POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES
109
H.ibngji.ng
Jllln
Growth .ate (Yo)
5.1 - 8.9
I
I
I
8.9 - 12.95
12.95 - 19.28
13.28 - 41.09
no data
BJ: Beijing
TJ: Tianjin
SH: Shanghai
Mop
5,3,
Chino's Populolion GroMh Rote belween 1990 ond 2003
hahou statlus. Recent policy changes are now altering the rigid, huhou system ofthe past
to allow rural residents to establish residency status in towns and small cides.
Clearly the rules are changing to reflect the new realities of migrants who perform
valuable and needed labor services to allow them to become legal residents where they
work. It is becoming abundandy clear that the urban economies in many of Chinat
larger cities and metropolitan regions could not function without the labor services
of these migrants. Moreover, urban subsidies are diminishing in importance owing ro
efforts to improve the efficiency and profinbility of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
or by simply allowing those rhat are inefficient to fail and close. Increasingly, these
tralsient workers are becoming a part of the urban scene, and their temporary status is
now wolving over time into a more long-term arrangement as befis their contribution
ro these burgeoning Chinese urban economies.
Population Size and Vital Rates
'\i?hen
the CCP came to powet it decided to conduct a national census to obtain
information indispensable for the preparation of its first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957).
The information sought was quite simple: the address ofeach Chinese household, and
the name, age, sex, ethnic status, and relationship to the head of the household ofeach
I
l0
CHAPTER
5
household member. According to the census results, China in mid-1953 had a total of
582.6 million people, plus 1 1.7 million on Taiwan. Since this census was the first official
population count China has made in the socialist period, it has been used widely as a
basis for population estimates and pro.jecrions, and was a basis for more recent census
counts taken in 1964, 1982,1990, and 2000 (Tien 1983; Banisrer 1987).
There are indicarions that even the Chinese leadership was unclear about the actual
of the population. In the 1970s, topJevel Chinese leaders and other informed
so-urces used national figures that differed by as much as 100 million. For example,
officials at the Supply and Grain departments believed that China's population was g00
million, while the Ministry of Commerce stated thar it was A;O milltn. In 1972, rhe
head of the Chinese delegation to a UN environmental conference in Stockholm said
that China had as many as 900 million people, a 6gure that was then widely used in
size
the Chinese press until mid-1979 when the figure of975 million (1978 population)
was released by the State Statistical Bureau. Recenr official information from China
indicates that the rate of population growth in the 1950s and the 1960s averaged 2
Pefcent Per year.
Since the early 1970s, stringent policies of family planning have been enforced with
substantial results. Vice-premier Chen Muhua disclosed in late 1979 that the rate of
China's natural population growth had dropped from 23.4 per thousand in l97l to
12.05 per thousand in 1978. Such a drastic reduction ofthe net natural increase in a
few years is extrernely rare in the history of the world's population wolution, outside
of catastrophes such as massive famines. As seen in table 5.1 and figure 5.1, the rate
BirthVdeaths per 1,000 people
50
0
1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 .1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2oO4
Flgure 5.1. Birih ond Deoth Rotes ln Chino, 1949-2@4. Sour€e,. Noiionol Bureou of
Stotistics 2004
POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES I11
airth rat6 (p6r 1,000)
4.85 - 9.24
s.25 - 12.s8
II
12.59
14.69
-
14.68
17.4
BJ: Bcting
TJ: Tianjin
SHr Shangh.i
CQ: Chonsqins
Mop
5.4.
Chino's Birth Roie, 2003. Source; Notionol Bureou of Stotistics 2004
had increased by 1990 to 14.26 per thousand as some relaxation ofthe one-child policy
occurred in rural areas. The Chinese government has since called for a further reduction
to zero growth by the early rwenry-first century and a decline in fertiliry and birth rares
has continued to reduce the natural growth rare. By 2000 the birth rate had declined
to 1.3 percent with a rate of annual net natural growth of 0.69 percent, a figure that
indicates continuing decline toward zero population growth. fu seen in table 5.3 and
map 5.4, the birth rates continue to vary in different regions ofChina, with substantially
higher birth rates in the western and interior provinces than in rhe east coast provinces.
In 1999 the average fertility rate, basedon a less than I percent sample, was 1.33forthe
nation, well below the replacement level. A 2001 survey indicated a total fertility rate of
1.22 children per womar in urban areas, while the total fertility rate on average among
rural women was 1.98. Thus, there is a significant gap berween urban and rural families.
This evidence indicates China has gone through much ofits demographic transition
in a very short period, although whether such progress is sustainable in the absence of
firm and coercive central policy remains problematic. Adeveloping country experiencing
the process ofdemographic transition orshiftcan often beseen togo through three stages
ofchange, beginning with reladvely high birth and death rates (say, 30-50 per thousand
people per year) and ending with relatively low vital rates (5-15 per thousand per year;
see fig. 5.1). The intermediare stage is a period of rapid population growth resulting
from decliningdeath rates and continued high birth rates. The rapid population growth
in China resulted from good and sufficient nutrition, improved health conditions, and
better environmental sanitation, all ofwhich help ro reduce momalirf. Meanwhile, rhe
birth and fertiliry rates declined more slowly due to the persistence oftradirional culrural
112
CHAPTER
5
values associated with Confucian ideals in favor ofmale children, and often resuldng
in
larger families, especially in rural areas where the vast majority of China's people have
always lived. Fertility reduction is necessarily a slow process, for it involves not only
amitudinal changes toward the role ofthe family in the social fabric of the nation, but
also an awareness and adoption ofnew ideas and techniques of family planning. This
parallels improvement in living standards, income, and the educational level ofwomen.
Such a reducdon proceeds more rapidly and effectively in ciries than in rural areas (Hsu
1985). China has been able ro enforce compliance with family planning policies more
easily in cities where people depend more on state supporr for housing, jobs, and other
benefits.
Both birth and the death rares in China have decreased appreciably since the 1949
rwolution. In 1953, the census reported an impressively reduced crude death rate of 17
per thousand and a high crude birth rate of 37 per thousand, leaving a crude natural
rate of increase of 20 per thousand (see fig. 5.1). According to official data, between
1954 and 1957, death rates also dropped more rapidly than birth rates, resulting in
large natural rates ofgrowth, (Selected data for annual birth rates, death rates, and rates
ofner annual growth are presented in tables J.1 and 5.3.)
Aside fiom the issue of food supply and nurition, China's mormliry and fertility
declines are the result of two national programs focused on public health and family
planning. The accomplishments ofthe early years ofrhe PRC in public health are wellknown, In a relatively short time, China eliminated or greatly reduced such dreaded
diseases as typhoid, smallpox, cholera, scadet fever, tuberculosis, trachoma, and venereal
disease. Parasitic diseases such as schistosomiasis, hookworm, and malaria were brought
under control and today pose no serious threar to the population, These accomplishments were achieved through massive inoculation drives, pest-eradication programs,
environmental cleanup campaigns, and preventive medicine. Public health programs
today are carried out in every province, city, and county in China.
One of the saddest and most regrettable aspects of China's recent demographic
history was the catastrophic human suffering that resulred from the late Chairman
Mao Zedongt Great Leap Forward policy and program. In 1958, Mao announced a
program to push China ahead forcefully through full communization of agricultural
lands and property and other radical production and social policies. Thepeasants reacted
unfavorably to these new policies that took private plots and animals away from them,
and farm production, including that of food-grains, plummeted in 1959 and 1960
(Ashton et al. 1984; Banister 1987). Bad weather and inaccurate reporting of grain
production firrther exacerbated the production declines. Food-grain shonages followed,
and a massive famine swept the country (it was especially serious in 1960). So severe was
this famine, coupled wirh the government's unwillingness to publicize the problem and
seek help internationally, that as many as 30 million people may have died as a direct
result ofthe governmentt failed policies and programs. The tremendous demographic
impact and suffering ofthis famine may be seen in decreased birth and increased dearh
rates (see table 5.3 and figs. 5.1 and 5.2), with rheir dwastating effect on the age cohorts
born in 1960 and 1961. Only after the radical policies were rescinded, and small private
plos and animals were restored to the peasants, did farm production pick up and return
some normaliry to both the rural economy and way oflife ofChinat rural people.
POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES
l l3
Age
aO9.l
161tt
6+60
565e
5G5a
a$3e
2!-2,'
m-24
lFlil
t9
Percent of population
Flgure 5.2.
Chino, o Populotlon Pyromid,2000. Sout€e; Notionol Bureou of Stotlstlcs
2@A
At an approximate average rate ofnatural growth of20 per thousand between 1949
and 1982, China in those thirty-three years had a net gain in population of roughly
480 million (see table 5.1). Another 126 million were added between 1982 and 1990,
and still another 1 37 million between 1 990 and 2000. China continues to add about 7
million each year to its population, despite a reduction in birth rates, simply by virrue
of its enormous size. These rapid, large, absolute gains are without precedent in China's
history. Despite recendy declining birth rates, the large number ofwomen in the childbearing years offifteen to forty-five will ensure substantial populadon momentum and
gror.th, but the size ofthe cohort is diminishing rapidly as relatively low birth rates have
been in place now for a generation (see 69. 5.2). So rapid is the reponed drop in birth
and fertility rates that some observers now foresee a new potentid problem in another
generation of a rapidly aging population (Kinsella and Phillips 2005).
Family Planning
China expects to reach zero population growth at some point early in the twentyfirst century, and 1.6 billion people as a maximum population reached around the
year 2030 was a possibiliry recendy discussed (Vu 1997, 6). This goal, of course,
tt4
CHAPTER
5
remains ambitious, especially considering rhe fact thar rhe nation has experienced only
partial industrialization and urbanizarion, processes that are just now moving into fuil
acceleration and that are yet rheoretically associated with slowdowns in plpuladon
growth in modernizing economies and societies. In a country where tradition continues
m place a high value on male children, the nrget will be even more difficult to reach.
The Chinese government, however, is now firmly committed to limiting the growth
of its population, and it has provided effecdve if sometimes controversid leadership.
The new social structure of the nation is such that it greatly facilitates family planning
programs, and China continues to promore aggressively a reduction in feniliry anJ
births to achieve the goal ofzero population growth.
Failure to nke effective action before the 1970s to stabilize the rapidly growing
population was a shortcoming of Chairman Mao 7rd,ong, who appeared to b.lieu.
literally in the Marxist notion ofsurplus labor value and therefore that a large population
would bring more producers. The Chinese leadership did not initially ."*grrir. th"
fact that an excessively large population could deter the growth and development ofthe
nationt economy. Seriow efforts were not made during the 1950s to reduce the birth
rate, although limited proposals for family planning were made. Four separate family
planning campaigns operated in China during the socialist period. Each successive one
intensified the rigor with which the plans were implemented.
EARLY EFFORTS AND POLICIES
An initially cautious and limited approach ro promoting birth control and to producing
contraceptive devices was launched in 1956. The Great Leap Forward interrupted thii
program in 1958 because ofits emphasis on late marriages. This was to some extent inrerrupted by the Cultural Revolution, although it is difficulr to establish the Chinese governmentt official position on family planning during this tim e (Banistet 1987 , l4B-52) .
In 1971 China
began to place much greater enphasis on family planning wirh its
third family planning campaign. The Chinese press in the late l9Z0s carried Ltensive
information on family planning programs and their effects on population growth.
AII newly married couples were expected and were legally obligated to pracrice binh
control. The drive to lower the nation's fertility rate was irnplemented through a vast
medical and public health sysrem (Chen I 976) . It involved extensive face-to-face contact
with the people by both trained medical personnel and paramedics, readily available
contraceprives, and a variety of incentive programs. More than a million ..barefoot
doctors," who normally received shon-term medical training of between rhree and six
months, and who engaged in farm production while not performing their medical
services, worked in China's countryside.
Dedicated medical personnel were rhen ubiquitous at all levels of China's rural
administrative unirs. In the cities, rhe urban residents' committees were rhe basic administrative units where family planning programs were formally structured. Ar these
basic levels of sociery, nu$es, barefoot doctors, and midwives nor only provided ordinary health care to the people, they also provided modern contraceptives, sterilization,
and abortion services that were readily alailable and free or at low cost. Contraceptives
POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES I15
available to the Chinese are similar to those found elsewhere, and new methods have
been frequently reported in the Chinese press. Xe (2000, 58) has nored that according
to recent surveys in China, over 80 percent ofcouples were using contraception methods
by the early 1990s. Most common methods included female sterilization through tubal
ligation (41 percent), use ofan IUD (40 percent), and male srcrilization (12 pircent).
Abonion had declined substantia.lly fiom 20 million per year in the 1980s to 10 million
in 1992.
Family planning, as noted above, has since the late 1950s been openly publicized
through the adminisnative and educational systems. Ir is organized at the cenrral government level by the Office of Family Planning of the State Council. Since 1981, rhe
State Family Planning Commission is the principal agency responsible for carrying out
China's population program (Xe 2000 , 52). Leading cad.res at rhe provincial, regional,
and county levels transmit the state's policies downward to the rural communities and
urban disricts for enforcement. Each township has a Family Planning Committee,
which coordinates and supervises family planning work. Family planning subcommittees are responsible for such details of birth control as disseminating family planning
information and conrraceptives, organizing and leading srudy groups, persuading nonparticipanrs ro adopt family planning, and checking the resulc of these programs. In
the cities, similar activities are found in offices and factories as well as in residents'
committees.
At these lowesr levels of family planning, detailed records are kept on the number of
the local population, the number oflocal women ofchildbearing age and their monthly
cycles, the methods ofmale and female contraception used, and the projected number of
births each year. Women who hil to pracrice birth control, who have too maly children,
orwho get pregnant or give birth at the wrong time, are likely to encounter unpleasant
official pressure from cadres and sometimes social pressure fiom their colleagues and
neighbors to conform ro the rules.
In the third family planning campaign, three key words characteriz€d rhe goals of
Chinat family planning education: late, thin, and, feu-meaning late marriage, spacing
binhs at intervals of no less than four or 6ve years, and fewer children p.t
In
"otrpl..
the counrryside, the target age for marriage is generally twenry-three for women
and
twenry-five for men, but there are many different ages used, and early mariage has been
preferred. In the cities, the minimum nrget ages for marriage have been slightly higher:
for example, twenry-five for women and rwenty-seven for men, but again there have
been manyvariations. There is some evidence thar late marriage has been deemphasized
with rhe advent of the one-child policy and because of a strong social preference for
early marriage,
THE ONE.CHILD POLICY AND PROGMM
In January 1979, a fourth family planning campaign emerged, arrd a one-child policy
was formally put into effect for most of China's population. Since then, hmilies have
been encouraged ro have only one child, and to sign a pledge that they will have only
one child. Many places have issued honor certificates to families that have decided
tt6
CHAPTER
5
to have no more than one child. The certificate provides economic benefits to those
who qualify. For example in many urban places, one-child families receive a "monthly
health maintenance fee" (it originally amounted to a significant share of an average
workert monthly income) until the child reaches a certain age. Priorities for admitting
children to nurseries, kindergartens, and schools are granted to these families, often
free of charge. In some cities, such families enjoy priority in housing allocarion and
receiye the same amount of living space as hmilies with two or more children Qowett
1990). In Shanghai, a retiree with only one child will get an addidonal pension payment
to be calculated on the basis of 5 percent ofhis wage at retirement. These incentives,
however, are cancelled if a second child is born. In most places, families must return
these acquired benefits to the state in insallments if rheir one-child pledge is broken.
Education has been assigned
high priority in China's family planning. The masses
"Grain is stored against famine,
and sons are brought up to ensure security for onet old age." Under the communist
system, they are told, everyone is guaranteed a certain amount ofbasic daily necessities
(such as grain, cooking oil, and cloth) , and there is no need to have several sons ald a large
family. It is also argued rhat improved medical care and public health sewices have greatly
increased the probability of infant survival, and rhere is no need to produce many sons
to ensure the survival ofa few or even one. The masses are also told that successful Family
planning will help improve the health ofboth the mother and the child and will bring
about a higher standard of living for the family. Since 1979, population planning has
been justified on the basis that the nation's large population hindered the development
of the national economy; created serious problems in availabiliry of food, housing,
education, and employment; and reduced per capita income and an already low mainla-nd ratio. Yet rhe policies ofeconomic reform, especially in rural areas with privatizarion
of farms, have worked ar cross-purposes wirh family planning policies. Peasants who
work the land clearly see more children as a direct economic benefit (Tien et at. 1992).
Through the mass media, study classes, and small group discussions, reasons for
family planning are persistently explained to the people. Furthernore, health workers
make frequent home visis, during which pressure to adopt family planning measures
is privately exerted. There are indications that the younger generarion has been more
receptive to family planning than the older generation was, and that rhe urban population is more actively involved in family planning than the rural people. Local cadres
must work closely with women ofchildbearing age to determine who shall have a child
and when. Such intensive family planning programs, ofcourse, affect personal freedom
of action and fiequendy generate dissatisfaction. In the long run, however, a smaller
population is seen ro benefit rie entire nation.
a
are taught that there is no need to adhere to the old saying
COMPLIANCE AND COERCION
The idea ofa single child per family and the rigorous hmily planning introduced in the
late I 970s have been controversial and unpopular in China. Perhaps the mosr controversial aspect ofrhis are the coercive measures used to ensure compliance ofall Chinese. In
addition to the economic incentives and official pressures used to promote compliance,
POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES II7
cadres and health workers, especially in the early 1980s, carried out forced abortions and
sterilizationswhen family planning policieswereviolated. This created much resentment
and criticism ofthe policies and their implementation, criticism that sometimes came
(see for example, Aird 1990; Mosher 1983, 1993). Another unforrunate aspect ofthe policies was significant increases in the incidence of female infanticide, especially in rural areas where peasants wanted to ensure the birth ofa male heir.
li7hile there may have been some over-dramatization of the significance of this,
vital statistics on the sex ratios of China's populadon in many counties offer direct
from foreign sources
suggests that the practice of
female infanticide may have been more widespread than admined during the 1980s
(Li 1987). Other pernicious practices, such as forced abonion during the second or
even third trimester ofpregnancy, and forced sterilization ofwomen who have already
evidence
of inordinately large male populations, which
had three or more children, have offended mary foreigners, who are concerned by the
severityand rigor with which Chinahas gone about its family planning and birth control
program. Undoubtedly, freedom ofchoice has been denied to many ifnot mosr Chinese
hmilies, and some pain and suffering have been inflicted. \Thether or not these severe
and draconian policies and actions are justified by the magnitude ofChinat population
problem and its aspirations for future development are complex and dif,ficult questions
for policy makers and officials. Thoughtful appraisals of this contentious issue and the
related matter oFthe impact and significance ofrapid ferdliry decline may be rwiewed
in Tien (1987) and Riley (2004).
As Riley (2004) explains, although economic advance and feniliry decline have
been closely associated in the traditional economic development literature, recent state
policy in China of rigorous family plarning and birth control has trumped in part
the more conventional forces associated with economic growth. These forces include
improved literacy, more education, and higher urbanization. Nevertheless, it remains
clear that in China, fertility levels are higher in rural areas, while lower fertility is found
in association with higher socioeconomic status in the wealthier, more urbanized regions
rypical in the eastern provinces.
Perhaps the basic question is whether more Pain and suffering will result from too
population-one that may PerPetuate economic stagnation and persistent
poverty-than from the culrent rigorous and unpleasant policies that China hopes will
help push it more quickly to faster economic growth and a better standard ofliving for
huge a future
all its citizens.
Advances in Education and Literacy
China is a developing nation undergoing the throes of rapid but sometimes unequal
economic growth and change. The nation's large and growing population Pos€s a serious challenge to its hope of lifting itself out of the vicious cycle of underdwelopment. One cause as well as symptom ofunderdevelopment is that advanced educational
opportunities are available to only a small share ofthe population. This affecs directly
the qualityofthe population. China's ambitious plans for the development ofagriculture,
Chino's Geogrophy
Globalizalion and
the Dynomics of
Polilicol, Economic,
and Sociol Change
Gnnconv Vnpcr, Cr,rrroN'W. PeNNnr,L
CunrsropnenJ. SrrarrH, exo YouqIN HueNc
r I"''f
RO\TMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Laxbam . Boulder . Neu Yorh . Tblotto . Pbmouth, UK
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