HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING; 11(1): 21-29
© Oxford University Press 1996
The evolution of population policy in rural China
NEIL THOMAS1 AND NEIL PRICE2
'Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales, Cardiff, UK, and 'Centre for
Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea, UK
Fertility declined rapidly in China in the 1970s, to slightly above replacement level by 1978. It was intended by the government that the One-Child Family Policy, introduced in 1979, would lower fertility
still further. However, the decollectivization of agriculture, also initiated in the late 1970s, weakened
collective institutions, thereby undermining birth planning administration and family planning services.
The consequent stall in fertility was succeeded in 1987 by a sudden and pronounced decline, to a total
fertility rate of 1.8 in 1992. This paper is an attempt to explain this recent decline in terms of falling
demand for children, the provision of more accessible family planning services, and the operation of
restrictive population policy. The major emphasis is on the formulation and implementation of birth
control policies in rural areas. Since 1979 central government population policy has become progressively
liberalized, culminating in the formal abandonment of the One-Child Family Policy in 1991. Local policymakers, however, have been intimately exposed to the reproductive demands of the peasantry. As
a result a uniform national policy co-exists with highly diverse policies at the local level, dependent
on social and economic conditions. The declining authority of township (commune) birth planning administrations was arrested in the late 1980s with the massive injection of funds from all levels of government. This reversal was aided by the recruitment of over 50 million volunteers by the Communist
Party-led Family Planning Association, to reinforce the work of birth planning cadres and family planning personnel. Above all, it is argued that the effective implementation of local birth plans has relied
on an intensification of cooperation between birth planning officials and other local government cadres
who regulate access to resources, such as land and credit, without which the aspirations of ordinary
people cannot be realised.
Introduction
In the early years of the Revolution opinion was
divided within the Communist Party over whether
China was over-populated. Some regarded the
number of people, and their rate of increase, as a
serious impediment to development, while others considered such a perspective an excuse for failing to
implement effective economic policies. With the exception of the years of the Great Leap Forward
(1958-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), a
broad consensus gradually evolved in favour of
attempts to limit population growth. Thus in 1971
birth planning policies were incorporated into China's
Fourth Five-Year Plan (Tuan 1989:74). There
followed a fertility decline throughout China of unprecedented proportions. By 1978, only 7 years later,
the total fertility rate (TFR) had declined from 5.5
to 2.7 (Banister 1984:254). Contraceptive practice
had become almost universal in rural China in less
than a decade. Although this is normally attributed
to the adoption of anti-natalist policies, the evolution
of institutions guaranteeing economic security to the
rural population is a complementary explanation
favoured by some (Dreze and Sen 1989).
The government, eager to reduce population growth
still further, introduced the One-Child Family Policy
in 1979. Despite this, no significant further decline
in fertility took place until 1987. This stall in fertility
decline was explained by numerous writers in terms
of the decollectivization of agriculture, which was initiated in 1979. They stressed the pro-natalist consequences of the resurgence in the economic value of
children as labour on privatized farms, as well as the
resurrection of the lineage as the main source of
economic opportunity and security (Caldwell and
Srinavasan 1984; Davin 1985; Potter and Potter
1990; White 1987).
From around 1987 another sudden and dramatic
decline in fertility began. A possible major cause of
22
Neil Thomas and Neil Price
this was a sharp escalation in the costs of childrearing arising out of the privatization of local production and service provision. Greenhalgh (1992b:23)
particularly emphasises the enormous investment entailed in weddings, a finding supported by the anthropological work of Croll (1992). Potter and Potter
(1990) attribute this resurgence of wedding costs to
the increasing importance of maintaining and
strengthening kinship ties as a substitute for the
declining support of the collective. Thus an allegedly
powerful pro-natalist force of the early 1980s reappears as an equally powerful anti-natalist force in less
than a decade.
In most country settings it is conventional to analyze
fertility trends in terms of 'demand' and 'supply' factors: those which influence the demand for children,
and those which influence directly the practice of
family planning through the availability and quality
of appropriate services. Thus some of the demand
factors invoked to explain fertility trends in China
over the past 20 years or so have been oudined above.
To a lesser extent the partial loss of governmental
control over fertility in the 1980s has been attributed
to supply factors: the demise of local cooperative
medical systems and the adverse consequences for
family planning service provision (Kan 1990:43;
Kaufman et al. 1992).
However, the operation of restrictive reproductive
policies offers an additional explanation of fertility
trends in China, of comparable weight. In this paper
an attempt is made to explain the fluctuating levels
of fertility in the 1980s, and the recent sharp decline,
in terms of evolving population control policies and
their implementation. Most of the analysis utilizes
secondary data sources, although some insights into
policy implementation gained on a visit to a rural area
of Jiangsu Province by the authors in 1993 are
offered.
First however, the evidence is presented for both the
fluctuating levels of fertility between 1979 and 1987,
and for the more recent decline, up to 1992.
Fertility trends in China, 1979-1992
The introduction of the One-Child Family Policy in
1979 saw an immediate decline in fertility up to 1981.
Feeney et al. (1989:304), applying the 'own-children
method' to the 1987 One-Percent Population Survey,
show that fertility then fluctuated up to 1987, with
the total fertility rate (TFR) in that year being almost
identical (2.45) to that in 1981. They argue that this
equality is an artifact of declining marriage age, and
that marital fertility, more reflective of long-term
reproductive intentions, actually declined quite
significantly between 1981 and 1987.' In the last
two years of this period though, 1985 to 1987, Gu
and Yang (1991:10) have shown that in rural areas
there was an 11 % increase in fertility unrelated to
trends in marriage.2
Knowledge about fertility trends since 1987 is largely
derived from Annual Population Change Surveys,
conducted by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), and
a fertility survey conducted in 1992 by the State
Family Planning Commission (SFPC). The SSB
surveys reveal a progressive decline in CBR from
23.3 in 1987 to 18.2 in 1992, the latter coinciding
almost exacdy with the SFPC survey estimate of 18.1
(Peng 1993:2-3). The SFPC data have been analyzed
by various demographers, but none of their reports
have yet been published. Wu and Lu (1993) have
derived a TFR series which also declines progressively from 2.54 in 1987 to 1.72 in 1992. From the
same data Nygren and Hoem (1993) derive a TFR
estimate of 1.73 for 1992, and Feeney an estimate
of 1.8.3 Others, while confirming a fertility decline
in the late 1980s, doubt whether TFR was below 2
in 1992 (for example, Brass 1994). The government
itself claims a TFR of 2.0 (GOC 1994), although it
has been suggested that political considerations may
have biased this estimate upwards.
Evidence of fertility decline in the late 1980s is supported by the 1990 census (Peng 1992:8), while a
major increase in contraceptive prevalence between
1988 and 1992, derived from the 1988 2-per-thousand
Fertility Survey and the 1992 SFPC survey, suggests
it may have continued into the 1990s (Peng 1993:8).
These data sources, and their various analyses, indicate that the minor increase in fertility between 1985
and 1987 went sharply into reverse during die last
few years of the 1980s and may even have continued
into the 1990s and fallen below replacement level by
1992.
We move on now to an explanation of the fertility
trends in rural China between 1979 and 1992, in
terms of population policy formulation and implementation.
Population policy formulation
The formulation of population policy in China is
driven primarily by the government's demographic
Population policy in rural China
objectives. But it is also constrained by both the
changing demand for children and by the availability
and quality of family planning services. The contradiction between demographic objectives and the
perceived reproductive aspirations of millions of rural
Chinese couples is believed to have prevented the
One-Child Family Policy from being passed as law
in 1979 (Croll 1985:27). Instead the outcome was a
number of sets of rules and regulations issued by the
individual provinces, based on central government
guidelines.
The next central directive appeared in 1984, and
reportedly represented a softening of policy. Like the
One-Child Policy before it, the precise contents of
this Document 7 of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party were not made publicly available,
at least until recently (White 1994:148). A slightly
more liberal document was issued in 1986, but the
essence of the one-child restriction remained (Aird
1990:35; Greenhalgh 1986:494). By 1988 the majority of provinces had adopted a de facto 'daughteronly policy' permitting couples with one daughter
only, to have another child (Zeng 1989:334). In
recognition of this reality Central Government confirmed the daughter-only policy as national policy in
May 1991 (Greenhalgh and Li 1993:31; White
1994:154). In addition to these central government
directives there have also been ad hoc short-term
campaigns to reinforce the existing policy. Foremost
amongst these have been the national abortion and
sterilization campaigns of 1981 and 1983 respectively
(Potter and Potter 1990:246).
This brief account of changes in population policy
in China illustrates both the importance of provinciallevel policy and of the interaction between central and
provincial governments. Some writers even consider
that the communications between different levels of
government are a much more accurate indicator of
real policies than are the public pronouncements of
higher-level authorities. Aird in particular argues that
real policies operate according to the 'documents,
directives and exhortations transmitted from the central authorities through domestic channels' (Aird
1990:vii). In other words the outside world necessarily remains largely ignorant of the reality of
regional population policies, to which central and
even provincial policies are a poor guide.
At the level of implementation - that of the township
and village - birth planning authorities are most intimately exposed to the reproductive demands of the
23
peasantry, and this necessarily limits the degree of
conformity of local to higher level policy. At any one
time, there exists throughout rural China a huge
number of policies at different levels, all loosely
guided by the level of the hierarchy immediately
above. There is evidence, however, that such 'informal' policies are rapidly being overridden, and
replaced by a greater degree of enforced uniformity
within provinces in recent years (Greenhalgh and Li
1993:32).
Population policy implementation
Official government policy since 1979 has comprised
a gradual expansion of categories of exemption from
the one-child restriction, culminating in the 'daughteronly policy' in which parents with one daughter are
allowed a second child. However, central government
thinking as revealed by the internal documents
analyzed by Aird (1990) suggest instead repeated
fluctuations in degree of permissiveness, motivated
alternatively by intense demographic anxiety and by
concern about the damaging consequences of
alienating support from both local political leaders
('cadres') and ordinary citizens alike.
Government policy pronouncements, whether public
or internal, reflect the struggle of opposing interests
between citizens and cadres in thousands of villages
throughout China. For most rural couples decollectivization almost certainly increased the value of
children's labour, and their role as sources of
economic security. Economic policies emerging in
the 1980s, either by design or through the increasing political power of the wealthy, also discriminated
against the most vulnerable, with damaging consequences for local demographic policies (Oi 1986;
Unger and Xiong 1989). Not only were the poorer
families less able to make reproductive sacrifices, but
their marginalized status diminished their sense of
duty to government, party and nation. Decollectivization deprived local authorities of direct control over
rural incomes, and their reduced capacity to adminster disincentives and fines made the imposition
of reproductive restrictions largely dependent on the
practice of persuasion.
Direct persuasion of recalcitrant couples is carried
out by local 'birth planning' cadres, and reinforced
by higher level authorities. Opposition, and
sometimes resistance, from couples is reinforced by
their kinsfolk, thereby deepening the difficulties of
implementation. Cadres are aware that in women's
24
Neil Thomas and Neil Price
struggle for reproductive control, 'just behind them
were their husbands, in-laws, and in some cases also
their own parents, supporting, prodding, and at times
probably pressuring them to resist the policy'
(Greenhalgh 1992a: 16). Some prominent lineage
members have a major influence on reproductive
decision-making, and in recognition of this, birth
planning cadres consider them legitimate targets of
persuasion. Not only are they urged to withhold their
opposition, but they are asked to cooperate in the process of persuasion itself. Furthermore they may be
held responsible in the event of failure, and punished
accordingly (Potter and Potter 1990:242).
The perception of the broader community is also
crucial in the birth planning process. While it is inherently neutral in the opposition of interests between
cadres and relatives, it recognizes the significance of
the outcome of specific instances. The willingness of
the community, whether as child-bearers or their kin,
to accept reproductive restrictions, depends on the
equality of application of birth planning principles.
To this extent the community acts as both a restraint
on the defiance of couples, and as an intense pressure
on cadres to avoid favouritism or to prevent sympathy
with couples' reproductive desires from interfering
with a strictly equal application of the local birth plan.
The work of village-level cadres is sometimes reinforced by higher-level officials, in periodic and ostentatious shows of strength, called 'campaigns'. The
personnel involved, their methods, and their reasons
for involvement all differ widely. Case studies reveal
that the introduction of more restrictive policies,
locally or nationally, often requires the additional involvement of township officials (Greenhalgh 1992a;
Huang 1989; White 1987). In other cases normal
village birth planning mechanisms have failed to fulfil
policy stipulations, and periodic reinforcements are
found necessary. Freedman and Guo (1988) even
report on a Fujian village where local women's
leaders had little involvement in persuasion; instead
a powerful team from outside accompanied local
cadres several times a year in this task. There have
also been unsavoury reports of 'poverty relief teams',
with no identification with the locality, implementing policy by forceful means, due to the refusal of
village cadres to cooperate (Yang 1992:21).
The opposing interests of peasants and cadres are normally resolved in a systematic manner. Data from
Greenhalgh's study in rural Shaanxi reveal that
women risk personal injury by removing IUDs to
evade reproductive restrictions. But data on sterilization by family composition supports the notion of a
communally agreed compromise. This is illustrated
by the fact that of 45 couples sterilized during
1979-87, 38 had a boy and a girl, and the rest at least
two sons (Greenhalgh 1992a: 30). Strikingly similar
locally-forged policies are described by Potter and
Potter (1990) in their case study in rural Guangdong.
The resort to birth control campaigns, and the
substantial compromises forced on cadres, reflects
a progressive weakening of local administrative
authority. It also represents a partial victory for the
reproductive desires of peasants, and a defeat for the
government's demographic policy.
It is a recurrent theme of the literature that morale
among low-level cadres collapsed in the 1980s with
the decline in both their power and their remuneration. As late as 1984 a field study in Hubei Province
concluded that 'brigades and teams are becoming increasingly important decisional units in the policy
process, particularly when they retain substantial administrative autonomy, as in the case of population
policy' (White 1987:298). By 1987 however, villagelevel birth planning cadres in Shaanxi had to depend
on the assistance of other village-level cadres. They
had little help from the team-level women's cadres
who 'found cultivating their fields infinitely more
rewarding than badgering their neighbours to
contracept' (Greenhalgh 1992a: 18).
This picture of local government in decline appears
to be typical of the situation throughout rural China
in the mid-to-late 1980s. Then, quite suddenly, from
around 1987 the local administrative structure
received massive reinforcement from Central
Government funds. Since the 1970s birth planning
activities at the commune (township) level have been
overseen by a committee of Party activists, but only
one of these devoted their time exclusively to such
work. Then, in the late 1980s, a body of full-time
birth planning personnel came into existence. In
Dantu County (Jiangsu Province) each township
government now supports a permanent 'family planning office' staffed by 4-5 full-time cadres. In the
19 townships of the county there is a total of 85 such
cadres. Financial support for these offices and their
staff comes from a combination of subsidies from
higher levels and increased allocations from township
budgets. Similarly in Shaanxi Province there was a
huge increase in funding for 'birth planning' (which
includes technical family planning services) between
Population policy in rural China
1987 and 1991, followed by a three-fold increase in
per-capita expenditure between 1991 and 1993
(Greenhalgh et al. 1993).
The establishment of the new birth planning administrators has been achieved at considerable expense. In Dantu County they are all highly trained
local people who have passed demanding and competitive examinations in politics, language, history,
geography and mathematics. In addition to the local
director, there are cadres responsible respectively for
contraceptive supply; statistics; information, education and communication; and technical services. Each
cadre maintains intimate contact with local officials
and service personnel, and spends around 20 days
each month in the village. Here, the person responsible for birth planning is normally either the Vice
Leader of the Village Council, or else the village
representative of the Women's Federation - more
simply, the 'Women's Leader'. She is a full-time
cadre who spends around half of her time doing a
mixture of family planning and birth planning work,
which includes the recording of the number of married women by parity, and calculation of how many
are allowed to have second children. She sometimes
has the support of a women's representative at the
Village Group (formerly 'production team') level,
who is a part-time, paid official, charged with the
responsibility of monitoring the local birth plan.
It seems that this whole system of birth planning,
from the township level down to the village group,
has been reinforced and consolidated by means of
enlarged financial support from provincial governments. The enhanced authority and status of the
township office facilitates the administration of
penalties for resistance to the local birth plan, but
funds have also become available for incentives, including pensions, to reward compliance (Greenhalgh
et al. 1993). However, just as these increased costs
have been shared by the township, improved salaries
and performance incentives for village cadres are
allocated by the villages, rather than from higher
administrative levels.
On the face of it, this abrupt transition to the
availability of both local and higher level resources
for birth planning is most surprising. At the end of
the 1980s and into 1990 everything seemed to militate
against such a reversal. All political factions in the
central government were anxious to avoid confrontation with the peasantry, and equally they felt unable
to either support an intensification of birth control
25
or to induce local governments to invest more
resources in it (White 1994). And yet from 1987 it
seems that such obstacles were overcome, increased
funding was forthcoming, and birth control activities
resumed priority at all levels. Between 1987 and 1990
central government expenditure on birth planning
throughout China increased by 43.8%, and then by
a further 34.8% up to 1992. In other words, overall
expenditure (at constant prices) on birth planning
nearly doubled (94% increase) in just five years
between 1987 and 1992, during a period of major
fertility decline.4
Family Planning Association
In parallel with the birth planning and family planning organizations there has developed over the past
five years or so a huge body of volunteers, coordinated through the China Family Planning Association. In one township visited there were over 2000
members, and there is no reason to believe that this
is atypical. They include many retired people of high
social status, such as teachers, doctors and Party
cadres. While they work closely with the township
FP office, they are neither involved in birth planning,
nor in service provision as such. Instead they undertake house-to-house visits, publicizing population
theory and policy, knowledge about contraception,
and the 'proper upbringing of children'.
The reasons for this recent development, and the purposes of the FPA, independent of the organizations
already described above, are not entirely clear. Peng
Peiyun, Minister in charge of the State Family Planning Commission, describes the role of the FPA in
this way: '. . . to organize the people, to educate the
people and to promote popular acceptance of family
planning' (Peng 1989:13).
These principles are reiterated, in rather more detail,
by Zhou Boping, Vice President of the FPA: 'We
want to help the Government control the population
quantity and to improve its quality . . . but we also
want to safeguard the needs of the people in family
planning and at the same time to supervise government organizations which cany out the programme
. . .' (Rowley and Hamand 1989:7).
While both of these quotations are rather vague, and
couched in diplomatic language, it is possible to
discern three different sets of concerns which the FPA
was created to address. Firstly, it is likely that even
the reinforced birth planning organization is inade-
26
Neil Thomas and Neil Price
quate to deal with a demand for children in excess
of population policy stipulations. The FPA therefore
represents a large body of free labour able to reinforce the local birth plan through the education of
reluctant couples.
Secondly, Zhou's reference to safeguarding the needs
of people, and supervising government organizations,
implies a concern over the quality of family planning
services, or even over the methods of persuasion
adopted by overworked birth planning cadres.
A final point was stressed on a number of occasions
by family planning officials in Jiangsu. This related
to the difficulties which some couples face, normally
as a result of temporary contingencies, in conforming with the birth plan. Short-term material/economic
problems, usually described as 'production difficulties', are systematically addressed by FPA
volunteers. In the longer term, it is generally
recognized that one-child families, or those without
sons, are more likely to be economically vulnerable
in old age. For this reason one of the functions of
the heads of the village FPAs in Jiangsu is the administration of local insurance schemes. In many
townships both safety and old-age insurance schemes
have been introduced (see also Wu 1991). In the
former, parents are insured against the death, serious
disease or disability of their single children, up to the
age of 16. In one township visited, all villagers are
expected to contribute to this fund, and parents
receive 2000 yuan on the death of a child. This is
equivalent to around two years' income.
In the same locality old age insurance for one-child
families involves the payment of 300 yuan over a fiveyear period, by both the village and the insured
couples. Fathers will receive benefits at age 60, and
mothers at 55, the amount depending on the success
of investments. Township officials expected that the
monthly income would be around 60-70 yuan, but
could be as high as 120 yuan.
In general the one-child policy appears to operate in
the wealthier provinces, and in the wealthier parts
of such provinces in particular. In these areas administrative capacities are likely to be greater, and
safety and old-age insurance schemes more affordable. In principle these schemes entail a considerable
transfer of wealth from those parents with two or
more children to those with one. As Kane (1987:201)
has pointed out though, where high-parity women are
rare, the sources of fines and taxes are consequently
limited. In such circumstances it follows that the bulk
of insurance payments must come from the pockets
of the insured themselves. Nevertheless, the financial penalties for non-compliance with the plan are
severe, and serve as a powerful disincentive to
challenging the one-child norm.
Although some of the precise functions of the FPA
have been stated, and we have speculated on its
broader significance, it remains to be explained why,
and how, such a massive recruitment occurred
throughout China in the late 1980s. Perhaps the need
arose in areas of the country where family planning
services had deteriorated under decollectivization,
and the local community would not pay the price of
local birth planning officials. In these circumstances
the idea of using volunteers to reinforce aspects of
their work makes good sense. In South Jiangsu,
however, both birth and family planning organizations appear to have been strengthened over the past
decade. It is therefore surprising, on the face of it,
that the cooperation of the FPA has been found
necessary. On the other hand, the compromise
between the conflicting demands of cadres and
people, found necessary in areas of the country
studied by Greenhalgh (1990) and Potter and Potter
(1990), appears to be largely absent in South Jiangsu.
That the FPA operates in all parts of China implies
that one of its functions is to help tighten-up policy
implementation, to close the gap between provincial
guidelines and actual family size.
These, then, appear to be some of the reasons behind
the development of a parallel organization reinforcing the work of state and community birth and family
planning service providers. There still remains,
however, the question of how 50 million volunteers
(Government of China 1994) have been so rapidly
assembled, and why so many people should be
prepared to devote themselves to such apparently
thankless work. One possible explanation is that they
are genuinely convinced that continuing population
growth is a major impediment to economic development, and to the quality of life of communities and
individuals. At the same time, many FPA volunteers
may find themselves torn between a sense of duty to
the State and Communist Party, and their personal
desires as family members. Potter and Potter believe
that for Chinese villagers 'there are two levels of
social structure which organize morally valid social
action . . . the government and the family, and these
structures take on an intrinsic moral significance'
(1990:226).
Population policy in rural China
FPA volunteers, many of whom are retired people
of elevated social status, may therefore find
themselves faced with difficult moral dilemmas arising from persona] conflicts of interest. As figures of
authority in local affairs they may be expected to lend
support to the government population policy, while
as lineage elders they may desire grandchildren in
excess of policy prescriptions. In the Shaanxi villages
studied by Greenhalgh 'not only women, but also
their husbands and parents-in-law . . . participated
in decisions on reproduction' (1992a: 16).
In conclusion, whatever the intended and actual function of the FPA volunteers, and however this massive
enrolment was achieved, there is little doubt that the
process of decollectivization led to a situation in the
middle of the 1980s where a thorough overhaul of
policy implementation became necessary, if a
resurgence of population growth was to be avoided.
Part of this restructuring of local birth and family
planning organizations entailed the recruitment of a
volunteer force to supplement the work of cadres and
family planning doctors.
Conclusions
The preceding sections describe the changes in policy
formulation and implementation since the introduction of the One-Child Family Policy in 1979. These
can be summarized as follows:
Formal population policy pronouncements issued
by Central Government indicate a progressive
softening of reproductive restrictions over the
period. More importantly however, limited and
relatively inaccessible sources suggest that informal local policies, reflecting genuine constraints
and possibilities, became more flexible throughout
the 1980s but tightened up after 1987. This was
facilitated by increased financial support for birth
planning administrations, and the mobilization of
a Party-led army of 50 million FPA volunteers.
Prospects of continuing low levels of fertility in rural
China are clearly dependent on a vast array of diverse
factors. We conclude this review with some thoughts
on future scenarios in policy formulation and implementation. First, it is evident that government
priorities in recent years have emphasized the
control of population growth as a prerequisite for
economic development. It must be remembered,
however, that only as recently as 1986, Central Docu-
27
ment 13 was arguing that economic development was
as much a cause as a consequence of declining birth
rates (White 1994:150). A return to this philosophy
would reverse the increased financial support for birth
planning and family planning activities, and political
encouragement for the FPA, which have been central to the effectiveness of population control in recent
years.
Continuing support for the birth planning activities
of township and village cadres is, however, no
guarantee of effective population control. The
primary mechanisms of direct policy enforcement by
cadres are persuasion and propaganda, backed by
relatively minor financial inducements. For those
couples with a strong desire to bear children in excess of the locally sanctioned number, such authority
is eminently resistable. Ultimately, birth planning administrations depend for their success on the support
of more powerful local officials who control
economic resources of vital importance to their
clients. It is therefore the power and the cooperation
of local government in general which will decide the
future of birth policy compliance, and of population
growth in rural China.
Evidence suggests that the decline in the authority of
local government which accompanied decollectivization has unexpectedly gone into reverse since the late
1980s. Even in 1985 the introduction of the OneChild Family Policy in a Fujian village was expected
to encounter little resistance despite its unpopularity.
As the Village Party Secretary put it: 'Investment in
private enterprises is the biggest concern of all village
families now. Without the village government's approval, no village family could possibly borrow
money from government banks or credit associations'
(Huang 1989:178). Villagers' investment plans were
simply not realizable without this source of credit.
This intensification of local government control has
been noted by many writers (Oi 1986; Shue 1988;
Unger 1989). In a study in Jiangsu Province, Rozelle
(1994:123) observed that 'cadres are endowed with
substantial "assets" (such as inexpensive fertilizer,
jobs in factories, allocations of profitable cash crop
lands) that they are able to use to elicit behavioural
responses from farmers'. That such responses are
likely to embrace birth control under Central Government urgings may be the primary explanation of rapid
fertility decline between 1987 and 1992.
28
Neil Thomas and Neil Price
Endnotes
1
The first birth components of the TFR were well above 1 in
both 1981 and 1986, which suggests a declining age of first birth,
probably due to a declining marriage age (pp. 306-7). Furthermore, parity progression ratios from first to second births fell from
85.9% in 1981 (from the 1982 One per Thousand Fertility Survey)
to 82.6% in 1987, implying a growing compliance with a onechild norm (p. 310).
2
Between 1985 and 1987 in rural China the total parity progression ratio (TPPR) increased from 2.51 to 2.79. The TPPR
is a hypothetical cohort life-time measure of fertility which, unlike
the TFR, controls for die effect of parity structure. As age at marriage influences parity structure, the increase in TPPR in effect
reveals a genuine fertility increase between 1985 and 1987 over
and above that due to declining age at marriage. A simpler indication of this is the increase in PPR(l-2) from 0.89 to 0.96.
3
This refers to a preliminary estimate by Feeney, cited at a
paper presented at the 1994 Annual Conference of the British
Society for Population Studies: Steele et al. (1994).
4
Birth planning expenditure increased from 715 million yuan
to 1.936 billion yuan between 1987 and 1992 (data direct from
the State Family Planning Commission; plus the Birth Planning
Yeabook 1990: 143). Expenditure data were converted to constant
(1987) prices using monthly inflation rates computed from annual
Retail Price Indices (China Statistics Yearbook 1994: 231).
References
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Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the financial assistance
provided by the UK Overseas Development Administration for the
fieldwork for this study in April-May 1993, and also the generous
support and cooperation of the Chinese authorities.
Biographies
Neil Thomas is a lecturer in applied demography at the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of Wales,
Cardiff. He worked formerly at the Sir David Owen Population
29
Centre, where he developed an interest in the political and ethical
issues surrounding fertility and population growth, especially in
the contexts of China and Bangladesh. These ideas are explored
in his article 'Land, fertility and the population establishment' in
Population Studies (1991). He has undertaken teaching and study
visits to China, Tanzania, Kenya and Pakistan, as well as field
research in China. His first degree was in philosophy, and he has
further qualifications in chemistry, statistics and demography.
Neil Price is a lecturer in population and development studies at
the Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea.
He was formerly Population Programme Officer for the Overseas
Development Administration (UK), and has worked extensively
as a population and health consultant to NGOs and bilateral and
multilateral donors in a number of countries in Africa, Asia and
the Pacific. In addition to China, he has undertaken field research
in the Caribbean, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. His publications include a detailed ethnography Behind the Planter's Back: Lower
class responses to marginality in Bequia Island, St Vincent (Macmillan). He holds a doctorate in social anthropology.
Correspondence: Neil Thomas, Department of City and Regional
Planning, University of Wales, PO Box 906, Cardiff, CF1 3YN,
UK.