A New Intelligence Paradigm
and the European Union
Damir Črnčec
ABSTRACT
Purpose:
The purpose of the article is to analyze and present the new intelligence
paradigm and the importance of modern trends in the area of intelligence.
Particular focus is given to the establishment of the intelligence architecture of the
European Union.
Design/Methodology/Approach:
For this article, key qualitative methods, the descriptive method and contents
analysis, as well as primary and secondary written sources, were applied. In
analyzing intelligence activity in the European Union, the method of direct
participant observation was used to obtain relevant information from practice.
Findings:
The intelligence sphere is witness to profound changes which are the
consequence of a changed strategic security environment, globalization and
information technology. Long before the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001, experts had led discussions on changes to intelligence activity during the
information age. The September attacks themselves represent a unique stimulant
for the new intelligence paradigm which is comprised of trends that have recently
appeared in the area of intelligence activity. There are at least seven of these trends
impacting upon intelligence service operations. The trends include processes, such
as the transformation of national intelligence and related structures. The aim of the
transformation is to ensure better coordination, data evaluation and dissemination
to users within the shortest time possible. This also applies to the European Union
as an important factor in the changed modern security environment which has been
marked by globalisation, normalization and the increasingly transnational character
of security threats. Intelligence activity in the European Union is, however, given
insufficient attention by experts in the field. In recent years, we have witnessed
a strengthening of intelligence capabilities within the European Union, either
through the Satellite Centre, the Situation Centre or the Intelligence Directorate of
the EU Military Staff. To this purpose, the comprehensive intelligence-analytical
capability has been used since the beginning of 2007, the basic purpose of which is
to provide all EU users with the best possible analytical product. Directly linked
with the establishment of new operational modes of intelligence bodies is also the
modification of their culture of secrecy. As part of the new intelligence paradigm,
the EU intelligence structures are now replacing and upgrading the “need-toknow” principle with that of “need-to-share”.
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Research limitations/Implications:
The article deals with topics which by their very nature are limited, since
researching the area of intelligence involves the clash of scientific interest and
requirements for secrecy.
Practical implications:
The article informs the widest circles of interested public, from academics to
key players within the national security system, that Slovenia has become active in
the intelligence environment of the European Union.
Originality/Value:
The article provides an overview of modern trends and challenges in the area
of intelligence. It describes the place of intelligence activity in the European Union
and presents the role of Slovenian intelligence structures vis-à-vis the EU in a
comprehensive, schematic and original manner.
UDK: 351.746.1
Key words: Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, European Union, Intelligence
Directorate, need to share, need to know, new intelligence paradigm, Satellite
Centre, Situation Centre
1
INTRODUCTION
Modern security threats are very similar to the threats of the past, yet they differ in
their increased expansion and dispersion ability. This type of ability is the result of
modern processes, such as globalisation and normalization. As with the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism is not a new terrorist threat. What is
new are the changes to the strategic circumstances where these modern threats are
being manifested. Terrorism now has a global dimension and embraces modern
technology, making it no longer an activity of purely local or regional significance.
Similarly, changes have occurred in relation to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. With the dissolution of the state possessing great quantities of
these weapons (for example, in the case of the Soviet Union), new opportunities
have emerged for the dispersion of these weapons to various groups that are also
prepared to sacrifice numerous civilian lives to achieve their goals. The area of the
former Soviet Union is however not the sole originator of these assets. The time
we live in is, therefore, characterized by the global and transnational character of
such threats. Consequently, intelligence services also have to adjust. Changes to the
intelligence environment can be explained through a new intelligence paradigm.
The new intelligence paradigm is a framework of changes in the area of intelligence
not only of individual countries, but also at the level of international organizations,
such as NATO and the European Union. Having no intelligence services of their
own, these organizations have in-house intelligence capabilities and depend on
intelligence support from member states.
In such times of changed globalised security, it has become clear that small
groups and individuals can pose a direct threat to and jeopardize even the largest
countries. The most tragic and widely known example is the use of the internet by
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various terrorist organizations. Having established that, prior to terrorist attacks
on 11 September 2001, terrorists had been using the internet as their means of
communication, the US had seriously considered the possibility of disassembling
it. The issue of how to implement this and whether it is possible or not is, of course,
another thing. The term interdependence is used to define mutual dependence
upon each other and describes associated power dynamics as that of asymmetric
interdependence (Keohane, 2002: 276). The relations between various countries, each
in possession of their own military potential, cannot be referred to as asymmetric
interdependence1. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, international terrorism
showed that it can utilize two types of asymmetry to attain its goals. The first is that
of asymmetry of information. It may seem paradoxical that the modern information
society of the US is in a worse position, in terms of information, than a network of
individuals presumably using hand-written messages and personal conversations
as their means of communication. Yet the information society is also an open society.
Potential terrorists have good information about their targets, whereas the US had
poor information about the activity of terrorist networks in Western societies. The
second asymmetry is the asymmetry of values. Certain terrorists believe that
they will be awarded for their suicidal attacks in their afterlife. Volunteering for
terrorist attacks and their execution against civilian populations is in contradiction
with the secular values of the societies attacked by Al-Quaeda. It has become
evident that even the most powerful country in the world can be vulnerable to
small terrorist groups because of asymmetric interdependence. Too much attention
has been accorded to the importance of the state and too much power has been
accumulated (Keohane, 2002). All these new, changed circumstances now require
the establishment of new ways of responding to security challenges, through the
prism of the new intelligence paradigm.
The effects of processes such as globalisation, information technology and the
increasingly transnational character of modern security threats, have presented
entirely new challenges to the bodies engaged in information-gathering, i.e.
bodies dealing primarily with intelligence activity. The traditional method of data
collection, processing and dissemination has proved inappropriate, too narrowly
specialized, rigid and dependent on strict compliance with the need to know
doctrine. Combined, these factors added a new dimension to the 9/11 attack after
it became clear that available data about the preparations were not, for various
reasons, adequately processed and disseminated to responsible authorities. At
the same time, intelligence services were put in a non-competitive position with
the media that can transmit information live from a particular scene. In this way,
the decision makers are at a disadvantage when they are required to comment
upon events without being informed by the bodies responsible for their support.
Similarly, tactical events change into strategic events with help of the media and
information technology. The asymmetry of the involved structures and reactions is
evident in the fact that the action of the Marine Corps Squad had to be commented
upon by the President. The tragic event triggered by a squad of US marines received
such public attention that President Bush made a public promise to investigate
1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
The US was not vulnerable, asymmetrically, to the Soviet Union (Russia). To the contrary, vulnerability was uniform as a result of the nuclear potential.
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the event and punish the culprits2. Kotnik-Dvojmoč (2002: 178) suggests that, “It
is obvious that we will be facing an increasing number and variety of security
risks and threats, more institutions in charge of their management, and with an
increasingly weaker public, expert and even scientific consensus about what the
most important future issues are, which is of particular concern“. The concluding
part of these considerations from 2002 is still highly relevant today, especially in
terms of the analysis of the new intelligence paradigm.
2
NEW INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM
In the period following 11 September 2001, the strategic environment has been
characterised by globalisation, normalization and the global ’war on terrorism‘3.
The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 are a key events that triggered
the changing of intelligence activity methods within the public sector. Following
the initial shock of 11 September 2001, questions arose about the functioning of
intelligence services and their failure to prevent terrorist attacks on the US. The
critiques were shaped after the report issued by the mixed Senate Commission
which, in addition to several other findings, also stressed the fact that the data were
available but inappropriately processed, as well as that intelligence structures did
not exchange them, and possessed no adequate sources of information4.
Intelligence services were confronted with new challenges regarding both
structure and content. The issues of whether we are properly organized and
structured and of how we deal with the adversary appropriately, are important,
yet represent just a small portion of the mosaic of the new intelligence paradigm.
Previous arrangements were not suited for this new information age and were
based on classic adversaries, classic threats and the classic modus operandi. Now
that the number of classic adversaries and threats has decreased, the operation
mode should be changed and, what is more important, an entirely new framework
for addressing the threats of the information age should be implemented.
The scene was set for change, and funds and conceptual solutions have been
put in place. The time has come now for a new intelligence paradigm. The new
paradigm is composed of trends which have appeared recently in intelligence
activity. There are at least seven trends which impact on the nature of intelligence
service operations. The first trend has already been mentioned. It refers primarily to
the transformation of national intelligence and related structures. The most obvious
2
3
4
In November 2005, a Marine Corps Squad ran into a bomb by the roadside in Hadita, Iraq, the
explosion of which killed one and injured two marines. The marines then killed 24 civilians in
nearby houses, including women and children. There were attempts afterwards to cover up the
crime, but after discovery by the media a comprehensive investigation was carried out resulting in
four charges of murder and four charges of conspiracy.
’War on terrorism‘ is a term used in the US after 9 September 2001. The terminology has been adopted
by numerous countries, including the United Kingdom. European countries were generally very
sceptical about this term. Slovenia has likewise retained a critical distance. As terrorism represents
a threat to national security in the US, it involves the use of all resources, including the military.
In 2007, the United Kingdom decided to abolish the use of the phrase ‘war on terrorism’.
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
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example of this trend is the transformation of the largest intelligence community,
i.e. the US intelligence community. The aim of the transformation is to ensure better
coordination, data evaluation and their dissemination to users within the shortest
time possible. The first trend is directly linked with the second trend which expands
the obligations and powers for data-gathering by intelligence services, most often
through substantial encroachment on human rights and freedoms. The third
emerging trend is a requirement for intelligence and evidence with forensic value.
This trend is posing a whole range of new challenges to intelligence services. Data
obtained through technical means require accurate and quality processing within
a very short period of time, finalization to an appropriate evidentiary level and
then dissemination to clients within the shortest time possible. The fourth trend
is linked with an increased capacity for the transmission of large amounts of data
and information, which often makes intelligence services unable to compete with
the means designed for transmission of data and information, such as television,
radio, internet and telephone calls (conversations, SMS), which represent the most
frequent medium for exchanging the news. The fifth is embedded in the spirit
of the flattened world, flattening access and usability of information technology
allowing two billion people to use the internet in 2007, some of whom may misuse
the internet to compromise the achievements brought by the internet itself. The
sixth trend is the result and consequence of the penetration of the third and fourth
trends into intelligence community. Intelligence services are required to support
strategic, operational and tactical users with relevant information. The contents
should be adjusted for use on different levels, taking into account that, in the
information age, tactical moves in the theatre or during the execution of intelligence
activity can have strategic implications. The seventh trend is closely linked with the
first, yet it surpasses its sole national dimension. International cooperation in the
area of intelligence, and within the framework of various supranational, security,
regional or economic organisations has nowadays become more important than
ever before. Modern intelligence trends are being harmonized with ’megatrends’
(Table 1) which differentiate between global and security changes during the Cold
War period and the 21st century5.
The common denominator of all these trends is of course man6 - individual,
educated, qualified and permanently trained in his area of expertise, as well as in
the use of information technology and the protection of human rights and basic
freedoms. An individual who understands that the environment around him
has changed, that the organization he works for and he himself need to change.
Changes should include changing the culture of secrecy that has always been
(and continues to be) one of the key guiding principles of intelligence services. It
is essential, therefore, that collaboration within, and among, organizations, both
domestically and internationally, is ensured.
5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
The above topics were presented by Terri Everret on behalf of the Office of the US National Intelligence Director at the Industry Conference in his presentation titled ’Procuring the Future‘ 21st
Century IC Acquisition.
6 Innovatively, the Time magazine chose man as the ‘Person of the Year 2006’. An individual is a
person mastering the information era and one who both creates and uses information age services.
Time, 25.12.2006/1.1.2007.
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COLD WAR PERIOD
21st CENTURY
Technology change
Gradual

Rapid
Geopolitical environment
Known

Unpredictable/dynamic
Budget/people
Ample

Limited/constrained
Organizational structure
Hierarchical

Flattened, fluid, flexible
Non-core functions
In-house

Outsourced
Work environment
Dedicated

Virtual, telecommuting
Employee mobility
30 years

3-5 years
Risk taking
Avoidance

Management
Low priority

Rising priority
Restricted

Broadened
Incidental

Essential
Environmental concerns
Table 1:
Megatrends Personnel security
(Source: Everett,
2007: 6) Collaboration
The culture of secrecy manifested through the need to know principle should
be replaced and upgraded with the need to share principle. It is necessary to
allow access to information to a wide circle of institutions that are involved in the
process of ensuring national security, facilitated through information technology.
A joint information network linking all institutions that function either as receivers
or originators of information would be a welcome development. In itself, it is
not enough for this new culture to be understood, defined in doctrines and
then implemented by intelligence structures themselves. It should be a process
directed by and adhered to by the entire intelligence community in the widest
sense, including those using intelligence products, and coordinating, guiding or
overseeing intelligence services7.
The provision of real time intelligence to all decision makers in the public or
private sector is crucial to contemporary societies and one of the key parameters
for measuring the efficiency of a system. The conduct of military operations in the
theatre has gained an entirely new dimension with the use of unmanned aircraft,
7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Such common information networks are known as systems of systems. These systems allow interoperability, integration and interdependence among various databases. Other challenges concerning
the use of information technology achievements are derived from the appropriate use of managerial
and human resources and the ability of unconventional thinking. The concept of intelligence power
should, therefore, be properly adjusted (Herman, 2003). One of the key findings of the 9/11 report
was that certain information was available, but was not submitted to appropriate addresses. The
widest circle of users with the need to know should be granted access to databases interoperable via
interfaces. In the past, databases, information systems were also developed within the intelligence
community for individual clients who defined the standards, security measures and access modes,
thereby aggravating or even disabling access to this information by other bodies within the intelligence community who were in need of such information.
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such as Predator8, which can submit quality photos taken during a flight above an
Iraqi village directly to the laptop of a soldier in the theatre and at the same time
to the main command in Florida9, the Khatar regional command, Pentagon and
probably to the CIA. Various analysts all around the world can simultaneously
observe and interpret the event (Friedman, 2005, 2006: 39). The transmission of
such a quantity of information directly to the field requires entirely new operational
modes, and command and control in the military. It also forces modern armies
to delegate the decision-making authority to lower command levels. A rigid,
hierarchically structured organization such as an army should adjust to this, as it
is becoming flattened according to Friedman. A more appropriate use of the term
real time intelligence is the term near real time intelligence. The data obtained by
Predator have a short time delay ranging from a second to a few seconds, therefore
the term near real time has been used in practice. Needless to say that the basic
pre-condition for the use of data in near real time is appropriate informationcommunications support, including sufficiently robust wide-band connections,
adequate transmission signal and software and hardware on the ground and in
the air.
In modern security environment, intelligence services function not only
in accordance with the new intelligence paradigm or the requirements for near
real time intelligence, but are also an important tool of the state as smart power.
Combining and balancing hard power (military) and soft power (diplomacy)
means using power wisely (Nye, 2008)10. Hard and soft power may sometimes be
mutually reinforcing but also contradicting. Using a proper combination of one or
the other at the right time and place is art. Given the circumstances, intelligence
activity can in itself become a supporting instrument for hard or soft power. The
expectations that the use of hard or soft power will be replaced by wise power is
inevitably linked with the fact that intelligence capabilities will be utilized in the
same way. It is the new paradigm that makes this possible.
The new intelligence paradigm and with the war on terrorism is also a test
for human rights and basic freedoms. When analysing intelligence activity, special
attention should be given to the protection of human rights and basic freedoms.
In the information age it is necessary to establish a more efficient control system
for human rights in the private sector. State institutions, including intelligence
services, are supervised by a number of agencies although this does not always
apply to the private sector.
The dark side11 of the new intelligence paradigm, the unbalanced (illegal)
interference with human rights aimed at justifying higher objectives should not
8
Predator is an unmanned aerial vehicle that can, in addition to various cameras, also carry guided
missiles. The aircraft is remotely controlled by a pilot from a remote place, for instance from the Las
Vegas Air Base, Nevada.
9 US Central Command in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for Iraqi operations.
10 For a detailed breakdown of the soft power concept, see Nye (2004).
11 Guantanamo can be used as a synonym for the dark side of the intelligence paradigm. Guantanamo
is a physically separated and enclosed US military base on Cuba, which, as interpreted by the US
federal administration, does not fall under the US legal jurisdiction. The base was, therefore, the
scene of highly disputable methods of interrogation, regarded as torture by European and Slovenian
definitions. Sleep denial, prolonged enclosure in isolated rooms and the notorious ’water board-
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be ignored. The dark side of the new intelligence paradigm is a less exposed part
of intelligence activity in the European international environment. International
intelligence collaboration has become a greater imperative than previously and has
been supported through the development of the new intelligence paradigm.
3
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Multilateral cooperation includes several players which are not necessarily
countries. Such cooperation often takes place under the umbrella of international
organizations. According to some sceptics, this can be dangerous, as, with the
increasing number of players in the exchange, the risks for data release (which
impacts upon national security) are also high. International intelligence and security
cooperation can be defined in terms of cooperation between civilian intelligence
and security services and cooperation between security structures (police forces)
and between military/defence structures. The systematic approach to cooperation
in relation to intelligence and security were also described by Aldrich. Some
multilateral intelligence and security Euro-Atlantic links were very important
in the past, particularly from the perspective of countering covert intelligence
activity. The period following 11 September 2001 was, however, mainly focused
on cooperation in the fight against both terrorism and organized crime. Key
organizations or groups here are the UKUSA Agreement, the CAZAB Alliance,
the Kilowatt and Megaton systems, the Bern Group or Club and the Antiterrorist
Group (Aldrich, 2004).
The UKUSA12 Agreement was signed in June 1948 between the United States,
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Cooperation in the field
of SIGINT also included the development of the ECHELON project initiated by the
US National Security Agency. Its purpose is, within the global telecommunications
network, to intercept e-mail, fax and telephone communications. The system
controls non-military targets (governments, organizations, companies and
individuals). It intercepts large quantities of information, analyzes them and with
the help of precision software and hardware and extracts only selected data of
interest. The data are selected on the basis of key words. As part of the CAZAB
alliance, the joint analysis and exchange of intelligence on the Soviet Union began
in the 1960s. The 1970s saw the establishment of two intelligence systems, Kilowatt
and Megaton, by a group of countries who wished to exchange data on Middle
East terrorism. The standard transatlantic partners of the systems were also joined
by Norway, Israel and South Africa.
Of all the systems for data exchange, the most persistent or permanent is
the Bern group established in 1971. It originally involved six European security
services, including the British Security Service, French DST, German BfV and
ing‘ are just a few, high profile examples that are, in my opinion, wrongly defined as interrogation
techniques. The US Supreme Court rejected the justification of Guantanamo and the newly elected
US president Barack Obama has publicly stated that he was going to close down the base after his
inauguration on 20 January 2009. He actually did that already two days after his inauguration.
12 See also Richelson (2008: 342-346).
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Swedish SAPO. The director-level meetings are held twice a year and are not meant
to be solely courtesy gatherings. In 2004, this group included 17 security services
from EU member states that exchange data via UK-administered communication
links. The club incorporates working subgroups dealing with individual specific
problem areas such as terrorism and organized crime.
After 11 September 2001, the Bern Club established a new organisation called
the Counterterrorism Group (CTG). This is a separate body with a wide range
of membership involving EU intelligence and security services, and additionally
the services of the US, Switzerland and Norway. The first meeting of CTG was
in November 2001. Currently, the most important activity of this group is the
identification of threats posed by Islamic terrorism. Although not under direct
jurisdiction of the EU, its analyses of security threats are available to individual
senior EU committees. CTG has no formal seat, and its presidency rotates together
with the EU presidency13. In 2004, a decision was taken for CTG to assume
a significant intelligence-related role in the implementation of the European
Declaration Against Terrorism. Also in May 2004, the group embraced new
members from the intelligence services of the ten new EU member states.
In respect of classic, or organized, crime there are institutions, such as
INTERPOL, EUROPOL or EGMONT that deal with financial aspects of organized
crime or terrorist organizations. The Schengen area, which Slovenia joined on
21 December 2007, on land and at sea14, is another important development. Full
integration of the Schengen Agreement in Slovenia was completed on the night
of the 29 March 2008. The key tool facilitating the implementation of Schengen
rules is the Schengen Information System (SIS) - a common electronic database
on warrants for persons and property. It deals with persons forbidden to enter
the Schengen area who are being sought for the purpose of arrest or extradition,
missing persons, as well as stolen vehicles and documents, money, weapons and
marked money originating from criminal acts.15
Special attention should be given to the analysis of intelligence-related
cooperation in two very important international organizations, i.e. NATO and the
European Union. While the focus of cooperation, in the former, lies in defence and
military sectors and the fight against terrorism, the second develops this cooperation
equally, both in the civilian and military areas. In contrast to the European Union,
intelligence activity represents an inherent element of NATO, as it was created as
a security and political organization, while the EU has been built as an economic
association. Particular attention will, therefore, be given to the development of EU
intelligence activity in the remainder of the text, from the viewpoint of the new
intelligence paradigm and the role of the state.
13 Slovenia took up the presidency of the CTG in the first half of 2008.
14 The basic idea of the Schengen Agreement, which was concluded in 1985 among five EU member
states (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands) in a village in Luxembourg,
is to ensure the right of free movement across internal borders. A countermeasure to this was stricter
border control on external Schengen borders, intended primarily to stop illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, human trafficking and other illegal activity. With the entry of Slovenia and six other
countries, the total number of member states increased to 22.
15 Slovenia – a new member of the Schengen Agreement, Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Slovenia,
Ljubljana, December 2007 (Slovenija – schengenska novinka, 2007).
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4
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
It is a fact that neither the European Union nor NATO has an intelligence and
security service of its own. There are bodies existing in both organizations dealing
with the issues of intelligence, counterintelligence or security. The management
of classified information is regulated in detail, while the intelligence and security
activity remains the domain of member states of both organizations. Countries are
still unwilling to delegate part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions
such as the EU. However, modern threats and security challenges demand new
forms and more effective ways of information exchange.
The idea of developing some sort of a European version of the US intelligence
agency, the CIA, appeared previously within the European Union and tend to
emerge during incidents that affect the entire European Union. Such an example
was the terrorist attacks in Spain in March 2003, which claimed more than 200
deaths and injured 1,500 others. The EU responded quickly and appointed a
counter-terrorism coordinator responsible for enhanced cooperation amongst
member states, EU working bodies and other relevant bodies. The main stress of
their role is the exchange of intelligence information among member states that
mostly oppose the establishment of a European intelligence service. Javier Solana,
a high-ranking representative of the EU for common external and security policy,
has proposed that the present Situation Centre of the EU Council, which collects
and analyzes information on external risks, should do the same in the area of
internal security threats. Continued cooperation remains imperative among the
countries and their intelligence and security services, as does the efficient exchange
of information to allow timely implementation of preventive measures.
Prior to the year 2000, cooperation between intelligence services within the
EU depended heavily on bilateral relations. Military intelligence cooperation
started as part of the ESDP programme adopted at the Helsinki Summit in 1999.
The EU intelligence architecture itself stems from the EU Brussels Summit in 1999,
when the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit were created16. Between 2000
and 2001, the establishment of the EU Military Staff followed which comprised
an integrated intelligence component. The end of 2001 saw the endorsement of
the ISTAR concept17 for EU-led operations. The future challenges of the EU were
outlined in the EU Security Strategy entitled ”A Sustainable Europe for a Better
World“. By the beginning of 2007, the development of EU intelligence activity
became recognisable through the creation of common civilian, military, defence
and analytical products. The products are made available to all key institutions
within the EU and member states.
As mentioned previously, discussions about the formation of a European CIA
are revived occasionally, but the European intelligence agency still remains just
an idea. In practice, the provision of a common European security and defence
16 This is now called the Office for Policy.
17 ISTAR is a concept defining full intelligence support to (military) operations. ISTAR is a part of
intelligence cycle i.e. collection. The concept includes intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance.
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policy18 (ESDP) led to the creation of some institutions that dealt with the complete
intelligence circle and others that dealt with specific parts of it. The only real EU
intelligence capability is the Satellite Centre (SATCEN)19. SATCEN is an important
and proven asset that provides support to EU missions and geospatial products to
member states that are the result of the analysis of satellite images and other data.
SATCEN plays an important role in ESDP by providing analysis of satellite imagery
which can be essential for the success of military missions and the safety of military
personnel. SATCEN priorities are derived from the European security strategy and
include: monitoring of regional conflicts, threats by organized crime, terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has also provided full support
for EU operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Moreover, it is an important early warning tool as it simplifies informationgathering for the prevention of armed conflicts. SATCEN can also be guided by
EU member states, and it commonly prepares documents for various international
organizations, in particular for the UN20. SATCEN users can be divided into five
groups21:
−− EU Council and its bodies have direct relations mostly with the DG E
VIII Directorate, EU Military Staff and the Situation Centre (SITCEN). In
accomplishing these tasks, SATCEN provided support to 15 different EU
missions ranging from PROXIMA in Macedonia to Congo. It is highly probable
that it will support two important EU missions launched in the first half of 2008,
i.e. EUFOR Chad and EULEX Kosovo.
−− With 27 member states, SATCEN cooperates with various working groups and
has expert exchange and internship programmes.
−− The EU Commission may request from SATCEN products and services, and
cooperates with the centre in joint research projects.
−− Non-members of the EU (Iceland, Norway, Turkey and EU accession members)
can request and receive products, and can also be involved in the direct
implementation of SATCEN tasks.
−− International organizations, for instance various bodies of the United Nations
Organization, are important partners of the EU in crisis management and conflict
prevention. Therefore, SATCEN has close cooperation with, and provides
support to, the following UN bodies and operations: MONUC (operation in
Congo), UNDOF (operation in the Golan Heights), UNDPKO (operation in
Sudan – Darfur), UNMIK (Kosovo) and UNMOVIC (Iraq).
Slovenia has been a full partner of SATCEN since 2004. The MoD representative
is the national representative and member of the SATCEN supervisory board.
SATCEN provides Slovenia with its products in CD and DVD format and these
are stored in a dedicated digital library at the ministry. Some of the more recently
18 ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
19 More on EUSC: www.eusc.europa.eu
20 EUFOR RD CONGO: The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) in support of EU operations in the DRC
(2007), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), January 2007
21 http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7&Itemid=15, 6. 3.
2008
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released products can be accessed through the SATCEN internet portal, where
products are protected with a key Chiasmus (Florjanc, Ilnikar, 2007: 19). SATCEN
provides similar support to all member states. Within the EU structure, SATCEN
provides its products primarily to two bodies dealing with intelligence support
of EU operations: the intelligence component of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in
defence and military areas and the Joint Situation Centre of the EU in the civilian
sphere22. Both structures are heavily supported by EU member states, the defence/
military resources of the EUMS and the civilian resources of the Situation Centre.
National contributions are primarily of human resources, whereas the input of
products is ensured with the help of national representatives functioning under a
’dual-hatted‘23 role. On the one hand they are an integral element of the permanent
EU structure and accomplish their tasks in accordance with job descriptions
defined for individual positions. On the other hand, they also function as national
representatives, and points of contact24 responsible for the uninterrupted exchange
of national intelligence products between the EU and their own countries.
Solutions of this type are particularly practical for small countries with limited
human resources, and also useful for crisis response operations both within the
EU and NATO.
In terms of formal hierarchical subordination, EUMS and the Joint SITCEN
belong to the General Secretariat (GS) rather than the European Commission25. For
the sake of efficiency, and due to the scarcity of intelligence resources, the High
Representative of the GS established the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity 26
(SIAC) in 2006. The basic aim of this initiative is to provide all members of the
European Union with the best possible analytical product, generated from all
available resources and through the cooperation of the Joint Situation Centre
and the intelligence component of EUMS. SIAC are jointly led and guided by
the Director General of the EUMS and the Director of SITCEN. Hence, there is
an emphasis on combining processes as opposed to organizational structures.
This combining of the processes of EU intelligence and security activity is shown
in Chart 1. Harmonized joint products are then also distributed to lower levels.
Coordinated analytical products are put on a list with tasking and supporting
authorities clearly indicated. The responsible authority for SIAC products, in case
of military and defence issues is, naturally, the EUMS Intelligence Directorate.
22 When Henry Kissinger was the US State Secretary, he approached the EU with a question about
the essence of the EU. The EU had no clearly defined representative or, as he put it, did not have a
single telephone number. Joint SITCEN is now the single EU telephone number.
23 The term ’dual-hatted’ mainly became known through the NATO Supreme Allied Commander for
Operations also functioning as Supreme Commander of US Forces in Europe. The term is often
used outside NATO structures and the EU, mostly for individuals performing tasks/functions in
international structures and, concurrently, for national purposes.
24 POC (point of contact), can also refer to liaison officers involved in the exchange of information.
25 The Commission employs approximately 27,000 employees, the Secretariat around 3,300 and EUMS
some 200 employees.
26 The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) has been in operation since 1 January 2007. All
products are produced in accordance with a 6-month programme which is jointly approved by both
superiors.
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With intensified activity of the European Union during crisis response
operations, the EU Commands responsible for individual operations have a
greater need for tactical and operational intelligence. Such an example, in 2008, was
EUFOR Chad which is under the command of the Paris Operation Headquarters.
The provision of appropriate permanent intelligence support is one of the key
challenges of every crisis response operation. This trend, particularly in relation to
defence and military considerations, will lead to even more intensified cooperation
in relations between EU member states. If appropriate mechanisms for cooperation
and exchange of information are properly established at a strategic level, the EU
will continue upgrading direct support capabilities for crisis response operations.
An important role in this process is also being played by the European Defence
Agency that is developing relevant intelligence capabilities.
Chart 1:
Intelligence
in the civilian
and military
structure of
the European
Union
The appropriate placement of intelligence structures within the secretariat
organization is also important. EUMS occupies the top position in the hierarchy
of organizational structures, similarly to the status of directorate-general. Its
internal organizational structures, including the area of intelligence, were not
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A New Intelligence Paradigm and the European Union
given sufficient status. The new structure, effective from March 2008, will see the
intelligence component function as a directorate within EUMS and will be led by
the director of the EUMS Intelligence Directorate. This appears to show that, in the
future, specific attention will be given to strengthening the defence and military
intelligence capabilities of the European Union. The increased involvement of the
EU in humanitarian and crisis response operations highlights a greater practical
need for the provision of appropriate intelligence support at operational and
tactical levels. In order to provide such support, every intelligence structure needs
a clearly defined organizational structure and their own capabilities for collecting
and processing data and information.
Slovenia presided over the EU Council in the first half of 2008. For obvious
reasons it would be difficult to speak about intelligence achievements during the
presidency, but some findings and assessments can still be provided.
5
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
There are two intelligence and security services in Slovenia: the Slovenian
Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) and the Intelligence and Security
Service of the Ministry of Defence (OVS). Both of them perform intelligence,
counterintelligence and security activity. The SOVA personnel are empowered
to undertake special forms of data collection, but have no police authority, while
OVS personnel involved in intelligence and counterintelligence activity have the
same powers as SOVA personnel, and the security personnel of the OVS have
police powers. Historically speaking, they are two totally different services. SOVA
is the successor to the Security and Information Service (VIS), which succeeded
the National Security Service (SDV) or political police forces27 that functioned in
Slovenia up to the introduction of a multi-party system28. The OVS was established
only after the first democratic elections in April 1990.
Since 11 September 2001, Slovenia has not modified its national security
system, nor the structure of its intelligence services. I would particularly like
to stress that Slovenia, unlike some other countries, has not succumbed to the
temptation of strengthening its counterterrorism legislation although terrorism
in Slovenia remains a security threat and a criminal act. Intelligence services are
primarily the first to detect or perceive terrorist threats. Should these threats be
real and imminent, they are required to submit such information to potentially
27������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Still in 1990, when the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs determined in the Rules on Operations of the National Security Service (SDV) the methods to be used by SDV concerning human
rights of the citizens. Without any prior court approval the following activity was allowed: secret
eavesdropping, secret control of telephones and other telecommunication means, secret control of
international and other telecommunications traffic, secret control of mail and other shipments, secret
recording and document management, technical checks and protection of premises and facilities,
secret investigations of premises, secret maintenance of links with co-workers. The measures were
carried out temporarily or permanently.
28 For more on the activity of the National Security Service and the Security and Information Service
in the period before, during and after Slovenian independence see Brejc (1994).
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affected parties such as the police and other bodies within the national and security
system.
Against such background knowledge of the modern security environment,
Slovenian security and intelligence structures conducted preparations for the
presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2008. During
the presidency, both services gained first-hand experience of the international
environment. During the presidency, SOVA organized three events related to its
area of work in Slovenia. The Security and Intelligence Service of the Ministry
of Defence hosted the second workshop on intelligence and security support in
crisis response operations, focusing on Operation EUFOR in Chad (Report on the
Presidency, 2008).
During the preparations for and the actual presidency of the Council of
the European Union, both agencies intensified the exchange of intelligence data
and products, both domestically as well as with foreign partner services and
international organizations. The agencies were faced with additional responsibility,
namely, by potentially submitting wrong assessments and information they could
risk immediate reaction not only at the national level, but also at the level of the
European Union. The provision of intelligence and security support for national
decision-makers on the presiding EU Council also involved direct intelligence
support for the European Union.
6
CONCLUSION
Modern times require modern methods of dealing with risks and threats. The only
way to implement this, in the area of intelligence, is through a new intelligence
paradigm. This requires the understanding that, as in the search for a solid
consensus on determining the most important problems of the future, the reaching
of a consensus on the new intelligence doctrine is also difficult.
It is, therefore, necessary to take full responsibility when faced with the fact that
during the period after 11 September 2001 some countries, having been exposed to
direct risks, embarked upon modifying their legislation and thus encroaching upon
human rights. Some extreme examples of new normative acts and their practical
interpretation are a constituent element of the dark side of the introduction of
the new intelligence paradigm. It is crucial that, although we recognise the
importance of adopting the new paradigm, that we are aware of its downside.
In implementing the new intelligence paradigm it should be understood that the
essential precondition for successful intelligence cooperation in the international
environment is an appropriate and efficient national intelligence system. It is the
only means of appropriate intelligence support for the European Union, which has
only recently begun upgrading its intelligence architecture.
It can be anticipated that the move towards enhanced intelligence capabilities
within the European Union will continue into the future. The integration of
intelligence processes will definitely intensify, but at the same it is likely that these
processes will become fully integrated with intelligence structures. However, the
final objective remains unchanged, that is to provide all users in the European
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Union with the best possible analytical product. Considering the tremendous
progress achieved over recent years, it should not be ignored that we are still
distance away from a European intelligence service that functions in the way that
national intelligence services operate.
Changes to intelligence activity within the EU are taking place within the
limits of the new intelligence paradigm, the implementation of which, at national
and international levels, can be measured through a variety of factors. Some of the
most important are as follows.
First, changes to normative and doctrinal documents on the modification
of national security systems have left an imprint on the intelligence systems of a
large number of European countries, including the United States, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Austria, as well as upon the intelligence structures of NATO and
the European Union. Second, similarly we have witnessed a transformation of
intelligence systems as a consequence of adopting a new normative and doctrinal
framework. Third, the field of intelligence is witnessing the establishment of new
institutions, including the European Union. Here two dimensions need to be
highlighted: new institutions for data collection and processing, and transformed
existing institutions, the purpose of which is better coordination and data
exchange. Fourth, intensified involvement in international relations has become
one of the priorities of all services. International involvement differs simply in
terms of individual member states’ engagement with individual organizations.
Fifth, along with all these changes, the methods of external supervision of the work
of the intelligence services should also be upgraded. New obligations and powers
increase the possibility for misuse. In order to avoid this, supervision should be
intensified in order to prevent the development of the dark side of the intelligence
paradigm.
The new intelligence paradigm is something that Slovenia, as an active
member of NATO and the European Union and an active contributor to the area
of intelligence, cannot avoid. Given the fact that the European Union and NATO
have no intelligence services of their own, the role of individual member states
becomes even more important. Domestic intelligence systems need to be properly
structured and organized, as this is the only way that they can provide optimal
support for the intelligence capabilities of both organizations, and, simultaneously,
efficiently receive intelligence products. It is, therefore, reasonable and rational
to upgrade the national intelligence system through increased transparency and
exploitation of available resources. During times of modern transnational threats,
cooperation and information exchange should be provided on various levels within
a country, as intra- and inter- agency, and outside the country, bilaterally, within
the EU and NATO, with the UNO taking on international peacekeeping operations
at tactical and strategic levels. The need to share far outweighs national dimensions
and has become a supranational need for all who actively participate within the
international security environment.
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About the Author:
Damir Črnčec, holds a Ph.D. in political sciences and has been the director
general of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of Defense of Slovenia
since 2005. He is the author of many articles on classified information, security,
intelligence, biometry, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. His
views do not represent the official position of the institution he works for.
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