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The state of our unsettled Union
Brigid Laffan*
This is a time of transition for the European Union (EU), and 2014 is a year of renewal
for European institutions, involving elections to the European Parliament and the beginning of a five-year legislative term under new leadership in the Commission, the European
Council, and the External Action Service (EES). The EU has been tested—perhaps like
never before—during the Eurozone crisis. The Union’s legal framework, its governance
structures, its ability to respond to pressing societal needs and relations among the member states, have all been placed under severe strain since 2009. The Union managed to
battle through the acute phase of the crisis albeit at a high social, political, and economic
cost and is in mending mode. The address develops four analytic propositions about the
state of the Union arising from observable trends in this crisis phase of European Union
integration.
The four propositions are (i) that contestation and politicization in the Union are
here to stay; (ii) that the euro area mark 2.0 implies “more Europe”; (iii) that “more
Europe” in the euro area implies even more differentiation in the Union; and (iv) that
the return of geopolitics puts the spotlight on the Union’s role in twenty-first-century
world politics. The future of the EU will be shaped by the interaction of these four
dynamics.
“I sing of time’s trans-shifting…”1
1. Introduction
It is an honor and a privilege to address this distinguished audience on “The state
of our unsettled Union.” I do so as Director of the Robert Schuman Centre at the
European University Institute (EUI), as a European citizen, and as someone who takes
public engagement on European issues very seriously. As a citizen of Ireland, which
has had more EU referendums than any other, I have voted seven times on European
treaties. I have participated in many lively debates on television, on radio, and in print
on Europe. I have stood outside supermarkets and football pitches talking to individual
* Director, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. Email: [email protected]. This article is the text of a speech delivered on the occasion of the State of the Union 2014
(May 9, 2014).
1
Robert Herrick, The Argument of his Book, available at http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/176694.
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voters, discussing different EU treaties and explaining why Europe matters. The lesson
I take from my personal experience of many campaigns is that the case for Europe can
be communicated politically, and that individual citizens can be motivated to support
it, but only if they are persuaded that the Union has a part to play in addressing their
concerns and that they themselves are comfortable with making a political choice about
Europe.
This year, 2014 is a year of commemoration and recollection: a hundred years since
the outbreak of World War I; seventy-five since the outbreak of World War II; twentyfive since the collapse of communism; and ten since the Union’s bold enlargement to
east central Europe on May 1, 2004. 1914 is the most searing of reference years, as
on August 4 that year, in Fritz Stern’s haunting words, “the first calamity of the 20th
century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang”2 was unleashed. The
Europe of 1914 did not have powerful institutions to mediate relations among the
Great Powers, foster shared interests among Europe’s peoples, and contain conflict.
A fragile balance of power system succumbed in thirty-seven short days to the vanities, miscalculations, and blunders of leaders and their generals.
These references to pivotal years of twentieth-century history highlight for us
that Europe’s Community, now Union, was forged in the shadow of a long European
trauma. More recently, the welcome unfreezing of Europe’s post-war divide in 1989
opened the way to a truly “European” Union on a continental scale. The taming of
inter-state relations in Europe and the openness to new members is the Union’s unrivalled contribution to this continent and the wider world.
I address you today in a year of transition and at a time of change for the European
Union. The Union has experienced two major shocks over the last five years: first, the
extended shock of the Great Recession; and, more recently, the reemergence of hard
geopolitics to the east. It is not my intention to address Ukraine and Russia in any
detail, but the images of militias in balaclavas and military maneuvers at a European
border remind us that the European states system has been transformed in this part of
Europe, and that our Union played a pivotal role in that transformation. The display
of hard power and the use of force that we witness on the frontier of the Union are
unimaginable within it.
2. 2014: a year of transition
2014 is a year of transition and renewal for the EU and European institutions. The
European Parliament elections, in a few short weeks, are a key event in the political life of the Union. This time is different, we are told. The experiment of declaring
Spitzenkandidaten undoubtedly adds political drama—drama that continues here later
this afternoon with the presidential debate among the candidates. We cannot yet
judge what impact, if any, the Spitzenkandidaten will have on the future leadership of
the Commission on the Union’s policy choices.
2
This quote from Fritz Stern is one of the most frequently quoted WWI references because it captures the
long-lasting consequences of that war.
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The elections draw our attention to the political climate in Europe. Turnout will be
a crucial barometer of the attitudes and political engagement of European citizens six
years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Low or declining turnout will
undermine the European parliament’s claim to representativeness. The eventual division of seats between the two largest groups, the European Peoples Party (EPP) and
the Socialists Group (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats)
will count as these two parties continue to dominate the parliament. The performance
of Euro-skeptic parties both of the radical left and right will be eagerly watched. It is
likely that the first truly transnational European elections will be a major success for
EU critical parties.
The political complexion of the house will affect the legislative battles ahead and the
leadership of the Commission. There is much we do not know:
•
•
•
•
Will the Parliament coalesce around the candidate of the party with the largest
number of seats—that is behind either Jean-Claude Juncker or Martin Schultz?
How will the European Council react to the outcome of the election?
What coalitions will the member states forge around which candidates in the
intense post-election period?
And how will the election of the Commission President play out in tandem with
the other EU roles to be settled this year (those of the European Council President
and High Representative)?
Is the Union ready for this experiment? Neither the Parliament nor the European
Council will want to trigger a constitutional crisis but they may not be able to prevent
it. We can anticipate fierce battles within the Parliament; between the Parliament and
the European Council; and among the member states over the new procedure and the
distribution of roles. Once the votes are counted and seats distributed, a potent cocktail of member state, party, and institutional politics will begin in earnest. We know
with certainty that no one party in the parliament will have enough votes to elect the
Commission president on its own. Thus, coalition politics will be the order of the day. If
the radical left and right perform as well as anticipated, this might shape a grand coalition not just for the election of the Commission president but for the entire legislative
period ahead, with all of the attendant consequences for EU strategy and policy. One
or more of the Spitzenkandidaten may survive to the end game or they may be replaced,
given the exigencies of member state and institutional politics.
Whatever its final complexion, the new collective leadership of the Commission,
the European Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS) will confront
a crowded agenda as the Union seeks to stabilize a weak recovery, move beyond crisis
mode, and address intensifying external pressures.
3. A time of transition
This is a time of transition not just a year of transition for the European Union. It
has been tested—tested perhaps like never before—during the Eurozone crisis. The
Union’s legal framework, its governance structures, its ability to respond to pressing
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societal needs and relations among the member states, have all been placed under
severe since 2009. The Union managed to battle through the acute phase of the crisis
albeit at a high social, political, and economic cost. It is now in mending mode but
its troubled member states continue to face a legacy of hardship and debt. Moreover,
taxpayers in creditor states feel exposed to the risks they have taken in bailing and
backing the currency. Both creditor and debtor states were caught in a vice-like grip
by the markets and their banking systems.
It is neither wise nor feasible to attempt to predict the “state of the Union” by the
end of this decade, notwithstanding the emphasis on 2020 in many EU policies.
Taking a bird’s eye view, however, it is possible to sketch in broad outline a number of
underlying trends that the crisis dynamic has unleashed and a number of issues that
the Union is faced with. The last six years have brought a chasm between the world
of the Brussels/Frankfurt beltway and domestic politics in the member states sharply
into focus. The division of politics in the Union, exemplified by the striking resilience
of the EU’s policy-making system, on the one hand, and deep political and economic
fissures across the member states, on the other, was revealed.
At several stages during the acute phase of the crisis, it appeared as if the euro
would implode, given the relentless pressure on individual member states and on the
currency union as a whole. Implosion was, however, averted, because the Union’s
decision-making capacity proved robust enough to prevent collapse.3 The governments of all euro states, both creditor and debtor, were forced to agree to highly controversial and costly policy interventions. The European Council and the European
Central Bank (ECB) muddled through by addressing the immediate pressures of the
crisis, while building more robust institutions and policy instruments for the longer
term. Crisis management and mending went hand in hand. Legal and institutional
frameworks were stretched but not broken.
Summer 2012 was the turning point. Chancellor Merkel and ECB President Draghi,
working in tandem, orchestrated the delicate process of delivering a consistent and
credible signal to the markets. President Draghi made the decisive announcement in
London that “[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.”4 Financial market actors began to
accept that those responsible for the euro area would indeed do “whatever it takes.”
Extensive political capital was invested in rescuing the currency, particularly by the
heads of state and government, and the ECB, which put the credibility of the latter on
the line. Governing parties carried the political weight and bore the political costs of
the rescue.
The resilience of the policy-making system masked powerful center–periphery
dynamics that were, and continue to be, at play. There is a deep fracture between the
countries in the south and Ireland—an honorary member of Club Med—and the
creditor states to the North. All economic indicators point to a fractured euro area.
The measures taken included four rescue packages, banking support for Spain, new laws on economic
governance, and banking Union.
4
Global Investment Conference in London, July 26, 2012. The Draghi speech was followed on August 2 by
the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) package.
3
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However, because of its consequences for individuals, families, and society, unemployment is perhaps the most compelling indicator of all. At the end of 2013, the gap in
the average unemployment rate between the two best performing states (Austria and
Germany 5 percent) and the two worst (Greece and Spain 26 percent) was 21 percentage points, and the gap for youth unemployment was almost 50 percent. This is a
failure. Europe’s youth in fiscally troubled countries are experiencing a level of mass
unemployment that should not be acceptable in one of the world’s richest continents.
Fractures between states have been accompanied by fractures within countries
because of the distributional consequences of the crisis. The effects of unemployment
and welfare cuts on those most vulnerable undermine a core European value: a commitment to well-being for all. Although achieving a rational macroeconomic policy is
deeply problematic in the Union, mass unemployment and growing inequality should
not be tolerated as the “new norm.” At issue is the question of whether the euro area
will offer a return to prosperity for all, or just constrain governments.
Turning now to the dynamics unleashed by the crisis, I offer four analytic propositions about the state of the Union arising from observable trends in this phase of
European Union integration.
The four propositions are:
(i) contestation and politicization are here to stay;
(ii) the euro area mark 2.0 implies “more Europe”;
(iii)“more Europe” in the euro area implies even more differentiation in the
Union; and
(iv)the return of geopolitics puts the spotlight on the Union’s role in the twentyfirst century world politics.
3.1. Proposition 1: a Union contested
The enduring images I carry of the crisis are the colored graphs of “bond spreads”
that became the staple diet of prime-time news; mass anti-austerity marches; and
European citizens burning the European flag because of its symbolism. The Union
undoubtedly moved “closer to its citizens”, as they learnt what it meant to share a
single currency. Domestic crisis elections were marked by high levels of volatility
and incumbency losses, as voters demanded hyper-accountability. Since 2009, governments in almost all states have been defeated, in some cases by historically high
margins; and once-mighty political parties have been brought low. The widespread
punishment of incumbents offered a political opening to anti-system parties enabling
them to gain further traction with dissatisfied voters.
The performance of Beppe Grillo’s 5-Star Movement in the 2013 Italian elections
when polling over 25 percent of the popular vote in contrast to Mario Monti’s Civic
Choice which could only muster 10.5 percent, is a striking example of a more widespread phenomenon. Disaffection and protest have generated a politics of anti-politics
in many states. The performance of the Front National (FN) in the March 2014 muni­
cipal elections in France, and the abysmal performance of the Socialists just two years
into the Hollande presidency, reveal the political cost of governing in hard times. The
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EP elections are likely to confirm this trend. The polls suggest that more Europeans will
vote for populist, Euro-skeptic, and radical parties of the left and right than they did in
2009, and that in the next parliament there may well be four political groups to the
right of the EPP.
National political systems are under strain across Europe, and national democracies struggle to respond to voter demands. Those political forces committed to maintaining and strengthening this Union must begin to ask what weight democratic
politics can bear, and how contestation in and about the EU can be politically managed, so that it does not put more stress on the system than the system can bear.
Politicization might well lead to such a high level of dissent that even the elite consensus on which the Union rests will break down. Or it may in time enhance the legitimacy by furthering the debate on the political and policy choices facing the Union.
This depends both on the agency of politicians and on economic recovery. Politicians
who aspire to govern Europe cannot insulate EU policy-making and the Brussels beltway from open political debate any longer. While maintaining their programmatic
differences, centrist political forces of both the left and the right must be willing to
engage in robust argument about the successes, challenges, and—yes!—failures of
the EU. Nor should they overreact to the arrival in the European Parliament of more
EU-critical forces.
Not unexpectedly, the depth and duration of the crisis have affected public attitudes
toward the European Union, eroded trust in its institutions, and undermined the value
placed on membership. Trust in the Union has declined from 48 percent in the fall of
2009 to 31 percent in the fall of 2013. These global figures hide significant variation across the member states. There is a major decline among the most economic­
ally stressed states, from just under 80 percent in 2002 to 35 percent (–53 percent)
in 2013. Moreover, individual European citizens have little sense of political efficacy.
Two-thirds of respondents do not think their vote counts in the Union, according to
the latest Euro barometer (fall 2013). Denmark is the only country where a majority
of voters claim to have influence. At the opposite end of the spectrum, in ten of the
twenty-eight member states fewer than one in ten citizens think their votes count.
Given the increased visibility of the Union in the member states and the politicization of European issues in elections, European elites should not ignore these findings.
The Union must move beyond the politics of “There is no Alternative” (TINA) because
there can be no democratic politics without voice and choice.
3.2. Proposition 2: more Europe
This contested Union faces powerful functional pressures for “more Europe” within the
euro area as the Union addresses the design faults that were so harshly exposed. “More
Europe” implies a more intrusive Union in the euro states and further centralization
at the supranational level. Member states are increasingly subject to more stringent
surveillance, reinforced penalties, and constraint on national policy choice. The growing policing role of the Commission and member states as assessors of their partners’
national budgetary strategies, and, in extremis, as imposers of sanctions, introduce a
The state of our unsettled Union
859
strong supranational dimension to the economic policy with all the attendant implications for national politics and democracy. The new system greatly strengthens the
responsibility to the collective and places further limits on the freedom of governments
to respond to their electorates. Co-responsibility within the euro area comes at the
price of responsiveness at domestic level.
The step change in economic governance has gone hand in hand with deeper
integration, notably the establishment of a banking union. The centralization
of supervision in the ECB represents a major federalization of power. Given the
scope and the ambition of this development, and the pronounced heterogeneity of
European banking, the creation of a banking union will not be without tension.
Nonetheless, banking supervision is decisively switching from the national to the
European arena. Beyond supervision, a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is a
necessary complement to ECB supervision. Agreement on the SRM was reached
on March 20, 2014. The complexity of the final deal is underlined by its dual
character; an SRM Regulation under EU law and an intergovernmental agreement
addressing elements of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The deal is truly significant because the Resolution Authority has a backing fund which will be built up
over eight years and its resources will be gradually mutualized during this period.
This breakthrough on mutualization, albeit on a very limited scale, is another step
change in the euro area. Pressures for further centralization will not rest with
banking union. Ahead are battles about how much more centralization will be
needed. Already the euro area has been forced into deeper integration which, in
turn, creates tension with those outside. This brings me to my third proposition:
yet further differentiation.
3.3. Proposition 3: yet further differentiation
Up until the 1990s, membership in the European Union implied agreement on a common constitutional and legal order, as well as shared institutions based on common
principles. Successive enlargements and diverse preferences among the member states
gradually led to more flexibility. The euro states have been propelled into deeper integration, including important measures adopted outside the treaty framework and the
euro area is now the core of the Union given the ties that bind these states. Non-euro
states are very sensitive to these developments as they seek to protect the unity of the
Union’s institutional system and the openness of the euro area. The ten non-member
euro states do not form a homogenous whole, but rather comprise two groups: those
who have decided to opt-out (the UK, Denmark, and Sweden), and those who are committed to joining if circumstances allow. The position of the United Kingdom is the
most problematic.
“Europe” has become one of the most salient and toxic issues in UK politics. David
Cameron’s Europe speech in January 2013 was groundbreaking for his country’s relations with the Union. In it he set out the road map of what he, as UK Prime Minister,
would do if his party wins the 2015 general election. His intentions were clear; he is
committed to renegotiating the terms of UK membership after the election followed
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by an “in”–“out” referendum by the end of 2017.5 This diminished the UK’s influence in the Union during this critical period. The leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband,
has stated that he will not hold a referendum on the terms set out by Cameron, but
has pledged to hold one in the event of a new treaty involving a significant transfer
of power.
The British question would receive far more attention on the European agenda if
these were normal times. The crisis, however, has monopolized political energy and
relegated the position of this large member state to the margins. In March 2014, the
Prime Minister set out the key changes he is seeking for a new settlement with the
Union. Although stated in general terms, essentially, he wants to end the UK’s commitment “to ever closer union,” repatriate some powers, strengthen the blocking powers for national parliaments, reduce red tape, free the police and justice systems from
Brussels interference, and control the access of EU migrants to UK welfare benefits.6
The other member states have been careful not to make any concessions at this stage,
but the Cameron shopping list resonates with the sentiments in a number of other
countries.
All indications are that the UK’s partners are prepared to negotiate a deal but are
unlikely to offer major changes which in turn would make it more difficult for Cameron
to present the outcome convincingly as a “new settlement” in an “in”–“out” referendum. If those advocating exit prevail, the UK would have to seek either a bilateral deal,
like Switzerland, or membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) like Norway.
Just how willing the Union would be to grant a large state this status, given that it was
developed with small, rather than large, states in mind, is impossible to predict. In any
event, generous market access would turn the UK into a taker, rather than a shaper, of
European regulation. Of course, by then, the Union may want to develop a new kind
of privileged partnership for a number of large states at its borders, such as Turkey,
Ukraine, and perhaps then also the UK.
This is not just a British issue, but an important challenge for the EU as a whole.
It may be tempting to regard the departure of an “uneasy” partner with a certain
amount of equanimity, especially as its prime minister introduced his demands for
reform at a time when the EU was already under severe strain. An EU–UK divorce
would, however, carry great dangers for the Union in the long term. It would embolden
anti-EU forces in many states, and introduce a degree of contingency to the membership of all. The UK would be a powerful reference point for those opposing integration
in all member states. This could destabilize the Union, and perhaps transform differentiation into disintegration. This brings me to my final proposition, the return of geopolitics and hard security.
The Prime Minister was motivated by a desire to contain the Euro-skeptics within his own party, counteract the rising popularity of Nigel Farage and UK Independence Party (UKIP), and put the Labour Party
under pressure on Europe.
6
David Cameron, The EU Is Not Working and We Will Change It, The Telegraph (Mar. 15, 2014), available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700644/David-Cameron-the-EU-isnot-working-and-we-will-change-it.html.
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3.4. Proposition 4: the return of geopolitics and hard security
During its formative phase, the European Union was insulated from geopolitics
because of the bipolar character of the international system and the security blanket
provided by North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Pax Americana. The fall
of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the
way for a peaceful unification of the continent, the Balkans aside, and for a peace
dividend that freed European states to spend less on security and defense. A united
Germany reemerged as a power bridging the east and west of the continent.
All of these developments confirmed and reinforced the EU’s self-understanding
as an inward-looking peace-loving power built on the deployment of “soft power.” It
allowed the EU to exist in a geopolitical bubble. The Arab Spring and its aftermath
were a reminder of Europe’s unstable neighborhood but events in the east amount to
a shock.
Clearly, the threat of war has not disappeared as Russia seeks to reassert its dominance in its neighborhood. Moreover, the turmoil in Ukraine was triggered by a deep
conflict between forces wanting to embed Ukraine in a close relationship with the EU
and those favoring a strong relationship with Russia. The European flag was flown
in defiance of Russia by the protesters in Kiev. If the crisis cannot be de-escalated,
the EU and the US is forced to strengthen sanctions and offer yet more support to the
beleaguered government in Kiev. For certain, we can say that hard security and traditional “high politics” is back in European affairs and high on the Union’s agenda, with
respect to Russia and Ukraine, but more generally as well. The crisis has already tested,
and will continue to test, the capacity of the Union to agree collectively on core foreign
policy interests and actions when faced with a serious external security challenge on
its borders. The crisis also puts EU energy policy high on the agenda and will provide
an important impulse to reduce dependency on Russian oil and gas.
4. Whither the transition?
For the foreseeable future, the state of this unsettled union will be “transition.” Indeed,
transition or “becoming” is a permanent feature of the dynamic of integration. Thus
the response to the crisis displayed both continuity and innovation—a trend which
is likely to continue. The four dynamics I have outlined in this address—politicization, more policy integration, further flexibility, and the new consciousness of geopolitics—will have a major influence on the next chapter of the Union’s history. There
is a profound tension between growing public contestation about Europe and the
deepening of integration through technocratic policy solutions. Deeper integration
in turn creates new tensions between insiders in the Eurozone and outsiders. And
the return of geopolitics highlights the tension between the economic interests of
each member state and the challenge to the European order emanating from Russia.
The Union may not have the capacity to fully resolve these tensions; political systems
rarely do. Nonetheless, the challenge for Europe’s collective leadership is to find ways
of mediating them.
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Rebuilding trust and fashioning an adequate consensus for the medium term is
essential to managing these deep tensions. Rebuilding trust implies that all member
states, particularly those in the euro area, take seriously their responsibility to each
other, and ensure that in their domestic policies and practices, they do not endanger
the well-being of partners. Rebuilding trust also depends on ensuring that Europe’s
financial system is adequately regulated so that the public bailing out of banks is a last
not a first resort. Rebuilding trust requires an open public debate within the member
states and across the Union about shared priorities and choices for the next decade.
And rebuilding trust implies taking “subsidiarity” really seriously so that the member
states are not caged and rendered powerless.
I end with a political message to Europe’s leaders who take power in November 2014.
(i)
Do not be complacent: Now that the market stress has abated, it might be
tempting to think that there has been sufficient retrofitting of the Economic
and Monetary Union. This would be a mistake, because the legacies of the
crisis still need to be addressed, and the euro area is not yet equipped to deal
with future crises.
(ii)
Do not be tempted by big-bang treaty change: A new constitutional convention
may appear attractive, but given the experience of the Constitutional Treaty
and the outcome of the referendums in 2005, asking the member states to
negotiate and ratify such a treaty at this fragile juncture would overburden
the domestic politics of many member states and provide Europe’s populist
parties with an appealing political opportunity.
(iii)
Focus on the big questions: Europe faces many big issues such as the search for
a sustainable growth model, energy, research and education, welfare provision, poverty, migration, and changing demographics. Rather than having
sterile debates on the “future of Europe,” put the big issues on the table and
facilitate deliberation across the Union and within the member countries on
the choices we face.
(iv)
Focus on the global: The euro crisis turned the Union inwards as so much
political energy and capital went into the rescue effort. Yet as Europeans, we
live in and struggle with an age of global politics. Every European issue has a
“global” dimension that would be folly to ignore. Moreover, Europe must play
is role in the difficult search for transnational and global governance in this
increasingly multi-centered world.
(v)
Bite the bullet on limited fiscal federalism: Economic governance cannot
rely only on indicators, targets, monitoring and surveillance. The dismal
experience of the hard hit countries demonstrates the costs of supply side
adjustment without a macroeconomic capacity. Building a limited fiscal
union—and I emphasize limited—beyond fiscal surveillance is necessary.
(vi)
Recognize the trials and tribulations of reform: Many member states face a
decade of reform that address embedded practices and institutions. It is precisely those states where trust in the EU and in national governments is lowest, that most is demanded. Reform cannot be achieved by external diktat
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alone. Democratic politics will not bear it. Thus in designing reform programs, it is important that the Union develops incentives and if necessary
lubricates the process with side payments.
If Robert Schuman were here today, what would he say about the state of this unsettled Union? Shortly before he died in 1963, Schuman had said that “the hard lessons
of history have taught me not to trust hurried improvisations or overly ambitious
projects.”7 Throughout its history, the Union has attempted to steer a course between
improvisation and overly ambitious design. The crisis, however, was dominated by
“hurried improvisations.” Now is the time to go beyond this while keeping in mind
Schuman’s guidance on overly ambitious projects. We must remember that this Union
has been crafted by artisans, not architects. It has achieved an enormous amount in
just sixty short years, and we should have the confidence as Europeans to face and find
a future that builds on our values, institutions, and creativity.
7
EP Library, Robert Schuman and May 9th, European Parliamentary Research Service (May 9, 2013), available
at http://epthinktank.eu/2013/05/09/robert-schuman-and-may-9th/.