A Note on Belief - York University

A Note on Beli ef
D . M. J O H N S O N
P etra von M orstein remarks. with out seeing n eed to give arguments in
support of the view , th at " •. 1 cannot comman d someone to bel ieve
somethi ng (though I can command h im to un de rt ake everythin g th at
mi ght lead to his acq uisi tion of a certain be lief) . • • .'1
T he point seems to be that it is onl y sensible to comman d th ings wh ich
ar e un der a p erson' s volunt ary control; but bel ief is no t one of these. It
is n ot, fo r exam p le, like win king o r ra ising on e's ha nd. Ra the r I it is like
an eye -t ic, or falling in love with som eon e, or go ing to sleep, or w iggling
one's ears-e-i.e. th ings b rou gh t ab ou t in direc tly . If I ta ke a certain
medi.cine. my eye-tic will start (or st op) ; if I dwell on XiS good poi nts
an d Ignore the bad, love for X may follow ; if I close m y eyes an d stay
m otion less in b ed , sleep usu ally cc mes ; if I tw itch m y jaw (the only pa rt
I really m ove) , it pulls along wit h it th e skin of my ch eeks and thence
also my ea rs, so I m ay claim , jokin gly, t o ' m ove' m y ears .
T hus, the re can b e ( I) causes of b elief, whi ch b ring it ab ou t irrespective
of evid ence-e-e.g. th e pai n of t he r ack, or fear of it , m ay be su fficient to
make one believe, no t just prete n d to bel ieve, in the existence of G od or
divin ity of Christ . (2) Evidence can de termine b elief, as wh en I bel ieve
th at a sh ip is unseawo rt hy be ca use I see cr acks in its h ull. Dut th ere ne ver
can b e (3) com m an ds to beli eve, wh ich som eon e is free either to follow
or not t o follo w.
Al thou gh th is is a comm on, p erh ap s the 'official' view of b elief today
it seem s to m e m istaken since (3) is po ssibl e in so me situations .
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The situa tion s I ha ve in m in d are those wh ere a p erson com plies with
a .com man d to believe or n ot b elieve someth in g b y lowering or r aising
hi s threshold of adequa te evidence. So m et im es one h as strong evidence
b u t n o resu ltin g belie f, because h is standard is h igh . T his is often true,
fo r example, w hen a judge h ears n case in court. So m etimes one has
weak evide nce wh ich nev ert h eless brings abo ut a b elief, be cause one 's
sta ndard is low. This is often the case , for exam ple, when p eop le exchan ge
~umours in con vers.ation. ,Du t one can change th is ; nnd th is possib ility
~s wh at also m akes It sens ib le to speak of comm an di ng be lief. Thus if a
J udge chooses to d o so (perhaps fro m ap at h y, bo redo m , spi te , etc.), he
su d den ly can begin determining his beli efs abo u t the gu ilt or innocence
o~ defendants i ~ an arb it rary, laz y or p rejudiced way. S imila rly , a st rong.
Willed hou sewife may re solve (p erhaps be cau se she is asham ed of
p rev iou sly h aving acce p ted things th at were just hearsay) that from no w
on sh e will b elieve n othin g th at is not subs tan tiate d by good evide nce-san d then stick to h er resolu tion .
\ Vhy do I claim that re vising a th reshold of eviden ce for determ in ing
bel ief is con trolled b y the will? The re ason is th at it is not ind irect. One
" 'I magin e".' Mind, Ap ril 1974, p. 242.
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D . M. JOHNS O N : A NOT E O N B EL I EF
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d oes n ot b ring it abo ut bydoin g some thin g else, an d h op ing that it will
b e ca rried along as well. In th is respec t, ado p ting a chan ged stan da rd is
like raisin g one's ha nd-not like goin g to sleep, fall ing in love or wigglin g
one's ea ra.
Sup pose som eon e obje cts th at ch an ging a thresh old of adequate
evidence do es no t coun t as d etermi n ing a belief at will, but is on ly a
prepara tion , by whi ch one gets read y, or sets the st age for believin g.
I re ply that su pp orting evidence com in g u p to a ce rta in standard is p art
o f b elief, not a preliminary t o it, because belief is a n orm at ive n oti on .
Thus , even if something invol un tary happ ens to a perso n wh enever he
is faced with a prep onderance of evidence in favo u r of P, it docs n ot
follow th at it is appropri ate to call t h is in volun tary reac tion ' b elievin g
that (or in) P,'
T o deny th e last poi n t is to m ake on eself incapab le of distinguish ing
belief and an inclinatio n to be lieve . F or exam p le, behaviourists seem
un ab le to draw th is corn mon-eense dis tin ct ion.
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