The Efficacy of Third-Party
Intervention
Steven R. Liebel
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Colorado State University, Pueblo
The domestic discussion of the necessity of (or desire for) U.S. engagement
abroad has a long history. U.S. President George Washington famously wrote
that the United States should avoid foreign military and economic entanglements
so as to preclude the development of localized prejudice that could undermine
otherwise inherent goals of national unity.1 Even before Washington’s writings, in
1776, then-delegate to the Second Continental Congress John Adams crafted the
Model Treaty, which outlined the limits of U.S. engagement abroad. The treaty
stipulated that, when engaging in practices such as trade, the nascent country
was to take special care to avoid making political commitments or placing itself
under the authority of other countries for fear of entanglement in future wars.2
Despite these early warnings about foreign engagement, the notion that the
United States is today, or ever has been, an isolationist country is debatable. While
there are clearly documented periods of resistance to foreign engagement— the
anti–League of Nations movement headed by the likes of U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge being but one oft-cited
example—there are also periods of sustained international engagement.3 For
instance, between 1945 and 2003, the United States intervened militarily in
foreign conflicts no fewer than 35 times.4 During the same time period, other
major powers have similarly involved themselves in conflicts abroad: France 29
times, the United Kingdom 25, Russia 20, and China 17.5. Thus, there is an
extensive history of major powers involving themselves in the affairs of other
53
Steven R. Liebel is Assistant Professor of Political Science, specializing in International Relations, at Colorado State University, Pueblo. His research interests include warfighting dynamics, third-party involvement
in ongoing wars, and insurgency. He is published in the field of International Relations, and, with Andrew
J. Enterline, is co-author of “Negotiation, Mediation and Insurgent Victory in Counter-insurgency Wars
Fought by Foreign Powers,” International Negotiations, 2014.
Copyright © 2015 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
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countries, and the United States is no exception.
A recent example of such military activity involves the United States and
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Beginning on 8 August 2014,
the United States began a protracted aerial campaign against ISIL in Syria and
Iraq. The initial air strikes were deemed “targeted,” with the intent of stemming a potential genocide against the Yazidi religious community trapped on
and around Mount Sinjar, Iraq.6 Air strikes then expanded to defend strategic
locations such as the Mosul Dam on 18 August and quickly developed into a
more general air campaign following the publicized beheading of U.S. journalist
James Foley on 19 August; ISIL’s move toward Haditha Dam, Erbil, and Amerli;
and the second beheading of Steven Sotloff on 9 September.7 The campaign has
continued into 2015 with air strikes across a wide geographic area and against
differentiated targets, such as the Syrian border town of Kobani and the oilladen areas around Kirkuk.8
As of April 2015, the conflict in Syria and Iraq has—or threatens to—spill
into Lebanon, Turkey, and other neighboring states.9 This raises the question
of what could potentially motivate more significant U.S. participation in the
conflict and what the potential outcomes from such an action could be. As of
this writing, there has been a limited military response, but the internal dialogue
within the U.S. policy-making establishment of what can and should be done is
still in flux. In January 2015, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said that the United States would consider directing attacks from
the ground, signaling a willingness to expand the role of the United States in
the fight against ISIL.10 Because of the fluid nature of the conflict, such decisions must be made with full deliberation and clarity of consequences. This is
precisely the purpose of the remainder of this article. The academic literature on
third-party intervention in ongoing conflicts can illuminate potential alternatives for the United States and the nations within the coalition fighting ISIL.
This paper contends that military interventions can produce both negative
and positive consequences. To address this hypothesis, and to provide meaningful
recommendations, the paper is organized as follows. First, a brief summary of
the literature on the subject of third-party intervention is presented, allowing
the reader to glean an understanding of the perimeter of findings on the subject
of intervention in terms of motivations, application, and consequences. Second,
having reviewed the research, the paper provides an integrated historical analysis
of the ongoing conflict combined with an analysis of research findings to develop
plausible prescriptions for policymakers in a live environment.
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LITERATURE ON INTERVENTION
The scholarly literature on intervention is both broad and deep. That is to say,
there are numerous lines of inquiry and many have been vetted from multiple
perspectives. This body of research can, however, be effectively divided into two
broad areas of inquiry: first, identification of conditions or events that compel
intervention, and second, understanding the consequences of intervention for
both the intervening and intervened country. The following section briefly
reviews the major findings within each area of study.
CONDITIONS THAT FACILITATE INTERVENTION
On the question of third-party intervention, academics have tended to treat
civil and international war as two fundamentally distinct phenomena, each
with separate causes and means of termination. The justification lies within
the different conditions present at the time of initiation and later when parties
seek to end the war. Civil wars often occur in states with limited governmental
capacity, whereas in international wars, state capacity to police its own territory
takes a back seat to larger interstate dynamics such as rivalry. Likewise, at the
end of civil wars, combatants must return home and share a fixed geographic
area with the same individuals they were previously fighting, whereas combatants of international wars return home and populations are generally separated
by significant geographical distance.11 While these differences might present
diverse areas of interest for scholars of one type of war or another, in terms of
the conditions that would compel a state to join an ongoing war, the two types
of war are not entirely dissimilar.
55
WHY INTERVENE?
Scholars of international warfare have long argued that two complementary
concepts fuel the decision to join an ongoing war: opportunity and willingness.12 The first concept—opportunity—reflects the ability of a third-party
actor to join a war and has conventionally been measured through territorial
proximity or military capacity. These two metrics allow one to capture the ease
with which intervention can occur. For instance, as geographic proximity to a
war decreases, the easier it is to participate with a similar level of expenditure.
Likewise, increased military capacity affords a state the ability to intervene relative to the challenges faced by a less capable state.
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The second concept at play is willingness, or the desire to join a war. Willingness is most often measured by the presence of military alliances between
a warring state and a non-involved third party. This allows one to assess the
desire for a third-party state to intervene in an ongoing war. The presence of an
alliance agreement can reliably indicate that a third party will join in defense of
their alliance members nearly 75 percent of the time, when the specific terms
of the alliance are activated.13
There are obvious caveats to the aforementioned conceptual framework.
For instance, it matters little how interested one is in an ongoing conflict if
there is no capacity to join. Similarly, proximity can breed willingness indirectly
through the presence of localized issues that could eventually exhibit a geographic
contagion. For example, many identified ethnic groups straddle a border and
can affect the possibility of a civil war hopping borders.14 Thus, states in close
geographic proximity are not only capable of joining—even in the absence
of massive military capabilities—but may also feel a pull to participate given
localized interests.
An additional caveat is that the concept of willingness narrowly construed as
military alliances only provides exposure to international war. Thus, by expanding willingness to broader cultural or institutional similarities between a third
party and warring actors, there is clear overlap between what motivates actors
in international and civil war literature.15 In both instances, shared democracy
or shared cultural values, and thus increased similarities, compel a heightened
chance of intervention. Thus, regardless of war type, there are similar motivational factors for potential third-party joiners.
More contemporary research explores the process of war as a motivational
influence on joining. In particular, this research argues that the day-to-day
changes in the battlefield environment continually update potential third-party
actors’ incentives to join.16 Developments within this literature as it pertains to
international war contend that, as a particular war’s geographic distance to the
third party decreases, there is an increased likelihood of military participation.17
Within civil wars, the same dynamic is captured, but in terms of belligerents
seeking assistance from third-party actors. Specifically, as fighting moves closer
to locations containing critical infrastructure or cities, increasingly vulnerable
states seek third-party support and frequently receive it.18 This dynamic perspective captures a critical aspect of the decision of third parties to join: wars that
move closer to a third party’s state borders or to critical domestic infrastructure
within a state threatened by strong civil disturbances heighten the chances of a
third-party intervention.
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Beyond conditions that compel joining, there are also strategic concerns
at play. For instance, third-party actors could prefer to see one side win relative
to another. This side-specific preference can result from cultural similarities or
from a larger strategic concern pertaining to the outcome of the war.19 As a result of this preference, third-party states occasionally join to advocate for their
preferred outcome.20
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION
There are numerous ways to assess the outcomes of third-party interventions.
When viewed from the perspective of third-party joiners, outcomes can be assessed by the extent to which they comport directly with goals behind third-party
activity, or indirectly in the sense of larger social consequences. In both instances,
intervention outcomes can be both positive and negative. This section briefly
reviews the consequences of intervention and closes by summarizing objective
data on how these interventions end in terms of political outcome.
INTERVENTION POSITIVES
57
There are potential positive outcomes to third-party intervention. While in
many respects success is subjective, there are objective metrics one can use to
assess intervention outcomes. Scholarly work in this area has placed an emphasis
on outcomes related to post-war democratization, economic development, and
localized political stability.
The United States has long advocated for the spread of democracy around
the world. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton argued in his 1994 State of the
Union address that “the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable
peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.”21 Similarly in 1999,
President George W. Bush, then-governor of Texas, remarked, “American foreign
policy must be more than the Democratization has been a central
management of crisis. It must
have a great and guiding goal: driver of much of U.S. foreign policy.
to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.”22
In line with this thinking, democratization has been a central driver of much
of U.S. foreign policy. We must then address whether or not democratization
is an attainable outcome of military intervention, as has often been advocated.
The record of military intervention translating a state at war into a democracy is mixed. James Meernik argues that military intervention has only
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a small impact on democratization in the states where intervention occurs.23
Likewise, Andrew Enterline and Michael Greig find that replacing standing
regimes through military action in pursuit of imposed democracy does not
necessarily result in the desired outcome.24 Imposed regimes can potentially
result in localized economic development, but there are significant downsides
that include the risk of political instability and spread of interstate violence.25
The limited impact of intervention on democratization is further supported
by Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, who find unilateral intervention to be
largely unsuccessful in this regard, especially in comparison to the occasionally
successful multilateral interventions by the United Nations.26
Other scholars suggest utilizing a more nuanced approach to the relationship between military intervention and democratization. Pickering and
Emizet Kisangani contend that third-party military intervention can compel
democratization and economic development only in non-democratic developing states.27 Developed states do not experience the same movement. Further,
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs show that military intervention
can actually retard democratic development that would otherwise occur in the
absence of intervention.28
All told, there is potential for democratic institutions and economic development to take hold in states that experience military interventions. However,
the risks are many and substantial. In attempting to reduce conflict bilaterally
through forced institutional development, an intervention can increase violence
in and around the target state during and following an intervention. Further,
there is no guarantee that democracy will take hold in the target state, and
the possibility of economic development is minimal. With all of the research
combined, it could be difficult to justify military intervention in the name of
democratic advancement, economic development, and localized political stability, given the minimal likelihood of any of these happening—although all are
potential end results of third-party military intervention.
INTERVENTION NEGATIVES
Just as there are potential, albeit unlikely, positive outcomes to third-party
military intervention, there are also possible negative consequences. The metrics
one can use to assess negative outcomes include: prolonged war, indirect social
consequences (e.g., human rights abuses), and the derailment of ongoing processes that could, if left alone, lead to long-term conflict resolution.
The work on third-party interveners who join in support of one side over
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another is particularly interesting. Indeed, because states join with a specific
objective in mind, their choice to support a specific side in pursuit of that objective bears directly on the outcome of the intervention. Work in this area by
Patrick Regan has concluded that biased interventions can shorten wars, while
neutral interventions can have the opposite effect and prolong the conflict.29
However, as Stephen Gent contends, this does not always translate into
desired outcomes for the third party. In fact, because third parties often intervene
to support governments against strong insurgent groups (the very instances in
which a state needs and seeks external support), the third party often fails to
successfully defend their chosen ally. In instances where the state is fighting a
weak opponent, it is often the case that third-party action is not necessary. Meanwhile, when the third party supports the insurgency, they often choose strong
movements against a weak central state and see a successful military outcome.30
A morally justified perspective might argue instead that humanitarian
justifications are enough to compel intervention. Duress Peksen contends that
while this motivation is occasionally used to justify action, the positive side effects of intervention as it pertains to human rights are limited.31 Indeed, much
like the side-specific literature, there is a difference in outcomes depending on
which side in the conflict is supported. When a third party intervenes in sup59
port of the state, the state’s behavior is reinforced or even validated. The state
subsequently seeks increased political isolation and imprisonment of opponents,
while simultaneously increasing the use of torture. On the other hand, should a
third party join against the state and in support of the rebel movement, political
imprisonment—again at the behest of the state—will increase When a third party intervenes in
in order to combat the rebels. suppor t of the state, the state’s
Thus, while interventions may
behavior is reinforced or even validated.
have a humanitarian objective,
in both instances—siding with the government or rebels—there is a continuation
or increase in instances of human rights abuse for the duration of the conflict.
Finally, there are concerns that well-intended but ill-timed interventions
disrupt natural processes that could, if left alone, lead to the establishment of
long-term conflict resolution. The argument contends that the interjection of
a third party assumed to be acting in order to keep or promote peace enables
the warring sides to regain their footing and reestablish themselves for further
fighting. Belligerents can do this by retreating to safe territories for rearmament
or reestablishment of logistical capabilities. Therefore, interventions prematurely
put an end to immediate hostilities, and when the third party leaves, the two
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sides can quickly return to war, better prepared than they were previously, thus
prolonging the conflict.32
There is empirical evidence to suggest that this is possibly the case. Greig
and Diehl identify a relationship between the usage of peacekeeping forces and
the likelihood of diplomatic efforts between warring parties. Specifically, the
usage of peacekeeping forces reduces the need to seek diplomatic resolutions,
and therefore decreases the chance of a lasting peace agreement being reached.33
As it pertains to conflict resolution, forceful third parties can indeed compel
belligerents to step apart, but this does not resolve the underlying issues that
motivate fighting, nor does this promote the necessary conditions for the warring parties to continue pursuit of a diplomatic agreement.
INTERVENTION AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES: WHAT THE DATA SAY
60
Finally, there is the possibility that a preset objective is achieved through military
intervention. Data derived from Sullivan and Koch that investigate justifications
for and consequences of major power interventions show that, of the 123 major
power military interventions between 1945 and 2003, 50 saw the intervening
state/coalition prevail and achieve the main political objective (Table 1).34 This
implies an overall success rate of 41 percent for all interventions.
When breaking this down by type of intervention, of the 123 military
interventions, 21 exclusively employed aerial power. As of April 2015, this
comports with the approach favored by the United States in the fight against
ISIL. Of this sample, six cases saw their political objective achieved, for a 29
percent success rate. Of the 21 cases of aerial intervention, nine utilized limited
commitments, while 11 were more extensive.35
Outcomes of limited intervention saw a 33 percent success rate compared
to 27 percent success in more extensive air campaigns. This difference is not
statistically significant given 1) the small sample size, and 2) the impact that one
case changing from success to failure would have on the percentages. What is
telling, however, is that of the 11 cases of extensive air campaigns, four resulted
in a negotiated outcome. None of the limited campaigns resulted in negotiation. Furthermore, while two cases of limited aerial campaigns saw significant
escalation on behalf of the intervening state, none of the extensive campaigns
saw escalation. Both limited and extensive campaigns had two instances in which
the intervening state withdrew without having attained its objective, and two
instances in which the air campaign was terminated by a preset end date without
obtaining the objective. All of this suggests that extensive campaigns are nearly
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as likely to end in success for third parties, and more likely to translate into discussions at the bargaining table without the addition of escalations in fighting.
Table 1: Force Type and InTervenTIon ouTcome
TYPE OF FORCE
USED
INTERVENTION OUTCOME
WITHDREW COMPLETED PREVAILED NEGOTIATED ESCALATED
Display
3
2
8
0
2
Limited Aerial
2
2
3
0
2
Limited Ground
4
2
10
3
2
Extensive Aerial
2
2
3
4
0
Extensive Ground
16
5
26
14
6
Table 1 suggests that a more extensive form of intervention could contribute to the possibility of a long-term successful outcome when including both
negotiations and success as a direct result of aerial campaigns. Once the data
are broken down to target type (i.e., who the third party is fighting against),
the story is even more telling. Sullivan and Koch provide a number of options
for target, including state and state-supported institutions, insurgents/guerrilla
movements, rioters/mass movements, coup leaders, and terrorists/warlords.36
According to the criteria listed for coding decisions, ISIL is most appropriately
classified as an insurgent/guerrilla movement.37 Table 2 provides information on
the type of military force used by the third party and the intervention’s outcome
when the focus of the military intervention is solely on insurgent movements.
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TABLE 2: FORCE TYPE AND INTERVENTION OUTCOME AGAINST INSURGENTS
TYPE OF FORCE
USED
INTERVENTION OUTCOME
WITHDREW COMPLETED PREVAILED NEGOTIATED ESCALATED
Display
0
0
0
0
0
Limited Aerial
1
0
0
0
0
Limited Ground
2
0
3
0
1
Extensive Aerial
0
1
2
0
0
Extensive Ground
5
1
8
4
1
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These data generate three observations. First, of the 29 interventions against
insurgent groups, 13 resulted in success for the intervener (45 percent). With
the previously noted success rate of 41 percent for all interventions against all
types of opponents, the data suggest that insurgencies experience relatively high
likelihoods of intervener success.
Second, by examining alternative forms of aerial intervention one is presented with a more granular picture. The only instance of limited aerial intervention resulted in the eventual withdrawal of intervening forces having failed to
achieve their objective (for example, France in the Spanish–Moroccan conflict
in 1958, while attempting to assist Spain to defend territory). Large-scale aerial
campaigns have a higher relative rate of success. Of the three cases of extensive
aerial campaigns, two reached their objective and one terminated at a preset date,
attaining a 66 percent success rate. Importantly, however, none of the extensive
aerial campaigns resulted in escalation or third-party withdrawal short of victory.
Third, ground campaigns present an interesting picture. Of the 29 interventions against insurgents, 19 involved extensive ground combat, and six were
limited ground campaigns. Extensive ground campaigns have a 42 percent success rate, while limited ground campaigns enjoy a 50 percent success rate. The
larger sample size presented by the ground campaigns allows for more stable
inferences relative to those regarding aerial campaigns. Thus, while the only case
of a limited aerial campaign against insurgents was not successful, it remains difficult to infer definitive conclusions when only one instance has occurred more
than half a century before the time of this writing. On the other hand, more
extensive aerial campaigns and all forms of ground campaigns have a chance of
success and their sample size provides heightened confidence. Further, extensive
ground campaigns are able to compel negotiations with insurgents, implying the
possibility of a mutually agreed outcome aside from outright victory or defeat, an
option not brought to bear by any other form of intervention against insurgents.
Broadly speaking, our understanding of the impact of aerial bombing on
the outcomes of ongoing wars indicates that it has only a marginal effect.38 The
aforementioned data on intervention success are supportive of this conclusion,
particularly in the case of limited campaigns. If aerial bombings have an effect
it would seem to be complementary to other tactics such as threats of escalation
or in conjunction with ground forces.39 Clearly, limited aerial campaigns alone
have a difficult time achieving substantial third-party goals. On the other hand,
more extensive aerial and ground campaigns can produce outcomes in line with
third-party interests, particularly when focused on groups similar to ISIL.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
There are significant debating points on the efficacy of state intervention in the
affairs of others. Some contend, much as Presidents Washington and Adams
did, that entanglements abroad lead to the eventual contamination of domestic
politics and unintended escalations of conflict. Others, however, believe that it is
the responsibility of strong actors to intervene in order to preserve the peace as
an “international police power,” much as President Theodore Roosevelt asserted
in his annual message to Congress in 1904.40 Furthermore, others advocate
the use of intervention to advance national interests in a broader sense. Both
President Ronald Reagan and former National Security Advisor to President
Bill Clinton, Anthony Lake, argued for intervention in the name of national
interests.41 Finally others, such as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, argue that the international community
must increase the present intervention against ISIL, justified on humanitarian
grounds to put an end to human rights atrocities.42
The aforementioned scholarship speaks both to the debate on intervention
broadly and to the circumstances unfolding between the U.S.–led coalition and
ISIL as of April 2015. The literature provides an understanding of when third
parties choose to intervene, the consequences of such intervention, and the
political outcomes of military intervention. The ways in which these findings
relate to the ongoing conflict are threefold.
First, at the present time, the discussion of why third parties join is relevant
because the United States and many other nations have already chosen to apply military force against ISIL. As a result of this choice, our understanding of
military intervention can help to assess the circumstances under which we might
see changes in that decision. Thus, while we know the conditions that facilitate
third-party joining (see previous discussion on causes of intervention), findings
related to intra-war processes and intervention are currently more relevant.
These findings can facilitate an understanding of the factors that might compel
an active third-party belligerent to escalate its presence or possibly compel new
states to join. For instance, the movement of a battlefield toward a previously
neutral third-party state can elicit a military response, and similar battlefield
movements toward population centers and infrastructure can elicit military and
non-military responses from third-party actors.43 This third-party response, be
it anything from management to full-blown military intervention, then shapes
the intra-war process as it pertains to military and non-military outcomes.
As ISIL has approached critical areas throughout the war, such as the hy-
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droelectric Mosul Dam in Iraq and cities such as Kobani in Syria, the coalition
has reacted by intensifying aerial assaults.44 This is exemplified by the rapid
and effective defense of locations such as Kobani and Kirkuk. The decision to
ramp up tactical air strikes in order to defend strategic positions is supported
when examining outcomes of such activity on a battle-by-battle basis, and is
even the self-admitted cause of ISIL’s withdrawal from Kobani.45 One may ask
whether these airstrikes will either roll ISIL back from their current positions
or deter them from future aggressions. Given past behavior, as of April 2015 it
is reasonable to assume that where and when ISIL attempts to expand to the
possible detriment of affected states or populations, the coalition will meet the
expansion with limited aerial strikes. Unless ISIL threatens additional significant
coalitional interests, this will likely remain as such.
Second, the current intervention will affect human rights in the region. In
its present form, the intervention against ISIL is not about dismantling ISIL from
the air, nor is it about stopping its chosen mode of behavior within its claimed
territory. Instead, the targeted strikes are a means of rolling back threatening
advances toward strategic infrastructure or population centers. As a result, it is
not likely that the aerial campaign in its present form will put a halt to human
rights abuses. Indeed, it is likely that the present intervention will contribute
to increased human rights abuse in the short term, before contributing to any
long-term reduction, by reinforcing states’ actions against their own populations
(e.g., the Syrian regime increasing repression against their own population to
cement their hold on power).46 Thus, it is possible to argue that states receiving
assistance—either in the form of direct aid or indirectly by fighting a common
enemy—will continue existing policies that lead to human rights abuse until
the conflict ends.
Third, in utilizing military means to seek what is otherwise a political
objective, there must be an appraisal of the likelihood that the present aerial
campaign will allow for the United States and coalition forces to attain their
desired objective. Notably, to infer from the data previously discussed, limited
aerial campaigns, such as those that have been employed up until April 2015,
have only a small likelihood of removing the threat that an organization like ISIL
presents. As a point of reference, over a period of six months between August
2014 and January 2015, there have been approximately 16,000 total strikes by
a combination of aircraft and other military forces against ISIL.47 This contrasts
nicely with other aerial campaigns, such as NATO’s Operation Allied Force in
1999, which resulted in 38,000 sorties and slightly less than 11,000 strike missions over seven weeks between 24 March and 10 June 1999.48 The intensity of
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Operation Allied Force, in conjunction with other military threats, resulted in
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević accepting peace terms on 3 June 1999.
It is not unreasonable to infer from the aforementioned data and examples
on intervention success that a more extensive aerial campaign against ISIL
could elicit responses favorable to U.S. and coalition goals. Such a response
could come in the form of negotiations with ISIL and possible mutually agreed
outcomes. However, while the data suggest that this could increase the chances
of a favorable outcome, it is necessary to question the likelihood of that result
given that the claimed motivations of ISIL are religious, and as a result, relatively uncompromising.49 This form of motivation is less likely to concede on
negotiating points given the absolute nature of the objectives, which are in this
case the establishment of a global religious order. Thus, while a more extensive
aerial campaign is more likely to inflict lasting damages to the functionality
of ISIL as an organization, it is questionable whether it will be able to compel
them to negotiate over their geopolitical and religious interests. It is still less
likely to eliminate their ideological perspective. That being said, the clear bias
of the intervention’s support would indicate that the conflict would be shorter.
However, as Gent argues, the biased intervention is occurring against a resolved
and capable opponent.50 As a result, limited military means against a resolved
opponent—as currently seen against ISIL by the United States—are unlikely
to achieve significant political objectives.
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CONCLUSION
In their fight against ISIL, the U.S.–led coalition has a number of options. First,
there is the reactionary option to respond to the movement of ISIL on the battlefield, thereby attacking them when they threaten infrastructure or population
centers. This option, while generally practiced at the time of this writing, does
not present a means by which the conflict can be ultimately resolved. Instead,
it calls for a prolonged conflict of action-reaction that does not see an end to
ISIL or the organization’s objectives.
Second, there is the option to escalate the aerial campaign to an extensive
and/or combined assault of air and ground forces. Indeed, as of April 2015,
U.S. President Barack Obama is seeking congressional approval through an
Authorization for Use of Military Force to expand the U.S. fight against ISIL.51
According to the previously examined data, there is the increased potential for a
favorable objective to be obtained as a result of more significant military activity.
However, there are downsides to this option as well. The downsides to escala-
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tion include: potentially being dragged into a prolonged and complex regional
conflict, increased military spending at a time of political gridlock pertaining
to the U.S. federal budget, placing a greater number of combat-ready troops in
harm’s way, and finally, failing to utilize the increased capacity to overwhelm
and dismantle ISIL entirely, thus failing to attain the larger objective. There is
the potential for increased resources to be poured into a military response that
could ultimately fail.
Third and finally, there is the option to more clearly define the ultimate
objective of the military campaign against ISIL. Early on in the war, the objective of the United States was to support resistance fighters in their efforts to
remove Syrian President Bashar alI s t h e o b j e c t i ve t o e l i m i n a t e Assad. As of March 2015, however,
I S I L a s b o t h a n i d e o l o g y a n d United States Director of National
as a geopolitical movement? Intelligence James Clapper was
noted as saying, “the immediate
priority is ISIL,” reserving Assad as a long-term objective.52 What this short-term
priority represents, however, is unclear. Clapper also noted, “we [the U.S.–led
coalition] have substantially reduced the territory that ISIL holds... a combination of Iraqi security forces, coupled with coalition airpower, our [U.S.] advice
66
and assistance, and our training, has brought about not just a stalemate but some
reversals.”53 This begs the question of whether the objective to protect local states
and populations from an aggressive movement can be accomplished simply by
rolling it back. In this instance, if ISIL were to refrain from exporting violence,
are they then free to exist within a constrained geographic area at the expense
of other states losing territory and population? Is the objective to eliminate ISIL
as both an ideology and as a geopolitical movement?
At present, the objective of the United States and the coalition is opaque.
Indeed, this is potentially a derivative of the number of states within the coalition,
and the difference in threat ISIL presents to each of them. In order to best facilitate congruence between military activity and political objectives (i.e., should
the military option of large-scale ground forces be exercised?), it is prudent to
first define how military operations contribute sequentially to the attainment
of a clear political objective. The United States would do well to more clearly
outline what it hopes to achieve such that operations can be chosen with purpose
and can move the conflict with ISIL forward to a long-term resolution. Without
outlining clear objectives and means of attaining them, the U.S. risks a major
power intervention that fails to achieve its goals and introduces tremendous risk
to those near the battlefield and at home. WA
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NOTES
1. George Washington, “Presidential Farewell Address,” American Daily Advertiser, 1796.
2. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 17; See also: William Weeks, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign
Relations, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
3. For example, see: Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S.
Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables:
The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970).
4. Patricia L. Sullivan and Michael T. Koch, “Military Intervention by Powerful States, 1945-2003,”
Journal of Peace Research 46 (2009): 707–18.
5. Ibid.; Sullivan and Koch define military intervention as the “use of armed force that involves the
official deployment of at least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to attain immediate
term political objectives through action against a foreign adversary.” With a more lenient definition of
intervention, “movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country
inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” the same countries have intervened
abroad 109, 66, 51, 35, and 22 times, respectively. For definitions, see: Frederic S. Pearson and Robert
A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention, 1946-1988,” Interuniversity Consortium for Political
and Social Research (1993): 6035; Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention,” Political Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 363–76.
6. Michael Georgy, “Iraq’s Yazidis Face Islamic State or Perilous Mountains,” Reuters, August 5, 2014.
7. Helene Cooper, Mark Landler, and Azam Ahmed, “Troops in Iraq Rout Sunni Militants From a Key
Dam,” New York Times, August 18, 2014; Mark Lander, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS, Promises Sustained
Effort to Rout Militants,” New York Times, September 10, 2014.
8. Louise Ireland, “U.S. Reports 27 More Strikes Against Islamic State,” Reuters, January 31, 2015.
9. Associated Press, “Islamic State Group Losing Ground in Symbolic Kobani Battle,” Washington
Post, January 14, 2015; Hwaida Saad and Rick Gladstone, “Border Fighting Intensifies Between ISIS and
Lebanon,” New York Times, August 5, 2014.
10. Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Vivian Salama, “Iraq Coalition Tensions Emerge in Islamic State Fight,”
Associated Press, January 22, 2015.
11. For example, see: I. William Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal
Conflicts,” in Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1985); Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary
for Rebel Groups,” World Politics 59 (2007): 217–42.
12. For example, see: Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Opportunity, Willingness, and the
Diffusion of War,” American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 47–67.
13. For example, see: Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” International Organization 57 (2003): 801–27.
14. For example, see: Lars-Erik Cederman et al., “Transborder Ethnic Kin and Civil War,” International
Organization 67 (2013): 389–410.
15. For international war, see: Renato Corbetta, “Determinants of Third Parties Intervention and
Alignment Choices in Ongoing Conflicts, 1946-2001,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2010): 61–85; for civil
war, see: Jun Koga, “Where do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties? Domestic Institutions and Military
Interventions in Civil Conflicts,” International Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 1143–66.
16. This perspective is derived from arguments that contend that war results from prewar information
conveyance challenges and that war itself acts as a means of information sharing between parties that
helps to resolve misunderstandings about who has the ability to attain their most desired post-war goals.
For example, see: Branislav Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and
the Terms of Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 813–29; Alastair Smith, “Fighting
Battles, Winning Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1998): 301–20; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of
War (New York: The Free Press, 1973).
17. Steven R. Liebel, “Endogenous Information and Interstate War Expansion” (dissertation, University
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68
of North Texas, 2012).
18. J. Michael Greig, “Nipping Them in the Bud: The Onset of Mediation in Low-Intensity Civil
Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (2013): 1–26.
19. Corbetta, “Determinants of Third Parties Intervention.”
20. Patrick M. Regan, “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 55–73; Stephen N. Gent, “Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention
and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): 713–35.
21. Bill Clinton, “State of the Union Address,” Washington Post, January 25, 1994.
22. George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library,
November 19, 1999.
23. James Meernik, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,” Journal
of Peace Research 33 (1996): 391–402.
24. Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, “Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy
on Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity,” American Journal of Political Science 67 (2005): 1075–99.
25. One only has to look at the post-2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to witness the development of such
instability on an anecdotal basis.
26. Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint,” International Studies Quarterly 50, (2006): 539–59.
27. Pickering and Kisangani, “Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military
Intervention.”
28. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” International
Organization 60 (2006): 627–49.
29. Regan, “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts.”
30. Gent, “Going in When it Counts.”
31. Drusen Peksen, “Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?,” Political Research
Quarterly 65 (2012): 558–71.
32. Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 55 (1999): 36–44.
33. J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, “The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma,” International
Studies Quarterly 49 (2005): 621–45.
34. Sullivan and Koch, “Military Intervention by Powerful States, 1945-2003.”
35. To be defined as a limited intervention, it must result in fewer than 500 target casualties, with no
more than 499 ground combat troops deployed. To be defined as an extensive intervention, there must be
at least 500 target casualties with no more than 1,999 ground combat troops deployed. The reason there are
21 instances of aerial intervention coded and only 20 discussed is that one instance of intervention, France
in Morocco in 1956–57, does not have identified outcomes or information on intervention composition.
36. Sullivan and Koch, “Military Intervention by Powerful States, 1945-2003.”
37. Defined as “a group of armed, irregular personnel organized along military lines to conduct a systematic campaign of military and paramilitary operations against the established system of government in
a state or colonial territory.” This is most appropriate given the constraint of “terrorist/warlord” requiring
clandestine operations as standard practice, which ISIL does not maintain. This selection is not to dispute
other definitions or classifications of terrorist groups/organizations, or to contend that ISIL does not approximate a terrorist organization or employ terrorism as a tool, it is merely to conform to the definitions
as utilized within Sullivan and Koch.
38. For example, see: Susan Hannah Allen and Tiffiny Vincent, “Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for
Kosovo,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 1–26; Gian P. Gentile, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Robert A. Pape,
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
39. Daniel R. Lake, “The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATOs Victory in Kosovo Revisited,” International Security 34 (2009): 83–1121; For anecdotal evidence from the ongoing conflict against ISIL and
others that is supportive of aerial bombing on a rolling case-by-case, battle-level basis, see: Dexter Filkins,
The Forever War (New York: Vintage Books, 2009).
40. Serge Ricard, “The Roosevelt Corollary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (2006): 17–26. This argu-
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ment echoes that made by the ancient Romans pertaining to relations with their less capable neighbors.
For example, see: Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the
Study of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
41. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994);
Anthony Lake, “Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post
Cold-War World,” remarks at George Washington University, March 6, 1996.
42. Zeid Raad Al Hussein, “Horrendous Violence By ISIS Is Unacceptable, U.N. Commissioner Says,”
National Public Radio, February 9, 2015.
43. Greig, “Nipping Them in the Bud”; Liebel, “Endogenous Information and Interstate War Expansion.”
44. Yousuf Basil, Jomana Karadsheh, and Laura Smith-Spark, “ISIS Launches Attack on Oil-rich
Northern Iraqi City of Kirkuk,” CNN.com, January 30, 2015.
45. Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Vivian Salama, “Islamic State Admits Defeat in Kobani,” Associated Press,
January 31, 2015.
46. Peksen, “Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?.”
47. Aaron Mehta, “A-10 Performing 11 Percent of Anti-ISIS Sorties,” Defense News, January 19, 2015.
48. William M. Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History,”
in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
49. For example, see: Adam Withnall, “Iraq Crisis: ISIS Declares its Territories a New Islamic State
with Restoration of Caliphate in Middle East,” Independent, March 27, 2014.
50. Gent, “Going in When it Counts.”
51. Jeremy W. Peters, “Obama to Seek War Power Bill From Congress to Fight ISIS,” New York Times,
February 10, 2015.
52. James Clapper, “James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence Discusses the Global Threats to
U.S. National Security,” PBS: Charlie Rose, March 1, 2015.
53. Ibid.
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