Strategy Development
Crafting Acquisition’s Foundation
Hugo A. Bonuccelli
trategy development launches the
acquisition cycle and sets the conceptual framework for everything
that follows. A well-thought-out
strategy can ensure an acquisition’s success, while a poorly-conceived strategy
can result in its failure. Just as an architect must design a foundation to support
a building’s ultimate form and function,
so an acquisition strategist must design a
strategy to support the needs and wants of
a procurement’s users.
However, matching a strategy to an acquisition’s ultimate purpose can be a complex undertaking. Far from considering the
tangibles of concrete and steel, the procuring organization may be faced with nebulous user expectations, evolving technology solutions, uncertain market conditions,
or the like. What activities can draw order
from these uncertainties? What makes
these activities strategy, and not planning?
S
The acquisition
strategy is the
base on which
subsequent activities
rest. Getting it right
means that the
acquisition has taken
its first step toward
success.
How can the results be judged successful?
In other words, where do you start, and
how do you know when you’re done?
To answer these questions, it helps to
have a working definition of “strategy.”
According to Webster’s (10th ed.), it is
“the art of devising or employing plans or
stratagems toward a goal.” This definition
implies an important distinction: The development of an acquisition strategy is not,
strictly speaking, a discipline but rather an
art. It relies on the informed use of judgment to craft an acquisition approach that
results in the highest probability that the
acquisition will achieve its stated goals.
As such, the acquisition strategy sets the
foundation for the subsequent acquisition
cycle stages set forth in “Acquisition in
the Large: Looking Ahead at Every Stage”
on p. 4 of this issue. As the authors note,
strategy development and planning are
two consecutive stages, but the end of one
• Success depends on understanding three elements—need (what the organization is acquiring),
purpose (what will constitute success), and context (what factors will shape the strategy).
• You can anticipate stakeholder wishes to some extent, but ultimately there is no substitute for
communication and consensus among all stakeholders.
• The right expertise is crucial. Even the most insightful evaluation scheme will fail if the acquisition
team cannot distinguish a strong proposal from marketing fluff.
• The strategy must support the success of the overall program, not just the competition for
award.
Acquisition Strategies
13
Questions to Ask at the Start
• Is this a one-time agency buy, a multiyear
project, or a competition to establish a new
government-wide acquisition contract program?
• What is the procurement’s dollar value?
• Can commercially available products and
services meet the requirements?
• How many stakeholders are there?
• Are the requirements subject to policy directives or regulatory restraints?
• Is software or hardware development or customer-specific configuration needed?
• Are there government-specific requirements?
If so, are they well-defined, or must they be
negotiated with input from industry?
• How many potential suppliers are there, and
how dynamic is the marketplace?
and the beginning of the other are often
nearly indistinguishable. Returning to the
building analogy, an architect’s design is
reflected in a set of blueprints, just as the
acquisition strategy is reflected in acquisition planning. And just as the architectural
design is a guide for blueprint revisions as
construction progresses, so the acquisition
strategy is a guide for in-course decisions
and adjustments to the planning blueprint
throughout the acquisition cycle.
So how does a procuring organization
begin to craft a strategy? Naturally, the
level of effort can depend on the particular
acquisition. In some cases, formal strategy
development isn’t necessary; rather, documenting the judgment of an experienced
acquisition official at the beginning of acquisition planning will suffice. In others, it
can involve the extensive efforts of many
people over several years. In all cases,
however, success depends on understanding and continuously addressing three elements—need (what the organization is
acquiring), purpose (what will constitute
success), and context (what factors will
shape the strategy).
Many acquisitions stumble because the
procuring organizations omitted or glossed
over some aspect of these elements. Some
efforts misfire by underestimating or overestimating what users need, while others
never quite get a handle on their definition
of value. Still others fail to deeply understand the larger environment in which the
14
acquisition takes place, and thus fail to obtain the value that would have constituted
true success. Only when the acquisition
team has addressed all these critical elements can it shape a strategy foundation
that can reliably support a successful acquisition.
How much is enough?
Inherent in effective and appropriate strategy development is the issue of
how much effort it will take to get there.
As shown in Figure 1, too little effort increases the risk of churn, inadequate competition, successful protest after award, or
other negative consequences, up to and
including the acquisition’s complete failure or redo. Too much effort wastes time
and resources and stretches the acquisition
cycle unnecessarily.
Effective Competition
Too Little
STRATEGY
• Churn and inefficiency
• Inadequate competition
• Successful protest
• Failure or redo
Too Much
• Churn and inefficiency
• Excessive cost
• Lengthened cycle
Figure 1. The extremes of strategy development.
The strategy should be just enough to obtain
value, which typically means enough to set up
and sustain an effective competition.
Thus, the short answer would seem to be
“Enough is as much as it takes to obtain
value.” However, given that competition
is the primary means of achieving value in
most acquisition activities, a more focused
answer is, “Enough is as much as it takes
to set up and sustain an effective competition.” The competition’s type and intensity
depend on the particular acquisition—what
and how much is being acquired and how
the program goals define value.
“Enough” also relates to the potential return on an investment of time and resources
in strategy development, which again depends on the specific acquisition’s requirements and context. The sidebar “Questions
to Ask at the Start” gives a short checklist
of considerations that can justify devoting
a larger or smaller effort on strategy development.
As a rule, the procuring organization must balance the time and resources
spent on strategy development against
the acquisition’s overall dollar value and
the likelihood that fine-tuning the strategy will yield better value. Generally, the
higher the stakes (and the more severe the
consequences of failure), the more likely
a well-conceived acquisition strategy can
leverage those stakes to set up and sustain
an effective competition. For example, an
acquisition intended to supply hundreds
of government agencies over 10 years is
more likely to attract vigorous competition
than one that represents a single agency
for half that period. The effort devoted to
strategy development should represent an
acceptable fraction of the value expected
from the competition the acquisition is creating. How much depends on the savings
or other benefit the organization can derive
from that program. Strategy development
for a major government-wide acquisition
contract (GWAC) could take years and
cost tens of millions, yet represent only a
fraction of the billions in potential savings.
Conversely, a smaller strategy effort can be
excessive if good planning gives the organization comparable value.
An intuitive process
In some ways, deciding what is enough
is largely intuitive. You would need little
or no strategy development for a simple
box buy (purchase of commercial software
or off-the-shelf hardware) or for a followon purchase in an ongoing project (using
line items in an established fixed-price
contract). For these, a strategy of “follow
established procedures” is often sufficient.
It also makes sense that as the acquisition’s
complexity increases, so does the return on
any investment in strategy. This is true regardless of the acquisition’s goal—whether
to get the best price on a large quantity of
products or the best technical solution for
a complex agency-wide problem. Virtually
all GWAC efforts would benefit from investing time and resources in strategy development, as would most multiyear projects large enough to attract the attention of
Congressional oversight bodies.
Business case value
The value proposition for any acquisition
is reflected in its business case. For capital
expenditures by a federal agency, the busiAcquisition Strategies
ness case typically conforms to the Office
of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-11 Exhibit 300, but other forms are
possible and procedures can vary across
agencies. The procuring organization can
complete the business case at various
points within either strategy development
or planning, but it is important to begin
conceptualizing the value of the acquisition in business case terms from the start
regardless of the business case’s “official”
timetable and format. Doing so will focus
strategy development on value, ensure an
appropriate definition of success, and help
determine the necessary level of effort.
What is success?
It seems obvious that success is best
defined in terms of the acquisition stakeholders’ needs and expectations. Failing to
establish this basis for success can expose
an acquisition to potentially fatal risks.
As “Risk Analysis: Making It Formal”
on p. 19, of this issue describes, this risk
is avoidable, but not without conscious
effort. Astute, experienced acquisition
personnel might have the judgment to anticipate stakeholder wishes to some extent,
but ultimately there is no substitute for
communication and consensus among all
stakeholders.
Success also requires concrete goals that
everyone understands and agrees on.
Knowing the stakeholders
Knowing stakeholders is critical in establishing clear, comprehensive goals that
can drive strategy development, and serve
as the basis for a successful acquisition. An
outreach plan is an effective mechanism for
identifying and understanding the various
acquisition stakeholders and their desired
or needed degree of involvement. Such a
plan also helps in first establishing clear
consensus goals and then supporting strategy development. The plan’s success depends on being persistent and patient—the
need for stakeholder involvement might be
greater than the stakeholders’ desire to actually get involved.
As Figure 2 shows, stakeholders fall
into four general groups. The obvious
first group—and the one to identify right
away—consists of the acquisition personnel who will be involved in the acquisiAcquisition Strategies
tion’s design and execution. In the users
group are those who will use what is being
acquired. In the oversight group are the officials or bodies, both internal and external to the acquisition organization, whose
interest is the acquisition’s alignment with
policy or regulatory considerations. Finally, the relevant industry players—those
who could supply the goods or services being acquired—form the fourth group.
Outreach need not occur for all groups
simultaneously. The initial and most critical communication is between the first
two groups, the acquisition staff and user
community. Such communication sets the
Acquisition Personnel
• Management
• Subject matter experts
• Contracting officers
• Legal staff
• ...
Users
• Project management
• Operations
• Other contracting
• Agency staff
• ...
Communication
and
Consensus
Oversight
• Agency executives
• OMB
• GAO
• Congress
• ...
Industry
• Individual vendors
• Trade associations
• Professional groups
• Advisory bodies
• ...
Figure 2. Identifying stakeholders. The acquisition team must identify four stakeholder groups.
The most critical communication is between acquisition personnel and the users.
stage by establishing foundational program requirements—identifying the types
of goods or services and defining any special conditions. Knowledge of the user
community is invaluable in determining
what problems the acquisition will solve
and what users want. Are they looking for
cost savings, schedule improvements, or
operational flexibility? Is their purpose to
satisfy a policy directive or to smooth the
transition to upgraded technology? What
performance characteristics do they expect? And so on.
It is important to establish a way of
communicating with the user community
throughout the acquisition cycle. For acquisition within an agency, routine progress meetings between acquisition and
project staff might suffice. For a more
complex acquisition that serves multiple
organizations, communication should
be more formal, such as an acquisition
oversight council, advisory board, or user
group. Groups such as these can offer insights that will help in forming acquisition
goals and strategy and support the generation of detailed acquisition requirements.
The acquisition team must keep this group
or its representatives informed of activity
progress (at a high level) throughout evaluation, as long as such information does not
compromise source selection integrity. The
team might even consider inviting such a
group to receive a briefing on the evaluation results and offer independent advice
to the source selection authority to support
the award decision.
Establishing clear goals
After the procuring organization identifies and understands the user community’s
preliminary needs and expectations, it can
begin to form explicit acquisition goals.
This is a good first step that can point toward the broad outline of a strategy or at
least bound strategy alternatives. At this
point, input from the other two stakeholder
groups can be beneficial. Skilled acquisition staff might be competent in incorporating published guidance, but for larger
acquisitions, establishing a two-way communications path with overseers can ensure
success and prevent unpleasant surprises.
Goals from users might not, for example,
reflect Federal Acquisition Regulation dictates or the latest policy guidance. Oversight groups are much more in tune with
evolving policy and can be an excellent
source of new goals or of realistic limitations on existing goals. Again, it is good
to keep the communications channel open
through the evaluation stage.
A communications mechanism for industry feedback is also valuable in helping goal formation, particularly if the industry or its products and services are in
a state of flux. The industry group can act
as a reality check for the acquisition team.
The communication with this group is not
to have industry help set the acquisition’s
goals. Rather, it is to understand the state
of practice in the commercial world, the
capabilities and products available to meet
the goals, and any real-world conditions
that might render the acquisition’s goals
unrealistic.
15
At this point, the acquisition team might
not see a need to involve the industry
group. They might feel that their expertise
and feedback from the user community
might provide enough knowledge, or that
they can fill any gaps with insights from
market research. For some efforts, this
might be enough. However, as activities
progress from goal formulation to strategy
analysis, larger acquisitions will benefit
from a more structured gathering of industry feedback through mechanisms such as
requests for information, meetings with
standing industry advisory councils, and
public forums organized for this purpose.
After the team gathers relevant stakeholder inputs, it is ready to encapsulate the
definition of success in a set of agreed-on
program goals that capture two aspects of
value:
• what constitutes value to the user (best price,
best schedule, special requirements, operations environment, or some combination of
these) and
• what sustains value (fixed prices, sustained
competition environment, low program overhead, or some combination of these)
The team should clearly articulate goals
that are both manageable (not too many)
and achievable. The goals should be comprehensive and focused enough to drive an
effective strategy and serve as the basis for
judging the acquisition’s success.
What is the environment?
The final question before crafting the
actual strategy addresses the environment
within which the acquisition effort is happening—an environment that could inhibit
or empower the effort’s success. Deeply
understanding the relationships within
this larger environment early in the cycle
is crucial. Sometimes missing just one aspect can significantly limit success or even
doom an acquisition to failure. For example, if a team plans to establish an agencyspecific acquisition contract, but does not
know or consider that policy-makers have
mandated use of a GWAC, the team can
expend time and resources on a strategy
that oversight pressure ends up reversing.
To know the environment, the procuring
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organization must know itself, the prospective users, and the marketplace.
Resources and constraints
Acquisition teams operate within larger
organizations, which can impose process,
budget, and schedule constraints. The
team must thoroughly understand these,
as well as how acquisition decisions will
be made, and who will approve such decisions. It must identify the expertise available in-house or from outside stakeholders
or consultants. Significantly, it must also
look beyond the acquisition stages leading
to award, and into the post award program
operations environment, and understand
what operations capabilities exist or will
need to be developed.
It is critical to identify and address any
resource or capability gaps early on. Even
the most insightful proposal evaluation
scheme will fail if the acquisition team
cannot distinguish a strong proposal from
marketing fluff, or if it sets up an unsustainable contract administration or operations environment.
The users
Knowing the users means knowing not
only what they want to acquire but also
how they intend to use it. This knowledge
should flow seamlessly if the team has established solid user communications during goal setting. At this time, the team
should solidify its knowledge of
• the project, system, or technology requirements;
• desired operational characteristics, such as
how users define ease of use;
Strategy Winners and Losers
Winners
• Conceptualize value
in business case terms.
• Establish an outreach
plan to identify
and understand
stakeholders and their
degree of involvement.
• Clearly articulate
manageable, achievable goals.
• Look beyond the award to identify what operations capabilities will be needed.
• Understand key marketplace capabilities and
trends.
• Involve contracting and legal staff in strategy
development.
• Have enough in-house expertise to distinguish industry hype from realistic claims.
• Incorporate performance measures for evaluation and contractor management.
• Understand when and how the program will
seek competition.
• Include risk mitigation measures.
• Think as an offeror would to try to defeat the
strategy.
• Get final consensus among key stakeholders.
Losers
• Spend too much or too little on strategy development.
• Define success in terms other than stakeholders needs and expectations.
• Under- or overestimate user needs.
• Fail to consider policy, legal or regulatory constraints or oversight
direction.
• Define value too narrowly.
• user policy considerations, such as small business participation goals; and
• missions that the acquisition must support.
Inadequate knowledge of any of these
could lead to downstream headaches. For
example, the acquisition might involve a
high volume of products and services that a
range of potential suppliers could offer using well-understood technology. This tends
to increase the likelihood of vigorous price
competition. At the same time, however,
ordering and inventory management could
be decentralized, or users might expect to
have access to contractor performance data
on a quarterly basis. Not knowing these
conditions and thus omitting support requirements in the solicitation could result
in a strategy that achieves the desired price
points, but leaves users with an excessive
administrative burden.
The marketplace
Marketplace knowledge fleshes out the
big picture, identifying factors that could
affect strategy. The team should understand
Acquisition Strategies
key commercial capabilities, trends that affect technology and services and those who
supply them, and trends in government
contracting. Examples include but are not
limited to the Internet and its myriad implications, evolving concepts in information
technology system architectures, or new
service delivery models such as managed
or outsourced services. Critical industry
trends might be consolidations, shifts from
traditional to emerging market leaders, and
the changing role of small businesses. In
considering the government contracting
environment, the team must be aware of
how policy changes, mandates, and legislative reform can potentially alter the rules
of acquisition or refocus the emphasis of
acquisition activities.
Market research is the usual starting
point, but supplementing this with formal
outreach to industry and oversight entities is often useful for larger acquisitions.
Acquisition staff and users embroiled in
day-to-day concerns may not be aware or
have only a rudimentary understanding of
emerging technologies or state-of-the-art
practices. The outreach to industry and
oversight entities enables the team to understand all the marketplace influences.
Again, this information should flow easily
if the team has successfully established a
stakeholder outreach plan.
Expertise is critical at this point. The
team must have enough in-house expertise
to distinguish industry hype from realistic
claims. Acquiring the latest technology
may be tempting, but new technology is
often touted as a solution long before it is
truly ready to support real-world missions.
The benefits of the latest service delivery
model might accrue more to the service
provider than to the service user. Pending
corporate mergers could limit or change
the nature of the competition. Knowing the
marketplace, on the other hand, gives the
team a way to enhance competition, encourage the participation of the industry’s
value leaders, and make the acquisition a
must-have for potential suppliers.
Let the crafting begin
Once the acquisition team knows its
stakeholders, goals, and environment, it
is ready to identify the range of possible
alternatives and begin crafting the actual
strategy. The sidebar “Strategy Winners
and Losers” lists some proven successful
strategies and those the team would do well
to avoid. As the list of winners implies,
any strategy must support the success of
the overall program, not just the competition for award. From this first principle,
the main objective is to maximize value (as
the program goals define it) over the life
of the project or program by achieving the
most effective competition and the most
advantageous contract terms that the environment can support. The team must think
about what this objective implies, both in
awarding the contract and in applying performance-based contracting principles to
the project or program.
Type ?
• Fixed-price
• Cost reimbursable
• Cost plus
• Incentive
• ...
Vehicle ?
Form ?
• Multiple award schedule
• Agency contract
• GWAC
• Agreement
• ...
• Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
• Labor hour
• Time and materials
• Line item
• ...
Process ?
• Sealed bid
• Negotiation
• Performance
• Sole source
• ...
Specification ?
• Requirements
• Statement of work
• Statement of objectives
• Terms and conditions
• ...
Figure 3. The nuts and bolts of contracting options. Understanding the meaning of government contracting terms and their implications for practitioners requires special training and expertise.
Acquisition Strategies
In building the strategy, the team must
choose from the many nuts and bolts of
government contracting options, as Figure
3 shows. Fully understanding the meanings
of government contracting terms and the
implications in practice can be a challenge
without specialized training and experience. For this reason, involving contracting and legal staff in strategy development
can be invaluable. Although team members
without this background can think of many
creative ways to achieve acquisition goals,
only these experts can ensure that all the
strategy components align and that the final
result stays within the limits of contracting
law and regulations. By operating this way,
the team can curtail the risk of subsequent
difficulties. Contracting officers and legal
staff, for example, are more qualified to
identify issues that could enable a losing
offeror to win a post award protest.
Specifying requirements appropriately
A major crafting task is to determine the
most unambiguous method for specifying
user requirements. Alternatives include a
statement of objectives, statement of work,
technical specification, or some combination. As the sidebar “Statement of Objectives?” describes, there can be confusion
about what kind of specification is most
suitable.
Regardless of the specification type, the
team must build in performance measures
for the evaluation. For goods and services,
this might be specifying the technical standards the provider must comply with and
the technical performance indicators that
the procuring organization will measure.
When describing the solution rather than
specific goods or services, the focus should
be on performance characteristics rather
than design details.
Incorporating contractor performance
measures into contract terms and conditions helps crystallize the post award basis for judging contractor performance. To
write sufficiently clear measures requires
at least a high level understanding of the
program’s concept of operations.
Supporting the competition model
Appropriate choices of contract type and
form depend on a program’s competition
model—points in the program where the
procuring organization seeks the benefits of
competition. Competition for a fixed-price,
17
line-item contract, for example, might establish outstanding prices as a condition
of award. Most competitions for contracts
that are based on labor hours, in contrast,
cannot lock in as much value before contract award, since the primary points of
competition are based on task orders issued after contracts have been established.
In these cases, the contract award has more
to do with prequalifying many competitors
and setting up rules of engagement—the
rules by which they will compete for task
orders.
The General Services Administration’s
FTS2001 long distance telecommunications services program (1998–present) is
an example of a highly successful fixedprice contract program. It established hundreds of thousands of fixed prices for specific telecommunications services available nationwide to any government agency
in any quantity. The fixed prices were
much better than what was commercially
available at the time of award and remain
so today. The program has also supported
subsequent agency-specific competitions,
leveraging the benefits of scale for its largest users. According to the Congressional
record, over its first six years of operation,
the program saved the American taxpayer
close to $2 billion.1
Many of the same competition model
considerations that apply to contracts apply as well to competitions for individual
task or delivery orders. For most of these,
the primary competition point occurs before order award, but larger and multiyear projects can also include competition
points after award. For these larger projects, well-thought-out rules of engagement
can be critical.
In either case, the team must build the
acquisition strategy to maximize the benefits of competition. The idea is to stimulate offerors to sharpen their pencils and
offer better value. The specification might
include, for example, the expected number
of awards, whether that’s a fixed number or
based on language such as “up to” and “not
more than.” The strategy should also clearly delineate the basis for picking winners
and losers. An “everybody who qualifies
wins” approach can be useful to prequalify
many contractors who will subsequently
compete for orders, but it is never optimal
and seldom effective in locking in value
for fixed prices at award.
18
Statement of Objectives?
The mantra “specify the outcome” has
created a common misconception that performance-based contracting dictates the use
of a concise, focused statement of objectives
(SOO) in lieu of a detailed specification, or
statement of work. This is not true. The SOO
is merely one way to state requirements. All
acquisitions should incorporate a performance
basis, regardless of the method used to state
requirements.
A SOO is most suitable when the desired
outcomes are straightforward, quantifiable, and
unambiguous but with many potential ways to
achieve them. If it is possible to specify such
outcomes, the SOO can work well by empowering industry to think creatively in developing a
solution and making the case for its value. This
is particularly true for task order competitions.
The SOO format is less useful when acquisition
involves commodity or commodity-like goods
and services, establishing fixed-prices or procuring fixed quantities, or establishing a new
multiple award contract program.
A SOO that is too general or poorly-focused
can result in proposals that are not comparable
on a common cost basis, require heightened
evaluator expertise to judge technical merit, or
make the project vulnerable to cost creep after
award. Conversely, a statement of work that is
too specific or specifications that are too detailed can limit the offerors’ ability to propose
optimum value. Either extreme is a strategic
mistake.
Finally, it is useful to incorporate special
policy requirements and risk mitigation elements. One example is the common policy
directive to include opportunities for small
and disadvantaged businesses in government contracting programs. An example of
risk mitigation is to include elements that
minimize the impact of industry consolidation, market instability, and the like.
For a small acquisition, this gaming exercise might be purely a thought process.
A larger, more complex competition, in
contrast, should consider applying formal
game theory to predict possible outcomes.
If all the potential strategies identified require fair competition—in the dimensions
sought for the desired value—the strategy
is probably sound. If not, the exercise has
probably identified risks that the team must
address before finalizing the strategy.
Getting final consensus
The last step in crafting a strategy is to
get the agreement of the key stakeholders
identified at the start of strategy development. Consensus can involve anything
from a single meeting with the project
manager and contracting officer (for a
routine agency purchase) to a multiyear
give and take involving the acquisition
oversight council, industry inputs and multiple Congressional hearings (for a major
GWAC program). Regardless of the consensus-getting method, the effort spent to
generate consensus is time well spent because it greatly reduces the potential for
downstream snags in the program.
n effective acquisition strategy addresses the full range of issues necessary to ensure value across the cycle.
Those who develop it must incorporate
sound professional judgment, user input,
and knowledge of environmental factors.
The strategy’s ultimate objective is to set
up a competition that can achieve value
well beyond the costs of strategy development and execution. It is the base on which
subsequent activities must rest. If done
right, it is the first step toward a successful
acquisition. v
A
References
Gaming the strategy
To ensure that the strategy is robust,
the team should try to defeat it once they
draft it. This requires thinking as an offeror would. How would you approach
the competition if you were an incumbent
supplier, or a new supplier trying to break
in? Could you maximize your probability
of award with an aggressive offer and then
use a loophole to lawfully increase prices
or profits later? If you lose the competition,
what would be the basis for your protest?
1. Making Networx Work: Countdown to the RFP for the Federal
Government’s Telecommunications Program, Hearing before the
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 109th
Congress, 1st session, Mar. 3, 2005; www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house/pdf/109hrg/20144.pdf.
Hugo A. Bonuccelli is a senior manager at
Noblis, where his interests include strategic
planning, technical and operational requirements
analysis, vendor qualifications analysis, request
for proposal preparation, vendor management,
vendor proposal evaluation, cost and price
analysis, program/project management, and
transition support. He received an MEng in
systems engineering from the University of
Virginia. Contact him at [email protected].
Acquisition Strategies