What It Means to Be Gendered Me: Life on the Boundaries of a Dichotomous Gender System
Author(s): Betsy Lucal
Source: Gender and Society, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Dec., 1999), pp. 781-797
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190440
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Perspective
WHATIT MEANS TOBE GENDERED ME
Life on the Boundaries of a
Dichotomous Gender System
BETSYLUCAL
Indiana UniversitySouthBend
Whatare the implicationsof living in a gendersystemthatrecognizes "twoand only two" genders? For
those individualswhose "genderdisplays" are inappropriate,therecan be a varietyof consequences,
many of themnegative. In this article, the authorprovidesan analysis of her experiencesas a woman
whose appearance often leads to gender misattribution.She discusses the consequencesof the gender
systemfor her identityand her interactions.Theauthoralso examinesLorber'sassertion that "gender
bending" actuallyserves to perpetuategendercategories ratherthanto breakthemdown,and she suggests how her experiences might contradictLorber'sargument.Using her biographyto examine the
social constructionof gender,she both illustratesand extendstheoreticalwork in this area.
I
understoodthe concept of "doing gender"(West and Zimmerman1987) long
before I became a sociologist. I havebeen living with the consequencesof inappropriate"genderdisplay"(Goffman1976;WestandZimmerman1987) for as long as
I can remember.
My daily experiencesare a testamentto the rigidityof genderin our society, to
the realimplicationsof "twoandonly two"when it comes to sex andgendercategories (Garfinkel1967; KesslerandMcKenna1978). Eachday,I experiencethe consequences that our gender system has for my identity and interactions.I am a
woman who has been called "Sir"so many times thatI no longer even hesitate to
assumethatit is being directedat me. I am a womanwhose use of publicrestrooms
regularly causes reactions ranging from confused stares to confrontationsover
what a man is doing in the women's room. I regularlyenact a varietyof practices
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I thankthe journal's reviewers,my writing group (Linda Chen, Louise Collins,
April Lidinsky,MargareteMyers, Monica Tetzlaff,and Becky Torstrick),Heather Bulan, and Linda
Fritschnerfor their helpful commentson earlier versions of this article.
REPRINTREQUESTS:Betsy Lucal, Departmentof Sociology, Indiana UniversitySouth Bend, P.O.
Box 7111, South Bend, IN46634-7111; e-mail: [email protected].
GENDER& SOCIETY,
Vol.13No. 6, December1999 781-797
? 1999SociologistsforWomenin Society
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GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
either to minimize the need for others to know my gender or to deal with their
misattributions.
I am the embodimentof Lorber's(1994) ostensibly paradoxicalassertionthat
the "genderbending"I engage in actuallymight serve to preserveand perpetuate
gendercategories.As a feminist who sees genderrebellionas a significantpartof
hercontributionto the dismantlingof sexism, I findthispossibilitydisheartening.
In this article,I examinehow my experiencesboth supportand contradictLorber's (1994) argumentusing my own experiencesto illustrateand reflect on the
social constructionof gender.My analysisoffers a discussionof the consequences
of genderfor people who do not follow the rules as well as an examinationof the
possible implicationsof the existenceof people like me for the gendersystem itself.
Ultimately,I show how life on the boundariesof genderaffectsme andhow my life,
and the lives of otherswho make similardecisions abouttheirparticipationin the
gender system, has the potentialto subvertgender.
Because this articleanalyzesmy experiencesas a womanwho often is mistaken
for a man,my focus is on the social constructionof genderfor women.My assumption is that,given the genderednatureof the genderingprocessitself, men's experiences of this phenomenonmight well be differentfrom women's.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER
It is now widely acceptedthatgenderis a social construction,thatsex andgender
are distinct, and thatgenderis somethingall of us "do."This conceptualizationof
gendercanbe tracedto Garfinkel's(1967) ethnomethodologicalstudyof"Agnes."1
In this analysis,Garfinkelexaminedthe issues facing a male who wished to pass as,
and eventuallybecome, a woman. Unlike individualswho performgenderin culturallyexpectedways, Agnes could not takeher genderfor grantedandalways was
in dangerof failing to pass as a woman (Zimmerman1992).
This approachwas extendedby KesslerandMcKenna(1978) andcodified in the
classic "DoingGender"by WestandZimmerman(1987). The social constructionist approachhas been developed most notably by Lorber(1994, 1996). Similar
theoreticalstrainshave developed outside of sociology, such as work by Butler
(1990) and Weston (1996). Taken as a whole, this work provides a number of
insights into the social processes of gender,showing how gender(ing)is, in fact, a
process.
We apply gender labels for a variety of reasons;for example, an individual's
gendercues ourinteractionswith heror him. Successful social relationsrequireall
participantsto present,monitor,and interpretgenderdisplays (Martin1998; West
andZimmerman1987). Wehave, accordingto Lorber,"nosocial place for a person
who is neitherwomannorman"(1994,96); thatis, we do not know how to interact
with such a person.Thereis, for example,no way of addressingsuch a personthat
does not rely on making an assumption about the person's gender ("Sir" or
(WestandZimmerman1987).
"Ma'am").In this context,genderis "omnirelevant"
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
783
Also, given the sometimes fractious nature of interactions between men and
women, it might be particularlyimportantfor women to know the gender of the
strangersthey encounter;do the women need to be wary,or can they relax (Devor
1989)?
Accordingto KesslerandMcKenna(1978), each time we encountera new person, we make a genderattribution.In most cases, this is not difficult.We learnhow
to readpeople's gendersby learningwhich traitsculturallysignify each genderand
by learningrules thatenable us to classify individualswith a wide rangeof gender
presentationsinto two andonly two gendercategories.As Westonobserved,"Genderedtraitsarecalled attributesfor a reason:People attributetraitsto others.No one
possesses them. Traitsarethe productof evaluation"(1996, 21). The fact thatmost
people use the same traitsandrules in presentinggendersmakes it easier for us to
attributegendersto them.
We also assume that we can place each individualinto one of two mutually
exclusive categoriesin this binarysystem. As Bem (1993) notes, we have a polarized view of gender;therearetwo groupsthatareseen as polaropposites.Although
thereis "norulefor deciding 'male'or 'female'thatwill alwayswork"andno attributes "thatalways and withoutexception aretrueof only one gender"(Kessler and
McKenna 1978, 158, 1), we operateunderthe assumptionthatthereare such rules
and attributes.
KesslerandMcKenna'sanalysisrevealedthatthe fundamentalschemafor gender attributionis to "See someone as female only when you cannotsee [theperson]
as male" (1978, 158). Individualsbasically are assumed to be male/men until
provenotherwise,thatis, until some obvious markerof conventionalfemininityis
noted.In otherwords,the defaultreadingof a nonfemininepersonis thatshe orhe is
male; people who do not deliberatelymarkthemselvesas feminine are takento be
men. Devor attributedthis tendencyto the operationof genderin a patriarchalcontext: "Womenmust markthemselves as 'other',"whereason the otherhand, "few
cues [arerequired]to identifymaleness"(1989, 152). As with language,masculine
forms are taken as the generically human;femininityrequiresthat something be
added.Femininity"mustconstantlyreassureits audienceby a willing demonstration of difference"(Brownmiller1984, 15).
Patriarchalconstructsof genderalso devaluethe markedcategory.Devor (1989)
foundthatthe women she calls "genderblenders"assumedthatfemininitywas less
desirablethanmasculinity;theirgenderblendingsometimeswas a productof their
shame about being women. This assumptionaffects not only our perceptionsof
otherpeople but also individuals'senses of their own genderedselves.
Not only do we rely on our social skills in attributinggendersto others,but we
also use ourskills to presentourown gendersto them.The roots of this understanding of how genderoperateslie in Goffman's(1959) analysisof the "presentationof
self in everydaylife," elaboratedlater in his work on "genderdisplay"(Goffman
1976). From this perspective,gender is a performance,"a stylized repetition of
acts"(Butler 1990, 140, emphasisremoved).Genderdisplayrefersto "conventionalized portrayals"of social correlatesof gender (Goffman 1976). These displays
784
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
are culturallyestablishedsets of behaviors,appearances,mannerisms,and other
cues that we have learnedto associate with membersof a particulargender.
In determiningthe gender of each person we encounterand in presentingour
genders to others, we rely extensively on these gender displays. Our bodies and
their adornmentsprovide us with "texts"for reading a person's gender (Bordo
1993). As Lorbernoted, "Withoutthe deliberateuse of genderedclothing, hairstyles, jewelry, and cosmetics, women andmen would look farmore alike"(1994,
18-19). Myhre summarizedthe markersof femininity as "having longish hair;
wearingmakeup,skirts,jewelry,andhigh heels; walkingwith a wiggle; having little or no observablebody hair; and being in general soft, rounded(but not too
rounded),andsweet-smelling"(1995, 135). (Note thatthese descriptionscomprise
a Westernconceptualizationof gender.)Devor identified"mannerisms,language,
facial expressions, dress, and a lack of feminine adornment"(1989, x) as factors
that contributeto women being mistakenfor men.
A personuses genderdisplayto lead othersto makeattributionsregardingheror
his gender,regardlessof whetherthe presentedgendercorrespondsto the person's
sex or gender self-identity.Because genderis a social construction,there may be
differencesamongone's sex, genderself-identity(the genderthe individualidentifies as), presentedidentity (the gender the person is presenting),and perceived
identity (the genderothers attributeto the person).2For example, a person can be
female withoutbeing socially identifiedas a woman,anda male personcan appear
socially as a woman.Using a femininegenderdisplay,a man can presentthe identity of a woman and, if the display is successful, be perceivedas a woman.
But these processes also mean that a person who fails to establish a gendered
appearancethatcorrespondsto the person's genderfaces challenges to her or his
identity and status. First, the gender nonconformistmust find a way in which to
constructan identityin a society thatdenies heror him anylegitimacy(Bem 1993).
A personis likely to wantto defineherselfor himself as "normal"in the face of culturalevidence to the contrary.Second,the individualalso mustdeal with otherpeople's challenges to identityand status-deciding how to respond,what such reactions to their appearancemean, and so forth.
Because ourappearances,mannerisms,andso forthconstantlyarebeing readas
partof ourgenderdisplay,we do genderwhetherwe intendto or not.Forexample,a
woman athlete,particularlyone participatingin a nonfemininesportsuch as basketball,mightdeliberatelykeepherhairlong to show that,despite actionsthatsuggest otherwise,she is a "real"(i.e., feminine)woman.But we also do genderin less
conscious ways suchas whena mantakesupmorespacewhen sittingthana woman
does. In fact, in a society so clearlyorganizedaroundgender,as ours is, thereis no
way in which to not do gender(Lorber1994).
Given our culturalrules for identifyinggender(i.e., thatthereare only two and
that masculinityis assumedin the absence of evidence to the contrary),a person
who does not do genderappropriatelyis placed not into a thirdcategorybut rather
into the one with which heror his genderdisplayseems most closely to fit; thatis, if
a man appearsto be a woman, then he will be categorized as "woman,"not as
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
785
somethingelse. Even if a persondoes not want to do genderor would like to do a
genderotherthanthe two recognizedby oursociety, otherpeople will, in effect, do
genderfor thatpersonby placingheror him in one andonly one of the two available
categories.We cannotescape doing genderor,more specifically,doing one of two
genders. (There are exceptions in limited contexts such as people doing "drag"
[Butler 1990; Lorber1994].)
People who follow the norms of gender can take their genders for granted.
Kessler and McKenna asserted, "Few people besides transsexualsthink of their
genderas anythingotherthan 'naturally'obvious";they believe thatthe risks of not
being takenfor the genderintended"areminimalfor nontranssexuals"(1978, 126).
However, such an assertion overlooks the experiences of people such as those
women Devor (1989) calls "genderblenders"and those people Lorber (1994)
refersto as "genderbenders."As West andZimmerman(1987) pointedout, we all
are held accountablefor, and might be called on to accountfor, our genders.
People who, for whateverreasons,do not adhereto the rules,risk gendermisattributionandany interactionalconsequencesthatmightresultfromthis misidentification. What are the consequencesof misattributionfor social interaction?When
mustmisattributionbe minimized?Whatwill one do to minimizesuchmistakes?In
this article,I explore these and relatedquestionsusing my biography.
Forme, the social processesandstructuresof gendermeanthat,in the contextof
our culture,my appearancewill be read as masculine. Given the common conflation of sex and gender,I will be assumed to be a male. Because of the two-andonly-two genders rule, I will be classified, perhaps more often than not, as a
man-not as an atypicalwoman,not as a genderlessperson.I mustbe one genderor
the other;I cannotbe neither,norcan I be both.This normhas a varietyof mundane
and serious consequences for my everydayexistence. Like Myhre (1995), I have
found that the choice not to participatein femininityis not one made frivolously.
My experiencesas a womanwho does not do femininityillustratea paradoxof
our two-and-only-twogender system. Lorberarguedthat "bendinggender rules
and passing between gendersdoes not erode but ratherpreservesgender boundaries" (1994, 21). Althoughpeople who engage in these behaviorsand appearances
do "demonstratethe social constructednessof sex, sexuality,and gender"(Lorber
1994, 96), they do not actuallydisruptgender.Devor made a similarpoint:"When
genderblendingfemales refusedto markthemselvesby publicly displaying sufficient femininityto be recognizedas women, they were in no way challengingpatriarchalgenderassumptions"(1989, 142). As the following discussionshows, I have
found thatmy own experiencesboth supportand challenge this argument.Before
detailing these experiences,I explain my use of my self as data.
MY SELF AS DATA
This analysisis basedon my experiencesas a personwhose appearanceandgender/sex are not, in the eyes of many people, congruent.How did my experiences
786
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
become my data?I beganmy research"unwittingly"(Krieger1991). This articleis
a productof "opportunisticresearch"in thatI am using my "uniquebiography,life
experiences, and/or situationalfamiliarityto understandand explain social life"
(Riemer1988, 121; see also Riemer 1977). It is an analysisof "unplannedpersonal
experience,"thatis, experiencesthatwere not partof a researchprojectbutinstead
are partof my daily encounters(Reinharz1992).
This work also is, at least to some extent, an example of Richardson's(1994)
notionof writingas a methodof inquiry.As a sociologist who specializesin gender,
the more I learned,the more I realizedthatmy life could serve as a case study.As I
examined my experiences,I found out things-about my experiences and about
theory-that I did not know when I started(Richardson1994).
It also is useful, I think,to considermy analysisan applicationof Mills's (1959)
"sociologicalimagination."Mills (1959) andBerger(1963) wroteaboutthe importance of seeing the generalin the particular.This meansthatgeneralsocial patterns
can be discerned in the behaviors of particularindividuals.In this article, I am
examiningportionsof my biography,situatedin U.S. society duringthe 1990s, to
understandthe "personaltroubles"my gender producesin the context of a twoand-only-twogender system. I am not attemptingto generalizemy experiences;
rather,I am tryingto use themto examineandreflecton the processesandstructure
of gender in our society.
Because my analysis is based on my memoriesand perceptionsof events, it is
of those events.Howlimitedby my abilityto recalleventsandby my interpretation
the
about
truth
that
I
am
not
ever,
genderandhow
claiming
my experiencesprovide
it works. I am claimingthatthe biographyof a personwho lives on the marginsof
our gender system can provide theoreticalinsights into the processes and social
structureof gender.Therefore,after describingmy experiences, I examine how
they illustrateand extend,as well as contradict,otherwork on the social construction of gender.
GENDERED ME
Each day, I negotiatethe boundariesof gender.Each day, I face the possibility
that someone will attributethe "wrong"gender to me based on my physical
appearance.
I am six feet tall and large-boned.I have had shorthairfor most of my life. For
the past severalyears,I have worna crew cut or flat top. I do not shaveor otherwise
remove hair from my body (e.g., no eyebrow plucking). I do not wear dresses,
skirts,high heels, or makeup.My onlyjewelry is a class ring, a "men's"watch(my
wristsaretoo largefor a "women's"watch),two smallearrings(gold hoops, bothin
my left ear), and (occasionally) a necklace.I wearjeans or shorts,T-shirts,sweaters, polo/golf shirts,button-downcollarshirts,andtennisshoes or boots. Thejeans
are "women's"(I do have hips) butdo not look particularly"feminine."The rest of
the outergarmentsare from men's departments.I preferbaggy clothes, so the fact
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
787
thatI have "womanly"breastsoftenis not obvious(I do notweara bra).Sometimes,
I weara baseballcap or some othertype of hat.I also am white andrelativelyyoung
(30 years old).3
My genderdisplay-what othersinterpretas my presentedidentity-regularly
leads to the misattributionof my gender.An incongruityexists betweenmy gender
self-identityandthe genderthatothersperceive.In my encounterswith people I do
not know, I sometimes conclude, based on our interactions,that they think I am a
man. This does not mean thatotherpeople do not thinkI am a man,just thatI have
no way of knowing what they thinkwithoutinteractingwith them.
Livingwith It
I haveno illusions ordelusionsaboutmy appearance.I knowthatmy appearance
is likely to be readas "masculine"(andmale) andthathow I see myself is socially
irrelevant.Given our two-and-only-twogenderstructure,I must live with the consequencesof my appearance.These consequencesfall into two categories:issues of
identity and issues of interaction.
My most common experienceis being called "Sir"or being referredto by some
othermasculinelinguisticmarker(e.g., "he" "man").This has happenedfor years,
for as long as I can remember,when havingencounterswith people I do not know.4
Once, in fact, the same workerat a fast-foodrestaurantcalled me "Ma'am"when
she took my orderand "Sir"when she gave it to me.
Using my credit cards sometimes is a challenge. Some clerks subtly indicate
their disbelief, looking from the cardto me and back at the cardand checking my
signature carefully. Others challenge my use of the card, asking whose it is or
demandingidentification.One cashier asked to see my driver'slicense and then
asked me whetherI was the son of the cardholder.Anotherclerk told me that my
signatureon the receipt "hadbettermatch"the one on the card. Presumably,this
was herway of lettingme knowthatshe was notconvincedit was my creditcard.
My identity as a woman also is called into question when I try to use womenonly spaces. Encountersin public rest rooms are an adventure.I have been told
countless times that"Thisis the ladies'room."Otherwomen say nothingto me, but
their staresand conversationswith otherslet me know what they think.I will hear
them say, for example, "Therewas a man in there."I also get stareswhen I entera
locker room. However,it seems thatwomen areless concernedaboutmy presence
there,perhapsbecause, given thatit is a space for changingclothes, showering,and
so forth,they will be able to makesurethatI am reallya woman.Dressingrooms in
departmentstoresalso areproblematicspaces.I remembershoppingwith my sister
once andbeing offereda chairoutsidethe roomwhenI beganto accompanyherinto
the dressing room.
Womenwho believe thatI am a mando not wantme in women-onlyspaces. For
example,one womanwouldnotentertherestroomuntilI came out, andothershave
told me that I am in the wrong place. They also might not want to encounterme
788
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
while they arealone. For example,seeing me walkingat nightwhen they arealone
might be scary.5
I, on the otherhand,am not afraidto walk alone,day or night.I do not worrythat
I will be subjectedto the public harassmentthat many women endure (Gardner
1995). I am not a clear targetfor a potentialrapist.I rely on the fact thata potential
attackerwould not wantto attacka big man by mistake.This is not to say thatmen
neverareattacked,just thatthey arenot viewed, andoften do not view themselves,
as being vulnerableto attack.
Being perceivedas a manhas mademe privyto male-maleinteractionalstyles of
which most women are not aware.I found out, quite by accident,that many men
greet,or acknowledge,people (mostlyothermen) who makeeye contactwith them
with a single nod. For example, I found thatwhen I walkeddown the halls of my
brother'sall-maledormitorymakingeye contact,men noddedtheirgreetingsatme.
Oddly enough, these same men did not greet my brother;I had to tell him about
makingeye contactand noddingas a greetingritual.Apparently,in this case I was
doing masculinitybetterthanhe was!
I also believe that I am treateddifferently,for example, in auto parts stores
(staffedalmostexclusively by men in most cases) becauseof the assumptionthatI
am a man. WorkersthereassumethatI know whatI need andthatmy questionsare
legitimaterequestsfor information.I suspect that I am treatedmore fairly than a
feminine-appearingwomanwould be. I have not been able to test this proposition.
However,Devor's participantsdid report"beingtreatedmorerespectfully"(1989,
132) in such situations.
Thereis, however,a negativeside to being assumedto be a man by othermen.
Once, a friendandI were drivingin hercarwhen a manfailedto stop at an intersection and nearlycrashedinto us. As we droveaway,I mouthed"stopsign" to him.
When we both stoppedour cars at the next intersection,he got out of his car and
came up to the passengerside of thecar,whereI was sitting.He yelled obscenitiesat
us andpoundedandspit on the carwindow.Luckily,the windowswere closed. I do
not thinkhe would have done thatif he thoughtI was a woman.This was the first
time I realizedthatone of the implicationsof being seen as a man was thatI might
be called on to defend myself from physical aggressionfrom othermen who felt
challengedby me. This was a soberingand somewhatfrighteningthought.
Recently,I was verballyaccostedby an olderman who did not like where I had
parkedmy car.As I walkeddown the streetto work,he shoutedthatI shouldparkat
the universityratherthan on a side streetnearby.I respondedthat it was a public
streetandthatI could parkthereif I chose. He continuedto yell, butthe only thingI
caughtwas the last partof whathe said:"Yourtires aregoing to get cut!"Based on
my appearancethatday-I was dressedcasuallyandcarryinga backpack,andI had
my hat on backward-I believe he thoughtthatI was a young male studentrather
thana femaleprofessor.I do notthinkhe wouldhaveyelled at a personhe thoughtto
be a woman-and perhapsespecially not a woman professor.
Given the presumptionof heterosexualitythat is partof our system of gender,
my interactionswith women who assumethatI am a man also can be viewed from
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
789
thatperspective.Forexample,once my brotherandI were shoppingwhen we were
"hiton"by two young women.The encounterendedbeforeI realizedwhathadhappened.It was only when we walkedawaythatI told him thatI was prettycertainthat
they hadthoughtbothof us were men. A morecommonexperienceis realizingthat
when I am seen in publicwith one of my womenfriends,we arelikely to be readas a
heterosexualdyad.It is likely thatif I were to walkthrougha shoppingmall holding
hands with a woman, no one would look twice, not because of their openmindedness towardlesbian couples but ratherbecause of their assumptionthat I
was the male half of a straightcouple.Recently,whenwalkingthrougha mall with a
friendand her infant,my observationsof others'responsesto us led me to believe
thatmanyof themassumedthatwe were a familyon an outing,thatis, thatI was her
partnerand the fatherof the child.
Dealingwith It
AlthoughI now acceptthatbeing mistakenfor a man will be a partof my life so
long as I choose not to participatein femininity,therehave been times when I consciously have tried to appearmore feminine. I did this for a while when I was an
undergraduateandagainrecentlywhen I was on the academicjob market.The first
time, I let my hairgrow nearlydownto my shouldersandhadit permed.I also grew
long fingernailsandworenailpolish. Muchto my chagrin,even thenone of my professors, who did not knowmy name,insistentlyreferredto me in his kinshipexamples as "theson."Perhapsmy firstact on the way to my currentstance was to point
out to this man, politely and afterclass, thatI was a woman.
Morerecently,I againlet my hairgrowout for severalmonths,althoughI did not
alterotheraspectsof my appearance.Oncemy hairwas abouttwo anda half inches
long (fromits originalquarterinch),I realized,basedon my encounterswith strangers, thatI hadmore or less passedbackinto the categoryof "woman."Then,when I
returnedto wearinga flat top, people again respondedto me as if I were a man.
Because of my appearance,muchof my negotiationof interactionswith strangers involves attemptsto anticipatetheirreactionsto me. I need to assess whether
they will be likely to assumethatI am a manandwhetherthatactuallymattersin the
context of ourencounters.Many times, my genderreally is irrelevant,and it is just
annoyingto be misidentified.Othertimes,particularlywhenmy appearanceis coupled with somethingthatidentifiesme by name(e.g., a check orcreditcard)without
a photo, I might need to do somethingto ensurethatmy identityis not questioned.
As a result of my experiences,I have developedsome techniquesto deal with gender misattribution.
In general, in unfamiliarpublic places, I avoid using the rest room because I
know thatit is a place wherethereis a high likelihoodof misattributionand where
misattributionis socially important.If I must use a public rest room, I try to make
myself look as nonthreateningas possible. I do not weara hat,andI tryto rearrange
my clothing to make my breastsmore obvious. Here,I am tryingto use my secondarysex characteristicsto makemy gendermore obvious ratherthanthe usual use
790
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
of genderto make sex obvious. While in the rest room, I nevermake eye contact,
and I get in and out as quickly as possible. Going in with a woman friend also is
helpful;herpresencelegitimizesmy own. People areless likely to thinkI am entering a space whereI do not belong when I am with someone who looks like she does
belong.6
To those women who verballychallengemy presencein the restroom,I reply,"I
know,"usually in an annoyedtone. Whenthey stareor talkaboutme to the women
they are with, I simply get out as quickly as possible. In general,I do not wait for
someoneI amwith becausethereis too muchchanceof anunpleasantencounter.
I stoppedtryingon clothes beforepurchasingthema few years ago becausemy
presence in the changing areaswas met with staresand whispers.Exceptions are
storeswhere the dressingrooms arecompletelyprivate,wherethereareindividual
stallsratherthana roomwith stalls separatedby curtains,or wherebusinessis slow
andno one else is tryingon clothes.If I amtryingon a garmentclearlyintendedfor a
woman,thenI usuallycan do so withouthassle. I guess the attendantsassumethatI
must be a woman if I have, for example, a women's bathingsuit in my hand. But
usually,I thinkit is easier for me to try the clothes on at home and returnthem, if
necessary, ratherthan risk creating a scene. Similarly,when I am with another
woman who is tryingon clothes, I just wait outside.
My strategywith creditcards and checks is to anticipatewarinesson a clerk's
part.When I sense thatthereis some doubtor when they challengeme, I say, "It's
my card."I generallyrespondcourteouslyto requestsfor photo ID, realizing that
these might be routinechecks because of concernsaboutincreasinglywidespread
fraud.But for the clerkwho askedfor ID andstill did notthinkit was my card,I had
a strongerreaction.Whenshe saidthatshe was sorryfor embarrassingme, I told her
thatI was not embarrassedbut thatshe shouldbe. I also am particularlycarefulto
make surethatmy signatureis consistentwith the backof the card.Facedwith such
situations, I feel somewhat nervous about signing my name-which, of course,
makes me worrythatmy signaturewill look differentfrom how it should.
AnotherstrategyI have been experimentingwith is wearingnail polish in the
dark bright colors currentlyfashionable.I try to do this when I travel by plane.
Given more stringenttravelregulations,one always must presenta photo ID. But
my experienceshave shown thatmy driver'slicense is not necessarilyconvincing.
Nail polish mightbe. I also flash my polishednails when I enterairportrest rooms,
hoping that they will providea clue thatI am indeed in the right place.
Thereareothercases in which the issues areless those of identitythanof all the
normsof interactionthat,in oursociety, aregendered.My most commonresponse
to misattributionactuallyis to appearto ignoreit, thatis, to go on with the interaction as if nothingout of the ordinaryhas happened.Unless I feel thatthereis a good
reasonto establishmy correctgender,I assumethe identityothersimpose on me for
the sake of smooth interaction.For example, if someone is selling me a movie
ticket,thenthereis no reasonto make surethatthe personhas accuratelydiscerned
my gender.Similarly,if it is clearthatthe personusing "Sir"is talkingto me, thenI
simply respondas appropriate.I acceptthe designationbecauseit is irrelevantto the
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
791
situation.It takesenougheffortto be alertfor misattributionsandto decide which of
them matter;respondingto each one would take more energy thanit is worth.
Sometimes, if our interactioninvolves conversation,my first verbalresponseis
enough to let the otherpersonknow thatI am actuallya womanandnot a man. My
voice apparentlyis "feminine"enough to shift people's attributionsto the other
category.I know when this has happenedby the apologies thatusually accompany
the mistake.I usuallyrespondto the apologies by saying somethinglike "No problem" and/or "It happens all the time." Sometimes, a misattributorwill offer an
accountfor the mistake,for example,sayingthatit was my hairorthatthey were not
being very observant.
These experiences with gender and misattributionprovide some theoretical
insights into contemporaryWesternunderstandingsof gender and into the social
structureof genderin contemporarysociety. Althoughthereare a numberof ways
in which my experiencesconfirmthe work of others,there also are some ways in
which my experiencessuggest otherinterpretationsand conclusions.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Genderis pervasivein oursociety.I cannotchoose not to participatein it. Even if
I try not to do gender,otherpeople will do it for me. That is, given our two-andonly-two rule, they mustattributeone of two gendersto me. Still, althoughI cannot
choose not to participatein gender,I can choose notto participatein femininity(as I
have), at least with respect to physical appearance.
Thatis wherethe problemsbegin.Withoutthe decorationsof femininity,I do not
look like a woman. That is, I do not look like what many people's commonsense
understandingof gendertells thema womanlooks like. How I see myself, even how
I mightwish otherswouldsee me, is socially irrelevant.It is the genderthatI appear
to be (my "perceivedgender")thatis most relevantto my social identityandinteractionswith others.The majorconsequenceof this fact is thatI mustbe continually
aware of which gender I "give off' as well as which gender I "give" (Goffman
1959).
Because my genderself-identityis "notdisplayedobviously,immediately,and
consistently"(Devor 1989, 58), I am somewhatof a failure in social terms with
respect to gender.Causingpeople to be uncertainor wrong aboutone's genderis a
violation of taken-for-granted
rules thatleads to embarrassmentanddiscomfort;it
meansthatsomethinghas gone wrongwith the interaction(Garfinkel1967; Kessler
andMcKenna1978). This meansthatmy nonresponseto misattributionis the more
socially appropriateresponse; I am allowing others to maintain face (Goffman
1959, 1967). By not calling attentionto their mistakes, I uphold their images of
themselves as competentsocial actors.I also maintainmy own image as competent
by letting them assume thatI am the genderI appearto them to be.
But I still have discreditablestatus;I carrya stigma (Goffman 1963). Because I
have failed to participateappropriatelyin the creationof meaning with respect to
792
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
gender(Devor 1989), I can be called on to accountfor my appearance.If discredited, I show myself to be an incompetentsocial actor.I amthe one not following the
rules, andI will pay the pricefor not providingpeople with the appropriatecues for
placing me in the gendercategoryto which I really belong.
I do thinkthatit is, in manycases, saferto be readas a manthanas some sort of
deviantwoman."Man"is an acceptablecategory;it fits properlyinto people's genderworldview.Passingas a manoften is the "pathof least resistance"(Devor 1989;
Johnson 1997). For example, in situationswhere gender does not matter,letting
people take me as a man is easier thancorrectingthem.
Conversely,as Butlernoted,"Weregularlypunishthose who fail to do theirgenderright"(1990, 140). Feinbergmaintained,"Masculinegirls andwomen face terrible condemnationand brutality-including sexual violence-for crossing the
boundaryof whatis 'acceptable'female expression"(1996, 114). People aremore
likely to harassme when they perceiveme to be a womanwho looks like a man.For
example, when a groupof teenagersrealizedthatI was not a man because one of
their mothers identified me correctly,they began to make derogatorycomments
when I passed them. One asked,for example, "Does she have a penis?"
Because of the assumptionthata "masculine"woman is a lesbian, there is the
risk of homophobicreactions(Gardner1995; Lucal 1997). Perhapssurprisingly,I
find that I am much more likely to be takenfor a man than for a lesbian, at least
based on my interactionswith people and their reactions to me. This might be
becausepeople areless likely to revealthattheyhavetakenme for a lesbianbecause
it is less relevantto an encounteror because they believe this would be unacceptable. But I thinkit is morelikely a productof the strengthof ourtwo-and-only-two
system. I give enough masculine cues that I am seen not as a deviantwoman but
ratheras a man, at least in most cases. The problemseems not to be thatpeople are
uncertainaboutmy gender,which mightlead themto concludethatI was a lesbian
once they realized I was a woman. Rather,I seem to fit easily into a gender category-just not the one with which I identify.
In fact, because men representthe dominantgenderin our society, being mistakenfor a man can protectme from othertypes of genderedharassment.Because
men can move aroundin publicspacessafely (atleastrelativeto women),a "masculine" woman also can enjoy this freedom(Devor 1989).
On the otherhand,my use of particularspaces-those designatedas for women
only-may be challenged.Feinbergprovidedan intriguinganalysis of the public
rest room experience.She characterizedwomen's reactionsto a masculineperson
in a public rest room as "anexample of genderphobia"(1996, 117), viewing such
women as policing gender boundariesratherthan believing that there really is a
manin the women'srestroom.She arguedthatwomenwho trulybelievedthatthere
was a manin theirmidstwouldreactdifferently.Althoughthis is an interestingperspective on her experiences,my experiencesdo not lead to the same conclusion.7
Enoughpeople have said to me that"Thisis the ladies' room"or have said to their
companionsthat"Therewas a manin there"thatI taketheirreactionsat face value.
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
793
Still, if the two-and-only-twogender system is to be maintained,participants
mustbe involvedin policing the categoriesandtheirattendantidentitiesandspaces.
Even if policing boundariesis not explicitly intended,boundarymaintenanceis the
effect of such responses to people's genderdisplays.
Boundariesandmarginsarean importantcomponentof bothmy experiencesof
gender and our theoreticalunderstandingof genderingprocesses. I am, in effect,
both womanandnot-woman.As a womanwho oftenis a social manbutwho also is
a woman living in a patriarchalsociety, I am in a uniqueposition to see and act. I
sometimes receive privileges usually limited to men, and I sometimes am
oppressedby my status as a deviant woman. I am, in a sense, an outsider-within
(Collins 1991). Positionedon the boundariesof gendercategories,I havedeveloped
a consciousness that I hope will prove transformative(Anzaldua 1987).
In fact, one of the reasons why I decided to continue my nonparticipationin
femininitywas thatmy sociological trainingsuggestedthatthis could be one of my
contributionsto the eventualdismantlingof patriarchalgenderconstructs.It would
be my way of makingthe personalpolitical.I acceptedbeing takenfor a man as the
priceI wouldpay to help subvertpatriarchy.I believedthatall of the inconveniences
I was enduringmeantthatI actuallywas doing somethingto bringdown the gender
structuresthat entangledall of us.
Then, I read Lorber's(1994) Paradoxesof Genderand found out, much to my
dismay,thatI mightnot actuallybe challenginggenderafterall. Because of the way
in which doing genderworksin ourtwo-and-only-twosystem, genderdisplays are
simply read as evidence of one of the two categories.Therefore,gender bending,
blending,and passing betweenthe categoriesdo not questionthe categoriesthemselves. If one's social genderandpersonal(true)genderdo not correspond,thenthis
is irrelevantunless someone notices the lack of congruence.
This realitybringsme to a paradoxof my experiences.First,not only do others
assumethatI am one genderor the other,butI also insist thatI reallyam a member
of one of the two gendercategories.Thatis, I amfemale;I self-identifyas a woman.
I do not claim to be some other genderor to have no genderat all. I simply place
myself in the wrong categoryaccordingto stereotypesand culturalstandards;the
genderI present,or thatsome people perceiveme to be presenting,is inconsistent
with the genderwith which I identify myself as well as with the genderI could be
"proven"to be. Socially, I display the wrong gender;personally,I identify as the
propergender.
Second, althoughI ultimatelywould like to see the destructionof our current
genderstructure,I am not to the pointof personallyabandoninggender.Rightnow,
I do not wantpeople to see me as genderlessas much as I wantthem to see me as a
woman.Thatis, I would like to expandthe categoryof "woman"to includepeople
like me. I, too, am deeply embeddedin ourgendersystem,even thoughI do notplay
by many of its rules. Forme, as for most people in oursociety, genderis a substantial partof my personalidentity(Howardand Hollander1997). Socially, the problem is thatI do not presenta genderdisplaythatis consistentlyreadas feminine.In
fact, I consciously do not participatein the trappingsof femininity.However,I do
794
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
identify myself as a woman, not as a man or as someone outside of the two-andonly-two categories.
Yet, I do believe, as Lorber(1994) does, thatthe purposeof gender,as it currentlyis constructed,is to oppresswomen.Lorberanalyzedgenderas a "processof
creatingdistinguishablesocial statusesfor the assignmentof rights and responsibilities" that ends up puttingwomen in a devaluedand oppressedposition (1994,
32). As Martinput it, "Bodies that clearly delineate gender status facilitate the
maintenanceof the genderhierarchy"(1998, 495).
Forsociety, gendermeansdifference(Lorber1994). The erosionof the boundaries would problematizethat structure.Therefore,for genderto operateas it currentlydoes, the category"woman"cannotbe expandedto includepeople like me.
The maintenanceof the genderstructureis dependenton the creationof a few categoriesthataremutuallyexclusive,themembersof whichareas differentas possible
(Lorber1994). It is the clarityof the boundariesbetweenthe categoriesthatallows
gender to be used to assign rights and responsibilitiesas well as resources and
rewards.
It is thatpartof gender-what it is used for-that is most problematic.Indeed,is
it notpatriarchal-or, even morespecifically,heteropatriarchal-constructionsof
gender that are actually the problem?It is not the differences between men and
women, or the categoriesthemselves,so muchas the meaningsascribedto the categories and,even moreimportant,the hierarchicalnatureof genderunderpatriarchy
that is the problem (Johnson 1997). Therefore, I am rebelling not against my
femaleness or even my womanhood;instead,I am protestingcontemporaryconstructionsof femininityand,atleastindirectly,masculinityunderpatriarchy.We do
not, in fact, knowwhatgenderwouldlook like if it were notconstructedaroundheterosexualityin the context of patriarchy.
Althoughit is possible thatthe end of patriarchywould meanthe end of gender,
it is at least conceivablethatsomethinglike whatwe now call gendercould exist in a
postpatriarchalfuture.The two-and-only-twocategorizationmightwell disappear,
therebeing no hierarchyfor it to justify. But I do not thinkthatwe shouldmakethe
assumptionthatgender and patriarchyare synonymous.
Theoretically,this analysispoints to some similaritiesanddifferencesbetween
the work of Lorber(1994) andthe worksof Butler(1990), Goffman(1976, 1977),
and West and Zimmerman(1987). Lorber(1994) conceptualizedgenderas social
structure,whereasthe othersfocused moreon the interactiveandprocessualnature
of gender.Butler(1990) andGoffman(1976, 1977) view genderas a performance,
andWestandZimmerman(1987) examinedit as somethingall of us do. One result
of this differencein approachis thatin Lorber's(1994) work,gendercomes across
as something that we are caught in-something that, despite any attemptsto the
contrary,we cannot breakout of. This conclusion is particularlyapparentin Lorber's argumentthatgenderrebellion,in the context of our two-and-only-twosystem, ends up supportingwhatit purportsto subvert.Yet,my own experiencessuggest an alternativepossibilitythatis morein line with the view of genderofferedby
Lucal / LIFE ON THE BOUNDARIES
795
West and Zimmerman(1987): If genderis a productof interaction,and if it is produced in a particular context, then it can be changed if we change our performances. However,the effects of a performancelinger, and gender ends up being
institutionalized.It is institutionalized,in oursociety,in a way thatperpetuatesinequality,as Lorber's(1994) workshows. So, it seems thata combinationof these two
approachesis needed.
In fact, Lorber's(1994) work seems to suggest that effective gender rebellion
requiresa moreblatantapproach-bearded men in dresses,perhaps,or more active
responsesto misattribution.Forexample,if I correctedeverypersonwho called me
"Sir,"andif I insistedon my rightto be addressedappropriatelyand grantedaccess
to women-only spaces, then perhapsI could startto breakdown gendernorms.If I
assertedmy rightto use publicfacilities withoutbeing harassed,andif I challenged
each person who gave me "thelook,"then perhapsI would be contributingto the
demise of gender as we know it. It seems thatthe key would be to provide visible
evidence of the nonmutualexclusivityof the categories.Wouldthis breakdown the
patriarchal components of gender? Perhaps it would, but it also would be
exhausting.
Perhapsthereis anotherpossibility.In a recentbook, TheGenderKnot,Johnson
(1997) arguedthat when it comes to genderand patriarchy,most of us follow the
paths of least resistance;we "go along to get along,"allowing our actions to be
shapedby the gendersystem.Collectively,ouractionshelp patriarchymaintainand
perpetuatea system of oppressionandprivilege.Thus,by withdrawingoursupport
from this system by choosing pathsof greaterresistance,we can startto chip away
at it. Many people participatein genderbecause they cannotimagine any alternatives. In my classroom, and in my interactionsand encounterswith strangers,my
presence can make it difficult for people not to see that there are other paths. In
otherwords,following fromWestandZimmerman(1987), I can subvertgenderby
doing it differently.
Forexample,I thinkit is truethatmy existencedoes nothave aneffect on strangers who assumethatI am a manandneverlearnotherwise.Forthem,I do upholdthe
two-and-only-twosystem.But thereareothercases in whichmy existence can have
an effect. Forexample,whenpeople initiallytakeme for a manbutthenfindout that
I actuallyam a woman, at least for thatmoment,the naturalnessof gendermay be
called into question. In these cases, my presence can provokea "categorycrisis"
(Garber1992, 16) because it challenges the sex/genderbinarysystem.
The subversivepotential of my gender might be strongestin my classrooms.
When I teach aboutthe sociology of gender,my studentscan see me as the embodiment of the social constructionof gender.Not all of my studentshave transformative experiencesas a resultof takinga coursewith me; thereis the chancethatsome
of them see me as a "freak"or as an exception.Still, afterlistening to stories about
my experiences with gender and readingliteratureon the subject, many students
begin to see how and why genderis a social product.I can disentanglesex, gender,
andsexualityin the contemporaryUnitedStatesfor them.Studentscan begin to see
the connection between biographicalexperiencesand the structureof society. As
796
GENDER & SOCIETY / December 1999
one of my studentsnoted,I clearlylive thematerialI amteaching.If thathelps me to
get my pointacross,thenperhapsI am subvertingthe binarygendersystem afterall.
Althoughmy genderedpresenceandmy way of doing gendermightmakeothersandsometimeseven me-uncomfortable, no one eversaidthatdismantlingpatriarchy was going to be easy.
NOTES
1. Ethnomethodologyhas been describedas "thestudyof commonsensepracticalreasoning"(Collins 1988, 274). It examines how people make sense of theireverydayexperiences.Ethnomethodology
is particularlyuseful in studyinggenderbecauseit helpsto uncoverthe assumptionson which ourunderstandingsof sex and genderare based.
2. I thankan anonymousreviewerfor suggestingthatI use these distinctionsamong the partsof a
person'sgender.
3. I obviously have left muchout by not examiningmy genderedexperiencesin the contextof race,
age, class, sexuality,region,andso forth.Sucha projectclearlyis morecomplex.As Westonpointedout,
genderpresentationsarecomplicatedby otherstatusesof theirpresenters:"Whatit takesto kick a person
overinto anothergenderedcategorycan differwith race,class, religion,andtime"(1996, 168). Furthermore, I am well awarethatmy whitenessallows me to assumethatmy experiencesaresimply a product
of gender (see, e.g., hooks 1981; Lucal 1996; Spelman 1988; West and Fenstermaker1995). For now,
suffice it to say thatit is my privilegedpositionon some of these axes andmy moredisadvantagedposition on othersthat combine to delineatemy overallexperience.
4. In fact, such experiencesare not always limited to encounterswith strangers.My grandmother,
who does not see me often,twice has mistakenme foreithermy brother-in-lawor some unknownman.
5. My experiencesin restroomsandotherpublicspaces mightbe verydifferentif I were, say, African Americanratherthan white. Given the stereotypesof African Americanmen, I think that white
women would react very differentlyto encounteringme (see, e.g., Staples [1986] 1993).
6. I also have noticedthatthereare certaintypes of rest rooms in which I will not be verballychallenged;the higherthe social statusof the place, the less likely I will be harassed.Forexample,when I go
to the theater,I might get staredat, but my presenceneverhas been challenged.
7. An anonymousreviewer offered one possible explanationfor this. Women see women's rest
rooms as their space; they feel safe, and even empowered,there. Insteadof fearingmen in such space,
they might insteadpose a threatto any manwho mightintrude.Theirinvulnerabilityin this situationis,
of course,not physicallybasedbutrathersocially constructed.I thankthereviewerforthis suggestion.
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Betsy Lucal is an assistantprofessorof sociology at Indiana UniversitySouth Bend, whereshe
teaches gender, classical theory,feminist theory, and introductionto sociology. Her current
researchfocuses on systems of oppressionand privilege, withparticular attention to race and
gender,and on teaching about inequalitiesand theory.