Offering Guideposts for Reform Efforts:
Lessons from the Agrarian Reform Program in the Philippines
VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES
ROLANDO G. LIBROJO
JANE LYNN D. CAPACIO
Department of Agrarian Reform / Land Bank of the Philippines
Paper prepared for presentation at the
“2016 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY”
The World Bank - Washington DC, March 14-18, 2016
Copyright 2016 by author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice
appears on all such copies. . The views expressed in this paper are not statements of policies of
the organizations of which the authors are a part of.
Abstract
The implementation of the agrarian reform program in the Philippines could offer numerous
lessons for future reform initiatives. The major lessons are on setting objectives, checking
assumptions, implementing program mechanisms and following reform models. This paper
also offers insights on the some of the effects of colonial institutions on property rights
governing agrarian lands. It likewise discusses the implications of implementing a reform
program based on a compromised piece of legislation. As it looks on hindsight into the longrunning Philippine agrarian reform, it offers an analysis of what worked, what did not, why
and what policy and program takeaways could be gleaned.
Key Words: Agrarian reform, lessons, implications
I. Introduction
The six-year term of the current Philippine administration will end on 30 June 2016. One of the
promises of the President was to implement agrarian reform by completing its land acquisition and
distribution component. Efforts were made to achieve this promise and the goals of the program.
Lessons could be gleaned out of this experience and could be shared as guideposts for implementing
future reform efforts.
If the lessons that are available today were known six years ago, many formal rules,
implementation mechanisms, and informal efforts would have been done differently. This paper is a first
attempt at distilling thoughts and initial conjectures and offering them as lessons.
However, this paper also takes a bolder step by recommending ways forward for addressing a
burning issue in the Philippines: How to address rural poverty and promote inclusive growth. This issue
is a concern given that despite good economic performance, sections of the population, particularly those
dependent on agriculture, remain poor.
This paper is organized as follows. The second part provides a background on the Philippine
agrarian reform program including the nature of the lands that were covered and the agencies that are
involved. The third part traces the roots of the agrarian reform program and offers key ideas on the
effects of colonial institutions. The fourth part summarizes at least ten of the lessons that were gleaned.
The fourth part offers ways forward for helping address rural poverty.
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II. Background on the Philippine Agrarian Reform Program
The Philippines has been implementing land reform for decades. The first land reform measures
sought to regulate tenancy in rice lands starting with Commonwealth Act 4054 (Rice Share Tenancy Act
of 1933) which was subsequently amended by in 1946 by Republic Act 34 and then by the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199). The scheme for distributing agricultural public land was
mandated by Republic Act 1160 otherwise known as the NARRA Law of 1954. Retention limit for
ownership of private agricultural land was first imposed by the Land Reform Act of 1955 which set the
limit for the ownership of rice and corn land to 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for
corporations. This retention limit was reduced to 75 hectares (though last in the order of priority)by the
Code of Agrarian Reform of 1963 (Republic Act 3844). The law also abolished share tenancy. Republic
Act 6389 passed in 1971 created the Department of Agrarian Reform. Presidential Decree (PD) 27
compulsorily mandated the distribution of tenanted private rice and corn lands to landless agricultural
tenants and lessees. RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law sought to transfer land
ownership of all public and private agricultural lands, regardless of crops planted, to landless farmers and
farmworkers. The latest, RA 9700, changed some implementation mechanisms, extended the budget
authorization and implementation of R.A. 6657 until June 2014. At present, the program continues to
cover the remaining target landholdings (“History and evolution,” n.d.). Beginning 1972, when rice and
corn lands were covered until the present, the Philippines has been implementing one of the longest
agrarian reform programs in the world.
Two different departments distribute land under the agrarian reform program: the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The DENR distributes public alienable and disposable (A & D) lands suitable for agriculture
through the processing and issuance of Free Patents and Homestead Patents. As well, the DENR allocates
select forest lands/areas suitable for agro-forestry by means of stewardship through the issuance and
award of Certificates of Stewardship Contract (CSC) for individual occupants, and Community-Based
Forest Management Agreements (CBFMAs) for communities/groups. Thus, under the DENR’s land
disposition function, the government recognizes and confirms the rights of farmer-beneficiaries who are
actual occupants/tillers over the public agricultural lands.(DENR, 2003)
The Department of Agrarian Reform is mandated by law (Republic Act 6657 as amended) to
redistribute private agricultural lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement. However, DAR also administers and
disposes all cultivable portions of the public domain declared as alienable and disposable for agricultural
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purposes which were transferred to it by the DENR and other government agencies and those foreclosed
by the national governments and government financial institutions. Moreover, the DAR also administers
and distributes public agricultural land in settlement areas which were administered by predecessor
agencies of the DAR.
The acquisition and distribution of private agricultural land may be compulsory or it may be
voluntary. Government compensates the landowner at government-determined prices although the courts
have final determination of just compensation when valuation of the acquired land is challenged.
Beneficiaries repay government at subsidized prices. The landowner has retention rights, that is, the
landowner can retain five hectares(seven hectares in the case of tenanted rice and corn lands) and three
hectares for every direct heir who are actual tillers of the land.
There are two voluntary modes for the acquisition and distribution of private lands:
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) in which the landowner voluntarily offers to sell the land to
the government at government-determined price. The land is then distributed to beneficiaries
who pays government for the land;
Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme (VLT/DPS) in which the landowner sells
the land directly to preferred beneficiaries. The role of government role is only to recognize
the sale as an agrarian reform-related land transfer. Since the transfer is agrarian reformrelated, the transferee does not pay capital gains tax. Land survey and titling cost is borne by
government.
There are two compulsory modes of acquisition and distribution of private agricultural lands:
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) for tenanted rice and corn land. This is governed Presidential
Decree 27 (PD 27), the 1972 agrarian reform program instituted by the dictatorial regime of
Marcos. The land title given to beneficiaries is known as an Emancipation Patents (EP); and
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) for all other private lands for expropriation. This is governed
by the 1988 law (Republic Act 6657) which mandated the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The land title granted to beneficiaries is called a Certificate of Ownership
Awards (CLOA). (CLOAs are also the land titles given to beneficiaries of voluntary modes of
private land acquisition and distribution as well as to beneficiaries of DAR-distributed public
agricultural lands.)
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Beneficiaries may be given individual titles (the EP or CLOA is in the name of the beneficiary) or
collective titles (the CLOA is in the name of a group of beneficiaries). Collective CLOAs may be granted
to several individuals as co-owners or to the organization/cooperative of a group of beneficiaries.
To see the extent of the agrarian reform program, we must necessarily look at Philippine land
data. The Philippines has a total land area of 29.8 million hectares of which 14.2 million hectares are
classified as alienable and disposable (Table 1). In terms of land use, 9.67 million hectares of Philippine
land are used for agricultural purposes1 of which 9.16 million hectares are planted to permanent and
temporary crops: 4.936 million are arable (planted to temporary crops and 4.225 million hectares are
permanent croplands.(Table 2).
Table 1: Philippine Land Classification (2014)
(in hectares)
TOTAL PHILIPPINE SURFACE AREA
Land
30,000,000
29,817,000
Inland Water
183,000
LAND CLASSIFICATION
CERTIFIED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE (A & D)
14,194,675
FOREST LAND
15,805,325
Unclassified Forest Lands
Established Forest Reserves
Established Timberland
755,009
3,270,146
10,056,020
National Parks
1,340,997
Military, Naval and Civil Reservations, Fishponds
1,724,150
Source. FMB-DENR
Table 2: Philippine Agricultural Land, 2002
(in hectares)
TOTAL PHILIPPINE LAND AREA
29,817,000
AGRICULTURAL LAND (2002 Census of Agriculture and Fisheries)
9,671,000
Arable Land (Planted to Temporary Crops)
4,936,000
Permanent Cropland (Planted to Permanent Crops)
4,225,000
Permanent Meadows and Pastures
Covered by Forest Growth
Others
129,000
74,000
307,000
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
1
Data on area of agricultural land is based on the 2002 Census of Agriculture and Fisheries and therefore refers to actual use
without consideration of zoning or classification (as A&D or non A&D).
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From 1972 (the first year records were kept) up to the end of December 2014, the agrarian reform
program was able to distribute almost 4.7 million hectares of land. Of the lands distributed through DAR,
2.59 million hectares were private agricultural land while 2.11 million hectares were public agricultural
lands (settlements, landed estates from former friar lands, government-owned lands, public agricultural
lands turned over to it through presidential proclamations or those turned over by the DENR and other
government agencies). Moreover, the DENR distributed 2.49 million hectares of public alienable and
disposable land suitable for agriculture. In addition, the DENR allocated to beneficiaries 1.042 million
hectares of select forest lands/areas suitable for agro-forestry by through the grant of Certificates of
Stewardship Contract (CSC) for individual occupants, and Community-Based Forest Management
Agreements (CBFMAs) for communities/groups. (see Table 3 below)
Table 3: Coverage of the Philippine Land Reform Program
(in hectares)
DAR WORKING SCOPE (Estimated Land Area Targeted for Distribution by DAR)
Private Agricultural Land Targeted for Distribution by DAR
3,220,514
Non-Private Agricultural Land Targeted for Distributed by DAR
2,165,445
DAR ACCOMPLISHMENT (Total Land Area Distributed by DAR (1972-2014)
4,691,175
Private Agricultural Land Distributed by DAR
2,584,902
Non-Private Agricultural Land Distributed by DAR
2,106,273
DAR BALANCE (Lands Still To Be Distributed as of end 2014)
Private Agricultural Land Still To Be Distributed by DAR
5,385,959
694,784
635,612
Non-Private Agricultural Land Still To Be Distributed by DAR
59,173
DENR TARGET FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A & D LAND
3,370,217
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LAND DISTRIBUTED BY DENR (as of 2014)
2,490,218
DENR TARGET FOR CBFM ALLOCATION
1,162,805
ISF/CBFM Areas Allocated by DENR (as of 2014)
1,042,634
Sources: DAR Field Operations Office; Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
By the end of 2014, land distributed by agrarian reform already covers 24% of the country’s total
land area, 50.59% of its alienable and disposable land, 74.26% of agricultural land and 78.39% of land
planted to temporary and permanent crops. (See table 4) There is, however, a caveat to DAR’s reported
accomplishment. We are now finding out that some of the reported distribution accomplishment are in
fact classified as timberland. Some of the collective titles distributed include roads, creeks, rivers, etc.
which should have been segregated and not included in the collective titles.
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Table 4: Land Area Covered By Land Reform vis-a-vis Philippine Land Area
(in hectares)
TOTAL PHILIPPINE LAND AREA
Total Area of Alienable and Disposable Land
29,817,000
14,194,675
Total Area of Agricultural Land
9,671,000
Total Area Planted to Permanent and Temporary Crops
9,161,000
TOTAL LAND AREA TARGETEDFOR DISTRIBUTION BY AGRARIAN REFORM
8,756,176
Private Agricultural Land Targeted for Distribution
3,220,514
Public Agricultural Land Targeted for Distribution
5,535,662
TOTAL LAND AREA TARGETED FOR DISTRIBUTION BY AGRARIAN REFORM AS PERCENT OF
Total Philippine Land Area
29.37%
Total Area Of Alienable And Disposable (A & D) Land
61.69%
Total Area Of Agricultural Land
90.54%
Agricultural Land Planted To Permanent And Temporary Crops
95.58%
TOTAL AREA LANDS ALREADY DISTRIBUTED BY THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (as of
end December 2014)
7,181,393
Private Agricultural Land Already Distributed
2,584,902
Public Agricultural Land Already Distributed
4,596,491
TOTAL AREA LANDS ALREADY DISTRIBUTED BY THE AGRARIAN REFORM AS PERCENT OF
Total Philippine Land Area
24.08%
Total Area Of Alienable And Disposable (A & D) Land
50.59%
Total Area Of Agricultural Land
74.26%
Agricultural Land Planted To Permanent And Temporary Crops
78.39%
Sources: DAR FOO, FMB-DENR, PARC
Reported land distribution accomplishment by DAR constitutes 87.1% of its scope or target for
distribution while DENR accomplishment constitutes 73.89% of its target for distribution. Overall, the
agrarian reform program is reported to have distributed 82% of its target for distribution.
An analysis of the land distribution accomplishment reveals that of the land area covered by
agrarian reform by both DAR and DENR(8.756 million), 63.22% (5.5 million hectares) are public
agricultural land. Only 36.78% (3.2 million hectares) are private agricultural land. The DAR, whose
primary responsibility should have been the distribution of large private landholdings, has a working
scope (i.e. estimated area for coverage under agrarian reform) in which only 59.8% (3.22 million
hectares) are private agricultural land. (Table 5)
Around 20% of private land covered by agrarian reform remains undistributed. Of the total
private agricultural land distributed to beneficiaries, only 36.13% were acquired through compulsory
modes of acquisition. Private land totaling 453,796 hectares are still to be distributed through compulsory
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modes of acquisition. (Table 5) This indicates that, in the past, priority was given to easily distributable
lands: government-owned lands and Voluntary Land Transfers leaving lands subject to Compulsory
Acquisition which is more contentious and more tedious for later acquisition and distribution.
Table 5: Private Lands Covered by Agrarian Reform
(in hectares)
TOTAL PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND TARGETED FOR DISTRIBUTION BY AGRARIAN REFORM
3,220,514
TOTAL AREA OF PRIVATE LANDS DISTRIBUTED BY DAR, (1972-2014)
2,584,902
Distributed through Voluntary Mode of Acquisition
1,480,060
Distributed through Compulsory Mode of Acquisition
933,998
Land Foreclosed by Gov’t Financial Institutions
170,845
DAR BALANCE (as of beginning January 2015)
635,612
For Distribution through Voluntary Mode of Acquisition
165,836
For Distribution through Compulsory Mode of Acquisition
453,796
Land Foreclosed by Gov’t Financial Institutions Still for Distribution
15,979
Source: DAR Field Operations Office
III. Agrarian Reform, Property Rights and Colonial Institutions
The agrarian reform program and the property rights regime for agricultural land in the
Philippines could be traced to colonial institutions. Unfortunately, the colonial institutions perpetuated
inequalities through expensive, lengthy and opaque policies, programs, and legal procedures.
The Spanish colonizers imposed the Regalian Doctrine where the state owned all the land and it
has the monopoly power to grant or recognize private ownership. With the Regalian Doctrine, any legal
rights to land or any other natural resources were taken from the natives and “the only way to reacquire
sovereignty was to get it back from the colonial usurpers” (Lynch, 2011). To be able to access land and
natural resources, the natives need to purchase or request a documented property right from the Spanish
regime or its state successors. Most of the rural poor failed to do this and as a result, only those who could
afford and those who had educational background, received land. Huge lands were given to Spain’s loyal
subjects or cooperators in their colonial enterprise such as religious orders.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) studied the different types of colonization policies,
which created different sets of institutions. In Spanish and Portuguese colonized Latin America, Asia and
Africa, the aim of the colonization was to obtain gold and other valuables. The Spanish crown granted
rights to land and labor (encomienda) and they set up a mercantilist system of monopolies and trade
regulations. The aim was to extract resources from colonies.
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The American colonizers distributed large tracts of land including friar lands. They also issued
land titles. However, they based the distribution and titling of lands based on occupancy. This pushed
the occupants with limited resources and the non-occupants, in essence, those who have no access to
courts and surveyors, to the hinterlands or to become farm laborers.
After independence, efforts were made to distribute agricultural lands to tenants and farmworkers
and to award stewardship contracts to forest dwellers and indigenous peoples. By this time, however, the
Regalian Doctrine still theoretically prevails in the thinking and attitude of policymakers (Lynch, 2011).
To this day, the Philippine government still serves as the institution that recognizes and hands out private
property rights. This is despite the 1909 US Supreme Court ruling that reaffirms the doctrine of native
title (Insular v. Carino) and the 2000 Philippine Supreme Court decision that affirmed the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (Cruz v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Native titles recognize
that even before state formation, the land is owned by the “natives” or indigenous communities.
Moreover, the current property rights regime governing lands, which could be bifurcated between
forestland2and alienable and disposable land, show inequalities which are exacerbated by overlapping,
complex, opaque and inaccessible institutions. Eventually, when native titles of the indigenous peoples
were recognized in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the communal titles that were issued, in many
cases, overlapped with the agrarian reform titles, forest stewardship contracts, pasture lease agreements,
mineral production sharing agreements (MPSA) and other instruments that may grant usufructuary rights
(and not necessarily ownership)and other land tenure instruments. This is partly because the cadastral
survey is yet to be finished3 and the forest lines were unchanged even after many decades. Partly, it is
also because it is profitable for the perpetrators of the current institutions to make the system complex and
overlapping.
In Southern Philippines, large tracts of forested and agricultural lands were not distributed or
leased to the farmers and forest dwellers who occupied the lands. Eventually, these lands served as
rewards to cronies of elites through long-term timber license agreements. Some of these logged-over
lands were released for private ownership. In some areas, these lands were leased out by the government
for agri-businesses. Upon the passage of the agrarian reform law, these lands were subjected to redistribution. The coverage in many of these areas was contested and most of the original occupants or
farmworkers felt that they were dispossessed with the entry of other farmers. The whole system was
complex and to claim ownership or possession required huge financial and transaction cost.
2
3
Lands classified as forest reserves, timberland, national parks, fishponds and military, naval and civil reservations.
Cadastral survey delineating political boundaries was finished only last year. Parcel mapping has yet to be completed.
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Worse, there are approximately 755,009 hectares that remains unclassified non A&D land, 55%
of which are in the Southern Philippines. Unfortunately, these lands are currently occupied by forest
dwellers, landless farmers, indigenous peoples, and other occupants who do not have any ownership or
possessory rights. It could be surmised that no significant investments were made on these lands and
thus, these were not optimized to their maximum potential.
It could be seen that the current property rights regime for agricultural land is rooted in colonial
institutions that perpetuated inequalities. This echoes Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) who
noted that the colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence. They offered three
possible reasons. First, setting up institutions that limit government powers and enforce property rights is
costly. When new elites are bequeathed with extractive, colonial-based institutions, they usually do not
want to incur the cost of introducing better institutions. Instead, they prefer to exploit the existing
extractive institutions. Second, when the size of the ruling elites is small, each will have a larger share in
the revenue of extractive institutions and thus they have a larger incentive to perpetuate the said
institutions. Third, if the elites or the agents made irreversible investments that complement a particular
set of institutions, they will wish to support these, making these institutions persist. For instance, agents
who invested in physical and human capital will be in favor of putting resources on enforcement of
property rights.
IV. Guideposts for Reform Efforts
A. The social justice goal and the breadth and width of the latter agrarian reform programs
The agrarian reform program in the Philippines has a triple goal: a) to restitute social wrongs so
lands were given to tillers or the farmworkers, b) to reduce rural poverty by working towards making the
awarded land productive and income-earning, and c) to diffuse wealth thereby achieving a stable society.
This was the reason why agrarian reform could be found in two articles in the 1987 Constitution, namely:
Social Justice, and National Economy and Patrimony.
An analysis of the land distribution accomplishment reveals that of the land area covered by
agrarian reform by both DAR and DENR is 8.756 million (see Table 2). Of this, 63.22% (5.5 million
hectares) was assigned as the DAR’s working scope. In the DAR target, around 2.3 million hectares are
public lands and around 36.78% or 3.2 million hectares are private agricultural land.
The laudable goal of restituting social wrongs needs to be distilled. This goal is consistent with
the acquisition and distribution of private land.
There was a need to impose social justice by
redistributing large private landholdings to be able to have an equitable distribution of ownership. In
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public lands, we strengthened the farmers’ occupancy by recognizing their possession. This should have
been clear in the law.
In a sense, restituting social wrong as an objective was watered down by the general framework
of giving land to the landless. The distribution of public lands was included in the agrarian reform
program; this is despite the non-applicability of the goal on restituting social wrongs in these governmentowned lands.
For public lands, the possession or occupancy of landless farmers should be recognized
and afterwards, their property rights must be secured. But the coverage of these public lands should have
a utilized a different, better-targeted program or instrument. Moreover, there were existing laws that
mandated the grant of public lands to those willing to develop the land, the Public Land Act. The grant of
public lands to beneficiaries (whether done by DAR or DENR) was merely a process of legally
recognizing the possession of actual tillers in these public lands or opening up undeveloped A & D lands
for development and cultivation of those willing to do so.
To restitute social wrongs, the agrarian reform law should have mandated only the acquisition
and distribution of private lands, especially large private agricultural lands. But the law included public
lands particularly DAR absorbed the functions of predecessor agencies that distribute public agricultural
lands and opens up settlements for cultivation. This need not have been a problem by itself if there is a
clear poverty focus and an understanding of its impact. Because of the inclusion of public lands in DAR’s
working scope and the emphasis on numbers (distributed hectares) in measuring the DAR bureaucracy’s
accomplishment, the DAR personnel focused on the distribution of public lands where processes are
shorter and easier rather than on the distribution of private lands where processes more tedious and
contentious.
Thus, by 2014, 20% of private lands in the DAR’s working scope remains undistributed (refer to
table 3 for DAR balance). Worse, the lands for distribution under compulsory acquisition were left
behind. Of the 1.4 million hectares of private lands targeted for compulsory modes of acquisition (under
PD 27 or RA 6657), only around two-thirds (933,988 hectares) were distributed in a span of more than 25
years. About 0.45 million hectare remains undistributed. Of those that remain undistributed, around
250,000 hectares are large landholdings of 25 hectares and above.
On this note, it could also be seen that if the agrarian reform laws are compared, Marcos’s PD 27,
which covered private and tenanted rice and corn lands was more focused and more aligned to the social
justice goal than the latter laws, which were comprehensive and included the distribution of public
agricultural lands.
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B. Design Should, As Far As Possible, Be Based on Accurate Data
To an extent, the misaligned goal on restituting social wrongs could also be traced to the lack of
available and accurate data during the program’s design phase.
Evidence-based policy design and
program implementation should have been the basis for targeting, benchmarking as well as in monitoring
and evaluating results. The importance of having accurate data cannot be overstated. For example, the
existence of a database of poor families would be essential for the successful implementation of a
conditional cash transfer program. Similarly, an accurate database of private agricultural lands that can be
covered by a land reform program is key to its successful implementation.
This is one major flaw in the design of the Philippines’ land reform program. The Philippine’s
land registration and administration system was (and in many ways, continues to be) antiquated and
disjointed.
Thus, the DAR encountered difficulties in establishing a landholding database. The
inadequacy of available landholding data was a major flaw in the design of the Philippines’ land reform
program and hampered implementation in the years that followed.
First of all, landholding records are fragmented. There is no single government agency in the
country that maintains complete records of all landholdings. Instead, different government agencies keep
different kinds of records. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and its Registers of Deeds in various
parts of the country keep records of titled properties. Until recently, there was no centralized database of
all titled properties. And until now, the LRA cannot determine the total area of all titled properties. The
DENR and the LRA have copies of approved survey plans but the DENR itself does not know which of
the survey plans resulted in the titling of the land. The LRA and the DENR does not have information on
which of the titled properties are used for agricultural purposes. This information is with the various
assessors’ offices in the provinces and municipalities have tax declarations and tax maps. But, land use
information filed with the assessors’ offices are self-declarations of owners or claimants of the land.
Most of the land records are not updated. Many of the titles and survey plans are still in the name
of the original landowners even if they have long been deceased and the properties have been subdivided
among the heirs. In many other cases, several land transactions have already occurred but the titles
remain in the name of the original owners because most of the transactions are not registered. There are
also instances of duplicate titles covering the same properties. This can happen when original titles are
not cancelled before the issuance of new titles.
In 1987 when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation 131 and Executive Order No.
229 instituting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, CARP scope (target for coverage) was
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initially estimated to be 9.7 million hectares with 10 million agrarian reform beneficiaries. This increased
to 10.3 million hectares and targeted beneficiaries declined to 3.9 million in 1989, a year after enactment
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) issued these estimates using the 1980 Census of Agriculture as basis.
In 1992, towards the fourth year of CARP implementation, the incoming DAR administration
realized how difficult it was to do realistic planning and programming in the absence of a reliable
landholdings database. DAR launched the CARP Scope Validation Project, which established a
comprehensive CARP database. Initial results in 1994 indicated that the estimate of total scope decreased
by more than 2.2 million hectares to only 8.1 million hectares. DAR’s jurisdiction went up to 4.29
million hectares (53%) while DENR’s share went down to 3.77 million hectares (47%). Further
adjustments were made when DAR conducted its Inventory of the CARP Scope starting 2006. This again
changed and at present, total CARP scope is around 9.2 million hectares, 5.4 million hectares are under
DAR and 3.8 million hectares are under the DENR.
Demographic data was also not considered in the crafting of the land reform program. In 1972,
when Presidential Decree 27 was promulgated, the Philippines was estimated to have a rural population of
25 million. In 1988 when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was instituted, Philippine rural
population had risen to 31.5 million (WDI, 2015). By 2010 rural population stood at 54.7 million (PSA,
2013) which is double that of the 1972 rural population. In contrast, agricultural land area in 1980 was
estimated at 9.7 million hectares which increased to 9.97 million hectares in 1991 but currently is
estimated to be 9.67 million hectares. There has, thus, been no substantial increase in agricultural lands
over the years while rural population has increased substantially. Thus the land reform program cannot,
by itself, be a solution to rural poverty. There is just not enough land for distribution to landless farmers
and rural workers.
C. The Underlying Assumptions of a Reform Program Should Be Thoroughly Analyzed
The agriculture policies and programs in the Philippines assumed that agriculture development is
most effective and efficient under a centrally-planned economy. As such, for the longest time, inputs
were provided to farmers, prices of farm goods had floor, and tariff for entry of goods were high. There
were no clear targets on who should have received the subsidies and benefitted from price ceilings. This
was due to the lack of a clear agricultural policy that has a poverty focus (elaborated in Lesson E). It
could be argued that if at all, the target of some of these interventions should be the smallholder farmers
particularly the agrarian reform beneficiaries. In any case, clear exit mechanism should have been put in
place.
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The land reform program had several assumptions, too. One of its assumptions is that most, if not
all, the agricultural lands to be distributed are tenanted and as such, the policies and processes apply more
to tenancy rather than on the task of distributing private large estates. When the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program was implemented in 1988, there were four types of land: tenanted private agricultural
land, plantations in private lands, plantations in public lands and government-owned lands. The tenurial
arrangement and production processes in each are different. Necessarily, the process of distribution would
have to be different.
A case in point is the process of identifying beneficiaries and assigning the farmlot that each
would have. It is simple in tenanted lands. The farmlots are clearly delineated in tenancy/leasehold
arrangement. The DAR need only to determine which tenant is cultivating which portion of the land then
have the parcels surveyed and titled under the name of the tiller. The situation is very different with
plantations. Farmworkers in plantations have no defined parcels of land which they till so farmlot
allocation is determined either through consensus of beneficiaries or through random selection. Since
there would be parts of a plantation that are more desirable than others (nearer the road or more fertile, for
example), lot allocation sometimes become contentious. Moreover, the law says that regular farmworkers,
seasonal farmworkers and temporary farmworkers can be beneficiaries and therefore, it often happens that
each beneficiary will receive a parcel of land which is of uneconomic size. Then there is the question of
the selection of beneficiaries.
Moreover, it is also assumed that the land administration system is functional. To this day,
however, land administration institutions remain disjoint. No one in government actually knows the area
of titled properties in the Philippines. The Land Registration Authority has a record of all active land titles
but not total area these covers4. The delineation of the country’s forest line was completed only recently
but is awaiting the passage of a law. Many classified forestlands or timberland are actually being
cultivated or used for residential purposes. The solution to this is the passage of a National Land Use Law
(to define the utilization of A & D lands) hand-in-hand with the passage of the Forest Limits Act (to
delineate the forest line and define the utilization of non-A & D lands. Sadly, the proposed national land
use law has been languishing in Congress for two decades. The Forest Limits Act which was filed last
2013 is likely to wait until the convening of the next Congress in July 2016.
In addition, the crafters of Republic Act 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 assumed that the distribution of tenanted rice and corn lands had, for the most part, been completed
4
Titling of land parcels was done at the various Registers of Deeds (RODs) in different parts of the country. Until 2009, there
was no central repository of land records. The Land Registration Authority has started the digitization of land records so there
will be a central database of land registration records. The digitization process is still ongoing though scheduled to be
completed soon.
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by the previous law, Presidential Decree 27, which had been in operation since 1972 during the
incumbency of the Marcos regime, sixteen years before the 1988 law. This proved not to be the case. It
turned out that this was not the case. PD 27 did indeed say that tenants and leaseholders of rice and corn
land are deemed owners of the land they till. However, titles (called Emancipation Patents or Eps) were
not issued to many beneficiaries since PD 27 provides that these titles will be issued only after
beneficiaries have fully paid. Thus by the end of the Marcos regime, only around 15,000 hectares have
been issued Emancipation Patents. The 1988 law provided that titles will be issued to beneficiaries after
completion of the acquisition process but will be held in trust by the Land Bank of the Philippines while
the beneficiaries are paying amortization to the Land Bank. Thus, in the immediate succeeding years after
1988, the DAR rushed the completion of documentation and issuance of titles. In the six years of the
administration of President Corazon Aquino, titles (EPs) for 359,000 hectares of tenanted rice and corn
lands were issued to beneficiaries. The rush in documentation resulted in problems that are still being
resolved today, the most serious of which is payment of just compensation to landowners whose lands
were acquired and distributed by the government. Until now, payment to former landowners of more than
270,000 hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands are still under process.
D. Overlapping laws and complex legal systems
What explains the shortcomings in the agrarian reform laws and programs, which adversely affect
the land tenure security and stability of smallholder farmers? One plausible explanation is the complexity
of formal rules.
Any law promulgated in a democratic society, most especially those that seek to change the status
quo, is a product of debate and compromise. The 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or Republic
Act 6657 is no exception. While land reform advocates got what they wanted (coverage of all private and
public agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced), the landowner
lobby got an implementation schedule that prioritizes public lands and lands subject to voluntary modes
of acquisition. The result is the non-prioritization of private lands subject to compulsory acquisition that
in turn resulted in a bureaucracy that got used to distributing lands that are easier to acquire and are noncontentious.
Old land laws retain residual powers over the new ones. The old laws were not necessarily
repealed and some of their sections were merely superseded, replaced, or amended in part by new
legislation. This results in a complex system of laws that are hard to navigate. For instance, laws enacted
in the last century are still used for land administration, with drastically different circumstances. Beyond
this, lands initially processed under a 1972 presidential decree were continuously covered under the same
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law even if a more comprehensive law, passed in 1988 (and amended in 1998 and 2009),was already in
place. To this day, outstanding issues from the 1972 law, including cases of undocumented landholdings
and unpaid landowners, are still being addressed.
Land and agrarian laws in the Philippines, in general, are intricate and confusing. An area could
be claimed as agricultural/agrarian land, indigenous peoples’ land, and protected site at the same time. In
some cases of this nature, the land was split and thus rules across boundaries are complicated.
It is becoming evident that one of the reasons for the complexity of laws and policies is the
layering of one formal rule over another. Layering, in this context, is the placing of new laws and policies
on top of the preexisting structures (Thelen, 2003). Hence, the stickiness of old laws, including their
blind spots, is incorporated into the new policies5.
E. Align agrarian reform and agricultural development to make a dent on poverty reduction
Beyond the restitution of social wrongs or undertaking redistributive reforms, the Philippine
agrarian reform program also intends to reduce poverty by making the awarded lands productive and
income-earning. In aiming towards diffusing wealth, it also aimed to contribute towards obtaining a
stable society.
Decades after, it has become clear that the goal on poverty reduction and improved income of
agrarian reform beneficiaries and other smallholder farmers is difficult to obtain. This section conjectures
a few reasons for the difficulty in achieving this goal.
Poverty reduction and income increase of agrarian reform beneficiaries do not rely exclusively on
land distribution. Land transfer was a necessary but insufficient factor. Receiving land creates
opportunities but not enough to reduce poverty or improve income. A big part rests in the country’s
agriculture vision, policies, programs and agencies.
Unfortunately, agriculture in the Philippines lacks a clear vision and policy which is solidly
linked to a) agrarian reform, b) trade and industry, and c) to overall economic growth. The conversations
on agriculture have always been on achieving food security and increasing productivity and thus, the
major programs and the budget are often heavy on research and development and other aspects that will
improve yield (e.g. rural infrastructure). On the surface, there is nothing wrong with this. However, the
5
Still, even if complex laws are there, there could still be administrative leeway. Appreciating that reform laws could be
compromised during policymaking, efforts could be made to fill the issues and gaps during implementation. In this sense, laws
that are relatively vague are preferred over very detailed pieces of legislation (see Lesson J).
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agriculture programs are not linked to improving the income of smallholder farmers; as such, the
productivity increases do not necessarily accrue to poverty reduction and inclusive growth.
Moreover, the agricultural vision and policy are also not linked to structural transformation; as
such, there is no blueprint for transforming agriculture to manufacturing and then to services. There were
no pro-active efforts at building industries and linking farmers with industries. Until recently, there were
no major efforts at mechanizing agriculture and setting up an environment conducive for generating jobs.
It is as if there are distinct silos that separate agricultural development, industrialization, and agrarian
reform. If at all, the plan for structural transformation, years ago, was to leapfrog from agriculture to
services. Landless rural workers and smallholder farmers who were low skilled and less connected could
not move out of agriculture. This lack of plan for structural transformation contributed to poverty being
largely rural.
For many years, the goal of agriculture was to obtain rice self-sufficiency and thus, the activities
and the budget were geared towards irrigating rice areas, improving variety and making sure that support
services are poured to enhance rice yield. This goal remains unachieved and may not have been an
excellent objective in the first place. The goal should have been in improving income and not only
production level results. Moreover, other crops and commodities that could have led to better smallholder
farmers’ income were not prioritized and amply supported by resources.
Part of reason was also the bifurcation of land reform and agricultural policy where one agency,
the Department of Agrarian Reform handles land distribution and provision of support services to
agrarian reform beneficiaries and the other agency, the Department of Agriculture (DA), sets crop goals
and handles other farmers’ farm concerns. This artificial demarcation between DAR and DA led to many
cracks that exacerbated the problems. The DAR needed to provide support services to beneficiaries
through farmers’ organizations that have at least 50% members who are land reform beneficiaries. The
DA puts land reform beneficiaries at the backburner of programs. Unfortunately, if one looks at the
budget, the DA’s resources are way higher the budget of the DAR, which already includes land tenure
services and for support services.
The cracks that were created by the demarcation between the DA’s focus on big, medium and
small farm owners and the DAR’s prioritization of land reform beneficiaries led to the non-prioritization
of landless rural workers. They fall into the cracks because they do not have lands and where they have
farm work, this is usually seasonal, informal, and insecure. Usually, landless rural workers are also not
organized leading to their further marginalization. The country’s non-inclusive growth largely accrues to
these farmworkers.
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It should also be noted that the concerns on the agriculture vision, policies, and programs are
exacerbated by the devolution of agriculture to local government units starting 1990. While land reform
was being implemented at the national level, agriculture was devolved to local government units and thus,
it was up to local chiefs to develop their own agriculture goals and initiatives and to provide budgetary
support. This led to the lack of prioritization and personnel for agriculture in numerous localities. This is
why in some areas, agricultural extension services are not even provided to smallholder farmers.
Knowing these at present, succinct lessons are reiterated.
Agrarian reform must be in sync with an agricultural vision and policy. This is the only way by
which poverty could be reduced. Receiving a piece of agricultural land is a necessary condition but
agricultural assistance to smallholder farmers is immediately needed. In a sense, agriculture will have a
clear poverty focus if it shows a bias for smallholder farmers.
But inclusive growth will not be obtained only by having an agricultural vision and having a bias
for smallholder farmers. Agriculture vision and policy should also be linked with the overall economic
goal. In this case, social transformation must be clearly articulated and provided with budgetary support
at the national and local government levels.
It must be noted that the 2011 to 2016 Philippine Development Plan provides an attempt to fuse
the goals and objectives of agriculture development, agrarian reform and environment when it states that
the “agriculture bureaucracy should be rationalized through the efficient and effective convergence and
complementation of the agriculture, agrarian reform and nature resources service agencies and related
offices by taking measures to sort out institutional overlaps.” However, this has not materialized.
F. Move on from a centrally-planned agriculture
Agriculture in the Philippines is still largely based on the framework of a centrally-planned
economy. This is most evident, among all crops, in the case of rice. To an extent, the government
controls the price and supply of rice and it imposes quantitative restrictions on the entry of imported rice,
even if rice is not the only crop in the country. In recent past, the government also provided various seeds
and fertilizers to farmers. This was done without clear exit mechanisms and thus, the farmers kept
waiting for the free inputs.
This incentivized and bred government corruption including a large
corruption case against select officials of the Department of Agriculture over a fertilizer scam.
In the past, there were also cases where government offices “organized” farmers into business
units and entered into agribusiness arrangements without the farmers’ real, prior, and informed consent.
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There were documented cases where the government enjoined the partnership between a farmers’ group
and a private investor without clearly explaining to the farmers the terms of the agri-enterprise agreement.
There were also cases where the collective land title was named to the farmers’ juridical entity even sans
careful discussion with the farmers.
Prior to this administration’s review of policies, agribusiness venture arrangements (defined as
agreements between farmers’ group/s and private investors), usually in the form of land lease, contract
growing, marketing agreements, are approved by the DAR, a government agency. The substance of the
contract, including details like price and volume of crops and timing of delivery are approved or
disapproved by the government. A few years later, intense conflicts arose out of these agribusiness
venture agreements. Among the disputes include loss of control of the land, price escalation, and contract
breech. At present, efforts are made to change the policy so it will focus on the government’s approval of
the process of agribusiness venture agreements (e.g. was consent given by all the stakeholders including
each individual farmer) rather than on the actual substance.
There is a need to move on from agriculture that is centrally-planned.
However, this
recommendation does not swing towards adhering to purely market-based agriculture or to an industryled program. One of the lessons from the last six years is the need to adopt a third choice, one that
borrows from the two extremes and creates a mix and match of options. This third choice should improve
the enabling policy including stabilizing the property regimes of farmers. Moreover, this track must be
based on a poverty reduction goal and be biased towards improving the bargaining power of smallholder
farmers.
In this track, the government provides public goods like farm-to-market roads and irrigation
facilities particularly in areas where these will be immediately used for the agri-enterprises of the farmers
and the private investors. The government also addresses the information asymmetry. But aside from
these, this track strengthens the bargaining power of the farmers’ organizations so these could compete in
the market and engage in contracts with private investors. This means building the capacity of farmers’
organizations and providing them with revenue-enhancing starter assets like farm machines and
equipment.
G. Carefully Examine the Reform Models
In most of the studies on agrarian reform, the Japan, South Korea and Taiwan programs are
offered as models of fast, efficient, and effective land redistribution. The Philippine agrarian reform
program is often compared to these models despite differences in overall turn out. Japan, South Korea
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and Taiwan swiftly implemented their land reform programs with Japan being the shortest (two years). In
the short span of time, these countries slashed tenancy in terms of the number of hectares and tenants. In
contrast, the Philippines has been implementing agrarian reform for 40 years from Presidential Decree 27
and 17 years from CARL. In its long period, land reform covered around 56% of the total alienable and
disposable land in the country whether these were tenanted or not.
These starkly different outcomes serve as puzzles given the striking similarities between the
formal rules that make up the property rights regime in the Philippines from those of Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan. The modeling could be seen on the rules on the identification of lands to be covered, the
selection of beneficiaries, the formula for land valuation, and the structures of governance. The details of
the agrarian reform programs of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were based on the work of Prosterman
(2007).
First, the land reform laws of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were largely land-to-the-tiller
programs fit for tenancy and not necessarily for plantation areas cultivated by regular and seasonal
farmworkers. In the Philippines, Presidential Decree 27, CARL, and the associated policies are mostly
geared towards land-to-the-tiller covering tenanted lands: the one tilling the land should be given
ownership over the cultivated land. In the Philippines, however, tenancy is only prevalent in many areas
in northern parts of the Philippines where the main crops were rice and corn. In other parts of the
country, the main produce were sugar and high-value crops and cultivation is through a plantation set-up
where landowners hire regular and seasonal farmworkers. The farmworkers do not attend to a specific
parcel of land but are paid wages for certain farm activities (e.g. planting, putting fertilizer, cleaning and
harvesting). The farmworkers only enter the plantation or the hacienda during certain periods. The
provisions in the CARL for implementing land reform in plantation areas, including beneficiaries
particularly in conflict situations is not very clear.
Second, Japan utilized village agrarian reform committees as mechanisms for implementing land
reform. The Philippines created barangay (village) agrarian reform committee for selecting beneficiaries.
There seems value with this mechanism given the need for local knowledge in redistributive reforms.
However, it has become clear that while the Philippine Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
is effective in tenanted lands, this mechanism fails in plantation lands. The village leader simply does not
know who are the regular and seasonal farmworkers who till the haciendas. In plantation areas, BARCs
could not be expected to effectively select beneficiaries. Up to the present, there is no effective
mechanism to strengthen or replace the BARCs in areas where these are not suited to select beneficiaries.
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Third, Taiwan’s land valuation formula shows a striking similarity with the land valuation
formula of Presidential Decree 27: Annual Gross Production x 2.5 Hectares x Government Support Price.
In the Philippines, this valuation was fixed even if farming seasons and market prices were different.
Since land valuation is a function of the court system, this formula has been a source of court disputes for
many years. At present, there are different jurisprudence on valuation and the wide discrepancies on the
rulings is becoming worrisome.
These are some of the implications of drawing inspiration from or transferring other models to the
Philippines. However, the extent and the other repercussions are not yet thoroughly studied.
H. Care Must Be Taken That Specific Aspects of Implementation Do Not Create Future
Problems Nor Negate the Goals of the Reform Program
In some cases, some aspects implementation would negate the some of the objectives of the
reform program. Or some implementation procedures create future problems.
This is the case for collective titles awarded by the DAR to agrarian reform beneficiaries. As a
background, out of 4.69 million hectares reported to have been distributed to beneficiaries from 19722014, around 2.146 million hectares or 45.75% of awarded lands were covered by collective Certificate of
Land Ownership Awards or CLOAs, the land title given to beneficiaries for distributed lands other than
tenanted rice and corn lands (Table 6). The awarding of collective CLOAs was prevalent in the 1990s
tapering off at the start of the new millennium. The present Administration discouraged the awarding of
collective CLOAs.
Some of these collective CLOAs were given to lands that are planted to crops more suited for
collective cultivation. In 149,826 hectares of collective CLOAs (6.98% of the total area of lands covered
by collective CLOAs), the beneficiaries prefer that their land remain under collective CLOA. What is
disturbing is that some collective CLOAs include areas not suitable for agriculture (roads, creeks, rivers,
marshlands, etc.) and areas that are not alienable and disposable (timberland, forest land and therefore are
not for distribution/titling. As of this writing, a total 114,632 hectares (5.34% of the total area of lands
covered by collective CLOAs) were found to be areas which should have been segregated and not
included in the collective CLOA. (Table 6) This is likely to increase. The DAR, in cooperation with the
DENR, is currently projecting all collective CLOAs into the land classification map in order to determine
the magnitude of the areas within these collective CLOAs which encroached timberland/forest land areas.
The issuance of Collective CLOAs was found to be a convenient way to abbreviate land
acquisition and distribution protocols and was a useful means to enable the DAR to award the land to
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beneficiaries pending resolution of certain problems. It was supposed to be just an interim measure.
However, since it could shorten the elapsed time of the land acquisition and distribution cycle by skipping
a major activity, it became an expedient strategy to fast track accomplishment. However, individual
titling did not begin immediately for two reasons. One, the landholding from which the collective CLOA
was awarded had already been booked as an accomplishment; there was very little incentive for the DAR
field offices to complete individual titling.
Second, there were no more funds for survey to subdivide the collective CLOAs into individual
farmlots. Only perimeter surveys were conducted preparatory to the issuance of the collective CLOA.
Oftentimes, there was not even a segregation survey (survey that will delineate portions of a land not
suitable for agriculture and will not be distributed to beneficiaries). It was only starting 1999 that the
problem was recognized and funds started to be appropriated for the subdivision of collective CLOAs. In
effect, the government spent twice for the individual titling of awarded lands if a collective CLOA was
awarded.
As of this writing, only 999,758 hectares of collective CLOAs have been subdivided into
individual CLOAs. (Table 6) Since the bulk of collective CLOAs were distributed in the 1990s, two
decades have passed and the DAR is having difficulty in subdividing these collective CLOAs. In those
two decades, a significant number of beneficiaries have died or have left their awarded lands. Therefore,
the process of subdividing the collective CLOAs necessitates the revalidation of beneficiaries, after which
the land had to be re-surveyed for individual titling taking care to segregate areas not meant for
distribution. This is akin to re-starting the process from the earlier stages of acquisition and distribution.
Table 6: Collective CLOAs Awarded (1988-2014)
(in hectares)
TOTAL LAND AREA DISTRIBUTED BY DAR (1972-2014)
4,691,175
TOTAL LAND AREA COLLECTIVE CLOA AWARDED
2,146,140
PERCENT OF DISTRIBUTED LAND WITH COLLECTIVE CLOA
Total Area Within Collective CLOA Found To Be Timberland, Forest, Watershed, Roads,
Creeks, etc. (Preliminary. Validation Ongoing)
Percent of Total Collective CLOA Land Area
Total Area Where Beneficiaries Prefer Collective Titles or Co-Owners Opt Not To Subdivide
(Preliminary. Validation Ongoing)
Percent of Total Collective CLOA Land Area
Total Area Already Subdivided to Individual Beneficiaries (as of January 2015)
Percent of Total Collective CLOA Land Area
45.75%
114,632
5.34%
149,826
6.98%
999,758
46.58%
Source: DAR Field Operations Office
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In the case of public agricultural lands, the award of collective CLOAs defeated the stated
purpose of recognizing or formalizing the occupancy of a farmer who is tilling a parcel of public land.
Until the collective CLOA is subdivided, property rights of the tiller/occupant will be unstable. This
discourages investment in the land. (This disincentive to invest is also true for collective CLOAs issued to
beneficiaries of private agricultural lands.)Almost half (49.82%) of distributed public agricultural land
was awarded collective CLOAs. Of the awarded collective CLOA from public lands, only40.21% has
been subdivided. (See Table 7)
A statistic that bears analyzing is the data that more than half of the beneficiaries of Voluntary
Land Transfers (VLT) were awarded collective CLOAs. One wonders why beneficiaries would consent to
collective titles when VLTs are supposed to be a transaction between willing landowners and landless
farmers who presumably are tillers of the land. Beneficiaries pay the landowners directly and so logically
would want an individual title for his/her land. Around 430,000 hectares out of a total of 835,000 hectares
of VLT lands are covered by collective CLOAs. Only half (212,000 hectares) have been subdivided to
individual farmer-beneficiaries.
Table 7: Collective CLOA Awarded by Mode of Acquisition
(in hectares)
Land Type/
Mode of Acquisition
Private Agricultural Land
Distributed
Land
(1972-2014)
Collective CLOA (CCLOA)
Awarded
Area
% of
Distributed
Not Yet Subdivided or Not
for Subdivision
Subdivided
Area
% of CCLOA
Awarded
% of CCLOA
Awarded
Area
2,584,902.42
1,096,865.95
42.43%
577,832.49
52.68%
519,033.46
47.32%
Tenanted Rice & Corn Land
592,637.30
186.44
0.03%
154.81
83.04%
31.63
16.96%
Land Foreclosed by Govt Financial
Institutions
170,844.86
124,262.42
72.73%
61,528.23
49.51%
62,734.19
50.49%
Voluntary Offer to Sell
645,474.52
405,977.80
62.90%
225,098.70
55.45%
180,879.11
44.55%
Compulsory Acquisition
341,360.67
143,536.88
42.05%
78,876.87
54.95%
64,660.01
45.05%
Voluntary Land Transfer
834,585.06
422,902.40
50.67%
212,173.88
50.17%
210,728.52
49.83%
2,106,272.23
1,049,274.05
49.82%
421,925.82
40.21%
627,348.23
59.79%
809,838.66
346,436.91
42.78%
136,066.25
39.28%
210,370.66
60.72%
81,441.23
11,935.63
14.66%
5,528.40
46.32%
6,407.22
53.68%
1,214,992.33
690,901.51
56.86%
280,331.16
40.57%
410,570.35
59.43%
4,691,174.64
Source: DAR Field Operations Office
2,146,140.00
45.75%
999,758.31
46.58% 1,146,381.69
53.42%
Public Agricultural Land
Settlements
Landed Estates
Government-owned Land
Total
Voluntary Land Transfer mode has been criticized as a wayof circumventing land reform because
the landowner can retain control over the land especially if the preferred beneficiaries are relative, close
friends and tenants unable to cut his/her relationship with the landowner. This is a loophole of the
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agrarian reform program. But equally disconcerting is that VLT rules allow the transfer of land below the
retention limit of five hectares. This is the only mode of acquisition that allows distribution of land below
the retention limit. Owners of less than five hectares of land can sell this to preferred beneficiaries without
paying capital gains tax. And government pays for the land survey and titling. This, thus, defeats the
purpose of distributing large landholdings. One can imagine the time, effort, and expense expended in
distributing these small landholdings when the DAR should have been concentrating on the distribution
of large landholdings. In some provinces, notably in the northern part of the Philippines, distribution of
private agricultural land was almost exclusively through VLT. (See Table 8)
Table 8: Area and Percent of Private Land in Selected Provinces Distributed Thru VLT
(Area in hectares)
Province
Private Land
Distributed thru VLT
Total Private Land
% of Private Land
Distributed
Distributed thru VLT
Abra
8,203
8,651
94.82%
Apayao
3,213
3,896
82.47%
Benguet
2,313
2,574
89.86%
Ifugao
5,588
6,513
85.80%
Kalinga
3,361
4,989
67.37%
810
858
94.41%
Nueva Vizcaya
8,072
10,320
78.22%
Quirino
6,126
8,810
69.53%
Marinduque
5,618
6,862
81.87%
Romblon
10,203
13,643
74.79%
Catanduanes
12,728
14,043
90.64%
Zamboanga Sibugay
13,195
15,717
83.95%
Lanao Norte
13,425
18,856
71.20%
Misamis Occidental
14,499
19,289
75.17%
Mt. Province
Source: DAR Field Operations Office
The fourteen provinces in the table above account for more than 107,000 of private lands distributed
through VLT. Two provinces, Bukidnon and Lanao Sur, which is in the top ten provinces with the largest balance of
undistributed land together distributed around 106,000 private lands through VLT. Bukidnon still has to distribute
more than 14,000 private land, half through compulsory acquisition. The other Lanao province, Lanao Norte, which
distributed 13,425 hectares through VLT still has 17,000 hectares to distribute, 12,000 hectares of which private
lands subject to compulsory acquisition.
I. Understand the capacity and absorptive capacity for reform efforts
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In the last six years, the administration implemented reform efforts to achieve the targets of the
agrarian reform program. It also implemented good governance initiatives aimed at curbing government
corruption.
One of the instituted changes is the linking of planning and budgeting. In the past, these
components, along with procurement, accounting, and auditing, were not systematically linked and
incentives were not based on an evaluation of the results from these linked components.
It has taken the bureaucracy a few years to understand, get handles on, and eventually go with
and implement the various reforms.
First, it was realized that the reform efforts, particularly the ones on good governance,
streamlined and tightened the processes in order to plug the leaks and remove inefficiencies. But capacity
building of the bureaucracy did not immediately accompany these reforms. People were looking for
handles on how to follow the reform efforts.
Second, absorptive capacity, defined as the ability to absorb, assimilate, and apply new
knowledge to attain organizational goals (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), was also low and it could not cope
with the fast paced reforms. The bureaucracy, the main implementers of the agrarian reform program, is
used to standardized programs and processes and it works fast with minimal deviation. It takes time to
implement changes.
The third point is related to the second, implementers that are used to silos resist reforms that
remove inefficiencies brought about by too many organizational compartments. Processes that overlap
are resisted and as such the linking of planning, budgeting, implementation, procurement, accounting and
auditing needed thorough explanation and time for assimilation.
J. Other lessons: Thoughts on the ideal reform law, working with the existing law, and the
need for data
The lessons from the agrarian reform program in the Philippines show that a targeted law is better
than a very comprehensive piece that has a very wide breadth and width. In this case, the Marcos-period
agrarian reform law that covered tenanted rice and corn land is better than the latter law, which covered
all lands whether these were tenanted or not or whether these were privately-owned or government lands.
However, a wide law where government agencies have flexibility in implementing the reform
program is more desirable than a law that is comprehensive in scope but very detailed in some aspects,
like the newest agrarian reform law. A reform law that has too much detail delimits the elbow room of
implementing agencies.
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It could be gleaned that it is important for reform laws to have a clear goal and a well-targeted
design. Beyond these, reform laws should be flexible where the details are left to the bureaucracy to steer
and implement. This is especially true since reform efforts are usually crafted in an environment of
political capture. A compromise law that has a lot of details is one that is very difficult to implement.
Still, even if one has a conflicted reform law, the bureaucracy should still be able to make do with
this law and implement the reform program. It should first cull the needed data for evidence-based
program setting. And then it should work within the available parameters, monitor and evaluate the
results and afterwards, recalibrate the program implementation.
A final note on data: It is not important to get all the data before a program is implemented.
Sufficient data, one that could support policymaking and program setting should be enough. But this data
must be correct and should stand scrutiny.
IV. Ways forward
This last part offers key ways forward. It is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive set of
plans out of the all the lessons that were gleaned; rather, it gives a few concrete handles that could address
some of the most glaring issues. This part has two discussion points: first, it offers short-term and longterm solutions that could be looked into and second, it offers concrete recommendations for reducing rural
poverty and addressing the concerns on inclusive growth.
Immediate and short-term changes need to be put in place. Credible and sufficient data should be
gathered and used as solid evidence for program enhancement, implementation and monitoring and
evaluation. But having credible and robust data are not enough. Improving a reform effort, like the
agrarian reform program in the Philippines, need to seriously consider factors like changing demographics
(e.g. aging farmers) and behavior of farmers. Insisting that support services programs must cater to the
beneficiaries is not recognizing that these beneficiaries have passed on or transferred their ownership.
Short-term changes are not enough. The lessons from the last few years show that silos inside the
Department of Agrarian Reform and silos among government agencies due to different mandates caused
cracks. The divide between the DAR and the Department of Agriculture and between the national and
local governments that implement agriculture programs do not contribute to improving the farmers’
agriculture income.
Digitizing the Land Registration Authority without changing the whole land
administration system caused delays. In this case, two sets of long-term, institutional arrangements are
proposed. These changes will force government offices to work together. These will also allow them to
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look at the overall land governance and agriculture policies and not just on their own mandates and
deliverables.
Land administration– It is important for three agencies to work together and not as separate units that
perform their own mandates. The agencies that handle land surveys, acquisition and redistribution of
public and private lands and land registration should be merged in one land administration and
management agency. This should also include the agency that handles the coverage and titling of
ancestral domain claims.
Agriculture and rural development – An agriculture policy and plan are needed to institute programs that
have a poverty reduction goal and a bias for smallholder agriculture. It is necessary for the Department of
Agriculture, the Support Services arm in the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Department of
Trade and Industry to work together to implement this agriculture blueprint.
An agriculture program that is focused on reducing poverty must be emphasized. Given that
poverty is largely rural, efforts should be made for programs to make a dent on rural poverty. This paper
surmised that the poorest in Philippine agriculture are the landless, seasonal, & unorganized rural farm
workers. They only have employment during critical season (land preparation and harvest) and they are
not in the priority of rural development agencies. The farmers who are in a better situation are those who
own land, feel secure about their land, members of organizations, and receive interventions from
government. Usually, these are small owner cultivators and agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Efforts should be geared towards improving the agri-based income of smallholder farmers and
landless rural workers. This could be reached not only through enhanced farm productivity or having
food security as emphasized by the Department of Agriculture. The goal is to see improved agri-income
and stretching it further, the objective should strive towards improved quality of life.
For landless rural workers, income and quality of life improvement could be achieved through
having better jobs, whether from agriculture or other sources. If these farmers are located in land that
could still be owned or possessed, then their land tenure should be improved. However, receiving land,
either through agrarian reform or other programs, should not be an automatic recourse for addressing
poverty.6
6
Giving all the landless farm workers a piece of land is not always the optimum solution. In fact, it may lead to making the land
size smaller, making it less optimal for cultivating different kinds of crops.
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Finally, it is also worth noting that most of the farmers’ households do not rely on agriculture
alone as their sole source of income.
Discussions with farmers reveal that agriculture is often
complemented with non-farm employment and in some cases, remittance. As such, agriculture is only
one of the many pathways out of poverty for poor people in rural areas. It is important for rural
development and inclusive growth interventions to be composed of agriculture and other means.
Agrarian reform and agriculture created opportunities for moving out of poverty. The long-term pathway
out of poverty is human capital improvement. Towards this, it is recommended that access to education
and health be further improved and programs like the conditional cash transfer be continued.
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