Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
“When Police Should Say “NO!” to Gratuities”
Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics,
Charles Sturt University, Australia
Working Paper 2003/6
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE)
CAPPE Melbourne
Department of Philosophy
University of Melbourne
Parkville 3010.
Phone (03) 9344 5125
Fax (03) 9348 2130
CAPPE Canberra
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Australian National University
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The law enforcement officer, representing government, bears the heavy responsibility of
maintaining, in his own conduct, the honor and integrity of all government institutions. He
shall, therefore, guard against placing himself in a position in which any person can expect
special consideration or in which the public can reasonably assume that special consideration is
being given. Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or gratuities, large or small,
which can, in the public mind, be interpreted as capable of influencing his judgment in the
discharge of his duties.1
(Article 9 of the Canons of Police Ethics: Police Code of Conduct, 1991.)
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
The issue of police acceptance of gratuities has long been a source of contention. Many
writers on police corruption see the acceptance of even the smallest gift or benefit as
being the beginning of the end of an honest officer’s career. Others suggest that the
acceptance of gratuities does little harm, and that there may in fact be positive benefits
in the practice, not just for the officer involved, but for society as a whole. I wish in this
paper to examine the practice of the acceptance of gratuities, in order to highlight some
particular situations in which the acceptance of gratuities will always cause problems,
and thus to bring to notice those situations where police ought to say “NO!” to
gratuities.
It should be noted that it is not my intention to exhaustively investigate the practice of
the acceptance of gratuities, and to thus describe every situation in which gratuities
ought to be refused. Rather it is my intention to draw attention to those types of
situations in which the acceptance of gratuities will inevitably lead to problems of one
sort or another. I also recognise that in an ideal world there would be no need to question
what sorts of gratuities ought to be refused, and what sort accepted, for an ideal world
would have no need of such transactions. But given that we live in the real world, where
such transactions are valued by both giver and receiver, it seems to me that it is
necessary to seek some solution to this problem that recognises that value, while at the
same time seeking to avoid the problems that the acceptance of gratuities can cause.
In order to clarify the issues and the problems involved, I will begin with an overview of
the main theoretical positions on the acceptance of gratuities, canvassing the main
arguments opposing the acceptance of gratuities, and the arguments in favour of their
acceptance. It should be noted that wherever I speak of “gratuities”, this term can be
taken to include other discounts, gifts and benefits offered to police as well.
1
From the Police Code of Conduct, 1991. Found in PROFESSIONAL L AW ENFORCEMENT C ODES : A
DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION p. 96. (J. Kleinig & Y. Zhang compilers and editors 1993).
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
Why police should not accept gratuities:
(i)The slippery slope to corruption
Police corruption is undeniably a serious problem. Some police departments have
become so riddled with corruption that the public comes to see every police officer as
bent. Many writers have suggested that the first step towards a police officer becoming
corrupt is the acceptance of gratuities.2 For example, Lawrence Sherman suggests that
there is “a continuum of graft stages”3 from the acceptance of gratuities, to the
acceptance of bribes in relation to such things as bar closing hours, to the acceptance of
payoffs from gamblers and prostitutes, to eventual involvement in narcotics. He sees
both the police officer who accepts a free cup of coffee and the police officer who is
involved in drug dealing as corrupt, it is only a matter of the degree of corruption
involved. This slide into serious corruption is seen by Sherman and many others as a
“slippery slope”. Once an officer is on the slope, then the slide into serious corruption,
if not inevitable, is at the very least difficult to stop.
John Kleinig4 points out that there are at least two different types of slippery slope
arguments used when asserting that the acceptance of gratuities will lead to corruption,
and that both of these types of arguments can be employed in a variety of different
ways. The two main types are the logical slope, and the psychological slope, and it is
worth taking the time to distinguish the two.
Logical slippery slopes exist when there are no clearly defined boundaries that can be
used to draw distinctions between different cases, and thus any line drawn in the sand
between two extremes will have some degree of arbitrariness about it. Suppose that a
particular company allows its employees to accept “small” gifts from prospective
suppliers. How should “small” be defined in those circumstances? Clearly a gift that has
2
For example see Sherman, Becoming Bent: Moral Careers of Corrupt Policemen in MORAL ISSUES IN
POLICE WORK 250-267 (F. Elliston & M. Feldberg, eds. 1985).
3
Id. at 259.
4
J. KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING, 163-187 (1996).
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
no monetary value would be acceptable, and an expensive piece of jewellery would be
unacceptable, but there exists a large grey area in between where the acceptability or
unacceptability of a gift is not so clear.
In terms of police acceptance of gratuities, it could be argued that although there seems
to be a big difference between accepting a cup of coffee and accepting a six figure bribe
to look the other way while a murder is carried out, this is not really the case. For there
is a logical slippery slope here, given that there is only a small difference between
accepting a cup of coffee, and accepting a cup of coffee and a doughnut, and only a small
difference between accepting a cup of coffee and a doughnut, and accepting a free meal,
and only a small difference between that and a gift, and another small difference to
accepting a large gift and another small difference to accepting … a whopping great
suitcase full of cash in small denomination, non-marked, non-sequential bills. Thus it
could be argued that since there is no clear boundary between accepting a cup of coffee
and accepting the suitcase of cash, one ought not accept the cup of coffee. As Kleinig
points out,5 arguments like this ignore the fact that while the differences between the
individual stages may be insignificant, they do have a cumulative significance. This
makes the difference between a cup of coffee and a suitcase full of cash significant, even
if we cannot say for sure at what point between them the line between acceptability and
non-acceptability is crossed. If a man is bald when he has one hair, and when he has two
hairs, and when he has three hairs … this does not mean that he is still bald when he has
ten thousand hairs. We may not be able to say with certainty when he is no longer bald,
but we can say that a man with ten thousand hairs is not.
Another way of applying the logical slippery slope is to suggest that though the
acceptance of a gratuity by a police officer is not a serious wrong, it is nonetheless
wrong. Thus the only difference between a police officer who accepts a cup of coffee,
and a police officer who accepts a thousand dollar bribe, is the degree of wrongness
involved. The suggestion is that by accepting the small gratuity, a police officer has
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
shown a willingness to be corrupted, and has thus removed any logical reason for
objecting to more serious practices. The only issue that remains to be settled is the
length to which they will allow themselves to be corrupted. However, there seems to be
a flaw in this argument as well. There is only a difference in the degree of corruptibility
between the police officer who accepts a cup of coffee and the police officer who
accepts a suitcase full of cash. But there is only a difference in the degree of hairiness
between the man with one hair and the man with ten thousand hairs, and we have seen
that there is an important difference between them, for one is bald and the other is not.
If the analogy between baldness and corruptibility holds, then it would seem that while
one of the police is certainly corrupt, there is at least the possibility that the other may
not be, for if one hair does not make a man hairy, then one cup of coffee may not make a
police officer corrupt.
Psychological slippery slopes are slopes which do have boundaries between cases,
unlike logical slippery slopes. However, the psychological slippery slopes are based on
the proposition that human beings have a tendency to extend boundaries, and if an
absolute proposition is converted to one that is any way flexible, human nature, being
what it is, will extend that flexibility to its absolute limits.
The application of this type of slippery slope argument to the issue of police
corruption is fairly obvious. If certain practices at the “top” of the slope are allowed
(such as the acceptance of the free cup of coffee), then there will be a tendency for
police officers to go on to other less acceptable practices as they slide down the slope,
until eventually police officers are engaged in wholesale extortion, burglary and drug
dealing. Perhaps the most significant difference between this type of argument and the
logical slippery slope argument is that the proponents of this type of argument do not
have to concede the dubious point that the practices at the top of the slope are in
themselves unacceptable. All that is necessary is to show that the allowing of such
practices has the tendency to lead to other more unacceptable practices. Nor it is
5
Id. at 175.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
necessary for proponents of this type of argument to suggest that everyone will slide to
the bottom of the slope. If only a few police officers slide into serious corruption, then
given the seriousness of this problem for the police force as a whole, this would be
enough to justify the banning of practices at the top of the slope.
However, there is an empirical question that needs to be answered here. Does the
acceptance of minor gratuities lead to more serious corruption, at least in some cases?
Sherman certainly thinks so, and his analysis does have some anecdotal support in the
writings of those corrupt police who have subsequently told the story of their decline.6
Others writers are rather more dubious. Feldberg for example, suggests that the argument
that gratuities lead to corruption, is similar to the argument that marijuana use leads to
heroin/cocaine addiction.7 He points out that most police are rather experienced in the
arts of inducement and deception, and can certainly tell the difference between a
harmless gratuity and open bribery.8 While this may be true, it does not actually show
Sherman’s assertion to be false. Just because one can tell the difference between a
gratuity and a bribe, does not mean that one will not accept the bribe when it is offered.
I would suggest that there are still at least three problems with the psychological
slippery slope argument however. The first is the fact that there is no real proof that the
acceptance of gratuities does lead to corruption, despite the anecdotal evidence. Also, if
it is true, as Richard Kania suggests,9 that the acceptance of gratuities is a social norm
for police, then surely it should be no surprise if the few corrupt police who have told
their stories actually engaged in the practice. I am sure that these corrupt police also
arrested and interviewed suspects, typed reports, investigated crimes etc. but no one has
ever suggested that these practices lead to corruption.
6
See for example Leuci, The Process of Erosion, in P OLICE AND P OLICING : CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
181-187 (D. Kennedy, ed. 1989).
7
Feldberg, Gratuities, Corruption and the Democratic Ethos of Policing: The Case of the Free Cup of
Coffee in MORAL ISSUES IN POLICE WORK 267-276 (F. Elliston & M. Feldberg, eds. 1985).
8
Id.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
The second problem is that even if there is a link between the acceptance of gratuities
and later corrupt conduct, if one wants to prevent the later corrupt conduct then it
cannot simply be assumed that the best way to do this is to ban the acceptance of
gratuities. To speak more generally about the situation, if one knows that X causes Z and
that Z is something that you wish to prevent, then it certainly does not immediately
follow that to prevent Z we should ban X, for X might also have some positive effects
that would be lost if X was banned, and it might well be the case that these positive
effects caused by X outweigh the negatives produced by Z. For example, it is a known
fact that increasing the level of education of a given community (X) will result in an
increase in the suicide rate of that community (Z).10 Does this mean that in order to
prevent an increase in the suicide rate, we should keep the level of education generally
low? Of course not, for an increase in the level of education produces other benefits that
tend to outweigh the increase in the suicide rate. Now in the case of gratuities, while the
other benefits are not so immediately obvious, this does not mean that they do not exist.
Thus if one wishes to prevent corruption, even if the acceptance of gratuities does lead
to later corrupt conduct, this does not mean that one should instantly ban the
acceptance of gratuities. A very careful study of the benefits of accepting gratuities
would need to be undertaken first, otherwise you risk cutting off your nose to spite
your face.
One must also consider the fact that banning gratuities almost certainly won’t guarantee
an end to corruption. This is elementary logic. The argument in favour of banning
gratuities in its simplest form seems to be “if we allow gratuities, then we get
corruption, therefore we should ban gratuities, so we don’t get corruption”. The logical
form of this argument would appear to be “If A then B, not A, therefore not B.” As any
good first year logic student knows, this is a common logical fallacy, the fallacy of
9
Kania, Should We Tell the Police to Say ‘Yes’ to Gratuities?, in MORALITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 327-339. (D. Close & N. Meier, eds. 1995).
10
E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE, 163-165 (1975). (Translated by J. Spalding & G. Simpson. First published
in English, 1952).
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
denying the antecedent. An obvious reply to this objection is to suggest that the banning
of gratuities is intended only to reduce corruption, not eliminate it. The success of such
a move would depend heavily on the extent to which the acceptance of gratuities does
have a tendency to cause corruption, a point which I have noted is yet to be adequately
determined.
Richard Kania11 implies that there is another problem with the psychological slippery
slope argument, by suggesting that the attitude of the recipient determines the ethical
status of accepting a gratuity. If he is correct, then it is solely that attitude of the
recipient that determines the slipperiness of the slope. I shall return to this point later.
(ii)The Democratic Ethos of Policing
While he does not accept the slippery slope argument against the acceptance of
gratuities, Michael Feldberg nonetheless feels that there is a case for their nonacceptance. His suggestion is that the acceptance of gratuities “can be demonstrated to
conflict with the just distribution of social benefits in society”.12 Feldberg reflects on the
history of policing, and notes that the forerunners of modern police systems were
actually fee-for-service systems of policing.13 Citizens received “only the protection,
detection, and restitution of stolen property that they paid for directly”.14 Feldberg had
previously discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a fee-for-service system of
policing with participants in his US-wide seminars in law enforcement ethics (taught
with Professor Howard Cohen) and the consensus amongst the participants of these
seminars15 was that the disadvantages of such a system would greatly outweigh the
possible benefits. The suggestion was that since police services were seen as a public
entitlement, restricting their availability to only those who could afford to pay would
create a social injustice. The feeling among the seminar participants was that, if
11
Kania, supra note 9, at 332-338.
Feldberg supra note 7, at 270.
13
Feldberg points to the example of the Bow Street Runners in London. Id. at 271.
14
Id.
15
The participants of the seminars were “professional police officers who currently (had) training
responsibilities, such as academy classroom instructing, curriculum development, field training, training
management, and so forth. Almost all have had experience as ‘street cops,’ many at a supervisory as well
12
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
anything, the poor needed police services far more than the middle and upper classes,
and that the institution of a fee-for-service system would mean that those who required
the services the most would actually receive them the least. Given that in a democracy,
public services should be equally available to all, allowing a fee-for-service system for
policing would be ‘anti-democratic’.
Feldberg’s suggestion is that the acceptance of gratuities parallels a fee-for-service
system. Those businesses (and they usually are businesses) that provide police with
better “gratuities” will receive a disproportionate amount of police protection.
If, for example, Officer Smith chooses to take his dinner at restaurant A because he is offered a
discount there, then restaurant A receives a disproportionate share of the officer’s presence. His
cruiser in the parking lot and his uniformed presence at a table are far greater deterrents to crime
than is the general presence of police in society as a whole. Restaurants B, C, D, and E, where
the food might be better, but the discount policy not as generous, do not receive a similar
benefit of personal police presence for extended periods of time.16
The conclusion of the argument is that while gratuities are not actually bribes, they are
at the very least a cousin to bribes in that “they are rewards to the officer in exchange
for his or her willingness to perform - or not perform - duties according to the wishes of
the payer”.17 However, Feldberg does note that small vices have small effects, that the
free coffee and discount meals that police receive seem a minimum compensation for the
risks of police work, and that we need not begrudge them.18 He also notes that it is true
that police have to eat somewhere, but maintains that police should be as democratic as
possible in the distribution of their time, both on and off duty.
as patrol level.” At the time of writing the article, Feldberg and Cohen had presented the seminar “seven
times to more than 200 participants”. Id. at 270.
16
Id. at 274.
17
Id. at 275.
18
Id. at 276.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
Feldberg’s ‘anti-democratic’ argument is indirectly criticised by Kania.19 He points out
that direct police services are already unevenly distributed in society. There are some
members of society who are heavy users of police services, and some who rarely, if
ever, require direct police presence. While police service is extended equally in the
abstract, the reality is quite different. He suggests that heavy users of police services
feel a sense of debt for their heavy usage, and so wish to repay this debt to the police in
some way. Hence the offering of gratuities. This a point to which I will return later.
(iii)The Public Perception
Much of the writing on the issues of police gratuities emphasises the problem that
gratuities cause in relation to the public image of police, yet there have been very few
studies of the public attitude to police acceptance of gratuities. Most studies only
examine police attitudes to acceptance of gratuities. A study that has surveyed the
attitude of the public to police gratuities was the one conducted by Tim Prenzler and
Peta Mackay,20 published in 1995. Their study attempted to assess the attitude of the
people of Brisbane, Australia to the subject of police acceptance of gratuities.
The results of their survey were extremely interesting, especially in the light of the
background to the study. Brisbane is the capital city of the Australian state of
Queensland. Several years before this study was undertaken, the Queensland police
force was wracked by a massive corruption scandal, which sparked off a Royal
Commission into police corruption in Queensland. The report of this commission
(known as the Fitzgerald inquiry) found evidence of massive endemic corruption in the
Queensland police force, and made over one hundred recommendations to the
government of the time.
Despite this background, and the commonly imputed link between the acceptance of
gratuities and later corrupt activities, Prenzler and Mackay’s study found only 31% of
19
Kania, supra note 9, at 330.
Prenzler & Mackay, Police Gratuities: What the Public Think, 14 C RIM . J UST . E THICS 15-25
(Winter/Spring 1995).
20
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
respondents were opposed to police accepting gratuities in all situations.21 However,
76% of respondents were opposed to police accepting regular free coffee, cold drinks or
discounted meals while on duty.22
Probably the most significant result in the study was found in the reasons that the
respondents gave for their non-approval of the acceptance of gratuities. 59% said that it
created the expectation that a favour or service would follow,23 48% said that they
thought it made the officer look like they were corruptible,24 and 47% thought that the
acceptance of a gratuity would lead to other more serious forms of corruption.25 These
results suggest that, at least in the public eye, the acceptance of gratuities is the start of
a slippery slope. Prenzler and Mackay themselves conclude that the only solution for
police is to accept a ‘no gratuities’ code.26
The main reason for this is that police actually need to have public support if they are
to carry out their duties efficiently. A public perception that police are corrupt, whether
true or not, will have a deleterious effect on police performance. To avoid this problem,
police need to avoid even the appearance of corruptibility.
Why police should accept gratuities:
(i) The Building Blocks of Positive Social Relationships
Richard Kania suggests that under certain circumstances, police in particular, and also
other justice officials, ought to be encouraged to accept gratuities. He grounds this
suggestion on the fact that most people who offer such gratuities do not have as their
purpose the corruption of the police force, but instead that they feel they owe some
sort of debt to the police, and are attempting to repay that debt by the means that they
21
Id. at 22.
Id.
23
Id. at 23.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 18.
22
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
have at their disposal. Kania quotes the example of a short order cook who provided him
with a free meal.27 This cook felt a sense of indebtedness to the police for the security
they brought by frequent visits to his establishment. While this was a service that the
police were routinely obliged to provide, this did not detract from the personal
indebtedness that the cook felt. His response; a personal one, a free meal.
As I mentioned before, police services are not distributed equally. Some citizens are
heavier users than others, and Kania suggests that it is generally the heavier users of
Police services who offer gratuities to police. In general, the intention of the offers is not
to induce police to later corruption, but to thank police for the task that they have
already done. Kania suggests that an analogy with tipping is appropriate.28 He suggests
that tip recipients recognise that they are being tipped for services already rendered, and
that neither the tipper nor the tipped feel any future obligation from the transaction.
The gratuities that are offered to police in these sorts of situations, should be seen as
tokens of an ongoing legal and ethical relationship, suggests Kania, and they should be
accepted by police “as the building blocks of positive social relationships between our
police and the public”.29
When gifts or gratuities are offered in these sorts of situations, where the intention of
the giver is only to thank the police for the services already provided, and the intention
of the recipient is merely to build up the good relations between the public and the
police, Kania thinks there is no ethical problem with the acceptance of gratuities. It is
only in situations where the provider of the gratuity is attempting to build up a ‘credit’
for future use, that such transactions are problematic. Even in those situations Kania
believes that it is ethical for the police to accept the gratuities, provided that they are
not received in that way, but rather are received as expressions of gratitude. He suggests
that “the perception of the recipient toward the exchange is more critical than that of the
27
Kania, supra note 9, at 330.
Id.
29
Id. at 328.
28
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
giver in the categorisation of an exchange as ethical or unethical”.30 If the gratuity does
not alter the way that the police officer carries out their duty, then it is ethical for the
officer to receive the gratuity. Gratuities accepted in this way are merely the building
blocks of good social relations between the police and those with whom they have
regular contact.
I would suggest that there are problems with Kania’s interpretation here, especially with
regard to his ‘tipping’ analogy. The first problem is that people who routinely receive
tips come to expect those tips, and in some cases even demand them. Seeing police
gratuities in this way will inevitably lead to trouble, a problem that I do not think Kania
fully recognises. When discussing the problems that can be caused if an officer
misinterprets an offer from a merchant, Kania mentions the following case.
Having become accustomed to free meals at one restaurant, an officer returned there some time
after being assigned to another beat. The bill for the full price was presented, and the officer did
not have sufficient cash to pay. He had to summon another officer there to help him out with the
payment. What he had been taking as a ‘gratuity’ or ‘gift’ had been an ‘investment’ that the
manager no longer had to keep up.31
While Kania appears to think the biggest problem in this story is the officer’s
misinterpretation of the restaurant’s offer, I am equally worried about the officer
expecting the gratuity, to the extent that he did not have the money to pay. What ‘debt
repayment’ arrangement might have been arrived at if there had not been another officer
present who could assist with payment of the bill? I would suggest that it is situations
like this that can certainly lead to corruption.
The second problem with the tipping analogy is the suggestion that there is no future
orientation in the exchange. I think this is not always the case. If I give you a generous
tip for example, then I may well expect better than average service from you in the
future. Even if the tip is not generous, I may feel that a certain level of tipping is
30
Id. at 335.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
required to ensure that I receive even adequate service in the future. Both of these seem
to be problems if the analogy is stretched to policing. If someone ‘tips’ the police
generously, then it is likely that they are seeking to build up credit for the future, and it
would, I think, be unethical for the police to accept such gratuities. These would be
attempts to corrupt police. This is especially the case where the ‘tipper’ asks at the
same time for the officer’s personal pager number (or equivalent), but also applies in
cases where the generous ‘tips’ are offered to all officers. If someone feels that they
need to provide gratuities to the police in order to receive adequate policing service, then
this is reminiscent of the fee-for-service objection proposed by Feldberg. Both ‘overtipping’ and feeling required to ‘tip’ seem problematic, though neither seems to me to be
quite as bad as the case of the police expecting gratuities, which can certainly lead to
corruption.
Another suggestion, that I will not explore further here, is the suggestion that police
should see the acceptance of tips as a threat to their status as professionals.
Professionals do not receive tips, so if police wish to be seen as professionals, then they
should not accept tips either.
Kania’s argument in favour of the acceptance of gratuities can also be criticised on other
grounds. He suggests that if the gratuity does not alter the way that the police officer
carries out their duty, then it is ethical for the officer to receive the gratuity. But the
acceptance of gratuities may well affect the way a police officer carries out their duty
without them even realising it. If the fact that certain establishments offer gratuities
causes a police officer to spend more time at those establishments, to the detriment of
others, then the acceptance of gratuities has affected the way that the police officer does
their job, even if only in a subtle way. This harks back to Michael Feldberg’s antidemocratic argument against the acceptance of gratuities.
31
Id. at 337.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
(ii) The False Sense of Corruption
John Kleinig points out another reason why it might be reasonable to allow police to
accept at least some gratuities. If the slippery slope to corruption has been overemphasised in police training, then those officers who accept gratuities might feel that
they are already corrupted, and that there is no reason not to proceed to other worse
practices,32 since the over-emphasis on the slippery slope tends to make an officer who
does accept something as simple as a cup of coffee, feel like they have just taken a large
bribe. If an officer feels that they are already compromised, then they might find it easier
to make more significant compromises later, since they feel that they have nothing to
lose. As Kleinig points out, this problem can be avoided by ethics trainers emphasising
Feldberg’s ‘anti-democratic’ argument, rather than the corrupting slippery slope
argument. An officer who feels that they have allowed an unequal distribution of police
resources by accepting a free cup of coffee, is less likely to feel that they have
something to hide than one who feels that they have succumbed to corruption.33
When Police Should Say “NO!” to Gratuities
Having discussed the theory of the acceptance of gratuities, I wish now to turn to the
practicalities of the matter. I want to discuss five types of situation which are
particularly problematic for police, and to suggest that in these types of situation
gratuities should always be refused, even when the policies of the local police
department would allow their acceptance. I also wish to outline the problems in devising
a policy regarding the acceptance of gratuities, and to explain why most such policies are
at the same time both too restrictive and too permissive.
The five situations that I want to examine are: (i) when gratuities are offered because the
recipient is a police officer; (ii) when gratuities are offered on a regular basis; (iii) when
the value of the gratuities offered is disproportionate to the services rendered; (iv) when
the person offering the gratuity is under the impression that certain services will only be
32
33
J. KLEINIG, supra note 4, at 180-181.
Id.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
provided if a gratuity is offered, and (v) when the person offering the gratuity is not
authorised to do so.
(i) Gratuities offered because the recipient is a police officer
There are many situations where people offer gifts or benefits to those who have helped
them, or to those who have performed a service on their behalf. Such interactions are a
part of human relationships, and in most situations are quite unproblematic. I might give
a bunch of flowers to the neighbour who has looked after my children while I have
rushed out to a forgotten appointment, or buy a box of chocolates for the friend who has
helped me to move house. These situations can also include cases where the person who
has served me has actually received payment for that service. An example of this might
include giving a bottle of wine to the plumber who has come to my house in the middle
of the night to fix my blocked sewer. However, when these situations involve police
officers, they become more problematic, since the line between gratitude and attempted
bribery is not always clear.
There is obviously the potential for gifts, gratuities and discounts to be offered to a law
enforcement official, such as a police officer, in an attempt to influence the way in which
that officer does their job. It may be that the discount or benefit is offered so as to
attempt to convince the officer to spend more time at a particular establishment than at
others. Or it may be that the discount or benefit is offered in an attempt to convince the
officer to overlook certain actions or inactions undertaken by the one offering the
benefit.
Whatever the motivation behind the gratuity being offered, any situation where the
gratuity is being offered because the recipient is a police officer must be considered to be
suspect. Realistically there can only be two motivating factors here. Either the person
offering the gratuity is attempting to influence the officer in some way (large or small),
in which case the gratuity should, of course be rejected. Or the person offering the
gratuity feels that they have to offer a gratuity to a police officer. This hearkens back to
the tipping analogy, where people feel that they are required to tip if they expect to
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
receive any sort of service at all. The public has already paid for police service through
their taxes, and should not feel required to make additional payments to the police in the
form of gratuities.
Thus gratuities offered to a police officer because they are a police officer ought to
always be rejected, either because they are being offered as an attempt to bribe the
officer in some (albeit usually small) way, or because they are being offered through the
(hopefully) mistaken feeling that it is necessary to offer something to the police in order
to get any sort of service at all.
Two things should be noted here. First, there is a difference between a gratuity being
offered to someone who happens to be a police officer, and that same gratuity being
offered because that person is a police officer. Let me give an example to illustrate this
point. Suppose a police officer has a relative who owns a restaurant, and that relative
invites all the members of his immediate family to eat for free at that restaurant as often
as they like. Free meals are thus being offered to a person who happens to be a police
officer, but the free meals are being offered because that police officer is a relative of the
owner, not because they are a police officer. It would be quite different if the restaurant
was owned by someone who was not a relative, who made it know that police could eat
for free in his restaurant. That would then be a case of gratuities being offered because a
person is a police officer (in this case probably as an attempt to get more police to eat
there, with the likelihood that this would make the restaurant less prone to disturbances,
and a less inviting target for thieves).
The second thing that should be noted is that simply because a gratuity is offered to
other people who are not police officers, this does not necessarily mean that it is
reasonable for police to accept it. For example, a gratuity offered only to police and
uniformed security guards is certainly no better than a gratuity offered only to police,
and even a gratuity offered to all emergency services personnel is still in some sense
being offered to a police officer only because they are a police officer. My point is
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
simply that if a gratuity is being offered because the recipient is a police officer, then it
should always be refused, and that this is a test of what should always be refused, not
of what ought to always be accepted.
(ii) Gratuities offered on a regular basis
Another situation in which police ought to always refuse to accept gratuities is when
those gratuities are offered on a regular basis. It is quite common for gratuities offered to
police to fit into both of these first two categories: offered because they are police, and
offered on a regular basis. Examples include such things as free drinks, free or discounted
meals, free entry to clubs, and so on. Even when these gratuities are not being offered
solely because the recipient is a police officer, I think that there is still a case for refusing
them, if they are offered on a regular basis.
The three main problems with gratuities being offered on a regular basis, are that they
can come to be expected (as was the case in the previously quoted example from
Kania34), that the acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis is likely to run foul of
Feldberg’s anti-democratic objection,35 and that the acceptance of gratuities on a regular
basis tends to create a relationship between the giver and the receiver, which has the
effect of creating a conflict of interest for the police officer where none previously
existed.
I have already mentioned the problems that occur when gratuities come to be expected,
or even demanded, by the recipient. This can only happen in situations where those
gratuities are given on a regular basis. Thus if police do not accept any gratuities that are
offered on a regular basis, these particular problems will not occur.
Acceptance of gratuities on a regular basis will also tend to fall foul of Michael
Feldberg’s “anti-democratic” argument.36 Since the regular acceptance of gratuities tends
34
Kania, supra note 9, at 337.
Feldberg supra note 7.
36
Id.
35
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
to cause a modification of the behaviour of those accepting the gratuities, this practice
will tend to cause the uneven (and unfair) distribution of police resources in society.
Those establishments and individuals who tend to favour the police with better
gratuities on a regular basis, are likely to see more police, and thus gain extra protection
from the extra police presence. While such an effect is likely to be small at the level of
the individual officer, the effect is more significant if it is examined on a service wide
basis. There is also the undeniable fact that regular acceptance of gratuities can
undermine the public perception of police, as shown by Prenzler and Mackay.37The
impression that extra police presence can be bought for the cost of a cup of coffee or a
greasy hamburger is certainly not an impression that I think the police should cultivate.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the regular acceptance of gratuities creates a
relationship between the giver and receiver, where no such relationship previously
existed. This inevitably involves police in a conflict of interest in any future situation
that involves the people who have offered those gratuities. Conflict of interest in
policing is a significant and under-acknowledged problem, and deserves far more
attention than it has previously been given. It is this issue that really lies at the heart of
the banning of gratuities in the International Police Code of Conduct, quoted at the
beginning of this paper. “Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or gratuities,
large or small, which can, in the public mind, be interpreted as capable of influencing his
judgment in the discharge of his duties”.38 The relationship created between the giver of
the gratuity and the receiver of that gratuity, rather than the actual value of the gratuity
itself, is what is seen as problematic here, for it is that relationship that may have the
tendency, or may be perceived to have the tendency, to influence the judgement of the
police officer in the course of his duties.
All of these problems can be solved by police simply refusing to accept any gratuities
that are offered on a regular basis.
37
38
Prenzler and Mackay, supra note 20.
Supra note 1, at 96.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
(iii) Value of gratuities offered disproportionate to services rendered
Another clear problem for police in accepting gratuities, is when the value of the gratuity
offered is disproportionate to the service rendered by police. For example, one can
imagine an officer called to a minor burglary at a department store, who is told by the
owner to take an expensive leather jacket as a thank you gift. When the value of the
gratuity is disproportionate to the service rendered, as in a case like this, then it is clear
that the gratuity can really only be interpreted as an attempt to bribe the police, to build
up credit for the future as it were, and thus the gratuity should, of course, be rejected. I
include the brief discussion here, only for the sake of completeness.
(iv) Gratuity offered to secure certain services,
Police can encounter situations where a person is, or appears to be, under the
impression that either (a) it is necessary for them to offer a gift or gratuity of some sort
in order to secure the provision of certain police services, or (b) that offering a gift or
gratuity would help to secure the provision of extra police services. This may be the
case even where those services would be supplied regardless of whether a gratuity is
offered, or even where police are obliged to provide those services. While it is obviously
problematic for a police officer to only provide those services if a gratuity is offered (i.e.
for the officer to require the “payment” of a gratuity before offering to provide those
services), it can seem less problematic for an officer to accept a gratuity when they
know that the services would be provided in any case, whether the gratuity was offered
or not. Consider the following case, which illustrates this point.
A police officer attends a burglary, where uninsured goods of a substantial
value have been stolen from a store. The police officer examines the scene of
the crime in the presence of the store owner, and determines that entry to the
store was obtained by breaking a rear window. Upon examination of the
window, the officer notices what appears to be a clear set of fingerprints upon
the glass adjacent to the point of entry, and comments on this fact to the store
owner. The owner immediately offers a small gift to the officer, “as a measure
of thanks”, and then suggests that the fingerprint branch be called to the scene
to record those fingerprints, and to see if that information could be used to
attempt to track down the perpetrator and recover the goods. The officer
knows that policy requires that fingerprint branch be called to the scene as
soon as possible, and was about to inform the store owner of this fact before
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
the owner had offered their gift. The officer accepts the gift (since it has not
altered the way in which they have carried out their duty) and then calls the
fingerprint branch and asks them to attend the scene of the crime.
While the acceptance of the gift has not altered the way in which the officer in this case
has done their duty, I think it is clear that acceptance of a gift in such a case would tend
to create the impression that the offering (and acceptance) of the gift was the reason that
the officer had immediately called the fingerprint branch. In other words, the store
owner is likely to form the mistaken impression that the offering of the gift was
necessary in order to secure the additional police services provided in this case.
Police departments need to guard against the impression that extra services can be
bought in such a way, for two reasons. The first reason is that fee for service systems of
policing, of which this could be considered a type, are anti-democratic, as has already
been noted by Feldberg.39 The second reason is that by appearing to be offering special
services in return for any sort of payment (in this case payment of a small gift), an
officer is helping to create the public impression that they are corruptible, as noted by
Prenzler and Mackay.40
One of the problems for any public official is the fact that they must not only carry out
their duties impartially, but they must also appear to be carrying out their duties
impartially. Even though the store owner is mistaken in their impression that the
offering of a gift has helped to secure speedy attendance of the fingerprint branch, police
must be at pains to ensure that such a mistaken impression is not given the chance to
arise. Thus police ought to refuse any gratuity where a person is, or appears to be,
under the impression that either (a) it is necessary for them to offer a gift or gratuity of
some sort in order to secure the provision of certain police services, or (b) that offering a
gift or gratuity would help to secure the provision of extra police services.
39
40
Supra note 7.
Supra note 20.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
(iv) Gratuity offered by unauthorised person
A final problem in the acceptance of gratuities, rarely mentioned, is the problem of
gratuities being offered by those who are not actually authorised to offer them. Kania’s
example of the short order cook seems to be an appropriate example here.41 At no point
in his discussion does Kania even examine the possibility of whether the short order
cook is actually authorised to give a free meal to a police officer. I think it is reasonable
to assume that he is not. Thus in accepting the free meal, the police officer is effectively
condoning, and even collaborating in, a theft. Police officers are supposed to be impartial
guardians of the law, and thus must not condone or collaborate in thefts in the form of
unauthorised gratuities, benefits, gifts or discounts. If a gratuity is offered by someone
not authorised to offer it, then the police officer should always refuse it, whatever its
value.
The Problems of Creating a Gratuities Policy
Before finishing, I would like to examine some of the problems in formulating a policy
on the acceptance of gratuities, and to make some suggestions as to how these problems
might be overcome. The ideal of any policy is to allow the acceptance of those gratuities
which will be beneficial to the police officer’s work, in line with Kania’s suggestion that
the gratuities build positive social relations between the police and the public,42 while at
the same time excluding those gratuities that will pose problems for policing. The
problem with most codes that allow the acceptance of certain gratuities is that they are
at the same time too permissive, and too restrictive. Let me illustrate this with some
examples.
Suppose we have a police department who have a “no gratuities” code, which prohibits
acceptance of any gratuities, gifts or benefits whatsoever. One problem with such a code
is that it can be carried to ridiculous lengths. A former student of mine once told me a
story of his work with a government department that investigated corrupt conduct.
41
42
Kania, supra note 9, at 337.
Id. at 329.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
Their policy was complete refusal of gratuities. This department held a Christmas
dinner at a nearby restaurant, and at the end of the meal were served coffee, with
“complimentary chocolates”. The head of the department insisted that the chocolates
had to be refused, since they had not been paid for, much to the anger of the owner of
the restaurant, who insisted that the chocolates were given to anyone who ordered
coffee.
A more serious problem with a “no gratuities” code is the fact that there will certainly
be situations where this code would actually inhibit the police officer’s performance of
their job. Imagine an officer who goes to the home of a victim of violent crime, in order
to get a statement from the victim. The victim is badly shaken, and asks the officer to
have a cup of tea with them while making the statement. The “no gratuities” code, will
mean that the officer must refuse the cup of tea, which is likely to put the victim offside
straight away. It might be suggested that the officer refuse the tea, but take a glass of
water, but this really doesn’t solve the problem, since even water has some value. In
cases like this, the actual value of the gratuity offered (i.e. the value of a single tea bag) is
far more symbolic than real. I think that in situations like this, the police officer should
accept the cup of tea, as in all likelihood they will actually get a better statement from
the victim if they do. But this would mean abandoning the “no gratuities” code in favour
of a code which allows acceptance of gratuities such as this.
So let us consider a gratuities code that allows the acceptance of a light refreshment,
such as a cup of tea or coffee. This would allow the officer to accept the cup of tea from
the victim of violent crime, but would also allow the acceptance of gratuities on a regular
basis from businesses. A 24 hour petrol station that provides free drinks to police might
well receive the benefit of extra police presence due to this service, to the detriment of
other nearby establishments who are equally deserving of police time. If the other
establishments feel that they must also provide free drinks for police in order to gain
equal police presence, then we have a situation where people are effectively paying for
police presence. This situation may also develop into a bidding war for better police
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
protection: one place offers free coffee, so the other offers coffee and a doughnut, so the
first offers sandwiches as well …
Perhaps the answer is a policy that forbids the acceptance of gratuities from businesses.
But there are some situations where it seems appropriate to accept gratuities from
businesses, such as the previously described case of taking a statement from a victim of
violent crime, while there are also some situations where individuals might benefit from
offering regular gratuities to police, such as the lone security guard who always offers
the police coffee from his thermos. Prohibiting acceptance of gratuities from businesses
would prevent police from accepting the first of these, but allow the acceptance of the
second, which seems to be precisely the situation that should be avoided.
Other codes attempt to get around the problem of gratuities by placing a limit on the
value of gratuities that can be accepted. The biggest problem with such a code is that the
value of a cup of coffee or tea is so small that these codes would always allow its
acceptance, yet the regular provision of free drink can cause problems for police, as we
have already seen. A further problem for such policies on the acceptance of gratuities is
that there seem to be some situations where it is appropriate for police to accept gifts
that are of significant value. Imagine a homicide detective who has been working on a
particular case for several years. In this time he has had regular contact with the victim’s
family. Eventually the case is cracked, and the perpetrator is brought before the court,
found guilty, and sent to jail. The victim’s family then sends a case of wine to the
detective, as thanks for all the work that he has done over the last few years. It seems to
me that it would be reasonable for the detective to accept this gift, which is certainly
given in recognition of services already performed, rather than in expectation of services
to be rendered in the future. Yet most gratuities polices would force the detective to
refuse this sort of gift; a code that based acceptance on the value of the gift would
certainly force refusal. Clearly there is a need for a code that will prevent acceptance of
inappropriate gratuities, but will allow the acceptance of genuine displays of gratitude.
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Stephen Coleman, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
I would suggest that the only answer to these sorts of problems is to create a code that
allows the police officer to exercise their own judgement about the acceptance of
gratuities. Such a code would need to specify the sorts of gratuities that should be
refused, and should outline the sorts of situations where they might be accepted. Since
one of the major problems with the acceptance of gifts and gratuities is their hidden
nature, such a code should also include provision for the recording and audit of gifts of
significant value.
Police are entrusted with significant powers, and are expected to exercise sound
judgement, within guidelines in a wide variety of circumstances. I would suggest that the
best way to deal with the problem of gratuities is to provide police with guidelines in
this area, and then let them exercise their judgement in this area as well.
25