British Journal of Industrial Relations
42:1 March 2004 0007–1080 pp. 1–22
Is There a Third Way for Industrial
Relations?
Chris Howell
Abstract
There has been little systematic analysis of what the ‘Third Way’ means in the
sphere of industrial relations. This paper examines the record of the New
Labour government in order to evaluate the distinctiveness, innovation and
coherence of its industrial relations policy. It argues that many of the limitations of this policy result from the institutional context within which it was
introduced. In comparative perspective, Third Way industrial relations can be
thought of as a policy adaptation specific to centre–left governments in weakly
co-ordinated liberal market economies.
1. Introduction
While a great deal of academic attention has been paid to identifying and
evaluating the distinctiveness of the British ‘Third Way’ in areas of economic
and social policy (Hay 1999: 108–30; Panitch and Leys 1997: 250–7; Thompson 1996: 267–85), examination of industrial relations policy has tended to
be subsumed under the heading of relations between party and unions (for
exceptions see Crouch 2001; Wood 2000: 130–5; Undy 1999: 331–3). This is
equally true of comparative analysis. Limited scholarly attention has been
paid to the manner in which the transformation of the Social Democratic
Left has involved the articulation of new industrial relations projects. Thus,
while the evolution of centre–left economic policy has been a subject of great
interest, there has been considerably less interest in how class relations are to
be organized in the new political economy.
This paper addresses the question of whether there is, any longer, a distinctive centre–left form of industrial relations. Its focus is the industrial relations policy of the British Labour Party in government since 1997, but that
experience will be examined in comparative perspective, considering the
extent to which the emerging model of industrial relations in Britain shares
features with those of other centre–left governments. While this paper takes
Chris Howell is in the Department of Politics, Oberlin College, Ohio.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
2
British Journal of Industrial Relations
ideology seriously, recognizing the importance of competing ideological
projects in shaping public policy, it adopts a comparative institutionalist approach which examines the degree of coherence and fit among
political–economic institutions and the manner in which national institutional context shapes the political projects of governments. Such an approach
provides both an explanation for policy outcomes, and evidence of failure
to translate partisan rhetorical commitments and public policy initiatives
into a concrete institutional construction that, rather than relying on narrowly political accounts of government policy, is rooted in the institutional
configuration of capitalist societies.
The paper argues that a system of industrial relations relying more
heavily on regulation of the labour market via individual legal rights, enforceable through labour courts and state agencies, than on collective bargaining
is a distinctive feature of the British ‘Third Way’, echoes of which can also
be found on the policy agendas of other contemporary centre–left governments (such as the Clinton Administration in the United States, and Jospin’s
French Socialist government). However, in the case of New Labour, this
industrial relations project is institutionally incompatible with other features
of the British political economy, with the result that elements of industrial
relations policy have been subject to persistent erosion, and the goal of
fostering partnership through industrial relations reform is unlikely to bear
fruit.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the
uses of the term ‘Third Way.’ Section 3 surveys the main New Labour industrial relations policies since 1997. Section 4 examines whether those policies
can be considered distinct, innovative and institutionally coherent, while
Section 5 reintroduces a comparative analysis.
2. What is the Third Way?
Before turning to a discussion of industrial relations policy in the period since
the election of the Labour government in May 1997, it is worth asking
whether the term ‘Third Way’ has any analytical value in the sphere of industrial relations beyond simply describing what centre–left governments do —
a convenient marketing device, perhaps, but little more.
The term ‘Third Way’ is used here as shorthand for contemporary
centre–left governments that have engaged in a critique of the central elements of postwar social democracy (full employment, an extensive universal
welfare state, a leading role for the public sector in the management of the
economy and a corporatist relationship with organized labour), and sought
to articulate a form of social democracy that is more appropriate to contemporary ‘international’ capitalism. This development has been most selfconscious within the British Labour Party, but similar debates have emerged
within every governing centre–left party in western Europe and North
America (White 2001: xiv–xv).
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
3
The precise content of Third Way politics is not assumed in this paper;
rather I seek to identify what, if anything, is distinctive in the field of industrial relations about the way in which Third Way parties have actually governed. The central question to which this paper seeks an answer is: Does the
ensemble of policies point in the direction of a coherent, viable set of industrial relations institutions and practices?
For the British case, Crouch has argued that ‘in the industrial relations field
New Labour represents a continuation of the neo-liberalism of the Conservative government, but one required to make more concessions than its predecessor with trade unions and social-democratic policy preferences’ (Crouch
2001: 104). If this is the case, Crouch suggests that ‘Third Way’ is not a useful
descriptor; it is not enough that policies occupy some mid-point between
postwar social democracy and neoliberalism, or constitute a mixture of the
two, for them to be labelled ‘Third Way’. The standard must be more exacting, implying policies that encourage an innovative set of industrial relations
institutions and practices distinct from prior forms regulating class relations.
A set of policies can be innovative and distinct but not coherent, and there
is some danger that using the term ‘Third Way’ implies too much coherence.
Does it make any sense to identify a coherent Third Way model of industrial
relations out of the plethora of governmental initiatives, many of which have
clearly been born of short-term political calculation? Intentionality is not
necessarily the issue here. Whether an industrial relations blueprint exists
somewhere in the Number 10 Downing Street Policy Unit or not is less
important than understanding the logic of a package of reforms — how they
fit together and what they imply for class relations. A set of policies can have
such a logic irrespective of the intention of its authors. The collective laissezfaire regime, in its heyday in the 1950s, and the neoliberal decollectivization
regime of the 1980s and early 1990s, formed coherent systems of industrial
relations, with labour law, bargaining structures, workplace institutions, state
action and so on combining to encourage a particular regulatory logic of
class relations.
Comparative political economy, as an academic discipline, has in recent
years focused attention on this question of the coherence and underlying
economic logic of the institutional configuration of capitalist societies (for
a review, see Howell 2003). What has come to be known as the ‘Varieties
of Capitalism’ approach to comparative political economy emphasizes
the role that political-economic institutions play in co-ordinating the
behaviour of economic agents, the relationship among the institutions of a
given country and the tight linkage between those institutions and particular patterns of economic growth (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6–21). The Varieties
of Capitalism approach argues that the interdependent, self-reinforcing
character of institutions within a particular country (e.g. the investment
and banking system, training regime, macroeconomic policy, interest group
organization and industrial relations) can, over time, create a degree of path
dependence that makes change difficult, encouraging certain patterns of
economic growth, while simultaneously closing off others. Institutional
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
4
British Journal of Industrial Relations
coherence matters because a particular set of industrial relations institutions
may simply be incompatible with the thrust of macroeconomic policy, or the
behaviour of investors, or the structure of employer and labour organizations. Evidence from Germany, for example, suggests that the particular
physiognomy of industrial relations — dual representation/industry
bargaining — is dependent upon the existence of ‘patient capital’ (itself a
product of bank-led investment), a co-operative training regime, and a social
insurance-based welfare system, as argued by Streeck (Streeck 2001: 1–5).
This in turn encourages a pattern of economic growth based upon ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck 1992: 4).
The Varieties of Capitalism approach suggests that the existence of institutions in one part of the political economy may make the introduction of a
new set of institutions in another sphere difficult, if not impossible; the selfreinforcing character of institutions makes it extremely difficult to jump paths
from one type of political economy to another. Varieties of Capitalism theorists have identified two primary ideal-type political economies (though the
outlines of a third, ‘Mediterranean’, type have been suggested: see Hall and
Soskice 2001: 21). In liberal market economies (LMEs), markets perform the
role of co-ordinating relations between economic actors, labour markets are
lightly regulated, and capital is allocated primarily through stock markets,
ensuring high degrees of labour and capital mobility, which in turn encourage rapid economic adjustment and relatively low-wage, low-skill production.
The United States is the exemplar here. In co-ordinated market economies
(CMEs), on the other hand, markets are subordinated to regulation through
non-market co-ordination mechanisms among collective economic actors,
collective bargaining and legislation regulate the labour market, and financial markets provide long-term capital to firms, limiting labour and capital
mobility. Low labour market flexibility is compensated for by high-skill
production and a high-trust system of industrial relations. As the capsule
description above suggests, Germany is the most cited example of a
CME.
Clearly, these are ideal types, and, as we shall see in the last section of this
paper, Britain does not fit easily into either of these categories. But for
Varieties of Capitalism theorists the ideal types function as more than
passive descriptors: they embody a logic of change in that, during periods
of rapid economic restructuring, there is an expectation that national
political economies will converge around one or other of these ideal types.
The implication is that we can anticipate neither the diversity of national
political economies that characterized the first thirty years of the postwar era
(Katzenstein 1978: 15–22), nor convergence upon a single model, but
rather ‘dual convergence’ (Iversen and Pontusson, 2000: 3).
What the discussion in this section suggests is that the term ‘Third Way’
might be useful in the sphere of industrial relations in so far as it identifies
a set of policies, distinct from those of postwar social democratic and neoliberal governments, that encourage the construction and embedding of industrial relations institutions that are compatible with institutions and practices
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
5
in the rest of the political economy during a period of heightened international economic competition. This is a tall order.
3. The industrial relations project of New Labour
If the relationship between organized labour and postwar Labour governments was characterized by a form of policy-making in which the unions had
privileged access to Labour policy-making, and that between organized
labour and Conservative governments after 1979 was characterized by exclusion, the relationship between organized labour and the New Labour government has been distinctive. On the one hand, unions have had very little
formal or institutional access to this government (Taylor 1998: 1–2), though
there have been quarterly meetings between general secretaries, ministers and
civil servants since late 2000. While there has been a sizeable influx of business people into the government, as ministers, advisers and heads of various
task forces, unionists have only rarely been tapped for office. Evidence covering 300 task forces found that only 2 per cent of the members of the new
bodies were from trade unions, compared with 36 per cent from private business and trade associations (Barker et al. 1999: 26). In 2001 the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) proposed a reorganization that would have put
business executives on newly formed strategy boards and sent civil servants
out to work in business for one week of each year. Only union protest led to
backtracking and a statement that unionists could also sit on the strategy
boards. Union influence has been informal, dependent upon personal
relations between unions and individual ministers, for the most part junior
ministers.
On the other hand, the Labour government has chosen to implement many
of its commitments to the labour movement through bi- or tripartite institutions or negotiating processes. In contrast to most other policy areas, where
the government has simply legislated with only limited prior consultation, in
the area of labour legislation there has been an effort to depoliticize government action, and to disarm criticism that the government favours labour, by
seeking prior agreement between employers and unions. This was attempted
(but failed) most clearly in the area of union recognition, where the government urged the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI) to negotiate an agreement, which would then be implemented by legislation. In fulfilling Labour’s long-time pledge of a statutory
minimum wage, a Low Pay Commission was set up, representing employers
and unions and headed by George Bain, to take evidence and make recommendations on the level of a minimum wage. A task force on family-friendly
working (with a remit not to create onerous burdens on business) was created
in 2001 with representatives of the CBI, TUC and Equal Opportunities Commission. Similarly, after efforts to derail an EU Directive on consultation and
information failed, Stephen Byers sought talks with the TUC and CBI in the
hope of reaching an agreement that could become the basis for legislation.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
6
British Journal of Industrial Relations
New Labour has sought political cover for labour legislation either by these
efforts to gain agreement ahead of legislation, or by permitting limited labour
market regulation courtesy of the EU once Britain’s opt-out from the Social
Chapter was ended. Thus, the government could claim to be acting not at the
behest of organized labour, but in response to broad-based agreements
beyond its direct control.
Brief comment on the broad contours of Labour economic policy is necessary, because macro- and microeconomic policy set limits on the range of
viable industrial relations policies. In practice, the dominant motif of Labour
macroeconomic policy has been convergent with Conservative policy; that is
to say, it has emphasized the need for fiscal neutrality, and the use of monetary policy, to prevent inflation. Inflation targets have remained as tight
(below 2.5 per cent per annum) as under the Conservatives, and within less
than a week of taking office the Chancellor handed over the control of interest rates to the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, establishing
the independence of the Bank to set monetary policy.
By the end of Labour’s first term, rising public concern about the state of
public services led to a major commitment to increase funding for education
and healthcare. Strong economic growth ensured that revenue for public
spending could be found without significant tax increases or public-sector
deficits. This commitment clearly marked a difference between the priorities
of Labour and Conservative governments. Nevertheless, overall, it is hard to
see New Labour macroeconomic policy as more than a more competent and
consistent version of Conservative policy. Referring to an acceptance that
there is no room for a distinctive ‘Left’ economic policy in a more global
economy, Hay and Watson (1998: 15) argue that ‘New Labour clearly acts
as if the globalization hypothesis were an accurate description of reality.’
This in turn severely limits the ability of the state to alter economic
outcomes.
The following sections survey New Labour industrial relations policy since
1997. The review is not comprehensive — it ignores some of the primarily
symbolic actions, such as permitting union representation at GCHQ, and
most developments in the public sector — but it captures the main policy
initiatives.
3.1. Pay Policy
The core of the relationship between organized labour and Labour governments from late in the 1945–51 Labour administration until the end of the
1970s was the implementation of wage restraint policies. During this period,
apart from voluntary or statutory incomes policies, governments had few
acceptable tools for limiting wage growth; deflation was one alternative, but
it was unpalatable to unions, and hardly improved the growth potential of
the economy. After 1979 incomes policies fell off Labour’s policy agenda.
There was strong union opposition to such policies, but there was also a
recognition that the twin capacities of organized labour and the state to
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
7
operate an incomes policy were much diminished. On the one hand, the collapse of collective bargaining coverage in the 1980s, allied to the continued
decentralization of collective bargaining, made it extremely difficult for union
leaders to make wage restraint work. On the other hand, governments have
been less able to impose an incomes policy because such policies are most
effective in the public sector, and the public sector is now smaller as a result
of privatization, to say nothing of the weaker capacity of governments credibly to promise full employment and a higher social wage — the essential quid
for the quo of traditional incomes policies — in return for restraint (Cameron
1984: 174). Incomes policies are now structurally all but impossible, and in
any case neither unions nor the Labour Party have shown much inclination
to return to them.
The most significant pay innovation has been the introduction of a national
statutory minimum wage. This had been a long-term promise of the Labour
Party, inherited by Blair. In advance of the 1997 election it was announced
that no level for the minimum wage would be set; instead, a representative
Low Pay Commission (LPC) would be set up to gather evidence and recommend a level. This guaranteed that the level would be set well below what
trade unions were asking for. The eventual recommendations of the LPC, in
May 1998, were closer to the original stated position of business, with a low
initial level for the minimum wage and exemption of young people from its
ambit, and a lower ‘development rate’ for new hires (Low Pay Commission
1998: 1–2).
The practical implementation of the new minimum wage also indicated
the close attention that government was paying to the concerns of business.
Regulations were introduced to prevent the need for employers to keep
special records, or to provide details of the minimum wage on employee pay
slips, making it less likely that employees would be aware of their rights.
Fines for non-compliance were set at a low level, and few new inspectors were
provided to enforce the law. However, as evidence mounted that the minimum
wage was having no adverse impact on employment (Denny 2002), and under
pressure from unions, the government has been willing to see sizeable
annual increases in the minimum wage.
The national minimum wage is an important indicator of New Labour’s
conception of industrial relations, and it is a clear area of contrast with its
Conservative predecessor. The latter abolished Britain’s previous form of
minimum wage, the tripartite wages councils, that set wages for particular
industries. The new minimum wage brings Britain into line with most
European countries, and it indicates a commitment to certain basic minimum
standards at work. That said, it is worth noting the main distinction between
the structure of this minimum wage and that of the old wages councils. The
councils were designed to be industry-level collective bargaining institutions
in embryo; the goal was always that they would evolve, over time, in the
direction of collective bargaining, and thus, in the long run, would strengthen
collective representation and bargaining. A statutory national minimum wage
will not have this effect.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
8
British Journal of Industrial Relations
3.2. The European Dimension
The second major plank of labour legislation, after the minimum wage,
promised by Labour while in opposition was an end to Britain’s opt-out from
the Social Chapter. John Major had won this opt-out during the Maastricht
Treaty negotiations, in order to protect the deregulatory measures introduced
by Conservative governments during the 1980s and 1990s. Trade unions
came to see European social legislation as having the potential to counteract
deregulation at home, and the Labour Party found it electorally popular
to argue that British workers were being denied basic rights granted to their
European counterparts. Thus, within days of winning the election in 1997,
the Foreign Secretary announced that Britain would sign up to the Social
Chapter.
The importance of this act was initially largely symbolic. There were only
two European Directives implemented under the Social Chapter, one on
parental leave and the other creating European works councils in large firms
employing significant numbers of workers in two or more EU countries. In
recent years the scale and scope of European legislation has rapidly
expanded; however, for the most part New Labour has not used European
social legislation as political cover for regulating the labour market. Blair
made it clear very early on that, while seeking minimum standards of fairness for workers, he placed a high priority on labour market flexibility. Blair
(1997a: 1) lectured other EU leaders on New Labour’s ‘third way, a way of
marrying together an open, competitive and successful economy with a just,
decent and humane society . . . Our aim must be to tackle the obstacles to
job creation and labour market flexibility . . . making sure the Social Chapter
and Employment Chapter help job creation, not hinder it’.
A pattern of initial rejection of EU social legislation, followed by minimalist interpretation and implementation, has repeated itself since 1997. In
response to a European proposal to extend works councils to solely national
firms, Britain made it known that it was unconvinced of the need for further
EU legislation to enhance the rights of workers to consultation and information. Only after extracting concessions concerning the phasing in of consultation rights and the size of firms affected did Britain sign up to the
Directive (Black and Wintour 2001).
The Working Time Directive was implemented into British law in an
extremely limited manner. In July 1999 government guidelines seemed to
suggest that all salaried employees would be exempted from the Directive.
Negotiations with trade unions led to a partial retreat by the DTI, but it
remains the case that employees are allowed to ‘choose’ to work more than
the maximum number of hours, opening the door to employer coercion. A
similar effort to minimize the impact of European Directives appeared with
the Directive giving full employment rights to part-time workers (Toynbee
2000), and the same tactic of narrowing the scope of applicability to employees with formal contracts has been used in the implementation of the Fixed
Term Directive in 2002.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
9
3.3. The Employment Relations Act (ERA)
The central statement of New Labour industrial relations policy in its first
term was the White Paper Fairness at Work (FAW), published in May 1998
(DTI 1998), which contained a number of new individual and collective rights
at work, including the third key pre-election pledge: a statutory right to union
recognition. Following publication of the White Paper, the Employment
Relations Bill was drafted and submitted to parliament in January 1999,
becoming law in July 1999. This section centres its analysis on the White
Paper itself (changes between it and final shape of legislation will be noted
below), not least because the language and organization of that document
were tremendously important in framing the public discourse around industrial relations reform. They best capture the justification that the Blair government used for legislating in this area — indeed, Blair himself wrote the
foreword to the White Paper. The packaging of the document was aimed at
dispelling criticism from business. Blair’s foreword emphasized the extent
to which British workplace relations would remain lightly regulated, and
elsewhere in the document there are numerous references to the hope that
the burden of any new rights on small business would be reduced through
consultation.
With the passage of the Employment Relations Act, New Labour interest
in the reform of industrial relations ended until after the 2001 election; and
in fact, the major industrial relations legislation in the second term has been
concerned primarily with limiting access to employment tribunals, not adding
new rights at work. In Blair’s words, FAW ‘seeks to draw a line under the
issue of industrial relations law . . . here are our proposals for an industrial
relations settlement for this parliament’ (DTI 1998: Foreword) — this after
18 years in which Conservative governments rewrote British industrial relations law, and reconfigured the balance of power between workers, unions
and employers.
FAW promised a handful of new or enhanced rights for individuals at
work, including: reducing the qualifying period before benefiting from claims
for unfair dismissal from two years to one; removing the limit on compensation claims for unfair dismissal (the final legislation capped awards); giving
workers on fixed contracts the right to claim unfair dismissal; extending
maternity leave to 18 weeks; and enhancing right to parental leave. These individual rights were fairly limited, and the section on family-friendly rights was
heavily influenced by existing or proposed EU legislation, which Britain had
to implement.
Trade unions and their members made a number of gains under the
heading of Collective Rights at Work. The central new right was a statutory
right to union recognition, but the White Paper also promised that workers
fired for engaging in lawful industrial action would have a right to use the
unfair dismissal procedure (though by the time this provision became law it
was limited to the first eight weeks of the strike), that blacklisting of, or discrimination against, union members would become illegal, and that there
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
10
British Journal of Industrial Relations
would be a legal right for individuals to be accompanied by a fellow employee
or union representative during grievance and disciplinary proceedings, even
if a union was not recognized at that workplace.
Regarding the statutory right to union recognition, both business and
unions could claim some success for their positions (Smith and Morton 2001:
124–8; Wood and Godard 1999: 236–9). Perhaps the biggest surprise was that
recognition would to be automatic where a union could demonstrate that a
majority of a firm’s employees were members of the union (though in legislation this was modified to permit the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC)
to intervene and force a ballot, for example where it suspects that worker
support for the union is weak and recent). Additionally, the union(s) and not
the employer will propose the scope of the bargaining unit, and the CAC,
which oversees the procedure, will arbitrate when there is disagreement.
On the other hand, employers won most of the battles for the application
of the statutory right. The legislation does not apply to firms employing 20
or fewer workers, meaning that 24.5 per cent of employees (excluding the
non-trading public sector) are not covered by the recognition procedure
(Wood and Godard 1999: 230), and a threshold was created whereby unions
need a majority of those voting and at least 40 per cent of those eligible to
vote in favour in order to gain recognition.
These collective rights at work are, again, fairly limited, particularly in
the context of 18 years of legislation restricting collective representation,
collective bargaining and collective action at work. Strike action remains as
restricted as before, with the single exception of providing greater safeguards
for those engaged in lawful industrial action.
It is too early for a comprehensive evaluation of the effect of the statutory
right to recognition. The statutory recognition procedure came into force in
June 2000. After almost three years of operation, 255 applications under part
1 of schedule 1 were made to the CAC, with recognition granted in 58 cases,
23 of which came without a ballot (CAC 2003: 21). Trade unions have reason
to be pleased with the procedural decisions made by the CAC on such issues
as the composition of the bargaining unit and access to the workplace during
a recognition campaign. On the other hand, the legislation mandated quite
long periods between each step of the statutory process, and in practice the
CAC exceeded even these, to the chagrin of trade unions. As Wood (2000:
131) has pointed out, the legislation was drafted so as to create the maximum
likelihood that voluntary agreement could be reached without requiring the
imposition of a union on an employer.
Recognition achieved through the statutory provisions has been dwarfed
by voluntary recognition agreements, which rose rapidly between 1999
and 2001 (TUC 2002). Cases of voluntary employer recognition of unions
were climbing while cases of derecognition were declining prior to the implementation of the recognition legislation, suggesting that the ‘climate’ of
industrial relations improved for unions in anticipation of the legislation.
Since the rise in voluntary union recognition also appeared to be accompanied by a rise in agreements that included no strike elements, it may be that
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
11
employers sought better agreements ahead of legislation (Gall and McKay
1999: 610).
Overall, the ERA contained very little by way of direct rights or gains for
unions themselves, beyond the statutory right to recognition. For example,
the right to be accompanied by a union official is an individual right, as are
rights against blacklisting and dismissal for strike action. The legislation did
not seek to strengthen unions directly, and if they gain it will be indirectly,
through additional rights for individual workers.
Trade union criticism of the limitations of the legislation, particularly the
small firm exclusion, the 40 per cent threshold in the recognition machinery
and the one-year waiting period for unfair dismissal rights, remained, and in
the run-up to the 2001 election the government promised a ‘root and branch
review of employment law’ (Baldwin 2000). It was not until mid-2002 that a
consultation process reviewing the ERA was announced. The unions were
deeply disappointed by the results of that process, as the government proposed no significant changes to the recognition legislation (DTI 2003).
3.4. The Employment Act (EA)
The centrepiece of industrial relations reform in Labour’s second term has
been the Employment Act (EA), which received royal assent in mid-2002.
While covering a number of areas, the core of the legislation was a reform
of the employment tribunals system, with the goal of reducing the number
of cases handled. The backdrop to the legislation was the increasing caseload
(Labour Research 2001: 14), and strong business pressure to reduce the costs
that result from individual claims brought by workers against their employers. There are several causes of this increase, including the greater number of
rights that workers have, and can therefore claim are being violated, and the
increase in compensation provided by the ERA; but it is also likely that the
collapse in union membership and collective bargaining coverage of the past
two decades have forced the tribunal system to undertake some of the work
previously handled by voluntary collective procedures (McKay 2001: 298).
That was certainly the TUC’s judgement in its response to the consultation
document that preceded publication of the Employment Bill (TUC 2001:
para. 1.2).
The EA contained a series of measures designed to reduce the numbers of
cases brought forward to tribunals; and, recognizing that a significant source
of tribunal complaints is the absence of proper dismissal and grievance procedures in many firms, especially small firms, the legislation laid out minimum
statutory internal procedures covering dismissal and grievances, ensuring that
they were implied terms of contract. Once these statutory procedures are in
place, certain complaints cannot go to a tribunal until the internal procedure
has been completed, and failure to follow these procedures can lead to
variations in the award made by a tribunal. The goal of reducing costs to
business was made clear by the explanatory notes that accompanied the
legislation (House of Lords 2002: para. 197).
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
12
British Journal of Industrial Relations
This section has summarized the main elements of New Labour’s industrial relations record for its first two terms in office. The national minimum
wage, the Employment Relations Act, the Employment Act and assorted
European social Directives constitute a coherent project of industrial relations reform, albeit a meagre one, given the scope of change implemented in
the previous 18 years. The next section offers an evaluation of these reforms
with an eye towards identifying the distinctiveness of Britain’s Third Way in
the sphere of industrial relations.
4. Evaluating New Labour’s industrial relations project
The current Labour government can legitimately claim to have fulfilled its
three main 1997 manifesto pledges with regard to labour legislation, albeit in
a narrow manner. The central elements of the current industrial relations
system, then, are as follows. The overwhelming bulk of Conservative industrial relations legislation remains in force, and has been endorsed by New
Labour. This entails strict regulation of, and limits upon, industrial action
and accompanying picketing, such that strikes are possible only between
workers and their direct employers, and then only after a postal ballot. It also
means state regulation of the internal affairs of unions, particularly elections
of officers, and the abolition of the closed shop. To this basic framework of
labour law has been added some degree of regulation of the labour market.
This regulation has taken the form of a limited set of minimum rights at
work, including a minimum wage, limits on working hours, expanded rights
of unfair dismissal, expanded rights for working women and parents, and
some regulation of precarious, ‘atypical’ forms of labour contract.
Regulation of the labour market has for the most part taken the form of
individual legal rights, enforceable through employment tribunals and state
agencies (the CAC and the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service —
ACAS), rather than collective rights designed to strengthen trade unions,
which would then take on the role of regulating social relations through
collective bargaining. With a few exceptions, any benefits likely to accrue to
unions will come indirectly, by virtue of a more regulated labour market or
a new role as enforcers of legal rights. In several areas, legislation further acts
as a substitute for collective regulation; for example concerning the statutory
minimum wage, and making statutory minimum internal procedures implied
terms of contract. Blair’s 1998 restatement of the Third Way did not mention
trade unions, instead reserving for the state the role of protecting the weak
through minimum standards at work (Blair 1998).
Thus, of the two parallel tracks along which class relations have been
regulated in Britain, as elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world — collective
regulation by unions and legal regulation by the state — it is the latter that
has become the focus of New Labour’s attention. This continues and accelerates the trend in Britain since the 1960s of a shift from voluntarism towards
individual rights at work. But even legal regulation of the labour market
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
13
remains limited, because of a concern that employment rights encroach as
little as possible on labour market flexibility.
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper, how
should one evaluate this government’s industrial relations project, and hence
the place of organized labour in the political economy of New Labour? To
what extent does it reflect a Third Way — indeed, what might the Third Way
mean with respect to industrial relations? Rhetorically, New Labour defines
its industrial relations policy (in classic triangulation fashion) with respect to
Thatcherite and Old Labour industrial relations. The former is characterized
as pure market regulation of class relations, without a role for collective bargaining or legal rights at work. Leaving aside whether that is an accurate
portrayal of Conservative policy after 1979, most Conservative rhetoric
emphasized the benefits of decentralization and an individualization of
industrial relations (Howell 1999: 33–4).
Old Labour Party industrial relations policy could be characterized as
collective laissez-faire plus incomes policies, in which public policy favoured
collective representation and collective bargaining as the primary mode of
regulating industrial relations, with only limited regulation of collective
bargaining and limited provision of individual rights at work by the state.
Incomes policies were superimposed upon this structure to manage persistent economic crisis. For New Labour, this approach encouraged a conflictual notion of social relations — ‘us and them’ — focused on distributional
issues rather than the improvement of productivity, and relying too heavily
on high-level negotiation between the government, employers and unions to
solve industrial problems.
A certain poorly defined Third Way model of industrial relations has on
occasion appeared in New Labour discourse. Prior to the 1997 election, and
following several speeches by Blair in 1996, the notion of ‘stakeholding’ was
proffered, and this remains the closest thing to an articulated theory of industrial relations offered by the government (Blair 1996: 291–309). If firms have
multiple stakeholders, of which shareholders are only one — employees, consumers, lenders and debtors being others — public policy should encourage
the participation of all stakeholders. This might imply minimum rights, job
security and some voice for workers in the firm. All but the most minimal
definition of stakeholding was disavowed by New Labour in advance of the
election, but it remains an alternative discourse, suggesting inclusiveness,
social solidarity and fairness, in contrast to the atomism, individualism and
exclusive concern with profitability allegedly characterizing Thatcherism.
More inchoate, but much more widespread in New Labour discourse, is
the notion of ‘partnership’. Firms are most successful, it is argued, when
employers, managers and employees work together; so the goal of public
policy should be to encourage partnership. The DTI created, under the ERA,
a Partnership at Work fund designed to encourage concrete experiments in
partnership, and the TUC subsequently created a Partnership Institute in
2000. Heery (2002: 21) has identified the wide range of policies that could
come under the heading of ‘partnership’, and one of the appeals of the term
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
14
British Journal of Industrial Relations
is precisely that it is such a broad tent, encompassing everything from suggestion boxes to co-determination. Wood (2000: 131) argues that at the heart
of the Third Way, is a notion of partnership understood as ‘high-involvement
HRM’ with the emphasis upon encouraging worker commitment to the firm
with the goal of improving productivity and quality. This certainly meshes
with the public statements of ministers. Importantly, as Wood (2000:134) also
notes, there is ‘nothing in the notion of partnership to link it exclusively with
unions’.
New Labour’s conception of industrial relations rests upon a series of
assumptions about the role of power in the workplace, and the relationship
between employment rights and economic efficiency. Blair has argued that
the interests of business and labour are not opposed: ‘My vision is where the
boundaries between management and workforce erode . . . the government’s
programme [is] to replace the notion of conflict between employers and
employees with the promotion of partnership’ (DTI 1998: Foreword).
Instead, the role of labour law is to ‘put a very minimum infrastructure of
decency and fairness around people in the workplace’ (DTI 1998: Foreword).
Thus, the primary task of industrial relations institutions is not to correct
an imbalance of power in the workplace, but to create a context in which the
productivity and creativity of workers is properly harnessed for the good of
the firm:
Let us build trades unions and businesses that are creative, not conservative, unions
that show they can work with management to make better companies. Let us build
unions that people join not just out of fear of change or exploitation but because
they are committed to success, unions that look forwards not backwards and that
support workers and foster the true adaptability they need to be secure in that competitive and fast changing world (Blair 1997b).
The absence of a conception of class conflict explains why state regulation
remains highly restrictive of the ability to engage in industrial action, but
does encourage minimum rights and a voice for workers. As Brown (1999:
168–9) put it, ‘the government is encouraging unions to develop the opportunity of being invited to the negotiating table, rather than to develop the
collective strength with which to force entry’.
New Labour does see an important role for the state in the regulation of
social relations, far more explicitly than its Thatcherite predecessor. Blair has
argued that legislation can operate to deepen, widen and embed cultural
practices:
My ambition . . . is nothing less than to change the culture of relations in and at
work — and to reflect a new relationship between work and family life. It is often
said that a change of culture cannot be brought about by a change in the framework of law. But a change in law can reflect a new culture, can enhance its understanding and support its development. (DTI 1998: Foreword)
The state should not evacuate the terrain of work, leaving social regulation
to employers and employees alone, because it is possible for employers to
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
15
organize social relations within their firms in a manner that is not even in
their own interests, let alone in that of the economy as a whole. The possibility of market failure brought on by conflictual industrial relations makes
it appropriate for the state to encourage social relations likely to push employers towards ‘high quality, high performance, high skills, high productivity,
high value’ (DTI 1998: para. 1.3). Thus the role of law and the state is twofold: to encourage the emergence of co-operative institutions and practices;
and to limit the access of employers to insecure, low-paid employment
through minimum rights at work.
New Labour’s industrial relations project is also distinguished from that of
Thatcherite Conservatism is its explicit linkage between contemporary economic conditions and the framework of social regulation appropriate to it.
Thatcherites tended to justify their opposition to trade unionism and deregulation of the labour market by reference to basic principles of free-market
economics and the rights that inhere in property (Wedderburn 1991: 203–7).
New Labour argues, by contrast, that what might have been justifiable during
the postwar boom is no longer appropriate: ‘The labour market today is completely different in substance from what it was in the early part of the 20th
century. It is light years away from that, but distant even to what it was 10
or 15 years ago, never mind 40 or 50 years ago’; globalization, deindustrialization, new technology and the feminization of the labour force have created
new conditions for economic success, requiring that ‘we must be adaptable,
flexible and open to change . . . [that] we will change jobs often and change
the nature of our jobs even if we keep them’ (Blair 1997b). New economic
conditions in turn require new sets of social relations inside the firm, and it
is the role of the state to encourage their development.
This model of industrial relations is distinct from both classical postwar
social democracy and neoliberalism, even if it contains elements of both of
them (Crouch 2001: 95–7). Its profound ambivalence towards the collective
regulation of industrial relations and the outright rejection of corporatism
points away from social democracy. Only ‘enterprise-confined, co-operative
unions as subordinate “partners” ’ are acceptable (Smith and Morton 2001:
121), and collective bargaining is accorded only a marginal role in regulating
the labour market. It is striking how little by way of legislation or other government action has been done to encourage collective bargaining.
But nor is the industrial relations model simply neoliberal. It entails a significant and permanent role for the state in regulating the labour market
through the provision of individual rights designed to encourage partnership
in the workplace and discourage a ‘race to the bottom’ in the labour market.
While the role of the state for Thatcherites was, in Gamble’s memorable
phrase, ‘to unwind the coils of social democracy’ (Gamble 1988: 32), for New
Labour that role is more creative than destructive: to coax a new set of social
relations out of the debris of Britain’s postwar system of industrial relations.
As we have seen, however, policies designed to encourage the emergence of
a distinctive Third Way industrial relations project have been subject to persistent erosion. New individual rights at work have always been introduced
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
16
British Journal of Industrial Relations
in the most minimalist, circumscribed manner possible. Constant business
pressure to reduce labour market regulation has led to repeated backtracking on the provision of rights at work, and even to occasional reversals, such
as the current reform of the employment tribunal system, which will limit
access to those rights. The answer to the question of ‘whether the government’s agenda of balancing employment protection with labour market
flexibility is realizable’ (McKay 2001: 285) appears to be ‘no’.
5. The comparative dimension
If New Labour’s industrial relations project is sui generis, then one could
explain its shape and limitations by reference to domestic political factors,
of which there are so many that the outcome could be said to be overdetermined. But if echoes of government policy can be found elsewhere,
with similar outcomes, and if the reforms conform to a recognizable comparative model of industrial relations, it suggests the availability of an
alternative evaluation of Third Way industrial relations, one rooted in the differing institutional configuration of capitalist societies.
As noted earlier, the Varieties of Capitalism literature identifies two idealtypical types of capitalist political economy, the LME and the CME, with
the United States and Germany the respective exemplars of each. Britain fits
uneasily into this dichotomous schema because, while it lacks most of the coordinating institutions associated with CMEs, it has never been a straightforward liberal market economy, relying almost exclusively upon market
mechanisms to regulate labour and capital markets. Between 1945 and 1979,
non-market institutions — including an extensive welfare state with important universal elements, a mixed economy, corporatist wage restraint mechanisms (albeit deeply flawed and dysfunctional ones) and a decentralized
collective bargaining system which set wages and conditions, directly and
indirectly, for approximately three-quarters of the labour force (Milner 1995:
82) — made Britain a hybrid political economy.
However, even before 1979 and the inception of Conservative efforts to
enhance the operation of markets while limiting or eliminating the role of
incomes policies and collective bargaining mechanisms, critical co-ordinating
institutions in Britain were either missing or underdeveloped. For well-known
reasons (Hall 1986: 34–47), the postwar British political economy lacked
institutions of employer co-ordination, systems of corporate governance,
financial capital prepared to lend for medium- and long-term growth, supportive social policy and the form of training regime associated with highwage, high-value co-operative industrial relations. There were non-market
co-ordinating institutions, but they were not those necessary to reinforce
and encourage the kind of partnership that the previous section suggested
was the goal of New Labour industrial relations policy. Eighteen years of
Conservative government undermined even those co-ordinating mechanisms
that had previously existed.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
17
Setting aside the potential determinism of the dual convergence argument
put by Varieties of Capitalism theorists (for a critique, see Howell 2003), it
is striking that, when faced with rapid economic restructuring after 1979,
Britain has converged in important ways towards a more pure LME model.
As a result, the co-operative vision of Third Way industrial relations articulated by New Labour, however well-intentioned, has been severely limited by
the absence of supportive institutions elsewhere in the political economy.
In comparative perspective, it has been argued that New Labour’s industrial relations reforms are based on the conception of a European model of
industrial relations (Taylor 1998: 4). In practice, this argument emphasizes
elements of the German system of industrial relations: the greater role of law
in regulating social relations; non-union forms of collective representation in
the workplace, such as works councils; and joint union and employer commitment to high-skill, high-wage production, underpinned by a sophisticated
training regime.
Despite the greater role of law in British industrial relations, this argument
is not persuasive. The application of European works councils to British
multinationals, the right of a worker to be accompanied by a union or nonunion supporter in grievance and disciplinary hearings and the, thus far,
unspecified right to consultation over layoffs and transfers of ownership do
not come close to the rights that elected works councils have in Germany.
This kind of collective representation requires strong legal underpinning;
and, while the Blair government appears willing to accept collective representation where it can be voluntarily negotiated between employer and
employees, it is loathe to impose it through legislation. It is also worth noting
that British employers have not even, for the most part, been prepared to
welcome collective representation voluntarily (Millward et al. 2000: 135–7).
More importantly, the German model of industrial relations (like that of
similar social democratic and corporatist countries such as Sweden and
Austria) remains organized around trade unionism and collective bargaining.
Strong unions and industry-level bargaining are a precondition for the successful operation of works councils, and the managing of collective action
problems that arise around training and wage issues (Thelen 2000: 158–63).
In the absence of a public policy commitment to a strengthening and privileging of collective bargaining, Third Way industrial relations point away
from the German model.
Despite the presence of Gerhard Schröder at Third Way seminars, the
institutional configuration of German political economy makes it clear why
British and German industrial relations are not converging. For practitioners of the Varieties of Capitalism approach, Germany is the archetypal ‘nonliberal’ economy (Streeck 2001: 5–6), or CME. Employers and workers are
organized in centralized, non-competing associations at regional and industry levels. Capital and labour mobility are limited by long-term lending agreements and regulation of the labour market. ‘Patient capital’ permits greater
investment in training and co-operative industrial relations, which in turn
encourages incremental rather than radical adjustment, and high-wage,
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
18
British Journal of Industrial Relations
high-skill production. These institutions are interdependent and selfreinforcing — without them, German industrial relations would unravel.
Britain has none of the institutions that could support an industrial relations system similar to that of Germany: industrial investment is weak and
biased towards short-term gains; training provision is haphazard and beset
by collective action problems; neither employers nor workers are organized
along lines that permit industry bargaining and the removal of wages from
competition; and, as Coates (2000: 175–7) has pointed out, the class character of British capital is one of longstanding and deep-seated hostility to
organized labour.
If one were seeking national models with which to compare the emerging
system of industrial relations in Britain, the United States and France would
offer a better fit. The United States is the prime example of a LME, while
the British and French political economies have been moving in that direction for two decades now (Hancké 2001: 332–4). In such political economies,
centre–left governments cannot rely upon bargaining and non-market
co-ordination to regulate the labour market; the choices are deregulation or
regulation by the state.
A framework of basic minimum rights at work, enforced by the state rather
than unions, and a statutory union recognition procedure overseen by labour
courts are now common to both Britain and the United States (MacShane
1998: 5). There are also important similarities in the industrial relations
regimes of Britain and France. Following the gradual rejection of the statist
planning model in France, a process that accelerated from 1983 onwards
(Hall 1986: 185–9), the Auroux Laws provided a set of ‘citizenship rights’ to
workers inside the firm, designed to strengthen job security and voice and to
engage in partnership (Howell 1992: 168–73). Trade unionism and collective
bargaining were indirectly weakened through the development of new forms
of consultation inside the firm which bypassed unions. Successive socialist
governments have used legislation on flexible working and the reduction of
work time both to regulate the labour market and, through derogation, to
encourage partnership agreements in the workplace.
There are, of course, significant differences between the industrial relations
systems of the United States, France and Britain. But one can detect the outlines of a common model of industrial relations centred on the enforcement
of individual rights in the workplace by the state, with only a peripheral role
for collective representation and collective bargaining. The United States,
France and Britain have seen some of the greatest declines in trade union
membership in the OECD since the mid-1970s. In all three cases, centre–left
governments either have not sought to strengthen collective regulation of
industrial relations, or have failed in that effort; and when they have instead
fallen back upon an attempt to regulate the labour market through the provision of individual rights, those rights have been eroded by the absence of
countervailing collective power in the workplace. Because ‘collective procedures are the custodians of individual rights’ (Brown et al. 2000: 627), those
rights are always subject to appropriation or reinterpretation by employers
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
19
where organized labour is weak. A greater state role in the provision
and enforcement of labour rights is a feature of industrial relations systems
where the weakness of employer and labour organizations forces the state
to substitute for the absence of social bargaining as a mechanism for regulating class relations. For centre–left governments in countries without strong
non-market co-ordinating mechanisms, conflict over the appropriate degree
of state regulation is the central battleground of industrial relations
reform.
The industrial relations project of the New Labour government in Britain
has modified the institutions and practices of industrial relations bequeathed
it in a manner that is both distinctive and innovative in comparison with its
Labour and Conservative predecessors. Third Way industrial relations in the
British context means a reversal of the situation in the 1960s, when collective bargaining was the primary mechanism for regulating the labour market
and class relations, with statutory individual labour rights playing a limited
and supporting role. It is now individual legal rights at work, provided and
enforced by the state, that are the primary motor of industrial relations, with
collective bargaining relegated to the public sector and those areas of the
private sector where, for the most part, employment is declining. Both collective bargaining and statutory rights at work are now justified by their contribution to the construction of partnership in the workplace in the quest for
global competitiveness. Even the TUC has acknowledged the ‘absolute
imperative’ of competitiveness in legitimizing employment regulation (TUC
2000: 2).
Yet, while this set of policies is distinct from labour market deregulation
tout court, it remains limited and unstable, providing a floor of protection for
workers while rarely being the means by which a new system of co-operative
institutions and practices is introduced. These new statutory rights at
work are more akin to the shifting front of a war than to seeds of future
partnership. The Third Way in industrial relations is institutionally incoherent, in that it is seeking changes in one sphere without challenging the
fundamentally liberal market orientation of the rest of the political economy.
In this sense, the Third Way can be thought of as a policy adaptation
specific to centre–left governments in weakly co-ordinated liberal market
economies.
Final version accepted 2 October 2003.
Acknowledgements
My thanks for comments and constructive criticism go to Stephen Wood in
his editorial capacity, to Francis Green, as discussant when I presented the
paper at the British Journal of Industrial Relations ‘Politics and Employment
Relations’ conference held at Windsor Great Park, 16–17 September 2002,
and to two anonymous referees.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
20
British Journal of Industrial Relations
References
Baldwin, T. (2000). ‘Unions win policy review’. The Times, 10 July.
Barker, A., Byrne, I. and Veall, A. (1999). Ruling by Task force, 20 November, pp.
1–176. http://www.charter88.org.uk/pubs/demaud/9911task force.pdf/
Black, I. and Wintour, P. (2001). ‘UK caves in on Work Directive’. Guardian, 12 June.
Blair, T. (1996). New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country. London: Fourth Estate.
—— (1997a). Speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Tony Blair MP, to the Party
of European Socialists’ Congress, Malmo, 6 June.
—— (1997b).
Speech
at
the
TUC
Annual
Congress,
September.
http://www.tuc.org.uk/congress/tuc-2423-f14.cfm#tuc-2423–14/
—— (1998). The Third Way: New Politics for a New Century. Fabian Pamphlet no.
588: 1–20.
Brown, W. (1999). ‘Individualisation and union recognition in Britain in the 1990s’.
In S. Deery and R. Mitchell (eds), Employment Relations: Individualisation and
Union Exclusion: An International Study. Sydney: Federation Press.
—— , Deakin, S., Nash, D. and Oxenbridge, S. (2000). ‘The Employment Contract:
from collective procedures to individual rights’. British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 38: 611–29.
Cameron, D. (1984). ‘Social democracy, corporatism, labour quiescence, and the
representation of economic interests in advanced capitalist society’. In J.
Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) (2003). Annual Report 2002/03.
http://www.cac.gov.uk/cac_2_annual_report/Reports/CAC_Report_0203.pdf
Coates, D. (2000). Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Crouch, C. (2001). ‘A Third Way in industrial relations?’ In S. White (ed.), New
Labour: The Progressive Future? New York: Palgrave.
Denny, C. (2002). ‘Labour market weathers minimum wage’. Guardian, 28 March.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (1998). Fairness at Work. London: DTI.
http://www.dti.gov.uk/
—— (2003). Review of the Employment Relations Act 1999. London: DTI.
http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/fairness/index.htm/
Foot, P. (1999). ‘Trade union castaways’. Guardian, 30 November.
Gall, G. and McKay, S. (1999). ‘Developments in union recognition and derecognition in Britain, 1994–1998’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37: 601–14.
Gamble, A. (1988). The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of
Thatcherism. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Hall, P. (1986). Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain
and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—— and Soskice, D. (2001). ‘An introduction to varieties of capitalism’. In P. Hall
and D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hancké, B. (2001). ‘Revisiting the French model: co-ordination and restructuring
in French industry’. In P. Hall and D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hay, C. (1999). The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False
Pretences? Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
Is There a Third Way for Industrial Relations?
21
—— and Watson, M. (1998). ‘The discourse of globalization and the logic of no
alternative: rendering the contingent necessary in the downsizing of New Labour’s
aspirations for government’. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
Political Studies Association, University of Keele.
Heery, E. (2002). ‘Partnership versus organising: alternative futures for British trade
unionism’. Industrial Relations Journal, 33: 20–35.
House of Lords (2002). Employment Bill: Explanatory Notes.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills.htm
Howell, C. (1992). Regulating Labor: The State and Industrial Relations Reform in
Postwar France. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
—— (1999). ‘Unforgiven: British trade unionism in crisis’. In A. Martin and G. Ross
(eds), The Brave New World of European Labor: Trade Unions at the Millennium.
Providence, RI: Berghahn.
—— (2003). ‘Varieties of capitalism: and then there was one?’ Comparative Politics.
36: 103–24.
Iversen, T. and Pontusson, J. (2000). ‘Comparative political economy: a northern
European perspective’. In T. Iversen, J. Pontusson and D. Soskice (eds), Unions,
Employers, and Central Banks. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Katzenstein, P. (1978). ‘Introduction: Domestic and international forces and
strategies of foreign economic policy’. In P. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and
Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison, Wis.:
University of Wisconsin Press.
Labour Research (2001). ‘Tribunal figures show union success’. Labour Research, 5:
14–16.
Low Pay Commission (1998). The National Minimum Wage: First Report of the Low
Wage Commission. London: HMSO, June, pp. 1–285. www.lowpay.gov.uk/er/lowpay/
MacShane, D. (1998). ‘New Labour and New Unionism’. Paper presented at conference on ‘New Labour and the Labour Movement’, 19–20 June, University of
Sheffield.
McKay, S. (2001). ‘Between flexibility and regulation: rights, equality and protection at
work’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 39: 285–303.
Millward, N., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. (2000). All Change at Work? London: Routledge.
Milner, S. (1995). ‘The coverage of collective pay-setting institutions in Britain,
1895–1990’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 33: 69–91.
Oldfield, C. and Higgins, S. (1998). ‘Union law “will cripple growth firms” ’. The
Times, 24 May.
Panitch, L. and Leys, C. (1997). The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left
to New Labour. New York: Verso.
Smith, P. and Morton, G. (2001). ‘New Labour’s reform of Britain’s Employment
Law: the devil is not only in the details but in the policy too’. British Journal of
Industrial Relations, 39: 119–38.
Streeck, W. (1992). Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies. London: Sage.
—— (2001). ‘Introduction: Explorations into the origins of nonliberal capitalism
in Germany and Japan’. In W. Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds), The Origins of
Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Taylor, R. (1998). ‘New Labour, the unions and the government’. Paper presented at
conference on ‘New Labour and the Labour Movement’, 19–20 June, University of
Sheffield.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.
22
British Journal of Industrial Relations
Thelen, K. (2000). ‘Why German employers cannot bring themselves to dismantle
the German model’. In T. Iversen, J. Pontusson and D. Soskice (eds), Unions,
Employers, and Central Banks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, N. (1996). Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of
Democratic Socialism, 1884–1995. London: UCL Press.
Toynbee, P. (2000). ‘Stabbed in the back’. Guardian, 25 February.
Trades Union Congress (TUC) (2000). The Next Five Years: Promoting Fairness and
Competitiveness. TUC Submission to the Labour Party Policy Commission on
Industry, Culture and Agriculture. Issued 23 February. London: TUC.
—— (2001). TUC Response to Government Consultation. Routes to Resolution: Improving Dispute Resolution in Britain. Issued October 3. http://www.tuc.org.uk/law/
tuc-3802-f0.cfm/
—— (2002). ‘New record high for employers recognising unions’. Press Release, 21
January. http://www.tuc.org.uk/organisation/tuc-4218-f0.cfm/
Undy, R. (1999). ‘New Labour’s “Industrial Relations Settlement”: the third way?’
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 37: 315–36.
Wedderburn, Lord (1991). Employment Rights in Britain and Europe. London:
Lawrence & Wishart.
White, S. (2001). ‘Introduction: New Labour and the future of progressive politics’.
In S. White (ed.), New Labour: The Progressive Future? New York: Palgrave.
Wood, S. (2000). ‘From voluntarism to partnership: a third way overview of the public
policy debate in British industrial relations’. In H. Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout
(eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation. Amsterdam: Kluwer Law
International.
—— and Godard, J. (1999). ‘The Statutory Union Recognition Procedure in the
Employment Relations Bill: a comparative analysis’. British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 37: 203–45.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2004.