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The New England Journal of History, Vol. '70, No. 2
The New England Journal of History, Vol. 70, No. 2
could better negotiate separation from the union, and thus end the
Civil War. Instead of looking at secession as some sort of blind, romantic “lost cause,” Schoen presents it as the strategic calculation it was.
He lays the basis for understanding that secession came from an offensive (not defensive) and materialist (not idealist) aim at advancing the
American South’s interests in a global framework, making his book a
thoughtful and reasoned examination of this part of our history.
Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War:
Trilateral communist relations in the 1.950s.
By Shen Zhihua (translated by Neil Silver).
New York: Routledge, 2012. 249 pages (hardcover).
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Fleming’s book, in contrast, can be difficult reading (indeed, for
this reviewer, too arduous to finish). His anecdotes from history, while
sometimes interesting, are hard to follow as a coherent argument. The
overall effect of A Disease in the Public Mind is an impression rather
than an argument—an unsupported premise that the Civil War could
have been avoided if cooler heads had prevailed. Instead of an analytical summation, Fleming ends with a lament: “If only Lincoln had
lived to serve out his term. . . .” While his book consistently shows the
strength of his knowledge of history, it is just as consistently befogged
by distracting and tedious dreams of what might have been.
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George Goss is an adjunct instructor at Dean College. .
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Elaborating on his decision to translate Shen Zhihua’s 2003,
Chinese language book Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, Neil Silver
explains that he is intrigued by Shen’s “non-ideological, realpolitik
analysis,” which broke new ground in the treatment “once sensitive
and even taboo topics.” Elsewhere in the book, Shen’s seminal work is
hailed as breaching “mainland Chinese taboo on publishing non-heroic accounts of the Korean War.” Silver characterizes the bestseller as
crossing “the line between scholarly monograph and popular history.”
In a personal context, reading Silver’s translation provoked
somewhat mixed feelings. VVhen I first read Shen’s original 2003
Chinese work, I was awed by the historian’s mastery of Soviet sources;
but I did scribble in my note cards one critical observation: Mao didn’t
come off too badly. He is a patriot. Somehow, that comment did not
seem significant at the time. Now, upon re-reading Shen’s work in this
new English edition, one comes away with the strong feeling that a
creeping “triumphant” interpretative undercurrent is at work.
In fact, one could argue counter intuitively that the popularity of Shen’s book was not due to its breaking alleged sensitive taboos,
but because it fitted very neatly within a category of Chinese books
that depict an ultimately “heroic” Chinese Communist Party leadership—albeit in a sophisticated manner, without the usual cumbersome
ideological baggage. According to this narrative, the arduous trials and
tribulations of early C.C.P. leaders were explicitly tied to practical,
nationalistic considerations; ideological concerns were mere appendages. Such an interpretative mode was made explicit in China’s recent
National People’s Congress (2012), where references to the philosophy
of Mao Zedong were downplayed.
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Ironically, as noted by Silver (and affirmed by another mainland historian, Yang Kuisong), for all Shen’s expertise and verve in
handling Soviet sources, the book exhibits much more vividly the deliberations of Chairman Mao with his politburo over the fateful decision to enter the Korean war. Kim Il-Sung, Syngman Rhee—even
Stalin, unwittingly—become secondary characters in Shen’s narrative.
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The New England Journal of History, Vol. 70, No. 2
The New England Journal of History, Vol. 70, No. 2
. ___u.. . .
The result is a picture of Mao as “heroic” as the famous image Mao goes
to Anyuan, drawn by Liu Chunhua during the Cultural Revolution.
Stalin is cast as a foil to the nationalistic Mao. Interestingly,
Mao explained the “difficulty” of his 1950 trip to Moscow, to negotiate
a Sino-Soviet treaty, in nationalistic terms: “China’s non-Communist
democratic parties opposed the visit, since, according to tradition, ‘foreign barbarians’ always came to pay tribute to the Chinese emperor,
not the other way around.” Under the treaty’s conditions, the Soviets
would continue their control of Port Arthur and preserve their extraterritorial privileges in Manchuria. In return, China gained Soviet financial loans and technical aid. Stalin further arm-twisted Mao into
signing the secret‘“Additional Agreement,” which banned any foreign,
“third-country” commerce and capital in “Soviet Far East and Central
Asia, and in China’s Northeast and Xinjiang.” Furthermore, only when
Stalin was firmly convinced of Chinese sincerity, after they paid amply
in blood during the Korean War, did the Russian leader turn on the
spigot of Soviet aid. The picture, primarily, is one of Mao toiling away
for China’s interests against an intransigent ally.
The Soviets’ involvement in the Korean War was nothing short
of Machiavellian. In October 1950, Stalin told the increasingly desperate Kim Il-Sung, who was losing ground to the Americans and the
South Koreans, to look to the Chinese for help. Although Shen objectively states that China’s results on the Korean battlefield would not
have been achieved without Soviet military assistance, he leaves no
doubt that Mao’s decision to send in volunteer troops was made without firm promises of aid from the Soviets. This is another implicit compliment to Mao, highlighting his faith in China and his faithfulness to
their unappreciative North Korean ally.
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“compensatory measure to foster this traditional Russian strategic aspiration,” meaning an ice-free port in Northeast China. “As a result,”
Shen writes, “the Korean issue found its way onto Moscow’s agenda
and Stalin’s map. The Soviet need to strengthen its hold in Asia thus
led it to a firmer confrontational mood toward the United States.
Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral communist relations in the 1950s suffers from a few missed opportunities. Shen provides some alluring analysis of the Korean Communist Party based on
Soviet sources, but seems to stop short of the full treatment (the leader
in examining North Korea’s motivations remains Bruce Cummings).
While Shen’s use of Chinese and Soviet sources to map the contours of
the Korean Communist Party is provocative, he leaves much room for
elaboration— and for further studies by future scholars with the appropriate linguistic abilities. Furthermore, one would have liked to see
an engagement with Historian Chen Jian’s interpretation-—emphasizing the importance of ideology in Mao’s calculations —which is currently dominant. Although Shen quotes from Chen Jian’s work from
time to time, there is no attempt at serious debate.
Neil Silver’s translation is beyond reproach, and the impressive endnotes show his herculean efforts in tracking down sources,
making this Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War a pertinent volume for
all research libraries. Its iconic status in the field of Korean War conflict, Cold War studies, and East Asia relations means that students for
years to come will continue to debate and discuss the points brought
alive by Shen Zhihua.
Pang Yang Huei is a Lecturer at Singapore University of Technology and Design.
Nonetheless, Shen does frame his interpretation of the Korean
conflict within the broader the Cold War context, and is persuasive
in his analysis of Stalin’s calculations in Europe and Asia. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Stalin’s focus was Europe, and when direct confrontation proved untenable for Russia, due to an assured firm
American response, Asia provided a window of opportunity. As Shen
writes, “In the early postwar years, Soviet policy sought to limit confrontation and conflict to the lowest possible level.” A couple of factors
forced Stalin to “recalibrate” his calculations: one was the success of
the C.C.P. in capturing power in China. Another was Stalin’s need for
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