ABC and the Destruction of American Television,
1953-1961
d•mes LewisBaughman
versityof Wisconsin-Madison
THE INTRODUCTION of televisionin the late 1940s and 1950s
involvedmore thana strugglefor audiences.
Through the fifties,the three
national networksoffered sharplycontrastingmodelsof programming.
And TV arguablywasmore diversebecauseof this rivalry. Almostfrom
the beginningof regularlyscheduledtelecasts
in 1947, nationalnetworks
determinedthe programmingof TV, especially
in the evenings,whenmost
consumersusedtheir receivers.One of the chains,National Broadcasting
Company,included managerswho believedTV could be a new form of
massamusement,suitable for experimentation.Columbia Broadcasting
Systemrelied on radio in lookingfor programmingideasand transferred
successful
radio showsto TV. A third chain, the American Broadcasting
Company,by succeedingin the late 1950s with a different philosophyof
programming,eventuallyimposedthe film industry'sstandards
ontonightly
entertainment. As audiences turned to ABC, the other networks followed.
Televisiontook on a standardized,movielandqualityfor the next twentyfive years [33, 99, 100].
Ironically,the federal overseerof television,the FederalCommunicationsCommission
(FCC), had anticipateda differentoutcome.The FCC
historicallychampioned"diverse" programming;that is, licenseesand
networksshouldoffer differenttypesof programssoconsumers
had a true
choiceamongthe limited number of radio and TV frequenciesavailable
[91, 93]. • In 1941, the FCC had forced NBC to divestitself of its second
radio chain, the Blue Network [9, 120]. This weak systembecameABC.
Twelveyearslater,the Commission
permittedthe financiallyailingnetwork
to be acquiredby United ParamountTheatres (UPT). The agencyhad
determined that ABC's continued operation would enhance American
television. With little attention to the economicsof broadcasting,the
Commissionconcludedthat Americanswould be better servedby three
56
ratherthan two networks[18; 19; 29; 30; 73; 121, pp. 264, 319, 333].
Yet by creatingABC out of the Blueand then keepingthat systemalive
by agreeingto the UPT merger,the Commission
ultimatelylessened
the
diversityof networktelevision.The FCC promotednewrivalriesthat came
to havea deleteriousimpacton the mostpopularculturalform in postwar
America.
The Commission's
February1953 approvalof the UPT-ABC merger
had little immediateeffecton networkcompetition.TV networkingthen
for all practicalpurposeswasa duopoly,with the NationalBroadcasting
Companyand the ColumbiaBroadcasting
System,dominant.ABC and a
fourthchain,the Du Mont network,werewaybehind.At the time of the
merger,ABC wasin a very weakposition.With thirteenaffiliatestations
(lessthan 10 percentof either CBS'sor NBC's chain),ABC programs
couldonlybe seenin one-thirdof the nation,comparedto virtualnational
coveragefor CBS and NBC. The networkhad two mildly popularseries
(OzzieandHarrietand Beulah) and wasexperiencingdifficultypersuading
advertisers
to sponsor
anything
elseoffered.The networkproducedtwelve
and one-halfhoursof programminga week. "We weren't a network,"
recalledone executivein 1961 [60, 68].2 Indeed, ABC wasso far behind
that two yearsafter the mergerNBC wasableto blackmailWestinghouse
into switchingownershipof TV stationsby exchangingits desirable
Philadelphia-owned
outletfor one in Cleveland,ownedby NBC. Westinghouseotherwisewould have lostits NBC affiliation,and its Philadelphia
stationwould have had to becomeand ABC affiliated station[35; 83; 122,
pp. 427, 432; 133].
Within six years,however,ABC wasnot only challengingNBC and
Columbiafor the ratingsleadership,but leadingthe older networksin
programmingtrends,which arguablylessenedthe diversityof television.
ABC led in shifts to filmed series, increases in the number of western and
detectivedramas.As CBSand NBC followed,theyin the process
canceled
many live and dramatic programsidentified with the massmedium's
"Golden Age." ABC, in fact, proved sufficientlysuccessful
that by late
1959,bothCBSandNBC hadformerABC executives
servingaspresidents
of their TV networks.In 1961, Martin Mayer, a journalist who had
followedTV from the beginning,observed,
ABC has become,in a surprisinglyshort time, the industryleader in
mattersof programming,sellingand dealingwith affiliatedstations.In
eacharea, the rival networks,mostof the advertisingagencies,
and the
staffof the FCC believe,rightlyor wrongly,that the ABC influencehas
tendedto destroywhat integritythe networkbusiness
had [68, p. 59].
A few TV criticsnoted thistransformation
with horror.John Crosby
of theHerald-Tribune,
whoin 1952hadbemoaned
the "dominantduopoly"
57
of CBSand NBC, wassixyearslatertermingABC a "pernicious"influence
on the medium [72, 113].
Differences
in management
experience
at the three networkspartly
explain ABC's role in fifties television.At the beginningof network
telecasting,CBS wasrun by figurestestedin radio broadcasting.
They
dreaded,perhapsto excess,
the possibility
of governmentintervention[ 13,
54]. Programmers
at NBC includedold radio handsand a former advertising executive,SylvesterL. Weaver.Chief programmerbetween 1949
and 1956, Weaver was determined to make TV distinctive, not the imitator
of radio or film. And in 1953, Weaverdevelopedthe 60-to-120minute
"spectacular,"
a speciallive musicalor dramaticproductionaired monthly
[31, 69, 136].
At ABC, in contrast,the merger with UPT wassoonfollowedby a
slowstruggleto bring Hollywood'sstandardsand productto television.
ABC
President
Robert
Kintrier
and UPT-ABC
Chairman
Leonard
Gold-
enson,despitepromisesto the FCC that the new ABC teamwouldadhere
to broadcasttraditions,"weresoonin Californiaseekingfilm companies
to produceseriesfor their network.Mostmotionpicturemakershad been
boycottingTV. But Kintrier,a gruff, chain-smoking
formerjournalist,was
an especiallyforceful presencein the movie colony.Indeed, he was
reputedlya matchfor the notoriously
rough-hewnHarry Cohnof Columbia
Pictures.
4 Goldenson,a graduateof the Universityof Pennsylvania
and
Harvard lawschool,alsousedhispre-mergercontactsasthe UPT executive
to negotiate[97].5Late in 1954, ABC broke the Hollywoodquarantine
of TV. Wait DisneyStudiosagreedto produceprogramsfor ABC after
the networkagreedto help financeDisney'splannedamusementpark,
Disneyland[1, 22, 95]. A year later, Warner Brothers,one of the largest
film makers,crossed
the lineandsigneda dealwith ABC. Others,including
MoG-Mand Fox,soonfollowed[2, p. 15; 75; 101].6
Both the Warnersand Disneyprogramsprovedextraordinarilysuccessful.Indeed, the first hour-longDisneyshowwassuchan immediate
hit with childrenthat evenstationsunaffiliatedwith ABC soughtto pick
it up. At ABC's New York headquarters,
secretaries
wore MickeyMouse
ears. Congressmen
reported of constituents
angry over certain stations
airingthe programpastyoungsters'
bedtime.Three differentDisneyhours
about the life of Davy Crocketttouchedoff a coonskincap craze so
widespreadthat SenatorEstesKefauverabandonedthat headgearas his
politicaltrademark.The coonskincap,hisdaughteraverred,hadbecome
too muchidentifiedwith little boys[32, 41, 53, 74, 78, 123].
For ABC, Warners,too, enjoyedsuccess
in televisionby producing
Westernseries.Efforts to adapt into seriesold feature films, King'sRow
andCasablanca,
failed,whileonesinvolvingthe frontier,includingCheyenne,
Sugarfoot,
and Maverick,drew large audiencesto the third network. Soon,
58
all three networkswere offering more westerns.And in January 1959,
onefifth of all eveningserieswerewesterns
[4, 7, 102, 109, 115 128].7
The westwardmovement-- initiatedby ABC -- wasquicklyfollowed
by an emphasisat Americanon the detectiveseries.Massproducedby
Warners,eachhada regularcastof unknown,youngeractorswhoa decade
earlier would have been featuredin a B movie.Serieslike 77 SunsetStrip
andSurfside
6 weredistinguished
onlybytheirlocale.A privateinvestigation
firm of two or more handsome men aided the beautiful and the damned,
weekin, weekout. And just as Cheyenne
had provedpopularin Bayonne,
programslike HawaiianEyewon the heartsof viewersfrom Portland to
Portland. With such popularity came still more young detectives.As
Warnersincreaseditsoutputof detectiveseriesinto the 1959-1960 season,
a San Franciscocritic wrote, "The Warner Brothersare turning out so
many private eyesthis seasonthey ought to be forced to take out an
optometrist'slicense."[64, 94, 137]
The detectiveand westernprogramshavebeencommonlyclassified
by communication
researchers
as "action/adventure"series.Gunplay,not
wordsor humoroussituations,ordinarilyresolvedan episode's"crisis."
Leadswereset,weekin, weekout. And criticshad somedifficultypraising
any of them. 77 Sunset
Strip,wroteone, proved"principallythat Warner
Brotherscan still make a B movie" [45; 65; 68, pp. 61, 62; 130, 131].8
But then Goldensonof ABC, wrote Martin Mayer in 1961, "believesthat
the B-pictureis the correct televisionshowas it was the correct showin
the neighborhoodmoviehouse"[68, pp. 59, 61, 62; 105, p. 6].
The action/adventureserieshad a specialappealto an audienceABC
coveted.Well behindCBS and NBC at the outset,ABC soldprogramsto
advertisers
on the basisof the qualityrather thanthe sheerquantityof the
network'saudiences.Most ABC westernsand detectiveseriesregularly
featuredyoungadult maleswho in turn were found to attract young
families.Kintner'ssuccessor,
Oliver Treyz, presidentof ABC TV between
1956 and 1962, skillfullyusedsuchdemographic
data in sellingprograms
to advertisers.
The 18-to-49-year-old
clusterof viewers,manywithfamilies,
frequentlypreferredABC programs.They werealsomorelikelyto spend
moneyon a widerangeof consumer
items.ABC, Treyz argued,appealed
to the "get set" [21; 23; 88; 97, p. 391; 105, p. 6].0
Then, too, most of ABC's action/adventureprogramssucceeded
becauseof the network's"counter-programming"
philosophy.
Counterprogrammingcalledfor the networkschedulerto locatevulnerableprogramson hisrival'sschedules
and then offer in contrasta very different
type of show.This practiceowedsomethingto the moviehousemanagers
of the 1940slookingfor a differenttypeof film (western)the weeka rival
ran anothertype(musical).
Mayerobserved,"If Clausewitz
sawwar asthe
continuationof politicsby other means,Goldensonhas seen network
59
televisionas the continuation
of the movietheatrebusiness
by other
means"[21; 23; 88; 97, p. 391; 105,p. 6].9In thecaseofABC TV, Treyz
determined
thatif NBC andColumbiaairedlivevarietyprograms,
asthey
eachdid at 8 p.m. (ET) on Sundays
in the fall 1957 season,
thena filmed
Western(Maverick)mightwin audiences
to American.Similarly,the next
season,a CBS anthology,Lux Playhouse,
might be vulnerableto the
detectivesworkingat 77 Sunset
Strip;in the fall 1959 season,ABC set
Adventures
in Paradise
againstAlcoa/Goodyear
Playhouse
(NBC). ABC also
scheduledpotentiallypopularsixty-minuteseriesone half-houraheadof
the competitions'
hour-longprograms[23, p. 28; 68, p. 59, 62; 88, p.
561.
Counter-programming
proved profitable for American. By the
1958-1959season,
ABCcouldboastfor thefirsttimeof beingcompetitive
in thoselargerurbanmarketswhereit had affiliates
competing
directly
with CBS and NBC stations. Advertisers like Procter & Gamble, which
had heretoforeshunnedthe third network,now answered
Treyz'scalls.
"Respectfor ABC hasincreased,"one underwritercommented."ABC has
programmedmuch 'junk' and a substantialpart of its scheduleis 'still
junk' butnevertheless
ABCisa serious
contender
andno onecandispute
that" [23, p. 28; 25; 34; 40; 55; 92; 103; 110; 129].
Treyz andGoldenson
defendedcounter-programming
by contending
it actuallyincreased
the diversityof programming
availableto viewers.If
ABCoffereda westernto varietyprograms
on NBCandCBS,theconsumer
had a choice. Moreover, ABC executives insisted that the total network
TV schedule,
notjust American's,
be considered
in calculating
diversity.
"We do not believethat ABC- or any network- can be all thingsto
all people,"Treyz told a Cincinnatiaudiencein April 1961, "It is not a
networkbut all thenetworks
collectively
whichshouldbe in balance"[80;
128]?
This contentionwas not then in keepingwith FCC practice.By
offeringlittle otherthanstandardized
entertainment
programming,
ABC
left to Columbiaand NBC the burdenof lesspopularinformationaland
culturalprogramming,
eventhoughthe FCC neverdefineddiversityby
typesof entertainment
programming
alone.The fall 1958Tuesday
evening
schedule,for example,consisted
of three westernsand a detectiveshow
[97, p. 308]. A criticfor the Christian
Science
Monitorporingover the
1961-1962 schedulefound, "Take awaythe action-adventure
films,animatedcartoons
andsituation
comedies,
andall theAmericanBroadcasting
Company'sother [evening]programscouldbe telecastbetween7 and 11
o'clock on a singleevening" [37]. ABC concurred.In its 1962 annual
report, ABC describedthe addition of two World War II series,Combat!
andMcHale's
Navy,onean actiondrama,the othera comedy,
asexamples
of the network'seffortsto bringdiversityto programming
([6];compare
6O
[40, p. 5]). A prominent TV producer told the FCC in 1961, "ABC is
beneath
discussion.
It
seems to me to be a combination
of Wild
West
Magazineand True Storyand Real Mysteries.
I think it shouldbe taken to
task,soonand severely"[59, p. 20].TM
FCC commissioners
and staff did recognizeABC's programming
philosophyand part in the declineof television.When, in February 1962,
Dwight MacdonaldinterviewedFCC ChairmanNewton Minow and CommissionerFrederick W. Ford, one a Democrat, the other a Republican,
both acknowledged
ABC's role in ending the Golden Age? FCC staff
memberssimilarly saw ABC acceleratingthe shift to standardization,
forcing the competitionto discardsomediverseprogramming[125]?
Yet the Commission
did nothing.Once,duringa hearingon programming in early 1962, Minow lost his temper at Treyz. Otherwise, the
chairmanand his colleaguespreferred to avoid any hint of berating a
particular network or censoringa specificprogram by groupingall the
networkstogetherandindictingwhat Minowdubbed"the vastwasteland"
of television. 14
The Commission
wasalsoguilt-ridden.Althoughsanctioning
the UPT
acquisitionin February 1953, the agencyhad not createdenoughVery
High Frequency (VHF) stations(channels2-13) for a true, three-way
network rivalry. As a result, becauseof its slow start, ABC found it had
fewer stationswith which to affiliate;a disproportionatenumber of ABC's
stationslay in the weaker Ultra High Frequencyband (UHF) (Channels
14-83). Even thoughABC programssometimes
provedpopularin larger
markets where it had strong affiliates, many advertisersdiscriminated
againstthe network.ABC lacked"comparablecoverage"in smallermarkets
lackinga third VHF station[47, 81, 119, 124, 135].15
Nevertheless,in no area did ABC continuallydisappointmore critics
and regulatorsthan nonentertainmentprogramming.ABC, despitethe
FCC's enthusiasmfor informational fare, was decidedly weak in news
programming.Unlike NBC and Columbia, the network did air live the
Army-McCarthySenatehearingsof 1954. But this decisionhad more to
do with the network'snonexistentdaytimeschedulethan altruisticprogrammingvalues[20, 138]? That sameyear,Kintnerdeliberatelycounterprogrammedentertainmentagainstthe CBS and NBC nightly newscasts,
whichwere then comingon at 7:30 (ET). Kintner'sactionsdroveboth to
an earlier hour with smaller potential audiences[52]. Despite greatly
increasedrevenuesseveralyears later, ABC actuallyreducedits evening
newsprogrammingbetweenthe 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 seasons,
even
as CBSand especially
NBC augumentedtheir publicservicefare [97, p.
243; 111]. A TV seasonlater, NBC aired 95 hoursof newsand public
affairsprogramming;CBS 85 hours.ABC telecast49 hours."The incontrovertible fact of the past few years,"wrote the New YorkTimesTV
61
columnistin 1961, "is that ABC concentratedalmostexclusivelyon the
most popular money-makingformats without bearing a proportionate
shareof the burdenof maintainingdiversityor publicservicein TV" [80;
105, p. 6; 114].
Two departuresat ABC offerfurtherproofof thenetwork'sinattention
to radio'straditionsor thoseof its rivals.In 1955, Chet Huntley,then a
Los Angeles-based
ABC newscaster,
whomWestCoastcriticscomparedto
CBS's Edward R. Murrow, left the network. He had been asked to deliver
the morningnewsin a milkman'suniform [11, 76, 77]. Five yearslater,
John CharlesDaly, the network'schief anchor,quit after Treyz decided
to curtail coverageof the 1960 presidentialelectionreturns in favor of
showingTheRiflemanand TheBugsBunnyShow[70, 79, 116]? CBSand
NBC had devotedthe wholeeveningto democracy's
sweepstakes.
Subsequent effortsto upgradethe ABC newsdivisionin the wake of Daly's
resignationprovedmerelycosmetic[26, 132].18
In additionto neglectingnewsprogramming,ABC disappointed
the
FCC twiceregardingvoluntaryprogrammingarrangements.
Earlyin 1960,
FCC ChairmanJohn C. Doerfer persuadedthe networksto devote six
hoursof programminga weekto nonentertainment,
newsprogramming.
Under the Doerfer Plan, eachnetwork would schedulein eveningprime
time two hoursof publicaffairsfare per week.But whenABC subsequently
refusedto obey the guidelinesof Doerfer's agreement,NBC and CBS
withdrew their commitmentand the plan died. A year and a half later,
FCC Chairman Newton Minow negotiateda "children'shour" treaty,
whereby each network would, in the interestsof enriching children's
television,simultaneously
telecastan hour of educationalprogramming
for the young.The preadolescent
consumerwould be compelledto view
programming"good" for him or her. Again, however,ABC reconsidered
its participationand abandonedMinow.His agreementcollapsed[14, pp.
116-17, 121, 214-15; 90]
Suchattitudesmight be dismissed
were it not for ABC's influenceon
advertisersand the other networks.ABC's rise strengthenedthe hand of
more demandingsponsors.
With that network finally presentingpopular
programming,some advertisersnow had a place to go if CBS or NBC
resistedtheir programmingideasor to scheduling
morepopularprograms
at the expenseof "GoldenAge" offerings[104].19Executives
at CBSlater
denied that their decisions were so affected, and there were some instances
of advertisers
havingto carryout their threatand takea programconcept
to American? ø NBC President Robert Sarnoff, however, confessed in
August 1959, "There's no questionthat [ABC's]programschedulehas
causedboth us and CBS to make a number of changes."By then, NBC
had eliminatedWeaver'sspectaculars
and virtually all of its anthology
dramasin favor of westernsand other actionseries[23, p. 34; 106].21
62
The fate of one program, The Untouchables,
is revealing.Sometimein
the late 1958 season, Desilu Productions offered CBS a violent action
drama concerningUS prohibitionagents.For somereason,CBS Chairman
WilliamS. Paleyrejectedit on the adviceof networkvicepresidentHubbell
Robinson[24].22 ABC then agreed to Desilu'sterms. The Untouchables
subsequently
provedto be not only an immenselypopularentry in the
1959-1960 seasonbut, astwo TV historiansobserved,"perhapsthe most
mindlessly
violentprogramever seenon TV to that time." For his poor
intuition,Robinson,thoughan architectof TV's GoldenAge, waspassed
over for the CBSTV presidencyin December1959. Instead,Paleynamed
a former ABC vicepresidentand Treyz protege,JamesAubrey.Of ABC's
rise, Aubrey confessed,
"Ollie Treyz and I did it all" [28; 60, p. 68; 67;
111, p. 7; 117; 138, p. 264].
Aubrey'spromotionover Robinsonmarked a peculiartriumph for
American. With his elevation,the chief programmersat Columbiaand
NBC both had worked at ABC. In 1957, Robert Kintner had become an
NBC vice presidentshortlyafter beingdismissed
at ABC. Soonpresident
of the network, Kintner had imposedhis philosophyof film and action
onto the NBC scheduleand canceledthe network's anthologiesand
spectaculars.
By all accounts,he oversawall schedulingdecisionsat NBC
between 1957 and 1966 [106]? s
At Columbia,former ABC Vice PresidentAubrey becamepresident
of CBS TV in December 1959. Aubrey shared his past employer's
enthusiasmfor standardization.Although having to sharesomedecisionmakingwith CBSownerWilliam Paley,Aubreynevertheless
exercisedthe
greatestauthorityin decidingwhat went on Columbiatelevision.Aubrey
had alreadydevelopedthe western,HaveGun,Will Travel,and aspresident
workedon the actionseries,Route66. He went on to promotea number
of new situationcomediesin rural settings,beginningwith The Beverly
Hillbillies.These seriescame to replace the action dramasas the most
watchedgenreon TV after 1961. Beforehisouster,Aubreyhad removed
the lastanthologies
still aired by Columbia[46, 54, 82, 84].
The ruthlessness
of AubreyandKintnershouldnotbe underestimated.
Internalnetworkmemoranda(subpoenaed
by a Senatecommitteein 1961)
conclusively
showedboth men and their underlingsorderingproducersto
infuseviolenceand sexinto their networks'programs[97, p. 329; 126]?4
Their designs
wereall too apparent:ABC programs,especially
the pol•ular
Untouchables,
were breaking viewers' resistanceto the third network.
Somethinghad to be done to checkABC's growth.Life editorializedin
May 1961.
A sort of Gresham'slaw alsooperatesto drive good programsout by
bad.The worstoffenderin network'wasteland'
programming,
American
63
BroadcastingCo., whichdevotesabout half its prime eveninghoursto
adventureshowsor gangsterbloodbathslike TheUntouchables,
hasbeen
taking both sponsors,viewersand outlets [sic] away from its rivals. If
the publictasteis soshoddyand sponsors
soservileto it, how canbetter
qualityemergeout of suchruthlessand irresponsible
competition[62,
134]?5
Althoughboth CBSand NBC continuedto spendtwo to three times
as much moneyon their newsdivisions,each waspreparedto sacrifice
eveningprime time hoursto keep aheadof ABC. Counter-programming
lessenedthe resolve,left from radio, to "balance"the eveningschedule.
Before counter-programming,
anthologiesmight commandgood ratings
[10], becauseviewershad only two choicesand mightrisk art over Milton
Berle. With twolight entertainments
to choosefrom, the networkstanding
by an anthologyor informationalserieswasriskingfar smalleraudience
sharesand moredisappointed
sponsors.
And by the 1959-1960 season,this wasa risk that ABC's rivalswere
nolongerpreparedto take.The three-network
1959-1960season
included
twenty-eightwesternsand thirteen crime shows.Almostall of the anthologieswere gone.The B-filmTV seriespredominatedon all three chains.
And later studiesby communicationresearchersconfirmedwhat a few
discerningcriticshad noticedin the late 1950s:ABC destroyedAmerican
television.
"Ferociouscompetition,"observedone reporter, "drove the older
networksonceableto indulgethemselves
in an occasional
stretchof quality
into programmingthat made the showson all three networkslook
interchangeable"
[44; 45; 51; 56; 57; 58; 59, p. 18; 98]?6 One writer for
thedepartinganthologies
bitterlyremarkedin 1961thatthethreenetworks
were now "satisfiedto becomemainly a purveyorof the worstkind of
HollywoodC-picturejunk" [8].
Of coursethe "interchangeable"
serieshad precededABC'sproductions,just as someprogramshad been on film from the very beginning
of networktelecasting.But the differencesin the extent of filmed, action
seriesbeforeand after ABC'sriseare telling.In June 1953, 81.5 percent
of all networkprogrammingcameover live. Six yearslater,49.1 percent
waslive. Eachyear,ABC led in the shiftawayfrom live transmission:
52.2
percentlive in June 1953, 38.0 percentin June 1959 (for CBS, 86.7
percentto 54.0 percent;NBC, 81.9 percentto 52.0 percent)[27, 112].
Each year in the late 1950s, ABC led in the move to action/adventure
programs.Wrote two communicationresearchers,
The ABC networkled the wayin the earlygrowthof thisprogramming,
showingan increaseof 800 percent from 1955 to 1960. As ABC
escalated,it wasfollowedin turn by NBC, whichincreasedits action/
64
adventuretime by approximately1,200 percent from 1956 to 1960.
CBS also followed suit, although not as drastically,by increasingits
action/adventuretime by 100 percentfrom 1956 to 1959 [38; 42; 50,
p. 75].
In the process,
variouselementsidentifiedwith the GoldenAge were
lost.Eveningprogramminghoursare finite. If a westernwasaddedto the
schedule,somethinghad to go. What went were costlyprogramsdrawing
smalleraudienceshares.Someof thisprogrammingremainedon TV, but
on Sundayafternoons,
not eveningprimetime.Moreoften,theseprograms
left the air altogether.
No programform wasa greatercasualtyof Hollywood'sascendancy
thanthe weeklyoriginaland liveteleplays,
usuallymadein New Yorkand
relyingheavilyon the talentsof writers,producers,
anddirectorsconnected
with legitimate theatre. Called "dramatic anthologies,"most of these
programswere sacrificed
asa consequence
of the late fiftiesconcentration
on California-made action serials. In 1961, commented one who had
written someof the anthologyscripts,"When mostof televisionmoved
to Hollywood,one of the mostsignalchanges,
it seemsto me, that took
place wasthat immediatelyeverybodystartedtrying to make television
look like movies? 7 "Drama [on TV] hasbeen narrowed down and down,"
saidanotherwriter four yearslater, "until drama is really no longeron
television.
Melodrama
is."•8
Sucha development
needhardlybe regardedasthe blow to art that,
say,the recentdeclineof the novelhasbeen.Many of the mostpraised
GoldenAge productions
were decidedlymiddlebrow.Individualefforts
like Marty and BangtheDrum Slowlystandout. Othersare bestforgotten.
Someof Weaver'sspectaculars
were spectacularly
unrewarding.And not
surprisingly,
industryleadersand figurestied to the new, standardized
television,like RonaldRegan,hostof GE Theatre,later dismissed
the idea
that TV "declined"in the late fiftiesand early sixties[66].
Nevertheless,
the GoldenAge wasmore in keepingwith the FCC's
encouragement
of diversity.Programmingin 1953 wasmore likely to be
producedin citiesotherthan LosAngelesthanin 1959. Productionvalues
(notably,
livetelecasting)
werelessuniformin 1953.Moretypesof programs
were availableto consumers
prior to the emergenceof ABC.
Yetmostof thesechanges
undoubtedly
wouldhaveoccurredregardless
of ABC's situationin the late 1950s.The declinein live productioncan
be attributedin part to the developmentof tape, the major film studios'
lifting of their boycottof TV, and the financialadvantages
of syndicating
or rentingfor retelecasting
filmedseries[118]. Then, too, the sizeof the
nationalTV audiencegrew,thoughmainlyby regionas opposedto class
or education.Many more viewersin southernand westernareasfinally
65
had TV in 1959-1960 and were perhaps more enthusiasticabout a
Hollywood-made
than a New York product[16; 49; 86; 96]. Finally,more
product advertisersentered TV and demandedmore time and larger,
massaudiences
compared
to the early,institutional
sponsors
like US Steel
and Alcoa [43]. ABC alonecannotbe accusedof "destroying"TV.
Furthermore,manystudentsof broadcasthistoryseethe fate of the
medium as "inevitable," the result of market forces that rewarded the
managerable to find the largestshareof the massaudience.This successful
operatornormallypromotedprogramming
that, thoughpopular,appalled
better-educated
Americans.The real problemhere, many maintain,was
consumerpreference:populartastewasnot often goodtaste.Put differently,it is a graveerror in reasoning,as GeorgeStiglerwrote, to blame
a waiterfor obesity[12, 108].
As Alfred Chandler and others have shown, however, the twentieth
centurymanagerhad choices.To regard the entertainmentindustryas
nothingmorethanthe captiveof consumerdecisions
wouldcontradictthe
work of thoseseeingbusiness
executivesexercisingreal power in other
areasof enterprise.Studiesof the BritishBroadcasting
Corporationsuggest
that the evolutionof that systemowed much to the characterand
determinationof one figure, Lord Reith, the first BBC chairman [36,
39].29Similarly,historians
of massunionismoftenforgetto notehowmuch
labor strife in Americawasavoidedin the late 1930swhencertainlarge
corporations,
notablyUS Steel,accepeted
outsidelabororganization
while
othersliterallytookto the trenches.The "inevitability"of a changenever
explainswhy a transformationoccurredwhenit did, or whoslowedor
accelerated
the shift.
Different managers,different regulators,might have made for a
differenttelevisionin the late 1950s.A morediscerning
FCC, for example,
mighthaveinsistedin 1953 that ABC be acquiredby a companywith an
established
recordin broadcasting.
Mindful of federaloverseers,network
radio had developeda standardof servicethrough the 1930s and 1940s;
schedules
includednot only massentertainmentbut programsfor opera
enthusiasts
and thoseseekingheadlinesand opinions.In contrast,the
motionpictureindustry,not subjectto nationalregulation,had only to
contend with private groups or local governmentsthat might censor
featuresfor their inclusion
of excessive
sexand crime.Otherwise,Hollywood was under no pressureto produce anything but entertainment.
"Balance"or diversityof outputwasdefineddifferentlyat eachstudio,
with somemakingmore of an effort than othersto createdifferenttypes
of films. TV's future was all but sealed when Goldenson of UPT-ABC,
he
told a friend,choseUniversalPictures,whichspecialized
in B films,asthe
modelfor his TV network[68, p. 61].
UPT's
record and Goldenson's
intentions
66
did concern the FCC's staff
and dissentingcommissioners
in 1952-1953, though apparentlyfor the
wrongreasons.During the hearingspreceedingthe Commission's
decision,
FCC lawyerspursuedUPT's role in the antitrustviolationsof the large
film companies.There were alsoquestionsabout UPT's interestin a pay
TV systemusingtheaters.But relativelylittle attentionwent to the very
substantial
gulf separatingSunsetBoulevardfrom RadioRow [17]?
At the time of the merger,the Commission
might havemore closely
examinedUPT's financialresources.Althoughcapableof absorbingABC,
United Paramountwithinthreeyearsafter the mergerfounditselfseeking
financialassistance.
BothUPT and the FCC hadunderestimated
the heavy
costsof TV networking.Only an eleventh-hourloan from Metropolitan
Insurancein 1956 savedABC-UPT from embarrassing
encounterswith
bill collectors[3; 60, p.64]. Yet evenafter the Metropolitanadvance,ABCUPT only had enoughmoney,apparently,to investin entertainment
programming.The then unprofitablenewsdivisionwas chronicallyunderfinanced.Into the sixties,ABC found itself gropingfor cash[21, p.
60; 89].
Weighingnone of thesefactors,the Commissionin 1953 held up a
shopworntheory of competitionas a socialand politicaladvantageto
consumers,
and contraryresultsfollowed."• The Commission's
expectation
that ABC's strengtheningwould fostermore diversetypesof programs
wasfrustrated.If anything,the numberof differenttypesof programson
the air declinedbetween1953 and 1959; oneform, the dramaticanthology,
virtuallydisappeared.
The greater "choice"at decade'send waslimited
to the specificcity in whichthe detectivewasbased.The seriesitselfwas
manufactured
in LosAngeles.FinallyABC ignoreda long-heldCommission
preferencefor newsand informationalprogramming.Whether measured
by ABC'sown performanceor its effectson CBSand NBC, the Commission's wish for three networks
had calamitous
results for American
tele-
vision.
NOTES
*The author thanksthe LincolnEducationalFoundationand the Universityof Wisconsin-MadisonGraduate School for supporting the research for this paper. He also
appreciates
the effortsof thoseat the meetingand WilliamB. Blankenburgwhoendeavored
to dissuade
him from makingthe argumentherein.
1. NBC vs. US, 319 (1942), p. 190, 218-19.
2. Docket 10031, Vol. 10, Proc., Vol. 35, p. 5405, FCC MSS, Record Group 173,
National
Archives.
3. CompareGoldenson's
commentsin Docket 10031, Vol. 12, Proc.,Vol. 44, p. 6866,
with thosein [71].
4. Notes of interviewwith Kintner, n.d. [late 1950s],Martin Mayer MSS, Columbia
University,Box 68.
5. Docket 10031, Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 33, pp. 4981-85.
67
6. Docket 12782, Vol. 11, Proc.,Vol. 21, p. 3917, FCC MSS, CommissionDockets
Room.
7. Beforethe FCC in 1962,ABC president
OliverTreyzdelightedin creditinghis
network for the late fifties trend to westernsand, later, detective series.Docket 12782, Vol.
21, Proc.,Vol. 61, p. 9365.
8. Docket12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5671, Vol. 15, Proc.,Vol. 42, pp. 6418,
6558. See also [48 and 50].
9. PressreleaseABC News,8 May 1961, copyin MayerMSS,Box 68; Docket12782,
Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 19, p. 3696.
10. Docket 12782, Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 19, pp. 3690, 3697, 3700, 3718, Vol. 21, Proc.,
Vol. 61, p. 9428.
11. David Susskind
in Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5627.
12. Notesof interviewswith Ford and Minow,ca. February1962, MacDonaldMSS,
Yale University,Box 124.
13. Memorandum,
L. P. B. Emersonto John S. Cross,18 January1962, copyin E.
WilliamHenry MSS,StateHistoricalSocietyof Wisconsin
(hereafter,SHSW),Box 53.
14. Docket 12782, Vol. 21, Proc.,Vol. 61, pp. 9426-9428.
15. Memorandum,JamesSheridanto Commission,29 April 1964; handwrittenmem-
orandum,E. William Henry, n.d. [ca. August-September
1964], Henry MSS, Box 53.
Docket12782,Vol. 21, Proc.,pp. 9356ff.,9664ff.
16. AT&T chargedthe networksa flat rate regardless
of whetherthe afternoonhours
were used.Docket 16828, Vol. 34, Proc,Vol. 14, p. 3315, FCC Records,GeneralServices
Administration.
17. F. N. Littlejohn to John Daly,25 November1958, Daly MSS, SHSW,Box 23.
18.ABC waitedthreeyearsafterCBSandNBC to expanditsnightlynewscast
to thirty
minutes.
19. Docket 12782, Vol. 2 Proc.,Vol. 5, pp. 619, 620, Vol. 6, pp. 767, 768, 858-59.
20. Docket 12782, Vol. 19, Proc.,Vol. 54, p. 8363; Interview with MichaelDann, 14
June 1979, ColumbiaUniversityOral History Collection(hereafter COHC) pp. 8-9.
21. Docket 12782, Vol. 2, Proc.,Vol. 6, pp. 855-56.
22. Dann interview.
23. Unabridgednotesof interviewwith NBC executives,
28-29 October1959, p. 51,
Officeof Network Study,FCC, FCC Records,GeneralServicesAdministration,Inv. No.
72A1986, Box 12; Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 38, p. 5878; William S. Shirer to
MorrisL. Ernst,9 April 1959, ErnstMSS,Universityof Texas,Box 542.
24. Seealsothe novelwritten by former NBC Vice PresidentDavid Levy [61].
25. Clipping in Newton Minow MSS, SHSW, Box 52.
26. Docket12782,Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, pp. 5526-27.
27. Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5466.
28. "WCBS RadioLooksat Television,"transcriptof an interviewwith ErnestKinoy,
16 August 1965, WCBS RadioMSS, SHSW.
29. Because
newspapers
like TV networkscombinedto enjoya naturalmonopoly(or
haveuntil the adventof cableTV), it couldbe arguedthat networkexecutivescouldhave
agreedamongthemselves
to air anything(that is, qualityprogramming)
withoutfear of
lost audiencesand revenues.See [15].
30. Interviewwith FrederickW. Ford, 19June 1978;Exceptionof CurtisB. Plummer,
Chief of BroadcastBureau, to Initial Decisionof 13 November 1952, separatebrief
accompanying...of
FrederickW. Ford, et al., in Docket 10031, Vol. 41.
31. The Commission
apparentlyhad no trainedeconomists
at the time of the UPT-
ABC decision.An economist
at the agencymight haveread PeterO. Steiner'swarning
againstmovingfrom a two-wayto three-waycompetitivemodel.Steinerpostulatedthat
68
diversitywoulddecline
asa result[107]. Commissioners
and staffmembersapparentlyread
administrative
lawjournals,if anything.Subsequently,
Steiner'sthesishasbeensupported
and attackedin numerousstudies,includingStewartL. Long [63], Bruce M. Owen [85],
and DavidPerry [87].
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