy roadblocks, minefields or destroyed bridges to minimize risk and maximize
the amount of relief delivered.
The most important point in using aerial reconnaissance like drones and satellites is cost.
Using drones instead of airplanes is much more cost efficient. Maintenance costs are generally
lower and the staff to operate and maintain the drones is much smaller than the one needed for an
airplane (Wingfield, 2009). If necessary, the drone can be operated by a pilot sitting at a desk
somewhere in the US. The drones also do not need excessive infrastructure. Whereas modern
aircraft need at least a landing strip and a hangar for maintenance, the drones can be started from
almost anywhere where there is a small flat piece of ground. Using satellites that are already in
orbit circling earth is also not too expensive as long as the course of the satellite does not have to
be changed for taking the pictures. In addition, the huge area that can be covered using aerial
reconnaissance helps cutting cost when it comes down to troop size. Instead of having to have
70
enough troops to patrol the whole area of operation, the peacekeepers would only need a small,
highly mobile force that could reach any point quickly once a suspicious activity is detected.
In general, the UN has several possibilities of how to get its intelligence. It could
develop its own intelligence capability using the NATO model for utilizing OSINT. The UN
structure with field offices in almost every country and its ability to go almost anywhere in the
world forms an excellent basis for that. The introduction of JMACs for peace operations also
goes in that direction depending on how far the UN Secretariat is willing to take this concept.
On the other hand, the UN could also try to cooperate with the US more closely, acknowledging
the fact that the US has the most extensive intelligence community in the world. In this case the
UN needs to greatly improve its information handling and security system. Necessary steps also
need to be taken to make sure that the UN will not be perceived as a US puppet.
Conclusion
Intelligence in peacekeeping operations is a complex and controversial issue. There is a
large variety of literature on peacekeeping. The bulk of that literature does not specifically focus
on the intelligence component of the missions, though. At first glance, this seems quite odd
considering the importance of intelligence to regular military operations. On closer examination
however, the reasons for that become clear.
First, initial operations by the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s were exclusively
observer missions. Their task of observing and patrolling an area by using air and ground patrols
and the frequent use of observing positions essentially made these missions intelligence
missions. After all, observation and reconnaissance are basic elements of intelligence gathering.
71
This did not change much throughout the Cold War unless the mission in question was a
humanitarian effort. Considering the omnipresence of intelligence, it becomes less surprising
that most authors concentrated on other features of peace operations, like whether they were
successful or not.
Second, there was no need for extensive intelligence operations during traditional peace
operations. The main reason for tactical and operational intelligence is force protection.
Because UN forces were only deployed when all parties to a conflict agreed to their presence,
there were no threats to the security of the troops. The most important issues UN commanders
faced were to make sure that no side of the conflict violated the terms of the treaty that was
signed before the UN deployed the troops.
And finally, the UN itself did not want to have anything to do with intelligence for the
longest time, because they were influenced by the negative connotations that clandestine
intelligence operations had and, to a certain extent, still have. This view did not change until the
1990s, with the start of large scale peace operations in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Somalia
(UNOSOM I & II). Both operations were conducted as if they were the same small scale
operations than before, with little or no intelligence preparation and support. As a result, both
operations suffered major setbacks and catastrophes. In Bosnia the Srebrenica massacre and in
Somalia the slaying of eighteen US Army Rangers in Mogadishu were direct results of bad or
missing intelligence, which eventually led to a change in the perception of intelligence in peace
operations.
The importance of finding a good classification for peace operations is a direct result of
the issue mentioned above. Additionally, the evolution of peace operations from observer
72
missions and traditional peacekeeping to second generation or wider peacekeeping to third
generation peace operations is also parallel to the development of intelligence requirements of
the troops.
In traditional peacekeeping, the main mission of the UN troops was essentially passive.
They were to deploy in between warring factions and keep them apart to prevent hostilities to
resume. There was no threat to the security of the troops as long as they stayed in their zone
along the demarcation line. The job of the troops was to monitor both sides and to report
suspicious behavior.
In second generation or wider peacekeeping, the intelligence requirements changed
drastically. The change from staying neutral and no use of force whatsoever to defense of the
mandate even by use of force together with dropping the requirement of consent of all conflict
parties to the presence of the UN force before its arrival necessitated a completely different
intelligence approach. Now there was a need for strategic intelligence preparation of the mission
as well as an intensive tactical and operational intelligence effort to prevent casualties and to
ensure the success of the mission. Unfortunately it took the tragedies of Srebrenica and
Mogadishu to hammer that point home within the UN. The US in Somalia and NATO in Bosnia
had already seen the need for a different approach to intelligence, but within the UN their efforts
went unheeded at first. Afterwards, the UN Secretariat saw the need for changes and installed a
commission to come up with suggestions. The resulting Brahimi report stressed the need for
intelligence support for peace operations which changed the perceptions of the issue slowly.
Now the question was what to do about intelligence. Should the UN develop its own
intelligence capability or agency or should they find other ways of achieving the goal of
73
comprehensive intelligence support for peace operations from the planning to the final stages of
the mission.
Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was the first to recognize the importance of
information. He tried to streamline the flow of information from local UN offices in countries
all over the world to the UN Headquarters in New York to enable the UN Secretariat to make
decisions based on good information without being dependent on what the member states
provided. To make this process more efficient, he founded the Office of Research and
Collecting Information (ORCI) in 1988. His successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali quickly shut the
ORCI down after noticing that it was not working very well. Mr. Boutros-Ghali assigned the
task of information collection to the newly founded Department of Political Affairs. To ensure
the quality of the information produced, he also started a training program for the employees
assigned to the department.
Recently, the UN greatly improved its ability to process information to use for peace
operations by establishing Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) in peace missions. These
centers have the potential of being developed into intelligence support centers. Their success
mainly depends on what the UN Secretariat is planning on doing with them. If they use them as
a tool to keep the secretariat informed they would curtail the enormous possibilities of the
JMACs for peace operations. Linked correctly with intelligence agencies of member states or a
UN owned intelligence entity, these JMACs could be developed into a powerful intelligence
authority. But to realize the great potential of the JMACs, the UN needs to decide how it wants
to generate the intelligence it needs for its peace operations. Do they want to start their own
intelligence agency, do they want to keep relying on members to provide intelligence support or
are they going for a mix.
74
The obvious choice would be to keep relying on intelligence support from member states,
especially the US. This would not require much change from the existing structures. The only
requirements would be to sign a bilateral treaty with the US government, to install a classifying
system for intelligence and to get secure communications gear for the peacekeepers.
A radical change from the status quo would be to start an intelligence agency or
department. This department could rely almost completely on OSINT to provide sufficient
intelligence for the UN Secretariat for planning and executing peace operations. The advantage
would be that the UN would not have to rely on anyone else to get the necessary intelligence.
And the UN would not have to establish the department from scratch. It could adopt the NATO
model for OSINT generation and sharing. For intelligence generation in the field, the UN could
ask the troop contributing countries to equip their troops with intelligence capabilities much like
American troops.
A mix between both extremes would probably work best. NATO and the US have
already realized the enormous potential of OSINT and have integrated it into their respective
intelligence structures. NATO even considers OSINT to be the basis for all-source intelligence
gathering as the model in Chapter II illustrates. This intelligence is easy to share since it should
not be classified by NATO or the US. For specific tasks the US or any other UN partner could
still enhance the intelligence picture generated through OSINT with some intelligence generated
through clandestine means. If they would just mix that information in with their overall
intelligence report the probability that any sources or technologies might be compromised are
almost non-existent.
75
Examining the different kinds of UN peace operations and how their intelligence
requirements are fulfilled creates the impression that the UN has made great strides towards a
comprehensive solution to the intelligence needs for its missions. The invention of the JMAC is
a great first step in implementing intelligence into the UN peace operations approach. In a next
step the UN will have to decide on how it wants to get its intelligence and then implement it
consequently. How this will turn out remains to be seen, but there is definitely reason for hope.
76
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