The New Political Geography
Author(s): Peter Hall
Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, No. 63 (Nov., 1974), pp. 48-52
Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
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The newpoliticalgeography
PETER
HALL
Professor
ofGeography,
University
ofReading
MS received28 February1974
and theoryin politicalscienceare sadlyill-developed.Of
ABSTRACT.
The connections
betweentheoryin humangeography
in politicalscience-normative,
andpositive-itis thelasttwowhichwouldseemto have
thethreetypesoftheory
descriptive
in geography
sincethesubjecthas neitheran explicit
thegreatest
relevanceforgeography.
Normative
theoryhardlyfeatures
norimplicitnormative
in geography,
base. Of thelikelyfieldsof politicaltheorywhichwouldbe fruitful
thoseconcerning
individualsand theirmotives,and decisiontheoryseemparticularly
Of thepositivetheory,
thetheoryofgames
promising.
at a micro-level
andthetheory
ofthefirmat a macro-level
seemto havegreatpotential.
shouldlearnmuchfrom
Geographers
of uncertainty.
thepoliticalliterature
on decision-making
in an environment
The new politicalgeographer
shouldbe concernedwiththedecisionforcesaffecting
thedistribution
ofspaceas a scarcepublicgoodand consequently
withthevalues,
theorganization
and theaccessto powerof groups.
THEdecisionto confront
a
thethemeofpublicpolicyat theI974 Conference
musthaveconcentrated
becausethereis stillan astonishing
lackofeffective
connection
between
numberofmindswonderfully,
in humangeography
in politicalscience.I wouldarguethattheword'astonishing'
andtheory
is
theory
for
for
connection
is
now
so
clear.
for
the
need
such
human
justified,
Younger
working
geographers,
theirPh.Ds,aretending
toturnawayfromhighly
macro-models
becausetheyfindthemlackquantified
and thereby
ingin depthof causalexplanation
(theyfeel)inadequatein predictive
power.They are
insteadon micro-studies
ofspatialdecisionprocessesbyone manor (more
concentrating
increasingly
in interaction:
thedecisionto locatea factory
in a
usually)a numberof peopleand groupsworking
on one lineratherthananother.These
area,thedecisionto buildan urbanmotorway
development
arehavingto forgea newbodyoftheory
on theirown;yet,apartfromtheneo-Marxian
frameworkers
Pahl
workprovided
and
behind
like
Castells
French
writers
them,
byHarvey(I973)
(1970) (and,
(I972)
no interpretation
ofpoliticalsciencemodelsis availablein spatialterms.
andLefebvre
(I972)), virtually
In thesecircumstances,
canbe no morethansuggestive.
It is clearly
to
mycontribution
impossible
makea systematic
whichis of potential
reviewof thevastbodyof literature
and to tryto
relevance,
it in termsmeaningful
to thegeographer;
in anycase,sucha systematic
reviewexistsin the
interpret
I shalltryfirst
ofBauerandGergen(I968). Therefore,
to makea verygeneraltaxonomy
earlychapters
to focuson someofthemoreimportant
ofthetheoretical
work;then,withinthisframework,
insights;
in
to
tentative
terms
some
lastly, suggest very
applications.
geographical
THE MAIN THEORETICAL
APPROACHES
The simplest
madein Bauerand Gergen'sreviewas in a numberofothersources,is
possibledivision,
betweennormative
and
One mayask howpeopleand groupsshouldact in
theory descriptive
theory.
theresultstheydo,
orderto getthebestresults;or one mayaskhowpeopleactuallygo aboutgetting
one mayspeak
whether
admirable
or not.But then,borrowing
also fromthelanguageof economics,
in
it
ofa thirdtype;positivetheory.
Like normative
this
is
that
starts
fromcertain
deductive
theory,
it seeksto explainwhatwillhappenundercertainconrulesor premises.
Butlikedescriptive
theory,
it provides
notwhatshouldhappen.Nevertheless,
becauseit hasan inherent
ditions,
logicalstructure,
in
it
an implicit
that
to
show
the
of
alternative
to
seeks
them
consequences
guide policy-makers
policy
actions.
This three-fold
classification
is I believethemostusefulone.It is notalwayseasyto decidewhere
within
it. Somereviewsdescribewholegroupsoftheories-inparticular,
belongs
anyparticular
theory
48
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andpublicpolicy
Geography
49
thosederiving
fromwelfare
economics-asnormative
whentheymightmoreaccurately
be classedas
I
But
if
we
the
would
that
themainareasof possiblerelevance
forgeoargue
positive.
accept triad,
arethedescriptive
andthepositive-particularly
thelatter.This is simply
becausetheyarethe
graphers
usualmodesof theorybuildingin humangeography.
Ecologicalmodelsof thecity,or studiesof the
urbanhierarchy,
ortheranksizerule,areclassicalexamplesofdescriptive
Centralplacetheory
theory.
and spatialinteraction
arestandardexamplesofpositivetheory.
The strengths
and weaknesses
theory
ofeacharereasonably
wellknownto all geographers.
Normative
on theotherhand,has hardlyanyplacein thegeographical
tradition.
At first
theory,
in Britain,
hasnothumangeography
offered
sight,thismightseemodd.Particularly
verystrong
policy
to theplanner
? Has notthisbeenthemeanswhereby
rather
thanarchitecture,
prescriptions
geography,
hasnowbecomethecommonest
? The answeris surely
singlemodeofentryto theplanning
profession
thatgeography's
rolehas been,first,
thesurveystageofGeddes'classicthreestagesof
descriptive-in
thenpositive,
in themanipulation
ofmodelswithinthesystems
survey-analysis-plan-and
approachto
Plannershavesoughtnormselsewhere:
fromtheirownmoralsense(especially
in thepioneer
planning.
calculadays);fromthereceivedopinionofpressure
groupsand opinionleaders;fromtheshort-term
tionsof localauthority
fromthepublicthrough
politicians;and latterly,
thoughso farinadequately,
exercises
in participation.
It is difficult
tosee howitwouldbe otherwise.
Forgeography,
mostclearly
ofall thesocialsciences,
has neither
an explicitnoran implicit
normative
base. It mightbe argued,perhaps,thatsucha basis
existedin spatialefficiency
ortheconquestofthetyranny
ofthefriction
ofdistance.
ButI do notthink
thatthisis trulya norm:itis rather
a description
ofwhatmenseektodo inactuality,
or(in otherformuaboutwhattheymightbe thought
to do, forproofor disproof.
The geographer
is
lations)a hypothesis
notheresetting
to be achieved,
orobjective
function
tobe maximized.
within
up anyobjective
Working
a plannedframework,
hewouldasktheplanner(orhisalterego,ifhe be a plannerhimself)
tojudgethe
objectiveofspatialefficiency
againstotherpossibleobjectives;thenhe wouldseekto rankor evaluate
theseobjectives,
The same,I think,goesforanyotherso-called
usingnormsdrawnfromelsewhere.
normthatthegeographer
the'norm'of qualityof environment.
mightbe said to have: forinstance,
Fromthis,I wouldarguethatgeography
is mostlikelytomakea fruitful
withthose
intellectual
marriage
thatareeitherdescriptive,
or positive,
in character.
partsofpoliticalsciencetheory
Thereis, however,
anotherusefulpossiblewayofclassifying
in politicalscience;for,like
theory
the
of
on contributions
fromothersocialsciences.Thus,justas
geography, study politicsdrawsheavily
humangeography
has a sidethatis strongly
basedon economictheory
and anotherthatis as strongly
basedon sociological
so exactlyhas politicalscience.Verybroadly,
one can saythattheories
theory,
derivedfromeconomics
aremorelikelyto be normative
thanthosederivedfromsociology.
Butthisis
notquitetrue,forat leasttworeasons.First,thereis theexistence
ofa largeandstrongbodyoftheory
in positiveeconomics,
whichhas strongly
influenced
politicalsciencein thelasttwodecades.Downs
describeshis classicEconomic
as positive,and thesameverdict
(I957) explicitly
theory
ofdemocracy
muststandforBuchananand Tullock's(1962) Thecalculusofconsent
and forMancurOlson's(1965)
Thelogicofcollective
action.Again,important
whichhaveprovedextremely
partsof economictheory
forapplication
fruitful
to politicalscience-suchas thetheory
ofgames-areessentially
positiveeconomicswitha normative
it hasto be recognized
thatbotheconomics
andsociology
application.
Secondly,
havea normative
stresses
andtradebasis,as Olsonhaspointedout.Economics
self-interest,
competition
offbetween
andalsobetween
in which
state
objectives
persons;itsidealis so-calledParetooptimality
(a
no one can be madebetteroffwithout
someoneelse beingmadeworseoff)and economicgrowth
in
mutual
pursuitof thatstate.Sociology-atanyratein theclassicalParsonianformulation-stresses
andadaptation
ofgroupsandindividuals;
itsidealis sucha stateofadjustment,
which(Olson
adjustment
wouldprobably
be an economically
suggests)
stagnant
society.Theoriesderivedfromthesetwosources
are likelyto showcleartracesof theirorigin-as one can see clearly,I think,if one compares,
say,
Downs(I957) withLindblom(1968).Butitis important
notto overstress
thecontrast.
Botheconomics
and Parsoniansociologydeal withcomplexmarginaladjustments
betweenindividuals
and between
withtrade-offs
and compromises
in a worldwhereall objectives
cannotbe
groups.Bothareconcerned
achieved.Andthisis centralto theworldwithwhichpoliticalscienceis alsoconcerned.
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50
PETER HALL
AN ARBITRARY
CHOICE
OF THEORIES
Withinsucha framework,
whichamonga richmultitude
of candidates
providethemostpromising
theoretical
forthegeographer?
The choicemustbe personal
andtosomeextent
Here
insights
arbitrary.
thenare somehostagesto fortune.
andsociologically
derivedsideonefindsa
First,on thedescriptive
American
in origin-concerning
individuals
andtheir
well-developed
bodyoftheory-overwhelmingly
theirrolesin thepolicy-making
and
ofgroups,and therecruitment
motivations,
process,thestructure
influence
ofelites.Sincethismaterial
is already
familiar
inparttosocialgeographers,
andis rapidly
fairly
moreso,itprovides
an obviousstarting
to be coupledwithanother
becoming
point.It needs,however,
of a moreexclusively
concernedwiththe theoryof
bodyof descriptive
theory,
politicalcharacter,
decisiontheory,
whichis purelynormative)
andof
decision-making
(bywhichI do notmeanstatistical
formulation.
Thislatterfieldincludessuchconcepts
as consensus
the
rolestructures,
policy
formulation,
rulesofthepolitical
of
the
allocation
and
the
(in
game anyparticular
context),
handling
political
priorities
offeedback
abouttheeffects
ofpoliticaldecisions.
willbe
The strengths
andweaknesses
ofsuchtheory
It is sufficiently
flexible
andsubtletoincorporate
ofpolitical
thecomplexities
behaviour
readily
apparent.
as theyactually
itis non-rigorous
andinpractice
notnecessarily
happen.But,bythesametoken,
(though
in theory)
somewhat
I thinkthatit willprovidethebasisfor
Nevertheless,
lackingin quantification.
mostofthemicrostudiesbygeographers
in thenextfewyears-asindeeditis alreadybeginning
to do.
More difficult,
butultimately
are thepositivetheoriesderiving
in part
perhapsmorerewarding,
fromtheeconomists.
Theirvalueis that,thoughtheycovermuchofthesamegroundas thedescriptive
thatshouldbe capableof repeatedtesting.In
theory,
theydo so on thebasisof deductive
postulates
onecan distinguish
twoimportant
areasofpositivetheory:first,
derivedfrom
particular,
micro-theory
vonNeumannand Morgenstern's
ofgames;and secondly,
derivedfromtheories
theory
macro-theory
ofthefirm.
Game theoryhas thesupremevirtuethatit is basedon thepostulated
of individuals
behaviour
is
to maximize
theirutilities
concerned
underconditions
ofuncertainty.
Its relevance
to politicaltheory
too obviousto needstressing.
Its overwhelming
in
is
of
the
course
difficulty practice
computational
zerosumgamewhich
probleminvolvedin movingbeyondthesimplest
typeofgame:thetwo-person,
was the mainburdenof von Neumann'swork.Two Americancontributors,
Rapoport(1960) and
non-zero
thetheory
to thecase of n-person,
Schelling(1960), havemademajoradvancesin applying
sumgames;thatis, gamesinvolving
where
the
is
not
one
of
situation
manyplayers,
purecompetition,
to co-operation.
butone involving
Thus thetheoretical
basisis available;theproblem
positivereturns
is computational.
workdependsheavilyon thenotionofa strategy;
themap,so to speak,
Rapoport's
of movesin a game.He showsthatin thesimplestpossibletwoperson,
of all possiblecombinations
zerosumgame-noughtsand crosses-thereare over15ooo different
waysof playingthegameand
to the
overone billiondifferent
forthetwoplayersto adopt.Applying
thetheory
possiblestrategies
in real-life
are invariably
n-person,
complexproblemsof decision-making
policyformation-which
non-zero
sum(becausetheyinvolvestrong
elements
ofco-operation
to achieveendsthatmayin aggrethanotherends)-it is clearthatat present
be better
is lessinrigorous
therelevance
applicagateutility
tion,thanin generalunderstanding.
inuncertainty.
knownofthemacro-theories
alsodealwithdecision-making
The better
Theycannot
ofcourseprovidetherigourofgametheory.
Buttheycan,perhaps,
a
of
level
explanasystematic
provide
fromDowns(I957),
tionofpoliticalprocesses
whichmaybe lackingin descriptive
An example,
theory.
in commonsave
is theaxiomthatan electionmaybe wonbya coalitionofminorities
sharingnothing
an intense
fortheirrespective
causes.Another,
alsofromDowns,is theconceptofthepassionate
concern
bothpartiesnearlyalwaysadopta policythatthe
the notionthatin a two-party
majority:
system,
citizensfeel
ofvotersstrongly
A passionate
exists,Downsargues,wherever
majority
majority
prefers.
morestrongly
aboutpolicyissuesthatmostotherssharewiththemthantheydo aboutthoseissueson
division
whichtheyareina minority.
is thatbyencouraging
ofviewpoint,
One implication
specialization
of labourin modernsociety
tendstobreakup passionate
andtoencourage
minority-coalition
majorities
Downs also showsthatthe celebratedparadoxof KennethArrow-that,in certain
governments.
it is logically
to followa majority
view-makesitlikelythatanygovernment
circumstances,
impossible
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andpublicpolicy
Geography
5I
willbe regularly
defeated
at thenextelection;onlyuncertainty
maysavetheday,sincevotersmaynot
ofgovernment
knowtheconsequences
policiesforthem.
Buchananand Tullock(1962), similarly
intothequestion:in whatparticular
providerichinsights
wouldindividuals
circumstances
orgroupsfinditworththeirwhileto supportcommunal
action,either
on a voluntary
basisorthrough
stateintervention?
thattheanswerdependson theaggreTheysuggest
coststo theindividual
ofthelaissez-faire
gateoftwosetsofcosts:ontheonehand,theexpectedexternal
thatbothwillvarywiththe
situation;
and,on theother,thecostsoftakingaction.The authors
suggest
ofpeopleinvolved
inreaching
on a decision;andthustheysuggest
number
a wayofanalysing
agreement
thesize of themajority
and forecasting
thatwillbe regardedas adequateforanyparticular
classof
decision.
To tryto summarize
in thiswayis necessarily
a hopelesstask.I canonlyprovide
complextheories
ofthetypesofapproachthatmightbe fruitful
illustrations
to applyin a spatialcontext.
For thehuman
theparticular
valueof thepositivetheorists
in politicalscienceis precisely
thattheirapgeographer,
ofa model,followed
formulation
as faras possibleagainstreality-isthe
proach-deductive
bytesting
onethathasalso nowbecomecommonplace
in ourscience.And,it mustbe said,geographers
willalso
thefactthatthemorerigorousthetheory,
findfamiliar
theless capableit seemsto be in generalof
data.Againstthisbackground,
whatmightbe themostlikelyapplications
to
testingagainstempirical
problems?
geographical
SOME GEOGRAPHICAL
APPLICATIONS
at centralor
whether
First,it is clearthatthesewillmainlybe in thesphereofpublicpolicydecisions,
level.(Relatedanalysesmighthoweverbe madeforpurelyprivateinvestment
local government
decisions-ifindeedsuchcanbe saidtoexistinthemodern
world-intermsoftheinternal
structure
ofthe
firm.)Secondly,the decisionwill have a distinctand centralspatialcomponent;almostall public
involvedisposition
of resources
in geographical
is
decisions,by definition,
space,butthegeographer
in questions
interested
wherea truespatialchoiceis involved-asinthelocationofa motorway
normally
or a powerstationor a greenbeltor a housingdevelopment.
Thirdly-andthishas becomeobvious
of
to
the
work
due
other
and
radical
be
willnormally
Pahl,
only
Harvey
geographers-the
geographer
in space as a valuableresource,
interested
forwhichdifferent
groupsof thepopulationcompetefor
variouspurposes.The politicalprocess,in thisformulation,
is seenas allocating
spaceas a publicgood,
in otherwordsa goodthatcannotbe sold in themarket
placebecauseof its nature,or is notin fact
so sold becausea politicaldecisionhas beentakento removeit in wholeor in partfromthemarket
inBritain).Geographers,
in thedecisionprocess
economy
(forexamplemedicine
then,willbe interested
thedistribution
ofspaceas a scarcepublicgood.The samespacemayhavedifferent
affecting
typesof
valuefordifferent
thelineofa proposedmotorway
groupsof thepublic:forinstance,
mayrepresent
thedestruction
of symbolic
old buildings
accessibility
by car forone group(motoring
organizations),
foranother
severance
and destruction
ofa community
foranother
(amenity
societies),
(localresidents),
Thesegroupsholdtheirvalueswithvarying
jobsforanother
(contractors).
strengths,
theyhavedifferent
accessto politicalpower,andtheyareofdifferent
size.
Fromthis,certaincentrallinesof research
seemto follow.The newstyleof urbanpoliticalgeoforthatis whatheseemsdestined
tobecome,willbe concerned
withthevalues,theorganization,
grapher,
andtheaccesstopowerofgroups.He willanalysetherelationship
ofthesegroupstothedecision-making
whooperatethismachinery)
at different
relevant
levelsofgovernment.
(andthepersonalities
machinery
He willstudyhowdifferent
agentsinthedecisionprocess-politicians,
bureaucrats,
technicians,
opinionhowtheyformalliancesand coalitions,
howtheybargain,
each
formers-interact,
promiseor threaten
othertoobtainobjectives.
His concern,
as I havestressed
earlierandnowfinally
stressagain,is toanalyse
whathappens,nottopostulate
whatshouldhappen.Yet,bytheveryfactofexposing
thewaydecisions
are takenin practice,I wouldexpectand hopethatthepoliticalgeographer
wouldprovidepowerful
forfuture
suggestions
improvement.
REFERENCES
BAUER,R.A. and GERGEN,K.J. (1968) Thestudyofpolicyformulation
(New York)
BUCHANAN,
J. M. and TuLLocK,G. (1962) The calculusofconsent
(AnnArbor)
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PETER
52
HALL
CASTELLS, M. (1972) La questionurbaine (Paris)
DOWNS,A. (1957) An economic
ofdemocracy
theory
(New York)
HARVEY,D. W. (I973) Socialjustice and the city (London)
LEFEBVRE,H. (1972) La penseeMarxisteet la ville(Paris)
LINDBLOM,
C. (1968) Thepolicy-making
process(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.)
action(Cambridge,Mass.)
OLSON, M. (1965) Thelogicofcollective
PAHL, R. E. (1970) Patterns
ofurbanlife(London)
RAPOPORT, A. (1960) Fights,
games,and debates(AnnArbor)
SCHELLING, T. (1960) Thestrategy
ofconflict
(Cambridge, Mass.)
VON NEUMANN, J. and MORGENSTERN, 0. (I964) Theory
behaviour
ofgamesand economic
(New York)
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