The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
UniversityPressScholarshipOnline
OxfordScholarshipOnline
TheEvolutionaryInterpretationofTreaties
EirikBjorge
Printpublicationdate:2014
PrintISBN-13:9780198716143
PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2014
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716143.001.0001
TheMeansofInterpretationAdmissiblefortheEstablishmentoftheIntention
oftheParties
EirikBjorge
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716143.003.0003
AbstractandKeywords
Chapter3takesissuewiththeperceivedwisdomthattheapproachtotreaty
interpretationoptedforintheViennaConventionhasbeenthatthegeneralruleof
interpretationputpaidtothenotionofthe‘intentionoftheparties’.Instead,theChapter
arguesthatthesearchforthatintention,objectivelydefined,istheveryaimofthe
processoftreatyinterpretation.Indoingso,theChapteradoptstheviewaccordingto
whichthe‘intentionoftheparties’referstothewillofthepartiesasdeterminedthrough
theapplicationofthevariousmeansofinterpretationrecognizedinArticles31–33ofthe
ViennaConvention.Throughananalysisofhowthemeansofinterpretationacttogetherin
theestablishmentoftheintentionoftheparties,theChaptershowsthattheevolutionary
interpretationoftreatiesisinnowaydifferentfromothertypesofinterpretation.
Keywords:consent,goodfaith,meansofinterpretation,ruleofinterpretation,Articles31–33VCLT,
intentionofparties
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
‘Ifwewantthingstostayastheyare,thingswillhavetochange.’
—GiuseppeTomasidiLampedusa,TheLeopard
(ArchibaldColquhountr,RandomHouse,1960),26
3.1Introduction
Atreatyrepresentsconsenttobebound.Itistheintentiontoenterintolegalrelations
byagreementthatgivesatreatyitslegalforce.1 Thismayseemaself-evidenttruthbutit
isusefultobeginbymakingthisclear.Infactoneoftheexpressionsthatappearsthe
mostintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT)isthedescriptionofatreaty
asa‘consenttobebound’.2TheViennaConventiontakesaclassicalapproachinthe
sensethatitsapproachisfoundedontheprincipleofstatesovereignty,withstate
consentbeingtheexpressionofthatsovereignty.Astateisboundonlytothattowhichit
hasexpressedintentiontobinditself.3
Aswillbeseen,thischapterarguesthattheverytaprootoftreatyinterpretationisthe
objectiveestablishmentoftheintentionsoftheparties.Thisiscloselyboundupwiththe
wholenatureofwhatisatreatyobligation.ThePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice
gaveexpressiontothis(obviousbutnonethelessimportant)insightwhenitheld,inFree
ZonesofUpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGex,thatnoobligationsensuingfromatreaty
instrumentcanbindastatewithoutthestate’sconsent.4Similarly,in(p.57) Daimlerv
Argentina5theTribunaltookasapointofdeparturethatallinternationaltreaties—
whetherbilateral,plurilateral,ormultilateral—areessentiallyexpressionsofthe
contractingstates’consenttobeboundbyparticularlegalnorms:‘Consentistherefore
thecornerstoneofallinternationaltreatycommitments’.6
Thisconsentbeingtheconceptualpointofdepartureinthelawoftreaties,itisno
surprisethattreatyinterpretationhasasitsmainobjectivetoestablishtheextentofthat
consentinrelationtoasetoffacts.Itwillthusbearguedherethatitfollowsnaturally
fromthepre-eminenceininternationallawofstateconsentthattheobjectoftheexercise
oftreatyinterpretationistheestablishmentoftheintentionoftheparties.Aswillbeseen,
giventhatwhatisinissueisthecommonintentionoftheparties,7thatestablishment
needstorelyonobjectivefactors.Itisthusan‘objectivizedintention’thatissought.8
WhileChapter2focusedontheunityandcoherenceofthemethodoftreaty
interpretationappliedbyinternationalcourtsandtribunals,thischaptersetsoutinmore
detailwhatthatmethodis,andhowitrelatestotheevolutionaryinterpretationof
treaties.
ThereceivedwisdomabouttheapproachtotreatyinterpretationoptedforintheVCLT
hasbeenthatthegeneralruleofinterpretationputpaidtothenotionofthe‘intentionof
theparties’.9Itwillbearguedhere,however,thatsuchanunderstandingoftreaty
interpretationdoesnotsitcomfortablywiththeViennarulesnorwiththejurisprudence
oftheInternationalCourt,notleastincaseswheretheCourthasarrivedatwhatcould
betermedevolutionaryinterpretations.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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TheapproachwhichtheInternationalCourttakestotreatyinterpretationwas
foreshadowedbythejurisprudenceofthePermanentCourt,whichheldin
InterpretationoftheTreatyofLausannethataTribunalinterpretingaconventionclause
must:
inthefirstplace,endeavourtoascertainfromthewordingofthisclausewhatthe
intentionoftheContractingPartieswas;subsequently,itmayconsiderwhether—and,if
so,towhatextent—factorsotherthanthewordingoftheTreatymustbetakeninto
accountforthispurpose.10
(p.58)
Itisimportanttoremember,however,thattherulesoftreatyinterpertationare‘asingle
setofrulesofinterpretation’; 11 theyareinprincipletobeapplied‘simultaneously’.12
ThisapproachhasaptlybeensummarizedbyformerPresidentoftheInternational
Court,GilbertGuillaume:
TheICJ’smaincanonofinterpretationfocusesontheparties’intention.Itdecryptssuch
intentionsbyhavingrecoursetothemethodsandtoolsenumeratedintheVienna
Convention,mostnotablyinArticles31and32.Althoughsuchmethodspotentiallycover
abroadrangeoflegalreferences,theICJrefersfirsttotheactualtermsofthetreaty,
butalwaysconsidersthemintheircontextandinthelightoftheobjectandpurposeof
thetreaty.13
Thus,inNamibia,theInternationalCourtreferredto‘theprimarynecessityof
interpretinganinstrumentinaccordancewiththeintentionsoftheparties’,14andused
thisasabasisonwhichtomakeitsevolutionaryinterpretationofthetreatytermsat
issue.ThesamewasthecaseinAegeanSea,15Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros,16Navigational
Rights,17andPulpMills,18theInternationalCourtarrivingatanevolutionary
interpretationoftheinstrumentatissuespecificallybystressingtheimportance,within
thelawoftreaties,oftheintentionsoftheparties.Asisclearfromthisselectionofcases
(rangingfromthetraité-contratinNavigationalRightstothetraité-loiinNamibia),19this
approachistakenbytheCourtregardlessofthetypeoftreatytobeinterpreted.20
Itwillbearguedherethatthesearchfortheintentionoftheparties,objectivelydefined,
istheveryaimoftheprocesssetoutinArticles31–33oftheVCLT.The(p.59) Vienna
rules,inthewordsoftheInternationalLawCommission(ILC),codify‘themeansof
interpretationadmissibleforascertainingtheintentionoftheparties’.21 Thebestwayin
whichtoexplainevolutionaryinterpretationistorelyonthemosttraditionalofconcepts
inthelawoftreaties—theintentionoftheparties.
Therearegoodreasons,however,fortreatingassumptionsregardingtreaty
interpretationwithsomecare.Lowehaswarnedthat‘treatyinterpretationisanareain
whichthereturnsonabstracttheorizingarelow,anddiminishing’.22Onthisviewthe
rule‘interpretthetreatyasreasonablepartieswouldhaveinterpreteditiftheyhad
facedthequestionsnowbeforethecourt’23isasgoodadistillationasany.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
Perhapswearewrongthereforetomaketoomuchofthemethodologicalquestions
bearingupontreatyinterpretation?Inrespectoftheevolutionaryinterpretationof
treatieswecan,however,takeheartfromthefactthatthesingleissuewhichLowesees
aseludingoversimplificationisthesettlementof‘questionsthatthepartiescouldnothave
foreseen,suchasthequestionwhetherareferencetodisputesover“territory”inan
earlytwentieth-centurytreatyshouldbeinterpretedsoastoincludethecontinental
shelfofaState—alegalconceptthatdidnotcomeintoexistenceuntilthemiddleofthat
century’.24Aswillbeseen,inthisChapterandinChapter4,thisisverymuchthe
territoryoftheevolutionaryinterpretationoftreaties.
Yetanotherpossiblegroundforrestraint,however,isthatquestionsoftreaty
interpretationarenotoriouslydifficult.Whatisclearisthatsomequestionsof
interpretationseemsoelusiveastobebeyondresolution—henceMcNair’soft-quoted
assertionthat‘thereisnopartofthelawoftreatieswhichthetextwriterapproacheswith
moretrepidationthanthequestionofinterpretation’.25Butweshouldnotbedeterred,if
fornootherreasonthanthatdifficultquestions,too,needananswer.Ratherweshould,
inthemodeofBeckett’sWorstwardHo,‘TryAgain.Failagain.Failbetter’.26
Inthatspirititisappropriatetobeginbydefiningtheterms.Inthisbook,thewords
‘evolutionaryinterpretation’aretakentomeansituationsinwhichaninternationalcourt
orTribunalconcludesthatatreatytermiscapableofevolving,thatitisnotfixedonce
andforall,sothatallowanceismadefor,amongotherthings,developmentsin
internationallaw.Thisis,inotherwords,asituationwhereaccountistakenofthemeaning
acquiredbythetreatytermswhenthetreatyisapplied.27
Somewritershavetakenanarrow,andverynearlysubjective,approachtotheconcept.
Classically,Basdevant’sDictionnairedeleterminologiedudroitinternationaldefined
‘intention’as‘cequel’auteuroulesauteursd’unacteonteuréellementenvuede
convenir,defaire,d’obteniroud’éviter,quecelasoitrévélépar(p.60) l’actelui-même
oupard’autreséléments’.28Salmon’smorerecentDictionnairededroitinternational
publicdefinesintentionas‘penséeouensembledespenséesquiontinspirélesparties’,
‘notammentlebutqu’ellessesontproposédepoursuivre’.29Onthisapproach,the
intentionofthepartiesisnotjustathoughtsharedbythem;itcanbeasetofthoughts
thatinspiredthemintheirconclusionofthetreaty.Asisclearfromthelastelement
pointedtobythedefinitiongiveninSalmon’sDictionnairededroitinternationalpublic,it
isnotunreasonabletoconceiveofthissetofthoughtsinspiringthetreatypartiesasan
objectwhichtheyhaveproposedtoseektoattainbyconcludingtheconvention.
Onethingisclearfrominternationaljurisprudence,however,andthatisthatwhatweare
talkingaboutisnotanintentionheldbyoneofthepartiesonly.Atreatywillbydefinition
involvetheconsentofmorethanjustonestate.Inissue,therefore,istheobjective
etablishmentofthecommonintentionoftheparties.JudgeSchwebelmadethispointin
MaritimeDelimitationandTerritorialQuestions:
‘Theintentionoftheparties’,inlaw,referstothecommonintentionofbothparties.It
doesnotrefertothesingularintentionofeachpartywhichisunsharedbytheother.To
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
speakof‘the’intentionof‘theparties’asmeaningdiverseintentionsofeachpartywould
beoxymoronic.30
TheILChastakenthesamelineinitsworkonthelawoftreaties.Theintentiontobe
establishedis‘notaseparatelyidentifiableoriginalwill,andthetravauxpréparatoiresare
nottheprimarybasisfordeterminingthepresumedintentionoftheparties’; 31 the
travauxpréparatoiresaresimplyevidencetobeweighedagainstanyotherrelevant
evidenceoftheintentionsoftheparties,and‘theircogencydependsontheextentto
whichtheyfurnishproofofthecommonunderstandingofthepartiesastothemeaning
attachedtothetermsofthetreaty’.32
Whatiscentraltherefore,astheInternationalCourtputitinaslightlydifferentcontext,is
a‘meetingofminds’.33Itcouldreasonablybeaskedhowonegoesaboutestablishingthis
meetingofminds.Inprincipleonemayascertainthemeetingofmindswhichmakesupthe
commonintentionoftheparties,ortheircommonwill,34byanalysingallthedifferent
interpretivefactorswhich,accordingtothe(p.61) establishedmethodofinterpretation,
thetreatyinterpretermaytakeintoaccount.TheInternationalCourtstatedin
NavigationalRightsthatatreatyprovisionmustbeinterpreted‘inaccordancewiththe
intentionsofitsauthorsasreflectedbythetextofthetreatyandtheotherrelevant
factorsintermsofinterpretation’.35Thesearethefactorssetoutbythegeneralruleof
interpretation,ascodifiedinArticle31oftheVCLT.
TheTribunalinPalenamadetheimportantpointthattheintentionofthepartiesmay
certainlybefoundoutsidethetreatytext.Inadiscussionofthedifferencebetween
interpretationofjudgmentsandoftreatiesitobserved,withrespecttothelatter,thatin
establishingthecommonwilloftheparties:‘itmaybehelpfultoseekevidenceofthat
commonwilleitherinpreparatorydocumentsoreveninsubsequentactionsofthe
Parties’.36Thustreatyinterpretation,accordingtothepracticeofinternationalcourts
andtribunals,is‘alogicaloperationthatseekstoestablishwiththemaximumpossible
certaintywhatthecommonintentionofthePartieswas’.37
Thisbegsoneimportantquestion,whichwillnonethelesshelpusinarrivingataworking
definitionof‘theintentionsoftheparties’:onwhatlevelofabstractionarethepartiesto
beunderstoodtohavewantedtobindthemselvesinrelationtolaterquestionsoffact
thataretobesubsumedunderthetreaty?
Dworkin,inthecontextofstatutoryandconstitutionalinterpretationintheUnitedStates,
saysabouttheintentionofCongressoroftheframersoftheUSConstitutionthatwe
mustdistinguishbetween‘differentlevelsofabstractionatwhichwemightdescribethat
intention’.38Hedrawsuptheexampleofacongressmanwhovotesforanamendment
requiring‘equalprotection’becausehebelievesthatgovernmentoughttotreatpeople
asequals,andthatthismustmeantreatingthemdifferentlywithrespecttotheir
fundamentalinterests.Thecongressmanbelievesthattheclauseforwhichheisvoting
wouldbeviolatedbycriminal(p.62) lawsprovidingdifferentpenaltiesforblackand
whitesguiltyofthesamecrime,ashebelievesthatliabilitytopunishmenttouchesa
fundamentalinterest.Healsobelieves,however,thatseparateandunequalpublic
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
schoolswouldnotviolatetheclause,ashedoesnotconsidereducationtobea
fundamentalinterest.Dworkinheredistinguishesanabstractandconcreteformulationof
thecongressman’sintention.Undertheabstractformulationtheintentionisthat
whateverisinfactafundamentalinterestmustbeprotected,sothatifacourtisitself
convincedthateducationis(orhasbecome)afundamentalinterestthenthatcourtmust
believeitisservinghisintentionbyoutlawingsegregation.Undertheconcrete
formulation,however,hisintentionistoprotectwhathehimselfunderstandstobea
fundamentalinterest,andacourtthatabolishessegregationopposesratherthanserves
hisintention.Itwouldrarelybethecase,however,thatacongressmanortreatyparty
hasonlyoneofthesetwotypesofintentionwhenheenactslegislationordraftsatreaty.
Bothstatementsabouthisorherintentionmaybetrue,thoughatdifferentlevelsof
abstraction,sothatthequestionisnotwhichstatementishistoricallyaccuratebutwhich
statementtouseinconstructingaconceptionofintention.39
LetsashasappliedthisDworkiniandistinctiontotreatyinterpretation.Inthecontextof
interpretationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)40Letsashas
arguedthatthedraftersoftheEuropeanConventionin1950hadanabstractintentionto
promoteandsafeguardhumanrightsinEuropeandthattheyalsohadamoreconcrete
intentionaboutwhichsituationssuchhumanrightsoughttocover.Whichintention,he
asks,isthemoreimportant:theirintentiontoprotectalistoffundamentalfreedomsof
theircitizens,whateverthesemaybe(whatheterms‘intentionsofprinciple’),ortheir
intentiontoprotectwhatthey,in1950,believedthesefreedomstobe(whatheterms
‘intentionsofdetail’)?Letsasrepliesthatitispossiblethatthedraftersfeltmorestrongly
abouttheirabstractintentiontoprotectthefundamentalmoralrightsthatpeopleare
indeedentitledtoratherthantheirconcreteintentiontoprotectthoserightstowhich
they,in1950,believedindividualsaremorallyentitled.Inthisregardthequestionisnot
whetherstates’(ordrafters’)intentionsarerelevantbutwhichoftheirintentionswe
oughttoaccordimportanceto.41 ThisbookfollowsDworkinandLetsasinassumingthat
abstractintentionsmustbemoreimportantthanconcreteones,andthatintentionsof
principleoughttotrumpintentionsofdetail.ThisseemstofitwellwiththatwhichJudge
HigginssaidinKasikili/Sedudu,wheresheheldthattheobjectoftreatyinterpretation‘is
nottodiscoveramythical“ordinarymeaning”within(p.63) theTreaty’;ratherthe
objectofthisexerciseis‘togivefleshtotheintentionoftheparties’,‘todecidewhat
generalideathepartieshadinmind,andthenmakerealityofthatgeneralidea’.42
Thus,ifwewanttobetruetowhatinternationalcourtsandtribunalsdo,onepossible
wayinwhichtodefine‘theintentionoftheparties’isthefollowingfunctionaldefinition:
theintentionofthepartiescouldbedefinedastheresultwhichonereachesifthegeneral
ruleofinterpretationisappliedcorrectly.This,ofcourse,comesclosetobeingapetitio
principii,thatis,itassumesthatwhichhastobeexplained.
Whilstonemaycriticizethiscirculardefinition,itshouldnonethelessberetained,ifforno
otherreasonthanthatitisalsothebestdefinitionwhichtheILChasbeenableto
produce.Theconceptsoftheintentionoftheparties,accordingtotheILC,‘referstothe
intentionofthepartiesasdeterminedthroughtheapplicationofthevariousmeansof
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
interpretationwhicharerecognizedinarticles31and32’; 43it‘isthusnotaseparately
identifiableoriginalwill,andthetravauxpréparatoiresarenottheprimarybasisfor
determiningthepresumedintentionoftheparties’.44‘Intention’isthusaconstructtobe
derivedfromthearticulationofthe‘meansofinterpretationadmissible’45intheprocess
ofinterpretation—andnotaseparatelyidentifiablefactor.Thisobjectiveapproachis
probably,toappropriateChurchill’squipaboutdemocracy,46theworstone,exceptall
thoseothersthathavebeenproffered.
ThisChapternowturns,first,togoodfaithanditsrelationtoevolutionaryinterpretation;
secondly,itsetsouttheestablishmentofthecommonintentionsofthepartiesandthe
meaningofthatforevolutionaryinterpretation.
3.2EvolutionaryInterpretationandGoodFaith
Itisdifficulttooverstatetheimportanceofgoodfaithintreatyinterpretationgenerally;
thisisnolesssowithrespecttoevolutionaryinterpretation.Thepossiblestylesof
interpretationtowhichArticle31givesrisearealldirectlylinkedtooneessentialrule:
theruleofinterpretationingoodfaith.Itmaybethatinformulatingthegeneralruleof
interpretationArticle31engagestosomeextentinover-simplification,astheprovisionis
capableofgivingrisetoanumberofdifferent(p.64) stylesofinterpretation.
Nonetheless,itisclearthatthepossiblestylesofinterpretationtowhichArticle31gives
risearealldirectlylinkedtooneessentialrule:theruleofinterpretationingoodfaith.47
Goodfaithisattheoriginsofthediversemeansofinterpretation,anditisasafunctionof
thisfundamentalrulethatthechoiceofhowtoweightheinterpretivefactorsmustbe
made.48
Theevolutionoftreatyconcepts—andthelimitswithinwhichtermsmayproperlybe
impliedinatreatyasnecessarilyinherentintheinstrument—istobeconsideredas
coveredbytherequirementofinterpretationingoodfaith.ThusWaldocksaidofthe
evolutionoftreatyconcepts,andthelimitswithinwhichtermsmayproperlybeimpliedin
atreatyasnecessarilyinherentinit,that‘boththesepointsaretobeconsideredas
coveredbytherequirementofinterpretation“ingoodfaith”’.49Withregardtoboth
thesepoints,somuchdependsontheparticularcontextandontheintentionsofthe
partiesintheparticulartreatythatitwouldbedifficulttolaydownanyspecificrules.
Thesequestionscanberesolvedonlythroughthenormalinterpretationofthetermsof
thetreatyingoodfaithinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose.50
TheInternationalLawCommissionconsideredthatthe‘correctapplicationofthe
temporalelementwouldnormallybeindicatedbyinterpretationofthetermingood
faith’.51 Theviewwillbetakenheretoothatevolutionaryinterpretationmustbeseenas
beingcloselylinkedtotheprincipleofgoodfaith:evolutionaryinterpretationmaybe
requiredbygoodfaith.52Thisisapotentiallyimportantpoint,asthelimitsto
interpretationdrawnbytheordinarymeaningofthewordsinterpretedingoodfaithis
oftenreliedonasanargumentagainstevolutionaryinterpretation.Theviewtakenhere
thereforestandsthatperspectiveonitsheadbyshowingthepotentialthatliesingood
faithasafactorleadingtoevolutionaryinterpretation.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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Animportantfacetofthisistherelationshipbetweengoodfaithandlegitimate
expectations,andwhatthisentailsforevolutionaryinterpretation.Evolutionary
interpretationmaybeexplainedthroughtheprincipleofgoodfaithbecauseofthe
legitimateexpectationsengenderedbythepromiseswhichthepartiesmadeinthetreaty.
Inthissensewecansafelytakeasapplyingtotreatyobligationsingeneralthatwhichthe
InternationalCourtheldinamorespecificcontext(aboutprovisionsofso-calledhost
agreementsbetweeninternationalorganizationsandhoststates)inWHORegional
Office:‘Clearly,theseprovisions’,saidtheCourt,‘arebasedonanobligationtoactin
goodfaithandhavereasonableregardtotheinterestsoftheotherpartytothetreaty’.53
(p.65)
Theprinciplemakesitsinfluencefeltinallareasofinternationallaw.TheCharterofthe
UnitedNations54provides,inArticle2(2),thatallmembers,inordertoensuretoallof
themtherightsandbenefitsresultingfrommembership,‘shallfulfilingoodfaiththe
obligationsassumedbytheminaccordancewiththepresentCharter’.TheDeclarationon
PrinciplesonInternationalLawConcerningFriendlyRelationsandCo-operationAmong
SatesinAccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations55goesfurther,adopting‘the
principlethatStatesshallfulfillingoodfaiththeobligationsassumedbythemin
accordancewiththeCharter’,not,itwillbeseen,‘under’theCharterbut‘inaccordance
withtheCharter’.56Itplaysanimportantrole,too,instatecontracts; 57‘foreign
investmentagreementsfreelyenteredintoby,orbetween,sovereignStatesshallbe
observedingoodfaith’.58
Goodfaithinthiswayactsasaguarantorofexpectationslegitimatelyheldbytheparties
tothetreaty;treatiesmustthusbeinterpretedinconformitywithloyaltyandreciprocal
confidence.59Itis,aswillbeseeninmoredetaillaterinthischapter,obviousthatattimes
itwouldbecontrarytogoodfaithtofrustratethelegitimateexpectationscreatedby
treatyobligations,andthisapplieswithnolessforcetoevolutionaryinterpretationtoo.
Thus,inLoizidou(PreliminaryObjections),Turkeyhadarguedthatgoodfaithrequireda
contemporaneous,asopposedtoanevolutionary,interpretation.TheEuropeanCourt
rejectedthis,however,holdinginsteadthattheelementsofthegeneralruleof
interpretation,ofwhichgoodfaithisone,requiredintheeventanevolutionary
interpretation.60
Itis,astheTribunalheldintheNorthAtlanticFisheriescase,aprincipleofinternational
law‘thattreatyobligationsaretobeexecutedinperfectgoodfaith’.61 Inthesamevein,
theInternationalCourtsaidinNuclearTeststhat:‘Oneofthebasicprinciplesgoverning
thecreationandperformanceoflegalobligations,whatevertheirsource,(p.66) isthe
principleofgoodfaith.’62ThishaslaterbeenaffirmedanddevelopedbytheInternational
Court.InPulpMillsitheldthat:
accordingtocustomaryinternationallaw,asreflectedinArticle26ofthe1969Vienna
ConventionontheLawofTreaties,‘[e]​v erytreatyinforceisbindinguponthepartiesto
itandmustbeperformedbythemingoodfaith’.Thatappliestoallobligationsestablished
byatreaty,includingproceduralobligationswhichareessentialtoco-operationbetween
States.63
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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Obviouslythereisaconnectionbetweentheobligationuponstates,ontheonehand,to
createandperformtheirlegalobligationsand,ontheotherhand,tointerpretthesame
legalobligations,ascreation,interpretation,andperformancearecloselyinterlinked.Just
asinterpretationdependsuponcreation,performancedependsuponinterpretation.
ThevaluablepointhasbeenmadethatifonethinksthattheInternationalCourtseems
hesitanttodiscusstherequirementofgoodfaithstatedattheoutsetofArticle31,this
hasasimpleexplanation:thatwhichmaybeinquestionisthegoodfaithoftheparties;an
interpretationbytheInternationalCourtinwhichtheCourtitselfshouldbeanimatedby
somethingotherthangoodfaithisnottobethoughtof.64Furthermore,ifthe
InternationalCourtshouldbethoughttobehesitanttorejectaninterpretationadvanced
byapartyonthesolegroundthatitwasnotmadeingoodfaith,thatcouldconceivably
bebecausesuchaninterpretationwouldinmostcasesalsooffendagainstsomespecific
canonofinterpretation,andtheCourtwillbeslowtoaccuseastateinitsjudgmentofbad
faith.65
Thepropositionthattreatiesaretobeinterpretedingoodfaithhasreceiveduniversal
acceptanceinlegaldoctrine.66ThusMcNair,forexample,saidthat‘theperformanceof
treatiesissubjecttoanoverridingobligationofmutualgoodfaith’; 67Reuterreferredto
theobligationofgoodfaithasfundamentalininternationallegalcommerceandinthe
executionofallobligationsofinternationallaw.68Othershaveseenthenotionofgoodfaith
asunderpinningalltherulesontreatyinterpretation,eventotheextentthatonemaysay
thatgoodfaithdominatesthewholeinterpretiveprocess.69
Theimportofthisinthelawoftreatieshascertainlynotbeenlostoninternationalcourts
andtribunals.JudgeSchwebel,inhisdissentingopinioninMaritimeDelimitationand
TerritorialQuestions(QatarvBahrain),referredtothegoodfaith(p.67) provisionin
thegeneralruleoninterpretationinArticle31(1)as‘thecardinalinjunctionoftheVienna
Convention’sruleofinterpretation’.70TheTribunalintheRhineChloridesarbitration
pointedto‘thefundamentalroleofgoodfaithandhowitdominatestheinterpretationand
applicationoftheentirebodyofinternationallaw’.71
Lauterpachtarguedthattherulethattreatiesaretobeinterpretedinaccordancewith
goodfaithwasperhapstheonlyuncontestedruleofinterpretation,72andthatmostofthe
currentrulesofinterpretation,whetherinrelationtocontractsortreaties,arenomore
thantheelaborationofthefundamentalthemethatcontractsmustbeinterpretedingood
faith.73Theprincipleaccordingtowhichinterpretationmustbedoneingoodfaithflows
directlyfromtheprincipleofpactasuntservanda;thereforetheprocessofexaminingthe
relevantmaterialsandassessingthemmustbedoneingoodfaith.74This,inthepresent
context,underlinestheimportanceweoughttoaccordintheinterpretationoftreatiesto
strictadherencetogoodfaith.
3.2.1Goodfaithasthecardinalruleoftreatyinterpretation
TheprideofplacegiventogoodfaithspecificallyinArticle31isnocoincidence.Aswas
seenabove,theprincipleofgoodfaithdominatesandunderliesthewholeofthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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interpretiveprocess;goodfaithisthemostimportantelementthatgoesintothecrucible
oftreatyinterpretation.ThepossiblediversestylesofinterpretationtowhichArticle31
givesrisearethus,asstatedabove,alldirectlylinkedtooneessentialrule:thatof
interpretationingoodfaith.Inthatsensemostcurrentrulesofinterpretationareno
morethantheelaborationofthefundamentalthemethatcontractsmustbeinterpreted
ingoodfaith.75
ThepointissometimesmadethatalthoughatfirstsighttheenumerationinArticle31of
thefactorstobetakenintoaccountmayseemtocreateahierarchyoflegalnorms,thatis
notso:thefactorsrepresentalogicalprogression,nothingmore.Whileithasbeen
claimedintheliteraturethattheprincipleofgoodfaithhasnot,whenitcomestotreaty
interpretation,playedanimportantroleinthejurisprudenceofinternationaltribunals,76
theprincipleofgoodfaithhasinfact,andaswe(p.68) havealreadyseen,beenatthe
foreinthejurisprudenceofinternationaltribunals.Ifthisbodyofjurisprudenceshows
onething,itisthatintreatyinterpretationthestandardofgoodfaithisapermanent
gravitationpointwhichdrawstheinterpretationoftreatytextsinthedirectionofthe
objectofthetreatyaswellasthespiritbywhichthetreatyisunderlain.77
Theprincipleofgoodfaithfurthermoreimposesontheinternationaljudgeanobligationto
adjudicatereasonably.78Thedemandsofgoodfaitharethusincompatiblewithformalism,
thatis,asystemwherebyformprevailsoversubstance.79Goodfaith,byitsnature,
abhorssuchunreasonableness.
Rivieralreadyinthenineteenthcenturystressedthispoint:‘Labonnefoidominanttoute
cettematière,lestraitésdoiventêtreinterprétésnonpasexclusivementselonleur
lettre,maisselonleuresprit’.80TheInternationalCourtheldinBarcelonaTractionthatin
allfieldsofinternationallaw‘itisnecessarythatthelawbeappliedreasonably’.81 Inthe
sameveinJudgesLauterpacht,WellingtonKoo,andSpenderinAerialIncidentof27July
1955heldthat:
Itisconsistentwithenlightenedpracticeandprincipletoapplythetestofreasonableness
totheinternationalinstruments—atestwhichfollowsfromtheeverpresentdutyof
Statestoactingoodfaith.However,thetestofreasonablenessmustitselfbeappliedina
reasonableway;itmustnotbeappliedbyreferencetocontingencieswhicharein
themselvesofamanifestlyexaggeratedcharacter;itmustnotbeappliedbyreferenceto
examplesborderingonabsurdity.82
Althoughgoodfaithforbidsunreasonableinterpretations,andinterdictsarrivingat
absurdconstructions,theexigenciesofgoodfaithdonot,however,demandthatthe
judgeadjudicateaccordingtoequity.83Asweshallsee,thispointissometimessomewhat
exaggerated,inawaythatmayendupgivingtogoodfaithasmallerambitthanwhat
oughttofollowfromthesourcesofinternationallaw.
ThiswasdevelopedinaninterestingwaybyJudgeadhocTorrezBernandezinLand,
IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute,wherehemadethepointthatwhenonebeginsto
interpretatreatyonemuststart‘asprovidedforintheViennaConvention,thatistosay
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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fromthe“ordinarymeaning”ofthetermsusedintheprovision’.Hewentontosaythat
thiscould,however,nothappeninisolation:(p.69)
Fortreatyinterpretationrulesthereisno‘ordinarymeaning’intheabstract.Thatiswhy
Article31oftheViennaConventionrefersto‘goodfaith’...Itis,thereforeafullyqualified
‘ordinarymeaning’.84
Thisapproachmustbecorrect,85anditshowshowinfactaccordingtothegeneralrule
ofinterpretation,ifoneinsistsonthedifferentfactorsmentionedinArticle31(1)being
sequenced,goodfaithmustcomefirst,metaphoricallyaswellasliterally.Thetextisnot
capableofhavingameaningdivorcedfromthedemandsofgoodfaith.
ThiswasmadeexplicitinRhineChlorides,wheretheTribunalcommentedontheoftquoteddictumfromtheInternationalCourt’sjudgmentinTerritorialDisputethat
‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’.86TheTribunalsaidin
thisregardthat:
IntheTerritorialDispute(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Chad)case,theCourtstatedthat
‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’.Inthisregard,the
Tribunalemphasisesthatthetextofthetreatyisanotiondistinctfrom,andbroaderthan,
thenotionof‘terms’.Relyingonthetextdoesnotmeanrelyingsolely,ormainly,onthe
ordinarymeaningoftheterms.Suchasolutionwouldeffectivelyignorethereferencesto
goodfaith,thecontext,andtheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.Theordinarymeaningof
thetermsisevenitselfdeterminedasafunctionofthecontext,objectandpurposeofthe
treaty.Lastly,asparagraph2ofArticle31oftheViennaConventionprovides,thetextof
thetreaty(includingthepreambleandannexes)isitselfpartofthecontextforthe
purposesofinterpretation.87
Bypointingoutthatthe‘text’ofthetreatyisdistinctfromandbroaderthanthenotionof
the‘terms’ofthetreaty,andthatbasingoneselfonthetextdoesnotmeantobase
oneselfonlyontheordinarymeaningoftheterms,theTribunalunderscoredthepoint
thatthetreatyinterpreterisinnowaylookingforanisolatedmeaningofthetreatyterms.
Suchanapproachwouldindeedbecontrarytotheprincipleofgoodfaithasitwouldgive
pre-eminencetoformoversubstance.
Thisaspectoftheprincipleofgoodfaithhasalongpedigree.Itwasgivenavividformin
the1926CayugaIndianscase,wherethearbitratorreferredtotheprincipleofgood
faithas‘theelementaryprincipleofjusticethatrequiresustolookatthesubstanceand
notstickinthebarkoflegalform’.88TheChapternowturnstotherelationshipbetween
goodfaithandintent.
3.2.2Goodfaithimpelsassumptionofacommonintentionoftheparties
Itisplainthat,asLowehasputit,‘ininternationallawliteralinterpretationsand
applicationsoflegalinstrumentsmustnotbeallowedtodefeattheevident(p.70)
intentionsofthosewhomadethem’.89Thiscoreinjunctionofinternationallawhasbeen
interpretedasmeaningthatgoodfaithincitestheinterpretertosearchforthecommon
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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intentionoftheparties.TheTribunalinDivertedCargoesthusdeterminedthat‘the
principleofgoodfaith,whichgovernsboththeinterpretationandtheexecutionof
treaties,leadstothesearchforthecommonintentionoftheparties’.90
ThiswasrenderedbyLauterpachtasmeaningthat‘theprincipleofgoodfaithimpelsthe
assumptionofacommonpurpose’;‘goodfaithandconsiderationofthegeneralpurpose
ofthetreatymaylegitimatelyprovideasubstituteforanylackofcommonintention’.91 It
isclearfromLauterpacht’schoiceofwordsthatthatintention,bynecessity,wouldhave
tobeanobjecticizedintention.
Whenatreatyinterpreterisfacedwithatreatyinrelationtowhichitisimpossibleto
establishtheintentionoftheparties,goodfaithrequirestheinterpretertoactaccording
towhatonewouldimaginethecommonintentiontohavebeen.
ThistypeofapproachhasbeencriticizedbyKolb,asthisinhisviewwouldmeannot
interpretingbutinfactrevisingthetreaty.92Thiscriticismhasbeenunderpinnedby
referencetothetraditionalreticenceoftheInternationalCourtanditspredecessorto
revisetreaties.93Suchcriticismsarelinked,aswillbeseenbelow,totheambitwhichone
iswillingtogivetotheprincipleofgoodfaith.
Itispertinentheretoaddressthiscriticisminsomedetail.Whileitisofcoursetruethat
internationaltribunalsexercisegreatreticencewhenitcomestorevisingtreaties,94and
nodoubtrightlyso,itisdifficulttoseethejustificationofthiscriticismofgoodfaith
appliedinthesearchforacommonintentionofparties.
First,itisnotclearthattheapproachsuggestedabove(thattheprincipleofgoodfaith
impelstheassumptionofacommonpurpose)wouldamounttotreatyrevision.If,asthis
bookargues,treatyinterpretationisconcernedfirstandforemosttoestablish,
objectively,thatwhichthepartiesactuallyintended,ortheircommonwill,95thenthe
approachsuggested,onthebasisofgoodfaith,seemstheonlypossibleoption.Indeed,
themattercouldbeturnedonitshead:strayingawayfromthatwhichmustbetakento
havebeentheintentionofthepartieswouldbetheoptionthemostresemblingrevision
ofthetreaty.Tostatethisisinrealitytostatelittlemorethan(p.71) whatwassaid
above:thatgoodfaithrequiresonetolooknotsomuchattheletterofthetreatyasto
thetreaty’sspirit,whichofcourseisnothingifnotunderlainbytheintentionofthe
parties.
Secondly,andfollowingfromthefirstpoint,ifitisnotacceptedthatthis(iethebroader
approachtakenbyinternationalcourtsandtribunalstogoodfaith)oughttobeseenas
treatyrevision,thenthereislittlethatsuggeststhatthepracticeoftheInternational
Courtanditspredecessorhavebeenreticentinthisregard,asthecasesmentionedby
Kolballbearontheimpossibilityoftreatyrevisioningeneralandnotspecificallyin
relationtothepointofhowgoodfaithimpelstheassumptionofacommonpurposewhere
noneseemstobefound.
Theprincipleofgoodfaith,takentogetherwithatreaty’sobjectandpurpose,mayina
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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legitimatewayprovideasubstituteforwhatseemstobealackofcommonintention.
Whentheprincipleofgoodfaithimpelstheassumptionofacommonpurpose,itreliesalso
onthefactthattheintentionofthepartiesistobepresumednottobeinbreachofother
internationallaw;toassumeanythingelse(withoutanyclearindicationstothecontrary)
wouldbeabreachofgoodfaith.
3.2.3‘Ifwewantthingstostayastheyare,thingswillhavetochange’
Thishasasidetoarelatedpoint,namely,theconservatismthatisinherentingoodfaith
andthegoodfaithrequirementofprotectinglegitimateexpectations.AstheTribunalin
RannofKutchobservedinconnectionwithgoodfaithandthestabilityrequiredin
interstatecommerce:‘Internationalpublicpolicyrequiresthatthereshouldbestability
andgoodfaithbetweennations.’96Thepropositioncouldjustaswellhavebeenputthe
otherwayaround:goodfaithrequires,ininternationallaw,theretobestability,inthe
senseofprotectionagainstthefrustrationoflegitimateexpectations.
Thus,inAffairerelativeàl’interprétationdutraitédecommerceconcluentrel’Italieetla
Suissele13juillet1904,97theTribunaldecidedthewholetreatydisputeonthebasisof
thegoodfaithrequirementofprotectinglegitimateexpectations:AsItalyatnopointhad
remonstratedwiththatwhichSwitzerlandunderstoodtobethecommonunderstanding
ofthetreatyterm‘vinnouveau’,alegitimateexpectationhadbeencreatedon
Switzerland’spartwhichcouldnotbefrustratedbyItaly,thelatterhavingthusbound
itselfbyitssubsequentpractice.98Itisonthisbackgroundnotdifficulttoseethe
frontierswhichtheprincipleofgoodfaithintreatyinterpretationshareswithteleology
andwitheffectiveness.(p.72)
Thenexusbetweenteleologyandeffectivenessontheonehandandgoodfaithonthe
otherwasclearlybroughtoutinthearbitralawardBaer.99Thiscasealsogoessomeway
inaddressingthepointdiscussedaboveaboutwhatthetreatyinterpreteristodointhe
primafacieabsenceofacommonintentionofthepartiesonaparticularquestion.
TheTribunalinBaerhadtodecidewhethertheclaimanthadbeentreatedasanenemy
underthelawsinforceinItalyduringWorldWarII.Italyclaimedthatthelawsofthe
ItalianSocialRepublic,BenitoMussolini’sRepublicofSalò,didnotcountas‘lawinforcein
Italyduringthewar’,theeffectsofwhichwasthattheclaimant,aJewishItaliannational
(latertobecomeaUSnational),whosefactoryhadbeenconfiscated,wasnotentitledto
receivecompensationforthewardamagessufferedbyhim.TheTribunaldidnotaccept
thisclaimbyItaly,whichitfoundtobeinbadfaith.
TheinterpretationproposedbyItalywouldhaveledtointroducingintothetreaty‘a
restrictionwhichisnottobefoundthereinandwhichwouldaltogetherchangethevery
textthereof’;thiswouldbreach,theTribunalcontinued,‘thefundamentalrulesofthe
LawofNationsontheartofinterpretinginternationaltreaties’.100Itwentontosaythata
teleologicalinterpretationwouldnotleadtoadifferentconclusion,asthepurposeofthe
treatyhadbeenthatofaccordingthebenefitsoftheTreatyofPeacetopersonswhose
property,rights,andinterestssustaineddamagesunderthelawsinforceinItalyduring
thewar.SeeingasthetreatydidnotindicatebywhichItalianpowertheselawswereto
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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havebeenenacted,‘thisgapmustbefilled’,theTribunalconcluded,‘inaccordancewith
goodfaithandinthelightoftheprinciplesofinternationallaw;theprinciplethatmustbe
appliedintheinstantcaseisthatofeffectiveness’.101 Aswillbeseen,thewayinwhichthe
TribunalinBaerfilledthisgapisverymuchinlinewiththepositiontakeninthisstudy:the
principleofgoodfaithimpels,togetherwiththebackgroundprinciplesofinternationallaw,
acommonintentionoftheparties.ItismoreovernocoincidencethattheTribunalalsoin
thisconnectionfoundsupportintheprincipleofeffectiveness.Goodfaithcomprisesthe
principleofeffectiveness.102
TherolegiveninBaertogoodfaithinterpretation,aswellastheeffectiveinterpretation
towhichthisled,hashoweverbeencriticized.Thiscriticismaddressesthedebate
enteredintoabove—theroleoftheprincipleofgoodfaithinfillingingapswherethereis
saidtobenocommonpurpose.ThusZollerhasarguedthattheroleplayedbygoodfaith
inBaerwentmuchfurtherthanmerelyaidinginsheddinglightontheintentionofthe
parties;goodfaithinsteadfilledagapwheretherewassaidtobenocommonintentionof
theparties.Seeingasgoodfaithhereplaysacreativerole,weare,onZoller’sreading,
reallydealingwithequityratherthangoodfaithinterpretation.Shethereforearguesthat
Baeroughttobeseenas(p.73) havingbeendecidedonaparticularsetoffacts,and
thatthecasecannotbeseenascontributingtothedevelopmentofgeneralrulesof
interpretation.103ThiscriticismoftheTribunal’sjudgmentinBaermaycomeacrossas
precipitate.
Whileitwillnotbeattemptedheretotheorizeonthebasisofthissinglejudgmentbythe
TribunaloftheItalian–UnitedStatesConciliationCommission,itshouldbepointedout
thatZoller’scriticismsseemillfoundedgivenboththegeneralimportancewhichthe
principleofgoodfaithenjoysininternationallawandtheparticularapplicationwhichwas
madeoftheprincipleinBaer.
Furthermore,thewordingofthetreatyprovisioninissuewasperfectlycapableof
accommodatingtheadoptedinterpretation;infactitwouldseemtobetogoagainstthe
wordingifsuchaninterpretationwerenottobeadopted.Itwasplainenoughthatthe
objectandpurposeoftheprovisiontobeinterpretedwastogiveeffectiveprotectionto
individuals,andthattheinterpretationwhichitseemsthatZollerisadvocatingwouldfail
todoso.ItistrueastheTribunalimplicitlysaid,thatnottoviewthelawsoftheSocial
ItalianRepublicas‘lawinforceinItalyduringthewar’,wouldineffectbetorevisethe
treaty,andthisofcoursetheTribunalwasnotcompetenttodo.Itmayseem
supererogatorytosayso,butitshouldbepointedoutthatitisnotonlywhenitcomesto
givingrightstoanindividual(tothedetrimentofthestate,sotospeak),thatatreaty
interpretermaynotrevisethetreatybeforethem;bythesametokenthesameapplies
whenastate,inbadfaithaswasthecaseinBaer,askstheinterpretertorevisethe
treatybygivinganinterpretationthat(tothedetrimentoftheindividual,sotospeak)
renderstherightsprotectionnugatory.104Thisshouldperhapsbeseeninrelationtoa
broaderpointmadebyZoller,namelythattheroleofgoodfaithhasbeenseentohave
whatshecallsaconservativefunction.Zollerhaspropoundedthethesisthatthe
demandsofgoodfaithmostusuallyleadsthetreatyinterpretertomaintainan
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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equilibriumbetweentheobligationsoftheparties.Thus,shemaintains,goodfaithhasa
conservativefunction,inthesensethatitstabilizeslegalsituations.105
Ontheonehand,itisobviouslytruethatthisisthefunctionofgoodfaith:asdiscussed
abovetheprincipleofgoodfaithprotectslegitimateexpectationsandinthatwayplainly
hasaconservativefunction.ByconservativeIheremeancautioustowardsoraverseto
change,aimingtopreservewhereitispossible.Heretooitseemsappropriatetoreferto
thatwhichtheTribunalsaidaboutgoodfaithinKutchofRann:(p.74)
Internationalpublicpolicyrequiresthatthereshouldbestabilityandgoodfaithbetween
nations.Itisnotgood,itisnotright,itisbadfaithwhenoneparty,havingactedinone
waythroughout,atsomelaterstagesays,‘ByerrororotherwiseIclaimtogobackupon
it’.106
Ontheotherhand,thepropositionthatgoodfaithhasaconservativefunctionmustnot
betakentomeanthatgoodfaithcounselsconservatisminthecrudestsenseofthat
concept.Forwhatis‘conservative’andwhatdoestheprotectionoflegitimatelyheld
expectationsmeanwhenitwasthecommonlyheldandgood-faithintentionoftheparties
tocontractinawaythatwasopentodevelopment?
Surelythenitwouldgoagainstgoodfaith,andalsogoagainstaconservativeapproach,
somehowtoconcludethatoneshouldnotincludeinthemeaningofthetreatyterm
changeswhichhaveoccurredsincethetreatywasconcluded.Insuchacaseitbecomes
clearthattoconserveistoallowforchange.ThewilyTancredi,indiLampedusa’sThe
Leopard,gaveexpressiontothecomplexrelationwhichexistsbetweenchangeand
conservation,whenhequippedthatitissometimesthecasethat:‘Ifwewantthingsto
stayastheyare,thingswillhavetochange’.107Thiscaptureswhathappenswhenthe
phenomenaofgoodfaithandevolutionaryinterpretationmeet.
3.2.4Good-faithconservatisminpractice
InthesamemodetheInternationalCourtinNavigationalRightssaidofinterpretationfor
thepurposesoftreatyinterpretationandcomplianceingoodfaiththat:
Itistruethatthetermsusedinatreatymustbeinterpretedinlightofwhatis
determinedtohavebeentheparties’commonintention,whichis,bydefinition,
contemporaneouswiththetreaty’sconclusion.Thatmayleadacourtseisedofadispute,
orthepartiesthemselves,whentheyseektodeterminethemeaningofatreatyfor
purposesofgood-faithcompliancewithit,toascertainthemeaningatermhadwhenthe
treatywasdrafted,sincedoingsocanshedlightontheparties’commonintention.108
Itwentontoholdthatthisdidnot,however,signifythat,whereatreatyterm’smeaning
isnolongerthesameasitwasatthedateofconclusion,noaccountshouldeverbetaken
ofitsmeaningatthetimewhenthetreatyistobeinterpretedforpurposesofapplying
it.109Goodfaith—orwhattheCourtcalledthedeterminationof‘themeaningofatreaty
forpurposesofgood-faithcompliancewithit’—maysteertheinterpretationawayfrom
whatcouldbetermedwrong-footedconservatism.Therighttypeofconservative
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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approach,theonetakenbytheInternationalCourtinNavigationalRights,is
conservativeinthesensethatitacknowledgesthatforthingstostayastheywere(inlight
ofwhatisdetermined,onthebasisofgoodfaith,tohavebeentheparties’common
intentionwhenthetreatywasconcluded),thingswillindeedhavetochange(theterm’s
meaningnolongerbeingthesameasitwas(p.75) atthetimeofconclusion,andaccount
must,inaccordancewiththeintentionsoftheparties,betakenofthis).
InmuchthesamewaytheprincipleofgoodfaithplayedaroleintheInternationalCourt’s
judgmentinNamibia,110whichledtheCourt’sinterpretationawayfromconservatismin
thesensethatitmadeanevolutionaryinterpretation.Itisimportanttonoteinrespectof
Namibiathatwhichwasseenabove,thatis,theprincipleofgoodfaithisenshrinedinthe
CharteroftheUnitedNationsas,111 accordingtoArticle2(2),allthemembersofthe
UnitedNations,‘inordertoensuretoallofthemtherightsandbenefitsresultingfrom
membership,shallfulfillingoodfaiththeobligationsassumedbytheminaccordancewith
thepresentCharter’.112
TheCourtinNamibiaunderlinedthatthemandatorypowershadboundthemselvesto
exercisetheirfunctionsofadministrationinconformitywith‘therelevantobligations
emanatingfromtheUnitedNationsCharter,whichmemberStateshaveundertakento
fulfilingoodfaithinalltheirinternationalrelations’.113Therecanbelittledoubtthatthe
Courtwasguidedbythedemandsofgoodfaithinreachingitsinterpretationofthe
Mandateagreement:questionsofinternationaltutelagehavealwayshadaparticularly
intimaterelationshipwiththedemandsoftheprincipleofgoodfaith.114Itisnotsurprising
thatthereshouldexistanaffinitybetweenfiduciarydutiesandbonafides;etymologically
therelationiscertainlyclearenough.ThusJudgeLauterpachtobservedinSouthWest
Africa—VotingProcedurethat‘aprincipleofgoodfaithisparticularlyappropriatein
relationtoaninstrumentofafiduciarycharactersuchasamandateoratrustinwhich
equitableconsiderationsactingupontheconscienceareofcompellingapplication’.115
Thisgood-faithrequirement,andtheparticularimportanceitisdeemedtohavein
connectionwithaninstrumentofafiduciarycharacter,cametotheforeinNamibiaasthe
InternationalCourtfoundintheconceptsembodiedinthetermsoftheMandate
agreementevolvingelementswhichledittoarriveatanevolutionaryinterpretationof
theagreement.116IfonecontraststhejudgmentoftheCourt,whichclearlyplacesa
premiumongoodfaith,withthedissentingopinionofJudgeFitzmaurice(thatwent
againstanevolutionaryinterpretationinthatcase),whichthoughitrunsto206pagesin
thelawreportsnowherementionstheprincipleofgoodfaithinthecaseinissue,117one
seeswithclaritytheimportantnexus(p.76) betweengoodfaithandtheevolutionary
interpretationadoptedbythemajorityoftheCourt.
3.2.5Conclusion
Evolutionaryinterpretationmay,aswillhavebeenseen,berequiredbygoodfaith.Thisis
partlyduetotheimportancethatgoodfaithaccordstotheprotectionoflegitimate
expectations.Itisobviouslycontrarytogoodfaithtoarguethatatreatytermmustbe
interpretedcontemporaneously(ieasnothavingevolved)118whenitfollowsfromwhat
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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mustbeheldtohavebeenthecommonintentionofthepartiesthatthetreatyterms
weretobeinterpretedevolutionarily.Theconservativeelementinherentingoodfaithis
thus,inthattypeofsituation,onewhichencompasseschangeinordertoconserve,and
whatistobeconservedistheobjectoftheparties’agreement.Theprincipleofgoodfaith
intreatyinterpretationinthiswaybringsoutthatthereismorethanjustanaccidental
affinitybetweentheintentionofthepartiesandevolutionaryinterpretation.Thisinterplay
—betweenthecommonintentionofthepartiesandevolutionaryinterpretation—isthe
topicinthenextpartofthischapter.
3.3EvolutionaryInterpretationandtheIntentionoftheParties
3.3.1Introduction
Thispartturnstothepre-VCLTapproachtotreatyinterpretationandshowswhatinthat
approachwascodifiedinArticles31–33andwhatwasnot.Theintentionistomakeclear
thatwhattheILCcodifiedinArticles31–33werethemeansadmissibleintheobjective
establishmentoftheintentionoftheparties.Itisnosurprisethereforethat,aswillbe
seen,theInternationalCourthasbeenprominentinputtingapremiumupontheintention
ofthepartiesincasesbearingonevolutionaryinterpretation.
TheInternationalCourtinNavigationalRightsmadeclearthatthetreatyinterpretermay
arriveatanevolutionaryinterpretationintwotypesofcase.Ontheonehand,theCourt
said,thesubsequentpracticeoftheparties,withinthemeaningofArticle31(3)(b)ofthe
VCLT,canresultinadeparturefromtheoriginalintentonthebasisofatacitagreement
betweentheparties.119Ontheotherhand,continuedtheCourt,therearesituationsin
whichthecommonintentionofthepartieswas,ormaybepresumedtohavebeen,to
givesomeorallofthetermsusedameaningor(p.77) contentcapableofevolving,not
onefixedonceandforall,soastomakeallowancefor,amongotherthings,developments
ininternationallaw:
Insuchinstancesitisindeedinordertorespecttheparties’commonintentionatthe
timethetreatywasconcluded,nottodepartfromit,thataccountshouldbetakenofthe
meaningacquiredbythetermsinquestionuponeachoccasiononwhichthetreatyisto
beapplied.120
Thisbifurcationprovidesapossiblestarting-pointfortheanalysisofevolutionary
interpretation.Thetopichereisevolutionaryinterpretation,andnotthesubsequent
agreementsandpracticeoftheparties,andtheanalysisdealsinprincipleonlywiththe
secondtypeofcase:evolutionaryinterpretationbasedon‘theparties’commonintention
atthetimethetreatywasconcluded’.121 Itwill,however,benecessarytodealtosome
extentalsowiththesubsequentagreementsandpracticeoftheparties.
InNavigationalRights,evolutionaryinterpretationandthesubsequentagreementsand
practiceofNicaraguaandCostaRicacouldbeseenasleadingtothesameconclusion.
JudgeSkotnikovinhisseparateopinionobservedthattheresultwhichtheCourthad
reachedshouldinsteadbereachedbywayofrelianceuponthesubsequentpracticeof
theparties:‘Inmyview’,hesaid,‘thesubsequentpracticeintheapplicationoftheTreaty
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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suggeststhatthePartieshaveestablishedanagreementregardingitsinterpretation:
CostaRicahasarightunderthe1858Treatytotransporttourists’.122Theresultwhich
theCourthadreachedbywayofevolutionaryinterpretationcouldalsobereachedby
basingtheinterpretationuponthesubsequentpracticeoftheparties.
ThisimportantpointhasalsobeenunderscoredbytheILC’sSpecialRapporteurGeorg
Nolte,whohaspointedout,theevolutionaryinterpretationoftreatiesandthetakinginto
accountofsubsequentconductareinprinciplemutuallycomplementary,andareoften
usedthatwayinpractice,123astheexampleofNavigationalRightsalsobearsout.The
samewasthecasewithNamibia,wheretheInternationalCourtreferredtothepractice
ofUnitedNationsorgansandofstatesinordertospecifytheconclusionswhichit
derivedfromwhatitsawastheinherentlyevolutionarynatureoftherighttoselfdetermination,124andinAegeanSea,wheretheCourtfoundsupportforits
evolutionaryinterpretationintheadministrativepracticeoftheUnitedNationsandinthe
subsequentpractice,inadifferentcontext,ofthepartywhichinthecasehadarguedfor
amorerestrictiveinterpretation.125
Itis,however,importanttonotethatinadditiontothisjustificatoryrolesubsequent
conductcanalsolimitevolutionaryinterpretation.Thelimitingroleofsubsequentconduct
emergesmoreclearlywiththegrowingrecognitionofthepossibility(p.78) ofan
evolutionaryinterpretation.Thusitiscertainlypossibletofindexamplesofcasesinwhich
internationalcourtshavebeenfacedwithcaseswhereanumberofthemeansof
interpretationwouldhaveledtoanevolutionaryinterpretationbutwhere,intheevent,
thecourtinissueoptedforanotherresultbyreasonofthesubsequentpracticeofthe
parties.
OnesuchexampleisMangourasvSpain,126wherearguablytheGrandChamberofthe
EuropeanCourtofHumanRights(whichwassplit10–7)decidedtolowertheprotection
offeredbyArticle5oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights127totheindividual
claimant,whohadcausedgreatharmtotheenvironmentintheformofanoilspill.The
Spanishcourtshadsetabailof€3million,asumwhich,accordingtotheminorityofthe
GrandChamber,was‘farbeyondthemeansoftheapplicant,withtheconsequencethat
hecontinuedtobedetainedonremandforatotalofeighty-threedays’.128Onecould
thuscertainlyseeMangourasasacasewhich,takenoutofcontext,couldbejudgeda
loweringofthestandardsofprotectioninArticle5oftheConventionconcerningthe
settingofbailagainsttheapplicant.
TheGrandChamberstatedthatinprinciple‘theincreasinglyhighstandardbeing
requiredintheareaoftheprotectionofhumanrightsandfundamentalliberties
correspondinglyandinevitablyrequiresgreaterfirmnessinassessingbreachesofthe
fundamentalvaluesofdemocraticsocieties’.129ButthisdidnotleadtheGrandChamber
totheconclusionthattheArticle5rightsinvolvedhadundergoneanevolutionthatmeant
ahigherlevelofrightsprotectionfortheindividualsintheapplicant’ssituation.Instead
theGrandChamberstatedthatitcouldnot‘overlookthegrowingandlegitimateconcern
bothinEuropeandinternationallyinrelationtoenvironmentaloffences’.130The
subsequentpracticeinMangouraswasevidencedinparticularbystates’powersand
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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obligationsregardingthepreventionofmaritimepollutionandtheunanimous
determinationbyEuropeanstatestoidentifythoseresponsibleandimposingsanctionson
them,sometimesusingcriminallawasameansofenforcingenvironmentallawobligations.
TheGrandChamberinMangourasadmittedlydidnotfollowtheexactingtestastowhat
issubsequentpracticedrawnupbytheInternationalCourtinKasikili/Sedudu,thata
subsequentpracticecanbeseenasbeingestablishedonlywhenthepartiestoatreaty,
throughtheirauthorities,engageincommonconduct,andthattheyactedwilfullyand
withawarenessoftheconsequencesoftheiractions.131 Nonethelessthiscaseisan
exampleofaninternationalcourtshyingawayfromgivingtoaprovisionofatreatyan
interpretationthatwouldhavegonewiththegrainoftheobjectandpurposeofthe
treaty,andinsteadfoundguidanceinthesubsequentagreementsandpracticeofthe
states,whichseemedintheeventtogointhe(p.79) otherdirection.TheGrand
ChamberinMangourasinotherwordsgaveprecedencetothesubsequentpracticeof
thestatesmembersoftheConvention,thusavoidingadivergencebetweenthe
jurisprudenceoftheCourtandofthepracticeofthestates.
NonethelessthethreeexamplesfromthejurisprudenceoftheInternationalCourt,
Namibia,AegeanSea,andNavigationalRights,areevidencethatwemaybestandingon
itsfeetafalsedichotomyifweassumewithoutmorethattheusebyinternationalcourts
andtreatybodiesofevolutionaryinterpretationwillmoreoftenthannotgoagainstthe
grainofthesubsequentagreementsandpracticeofstates.Itistruethattheconstraints
whichexistininternationallawmakemanyoftheconcernsaboutjudiciallaw-making
overblown.132Thesameisthecasehere,asitturnsoutthatonlyrarelyinthecases
whereinternationalcourtshavearrivedatanevolutionaryinterpretationhasthe
subsequentpracticeofthestatesinissueactedasaconstraintonthecourtorTribunal
reachingtheresultarrivedat.133
Mangourasnotwithstanding,thisisthecaseinthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourt
ofHumanRights,asthatcourtpracticallyneverarrivesatanevolutionaryinterpretation
withoutbasingsuchaninterpretationalsoupona‘consensus’amongthestatemembers.
ThisapproachgoesbacktoTyrer134andwassuccinctlysummedupbytheGrand
ChamberinA,B&CvIreland:
Theexistenceofaconsensushaslongplayedaroleinthedevelopmentandevolutionof
ConventionprotectionsbeginningwithTyrervtheUnitedKingdom,theConventionbeing
considereda‘livinginstrument’tobeinterpretedinthelightofpresent-dayconditions.
Consensushasthereforebeeninvokedtojustifyadynamicinterpretationofthe
Convention.135
TheILC’sSpecialRapporteuronTreatiesoverTimehasalsopointedoutthisaspectof
thejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourt,goingsofarastostatethatwheneverthe
Courthasrecognizedthatitisengaginginevolutionaryinterpretation‘ithasinvariably
referredtostate,socialorinternationallegalpractice’.136Thisperspectiveseemsat
timestobelostonsomeofthosewhoanalysethedynamicsofintentionandconsentin
relationtotheEuropeanConvention.Ratherthantodeemphasizetheintentionofthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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partiesbywayofaparticularly‘sovereignty-limitingapproach’,whichistheviewHelfner
takesoftheinterpretiveapproachoftheEuropeanCourt,137thisisanapproachwhich
developstheConventionbytakingabroadviewbothoftheintentionofthepartiesand
theirsubsequentpractice,andwhereanevolutionaryinterpretationisbasedequally
uponbothelements.
Thereasonwearefacedwithafalsedichotomyinthisregardispartlyduetotheaffinity
between,ontheonehand,thepointwhichthisstudyendeavourstomake(p.80) about
evolutionaryinterpretationandtheintentionofthepartiesand,ontheotherhand,the
traditionalreasongivenforwhyoneoughttogiveweighttothesubsequentpracticeof
thestates.Ashasalreadybeenstated,andaswillbeseeninmoredetailbelow,thisbook
arguesthatevolutionaryinterpretationcanonlyhappentotheextentthatitfollowsfrom
theintentionoftheparties,andthetraditionalreasongivenforwhyoneoughttoaccord
importancetothesubsequentpracticeofthepartiesis,classically,that‘l’exécutiondes
engagementest,entreÉtats,commeentreparticuliers,leplussûrcommentairedusens
decesengagements’.138ThePermanentCourtinInterpretationofArticle3(2)ofthe
TreatyofLausannewentevenfurther,sayingthat‘thefactssubsequenttothe
conclusionoftheTreaty’couldonlyconcerntheCourt‘insofarastheyarecalculatedto
throwlightontheintentionofthePartiesofthetimeoftheconclusionoftheTreaty’.139
ThiselementhasundergonesomedevelopmentinthepracticeoftheInternational
Court.140Weoughtnonethelessnottoexaggeratetheextenttowhichevolutionary
interpretationandinterpretationbaseduponthesubsequentpracticeofthepartiesare
likelytodiverge.
Anotherconditionoughttobeenteredaswell,andthatisthattheanalysisheredoesnot
dealspecificallywithArticle31(3)(c)oftheVCLTandtheconduitthatthatprovision
providesfortheevolutionaryinterpretationoftreaties.Thisprovision,requiringaccount
tobetakenofanyrelevantrulesofinternationallawapplicableintheparties’relations,
certainlyhasanimportantsidetotheevolutionaryinterpretationoftreaties.141 Article
31(3)(c)waspartofadevelopmentfromtheILC’sconsiderationof‘intertemporality’.
Whilethisstudydoesnotfocusontheinter-systemicaspectsofevolutionary
interpretation,intertemporalityisexaminedinChapter4.
InNavigationalRights,theInternationalCourtimputedanintentiontobeboundbyan
evolvinginterpretationofthetermsofthetreaty.142Inthatsense,asadumbrated
above,thecaseisofafeatherbothwithearlierandlatercasestohavereachedthe
Court.Inpost-VCLTcasessuchasNamibia,143AegeanSea,144Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros,145andPulpMills,146theCourtarrivedatanevolutionaryinterpretationof
theinstrumentatissuespecificallybystressingtheimportanceintreatyinterpretationof
theintentionsoftheparties.
InthisregarditisworthconsideringtheinterpretationwhichtheInternationalCourt
madeinWhaling.147TheretheInternationalCourtobservedbywayofbackgroundthat,
theaimsofthe1946ConferenceleadingtotheInternational(p.81) Conventionforthe
RegulationofWhaling,148asdescribedintheConference’sopeningaddressbyMrDean
Acheson,thenActingSecretaryofStateoftheUnitedStates,were‘toprovideforthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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coordinatonandcodificationofexistantregulations’andtoestablishan‘effective
administrativemachineryforthemodificationoftheseregulationsfromtimetotimeinthe
futureasconditionsmayrequire’.149IncontrasttotheprecedingConventionforthe
RegulationofWhaling150andInternationalAgreementfortheRegulationofWhaling,151
thetextoftheWhalingConventiondoesnotcontainsubstantiveprovisionsregulatingthe
conservationofwhalestocksorthemanagementofthewhalingindustry,astheseareto
befoundintheSchedulewhich,accordingtoArticleI(1),‘formsanintegralpart’ofthe
Convention.TheScheduleissubjecttoamendments,tobeadoptedbytheInternational
WhalingCommittee(IWC),whichunderArticleIII(1)isgivenasignificantroleinthe
regulationofwhaling.TheCommissionhasamendedtheScheduleseveraltimes.
OnthisbackgroundtheInternationalCourtobservedthat,‘thefunctionsconferredon
theCommissionhavemadetheConventionanevolvinginstrument’.152TheCourt
underlinedtheimportanceoftheobjectandpurposeoftheConventioninthisregardby
observingthat‘amendmentstotheScheduleandrecommendationsbytheIWCmayput
anemphasisononeortheotherobjectivepursuedbytheConvention,butcannotalter
itsobjectandpurpose’.153ThustheConventionitselfsetupasystemwhichprovidedfor
itsownevolution.JudgeLauterpachtobservedinSouthWestAfrica—VotingProcedure
that:
aproperinterpretationofaconstitutionalinstrumentmusttakeintoaccountnotonlythe
formalletteroftheoriginalinstrument,butalsoitsoperationinactualpracticeandinthe
lightoftherevealedtendenciesinthelifeoftheOrganization.154
Thus,inWhaling,155theformalletteroftheoriginalinstrumentitselfsetupasystem
which,inafashion,formalizedthe‘revealedtendenciesinthelifeoftheOrganization’.The
powertoamendtheSchedulegavetheCommissionscopeforadaptingtheConventionto
changingcircumstances;this,asJudgeGreenwoodobserved,wastheConvention’sway
ofaccommodating‘theneedtointerpretandapplythetreatyasa“livinginstrument”’.156
WithintheboundsoftheobjectandpurposeoftheConvention,157whichaccordingto
thePreambleincluded(p.82) ‘bothconservationandensuringafutureforsustainable
whaling’,158thewholeConventionwasthusfromtheoutsetintendedtobe‘anevolving
instrument’.159
ThusRedgwellmustberightinsayingthatitcannotbethecasethatenvironmental
treaty-making—suchasthetreatiesinissueincasessuchasGabčíkovo–Nagymarosand
PulpMills,Kishenganga,160andWhaling161 —hasengenderednewrulesoftreaty
interpretationapplicableonlyinthatsphere.Ratherthedevelopmentofsuchtreatiesand
attendanttechniquesofinterpretationshouldbeseenascontributingtothedevelopment
ofthegenerallawoftreaties.162
TheInternationalCourtwasreluctantinthe1970–80stohavingexplicitrecoursetothe
VCLTmoregenerallyincasesbearingupontreatyinterpretation;itwasonlyinthe1990s
thattheCourtbeganreferringtoArticle31initsjudgments.163Otherexamples,postVCLTbutnotspecificallydealingwithevolutionaryinterpretation,suchasContinental
Shelf(Libya/Malta)164andFrontierDispute(BurkinaFaso/Mali),165couldbegiventoo
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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oftheInternationalCourt,oraChamberoftheCourt,seeminglygoingdirectlytothe
notionoftheintentionofthepartieswithout,overtlyatanyrate,havingrecourseto
Articles31–33.Thetendencyis,however,strikinglypronouncedincasesbearingupon
evolutionaryinterpretation.
LatelyitisespeciallytheCourt’srulinginNavigationalRightswhichhasbeencriticized
forthewayinwhichtheCourtinthatcasedealtwiththeissuesofevolutionand
intent.166Commentatorshavewonderedwhether,ininterpretingthe(p.83) convention
atissueevolutionarily,theCourtwasinfactapplyingthegeneralruleofinterpretationas
laiddowninArticle31oftheVCLT.ThusPalchettihasobservedthattheInternational
Courtandotherinternationalcourtsandtribunals167inreachingevolutionary
interpretationsgenerally‘donotrefertothegeneralrulestatedintheVienna
Conventioninordertojustifytheirsolution,preferring,instead,torelyonanargument
whichisbasedontheidentificationofthepresumedintentionsofthepartiesatthetimeof
theconclusionofthetreaty’.168
Onthisbackground,thequestionariseswhethertheInternationalCourtdoesordoes
notfollowthegeneralruleofinterpretationwhen,ininterpretinganinstrument
evolutionarily,itseeksabovealltogiveeffecttotheintentionsoftheparties.
Interestingly,Palchettimakestheobservationthatalthough,inhisview,searchingforthe
intentionofthepartiesisnottheapproachlaiddowninArticle31,thereissomesimilarity
betweentheapproachtakenbytheInternationalCourtinsuchcasesandtheapproachof
thegeneralruleofinterpretation.Ashesays:‘Thepresumedintentionisdeducedfrom
objectivefactorswhicharesubstantiallythesamefactorsonwhichoneshouldrelywhen
interpretingatreatyaccordingtothegeneralcriterionstatedintheVienna
Convention’.169Aswillbeseen,thiswayofputtingthematter—therelianceupon
objectivefactorsinordertoestablishtheintentionoftheparties—isveryaptindeed.
3.3.2Aconservativeapproach?
Amoregeneralcaveatmighthereseemtobeinplace.Itcouldbethoughtthatthe
approachherearguedforisoverly‘conservative’.Thisrelatestothatwhichwas
discussedabove—howgoodfaithconservatismmightinfactdemandchange.Ifthequip
that‘ifwewantthingstostayastheyare,thingswillhavetochange’isrelevanttothe
demandsthatflowfromgoodfaith,thenthesameiscertainlytruewiththe(p.84)
intentionsoftheparties.Asthischapterbearsout,focusingongivingfullandfairimport
tothecommonintentionofthepartiesisnotinanywayinitselfaconservativeapproach.
First,thepointcanbemade,asithasbeenwithregardtotheolddebateastowhether
internationaltribunalsmayhaverecoursetopreparatorywork,170thatthereisnothing
inherentlyconservativeorprogressiveintheapproachestaken;thatwillvarywiththe
treatysituationinissue.Thus,ifwehereremainwiththeexampleofthedebateon
preparatorywork,Lauterpachtexplicateshowontheonehandconservativeinternational
lawyersopposedtheuseofpreparatoryworkonthebasisoftheconvictionthatthe
intentionofthepartiesmustbethedecisiveconsiderationandthatrecoursetotravaux
préparatoireswaslikelytorendermoredifficult,ifnottofrustrate,thetaskof
discoveringthetrueintentionoftheparties.Oppositiontoresorttothatinstrumenthad,
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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however,‘alsobeenpromptedbyconsiderationsofadiametricallyopposite
character’.171 ThusJudgeAlvarez,too,opposedresorttopreparatoryworks,onthe
viewthatthetreaty,onceadopted,possessesalifeofitsownindependentofthecommon
intentionoftheparties.AlvarezobservedinReservationstotheConventiononGenocide
thatthetreatiesinissue‘mustnotbeinterpretedwithreferencetothepreparatory
workwhichprecededthem;theyaredistinctfromthatworkandhaveacquiredalifeof
theirown;theycanbecomparedtoshipswhichleavetheyardsinwhichtheyhavebeen
built,andsailawayindependently’.172
Thesamecanbesaidoffocusingontheintentionsoftheparties:thereisnothing
inherentlyconservativeorprogressiveingivingprideofplacetothecommonintentionof
theparties.Whetherthatisthecaseornotwillofcoursedependonwhatwasinpointof
factthecommonwilloftheparties.Thismighthavebeenawilltoreacharesultwhich
couldbedescribedasveryprogressiveindeed,aswasthecaseinJurisdictionofthe
CourtsofDanzig,173whichisanalysedinmoredetailbelow,wherethecommonintention
ofthepartieswassorevolutionaryastoleadthePermanentCourt,bywayofwhathas
beencalled‘arevolutionarypronouncement’,174toleavebehindoldstatistorthodoxies
andembraceforthefirsttimethenotionthattreatiescanininternationallawconfer
rightsdirectlyonindividuals.Itcouldnotbedisputed,observedthePermanentCourt,
‘thattheveryobjectofanagreement,accordingtotheintentionofthecontracting
parties,maybetheadoptionbythepartiesofsomedefiniterulecreatingindividualrights
andobligations’;theCourt,givingfullandfaireffecttothecommonintentionofthe
partiesinthewaythatwastypicalofthejurisprudenceofthePermanentCourt,175could
donothingelse(p.85) butsaythatthesolutiontothequestionbeforeit‘dependsupon
theintentionofthecontractingParties’.176
AnotherexampleistheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,177thefounding
documentoftheCouncilofEurope.Itiswellknownthatinthelawoftreatiesthe
preambleofatreaty(inaddition,ofcourse,totheactualprovisionsofthetreaty)isan
importantplacetosearchforthecommonintentionoftheparties.178Itisplainfromthe
preambleoftheEuropeanConventionthat‘theaimoftheCouncilofEuropeisthe
achievementofgreaterunitybetweenitsmembersandthatoneofthemethodsbywhich
thisaimistobepursuedisthemaintenanceandfurtherrealisationofhumanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms’.Anotherpointinrespectoftheintentionsofthepartiesandthe
EuropeanConventionbearsontherelationtothe‘generalprinciplesoflawrecognized
bycivilizednations’asmentionedinArticle38(1)(c)oftheStatuteoftheInternational
CourtofJustice.179Theseprincipleshavebeenanimportantfactorinthejurisprudence
oftheEuropeanCourt;itreferredtothembothinGolder180andinDemirand
Baykara181 whereitdrewaconnectionbetweenArticle38(1)(c)oftheStatuteofthe
InternationalCourtofJusticeandArticle31(3)(c)oftheViennaConvention,statingthat:
Article31para.3(c)oftheViennaConventionindicatesthataccountistobetaken,
togetherwiththecontext,of‘anyrelevantrulesofinternationallawapplicableinthe
relationsbetweentheparties’.Amongthoserulesaregeneralprinciplesoflawand
especially‘generalprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations’.Incidentally,theLegal
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CommitteeoftheConsultativeAssemblyoftheCouncilofEuropeforesawinAugust1950
that‘theCommissionandtheCourtmustnecessarilyapplysuchprinciples’inthe
executionoftheirdutiesandthusconsideredittobe‘unnecessary’toinsertaspecific
clausetothiseffectintheConvention.182
Itisinthisregardsignificantthatduringthepreparatoryworkitwasspecificallysaidthat
theCourtmustrelyinitsinterpretationoftheConventionongeneralprinciplesnotsuch
astheywerewhentheConventionwasconcludedbut‘atanygivenmoment’:
Westatethatorganisedinternationalprotectionshallhaveasitsaim,amongotherthings,
toensure,thatinternallawsonguaranteedfreedomsareinconformitywiththe
fundamentalprinciplesoflawrecognisedbycivilisednations.Whataretheseprinciples?
Theyarelaiddowninmuchdoctrinalworkandbyajurisprudencewhichistheir
authority.Thesearetheprinciplesandlegalruleswhich,sincetheyareformulatedand
sanctioned(p.86) bytheinternallawofallcivilisednationsatanygivenmoment,can
thereforeberegardedasconstitutingaprincipleofgeneralcommonlaw,applicable
throughoutthewholeinternationalsociety.183
Onthebackgroundofthesetwopoints,theintentionofthepartiesisthusnotonlythe
maintenanceandsafeguardingofhumanrightsassetoutinthearticlesofthe
Convention;italsoinvolvesthefurtherrealizationandthedevelopmentoftheserights.
Thismustbetakenseriouslybythetreatyinterpreter.AsformerPresidentofthe
EuropeanCourtofHumanRightsJeanPaulCostahasputit:
lePréambuledelaConventionindiquequelebutduConseildel’Europe,etdoncdela
Cour,estnonseulementlasauvegardedesdroitsetlibertés,maisencoreleur
développement.Celaimpliqueuneconceptionévolutiveetprogressiveducontenudes
droitsreconnus,etlaCourmanqueraitàunepartiedesesdevoirssielleneveillaitqu’à
lasauvegardedesdroitsennéglieantl’impératifdeleurdéveloppement.184
Itwouldbeamistaketoseethisapproachasinherentlyconservative;nothingcould,in
respectoftheEuropeanConvention,bemoreprogressivethanfaithfulrelianceuponthe
intentionofthepartiestotheConvention.
MakingthepointthatArticle31doesnotmentiontheintentionoftheparties,SirGerald
Fitzmaurice,sittingasajudgeoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,underlinedin
BelgianPolicethat,‘thoughitdoesnotintermsmentionit’,Article31‘implicitly
recognisestheelementofintentions’.185Thisiscorrect.Butwhilstitistruethatthe
VCLT‘implicitlyrecognisestheelementofintentions’,asthenextsectionwillexplain,
puttingthematterinthiswaynonethelessrunstheriskofconfusingtheissues.
3.3.3Are-readingofArticle31?
Alreadyin1949theILCbegantoconcernitselfwiththelawoftreaties,andeventually
alsotheinterpretationoftreaties.In1966itadopted75draftarticlesthatformedthe
basisfortheVCLTof22May1969,whichenteredintoforceon27January1980.186The
SpecialRapporteurswereallBritish:firstBrierly,thenLauterpacht,Fitzmaurice,andin
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thelast,andmostimportant,stagesWaldock.187Tosomeextent,runninginparallelwith
theworkoftheILCwastheworkontreatyinterpretationundertakenbytheInstitutde
droitinternational,whichelectedas(p.87) theirSpecialRapporteursfirstLauterpacht
andthen,onthelatter’selevationtotheInternationalCourt,Fitzmaurice.188
Fitzmauriceheld,inanimportantcontribution,189thatanyanalysisofthejurisprudence
oftheInternationalCourtorindeedthepronouncementsofanyTribunalontreaty
interpretationcanonlybeproperlyevaluatedagainstthebackdropofthevarious
theoriesofinterpretationthatareorrecentlyhavebeencurrent.190Hedrewupthree
possibleapproachestotreatyinterpretation:thetextualapproach,theintentions
approach,andtheteleologicapproach.Fitzmauriceneverpresentedtheseschoolsof
interpretationasauthoritiesontheirown,stilllessintermsofbalancingpoliciesand
perceptions.Rather,theywererationalattemptsonFitzmaurice’spartatexplicationand
taxonomizationoftheapproachestakeninthedoctrine.191
ThetripartitesplitdrawnupbyFitzmaurice192becameinfluentialandmadeupthe
backdropofthedebatesintheILCinitsworkonthelawoftreaties.193ThusSpecial
RapporteurWaldockinhis‘ThirdReportontheLawofTreaties’sawthequestionasa
matterofwritersdifferingintheirbasicapproachtotheinterpretationoftreaties
accordingtotherelativeweighttheywerewillingto‘giveto’thetextofthetreaty,the
intentionsoftheparties,andobjectsandpurposesofthetreaty.
TheILCtookasapointofdeparturethatanattempttocodifytheconditionsofthe
applicationofthoseprinciplesofinterpretationwhoseapplicationinanygivencase
dependsontheparticularcontextandonasubjectiveappreciationofvarying
circumstanceswouldclearlybeinadvisable.194Itaccordinglyconfineditselftoisolating
andcodifyingthecomparativelyfewgeneralprincipleswhichappearedinitsviewto
constitute‘generalrulesfortheinterpretationoftreaties’.195
Amongmanyimportantchoiceswhichhadtobemadewasthechoiceofhowbestto
balancethedifferentfactors,ormeansofinterpretation,tobetakenintoaccount.Special
RapporteurWaldockwantedtogofaringivingpre-eminencetothetermsofthe
treaty,196buthisinitialproposalwasonthispointmadetogivewaytoamorebalanced
approach.
ThethreeSpecialRapporteursprecedingWaldockhadbeenfairlyunisoninthisregard.
SpecialRapporteurBrierlyhadinaprivatecapacityputthematterinthefollowingway:
theobjectoftreatyinterpretationis‘togiveeffecttotheintentionofthepartiesasfully
andfairlyaspossible’.197SpecialRapporteurFitzmauricestatedthat:‘Theviewthatthe
intentionsofthepartiesarerelevant,andthattoascertainandgiveeffecttothemisthe
primeandsolelegitimateobjectofinterpretation,isnotonlythetraditionalbutalsothe
juridicallynaturalview’.198Andifthereisone(p.88) commonthreadrunningthrough
theworksontreatyinterpretationofSpecialRapporteurLauterpachtitisthat‘the
ultimateobjectoftheworkofinterpretationistoexplainandclassifylegaltransactions
accordingtothedeclaredwillofbothparties’.199Itisclearthattotheextentthat
WaldocksetoutasSpecialRapporteuronthelawoftreatiestochangethishedidnotin
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
theendsucceed.
SpecialRapporteurWaldock’sinitiallyproposedgeneralruleofinterpretationprovided
that:
Thetermsofatreatyshallbeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththenaturaland
ordinarymeaningtobegiventoeachterm—(a)initscontextinthetreatyandinthe
contextofthetreatyasawhole;and(b)inthecontextoftherulesofinternationallawin
forceatthetimeoftheconclusionofthetreaty.200
Thisproposedruleplainlyfocusedonthe‘terms’ofatreatyandwentveryfaringiving
pre-eminencetoatextualapproach.Itwasvoteddownafteraninstructivedebateamong
themembersoftheILC.
BriggsagreedwithWaldock’sproposedrule,thoughheonlysawaninsistenceuponthe
primacyofthetexttobecorrectinsofarasitwas‘anexpressionoftheintentionsofthe
parties’.201 SeveralothermembersoftheILC,however,tookadifferentviewofmatters
totheAnglo-Americanpointofview.Citingthe1950reportfortheInstituteof
InternationallawbyLauterpacht,202Tabibistatedthathewouldratherhavegiven
‘greaterweighttotheintentionoftheparties’.203Amado,too,wascritical;hepointedout
thathethoughttheuseintheopeningpassageofthearticleof‘Thetermsofatreaty’was
toonarrow,as‘atreatyconsistedofanumberoftexts,contextsandterms;whathadto
beinterpretedwasthetreatyitself,notitsterms.204Pessoualsofeltthattheintentionof
thepartiesmustbegivenamoreprominentplaceintheprovision.205Verdrosswanted
tomentiontheintentionofthepartiesinthearticleitself.206BartosstatedthattheSpecial
Rapporteur’sdraftarticles‘werebasedonthegeneralconcept,sodeartotheEnglish
schooloflegalthoughtthatinterpretationmeantinterpretationofthetextratherthanof
thespiritofatreaty’.207Hecontinuedbyunderliningthat,tohismind:
Whereinterpretationwasconcerned,theautonomyofthewillofthepartieswas
paramount.Whatthepartieshadintendedwasmoreimportantthanwhattheyhad
actuallysaidinthetreaty.208
(p.89)
Theinterpretationofatreatyoughtthereforetobebasedonthegeneralspiritofthe
treaty.209ChairmanAgovoicedsimilarconcerns.Hewouldhavepreferredthatthe
objectsandpurposesofatreatyhadbeengivenamoreprominentplaceinthefirst
paragraphofthegeneralrule,thanwhathadbeenthecasewithWaldock’sinitially
proposedrule.210BartosanddeLuna,too,feltthatitwasunfortunatethattheobjects
andpurposesofatreatyhadnotbeengivenamoreprominentplace.211
Palexpressedthematterinthefollowingway:‘inordertofindouttherealmeaningofa
treaty,itwasnecessarytoconsidertheintentionofthepartiesinsofarasthoseparties
hadsucceededinexpressingitinthelanguageusedbytheminthetreaty’.212More
generally,leadingmembersoftheILC,suchasRosenne,213JiménezdeAréchaga,214
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
andChairmanAgo,215madeexplicitstatementsduringthedebatestotheeffectthat
treatyinterpretationwasabouttheascertainmentoftheintentionoftheparties,andthat
thatneededtobereflectedinthearticles.Inafashionthedividebetweentheapproach
ofWaldock’sinitiallyproposedruleandtheonewhichwasintheendadoptedis
summarizedbyLauterpacht:
Theproblemistoalargeextentidenticalwiththequestionwhetherthepurposeof
interpretationistodiscovertheintentionofthepartiesorthemeaningofthewords
whichtheyused.Itispossibletomaintainthattheintentionofthepartiesisrelevantonly
insofarasitsuppliesacluetothetruemeaningofadisputedtermorprovision.The
alternativeand,probably,thecorrectviewisthatthediscoveryofthemeaningofthe
wordsusedinatreatyisonlyameansforascertainingtheintentionoftheparties.216
Inlinewiththis,JudgeHigginsheldinKasikili/Seduduthattheobjectoftreaty
interpretation‘isnottodiscoveramythical“ordinarymeaning”withintheTreaty’;rather
theobjectoftheexerciseis‘togivefleshtotheintentionoftheparties’,‘todecidewhat
generalideathepartieshadinmind,andthenmakerealityofthatgeneralidea’.217‘In
thelawoftreaties’,Higginshasobservedelsewhere,‘theintentionofthepartiesisreally
thekey’.218
Itisimportant,however,tokeepinmindthatArticle31,asitwasfinallyagreedupon,
doesnotimplicitlyrecognizeintentionsasjustanother(unmentioned)meansof
interpretation;rather,itrecognizesintentionastheveryaimofthewholeprocess.De
Visschermadethispointabouttheintentionoftheparties,alreadybeforetheVCLTwas
adopted,stressingthepointthatthediscoveryoftheintentionofthepartiesistheobject
ofinterpretation,andmustnotbethoughttobeanythingelse.Itis,hesaid,thevery
thingtobeproven,‘lachoseàdémontrer’,andonecannot(p.90) regardasameansof
interpretationthatwhichcanonlybetheresultoftheinterpretiveprocessitself.219
OnthisbackgrounditisinstructivethatSpecialRapporteurWaldockmadehisapproach
clearbystatingthereasonwhy(incommonwithLauterpacht’sproposedarticlesforthe
Institutdedroitinternationalsome15yearsearlier)220hisapproach,laterqualifiedin
1966bytheILCcolleagues,reliedonthe'primacyofthetext’:
Ittakesasthebasicruleoftreatyinterpretationtheprimacyofthetextasevidenceof
theintentionsoftheparties.Itacceptstheviewthatthetextmustbepresumedtobethe
authenticexpressionoftheintentionsoftheparties.221
In1966,theILCdescribedtreatyinterpretationasgearedtowards‘appreciatingthe
meaningwhichthepartiesmayhaveintendedtoattachtotheexpressionsthatthey
employedinadocument’.222Indeed,oneofthemainreasonswhy,morebroadly,the
ILCfeltboundtotackleheadonthedifficulttaskofformulatingthecomparativelyfew
generalprincipleswhichappeartoconstitutegeneralrulesfortheinterpretationof
treatieswas,itsaid,tosetout‘themeansofinterpretationadmissibleforascertainingthe
intentionoftheparties’.223
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
ThiswaslaterwellsummarizedbyJenningsandWatts:ontheapproachofthegeneral
ruleofinterpretation,theyexplained,‘itistheintentionwhichisbeingsought’;‘the
questionisprimarilyoneofdeterminingwhatelementsmayproperlybetakeninto
accountasindirectevidenceoftheparties’intentionandwhatweightistobegivento
thoseelements’.224
TheILCmadeitclear,however,thatwhatitwascodifyingwasanapproachtotreaty
interpretationthatreliedinthefirstinstanceuponthetextofthetreatyasthestarting
pointinascertainingthecommonintentionoftheparties.Therelationbetweentextand
intentionhaslaterbeenwellbroughtoutbyCrawford,whodescribeswhathecallsthe
‘unitaryprocessofinterpretation’225outlinedinthegeneralruleofinterpretationthus:
‘Article31emphasizestheintentionofthepartiesasexpressedinthetext,asthebest
guidetotheircommonintention’.226
Yasseen,oneoftheleadingmembersoftheILCduringthedraftingoftheVCLT,madeit
clearthatwhentheILCtookthetextasthestartingpointforinterpretationthatwasinno
waytominimizetheimportanceoftheintentionofthe(p.91) parties:‘Goingfirsttothe
textisinevitable;thetextistakentocontainthecommonintentionoftheparties’.227
Hecontinuedbysaying:‘Whatisthepointofatextif,inordertointerpretthetreaty,the
intentionofthepartiesistobesearchedabinitio?Takingthetextasthepointof
departureisnottominimizetheimportanceoftheintentionoftheparties;rather,it
meansproceedingtodiscoveritbyexaminingtheinstrumentbywayofthatthrough
whichitisexpressed’.228
Reuter,anotherleadingmemberoftheILCintheperiodleadinguptotheVienna
Convention,inhiswritingsafter1969,madethesamepointasYasseenabouttheclose
nexusbetweentextualityandintentionalityinthegeneralrule:‘Thepurposeof
interpretation’,hesaid,‘istoascertaintheintentionofthepartiesfromatext’;
‘interpretationmeansgoingbackwardsfromthetexttotheinitialintention’.Inthe
interpretationoftreaties,becauseofwhathecalledthesubmissiontotheexpressionof
theparties’intentionitis,hesaid,essentialtoidentifyexactlyhowandwhenthatintention
wasexpressed;thus,Reutersaidaboutthemeansofinterpretationenumeratedin
Article31,‘itisfromtheseelements,sincetheyprimarilyincorporatetheparties’
intention,thatthemeaningofthetreatyshouldnormallybederived’.229
Capotorti,oneoftheItalianrepresentativesattheViennaConference,madethepointin
1969thatalthoughthegeneralruletakesanobjectiveapproach‘thesolutionadoptedin
theViennaConventionprovidesakeyholethroughwhichtolookforthecommon
intentionoftheparties’.230
Farfromminimizingtheimportanceoftheintentionoftheparties,then,theapproach
takenbyArticle31givesthetreatyinterpretertheadmissibleandagreeduponwayof
ascertainingit.Thatprocessbegins,asvirtuallyallinterpretationoftexts,withthetext
itself.231 ThisgistisconveyedintheILC’swords,referredto(p.92) above,tothe
effectthatthetaskoftheILCwastoenumerate‘themeansofinterpretationadmissible
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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forascertainingtheintentionoftheparties’.232
AscanbeseenfromYasseen’swords,too,theonlyrealdifferencebetweenwhat,inthe
runuptotheVCLT,hadbeentermed(slightlyconfusingly,asitturnsout)the‘textual’
andthe‘intentions’method,therefore,isthatthetextualmethodtakes,inthe
ascertainmentoftheintentionoftheparties,asitsstartingpointthetext,whereasthe
intentionsapproachinvestigatesabinitio(thatis,fromthebeginning)theintentionsofthe
parties.Theonedefiningdifference,then,isthatthetextualapproachisfoundedupona
presumptionthat,asSpecialRapporteurWaldockputit,‘thesignedtextis,withveryfew
exceptions,theonlyandthemostrecentexpressionofthecommonwilloftheparties’.233
EvenBeckett,whointhedebatesoftheInstitutdedroitinternationalin1950registered
probablythemostcriticalviewofthecategoryof‘theintentionoftheparties’tohave
enteredthedebate,wasoftheviewthatwhenthetextofatreatywassoimportantthat
wasbecause‘treatiesmustbedeemedtobedrawnupwithlegaladviceandprimafacie
toexpresscompletelytheintentionsoftheparties’.234
Onthisbackgrounditmustbecorrecttosaythat,asGajahasexplained,withinthe
approachsetoutinArticles31–33oftheVCLT,thetreatyinterpreterreconstructsthe
meaningofan‘objectivizedintentionoftheparties’;themeansofinterpretationare
‘objectiveelements’whichguidethetreatyinterpretertotheestablishmentofthe
intentionoftheparties.235
3.3.4TheILCapproachanditsantecedents
Bysearchingfortheintentionofthepartiesinrelationtoevolutionaryinterpretation,the
InternationalCourtisinfactnothingifnotapplyingtheframeworkofArticle31ofthe
VCLT.Althoughthegeneralruleofinterpretationdoesnotmentionintermstheintention
oftheparties—orwhatrole,ifany,thisconstructionoughttoplayintreatyinterpretation
—alltheelementsofthegeneralrulehaveonesoleaimandthatistoprovidethebasis
forestablishingtheintentionofthe(p.93) parties.ThisisclearnotonlyfromthepostVCLTjurisprudenceoftheInternationalCourtandofarbitraltribunals.Ashasjustbeen
seen,itfollows,too,fromtheapproachtakenbytheInternationalLawCommissioninits
work—mostnotablythatofSpecialRapporteurWaldock—leadinguptotheadoptionofthe
VCLT.
TheapproachtakentotreatyinterpretationbeforetheVCLTwassquarelyoneinwhich,
astheTribunalinAirTransportServicesAgreementputitontheeveoftheConvention’s
adoption,thegoalwasto‘establishwiththemaximumpossiblecertaintywhatthe
commonintentionofthePartieswas’.236
Infactthiswasevenclearerintheearlytwentiethcentury,tribunalsatthattimebeing
quiteprepared,intheascertainmentofthecommonintentionoftheparties,tointerpret
treatiescontralegem.237ThustheTribunalinIslandofTimorexpandedonthe
importanceinthelawoftreatiesofestablishingthatwhichtheTribunalcalled‘theactual
andmutualintention’oftheparties.238Treatiesbindthepartiestoloyalandcomplete
execution,theTribunalsaid,‘notonlyofwhathasbeenliterallypromisedbutofthatto
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
whichapartyhasbounditself,andalsothatwhichconformstotheessenceofanytreaty
whatsoeverastotheharmoniousintentionofthecontractingparties’.239Thus,concluded
theTribunalinIslandofTimor,theinterpretationoftreatiesought‘tobemadein
conformitywiththerealmutualintentionsoftheparties,andalsoinconformitywithwhat
canbepresumedbetweenpartiesactingloyallyandwithreason,notthatwhichhasbeen
promisedbyonetotheotheraccordingtothemeaningofthewordsused’.240(p.94)
BeforetheInternationalCourt,thePermanentCourttookthesameapproach,suchas
wheninLighthousesCasebetweenFranceandGreeceitsaidthattheendgoalofthe
interpretativeexercisewasnottofindthetruemeaningofthetreatytermbutthatthe
Courtmust‘satisfyitselfastothetrueintentionoftheParties’;‘itmustdeterminethe
intentionofthePartiesasregardsthescopeofthecontract’.241 Theapproachofthe
PermanentCourtwasinfactsofocuseduponestablishingthecommonwilloftheparties,
sometimestothedetrimentofthetext,thatsomeauthors,boththenandpresently,have
feltitnecessarytocautionagainstthisperceivedoverrelianceontryingtoteaseoutwhat
infactthepartiesmeantandthusnotseeingtreatyinterpretationasanoperationthe
objectofwhichistofindthemeaningofatreatytext.242
Thewritingsofleadingpublicistswere,fromthenineteenthcenturyonwards,squarely
influencedbytheviewthattreatyinterpretationwasdeterminedbytheintentionofthe
parties.243BeforetheVCLT,virtuallynowritertookadifferentapproach.ThusRivier
madeclearthatitisinthelawoftreatiesnecessary,aboveall,toestablishthemutual
intentionoftheparties:‘Ilfautavanttoutconstaterlacommuneintentiondesparties’;
‘lestraitésdoiventêtreinterprétésnonpasexclusivementselonleurlettre,maisselon
leuresprit’.244Sørensentookashispointofdeparturethatthewordsofatreatyhaveno
meaningexceptastheexpressionoftheintentionsoftheparties,andthatthesoleobject
oftreatyinterpretationisthereforetoestablishthoseintentions.245
DeVisschersaidasmuchwhenhestatedthat:‘Lamissiondujugeestdedégager
l’intentioncommunedesPartiesdestermesemployésparellespourautantqueceux-ci
netrahissentpasmanifestementcetteintention’.246Onthisreading,international
tribunals,wheninterpretingatreaty,setouttofind:‘cettepartdesintentionsdesparties
quedessignesextérieursrévèlent’.247InfactdeVisscherreinforcedthisbysayingthat
somecommentatorshavemisinterpretedthejurisprudenceofthePermanentand
InternationalCourtonthisscore,amisinterpretationwhichhastakenattentionawayfrom
theintentionofthepartiesandfocusedinsteadon(p.95) whathetermsliteral
interpretation:‘OnaquelquepeudéformélajurisprudencedelaCourpermanenteet
celledelaCourinternationaledeJusticeenparlantàsonsujetdeméthodes
d’interprétationlittérale’.248Thegoaloftheinterpretativeprocess,then,isto‘traduire
fidèlementunevolonté’.249
DeVisscherinhisdiscussiongivestheexampleoftheinterpretationgivenbythe
PermanentCourtinDanzigRailwayOfficials250—revolutionaryinwhatitsaidabout
internationalhumanrightsbutnothingifnotacopybookexampleofthegeneralruleof
interpretation251 —wherethePermanentCourtaddressedtheissueofwhethertreaties
canconferrightsdirectlyonindividuals,intheinstantcaseDanzigrailwayofficials.Poland
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
contendedthattheagreement(aso-calledBeamtenabkommen)betweenPolandand
Danzigconferrednorightofactionupontheindividualsinissue.ThePermanentCourt,
thoughitcouldontheorthodoxinternationallawofthedayverywellhaveagreedwith
Poland’scontention,252rejected,unanimously,aninterpretationofthetreatywhich
wouldhaveputapremiumonwell-establishedprinciplesofinternationallawinsteadof
thecommonwilloftheparties:‘Theanswertothisquestion’,saidtheCourt,‘depends
upontheintentionofthecontractingParties’.TheCourtcontinued:
Itmayreadilybeadmittedthat,accordingtoawellestablishedprincipleofinternational
law,theBeamtenabkommen,beinganinternationalagreement,cannot,assuch,create
rightsandobligationsforprivateindividuals.Butitcannotbedisputedthatthevery
objectofanagreement,accordingtotheintentionofthecontractingparties,maybethe
adoptionbythepartiesofsomedefiniterulecreatingindividualrightsandobligationsand
enforceablebynationalcourts.253
HadtheCourtwishedtoadheretothetraditionalviewthenitwouldhaveinterpreted
thecontroversialcommonintentionofthepartiesinthelightofthetraditionaldoctrine;
‘theissuemust’,asLauterpachtsaidinhiscommentstothecase,‘dependonthe
intentionoftheparties’.254Itshouldparentheticallybementionedthattheresultreached
unanimouslybythePermanentCourtwas,seeingasitwasbasedfoursquareonthe
intentionsofthepartiesandthusadministeredwithsuchjudicialrestraint,thoughtby
oneLegalAdvisortotheForeignOfficetobeasolemnaffirmationoftheorthodox
doctrine;heplainlycouldnotbelievethatitcouldbeotherwise.255(p.96)
ThisdovetailsneatlywiththatwhichMcNairheldtobe‘theessentialquestinthe
applicationoftreaties’—‘tosearchfortherealintentionofthecontractingparties’,256or
ashesaidasPresidentofthePalenaTribunal:theobjectoftheprocessoftreaty
interpretationis‘toascertainthecommonwill’oftheparties.257Alltherulesandmaxims
whichhavebeentakentomakeupthecanonsoftreatyinterpretation,heobserved,‘are
merelyprimafacieguidestotheintentionoftheparties,andmustalwaysgivewayto
contraryevidenceoftheintentionofthepartiesinaparticularcase’.258
Itmustberighttherefore,asWattssaidofthecontinuityofthelawoftreaties,thata
readerof‘LordMcNair’smagisterialLawofTreaties,publishedin1961,isunlikelytobe
greatlysurprisedbytheprovisionsoftheViennaConvention’;‘therewasabroad
internationalconsensusastotheruleofinternationallawapplicabletotreaties,andthat
consensuswasreflectedintheConvention’.259
InfactLauterpachthadcometothisconclusioninhis1927studyonprivatelawsources
andanalogiesofinternationallaw,wherehesaid,ofcontractsandtreatiesalike,that:‘The
ultimateobjectoftheworkofinterpretationistoexplainandclassifylegaltransactions
accordingtothedeclaredwillofbothparties.’260Thesamecontractualpointwasmade
byHuber,andlaterWaldockintheILCdebates:‘ilestévidentquel’essentield’un
contrat,d’uneconvention,d’untraitéestlavolontéconcordantedesparties’.261 Itis
apposite,therefore,tolookatthepossibleanalogyofcontractinterpretation,inorderto
seewhether,asweareoftentoldintheliterature,itisthesearchforthemeaningofthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
textortheintentionofthepartiesthatiscontrollinginthatareaofthelaw.
Treatyinterpretationwasseen,inBrierly’swordsquotedabove,asbeingabout‘giv[ing]
effecttotheintentionofthepartiesasfullyandfairlyaspossible’,262andnothingelse.
Rulesontreatyinterpretationwereseenasobfuscating,and(p.97) detrimentaltothe
searchfortheintentionoftheparties;logically,therefore,therecould,inBrierly’swords,
be‘notechnicalrulesininternationallawfortheinterpretationoftreaties’.263
ThedebatesintheILCintherun-uptotheViennaConventionwerecloselylinkedtothe
questionofwhatroletoconsignthetravauxpréparatoiresintreatyinterpretation.
Lauterpachthadbeenanardentadvocateofgivingprideofplacetopreparatory
works.264AsSpecialRapporteurfortheInstitutdeDroitInternational,Lauterpachtdrew
up‘projetsderésolution’ontheinterpretationoftreatieswhere,innumber2,he
suggestedinatextbestrenderedintheoriginalthat:
Lerecoursauxtravauxpréparatoires,lorsqu’ilssontaccessibles,estnotammentun
moyenlégitimeetdésirableauxfinsd’établirl’intentiondespartiesdanstouslescasoù,
malgrésaclartéapparente,lesensd’untraitéprêteàcontroverse.Iln’yaaucunmotif
d’exclurel’usagedetravauxpréparatoiresdûmentconsignésetpubliés,àl’encontre
d’Étatsayantadhéréautraitépostérieurementàsasignatureparlesparties
originaires.265
Thisapproachwascriticized.ProminentincriticizingtheapproachwasBeckett,whosaw
therelianceupontravauxpréparatoiresasadangertothelegalcertaintywhichtohis
mindcouldbeprocuredonlyifonestuckascloselyaspossibletothetextofthetreaty,
eventotheexclusionofothermeansofinterpretation.266If,heaverred,tooready
admissionofpreparatoryworkwasallowed,thestatewhichhadfoundaclearprovision
ofthetreatyinconvenientwaslikelytobefurnishedwithatabulainnaufragio;there
wouldalwaysbesomethinginthepreparatoryworkfittosupporttheircontention.267
Itisworthmentioning,however,thatBeckettmadeanimportantconcessionbytakinga
largeviewofwhatthetreatywas;quiteanumberoftheelementswhichhesawasbeing
partofthetreatyandnotofthetravauxpréparatoirescouldverywellhavebeenseenas
partofthepreparatoryworks.268Thisofcourseconsiderablysoftensthebruntofhis
claims.(p.98)
Later,theproblemwithtooreadyarelianceuponthetravauxpréparatoireswas
summarizedcriticallybytheILCin1966asbeingthat‘itisbeyondquestionthatthe
recordsoftreatynegotiationsareinmanycasesincompleteormisleading,sothat
considerablediscretionhastobeexercisedindeterminingtheirvalueasanelementof
interpretation’.269Nonetheless,asexplainedbyMortenson,270theVCLTisnotashostile
totravauxasissometimesthought,271 SpecialRapporteurWaldockhavingalsostressed
thattravaux:
aresimplyevidencetobeweighedagainstanyotherrelevantevidenceoftheintentions
oftheparties,andtheircogencydependsontheextenttowhichtheyfurnishproofofthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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commonunderstandingofthepartiesastothemeaningattachedtothetermsofthe
treaty.272
AccordingtotheapproachtakenbytheILC,andunanimouslyadoptedbytheinitial
partiestotheViennaConvention,inwhatwouldbecomeArticles31–33ofthe
Convention,theILCmadeclearthattotheextentthatitwasconfrontedwithachoice
betweenthetextualapproach,theintentionsapproach,andtheteleologicapproach,it
chosethetextualone.273
LeadingauthorshaveassumedthatinchoosingthisapproachtheILChaddismissed,in
onefellswoop,theage-oldprincipleaccordingtowhichtheaimoftreatyinterpretation
wastoascertainwhatwasthecommonintentionoftheparties.274
ButwhilsttheILCdidindeedoptforthatwhichittermedthetextualapproachitwasnot
thecasethattheILCjettisonedtheideathattheobjectoftreatyinterpretationisthe
ascertainmentoftheintentionoftheparties.
Itis,asexplainedabove,plainenoughthatArticle31(1)doesnotmentionintermsthe
intentionorwilloftheparties.OnlyinArticle31(4)doesthegeneralrulehaverecourse
totheintentionoftheparties:‘Aspecialmeaningshallbegiventoatermifitisestablished
thatthepartiessointended’.275Whatismore,WaldockobservedattheVienna
Conferencethatithad,withinthelaterstagesofthedebatesoftheILC,beensaid‘with
somejustice’thatArticle31(4)wassupererogatory,asArticle31(4)addednothingto
Article31(1).276
Conversely,inLauterpacht’s1950‘projetderésolution’,theintentionoftheparties
enjoyedprideofplaceintheverytermsofthefirstarticle:
Larecherchedel’intentiondespartiesétantlebutprincipaldel’interprétation,ilest
légitimeetdésirable,dansl’intérêtdelabonnefoietdelastabilitédestransactions
international,deprendrelesensnatureldestermescommepointdedépartdu
processusd’interprétation.277
(p.99)
Aswillhavebecomeclear,bycontrast,‘theintentionoftheparties’isconspicuousbyits
absenceinArticle31(1).Itisimportanttomakethepoint,however,thatwhatthegeneral
ruleofinterpretationdoesistoenumeratethemeansofinterpretation;itdoesnotset
outtoexplicatewhattheaimoftreatyinterpretationis.
3.3.5Treatyinterpretation:contractinterpretationwritlarge?
Itisundoubtedlytruethatinternationaltribunalshavetakeninspirationfromnational
privatelaw,bothwhenitcomestothematerialprinciplestheyapplyandwhenitcomesto
interpretation.Rivierwentsofarassayingthattheprinciplesoftreatyinterpretationare,
inshortandmutatismutandis,thoseoftheinterpretationofagreementsbetween
individuals.278Thisseemsliketheapplicationinthefieldofinterpretationoftheoldadage
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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thatinternationallawis‘butprivatelawwritlarge’.279
Lauterpachtobservedthatwhenalegitimateoccasionarisestoapplyaprivatelaw
principlecommontoallsystemsofprivatejurisprudence,thenitisuselessand
misleadingtoopposetherecoursetoacorrespondingruleofprivatelaw.Thequestion,
‘Whendoessuchalegitimateoccasionarise?’heansweredbysayingthatitarisesmainly
inallcasesinwhichthepartiestoatreatyhavethemselvesdeliberatelymadeuseofa
conceptionofprivatelaw.Thiswouldforexamplebethecasewhenthepartiesemploy
suchtechnicaltermsofprivatelawaslease,mandate,prescription,purchase,servitude,
usufruct,trust,orduediligence.Whenitcametointerpretation,however,whathesaw
asthefundamentalidentityoftreatiesandcontractstohimmeantthatthetechniquesof
contractinterpretationcouldserveasanalogyenbloc.280
ThepracticeofinternationaltribunalsseemstobearoutLauterpacht’sproposition.Thus
theTribunalinDivertedCargoesheldthat:
lesprincipesdudroitinternationalquigouvernentl’interprétationdestraitésouaccords
internationauxainsiquel’administrationdespreuves,ontétédégagésparladoctrineet
surtoutparlajurisprudenceinternationaleencorrespondanceétroiteaveclesrègles
d’interprétationdescontratsadoptéesàl’intérieurdesnationscivilisées.281
Asmuchhasbeensaidbyotherinternationaltribunalstoo.TheTribunalinBoundariesin
theIslandofTimorreliedonanalogiesfromtheinterpretationofcontractsandspokeof
‘theentireaccordofprivatelawandthelawofnationsonthispoint’.282InAbuDhabithe
Tribunalbaseditsinterpretationentirelyonwhatitsawastheapplicablerulesof
constructionastakenfromprivatelaw.283AsCrawfordhas(p.100) observed,ina
moregeneralcontext,itisonlynaturalthatinternationaltribunalsshouldchoose,edit,
andadaptelementsfromotherdevelopedsystems;theresultisabodyofinternational
lawthecontentofwhichhassurelybeeninfluencedbydomesticlawbutwhichisstillits
owncreation.284Thisissurelyalsothecasewithtreatyinterpretation,anditsrelationto
theconstructionofcontracts.Muchaswesawabove,withregardtotheliteratureon
treatyinterpretationandtheroleoftheintentionoftheparties,ithasbeenarguedinthe
literatureandinsomearbitralawardsthattheanalogywhichmaybedrawnfromthe
interpretationofcontractsismainlyonewhichcounselsafocusontheletterofthe
contractandnotontheintentionoftheparties.Thisargumentneedstobeanalysed.
Thecommonlawapproachtotheinterpretationofcontractsissometimesportrayedas
focusingonthetermsofthecontract,tothedetrimentoftheintentionsoftheparties.
ThusinFrenchdoctrine,forexample,thecommonlawapproachisdescribedasone
whereitwouldbecontrarytogoodfaithtotrytoescapetheletterofthecontractby
arguingonthebasisoftheintentionsoftheparties.285Thisapproachhasalsofoundan
echoinEnglishdoctrine;oneauthorrecentlyexpressedthatcontractconstruction‘isnot
concernedwithidentifyingsome(fictional)commonintentionoftheparties’.286Examples
mayalsobefoundofthisinolderarbitralpractice.ThusLordAsquithinAbuDhabi,
holdingthatthoughEnglishmunicipallawwasnotassuchapplicable,someofitsrules
wereso‘firmlygroundedinreason,astoformpartofthisbroadbodyofjurisprudence
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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—this“modernlawofnature”’onwhichhefelttheawardmustbebased,saidthat‘the
Englishrulewhichattributesparamountimportancetotheactuallanguageofthewritten
instrumentinwhichthenegotiationsresultseemstomenomereidiosyncrasyofour
system,butaprincipleofecumenicalvalidity’.287Aswillbecomeclear,thisiscertainlynot
anaccuratedescriptionofhowEnglishcourtsinterpretcontractstoday,anditisnot
entirelyclearthatthiswasanaccuratedescriptioninthe1950seither.288
ItisconvenienttobegintheanalysiswithFrenchlaw,asEnglishlawhasbeencontrasted
withtheFrenchposition.InFrenchlawtheinterpretationofcontractsaimsaboveallto
findthecommonintentionoftheparties.Article1156oftheCodecivilisthusinthe
followingterms:‘Ondoitdanslesconventionsrechercherquelleaétélacommune
intentiondespartiescontractantes,plutôtquedes’arrêterausenslittéraldestermes.’
Asonecommentatorhasputit:
Endroitfrançais,l’interprétationsertprincipalementàrechercherquelleaétéla
communeintentiondesparties,c’est-à-direquellesétaientlestermesdeleuraccord
réel.Dans(p.101) lamesureoùlavolontéinterneestlasourceetlamesurede
l’engagementdesparties,c’estellequ’ilfautprioritairementanalyserpourinterpréterle
contrat.289
Thoughrulesexistwithregardtohowcontractsaretobeinterpreted,theoverarching
ruleaccordingtowhichonemustlookforthecommonintentionofthepartiestrumpsall
otherconsiderations.ThisisalsotheapproachtakenintheUNIDROITprinciplesof
internationalcommercialcontracts.290Article4.1oftheUNIDROITprinciplesthus
providesthat‘Acontractshallbeinterpretedaccordingtothecommonintentionofthe
parties’.ThecommenttoArticle4explicatesthattheprovisionisbasedupon
theprinciplethatindeterminingthemeaningtobeattachedtothetermsofacontract,
preferenceistobegiventotheintentioncommontotheparties.Inconsequence,a
contracttermmaybegivenameaningwhichdiffersbothfromtheliteralsenseofthe
languageusedandfromthemeaningwhichareasonablepersonwouldattachtoit,
providedthatsuchadifferentunderstandingwascommontothepartiesatthetimeof
theconclusionofthecontract.291
Itcanbeseen,intheapproachofFrenchcontractlawandofUNIDROIT,thatthespirit
ofacompoundismoreimportantthanitsletter.ThishasinFrenchlawbeenseenasa
consequenceoftheprincipleofgoodfaith;tobeingoodfaithimpliesnothidingbehind
theletterofthecontract.292IfinotherwordsaFrenchcourtseizedofacontractual
disputehasreasontobelievethattheletterofthecontractdoesnotconformtothe
intentionofthepartiesitcannotstopattheletter.Thisalsoapplieswherethetermsofthe
contractareverygeneral;thespiritofthecontractmustprevail.293
Frenchcontractlawplaces,incommonwithinternationallaw,294apremiumon
effectiveness.Article1157oftheCodecivilcodifiesthatwhichinthelawoftreatiesis
calledtheprincipleofeffectiveness:‘Lorsqu’uneclauseestsusceptiblededeuxsens,on
doitplutôtl’entendredansceluiaveclequelellepeutavoirquelqueeffetquedanslesens
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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aveclequelellen’enpourraitproduireaucun.’Allcontracttermswhichmayleadoneto
doubttherealintentionofthepartiesmustbecheckedinthesensethatonemustmake
surethatthelatterconformtotheintentionoftheparties.295Inothercontinentallaw,
too,thisapproachisprevalent.296ThustheGermanCivilCodemakesclear,inArticle
133,that‘intheinterpretationofa(p.102) declarationofintentthetrueintentionisto
beascertainedwithouttakingaccountoftheliteralmeaningoftheterms’,andthisis
qualifiedbyArticle157,whichprovidesthat:‘agreementsmustbeinterpretedaccording
togoodfaith,ordinaryusagebeingtakenintoaccount’.Article1247oftheItalianCivil
Codeisinthefollowingterms:‘Nelleconvenzionisideveindagarequalesiastatala
communeintenzionedelleparticontrahenti,anzichéattenersialsensoletteraledelle
parole’.ThusinItalianlawcontractinterpretationisaboutestablishingthecommon
intentionoftheparties,andthecontractinterpreterisinthisendeavouraided
considerablybytheprincipleofgoodfaith.297
InfacttheEnglishapproachisverysimilar.Inthecommonlawtheaimofinterpretinga
provisioninacontractistodeterminewhatthepartiesmeantbythelanguageused.An
overviewoftheEnglishapproachwasgivenbyLordBingham,whoobservedthat:
Thereare(orwere)somewhofavouraveryliteralreadingoftheprecisetermsinwhich
thepartieshavechosentoexpresstheirbargain.Otherswouldinterpretthecontractina
broadercontextualsettingoffactsknowntothepartieswhencontracting.Theopinion
currentlyprevailinginEnglandandWalesisthatthecourtshoulddoboth,startingwitha
carefulconsiderationofwhatthepartieshaveactuallywrittenbutreadingthisinthelight
ofwhatthepartiesknewandmayobjectivelybetakentohaveintended.Inthisway,itis
hoped,thereasonableintentionsandexpectationsofhonestbusinessmen,dealingin
goodfaith,willbegiveneffect.298
ItwasverymuchinthismodethatLordHoffmann,inInvestorsCompensationScheme
LtdvWestBromwichBuildingSociety,299summarizedtheprinciplesonwhichthe
interpreterofacontractistorelyinEnglishlaw.ThegistofLordHoffmann’sjudgmentis
conveyedbyhisfirstandfifthprinciplesoncontractconstruction.Accordingtohisfirst
principle,interpretationistheascertainmentofthemeaningwhichthedocumentwould
conveytoareasonablepersonhavingallthebackgroundknowledgewhichwould
reasonablyhavebeenavailabletotheparties.Hisfifthprinciplesaysthatifonecan
concludefromthebackgroundofthecontractthatsomethingmusthavegonewrong
withthelanguageofthecontractthenthelawdoesnotrequirejudgestoattributetothe
partiesanintentionwhichtheyplainlycouldnothavehad.300
Theseprinciplesarewell-establishedpointsofdeparture,301 andhavebeenapprovedin
laterjurisprudence.302Theydonot,however,necessarilyprovidea(p.103) solution
setinstone.TheleadingSupremeCourtauthorityisnowRainySkySAandothersv
KookminBank,whereLordClarke,withwhomtherestoftheSupremeCourtagreed,
saidthat:‘theultimateaimofinterpretingaprovisioninacontract,especiallya
commercialcontract,istodeterminewhatthepartiesmeant’.303Theprinciplesof
contractconstructiondonot,however,saidLordClarke,citingHoffmannLJinCooperativeWholesaleSocietyLtdvNationalWestminsterBankplc,‘meanthatonecan
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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rewritethelanguagewhichthepartieshaveusedinordertomakethecontractconform
tobusinesscommonsense.Butlanguageisaveryflexibleinstrumentand,ifitiscapable
ofmorethanoneconstruction,onechoosesthatwhichseemsmostlikelytogiveeffectto
thecommercialpurposeoftheagreement’.304
Therelationbetweenthisbusinesssenseandthewordingofthecontractwasdiscussed
extrajudiciallybyLordSteyn,whoinanarticlesaidthat,generallyspeaking:
commerciallymindedjudgeswouldregardthecommercialpurposeofthecontractas
moreimportantthannicetiesoflanguage.And,intheeventofdoubt,theworking
assumptionwillbethatafairconstructionbestmatchesthereasonableexpectationsof
theparties.305
LordClarkesaidinRainySkySAandothersvKookminBankthatheagreedwiththis
approachandalsowithwhatLordSteynheldinSocietyofLloyd’svRobinson,wherethe
latterobservedthat:
intheprocessofinterpretingthemeaningofthelanguageofacommercialdocumentthe
courtoughtgenerallytofavouracommerciallysensibleconstruction.Thereasonforthis
approachisthatacommercialconstructionislikelytogiveeffecttotheintentionofthe
parties.Wordsoughtthereforetobeinterpretedinthewayinwhichareasonable
commercialpersonwouldconstruethem.Andthereasonablecommercialpersoncan
safelybeassumedtobeunimpressedwithtechnicalinterpretationsandundueemphasis
onnicetiesoflanguage.306
InEnglishlaw,therefore,forthepurposesoftheinterpretationofcontracts,theintention
ofthepartiesisthemeaningofthecontract.307
Therealobjectofcontractinterpretation,inthecommonlawasinthecivillawlaw,isto
giveeffecttotheintentionoftheparties.Innowayaretheseprinciplesnewtothe
commonlawofcontractortothecivillaw.Upholdingthecommonintentionofthe
contractingpartieshasbeenpresentedasthedefiningphilosophyofthe(p.104) English
commonlawofcontractforupwardsof150years,308andaswesawfromtheprovisions
oftheFrenchCivilCode,theyrepresentedtheorthodoxviewalsoinearlynineteenthcenturyFrance.
Inspiteofthevarietyofitsobjects,thetreaty,asaconceptofinternationallaw,hasbeen
mainlyindebtedinthecourseofitsdevelopmenttothecontractofprivatelawandof
contractconstructionincontractlaw.309TheTribunalinAzpetrolwasrighttopointout
that‘ininterpretingacontract,contemporaryEnglishlawhasfewtechnicalrules’.310This
conclusionisstrikinglysimilartoBrierly’sclassicpropositionwithrespecttotreaty
interpretation:‘therearenotechnicalrulesininternationallawfortheinterpretationof
treaties’.311 Itistrue,asClaphamhassaid,thatwiththeadoptionofthedetailedVCLT
rules,thispropositionmayindeedbequestioned,312butBrierly’spropositiondeserved
toberetainedtotheextentthat,incommonwiththatwhichmaybeconcludedfromthe
perspectiveofcontractlaw,itwarnsagainstafocusonmaximsofconstructionthatmay
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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obscuretherealobjectiveofinterpretation,which‘canonlybetogiveeffecttothe
intentionofthepartiesasfullyandfairlyaspossible’.313Onthisbackgrounditiseasyto
agreewiththeTribunalinAzpetrol,whenitconcludedthatinmostrespectstheapproach
takenbyEnglishcourtstocontractconstruction‘issimilartothatprescribedby
internationallawfortheinterpretationoftreaties’.314InEurotunneltheTribunalstated
thattheprinciplesofinterpretationlaiddownintheVCLT‘aredeclaratoryalsofor
agreementsbetweenStatesandprivatepartiesunderinternationallawandshouldbe
appliedtoresolveanydiscrepancies’.315Indeed,whilethereisadistinctionbetween
treatyandcontract,theyarepartofthesameoneworld; 316or,asFitzmauriceonce
said:
Theviewthattheintentionsofthepartiesarerelevant,andthattoascertainandgive
effecttothemistheprimeandsolelegitimateobjectofinterpretation,isnotonlythe
(p.105) traditionalbutalsothejuridicallynaturalview,derivedfromwell-known
principlesofprivatecontractlaw.317
3.3.6Domesticlawandevolutionaryinterpretation
Whileitusedtobethecasethatauthorswouldsaythatstatutesweretobeinterpreted
morestrictlythantreaties,thisishardlythecaseanymore.318Manynationalsystems
couldherebegivenasexamples.Thecommonlaw–civillawviewadoptedabovecould
havebeenfruitfulheretoo.InFrenchlawthecourtshavetoaverylargeextentbeen
willingtoadoptevolutionaryinterpretationsoflegalterms,andthisisnotleastduetothe
wayinwhichFrenchlegislationhasbeendrafted,certainlysincetheNapoleonicCodes
butalsobeforethat.319TheFrenchCourdecassationtookanevolutionaryapproachto
stauteinterpretationwhen,inafamouslineofcases,320itinterpretedArticle2279ofthe
CivilCode.Thisarticleprovidesthat:‘Enfaitdemeubles,lapossessionvauttitre’(‘In
mattersofmovables,possessionisequivalenttoatitle’).When,in1804,thearticlewas
draftedonecouldnothavethoughtofnon-corporealproperty,asthatdidnotatthetime
existinthewayinwhichitwouldcomeintoexistenceinthenineteenthcentury.The
questionthereforearoseastowhethersuchmovablesweretobeseenasbeing
coveredbythetermsofthearticle.TheCourdecassation,bywayofevolutionary
interpretationofthetermsusedbythelegislator,heldthattheselaterphenomenawere
infactcovered,astheterm‘meubles’wasofitselfcapableofgeneralizationandthus
applicabletoalltypesofmovables.321 Germancourts,too,havetakenthisapproach,
whileadmittedlyitmayhavebeenlesspronouncedthanithasbeeninFrance.322The
GermanFederalConstitutionalCourtinalineofauthoritiesbeginningintheearly1950s
developedGermanconstitutionallawbyrelianceuponadoctrineof‘Verfassungswandel’,
accordingtowhichtermsintheBasicLawwereinterpretedevolutionarily.323InUSlaw
thecourtstakeanapproachtobothstatutoryandconstitutionalinterpretationwhichis
verysimilartotheonetakenbyinternationaltribunalstotreatyinterpretationandthe
evolutionoftreatyconcepts,thoughofcoursethatisaparticularlyfraughtissuewithin
USlaw.324(p.106)
InafamouscasebeforetheDutchcourtstheDistrictCourtofRotterdamwasfacedwith
thequestionofwhetheraprovisionwhichreferredto‘telegraphcables’couldbe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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interpretedastoincludetelephonecables,eventhoughthesehadnotyetbeen
developedatthetimethatthe1884ConventionontheProtectionofSubmarine
Cables325wasconcluded.Thecourtthoughtthatitwasreasonabletoincludethelater
telephonecablesintheinterpretationofwhatwasprotectedundertheconvention.326
Nonetheless,thepresentanalysiswillconcentrateontheapproachtakenbythecommon
lawcourts.Inadditiontothefactthatspacewouldprecludegoingintoallthesystems
justmentionedinanydepth,thereisanotherreasonwhythecommonlawcaselawhas
beenchosen.ItistheopenwayinwhichtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedKingdomand
Wales(previouslytheJudicialCommitteeoftheHouseofLords)andthePrivyCouncil
argueandexplicatethewayinwhichtheyinterpretanddevelopthelaw:theyforthis
reasonprovidematerialthatparticularlyeasilylendsitselftoanalysisinthepresent
context.Thestyleofjudgmentinthecommonlawresemblestheoneadoptedby
internationaltribunals.
AstrikingexampleinthisregardisNewZealandMaoriCouncilvAttorney-General.327
TheNewZealandCourtofAppealinthiscasetookthesameapproachtotheTreatyof
Waitangi,aconventionsignedin1840betweentheMaoriandGreatBritain.PresidentSir
RobinCooke,onbehalfofaunanimousCourtofAppeal,statedthat‘thetreatyhastobe
seenasanembryoratherthanafullydevelopedandintegratedsetofideas’;thecorrect
approachwouldbetointerpretthetreaty‘widelyandeffectivelyandasaliving
instrumenttakingaccountofthesubsequentdevelopmentsofinternationalhumanrights
norms’.328
ThePrivyCouncilinEdwards329hadtodecidewhether,forthepurposeofsection24of
theBritishNorthAmericaAct1867(theActcontainingatthetimetheCanadian
constitution)womenwereinfact‘persons’,andwhetherbyextensiontheycouldbe
membersoftheCanadianSenate.Aslateas1909,inNairnvUniversityofStAndrews,
theHouseofLordshadheldthatwomengraduatesfromScottishuniversitieswerenot
‘persons’whowereabletovoteintheelectionofmembersofParliamentfortheScottish
universities.330
ItwasplainenoughthatwhentheActwasadoptedthetermhadreferredtomenonly.In
itsjudgment,writtenbySankeyLC,theboardofthePrivyCouncillaythefoundationsof
thatwhichwouldlaterbereferredtoinCanadian(p.107) constitutionaljurisprudence
as‘livingtreeinterpretation’andadoptedanevolutionaryinterpretation.331
InfactthewayinwhichthePrivyCouncilinterpretedthestatuteinEdwardscouldbe
thoughttobesurprisinglyakintothemethodusedbyinternationaltribunals,suchasthe
InternationalCourtinNavigationalRights.332Inatwo-stepapproachthePrivyCouncil,
first,tookasitsstartingpointtheintentionsofParliament,whichnecessarilywere
contemporaneouswiththeadoptionofthestatute;then,secondly,itunderlinedthatthe
takingofthisasastartingpointdidnot,however,signifythatastheterm’smeaningwas
nolongerthesameasitwasatthedateofconclusion,noaccountshouldeverbetakenof
itsmeaningatthetimewhenthestatutewastobeinterpretedforthepurposesofits
application.
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ThustheboardofthePrivyCouncilinitsinterpretationturned,attheoutset,totheAct’s
‘objectandpurpose’.Ittookintoaccount‘thefactsexistingatthetimewithrespectto
whichtheLegislaturewaslegislating’333asalegitimatetopictoconsiderinascertaining
whatwastheobjectandpurposeoftheLegislaturepassingtheAct.Thenitturnedfrom
theconditionscontemporaneouswiththeadoptionofthestatutetotheconditions
requiredbytheevolutionoflaw.TheaccountwhichthePrivyCouncilgaveofthepassing
oftheActwasonewhichsetthestageforevolutionaryinterpretation:itstressedthatthe
communitiesoftheCommonwealth‘embracecountriesandpeoplesineverystageof
social,politicalandeconomicdevelopmentandundergoingacontinuousprocessof
evolution’.334
Inviewofthisarestrictiveinterpretationwastobeavoided;theboarddidnotinany
waywishtocutdowntheprovisionsoftheActbyanarrowandtechnicalconstruction,
butrathertogiveitalargeandliberalinterpretation.Itwasplainlythedemandsof
evolutionthatthePrivyCouncilhadinmindwhenitcontinuedtosaythatthe‘British
NorthAmericaActplantedinCanadaalivingtreecapableofgrowthandexpansionwithin
itsnaturallimits’.335
LadyHale,inananalysisofEdwards,concludedthatthecommonlawisnostrangerto
theconceptofevolutionaryinterpretation.336Shefocusedonhowcommonlawcourts
whenitcomestotheinterpretationofstatutesintheorylookforthe‘intentionof
Parliament’.Attimesthismaybesomewhatofanillusion,however,‘becauseonmost
pointswhichcomebeforeusParliamentdidnothaveanyintentionatall’.337Commonlaw
judgesthen,incommonwithinternationaljudges,infertheintentionofthelegislation
fromthetermsused,readinthelightofthestatutorypurpose.338(p.108)
Manymoderncasescouldbereliedonheretounderscorethispoint.339Twoexamples
showtheapproachtakentodaybythecourtsintheUnitedKingdomtoevolving
statutorytermsparticularlyclearly.Thesetwoexamplesshow,generally,theaffinity
whichexistsbetweentheevolutionaryinterpretationsadoptedbyinternationaltribunals
andtheinterpretationsadoptedinanumberofcasesbycommonlawcourts,butthey
alsoeachbringoutaspecificpointwithregardtoevolutionaryinterpretation.
First,theUKSupremeCourtinYemshaw340gaveanillustrativeexampleofjusthow
naturallyevolutionaryinterpretationcomestocommonlawyers.Inthiscasethegeneric
statutoryterminissuewas‘violence’.Thiskindofgenericstatutorytermis,theSupreme
Courtsaid,capableofaccommodatingchangeanddevelopmentovertime.This,asLord
Brownunderscored,wasnothingelsethanapplyinga‘“livinginstrument”,“always
speaking”approachtostatutoryconstruction’.341 Thephrase‘alwaysspeaking’goesback
totheVictoriandraftsmanLordThring,whoexhorteddraftsmentodraftlegislationso
that‘anActofParliamentshouldbedeemedtobealwaysspeaking’.342Theintentionon
thepartofthosedraftinglegislationthatthestatuteshallbecapableofkeepingupwith
thetimesobviouslyhasasidetoevolutionaryinterpretation,andLordBrownwassurely
righttopointthatout.
Secondly,theHouseofLordsinQuintavallehadtoconsiderwhetheralivehuman
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embryocreatedbycellnuclearreplacementbywayofatechniquenotknownatthetime
whenthestatutewasenacted,fellwithintheHumanFertilisationandEmbryologyAct
1990.343Section1(1)ofthatActsaidthat,exceptwhereotherwisestated,theterm
‘embryo’wastomean‘alivehumanembryowherefertilisationiscomplete’.Lord
Binghamsaidthefollowingabouttherelationshipbetweenevolutionaryinterpretationand
theintentionofParliament:
Thereis,Ithink,noinconsistencybetweentherulethatstatutorylanguageretainsthe
meaningithadwhenParliamentuseditandtherulethatastatuteisalwaysspeaking.If
Parliament,howeverlongago,passedanActapplicabletodogs,itcouldnotproperlybe
interpretedtoapplytocats;butitcouldproperlybeheldtoapplytoanimalswhichwere
notregardedasdogswhentheActwaspassedbutaresoregardednow.Themeaningof
(p.109) ‘cruelandunusualpunishments’hasnotchangedovertheyearssince1689,
butmanypunishmentswhichwerenotthenthoughttofallwithinthatcategorywould
nowbeheldtodoso.344
Thistypeofinterpretationhasbeenexplicatedintheliteratureasaconstructionwhich
doesnotalterthemeaningoftheoriginalwording‘inwayswhichdonotfallwithinthe
principlesoriginallyenvisagedbythatwording’.345
Thesetwopoints—thecloseconnection,pointedoutbyLordBrowninYemshaw,
between‘livinginstrument’and‘alwaysspeaking’interpretation,andLordBingham’s
pointinQuintavallethatstatutorytermsretainthemeaningtheyalwayshadwhenthey
areseentobealwaysspeaking—leadustoathirdone.Thereisinfactapresumptionin
Englishlawthatlegislativelanguageistobeinterpretedevolutionarily,orasalways
speaking.346LordSteynsummedthepointupinthefollowingway:‘Parliamentmustbe
deemedtocontemplatethatgenerallyitsstatuteswillendureforaconsiderabletime,
andthatunlessstatutesevinceacontraryintention,theywillbejudgedtobeconstantly
speaking’.347This,tonolessadegreethanincontractlaw,isthensquarelybasedupon
theestablishmentofanintention.Forthepurposesofcomparisonitisinterestingthat
thereisinfactapresumptioninthecommonlawthatunlessotherwiseprovidedforthe
statuteistobeinterpretedevolutionarily,as‘alwaysspeaking’.
3.3.7‘Interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’
Akandehasposedthequestion,shouldtheordinarymeaningofatreatytexttrumpthe
intentionofthepartieswithregardtothattreaty?Hisanswertothatquestionisyes.He
continuestosaythat‘thisiswhattheVCLTsays’;‘thereasontopreferordinarymeaning
tothesupposedintentionoftheparties,particularlyinamultilateraltreaty,isbecause
theintentionofthepartiescanbeandisoftendifficulttogleanapartfromtheactual
wordsused’.348
Similarly,SorelandEvenohavearguedthat‘inconformitywithitslineofconduct
privilegingtextualinterpretation,theICJhasaccordedminimalspacefortheintentionof
theparties’.349TheauthorssuggestthattheInternationalCourthasplacedweightonthe
intentionofthepartiesonlyinastrictlysupplementarymanner,andthatthischoicehas
beenmadesoas‘nottogivefoddertocritics’.350If(p.110) onetakesthisnarrowan
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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approachtotreatyinterpretationitisclearthattheremaybetimeswhenanevolutionary
interpretationbecomesimpossible,blockedbytheprecedencetakenbytheletterofthe
treaty.
ThisapproachiscertainlynotwithoutbasisintheInternationalCourt’sjurisprudence.In
amuchquoteddictuminTerritorialDispute,theInternationalCourtsaidthat
‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’.351 Thedictum
followsinthesameveinasthatwhichtheInternationalCourtsaidonanearlieroccasion:
‘iftherelevantwordsintheirnaturalandordinarymeaningmakesenseintheircontext,
thatisanendofthematter’.352
Crawfordhaswarnedthat‘itmaydisplayalackofcautiontoextractgeneralpropositions
fromopinionsorjudgmentsdevotedtoaspecificproblemortothesettlementofa
disputeentangledwiththespecialrelationsoftwostates’.353Nonetheless,aswillbeseen
below,thedictumwasforaperiodreferredtobytheInternationalCourt,aswellas
othercourts,onseveraloccasions,soitdeservestobetakenseriously.
ThepassagejustquotedfromTerritorialDisputehasindeedbeentakenasgoodlaw,and
wasforawhilequotedregularly,bothininternationaljurisprudenceandindoctrine.354
Nonetheless,andthistiesinwithCrawford’spointaboutcautioninrespectofextracting
generalpropositionsfromjudgmentssettlingspecificproblems,355itmaybethat
focusingonjudicialdictainthiswayislesshelpfulthanwhatmightinitiallybethought.Itis
instructiveheretoadverttothatwhichLauterpachtsaidaboutthealluringbut
erroneousdoctrineof‘clearmeaning’(accordingtowhich‘iln’estpaspermis
d’interprétercequin’apasbesoind’interprétation’),356iethat:‘Therulethus
formulatedseemstobepre-eminentlyreasonable.Itsobviousnessexplainsthe
frequencywithwhichitisinvoked.’357Thesameisthecasewiththedictumthat
‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’.358Ithasanallureof
obviousnessbutdoesinthefinalanalysisnotgiveatruthfulpictureoftheinterpretive
techniqueusedbytheCourtinthecasewhereitappearedandmoregenerallyinthe
practiceofinternationaltribunals.Ifwetake(p.111) thispronouncementatfacevalue
—‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’359—thenthe
followingmustcertainlybepointedout.
Asmentionedaboveinrelationtogoodfaith,theTribunalinRhineChloridescommented
onthedictum.TheTribunal(consistingofGuillaume,Koojimans,andSkubiszewski,the
lastofwhompresided)saidthat:
IntheTerritorialDispute(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Chad)case,theCourtstatedthat
‘interpretationmustbebasedabovealluponthetextofthetreaty’.Inthisregard,the
Tribunalemphasisesthatthetextofthetreatyisanotiondistinctfrom,andbroaderthan,
thenotionof‘terms’.Relyingonthetextdoesnotmeanrelyingsolely,ormainly,onthe
ordinarymeaningoftheterms.Suchasolutionwouldeffectivelyignorethereferencesto
goodfaith,thecontext,andtheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.Theordinarymeaningof
thetermsisevenitselfdeterminedasafunctionofthecontext,objectandpurposeofthe
treaty.Lastly,asparagraph2ofArticle31oftheViennaConventionprovides,thetextof
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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thetreaty(includingthepreambleandannexes)isitselfpartofthecontextforthe
purposesofinterpretation.360
TheTribunalmadeclearthatifoneweretoadopttheapproachsummedupinthedictum
fromTerritorialDisputethenthatwouldnotmeanadoptinganinterpretationfounded
uniquelyorevenmainlyontheordinarymeaningoftheterms,seeingasthiswouldrun
countertothereferenceinthegeneralruletogoodfaith,context,andtoobjectand
purpose,andfinallythe‘ordinarymeaningoftheterms’willinitselfbeafunctionof
contextaswellasthetreaty’sobjectandpurpose.Inthemodeof2Cor3:6—‘Theletter
killethbutthespiritgivethlife’—theselinesseemtocautionagainsttakingtooseriously
theInternationalCourt’sdictuminTerritorialDispute.Nonetheless,aswasseenabove,
ithasindeedbeenquotedandfollowedinotherdecisionsupuntilLegalityoftheUseof
Force,361 thoughnotinlaterdecisionsontreatyinterpretation.
If,however,onelooksatwhattheInternationalCourtwentonactuallytodoinTerritorial
Dispute,oneseesthattheconclusionstowhichonemightbeledbyputtingtoomuch
storeuponthedictumarewrong.ThisshowsthattheInternationalCourtdidinfact
conductitsinterpretationalongthesamelinesastheTribunalinRhineChloridessaid
mustbethecorrectapproach:Thetextoftheprovisioninquestionwasimportanttothe
interpretationinTerritorialDisputeonlyinsofarasit,inthewordsoftheInternational
Court,‘conveystheintentionofthepartiestoreachadefinitivesettlementofthe
question’whichtheyhadsoughttosolve.362(p.112)
TheCourtthenreadthetreaty‘inthelightofitsobjectandpurpose’,andfound,after
havingextractedfromthetreaty’spreambletheaimsofthetreaty,thatthe‘objectand
purposeoftheTreatythusrecalledconfirmtheinterpretationoftheTreatygivenabove,
inasmuchasthatobjectandpurposelednaturallytotheinterpretationoftheTreaty’to
whichtheintentionoftheparties,aswellastheprincipleofeffectiveness,hadpointed.363
InotherwordseventheinterpretationinTerritorialDisputeturnsouttohavebeen
madeonthebasisofabroadrangeofmeansofinterpretation.TheCourtbeganbygoing
tothetext,butalsoreliedupontheobjectandpurpose,asextractedfromthepreamble,
andtheprincipleofeffectivenessinordertoestablishthecommonintentionofthe
parties.Apartfromthemuchquoteddictum,thereisnotmuchabouttheinterpretation
whichtheCourtmadeinTerritorialDisputethatis,instrictterms,text-focused.
Adictumwhichperhapsbetterdescribestheprocessoftreatyinterpretationingeneral
internationallawisthatwhichthepanel(amongothersSimma,Tomka,andHiggins,the
lastofwhompresided)gaveinIronRhine:‘Theobjectandpurposeofatreaty,taken
togetherwiththeintentionsoftheparties,aretheprevailingelementsfor
interpretation’.364Whilstitcouldbearguedthatthisstatementfailstomakeclearthatthe
intentionofthepartiesisnotameansofinterpretationbutrathertheresultofthe
interpretiveprocess,itisabettersummationthanthedictumfromTerritorialDisputeof
theapproachtakentotreatyinterpretationbyinternationalcourtsandtribunals.365
Therearecompetingviewsastoexactlyhowtosquareatreaty’stextwithitsobjectand
purpose;itistothisdebatethatthechapternowturns.(p.113)
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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3.3.8Treatyinterpretationandobjectandpurposegenerally
Afewwordsshouldbesaidinintroductionabouttheterminology‘objectandpurpose’.
Thetwowordsareoftenusedinterchangeably.Theymay,however,leadtosome
confusioniftheyareusedassynonyms.The‘object’ofaninstrumentreferstothe
juridicaleffectoftheinstrument;the‘purpose’hasateleologicelementwhichrefersto
theaimsofthecontractingparties.366Sometimesthedistinctionisclearer,andthe
confusionlessevident,inFrench.
ThefollowingextractfromthejudgmentofthePermanentCourtinMinoritySchoolsin
Albaniaissometimesusedtoshedlightonthedifferencebetweenthetwoconcepts:
‘Pouratteindrecebutdeuxchosessurtoutontétéconsidéréescommenécessaireset
fontl’objetdesdispositionsdesditstraités’.TheEnglishversionisperhapsless
instructiveinthisregardbutthepointismadetheretoo:‘Inordertoattainthisobject,
twothingswereregardedasparticularlynecessary,andhaveformedthesubjectof
provisionsinthesetreaties.’367
Thepreambleofatreatyisanimportantplacetosearchforthecommonintentionofthe
parties.368TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsputitthusinGolder:‘thepreambleis
generallyveryusefulforthedeterminationofthe“object”and“purpose”ofthe
instrumenttobeconstrued.’369Nonetheless,perhapsthemostimportantplaceto
searchfortheobjectandthepurposeofatreatyisthetextitself.Allthemeansof
interpretationavailablecaninprinciplecontributetotheestablishmentoftheobjectand
purposeofatreaty.AsVilligerputsit:
ThestructureofArticle31asaGeneralRuleleavesnodoubtthatalltheelementsof
Article31aswellasthesupplementarymeansofinterpretationinArticle32contributeto
thisend.370
Inthissenseoneoughtnottoconceiveof,ontheonehand,thetextand,ontheother,
theobjectandpurposeasnecessarilybeingatoddswithoneanotherornecessarily
beingaltogetherdifferententities.ThepointhasbeenmadebyCombacauthatreliance
onobjectandpurposedoesnotnecessarilymeanrelianceona‘constructive’
interpretation;ratheritmeanstointerpretaparticularterminthelightofthatwhichmay
bedrawnfromthetreatyasawhole.371 Itwouldnotthereforebe(p.114) correctto
assumethatthetextitselfdoesnothaveanimportantroletoplayintheascertainmentof
theobjectandpurposeofatreaty.372
TheVCLTbringsouttheparticularimportanceofatreaty’sobjectandpurposebyits
insistentmentioningoftheobjectandpurposeofatreaty;Articles18,20(2),41,58,60(3)
(b),aswellasArticle31(1),allspeakoftheobjectandpurposeofatreaty.Forthe
purposesoftreatyinterpretationitisespeciallytherelationshipbetweenatreaty’sobject
andpurposeandtheintentionofthepartiesinconcludingthetreatythatisofinterest.
DeVisschersaidoftheapproachoftheVCLTthat,incommonwiththejurisprudenceof
theInternationalCourt,‘laConventiondeVienneadoptecommecritèred’interprétation
“l’objetetlebutdutraité”’.373IndeVisscher’sviewthesearchfortheintentionofthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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partiesisintimatelytiedtotheobjectandpurpose;theInternationalCourt,hesaid,
‘pouréclairerl’intentiondesparties,recherchel’objetoulebutdutraité’.374
Similarly,Higginshasunderlinedthiscloserelationshipbetweentheintentionofthe
partiesandtheobjectandpurposeofatreatybysayingthattreatyinterpretationmust
beconductedbyapplicationofthewiderprinciplewhichguidesthelawoftreaties—the
searchfortheintentionoftheparties,‘reflectedbyreferencetotheobjectsand
purpose’.375Indeedinherviewtheintentionofthepartiesshouldbe‘deducedfromthe
objectandthepurposeoftheagreement’.376Guillaumehassaidthatwhilethetermsofa
treatyprovisionintheirordinarymeaningformthebasisfortheinquiryofthe
InternationalCourtintotheintentionoftheparties,theobjectandpurposeofatreaty
‘areequallystrongexpressionsoftheparties’intentionandcouldsometimesexpressthe
parties’intentmoreclearlywithrespecttoaspecificprovision’.377Reuter,oneofthe
leadingdraftersoftheVCLT,alsoputapremiumonthenexusbetweentheintentionsof
thepartiesandtheirtreaty’sobjectandpurpose.Heobservedthat,ontheonehand,
thepurposeoftreatyinterpretationis‘toascertaintheintentionofthepartiesby
referencetotheform,thefinalclausesandespeciallytheobjectandpurposeofthe
treaty’378andthat,ontheotherhand,inadditiontohavingbeenmanifested,the
intentions‘mustconcurtoformtheobjectandpurposeoftheagreement,bothofwhich
playsoprominentapartinthewholelawoftreaties’.379AccordingtoReuterthe
importantroleplayedbytheobjectandpurposewithintheViennarulesshouldnotbe
seenasanexceptiontotheprincipleoftheautonomyofthewillofthestate.380Ratherit
istheobjectivereinforcementofthatveryprinciple.Theobjectandthepurposeofa
treatyaretheessentialelementsoftheintentionoftheparties:itistobeassumed,
therefore,that(p.115) thepartieswouldnotwishforthatobjectandpurpose,freely
chosenbythemastheircommongood,tobefrustrated.381
Intheliteratureitisnonethelessoftenarguedthatinthelawoftreatiestheobjectand
purposeofaninstrumentplayalessimportantrolethanthewording.Austhas,for
example,saidabouttheobjectandpurposeofatreatythat‘fortunately,theroleitplays
ininterpretingtreatiesislessthanthesearchfortheordinarymeaningofthewordsin
theircontext’;‘havingregardtotheobjectandpurposeismoreforthepurposeof
confirminganinterpretation’.382This,inAust’sview,isclearfromthejurisprudenceof
theInternationalCourt,asthejudgmentsoftheCourt,eveninitsadvisoryopinionson
theUnitedNationsCharter,383accordingtoAust,‘donotsuggestthatininterpretingthe
ChartertheCourthasbeenmindedtofollowadoctrinaire,teleologicalapproach’.384
ThejurisprudenceoftheInternationalCourthastakentheapproachaccordingtowhich
objectandthepurposeofatreatyaretheessentialelementsoftheintentionofthe
parties.ThusinReservationstotheConventiononGenocide,wheretheInternational
Court,afterstressingthattheobjectsoftheGenocideConvention385mustbegivendue
consideration,heldthattheidealsinspiringthetreatymustberegardedto‘provide,by
virtueofthecommonwilloftheparties,thefoundationandmeasureofallits
provisions’.386InGabčíkovo–NagymarostheInternationalCourttookasimilarapproach,
statingthat,inaccordancewithArticle26oftheVCLT,‘everytreatyinforceisbinding
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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uponthepartiestoitandmustbeperformedbythemingoodfaith’;thislatterelement,
theCourtcontinued:
impliesthat,inthiscase,itisthepurposeoftheTreaty,andtheintentionsofthepartiesin
concludingit,whichshouldprevailoveritsliteralapplication.Theprincipleofgoodfaith
obligesthePartiestoapplyitinareasonablewayinsuchamannerthatitspurposecan
berealized.387
(p.116)
InOilPlatforms(PreliminaryObjection)theInternationalCourtunderlinedthe
importanceof‘thespiritandintent’ofatreatyassetoutingeneraltermsinArticle1of
thetreaty:‘thespiritandintentsetoutinthisArticleanimateandgivemeaningtothe
entireTreatyandmust,incaseofdoubt,inclinetheCourttotheconstructionwhich
seemsmoreinconsonancewithitsoverallobjective’.388Article1ofthetreaty,theCourt
said,‘cannotbeinterpretedinisolationfromtheobjectandpurposeoftheTreatyin
whichitisinserted’.389TheCourtinQuestionsrelatingtotheObligationtoProsecuteor
Extradite,citingfromthepreambleoftheTortureConvention,390underlinedthe
importanceoftheobjectandpurpose,consideringthat‘theobligationonaStateto
prosecute,providedforinArticle7,paragraph1,oftheConvention,isintendedtoallow
thefulfilmentoftheConvention’sobjectandpurpose,whichis“tomakemoreeffective
thestruggleagainsttorture”’.391 AndenasandWeatherallhaveconvincinglyarguedthat
theCourtcouldhavereliedontheConvention’spurposeinmakingtheprohibition
againsttortureeffective,andthetortureprohibition’scustomaryinternationallaw
characterasjuscogensandergaomnesininterpretingtheobligationtoextraditeor
prosecuteundertheTortureConventionassufficienttoprovideBelgiumwithstanding
beforetheCourt,onthebasisofagenerallegalinterestintheperformanceofthe
obligation.392
Itisnonethelesstruethat,inSouthWestAfrica,theInternationalCourttookcarenotto
engagein‘teleologic’interpretation(without,however,takingastanceinprincipletothis
typeofinterpretation),andstatedthat:
ItmaybeurgedthattheCourtisentitledtoengageinaprocessof‘fillinginthegaps’,in
theapplicationofateleologicalprincipleofinterpretation,accordingtowhichinstruments
mustbegiventheirmaximumeffectinordertoensuretheachievementoftheir
underlyingpurposes.TheCourtneednothereenquireintothescopeofaprinciplethe
exactbearingofwhichishighlycontroversial,foritisclearthatitcanhavenoapplication
incircumstancesinwhichtheCourtwouldhavetogobeyondwhatcanreasonablybe
regardedasbeingaprocessofinterpretation,andwouldhavetoengageinaprocessof
rectificationorrevision.393
ButinLaGrandtheCourtarrivedataninterpretation394inwhichtheobjectandpurpose
entirelyoverrodewhatmighthaveseemedatfirstglancetobethemeaning(atleastthe
Englishversion)ofArticle41oftheCourt’sStatute.395This,asformerPresident
Guillaumehasobserved,wasclearlyateleologicinterpretation.396The(p.117) Courtin
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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LaGrandmadeclearthattheobjectandpurposeoftheStatutewastoenabletheCourt
tofulfilthefunctionsprovidedforintheStatute,andinparticular,thebasicfunctionof
judicialsettlementofinternationaldisputesbybindingdecisionsinaccordancewith
Article59oftheStatute.TheCourtwentontosaythat:
ItfollowsfromtheobjectandpurposeoftheStatute,aswellasfromthetermsofArticle
41whenreadintheircontext,thatthepowertoindicateprovisionalmeasuresentailsthat
suchmeasuresshouldbebinding,inasmuchasthepowerinquestionisbasedonthe
necessity,whenthecircumstancescallforit,tosafeguard,andtoavoidprejudiceto,the
rightsofthepartiesasdeterminedbythefinaljudgmentoftheCourt.Thecontentionthat
provisionalmeasuresindicatedunderArticle41mightnotbebindingwouldbecontrary
totheobjectandpurposeofthatArticle.397
TheCourtthusshowedtheprominentimportancewhichmustbegiventoatreaty’s
objectandpurpose—tothedetrimentofthatwhichmightprimafacieseemtofollowfrom
thetreaty’swording.
ThesameisclearfromthejurisprudenceofthePermanentCourt.InRightsofMinorities
inUpperSilesia(MinoritySchools)thePermanentCourtreliedontheobjectand
purposeoftheinstrumenttobeinterpreted,asitheldthat‘theTreatywouldfailinits
purposeifitwerenottobeconsideredasanestablishedfactthatpersonswhobelonged
defactotosuchaminoritymustenjoytheprotectionwhichhadbeenstipulated’.398The
TribunalinOrdelaBanquenationaled’Albanieheldthatonemaynotrelyonthetextof
atreatyinstrumentifthattext‘n’estpascompatibleavecl’objetetlebutdeces
engagements’.399Investmenttreatyarbitrationtribunals,too,gofarinrelyinguponthe
objectandpurposeintreatyinterpretation;thejurisprudenceonArticle52oftheICSID
Convention,400onannulmentofawards,isagoodexampleinthisregard.401 Asthe
TribunalheldinHusseinNuamanSoufrakivUnitedArabEmirates:
Article52oftheICSIDConventionmustbereadinaccordancewiththeprinciplesof
treatyinterpretationformingpartofgeneralinternationallaw,whichprinciplesinsiston
neitherrestrictivenorextensiveinterpretation,butratheroninterpretationin
accordancewiththeobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.402
(p.118)
Onthisbackground,itcanbeconcludedthat,withinthelawoftreaties,thelanguageof
treatyprovisionsisnotsubjecttoanyparticularpresumptionbutwillbereadsothat
effectisgiventotheobjectandpurposeofthetreatyinitscontext.403
3.3.9Evolutionaryinterpretationandobjectandpurpose
Thequestionforthepresentpurposesiswhatthisemphasisontheobjectandpurpose
ofatreatymeansforevolutionaryinterpretation.Thisiswellbroughtoutintheclassic
MuscatDhows,404wheretheinterpretationofthetreatyterm‘protégé’intheActof
Brussels1890405wasatissue.Thosewhoweredefinedasthe‘protégé’ofFrancewere
exemptfromsearchesaimedatdiscoveringslavetrade.Intheevent,anevolutionary
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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interpretationofthetermwouldgivethatrighttoalargenumberofvessels;a
contemporaneousinterpretationwouldlimitthatnumberconsiderably.TheTribunal
foundthatanevolutionaryinterpretationwasnotwarranted.Inordertoreachthis
conclusiontheTribunalfocusedonthe‘purposeofsupressingslavetrading’,whichitsaw
asoneofthe‘elevatedintentions’oftheActoftheBrusselsConference.406The
evolutionary—andextensive—interpretationproposedbyFrance,whichwouldhaverun
theriskofeffectivelyaccommodatingslavetrade,wouldhardlyhavebeenconsonantwith
theobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.Thetermsweretobegiventhemeaning
whichcorrespondsthebestbothwiththeelevatedintentionsoftheConferenceandof
theresultingFinalActandwithprinciplesofinternationallawasexpressedintreatiesin
effectduringthatperiod,innationallegislationtotheextentthatithasreceived
internationalrecognitionandinthepracticeoftheLawofNations.407
ThereisanobviousconnectionherewithHuber’sdescriptionoftreatyinterpretationas
‘concentricencirclement’,wherebythejudgeestablishestheintentionofthepartiesin
conformitywiththefundamentaldemandsofthefullnessofinternationallawand
justice.408ButwhattheTribunalheldinMuscatDhowsontheinterplaybetweenthe
‘purpose’and‘intentions’inconnectionwithevolutionaryinterpretationalsofoundan
echoinIronRhine,wheretheTribunalsaidthat:‘Theobjectandpurposeofatreaty,
takentogetherwiththeintentionsoftheparties,aretheprevailingelementsfor
interpretation’.409TheTribunalinIronRhinewent(p.119) ontosaythatinthatcaseit
wasnotaconceptualorgenerictermthatwasinissue;itwasrathernewtechnical
developmentsrelatingtotheoperationandcapacityofarailway:‘anevolutive
interpretation,whichwouldensureanapplicationofthetreatythatwouldbeeffectivein
termsofitsobjectandpurpose,willbepreferred’.410Inotherwords,anevolutionary
interpretationwaschosenasthatwouldensurethattheintentionoftheparties,as
reflectedbyreferencetotheobjectsandpurpose,wasfollowed.Thisisthepoint
Bernhardtmadewhenhestressedhowtheobjectandpurposeofatreatyplaysacentral
roleintreatyinterpretation,andmorespecificallythatifatreatyistobeeffectivein
termsofitsobjectandpurposethenthatmaymeanentryintoacertaindynamism.411 If
itisthepurposeofthetreatytocreatelongerlastingandsolidrelationsbetweenthe
partiesthenitishardlycompatiblewiththispurposetoeliminatenewdevelopmentsin
theprocessoftreatyinterpretation.412
NationalityDecreesissuedinTunisandMoroccoshouldalsobeseeninthislight.413
TherethePermanentCourtobservedthatthequestionwhetheramatterissolelywithin
thejurisdictionofastateisessentiallyarelativequestion;itmustdependupon‘the
developmentofinternationalrelations’.414ThisinterpretationofArticle15ofthe
CovenantoftheLeagueofNations415mustbeunderstoodonthebackgroundofthe
objectandpurposeoftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations,whichaccordingtoits
preamblewas‘topromoteinternationalco-operationandtoachieveinternationalpeace
andsecurity’.416Thesameapproachwastakentotheobjectandpurposeofthe
Hungarian–CzechoslovakTreaty 417inGabčíkovo–NagymaroswheretheInternational
CourtextractedtheobjectandpurposeoftheinstrumentfromitsArticles15,19,and20
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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andheldthatforthetreatytobeeffectiveintermsofitsobjectandpurposeitmustbe
interpretedasbeing‘notstatic’,butrather‘opentoadapttoemergingnormsof
internationallaw’.418Thepartieshad,intheviewoftheCourt,committedthemselvestoa
programmeofprogressivedevelopmentbydrawinguptheobjectandpurposeofthe
treatyinthelanguagetheyhadusedinthetreaty.419Thesamewasthecasewiththe
interpretationwhichtheInternationalCourtmadeinWesternSahara,420whereinits
interpretationofResolution3292(XXIX)421 theCourtmadeanevolutionary
interpretationofthe(p.120) term‘legalties’onthebasisof‘theobjectandpurposeof
GeneralAssemblyresolution3292(XXIX)’.422
Aswasseenabove,theobjectandpurposealsosetthelimitsoftheevolutionary
interpretationofaninstrument.Thus,inWhaling,423wheretheInternationalCourtfound
thatthefunctionswhichthetheInternationalConventionfortheRegulationofWhaling424
conferredontheInternationalWhalingCommission(IWC)‘havemadetheConventionan
evolvinginstrument’,425theCourtobservedthat‘amendmentstotheScheduleand
recommendationsbytheIWCmayputanemphasisononeortheotherobjective
pursuedbytheConvention,butcannotalteritsobjectandpurpose’.426
3.3.10Tensionsbetweenintentionandevolution
Ithasintheliteratureofthelawoftreatiesbeenarguedthatgivingeffecttothecommon
willoftheparties,ontheonehand,andmakinganevolutionaryinterpretation,onthe
other,aretwopropositionsthatcanbereconciledonlywithdifficulty.Thisviewhas,for
example,beencastinthefollowingterms:‘theneedtogiveeffecttotheintentionofthe
partiesisevidentlyadeterrenttotheuseofanevolutiveinterpretation’.427Onthis
understandingaTribunal’sresorttoevolutionaryinterpretationisseenasadoptingan
interpretationwhichisatvariancewiththeintentionoftheparties.Thispropositionis,
however,opentoquestion.Ontheapproachtakeninthisbook,evolutionary
interpretationisnothingifnottiedtotheintentionoftheparties;itmustultimatelyrefer
backtotheconsentofthepartiesthemselvesandtotheircommonintention.Aswillbe
seen,thismeansthesameforbothwhathasbeencalledcontemporaneousandfor
evolutionaryinterpretation.
Itisinstructivetonotethat,inNavigationalRights,itwasNicaragua(arguingfora
contemporaneousinterpretation)thatarguedonthebasisoftheintentionsoftheparties,
notCostaRica(arguingforanevolutionaryinterpretation)—thoughintheeventthe
CourtconcludedinfavourofCostaRicaonthebasisoftheintention(p.121) ofthe
parties.Thisgoessomewayinshowingthedifficultythatmaybeencounteredin
marryingtheconceptsofintentandevolution.428
Waldockaddressedthispointinaseriesofworksonevolutionaryinterpretation,
observingthattheVCLTdidnotdealspecificallywiththeeffectofanevolutionintreaty
terms:‘TheInternationalLawCommission’scommentary,however,whichImyself
wrote’,hecontinued,‘explainedthatsomuchdependson...theintentionofthepartiesin
theparticulartreaty,thatitwouldbedifficulttolaydownanygeneralrules’.429Posing
thequestionofhowcourtsoughttoapproachtheproblemofevolutionaryinterpretation,
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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headdedthat:
Theproblemofinterpretationcausedbyanevolutioninthemeaninggenerallyattached
toaconceptembodiedinatreatyprovisionis,ofcourse,neithernewnorconfinedto
humanrights....Buttheproblemisageneralonewhichmaypresentitselfwheneverthe
originalmeaningofaconceptformingthebasisofatreatyprovisionisfoundtohave
evolved.IftheInternationalLawCommission’sviewofthematteriscorrect,ashardly
seemsopentodoubt,theanswertotheprobleminanygivencasemustbelookedforin
theintentionofthepartiestotheparticulartreaty.430
Confrontedwiththequestionofhow,accordingtothegeneralruleofinterpretation,a
Tribunaloughttoapproachtreatytermswhichmayormaynotbedeemedtobe
evolving,Yasseenmadeexactlythesamepoint:‘Thatdepends,tomymind,onwhatthe
partiesreallyintended’.431 Thisanswerisquestion-begging,forasWaldockwasquickto
pointout:‘thatintention,however,maynotalwaysbeeasilydiscernible’.432
Butthebroaderpointremains.Andthatiswhy,incasesbearinguponevolutionary
interpretation,theInternationalCourtandarbitraltribunalsalikehaveproceededasthe
TribunaldidinLaBretagne,where,inordertoestablishwhetherthetreatyterm‘fishing
regulation’oughtoroughtnottobeinterpretedinanevolutionaryfashion,theTribunal
stressed‘theprimarynecessityofinterpretinganinstrumentinaccordancewiththe
intentionsoftheparties’.433‘This’,theTribunalcontinued,‘willbedonebyfollowingthe
generalruleofinterpretation’.434
Internationaljurisprudencehasbeenconsistentintakingthisapproach.ThustheEritrea–
EthiopiaBoundaryCommissioninBorderbetweenEritreaandEthiopiafollowed‘the
generalrulethatatreatyistobeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththe
ordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheircontextandinthelightof
itsobjectandpurpose’because‘eachoftheseelementsguide(p.122) theinterpreter
inestablishingwhatthePartiesactuallyintended,ortheircommonwill’.435TheTribunal
intheRhineChloridescasestatedthatthereasoninternationaljurisprudencehas
adheredtoArticle31was,simply,that‘alltheelementsofthegeneralruleof
interpretationprovidethebasisforestablishingthecommonwillandintentionofthe
parties’.436
WiththeworkoftheILContreatyinterpretation,ledbySpecialRapporteurNolte,on
‘TreatiesoverTime’,437itistemptingtosaythattheissueoftheintentionoftheparties
haswithintheworkoftheILCcomefullcircle.TheILCinitsworkagreed,inDraft
Conclusion3,onthefollowingwording:
InterpretationofTreatyTermsasCapableofEvolvingoverTime
Subsequentagreementsandsubsequentpracticeunderarticle31and32mayassistin
determiningwhetherornotthepresumedintentionofthepartiesupontheconclusionof
thetreatywastogiveatermusedameaningwhichiscapableofevolvingovertime.438
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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TheILCCommentarytotheDraftConclusionleaveslittletobedesiredintermsofclarity
whenitcomestojustwhatitsapproachtoevolutionaryinterpretationand‘presumed
intention’is.Anyevolutionaryinterpretationofthemeaningofatreatyterm,theILC
states,mustbejustifiableasaresultoftheordinaryprocessoftreatyinterpretation.439
Andmorespecifically:‘Thephrase“presumedintention”referstotheintentionofthe
partiesasdeterminedthroughtheapplicationofthevariousmeansofinterpretation
whicharerecognizedinarticles31and32’.440‘Presumedintention’,theILCconcluded:
isthusnotaseparatelyidentifiableoriginalwill,andthetravauxpréparatoiresarenotthe
primarybasisfordeterminingthepresumedintentionoftheparties,buttheyareonly,as
article32indicates,asupplementarymeansofinterpretation.Andalthoughinterpretation
mustseektoidentifytheintentionoftheparties,thismustbedonebytheinterpreteron
thebasisofthemeansofinterpretationwhichareavailableatthetimeoftheactof
interpretation.441
‘Intention’isthusaconstructtobederivedfromthearticulationofthe‘meansof
interpretationadmissible’442intheprocessofinterpretation—andnotaseparately
identifiablefactor.
InCrawford’sview,instancesofevolutionaryinterpretationoftreatiesasinstancesof
internationalcourtsandtribunalselecting‘todepartfromtheintentionsofthepartiesat
thetimeofconclusionofatreaty’.443Inthesamediscussion,(p.123) however,healso
statedthattheissueofevolutionaryinterpretation‘isessentiallyoneofthecorrect
applicationofVCLTArticle31’.444Crawford’sdoublehelix(accordingtowhich,onthe
onehand,evolutionaryinterpretationinvolvesacourtmakingadeparturefromthe
intentionofthepartiesand,ontheother,evolutionaryinterpretationistheresultofthe
correctapplicationofArticle31)seemstocontainwithinitaninherentinstability.The
reasonforthisisthatthismodelismissingoneelement,thatis,thefactthat,properly
understood,acorrectapplicationofArticle31,inacasebearinguponevolutionary
interpretationasmuchasanyothertypeofinterpretation,leadstotheintentionofthe
parties.
Thequestionis,toalargeextent,oneofemphasis.Thatapproachis,however,squarely
theapproachpreferredbytheInternationalCourt.AndthereasonwhytheCourthas
chosenthatapproach,thischapterhasargued,isthat—asshownbytheworkoftheILC
underbothSpecialRapporteurWaldockandSpecialRapporteurNolte—identifyingthe
intentionofthepartiesisnothingifnottheapproachthatfollowsfromArticle31ofthe
VCLT.
3.3.11Evolutionaryorcontemporaneousinterpretation?
AccordingtoFitzmaurice,theprincipleofcontemporaneitycouldbesummedupas
follows:thetermsofatreatymustbeinterpretedaccordingtothemeaningwhichthey
possessed,orwhichwouldhavebeenattributedtothem,andinthelightofcurrent
linguisticusage,atthetimewhenthetreatywasoriginallyconcluded.445
ThisprinciplefounditsmainsupportinthejudgmentbytheInternationalCourtinRights
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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ofUSNationalsinMorocco.446Inthiscasethetreatyterminissuewas‘disputes’.Inthe
contemporaneous(andbroader)interpretationoftheterm‘disputes’encompassedboth
civilandcriminaldisputes;thismeantthatbothofthesetwotypesofdisputewere,with
respecttoUSnationals,exemptedfromtheMoroccanlegalsystemandinsteadunder
consularjurisdiction.Intheevolutionary(andlessbroad)interpretationoftheterm
‘disputes’would,followingthepresent-dayunderstandingoftheterm,encompassonly
civildisputes,sothatMoroccancourtswouldhavejurisdictionovercriminal‘disputes’
concerningUSnationals.
RightsofUSNationalsinMoroccohasbeencriticizedforbeing‘aSolomon’sjudgment’,
theimplicationbeingthattheheavyUSpoliticalandeconomicinterestsinvolvedhad
madetheInternationalCourt’sjobinthecaseaparticularlydifficultone.447Inthesame
vein,Noltehasobservedthat,duetothecontextinwhichitwasrendered,RightsofUS
NationalsinMoroccoshouldnotbeaccordedthesameauthorityasmorerecent
pronouncements.448(p.124)
Onthisbackground,Noltehasconcludedthat‘evenifitwerestillappropriatetoproceed
fromapresumptionthatatreatyshouldbegivenacontemporaneousinterpretation,this
isnotastrongpresumption’.Itmustbecorrecttosaythatthereisnopresumptionin
thelawoftreatiesthattreatytermsoughttobeinterpretedcontemporaneously.Butthis
isbecausethecontrollingelementmustbetheintentionoftheparties,notbecausethere
isapresumptiononewayortheother.Therecanbenopresumptiononewayorthe
otherbecausehereaselsewhereinthelawoftreatiestheruleappliesthatany
presumptionorconsiderationwhichtendtotransformtheascertainableintentionofthe
partiesintoafactorofsecondaryimportanceareinimicaltothetruepurposeof
interpretation.449
Itcannotberightthereforetosay,asMcNairdid,that‘thereisauthorityfortherule
thatwhenthereisadoubtastothesenseinwhichthepartiestoatreatyusedwords,
thosewordsshouldreceivethemeaningwhichtheyboreatthetimeoftheconclusionof
thetreaty;unlessthatintentionisnegativedbytheuseoftermsindicatingthe
contrary’.450Thereisnopresumptiononewayortheother.Hereasinother
connectionstheintentionofthepartiesmustbecontrolling.
Twoimportantinternationalarbitrationsinparticulararegivenasexamplesof
internationaltribunalsoptingnotforanevolutionaryinterpretationbutinsteadfora
contemporaneousone.451 ThesetwoarbitrationsareAtlanticCoastFisheries452and
AbuDhabi.453InthefirstcaseaTribunalsetupbythePermanentCourtofArbitration
heldthetreatytermsusedinaprovisionintheTreatyofLondonof1818,454stipulating
thatUSnationalswereexcludedfromfishinginCanadian‘bays’,
mustbeinterpretedinageneralsenseasapplyingtoeverybayonthecoastinquestion
thatmightreasonablybesupposedtohavebeenconsideredasabaybythenegotiators
oftheTreatyunderthegeneralconditionsthenprevailing.455
TheTribunalthendeclinedtointerprettheterm‘bays’byreferencetolegalconceptsof
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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asix-mile,ten-mile,ortwelve-mileclosinglimit,suchasthosedevelopedhadinthe
evolutionofinternationallawsubsequentto1818.
InAbuDhabi,456theTribunalwasaskedtointerpretnotatreatybutacontractforanoil
concessionenteredintobythesheikhofAbuDhabiwithaforeigncompany.(p.125) The
instrument,expressedascoveringallthelands,islands,andsea-watersoftheruler,had
beendrawnupin1938andtheTribunal,ofwhichLordAsquithwasthesolemember,
wasnotpreparedto‘readbackintothecontracttheimplicationsofadoctrinenotmooted
tillsevenyearslater,and,iftheviewwhichIamabouttoexpressissound,noteven
todayadmittedtothecanonofinternationallaw’.457
3.3.12Genericandspecificterms
TheTribunalsinAtlanticCoastFisheries458andAbuDhabi459automaticallyassumed
thatthetermsusedwereintendedtofixthescopeoftheparties’rightsandobligations
onceandforall,anditwasthereforeinrelianceontheintentionofthepartiesthatthe
Tribunalsdecidedagainstinterpretingthetreatiesevolutionarily.Theprovisionsinissue
wereconcernedwiththedistributionorgrantofterritorialrightsinmaritimeareas.It
wasthereforeonlynaturalfortheTribunalstoassume—andassumewaswhattheydid—
thatthepartiesinbothcaseshadintendedtheseprovisionstodefinetheirrespective
rightsatthattimeandforposterity,eveniftheymighthaveusedsuchtermsas‘bays’or
‘sea-waters’whichinadifferentcontextmightbeunderstoodasopen-endedandliableto
evolvewithchangingconditions.ThesamewasthecaseinLaBretagne,460wherethe
TribunalacceptedinprinciplethattheFrench–Canadiantreatyatissue461 couldcontain
termstheinterpretationofwhichmustevolve,notleastbecausethetreatywasan
agreementconcludedforanunlimitedduration.IntheviewoftheTribunalthetreaty
‘usedtheterm“fisheryregulations”asagenericformulacoveringalltherulesapplicable
tofishingactivities,whilethereferencetothedimensionsofthevesselsappearsto
suggestthataparticularpurposewastherebyintended,namelythelimitationofthese
vessels’fishingcapacity’.462Inotherwords,theintentionrestrictedtheextenttowhich
thedifferentgenerictermswereseenbytheTribunaltobeabletocarrythenew
meaning.
ItseemsthattheapproachofthePermanentCourtwaslessrestricted.Inastatementof
principleregardinggenericterms,or‘provisionswhicharegeneralinscope’,the
PermanentCourtinConventionconcerningEmploymentofWomenduringtheNight,
statedthefollowing:
Themerefactthat,atthetimewhentheConvention...wasconcluded,certainfactsor
situations,whichthetermsoftheConventionintheirordinarymeaningarewideenough
tocover,werenotthoughtof,doesnotjustifyinterpretingthoseofitsprovisionswhich
aregeneralinscopeotherwisethatinaccordancewiththeirterms.463
(p.126)
ThesameconclusionasthatreachedinprinciplebythePermanentCourthasbeen
reachedwithrespecttothegenerictermsinwhichtheEuropeanConventiononHuman
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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Rights464iscast.ManyoftheprovisionsoftheEuropeanConventionweredrawnupin
broadterms,whichlendthemselvestoanevolvinginterpretationthatcantakeaccountof
socialchange.465ThesamehasbeenthecaseinthelawoftheWorldTradeOrganisation
(WTO),466wheretheWTOAppellateBodyhasheldthat‘naturalresources’inArticle
XX(g)and‘soundrecording’and‘distribution’inChina’sGATS467Schedulearegeneric
termswhichmustbeinterpretedevolutionarily.468
Waldockinthisrespectpointedoutthattheanswertothequestionofwhethera
contemporaneousoranevolutionaryinterpretationoughttobeadoptedmustinany
givencasebelookedforintheintentionofthepartiestotheparticulartreaty:
Theinterpretationofatreatymustalwayshaveitssourcein,andbeconsistentwith,the
originalintentionofthepartiesatthetimeofitsconclusion.Consequently,itisonlywhen
itmaybeunderstoodfromthetermsofthetreatythatthepartiescontemplateda
possibleevolutionofthecontentofthetreatyinresponsetosubsequentdevelopments
thatthosedevelopmentsbecomepartofthelegal‘framework’foritsinterpretation.469
Itiswhenthetreatytermsatissuemaybesaidtohavebeen‘intendedtoevolvein
responsetochangesinlegalandsocialconcepts’470thatanevolutionaryinterpretationis
inappropriate.Ifthisisnotthecasethen,asAtlanticCoastFisheries471 andAbu
Dhabi472show,acontemporaneousinterpretationwill,inprinciple,betheappropriate
solution.ThisiswhattheInternationalCourtmadeclear,inNavigationalRights,whenit
saidthat:
Itistruethatthetermsusedinatreatymustbeinterpretedinlightofwhatis
determinedtohavebeentheparties’commonintention,whichis,bydefinition,
contemporaneouswiththetreaty’sconclusion.Thatmayleadacourtseisedofadispute,
orthepartiesthemselves,whentheyseektodeterminethemeaningofatreatyfor
purposesofgood-faithcompliancewithit,toascertainthemeaningatermhadwhenthe
treatywasdrafted,sincedoingsocanshedlightontheparties’commonintention.473
(p.127)
Itseemsthattribunalsoperateonthepresumptionthattheintentionofthepartieswas
foracontemporaneousinterpretationtobeadoptedifthepartiesusedintheinstrument
atechnicalorafactualterm,suchastopographicaldenominations.Thisisclearfromthe
approachtakeninDecisionregardingdelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaand
Ethiopia474whereithadbeenarguedthattheTribunalmustapplytheprincipleof
contemporaneityinitsinterpretationofthetreatytermsinissue:
BythistheCommissionunderstandsthatatreatyshouldbeinterpretedbyreferenceto
thecircumstancesprevailingwhenthetreatywasconcluded.Thisinvolvesgiving
expressions(includingnames)usedinthetreatythemeaningthattheywouldhave
possessedatthattime.TheCommissionagreeswiththisapproachandhasborneitin
mindinconstruingtheTreaties.475
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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ThesametypeoftechnicaltreatytermwasinissueinLandandMaritimeBoundary,476
wheretheInternationalCourtseemedtodistinguishtheinterpretationofthetreatyterm
‘mouth’ofariverfromtheinterpretationithadconducted,of‘mainchannel’ofariver,in
Kasikili/Sedudu.477Asthetermtobeinterpretedwasatechnicalone,‘theCourtmust
seektoascertaintheintentionofthepartiesatthetime’,478bywhichitclearlymeantthat
itmustgivetothetermsthemeaningtheywereseentohaveatthetime.
Ifwearetojudgefromthecasesavailableinthelawreportsofinternationaltribunals,
usuallywiththistypeofcasetheTribunalisconfronted,inonedecision,eitherwitha
technicalterm,orasetoftechnicalterms,oramoregenericterm,orasetofmore
genericterms.Thatisnot,however,necessarilythecase.
3.3.13Genericandspecificintentionsoftheparties
InWesternSaharabothtypesoftermwereinissueinthesamedecision,asthecase
involvedtheinterpretationbothoftechnicalandgenericterms.479TheInternational
Courtdrewadistinctioninitsinterpretationofalegaltermofartontheonehandanda
moregenerictermontheother.480TheInternationalCourthad,inResolution3292
(XXIX),beenaskedtwoquestionsbytheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnited(p.128)
Nations:‘WasWesternSahara(RíodeOroandSakietElHamara)atthetimeof
colonizationbySpainaterritorybelongingtonoone(terranullius)?’and,‘Whatwerethe
legaltiesbetweenthisterritoryandtheKingdomofMoroccoandtheMauritanian
entity?’481 Aswillbeseen,theCourtwasnotaskedtomakeaninterpretationofatreaty
instrumentbutoflegaltermscontainedinaResolutionoftheGeneralAssembly.
Thelegaltermofart(‘terranullius’)wasgivenacontemporaneousinterpretation;itmust
be‘interpretedbyreferencetothelawinforceatthatperiod’.482TheCourtsawnothing
intheusebytheGeneralAssemblyofthislegaltermofartthatpointedinthedirectionof
anevolutionaryinterpretation.Thiswas,accordingtotheCourt,differentwhenitcameto
themoregenericterm(‘legalties’),atermwithnoveryprecisemeaning,whichwas
interpretedbyreferencenotonlytothecircumstancesofthetimetowhichitsapplication
relatedbutalsointhelightoftheintentionsunderlyingtherequestfortheCourt’s
opinion:
QuestionIIaskstheCourttostate‘whatwerethelegaltiesbetweenthisterritory’—that
is,WesternSahara—‘andtheKingdomofMoroccoandtheMauritanianentity’.Thescope
ofthisquestiondependsuponthemeaningtobeattachedtotheexpression‘legalties’in
thecontextofthetimeofthecolonizationoftheterritorybySpain.Thatexpression,
however,unlike‘terranullius’inQuestionI,wasnotatermhavinginitselfaveryprecise
meaning.Accordingly,intheviewoftheCourt,themeaningoftheexpression‘legalties’
inQuestionIIhastobefoundratherintheobjectandpurposeofGeneralAssembly
resolution3292(XXIX).483
TheCourtwentontosaythatabouttheinterpretationof‘legalties’that‘inframingits
answer,theCourtcannotbeunmindfulofthepurposeforwhichitsopinionissought’.484
Aswasseenabove,theintentionofthepartieswillbereflectedbyaninstrument’sobject
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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andpurpose,andcanthusbeinferredfromtheobjectandpurpose.485
ItwasclearfromtheintentionoftheGeneralAssemblythattheInternationalCourthad
beenseizedofthequestionsforthepurposeofthedecolonizationofWesternSaharain
conformitywithResolution1514(XV)486ontherighttoself-determination.Thisapproach
couldbethoughttobereminiscentoftheonesuggestedbyJiménezdeAréchaga
(incidentallyaJudgeontheCourtinthiscase)duringtheILCdebatesontheVCLTwith
respecttowhetherornotatermshouldbeinterpretedcontemporaneouslyor
evolutionarily:‘Theintentionofthepartiesshouldbecontrolling’.487TheInternational
CourtinWesternSahara,inotherwords,exemplifiedhowtheobjectivizedintentionof
theparties—orinthecontextofaresolutionfromtheGeneralAssembly:theintentionof
theAssembly—isthedecidingfactorastowhetheroneadoptsacontemporaneousoran
evolutionaryinterpretation.(p.129)
Itispossibletoconclude,then,thatwhenthepartieshaveinsertedintoaninstrumenta
technicalorafactualterm,suchastopographicaldenominations,orinthenarrower
formulationofSpecialRapporteurNolte:‘ratherspecifictermsinboundarytreaties’,488
thepresumptionarisesthatthistermoughttobegivenacontemporaneous
interpretation.InNolte’sview,thisispartlybecauseinsuchcases‘changesinthe
meaningofa(generalorspecific)terminologynormallydonotaffectthesubstanceofthe
specificarrangement,whichisdesignedtobeasstableanddivulgedfromcontextual
elementsaspossible’.489
Theviewisperhapspreferable,however,thatthisisratherafunctionoftheintentionof
theparties:internationaltribunalswillinsuchcasesproceedontheassumptionthatthe
intentionofthepartieswasforthetreatyterminissuetobeinterpretedina
contemporaneousmanner.Butwhenthetreatyterminissueismoregeneric,then
internationaltribunalswillproceedontheassumptionthattheintentionwasforthetreaty
termtobeinterpretedinanevolutionarymanner.Thus,forexample,McNairstatedthat
‘expressionssuchas“suitable,appropriate,convenient”,occurringinatreatyarenot
stereotypedasatthedateofthetreatybutmustbeunderstoodinthelightofthe
progressofeventsandchangesinhabitsoflife’.490
Twoexamplescouldbegivenhere:first,theevolutionaryinterpretationgivenbythe
InternationalCourttothetermsoftheMandateSysteminNamibia,491 andmore
generallytheintentionsbehindtheconstitutivedocumentsoftheLeagueofNations492
andtheUnitedNations,493and,secondly,theapproachtakeninmanycasesbythe
EuropeanCourtofHumanRightstotheinterpretationoftheEuropeanConventionon
HumanRights.494Theevolutionaryinterpretationsmadeinbothofthesetypesofcase
arebestunderstoodasbeingfullyconsonantwiththecommonintentionoftheparties.
Aswasseenabove,theInternationalCourtinNamibia495referredto‘theprimary
necessityofinterpretinganinstrumentinaccordancewiththeintentionsoftheparties’.It
wentoninthesameparagraphtoholdthat,becauseofthisprimarynecessity,
theCourtisboundtotakeintoaccountthefactthattheconceptsembodiedinArticle22
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oftheCovenant—‘thestrenuousconditionsofthemodernworld’and‘thewell-beingand
development’ofthepeoplesconcerned—werenotstatic,butwerebydefinition
evolutionary,asalso,therefore,wastheconceptofthe‘sacredtrust’.496
(p.130)
Itiswrongtoseethereferencetotheprimarynecessityofinterpretingthetreatyin
accordancewiththeintentionsofthepartiesastheCourtmerelypayinglipservicetoan
oldprincipleofinterpretation.TherulingoftheInternationalCourtinNamibiahas,
however,beencriticizedforapplyingretroactivelyamodernunderstandingofthe
MandatesSystem.IthasbeenarguedthattheCourtreliedonanapparentactof
benevolenthindsight,thepointbeingthattheCourtinnowayreliedontheintentionsof
thepartiesbutinsteadthatwhich,in1971,intheviewofCourtoughttohavebeenthe
parties’intentions.497
Thisargumentisopentocriticism.Itisbasedonthepropositionthatitwasinconceivable
forthestatesmen,whenattheParisConferencein1919theydrewuptheprovisionson
theMandateSystem,498tohavehadinmindthepossibilityofrecognizingthatstatesmay
haveageneralinterestinthemaintenanceofaninternationalregimeadoptedforthe
benefitofinternationalsociety.Moreover,theproblemisthatthispropositiondoesnot
sufficientlytakeintoaccounttheidealisticaspirationtowhichtheendoftheGreatWar
hadinfactgivenrise,andofwhichthefollowing1928quotationfromMcNairisbutone
example:‘TherewasperhapsnopartoftheCovenantthatcalledforthmorederisionfrom
thecynicalandtheworldly-wisethantheMandatesSystem’;‘theMandatesSystem
representstheirruptionoftheidealistintooneoftheperiodicalworldsettlementswhich
haveinthepastlaintoomuchinthehandsofso-called“practicalmen”’.499
AsJudgeJessuplaterobservedinSouthWestAfrica:‘Nodoubtsomestatesmenwere
cynicalbutgreatchartersofhumanlibertiesweresignedandratifiedandbecame
bindingonStates.’500Itis,againstthisbackground,notsoclearthattheobjectivized
intentionofthepartiesonwhichtheInternationalCourtfoundeditsevolutionary
interpretation,in1971,wastheresultofbenevolenthindsight.Thoseintentionsshould
bedeemedtohavecontained,in1919,someverybenevolentaspirations,aspirationsto
whichtheInternationalCourthadtogivefullandfaireffectinitsinterpretation.Toadopt
thisinterpretationwasindeed‘nottosetasidebuttogiveeffecttotheoriginalintention
oftheparties’.501
ThesameapproachmustbetakentotheintentionofthepartiestotheUNCharter.502
AkandehasobservedthattheUNCharterisamongthetypeoftreatywhich‘mustbe
regardedaslivinginstrumentsandbeinterpretedinanevolutionarymanner,permitting
theorganizationtofulfilitspurposesinchangingcircumstances’.503Hegivesinstancesof
whatheregardsassuchevolutionary(p.131) interpretationsoftheUNCharter.
PerhapsthemostsalientexampleisReparationforInjuries,inwhichtheInternational
CourtreferredtothepracticeoftheUnitedNationsandthefactthatithadenteredinto
treatiesasconfirmingthelegalpersonalityoftheorganization.504Itisplainthatifone
seesthisinterpretationinlightoftheintentionsoftheparties,itbecomesclearthatthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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interpretationconfirmstheseintentionsandinnowayrunscountertothem.Infactthe
InternationalCourtinReparationforInjuriesexplicitlyreferredtohowitsinterpretation
arose‘bynecessaryintendmentoutoftheCharter’.505Thesameconclusionwasdrawn
inEffectofAwardsofCompensationbymadebytheUNAdministrativeTribunal,where
theInternationalCourtheldthatthepowertoestablishaTribunaltodojusticeas
betweentheUnitedNationsandthestaffmembers‘arisesbynecessaryintendmentout
oftheCharter’.506Thisshouldnotcomeasasurprise.
AstheTribunalinRosInvest(Jurisdiction)(SirFranklinBerman,LordSteyn,and
Böckstiegel,thelastofwhompresided)putit,asregardsconstituentinstrumentsof
internationalorganizations:
giventhechangingnatureoftheproblemsandcircumstancesinternationalorganizations
havetoconfront,adegreeofevolutionaryinterpretationistheonlyrealisticapproachto
realizingtheunderlyingpurposesoftheorganizationaslaiddowninitsconstituent
instrument.507
Thenatureofcircumstancesofsuchinstrumentsthus‘provideevidencethattheParties
themselvesintendedorunderstoodthatanevolutionaryinterpretationwasappropriate
totheinterpretationandapplicationofwhattheyhadagreedupon’.508Theinferences
madebytheInternationalCourtinReparationforInjuries509andEffectofAwardsof
CompensationmadebytheUNAdministrativeTribunal510wereclearlybasedonsimilar
typesofreasoning;imputationsweremadeonthebasisofanobjectivizedestablishment
of‘intendment’or‘intention’.
Thisisnotsurprising.Afterall,‘itwas’,asFranckhasputit,‘theintentionofthefounders
atSanFranciscotocreatealivinginstitution,equippedwithdynamicpolitical,
administrative,andjuridicalorgans,competenttointerprettheirownpowersundera
flexibleconstituentinstrumentinresponsetonewchallenges’.511 (p.132) Crawford
has,inananalysisofReparationsforInjuries—wheretheInternationalCourtheldthat
underinternationallawanorganization‘mustbedeemedtohavethosepowerswhich,
thoughnotexpresslyprovidedintheCharter,areconferreduponitbynecessary
implicationasbeingessentialtotheperformanceofitsduties’512—madethesamepoint
bystatingthat:‘theunderlyingideaisthataninternationalorganizationisexpectedto
evolveandadapttochangesontheinternationalplane’.513
ThepointcouldbemadethatthisisaWesternviewofwhatinfacttheintentions—orin
theregisteroftheInternationalCourtinthislineofcases:intendment—ofthefoundersat
SanFranciscowere.514Itisindubitablytrue,asHambrosaid,thatonethreadof
continuityintheinterpretationandapplicationoftheCharter,515certainlyduringthe
ColdWar,wasthat:
members,whentheyrelyheavilyontheUnitedNationsfortheadvancementoftheir
nationalinterestsandthesupportoftheirnationalpolicies,tendtotakealiberalviewwith
regardtothepowersoforgansandthecapacityoftheUnitedNationstoactin
furtheranceofitspurposes.Thus,ontheonehand,non-Communistmembersunderthe
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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leadershipoftheUnitedStates,duringthefirstdecade,tookaliberalviewofthepower
andresponsibilitiesoftheGeneralAssemblytojustifytheuseofthatveto-freeorganto
supporttheirpoliciesandachievetheirpurposesinthe‘coldwar’.Ontheotherhand,
members,whentheydonotseethepossibilityofutilizingtheUnitedNationstoserve
nationalinterests(possiblybecauseoftheirbeinginaminoritypositiononimportant
issues),tendtotakearestrictivelineinCharterinterpretation.516
Perhapsthebestreplytothistypeofcriticismwouldbetosaythat(inthecurrentperiod
ofinternationallaw,wherethepositionsoftheColdWarareifnotreversedthenatleast
significantlychangedinthisrespect)517thebroadviewoftheintentionsofthepartiesat
SanFranciscowhichwassopopularinargumentsbyWesterncountriesbeforethe
InternationalCourtinthe1940s,1950s,and1960saretodaynolesstrueforthefact
thatsomeofthosecountrieshaveceasedtoholdthem.
AsimilarpointabouttheintentionofpartiesandtheEuropeanConventiononHuman
Rights518ismadebySimpson,whosaysthatifwearetobelievethejudgesonthe
EuropeanCourtofHumanRights(whichhesuggestsweoughtnotto),thenhuman
rightsviolationsaretakingplaceinEuropeonadailybasis,and‘thisisonly(p.133)
partiallytheresultofmovingthegoalpostsbyinterpretingtheConventionasaliving
instrument’.Hecontinuesbyobservingthat:
Absolutelynobodythoughtthatthatwasthesituationbackin1950,andLauterpachtwas
certainlynoexceptiontothegeneralmoodofself-congratulatoryoptimism.Henever
imaginedthattheStrasbourginstitutionswouldbecomeasintrusiveaforceastheyhave
subsequentlybecome.OnewonderswhathewouldhavemadeofStrasbourgtoday,
withtheSecretariatandtheCourtatriskofdestructioninpartbythelivinginstrument
theyhavedeveloped,andbythehugeextensionofpopulationsprotectedbythe
Convention,aswellasbytheuseoftheConventionbyindividualswho,backinthe
1950s,wouldhavesimplyacceptedtheirlot?519
ThoughSimpsondoesnotgiveanyexamples,itwouldsurelynotbewrongtoimputeto
hiswordsacriticismofrulingsfromtheEuropeanCourtsuchasTyrervUnited
Kingdom520andAireyvIreland521 wheretheEuropeanCourthasheldthatthe
Conventionis‘alivinginstrument’tobe‘interpretedinthelightofpresent-day
conditions’.522TheviewexpressedherebySimpsonontheintentionsoftheparties—
accordingtowhichnoonehadthoughtthattheEuropeanConventionwasintendedby
thepartiestohaveanyinfluenceonthelawofthememberstatesoftheCouncilof
Europe—isopentoquestionforthefollowingreasons.
Itis,however,clearfromthepreamblethat‘theaimoftheCouncilofEuropeisthe
achievementofgreaterunitybetweenitsmembersandthatoneofthemethodsbywhich
thisaimistobepursuedisthemaintenanceandfurtherrealisationofhumanrightsand
fundamentalfreedoms’.523Thepartiessoughtnotjusttheachievementbutalsothe
furtherrealizationandthedevelopmentoftherightsatissue.
ThiswasclearalsotothejudgesontheEuropeanCourtinthefirstyearsofitsactivity.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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PresidentMcNairunderlinedalreadyin1961,astheEuropeanCourtsatforthefirst
time,theimportanceoftheEuropeanstateauthoritiescollaborating‘fullyand
conscientiouslyinimplementingtheConventionandaidingtheCommissionandtheCourt
intheirdelicatetask’;itcanthusnothavebeenanimpossiblecontingencytothe
EuropeanCourt’sfirstPresident(1959–65)thattheConventioncouldbecomean
intrusiveforceifthestateauthoritiesdidnotdoso.524
Justasimportantly,however,thereexistsprooffrombefore1950thattheEuropean
Conventionwasintendedbythepartiestohaveaveryrealeffectindeed.(p.134)
Lauterpacht,whoseworkwasacknowledgedasbeingadirectforerunnertowhatwould
becometheEuropeanConvention,525saidin1949that:‘Evenindemocraticcountries,
situationsmayariseinwhichtheindividualisindangerofbeingcrushedunderthe
impactofreasonofState’.Hecontinuedbyexplicitlymentioninghumanrightsproblems—
astheyhadcometolightinfamoustrialsbeforethedomesticcourtsoftheUnited
Kingdom,France,andtheUnitedStates—andconcludedthat:
evenincountriesinwhichtheruleoflawisanintegralpartofthenationalheritageandin
whichtheCourtshavebeenthefaithfulguardiansoftherightsoftheindividual,thereis
roomforaprocedurewhichwillputtheimprimaturofinternationallawupontheprinciple
thattheStateisnotthefinaljudgeofhumanrights.526
Thesamepoint,thattheConventioncouldindeedhaveseriouseffectsonthelawof
WesternEuropeanstates,wasmadebyHartcourtBarrington—representative,together
withMaxwellFyfe,oftheUnitedKingdominthedraftingoftheEuropeanConvention.
HartcourtBarringtonexpressedwhathecalledtheBritishdraftsmen’sgreatdebtto
Lauterpacht,fromwhomthey‘shamelesslyborrow[ed]manyideas’.Hartcourt
BarringtonsaidthattheConventionwas‘intendedtobeenforceable,andthereforeputs
therightsinaveryconciseandclearform’.527Thisbackgroundgoessomewayin
temperingSimpson’sclaim.AsanotherPresidentoftheEuropeanCourtwouldputit,the
Conventionwasindeed,asbothitspreambleanddraftinghistoryshow,‘intendedto
evolveinresponsetochangesinlegalandsocialconcepts’.528
3.3.14LoizidouandBankovic
ThepointcouldbeillustratedwiththejudgmentsoftheGrandChamberoftheEuropean
CourtinLoizidou(PreliminaryObjections)529andBankovic.530ThedecisioninLoizidou
(PreliminaryObjections)boreonwhetheraninvalidreservationtoatreatyisseverable.
Ithadbeentheorthodoxpositionofgeneralinternationallawthatitwasnot,531 though,
asHigginshaspointedout,theexactscopeoftheorthodoxposition,assetoutbythe
InternationalCourtinReservationstotheGenocideConvention,isdebatable,which
makesitpossibletosaythatthereisnobifurcationbetweenhumanrightslawandthe
orthodoxposition.532TurkeyhadagreedtotheapplicationoftheEuropean
Convention533andthecompetenceoftheCourt(p.135) inrespectof‘matterscoming
withinArticle1oftheConventionandperformedwithintheboundaryofthenational
territoryoftheRepublicofTurkey’,areservationwhichwasplainlyintendedtoexclude
thenorthernpartofCyprusfromthejurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourt.TheGrand
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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ChamberoftheCourtheldthatthe‘invalid’Turkishreservationwasseverable,andthat
TurkeythereforemustbetakentohaveacceptedthecompetenceoftheCourtwithout
anyreservationatall.534
Beforeitcouldturntothequestionofseverability,however,theGrandChamberhadto
ascertainwhetherthereservationsinissuewereacceptable;itwasinthisconnectionthat
theGrandChamberdiscussedtheevolutionaryinterpretationoftheConventionandthe
intentionsofthestatespartiestoit.TheGrandChambernotedthattheConventionwasa
livinginstrumentwhichmustbeinterpretedinthelightofpresent-dayconditions,and
thatsuchanapproachwasnotconfinedtothesubstantiveprovisionsoftheConvention
butalsoappliedtothoseprovisions,suchasArticles25and46,whichgovernthe
operationoftheConvention’senforcementmachinery.TheGrandChamberthenmade
thefollowingpointabouttheintentionsofthepartiesandevolutionaryinterpretation:
‘theseprovisionscannotbeinterpretedsolelyinaccordancewiththeintentionsoftheir
authorsasexpressedmorethanfortyyearsago’.535Thissoundslikeanoutright
repudiationoftheargumentmadeinthisbook.Itshouldbeadded,however,thatthe
GrandChamberwasnotconvincedthatitwouldinfactbegoingagainstthegrainofthe
intentionsofthepartiesifitweretomake,asintheeventitwoulddo,aninterpretationof
theprovisionsleadingtoatreatmentoftheobjectionablereservationasseverable.The
GrandChamberunderlinedthatitwouldnotbeinlinewiththeobjectandpurposeofthe
Conventiontosaythatthecontractingpartiesmayimposerestrictionsontheir
acceptanceofthecompetenceoftheCommissionandtheCourtunderArticles25and46.
Thisisinkeepingwiththethreadthatrunsthroughbothoftheexamplesabove—itwould
bewrongtoadopttoonarrowaviewoftheintentionsoftheparties.536Itisalsoin
keepingwiththebroaderpointmadeinthischapter:itisthetakingintoaccountofallthe
meansoninterpretationtowhichthetreatyinterpreterisdirectedbyArticles31–33of
theVCLT,ofwhichtheobjectandpurposeisanimportantelement,thatleadstothe
establishmentofwhatwastheintentionofthepartiesproperlyso-called.Infact,
therefore,theGrandChamberinLoizidou(PreliminaryObjections)basedits
evolutionaryinterpretationupontheobjectivizedintentionofthepartiesasestablished
onthebasisoftheapproachoftheVCLT—althoughtheGrandChamberdidsomalgré
elle.
InBankovictheGrandChamberoftheEuropeanCourtlater,inrespectofthe
interpretationofArticle1oftheEuropeanConvention,distinguishedtheevolutionary
interpretationithadmadeinLoizidou(PreliminaryObjections).537(p.136) Whenthe
CourtheldinBankovicthatitwas,inprinciple,outofthequestiontomakean
evolutionaryinterpretationofArticle1,538itobservedthatthiswassobecausethe
scopeofthatprovision‘isdeterminativeoftheveryscopeoftheContractingParties’
positiveobligationsand,assuch,ofthescopeandreachoftheentireConventionsystem
ofhumanrights’protection’.539This,accordingtotheCourt,settheinterpretationof
Article1apartbothfromtheinterpretationoftheConvention’ssubstantive
provisions,540andtheprovisionsoftheConventionwhichregulatethecompetenceofthe
Conventionorganstoexamineacase,thelatterofwhichhadbeenatissueinLoizidou
(PreliminaryObjections).541
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TheargumentiscolourablethatthescopeandreachoftheConventionwereintendedto
beevolutionary.ThatistheapproachtheInternationalCourtanditspredecessorhave
takentotheevolutionaryinterpretationinsimilarsituationswherethescopeandreachof
theprovisionscontainedinaninstrumenthavedependedupontheinterpretationofthe
termscontainedinoneparticularprovision.ThusinAegeanSeatheCourt,calleduponto
interpretastate’sinstrumentofaccessiontoatreatyexcludingfromtheCourt’s
jurisdiction‘disputesrelatingtoterritorialstatus’ofthatstate,wherethemeaningof
‘territorialstatus’wascontested,statedthat:
onceitisestablishedthattheexpression‘theterritorialstatusofGreece’wasusedin
Greece’sinstrumentofaccessionasagenerictermdenotinganymatterscomprised
withintheconceptofterritorialstatusundergeneralinternationallaw,thepresumption
necessarilyarisesthatitsmeaningwasintendedtofollowtheevolutionofthelawandto
correspondwiththemeaningattachedtotheexpressionbythelawinforceatanygiven
time.Thispresumption,intheviewoftheCourt,isevenmorecompellingwhenitis
recalledthatthe1928Actwasaconventionforthepacificsettlementofdisputes
designedtobeofthemostgeneralkindandofcontinuingduration,forithardlyseems
conceivablethatinsuchaconventiontermslike‘domesticjurisdiction’and‘territorial
status’wereintendedtohaveafixedcontentregardlessofthesubsequentevolutionof
internationallaw.542
Thesepointsseemtoapplywithnolessforceinrespectspecificallyoftheinterpretation
ofArticle1oftheEuropeanConvention.Moreover,asmentionedabove,thePreambleof
theConventionitselfclearlystatesthatitistheEuropeanCourt’stasktosecurenotonly
‘themaintenance’ofthehumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms;italsosetsoutthetask
ofensuringthe‘furtherrealisationofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms’.The
FrenchversionofthePreamblespeaksof(p.137) ‘lasauvegardeetledéveloppement
desdroitsdel’hommeetdeslibertésfondamentales’.Thisinjunctionmustbetaken
seriously.AsformerPresidentoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,JeanPaulCosta,
observes:
lePréambuledelaConventionindiquequelebutduConseildel’Europe,etdoncdela
Cour,estnonseulementlasauvegardedesdroitsetlibertés,maisencoreleur
développement.Celaimpliqueuneconceptionévolutiveetprogressiveducontenudes
droitsreconnus,etlaCourmanqueraitàunepartiedesesdevoirssielleneveillaitqu’à
lasauvegardedesdroitsennéglieantl’impératifdeleurdéveloppement.543
Nottotakethelivinginstrument,orevolutionary,approachtoArticle1oftheConvention
wouldamounttoafailureoftakingintoaccountthe‘conceptionévolutiveetprogressive
ducontenudesdroitsreconnus’which,bytheclearadmissionofthePreamble,is
incumbentupontheCourt.
ButgiventhattheCourtinBankovicalsomadethestatementthattherightsofthe
Conventioncouldnotbe‘dividedandtailored’,544itispossibletohavesomesympathy
fortheconclusiontheCourtreachedinBankovicinrespectofwhethertheliving
instrumentapproachcouldbetakentoArticle1.Givinganevolutionaryinterpretationto
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thegatekeeperprovisionofArticle1,theresultofwhichwouldbethebroadeningofthe
scopeandreachofanindivisibleanduntailorableConvention,could,giventhewaythe
scenariowaspresentedbytheCourt,beseentobeatallorder.
InAl-Skeini,545however,theGrandChamber,overturningBankoviconthispointat
least,madeclearthattherightsandobligationsintheConventioncaninfactbe‘divided
andtailored’.546ThislargelytakesthestingoutofthepointwhichtheGrandChamber
madeabouttheterritorialreachandscopeoftheConventioninBankovic,thatitwould
takearestrictiveapproachtothepossibleexpansion,rationeloci,ofthe‘scopeandreach
oftheentireConventionsystemofhumanrights’protection’.547Infact,aswillbeseenin
Chapter5,theGrandChamberhasexplicitlytakenanevolutionaryapproachtothescope
andreachoftheConventionrightsintemporalterms.ThereisnoConventionarticlethat
regulatesthescoperationetemporisinthewaythatArticle1bearsonthescoperatione
loci.IndevelopingitsapproachtothescopeoftheConventionrationetemporis,the
GrandChamberinŠilih548explicitlysawtheobligationsatissueashaving‘evolved’,and
itdidsoinŠilih,andinlatercases,onthebasisoftheideathat,intemporaltermslikein
territorialterms,theapplicationoftheConventionrightscanbe‘dividedandtailored’.549
(p.138)
Chapter5willshow,however,thattheevolutionaryinterpretationwhichtheGrand
ChambermadeinŠilihwassupererogatory,asastraightforwardapplicationoftheageolddoctrineofjurisdictionrationetemporisininternationallaw,asdevelopedalreadyby
thePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,wouldhaveledtothesameresult.550
Infact,thequestionofthe‘livinginstrument’orevolutionaryinterpretationofArticle1of
theEuropeanConventionismootforthesamereasonsasthequestionofanevolutionary
approachtojurisdictionrationetemporisismoot.TheEuropeanCourtcan,insteadof
seeingthecorrectinterpretationofArticle1asaquestionofevolutionaryinterpretation,
simplyapplytheapproachofgeneralinternationallaw.
InconsideringthesameissueasconfrontedtheEuropeanCourtinBankovic,the
InternationalCourtobservedintheWallopinionthat,inlightofitsobjectandpurpose,
theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights551 was‘applicableinrespectof
actsdonebyaStateintheexerciseofitsjurisdictionoutsideitsownterritory’.552This
wasconfirmedinCongovDRC.553SubsequentlytheCourthasevendoneawaywiththe
mentionofexerciseofjurisdiction,statinginRussiavGeorgia(ProvisionalMeasures)
thatArticles2and5oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsof
RacialDiscrimination554‘generallyappeartoapply,likeotherprovisionsofinstrumentsof
thatnature,totheactionsofaStatepartywhenitactsbeyonditsterritory’.555Asfaras
generalinternationallawisconcerned,‘aStatewill’,inthewordsofPresidentHiggins,‘of
courseberesponsiblefortheactsattributabletoit,evenwhenthoseoccuroutsideofits
ownjurisdiction’.556(p.139)
3.3.15Conclusion
Itispossibleonthisbasistoconcludethattheevolutionaryinterpretationsarrivedatin
Namibia557andinTyrervUnitedKingdom558andAireyvIreland559aswellas
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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numerouscasesinthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtarebestunderstoodonthe
backgroundoftheintentionoftheparties,thatis,anintentionwhichisestablished
objectivelyonthebasisofthemeansofinterpretationlegitimatelyavailable.Asthe
TribunalinRosInvest(Jurisdiction)putit,humanrightstreaties‘representthevery
archetypeoftreatyinstrumentsinwhichtheContractingPartiesmusthaveintendedthat
theprinciplesandconceptswhichtheyemployedshouldbeunderstoodandappliedin
thelightofdevelopingsocialattitudes’; 560thecommonthreadinhumanrightstreaties‘is
thattheirnatureorcircumstancesprovideevidencethatthePartiesthemselves
intendedorunderstoodthatanevolutionaryapproachwasappropriatetothe
interpretationandapplicationofwhattheyhadagreedupon’.561
Ifthecommonintentionofthepartiesisgivenarestrictedreading—onewhichdoesnot
fullytakeintoaccountwhatthepartiesintendedtoachievewhenconcludingthe
instrument—thenonemayeasilyendupwronglycriticizinginterpretationsmadein
respectoftreaties,elementsofwhichweremeantfromtheoutsettoevolve.Thereare,
however,timeswhentheintentionsofthepartieswerethatthetreatytermsshouldbe
interpretednotinanevolutionarymannerbutrathercontemporaneously.Insuchcases,
too,itisthecommonintentionofthepartieswhichiscontrolling.
3.4Conclusion
Theanalysisabovehasborneoutthatevolutionaryinterpretationisinexorablylinkedto
theobjectivizedintentionoftheparties.Thegivingofeffecttotheintentionoftheparties
doesnothavetobeadeterrenttotheuseofevolutionaryinterpretation;ratherthetwo
—theintentionofthepartiesandtheevolutionaryinterpretationoftreaties—arecutfrom
thesamecloth.ThisiswhyonecansaythatArticle31oftheVCLT562hasplayedacritical
roleinthedevelopmentofanevolutionaryapproachtotreatyinterpretation.
Inthatsenseevolutionaryinterpretationrelatestotheintentionofthepartiesinthesame
waythatcontemporaneousinterpretationdoes.Whenonelooksattheinterpretive
resultsarrivedatbytheInternationalCourtin,forexample,NamibiaorNavigational
Rights,andonetakesintoaccountthecarefulwayin(p.140) whichtheCourtinthose
casesreliedonthewilloftheparties,thenoneseesthatthisinsistenceontheimportance
oftheintentionofthepartiesisnotbydefinitionconservative.Thatwhichcouldbe
thoughttobeconservativewouldbetotaketoonarrowanapproachtowhatinfactwas
thecommonintentionofthepartiesandthenproceedtorelyonthatnarrowconception.
Astheanalysishasbroughtout,theobjectoftreatyinterpretationistogiveeffecttothe
intentionofthepartiesasfullyandfairlyaspossible.Theanalysishasalsoshownthatthat
willbynecessityattimesinvolveimputinganintentiontobeboundbyanevolving
interpretationofthetermsofthetreaty.Oncethepartieshavechosentoclothetheir
intentionintheformoftreatyprovisions,aninternationalTribunalseizedofthe
interpretationofthattreatyisboundandentitledtoassumeaneffectivecommon
intentionoftheparties.
Ifevolutionaryinterpretationisseenasafunctionofthecommonintentionoftheparties,
itisnotonlyrenderedexplicable;italsocomestousnotasanaberrantandfreewheeling
interpretivetechniquebutasnothingelsethanaresultofthetraditionalcanonsoftreaty
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interpretation.Itis,toappropriateMcNair’sdescriptionofHuber’sevolutionary
interpretationinSpanishZoneofMoroccoClaims,563a‘properandcommonsense’
interpretivetechnique.564
Equally,however,theseinsightsmakeitnecessarytotaketheargumentonestep
further.Notonlyisevolutionaryinterpretationnotexceptional,asittooisaresultofthe
interpretiveprocessdescribedinthegeneralruleofinterpretation.Notonlywillit,as
wasseenatthebeginningofthischapter,moreoftenthannotbecorroboratedbythe
subsequentpracticeoftheparties,ashasbeenthecaseinthejurisprudenceofthe
InternationalCourtandalsointheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.Therearetimes
whenevolutionaryinterpretationisreallywhollysupererogatory,timeswhenthere
simplyisnoneedforitastheresulttowhichitwouldhaveledalreadyfollowsfromthe
plainmeaningofthetextreadingoodfaith.
Ashasbeenseeninthischapter,interpretationoftreatiesdraftedingenericterms
indeedcomesclosetomeaningthatspeakingofevolutionaryinterpretationmaybeof
littleuse,asthemerewordingcomessoclosetoprovidinguswiththeanswer.Asseen
above,thispointwasmadealreadybythePermanentCourtinEmploymentofWomen
duringtheNightwhen,inastatementofprincipleregarding‘provisionswhicharegeneral
inscope’,itstatedthat:
Themerefactthat,atthetimewhentheConvention...wasconcluded,certainfactsor
situations,whichthetermsoftheConventionintheirordinarymeaningarewideenough
tocover,werenotthoughtof,doesnotjustifyinterpretingthoseofitsprovisionswhich
aregeneralinscopeotherwisethatinaccordancewiththeirterms.565
Thesamepoint,whichiftakenseriouslyleavesverylittlescopeorneedforevolutionary
interpretation,wasmademorerecentlybythePanelReportinCertain(p.141)
InformationTechnologyProducts.566Atissueinthiscasewastheinterpretationofsocalledconcessioncommitmentsinrelationtotechnologicalprogressandwhetherthe
treatytext,‘flatpaneldisplaydevices’,coveredtypesoftechnology,intheeventLCD
screens,whichdidnotexistwhenthetextwasdrafted.ThePanel‘appliedthecustomary
rulesofinterpretationofpublicinternationallaw,ascodifiedinArticle31oftheVienna
Convention’and,indoingso,‘examinedtheordinarymeaningoftheterms’,andthe
Panelwentontonotethatthe‘genericterms’hadbeenusedinthetreaty,‘tocovera
widerangeofproductsandtechnologies’.567Inlightofitsconclusionontheordinary
meaningoftheterms,thePaneldid‘notconsideritnecessarytoresorttoanyformof
evolutionaryinterpretation’.568InthiswaythePanelinCertainInformationTechnology
Productsarrivedatthesameresulttowhichanevolutionaryinterpretationwouldhave
ledintheevent,byrelyinguponwhatitsawastheordinarymeaningoftheterms.
InfactthesamecouldbesaidaboutNavigationalRights,whereJudgeadhocGuillaume
heldthattheresultwhichtheCourthadreachedbywayofevolutionaryinterpretation
couldalsobereachedbywayofordinaryinterpretationofthewording.Forhefound
that‘thedraftersofthe1858Treatyintendedtocoverthetransportforprofitof
passengersaswellasofgoodswhentheyreferredtonavigationforcommercial
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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purposes’.569Inotherwords,itwasarguablynotnecessarytoresorttoanyformof
evolutionaryinterpretationhereeither.
Inanyevent,theseinsightsaddtothepointthatthereisnothingexceptionalabout
evolutionaryinterpretation.Notonlydoesevolutionaryinterpretationfollowasnaturally
fromthegeneralruleofinterpretation;itis,attimes,nothingelsethanadifferentname
for,asthePermanentCourtputitinEmploymentofWomenduringtheNight,
interpretingtreatyprovisions‘inaccordancewiththeirterms’.570
Notes:
(1 )FBerman,‘InternationalTreatiesandBritishStatutes’(2005)26SLR1,3.
(2)ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,23May1969,1155UNTS331;(1969)8
ILM679,Art2(b),Art11,Art12,Art13,Art14,Art15,Art17,Art18(b),Art20(4)(c),
Art20(5),Art23(2),Art24(2),Art46(1),Art48(1),Art49,Art50,Art51,Art65(1),and
Art69(4).SeeSRosenne,‘“Consent”andRelatedWordsintheCodifiedLawofTreaties’
inMélangesoffertsàCharlesRousseau:Lacomunautéinternational(Pedone,1974),
229;ABolintineau,‘ExpressionofConsenttobeBoundbyaTreatyintheLightofthe
1969ViennaConvention’(1974)68AJIL672;GKorontzis,‘MakingtheTreaty’inDHollis
(ed),OxfordGuidetoTreaties(OxfordUniversityPress,2012),196.
(3)PReuter,LaConventiondeViennedudroitdestraités(ArmandColin,1971),15–17.
(4)FreeZonesofUpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGex(1932)PCIJSeriesA/BNo46,
166;InterpretationoftheStatuteoftheMemelTerritory(1932)PCIJSeriesA/BNo49,
313–14;AwardintheArbitrationregardingtheIronRhine(‘IjzerenRijn’)(Belgiumv
Netherlands)(2005)27RIAA35,64.
(5)DaimlerFinancialServicesAGvArgentineRepublic,ICSIDCaseNoARB/05/1,22
August2012.
(6)DaimlerFinancialServicesAGvArgentineRepublic(n5)at[168].
(7)ILCYbk1964/II,58at[21].
(8)GGaja,‘Trattatiinternazionali’(1999)15DDP344,355–6.
(9)ISinclair,TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(2ndedn,Manchester
UniversityPress,1984),114–53;FJacobs,‘VaritiesofApproachtoTreaty
Interpretation’(1969)18ICLQ318;JMSorelandVBoréEveno,‘Article31’inOCorten
andPKlein(eds),TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties:ACommentary(Oxford
UniversityPress,2011),804–37;RKolb,Interprétationetcréationdudroit
international.Esquissed’uneherméneutiquejuridiquemodernepourledroit
internationalpublic(Bruylant,2006);SSur,L’interprétationendroitinternationalpublic
(LGDJ,1974),194;CMcLachlan,‘ThePrincipleofSystemicIntegrationandArticle31(3)
(c)oftheViennaConvention’(2005)54ICLQ279,291;AOrakhelashvili,The
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
InterpretationofActsandRulesinPublicInternationalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress,
2008),285;IBrownlie,PrinciplesofInternationalLaw(7thedn,OxfordUniversity
Press,2008),630–1.
(10)InterpretationoftheTreatyofLausanne,Article3,paragraph2(1925)PCIJSerB,
No12,18–19.Also:Italy–UnitedStatesAirTransport(Arbitration)(1965)45ILR393,
408.Further:PReuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(JMicoandP
Haggenmachertr,PaulKeganInternational,1995),24.
(11 )RGardiner,TreatyInterpretation(paperbackedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2011),
5.
(12)Reuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(n10),96–7.
(13)GGuillaume,‘MethodsandPracticeofTreatyInterpretationbytheInternational
CourtofJustice’inGSacerdoti,AYanovich,andJBohanes(eds),TheWTOatTen:The
ContributionoftheDisputeSettlementSystem(CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),
472–3.
(14)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276(1970)
[1971]ICJRep16,35at[53].Also:LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonand
Nigeria(CameroonvNigeria:EquatorialGuineaintervening)(Judgment)[2002]ICJRep
303,346(‘theCourtmustseektoascertaintheintentionoftheparties’).
(15)AegeanSeaContinentalShelf[1978]ICJRep3,32at[77].
(16)Gabčíkovo–NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(Judgment)[1997]ICJRep7,
78–9at[142].
(17)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)
(Judgment)[2009]ICJRep213,242at[63].
(18)PulpMillsontheRiverUruguay(ArgentinavUruguay)(Judgment)[2010]ICJRep
14,83at[204].
(19)See,ontheseconcepts,Ch2.2.
(20)VGowlland-Debbas,‘TheRoleoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeinthe
DevelopmentoftheContemporaryLawofTreaties’inCJTamsandJSloan(eds),The
DevelopmentofInternationalLawbytheInternationalCourtofJustice(Oxford
UniversityPress,2013),35–7.Also:YoungLoanArbitration(1980)59ILR494,531at
[18]–[19];DisputeconcerningFilletingwithintheGulfofStLawrence(‘LaBretagne’)
(Canada/France)(1986)82ILR591,659–60;CaseConcerningtheDelimitationofthe
MaritimeBoundarybetweenGuinea-BissauandSenegal(Guinea-BissauvSenegal)
(1989)10RIAA119,152at[85];IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),65and73.
SeeILCDraftConclusionsonSubsequentAgreementsandSubsequentPracticein
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
RelationtotheInterpretationofTreaties2013,ILCReport2013UNDocA/68/10,26at
[7](‘IntheIronRhinecasethecontinuedviabilityandeffectivenessofamulti-dimensional
crossborderrailwayarrangementwasanimportantreasonfortheTribunaltoacceptthat
evenrathertechnicalrulesmayhavetobegivenanevolutiveinterpretation’).
(21 )ILCYbk1966/II,218–19.Also:ILCYbk1964/II,58at[21].
(22)VLowe,InternationalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress,2007),74.
(23)AAust,ModernTreatyLawandPractice(3rdedn,CambridgeUniversityPress,
2013),222.
(24)Lowe,InternationalLaw(n22),74.Also:Aust,ModernTreatyLawandPractice(n
23),216–17.
(25)ADMcNair,TheLawofTreaties(2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress,1961),392.
(26)SBeckett,‘WorstwardHo’inNohowOn(Calder,1992),101.
(27)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),
242at[63].
(28)JBasdevant(ed),Dictionnairedelaterminologiedudroitinternational(Sirey,1960)
‘intention’.Also:CCalvo,Dictionnairededroitinternationalpublicetprivé(Pedone,
1885),400.
(29)JSalmon(ed),Dictionnairededroitinternationalpublic(Bruylant,2001),‘intention’.
(30)DissentingOpinionofJudgeSchwebelinMaritimeDelimitationandTerritorial
Questions[1994]ICJRep6,27.Also:EC—ComputerEquipment,ReportoftheAppeallate
BodyWT/DS62/AB/R;WT/DS67/AB/R;WT/DS68/AB/R[84]:‘Thepurposeoftreaty
interpretationunderArticle31oftheViennaConventionistoascertainthecommon
intentionsoftheparties.Thesecommonintentionscannotbeascertainedonthebasisof
thesubjectiveandunilaterallydetermined“expectations”ofoneofthepartiestoa
treaty.’
(31 )DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
SessionA/CN.4/L.819/Add.1,18.
(32)ILCYBK1964/II,58.
(33)Lands,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(Judgment)[1992]ICJ351,585at
[378].Also:TheBorchgraveCase(PreliminaryObjections)PCIJ(1937)SeriesA/BNo72,
163.
(34)Argentina/ChileFrontierCase(Palena)(1966)16RIAA109,174;(1966)38ILR10,
89;DecisionregardingdelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(2002)25
RIAA83,110;(2002)130ILR1,34at[3.4].
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(35)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),
237.
(36)Argentina/ChileFrontierCase(Palena)(n34),89.Also:MSørensen,Lessourcesdu
droitinternational:ÉtudesurlajurisprudencedelaCourpermanenteinternationalde
justice(EinarMunksgaard,1946),214–15;JDMortenson,‘TheTravauxofTravaux:Is
theViennaConventionHostiletoDraftingHistory?’(2013)107AJIL780;GNolte,
‘IntroductoryReportoftheStudyGrouponTreatiesoverTime’inGNolte(ed),Treaties
andSubsequentPractice(OxfordUniversityPress,2013).
(37)InterpretationoftheAirTransportServicesAgreementbetweentheUnitedStates
ofAmericaandFrance(1963)16RIAA5,47;(1963)38ILR182,229.Also:Lighthouses
CasebetweenFranceandGreece(1934)PCIJSeriesA/BNo62,13and18;
ReservationstotheConventiononGenocide(AdvisoryOpinion)[1951]ICJRep15,23;
CaseofCertainNorwegianLoans(Judgment)[1957]ICJRep9,23and27;Legal
ConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia(South
WestAfrica)(n14),35at[53];DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(Costa
RicavNicaragua)(n12),237at[48];Argentina/ChileFrontierCase(Palena)(n27),89;
DecisionregardingdelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(n34),34at
[3.4];TaxregimegoverningpensionspaidtoretiredUNESCOofficialsresidinginFrance
(FrancevUNESCO)(2003)25RIAA231,248;China—AudiovisualEntertainment
Products,ReportoftheAppeallateBodyWT/DS363/AB/Rat[405];US—GamblingReport
oftheAppellateBodyWT/DS363/AB/Rat[84];EC—ComputerEquipment,Reportofthe
AppeallateBodyWT/DS62/AB/R;WT/DS67/AB/R;WT/DS68/AB/Rat[84].
(38)RDworkin,AMatterofPrinciple(HarvardUniversityPress,1985),48.
(39)Dworkin,AMatterofPrinciple(n38),48–50.
(40)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.
(41 )GLetsas,ATheoryofInterpretationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights
(OxfordUniversityPress,2007),70.Letsasgoeson,however,tostatethat:‘anytheory
ofinterpretationfortheECHR(oranyinternationaltreaty)mustatsomestagestand
outsidedrafters’intentionsandprovideanormativejustificationbasedonvaluesof
politicalmorality’.Thisideacaptures,hesays,‘thespiritofarts31–32VCLT.Wecannot
knowwhether(andtheextenttowhich)drafters’intentionsarerelevantunlesswesettle
firstontheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty’.Aswillbecomeclear,thisstudydoesnot
sharethatviewofArts31–32oftheVCLTandmorebroadlyoftheroleoftheintentionof
theparties.
(42)DeclarationofJudgeHigginsinKasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)
(Judgment)[1999]ICJRep1045,1114.Also:RHiggins,‘SomeObservationsonthe
Inter-TemporalRuleinInternationalLaw’inTheoryofInternationalLawatthe
Thresholdofthe21stCentury:EssaysinHonourofKrzystofSkubiszewski(Kluwer,
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
1996),181.Further:HWaldock,UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawofTreaties:
OfficialRecords,FirstSession,Vienna,1968:SummaryRecords184at[70].
(43)DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),17–18.
(44)DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),18.
(45)ILCYbk1966/II,218–19.
(46)SeeWChurchill,HouseofCommonsSpeech,11November1947(‘Democracyisthe
worstformofgovernment,exceptforallthoseotherformsthathavebeentriedfrom
timetotime’).
(47)PDaillier,MForteau,andAPellet,Droitinternationalpublic(8thedn,LGDJ,2009),
283.
(48)Daillier,Forteau,andPellet,Droitinternationalpublic(n47),283
(49)HWaldock,‘TheEffectivenessoftheSystemSetupbytheEuropeanConventionon
HumanRights’(1980)1HRLJ1,3.
(50)Waldock,‘TheEffectivenessoftheSystemSetupbytheEuropeanConventionon
HumanRights’(n49),1–4.
(51 )ILCYbk1966/II,222.
(52)JChristoffersen,FairBalance:Proportionality,SubsidiarityandPrimarityinthe
EuropeanConventiononHumanRights(MartinusNijhoff,2009),54.
(53)InterpretationoftheAgreementof25March1951betweentheWHOandEgypt
[1980]ICJRep73,95at[47].
(54)CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(55)Resolution2625(XXV),24October1970.
(56)Lowe,InternationalLaw(n22),116–18.
(57)CGreenwood,‘StateContractsinInternationalLaw’(1982)53BYIL27,42.
(58)Resolution1803(XVII),14December1962.
(59)RKolb,Labonnefoiendroitinternationalpublic:Contributionàl’étudedes
principesgénérauxdedroit(PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,2000),274–5.
(60)LoizidouvTurkey(PreliminaryObjections)(1995)103ILR622,644–9.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(61 )NorthAtlanticFisheries(GreatBritainvUnitedStates)(1910)11RIAA167,188.
SeealsoLandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria(Preliminary
Objections)(Judgment)[1998]ICJRep275,296(whichcitesNorthAtlanticFisheries);
FactoryatChorzow(Merits)(JudgmentNo13)(1928)PCIJSeriesANo17,30;Certain
GermanInterestsinPolishUpperSilesia(Merits)(1926)PCIJSeriesANo7,4,30
(Frenchversiononly);FreeZonesofUpperSavoyandtheDistrictofGex,Orderof6
December(1930)PCIJSeriesANo24,12and(1932)PCIJSeriesA/BNo46,167;
ConditionsofAdmissionofaStatetoMembershipintheUnitedNations(Article4ofthe
Charter)(AdvisoryOpinion)[1948]ICJRep57,63;RightsofNationalsoftheUnited
StatesofAmericainMorocco(Judgment)[1952]ICJRep212;FisheriesJurisdiction
(FederalRepublicofGermanyvIceland)(JurisdictionoftheCourt)(Judgment)[1973]
ICJRep18.SeealsoReItalianSpecialCapitalLevyDuties(1949)18ILR406,407;
LighthousesArbitration(ClaimNo26)(1956)23ILR342,345;AlsingTradingCovThe
GreekState(1954)23ILR633,635;InterpretationofArticle78(7)ofthePeaceTreaty
withItaly1947(Franco–EthiopianRailwayCoclaim)(1956)24ILR602,626;Pertusola
claim(1951)18ILR414,419.
(62)NuclearTests(AustraliavFrance)(NewZealandvFrance)ICJRep1974253,267.
(63)PulpMillsontheRiverUruguay(ArgentinavUruguay)(n18),14at[145].
(64)HThirlway,‘TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice1960–1989
PartIII’(1991)62BYIL1,17;MKYasseen‘L’interprétationdestraitésd’aprèsla
ConventiondeViennesurledroitdestraités’(1976)15HagueRecueil21.
(65)Thirlway,‘LawandProcedure1960–1989III’(n64),17–18.
(66)SeeMEVilliger,‘TheRulesonInterpretation:Misgivings,Misunderstandings,
Miscarriage?The“Crucible”IntendedbytheInternationalLawCommission’inE
Cannizzaro(ed),TheLawofTreatiesBeyondtheViennaConvention(OxfordUniversity
Press,2011),108–9.
(67)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),465.
(68)Reuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(n10),94.
(69)EZoller,Labonnefoiendroitinternational(Pedone,1977),202.
(70)DissentingOpinionofJudgeSchwebelinMaritimeDelimitationandTerritorial
Questions[1994]ICJRep6,39.
(71 )AuditingofAccountsbetweentheKingdomoftheNetherlandsandtheFrench
Republic(Netherlands/France)(RhineChloridesArbitration)(2004)25RIAA267;(2004)
144ILR259,292–3at[63].Also:RYJennings,‘Treaties’inMBedjaoudi(ed),
InternationalLaw:AchievementsandProspects(MartinusNijhoff,1991),146.
(72)HLauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(1950)43Anndel’Inst366,383.Also:
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
RBernhardt,DieAuslegungvölkerrechtlicherVerträge—insbesondereinder
RechtsprechunginternationalerGerichte(Heymann,1963),24.
(73)HLauterpacht,‘RestrictiveInterpretationandthePrincipleofEffectivenessinthe
InterpretationofTreaties’(1949)26BYIL48,56.
(74)Aust,ModernTreatyLawandPractice(n23),160–1.
(75)Lauterpacht,‘RestrictiveInterpretationandthePrincipleofEffectiveness’(n73),56.
(76)Bernhardt,AuslegungvölkerrechtlicherVerträge(n72),24.(Theagreementinlegal
doctrineoftheimportanceintreatyinterpretationofgoodfaith‘stehtdieerstaunliche
Tatsachegegenüber,daβinderneuerenPraxis,voralleminderinternationalen
Gerichtspraxis,vonGebotenderbonafidesnurauβerordentlichseltendieRedeist’.)
(77)Kolb,Labonnefoi(n59),267.
(78)CfULinderfalk,OntheInterpretationofTreaties:TheModernInternationalLawas
Expressedinthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(Springer,2007).
(79)SeegenerallyOCorten,L’utilisationdu‘raisonnable’parlejugeinternational
(Bruylant,1997).
(80)ARivier,Principesdudroitdesgens(Rousseau,1896)at[157].
(81 )BarcelonaTraction,LightandPowerCoLtd(Judgment)[1970]ICJRep3,48at[93].
Also:DissentingOpinionofJudgeYusufinWhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:
NewZealandIntervening)(Judgment)31March2014at[15].
(82)JointDissentingOpinionofJudgesLauterpacht,WellingtonKoo,andSpenderin
AerialIncidentof27July1955(IsraelvBulgaria)(PreliminaryObjections)[1959]ICJRep
127,189.SeeegZoller,Labonnefoi(n69),229;Kolb,Labonnefoi(n59),271.
(83)Zoller,Labonnefoi(n69),203.Seeontherelationshipbetweenequityandgood
faithmoregenerally,AVLowe,‘TheRoleofEquityinInternationalLaw’(1989)12AYIL
54,72–3;ELauterpacht,AspectsoftheAdministrationofInternationalJustice(Grotius,
1991),117–52.
(84)IndividualOpinionofJudgeadhocTorresBernárdezinLand,IslandandMaritime
FrontierDispute(ElSalvador/Honduras:Nicaraguaintervening)[1992]ICJRep351,
718–19.
(85)Further:Sinclair,ViennaConvention(n9),120–1.
(86)TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad[1994]ICJRep6,21–2at[41].SeeCh
3.3.7.
(87)RhineChloridesArbitration(Netherlands/France)(n71),292–3at[63].
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(88)CayugaIndians(GreatBritain)vUnitedStates(1926)6RIAA173,179.
(89)Lowe,InternationalLaw(n22),117.
(90)DivertedCargoesCase(GreecevUnitedKingdom)(1955)12RIAA53,70(‘le
principefondamentaldelabonnefoiquirégit,soitl’interprétation,soitl’exécutiondes
conventionsetinciteàrechercherlacommuneintentiondesÉtatscontractants’).
(91 )HLauterpacht,InternationalLaw—CollectedPapersIV(CambridgeUniversity
Press,1978),437–8.
(92)Kolb,Labonnefoi(n59),275.
(93)SeeCertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations(Article17,paragraph2oftheCharter)
(AdvisoryOpinion)[1962]ICJRep151,159;SouthWestAfrica(SecondPhase)
(Judgment)[1966]ICJRep6,48;InterpretationofPeaceTreaties(SecondPhase)
(AdvisoryOpinion)[1950]ICJRep221,229;RightsofNationalsoftheUnitedStatesof
AmericainMorocco(FrancevUnitedStatesofAmerica)(n61),196.
(94)BoundaryDisputebetweenArgentinaandChileConcerningtheDelimitationofthe
FrontierLinebetweenBoundaryPost62andMountFitzroy(1994)22RIAA3,25;(1994)
113ILR1,45at[75].
(95)SeeLighthousesCasebetweenFranceandGreece(n37),13and18;Interpretation
oftheAirTransportServicesAgreementbetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaand
France(n37),229;DecisionregardingdelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaand
Ethiopia(n34),34at[3.4].
(96)TheIndo–PakistanWesternBoundary(RannofKutch)Case(IndiavPakistan)
(1976)50ILR1,104.
(97)Affairerelativeàl’interprétationdutraitédecommerceconcluentrel’Italieetla
Suissele13juillet1904(Italie/Suisse)(1911)11RIAA257.
(98)Affairerelativeàl’interprétationdutraitédecommerceconcluentrel’Italieetla
Suissele13juillet1904(n97),262.Also:Affairedel’indemnitérusse(Russie/Turquie)
(1912)11RIAA421,446;PertosulaClaim(1951)18ILR414,419–23;Anglo–IranianOil
CoCase(Jurisdiction)(Judgment)[1952]ICJRep93,107.
(99)Baer(1959)14RIAA402.
(100)Baer(n99),405–6.
(101 )Baer(n99),406(internalreferencesandinvertedcommasomitted).
(102)AClapham,Brierly’sLawofNations:AnIntroductiontotheRoleofInternational
LawinInternationalRelations(7thedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2012),354;Jennings,
‘Treaties’(n71),145.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(103)Zoller,Labonnefoi(n69),235–6.
(104)ThiswasclassicallyexpoundedbythePermanentCourtinAcquisitionofPolish
NationalityPCIJ(1923)SeriesBNo7,7,20,towhichtheTribunalinBaeralsomade
reference,wherethePermanentCourtdeclinedtofollowthebad-faithinterpretation
suggestedbyPolandastowhowasPolishforthepurposesofArt4(1)oftheTreatyof28
June1919betweenthePrincipalAlliedandAssociatedPowersandPoland.TheCourt
heldthat:‘TheCourt’staskisclearlydefined.Havingbeforeitaclausewhichleaveslittle
tobedesiredinthenatureofclearness,itisboundtoapplythisclauseasitstands,
withoutconsideringwhetherotherprovisionsmightwithadvantagehavebeenaddedto
orsubstitutedforit....ToimposeanadditionalconditionfortheacquisitionofPolish
nationality,aconditionnotprovidedforintheTreatyofJune28th,1919,wouldbe
equivalentnottointerpretingtheTreaty,buttoreconstructingit.’SeeCh1.
(105)Zoller,Labonnefoi(n69),238.
(106)TheIndo–PakistanWesternBoundary(RannofKutch)Case(IndiavPakistan)(n
96),104.
(107)GTdiLampedusa,TheLeopard(ArchibaldColquhountr,RandomHouse,1960),26.
(108)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n
17),213at[63].
(109)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n
17),213at[64].
(110)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),35.
(111 )CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(112)SeeKolb,Labonnefoi(n59),503–10.
(113)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),35,45–6.
(114)Kolb,Labonnefoi(n59)526–30.
(115)SeparateOpinionofJudgeLauterpachtinSouthWestAfrica—VotingProcedure,
AdvisoryOpinion[1955]ICJRep67,105,119–20;SeparateOpinionofJudgeGrosin
LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia
(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),35,338–41.
(116)SeeHWaldock,‘TheEvolutionofHumanRightsConceptsandtheApplicationofthe
EuropeanConventiononHumanRights’inMélangesoffertsàPaulReuter—Ledroit
international:unitéetdiversité(Pedone,1981),535,541.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(117)DissentingOpinionofJudgeFitzmauriceinLegalConsequencesforStatesofthe
ContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),35,208–310.
(118)SeeCh4.
(119)SeeNolte,TreatiesandSubsequentPractice(n36);JArato,‘TreatyInterpretation
andConstitutionalChange:InformalChangeinInternationalOrganizatons’(2013)38Yale
JIL289,307–48;RGardiner,‘TheViennaConventionRulesonTreatyInterpretation’in
DHollis(ed),TheOxfordGuidetoTreaties(OxfordUniversityPress,2012),494–5.
(120)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n
17),213,242–3.
(121 )DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n
17),213,242.
(122)SeparateOpinionofJudgeSkotnikovinDisputeregardingNavigationalandRelated
Rights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),213,284–85.
(123)Nolte,‘IntroductoryReportoftheStudyGrouponTreatiesoverTime’(n36),184–
8.
(124)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),16,30–1.
(125)AegeanSeaContinentalShelf(n15),31.
(126)MangourasvSpainAppNo12050/04judgment[GC]28September2010.
(127)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.
(128)JointDissentingOpinionofJudgesRozakis,Bratza,Bonello,CabralBarretto,Davíd
ThórBjörgvinsson,Nicolau,andBiankuinMangourasvSpain(n126)at[1]​.
(129)MangourasvSpain(n126)at[87].
(130)MangourasvSpain(n126)at[86].
(131 )Kasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),1094.
(132)TGinsburg,‘BoundedDiscrectioninInternationalJudicialLawmaking’(2005)45Va
JIL1,41–2.
(133)Also:NationalityDecreesIssuedinTunisandMorocco(1923)PCIJSeriesBNo4,
7;Gabčíkovo–NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(n16);PulpMillsontheRiver
Uruguay(ArgentinavUruguay)(n18),14.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(134)TyrervUnited-Kingdom(1978)58ILR339,353.
(135)A,BandCvIrelandAppNo25579/05judgment[GC]16December2010at[234].
(136)Nolte,‘SecondReportoftheStudyGrouponTreatiesoverTime’(n36),254.
(137)LRHelfner,‘NonconsensualInternationalLawmaking’[2008]UIllLR71,88.
(138)Affairedel’indemnitérusse(Russie/Turquie)(1912)11RIAA421,433.
(139)InterpretationofArticle3(2)oftheTreatyofLausanne(n10),24.Also:Jurisdiction
oftheCourtsofDanzig(1928)PCIJSeriesBNo15,4,18.
(140)SeeGDistefano,‘LapratiquesubséquentedesÉtatspartiesàuntraité’(1994)40
AFDI41.
(141 )SeeGardiner,‘ViennaConventionRules’(n119);ABoyle,‘Reflectionsonthe
TreatyasaLaw-MakingInstrument’inAOrakhelashviliandSWilliams(eds),40Yearsof
theViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(BritishInstituteofInternationaland
ComparativeLaw,2010),21–8.
(142)Clapham,Brierly’sLawofNations(n102),356.
(143)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),16at[53].
(144)AegeanSeaContinentalShelf(n15),32at[77].
(145)Gabčíkovo–NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(n16),78–9at[142].
(146)PulpMillsontheRiverUruguay(ArgentinavUruguay)(n18),83at[204].
(147)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81).
(148)InternationalConventionfortheRegulationofWhaling,2December1946,161
UNTS72.
(149)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[44].
(150)ConventionfortheRegulationofWhaling,24September1931,155LNTS349.
(151 )InternationalAgreementfortheRegulationofWhaling,8June1937,190LNTS79.
(152)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[45].
Further:SeparateOpinionofJudgeGreenwoodat[5]​; SeparateOpinionofJudge
Charlesworthadhocat[3];SeparateOpinionofJudgeCançadoTrindadeat[25]–[40].
(153)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[56].
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(154)SeparateOpinionofJudgeLauterpachtinSouthWestAfrica—VotingProcedure(n
115),106.
(155)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81).
(156)SeparateOpinionofJudgeGreenwoodinWhalingintheAntarctic(Australiav
Japan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[7]​.
(157)SeeCh3.3.8.
(158)SeparateOpinionofJudgeGreenwoodinWhalingintheAntarctic(Australiav
Japan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[5]​.
(159)Further:SeparateOpinionofJudgeCharlesworthadhocinWhalingintheAntarctic
(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[3]​.
(160)IndusWatersKishengangaArbitration(PakistanvIndia)(PartialAward)(2013)154
ILR1,173at[452].
(161 )WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81).
(162)CRedgwell,‘MultilateralEnvironmentalTreaty-Making’inVGowlland-Debbas(ed),
MultilateralTreaty-Making:TheCurrentStatusofChallengestoandReformsNeededin
theInternationalLegislativeProcess(MartinusNijhoff,2000),107.Also:Separate
OpinionofJudgeCançadoTrindadeinWhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:New
ZealandIntervening)(n81)at[29]–[30].
(163)SeeTerritorialDispute(Libya/Chad)(n86),21–2;OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublic
ofIranvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(PreliminaryObjection)(Judgment)[1996]ICJRep
803,812;Kasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),1059;LaGrand(Germanyv
UnitedStatesofAmerica)(Judgment)[2001]ICJRep466,501;PulauLigitan/Sipadan
[2002]ICJRep625,645;AvenaandOtherMexicanNationals[2004]ICJRep12,34;
LegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory
(AdvisoryOpinion)[2004]ICJRep136,174;ApplicationoftheConventiononthe
PreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(BosniaandHerzegovinavSerbia
andMontenegro)[2007]ICJRep43,109–10.
(164)ContinentalShelf(Libya/Malta)[1995]ICJRep13,23(‘Sincethejurisdictionofthe
CourtderivesfromtheSpecialAgreementbetweentheParties,thedefinitionofthetask
soconferreduponitisprimarilyamatterofascertainmentoftheintentionoftheParties
byinterpretationoftheSpecialAgreement’).
(165)FrontierDispute(BurkinaFaso/Mali)[1986]ICJRep554,577(‘Inthepresent
case,theChamberfindsittobeclearfromthewordingoftheSpecialAgreement—
includingitspreamble—thatthecommonintentionofthePartieswasthattheChamber
shouldindicatethefrontierlinebetweentheirrespectiveterritoriesthroughoutthe
wholeofthe“disputedarea”,andthatthisareawasforthemthewholeofthefrontiernot
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
yetdelimitedbyjointagreement’).
(166)BSimma,‘MiscellaneousThoughtsonSubsequentAgreementsandPractice’inG
Nolte(ed),TreatiesandSubsequentPractice(OxfordUniversityPress,2013),48;P
Palchetti,‘Interpreting“GenericTerms”:BetweenRespectfortheParties’Original
IntentionandtheIdentificationoftheOrdinaryMeaning’inBoschieroetal(eds),
InternationalCourtsandtheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw:EssaysinHonourof
TullioTreves(Brill,2013),103–4;JKatzCogan,‘The2009JudicialActivityofthe
InternationalCourtofJustice’(2010)104AJIL605,612–13;AOrakhelashvili,‘The
RecentPracticeonthePrinciplesofTreatyInterpretation’inAOrakhelashviliandS
Williams(eds),40YearsoftheViennaConventiononTreaties(BritishInstituteof
InternationalandComparativeLaw,2010),134–5.
(167)IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),65and73–4.Also:LaBretagne
(Canada/France)(n20),659–60;YoungLoanArbitration(n20),531[18]–[19];United
States—ImportProhibitionofCertainShrimpandShrimpProducts,WB/DS58/AB/R,12
October1998at[130];China—MeasuresAffectingTradingRightsandDistribution
ServicesforCertainPublicationsandAudiovisualEntertainmentProducts,
WT/DS363/AB/R,21December2009at[396].CfEuropeanCommunitiesanditsMember
States—TariffTreatmentofCertainInformationTechnologyProducts,WT/DS375,376
and377/R,16August2010at[7.600].Moregenerally,theABtakestheviewoftreaty
interpretationthat:‘ThepurposeoftreatyinterpretationunderArticle31...istoascertain
thecommonintentionsoftheparties’:EC—ComputerEquipment,ReportoftheAppellate
BodyWT/DS62/AB/R;WT/DS67/AB/R;WT/DS68/AB/R[84];US—Gambling,Reportofthe
AppellateBodyWT/DS363/AB/Rat[84].
(168)Palchetti,‘Interpreting“GenericTerms”’(n166),103–4.
(169)Palchetti,‘Interpreting“GenericTerms”’(n166),104.
(170)CfMortenson,‘TheTravauxofTravaux’(n36).
(171 )HLauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLawbytheInternationalCourt
(Stevens&Sons,1958),134.
(172)DissentingOpinionofJudgeAlvarezinReservationstotheConventiononGenocide
(n37),53.
(173)JurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(n139),17–18.
(174)Lauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),174;Crawford,
InternationalLawasanOpenSystem:SelectedEssays(CameronMay,2002),27–8;
Orakhelashvili,TheInterpretationofActsandRulesinPublicInternationalLaw(n9),
293;KParlett,TheIndividualintheInternationalLegalSystem:ContinuityandChange
inInternationalLaw(CambridgeUniversityPress,2011),16–26;RMcCorquodale,‘The
IndividualandtheInternationalLegalSystem’inMEvans(ed),InternationalLaw(4th
edn,OxfordUniversityPress,2014),284.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(175)Nolte,‘IntroductoryReport’(n36),176–7.
(176)JurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(n139),17.
(177)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.Also:EffectofReservationsOpinion(1982)67ILR
558,567–8.
(178)SeeegSovereigntyoverCertainFrontierLand[1959]ICJRep209,221.
(179)StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(180)GoldervUnitedKingdom(1975)57ILR200.
(181 )DemirandBaykaravTurkeyAppNo34503/97judgment[GC]12November2008.
(182)GoldervUnitedKingdom(n180),217at[35](internalreferencesomitted);Demir
andBaykaravTurkey(n181),at[71].Also:RJenningsandAWatts,Oppenheim’s
InternationalLaw(9thedn,Longman,1992),1275;JArato,‘Constitutional
TransformationintheECtHR:Strasbourg’sExpansiveRecoursetoExternalRulesof
InternationalLaw’(2012)37BrooklynJIL349.
(183)ReferencestotheNotionofthe‘GeneralPrinciplesofLawRecognizedbyCivilised
Nations’ContainedintheTravauxPréparatoiresoftheConvention,4(emphasisadded).
Also:Christoffersen,FairBalance(n52),54–5.
(184)JPCosta,LaCoureuropéennedesdroitsdel’homme:Desjugespourlaliberté
(Dalloz,2013),43.
(185)SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmauriceinNationalUnionofBelgianPolice(1980)
57ILR262,293–4.
(186)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(8thedn,OxfordUniversity
Press,2012),367.
(187)Theprincipalitems,withrespecttotreatyinterpretation,are:ILCYbk1964/I–II;
ILCYbk1966/I–II;ILCFinalReportandDraftArticles,ILCYbk1966/II.
(188)Theprincipalitemsare(1950)43Anndel’Inst;(1956)46Anndel’Inst.
(189)SeeILCYbk1964/II,53–4.
(190)GFitzmaurice,‘TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice1951–
54:TreatyInterpretationandOtherTreatyPoints’(1957)33BYIL203,204.
(191 )Orakhelashvili,‘PrinciplesofTreatyInterpretation’(n166),118.
(192)SeeCh3.3.3.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(193)SeeILCYbk1964/II,53–4.
(194)ILCYbk1966/II,217.
(195)ILCYbk1966/II,217–18.
(196)ILCYbk1964/II,52.Cf1966ILCYbk/II220.
(197)JLBrierly,TheLawofNations:AnIntroductiontotheInternationalLawofPeace
(OxfordUniversityPress,1928),168.
(198)GFitzmaurice,‘TheLawandProcedureoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:
TreatyInterpretationandCertainotherTreatyPoints’(1951)28BYIL1,3.
(199)HLauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogiesofInternationalLaw:with
SpecialReferencetoInternationalArbitration(Longman,1927),187;Lauterpacht,
‘RestrictiveInterpretationandthePrincipleofEffectiveness’(n73),73;Lauterpacht,The
DevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),136.
(200)ILCYbk1964/II,52.
(201 )ILCYbk1964/I,275.
(202)Lauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(n72),366–402.
(203)ILCYbk1964/I,276.
(204)ILCYbk1964/I,277.
(205)ILCYbk1964/I,278.HethusaddedthattheCommissionshouldnothesitateto
mentiontheteleologicalaspectsoftreaties.Pessou,too,feltthatthewordingofthe
SpecialRapporteurwastoonarrow.Heproposedinstead:‘Inthelightofthecontextand
ofthegeneralrulesofapplication,theprovisionsofatreatyshallbeinterpretedingood
faithinconformitywiththeobjectsandpurposesofthetreatyandwiththeintentionsof
thepartiesatthetimeoftheconclusionofthetreaty.’
(206)ILCYbk1964/I,287.
(207)ILCYbk1964/I,279.
(208)ILCYbk1964/I,279.
(209)ILCYbk1964/I,280.
(210)ILCYbk1964/I,281.
(211 )ILCYbk1964/I,281.
(212)ILCYbk1964/I,286.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(213)ILCYbk1964/I,36(the‘fundamentalruleofinterpretation[is]thattheintentionof
thepartiesmustprevail’).
(214)ILCYbk1964/I,34(‘theintentionofthepartiesshouldbecontrolling’).
(215)ILCYbk1964/II,189(‘Interpretationconsistedintheattempttodeterminewhat
thepartiesintended’);ILCYbk1964/II,205(treatyinterpretationaims‘toascertainthe
willofthepartiesfromwhattheyhadsaid’).
(216)Lauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),136.
(217)DeclarationofJudgeHigginsinKasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),
1114.
(218)Higgins,‘Inter-TemporalRule’(n42),181.
(219)CdeVisscher,Problèmesd’interprétationjudiciaireendroitinternationalpublic
(Pedone,1963),50.
(220)WaldockinfactpointedoutthathisproposedArt70—whichwouldbecomeArt31
—‘correspondstoarticle1oftheInstitute’sresolution’:ILCYbk1964/II,56.
(221 )ILCYbk1964/II,56.CfILCYbk1966/II,220where,nolongerenjoying‘primacy’,
thetextwasdescribedbytheILCas‘thestartingpoint’.
(222)ILCYbk1966/II,218.
(223)ILCYbk1966/II,218–19.
(224)JenningsandWatts,Oppenheim’sInternationalLaw(n182),1271(myemphasis).
(225)JCrawford,‘Chance,Order,Change:TheCourseofInternationalLaw’(2013)365
HagueRecueil9,300.CfMWaibel,‘UniformityversusSpecialisation:AUniformRegime
ofTreatyInterpretation?’inTams,Tzanakopoulos,andZimmermann(eds),Research
HandbookontheLawofTreaties(Elgar,2014).
(226)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(n186),379.
(227)Yasseen,‘L’interprétationdestraités’(n64),25(‘C’estautextequedeprime
abordilestinévitablederecourirpourinterpréterletraité.Cetexteestcensécontenir
l’intentioncommunedesparties’).
(228)Yasseen,‘L’interprétationdestraités’(n64),25(‘Aquoisertuntexte,si,pour
interpréterletraité,ilfautchercherabinitiol’intentiondesparties?Prendreletexte
commepointdedépart,cen’estdoncpasminimiserl’importancedel’intentiondes
parties,maisprocéderàsadécouverte,parl’examendel’instrumentparlequelelles’est
exprimée’).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(229)Reuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(n10),96–7.Also:Reuter,La
ConventiondeVienne(n3),17(‘L’interprétation[doit]sefaireessentiellementparla
recherchedel’intentiondespartiestellequ’elleapparaîtdanscesélémentsobjectifsque
constituentletexte,lecontexteetl’attitudedesparties’);PReuter,Droitinternational
public(5thedn,PressesuniversitairedeFrance,1983),145(‘Interpréterconsisteà
retrouverlavolontéduoudesauteursd’unactejuridique.Interpréterunaccord
instrumentédansuntexteconsistedonc,ensesoumettantd’abordautexte,à
retrouverlacommunevolontédesesauteurs’).Also:MDawidowicz,‘TheEffectofthe
PassageofTimeontheInterpretationofTreaties:SomeReflectionsonCostaRicav
Nicaragua’(2011)24LJIL201,206–7.
(230)FCapotorti,ConvenzionediViennasuldirittodeitrattati(CEDAM,1969),36(‘In
definitivasipuòbendirechel’importanzasemprecrescentedegliaccordimultilaterali,
accentuandoilvalore“normativo”enonmeramente“contrattuale”delladisciplina
pattizia,hacontribuitoadeterminarelaprevalenzadeicriterioggettivirispettoaquelli
soggettividiinterpretazione.Bisognod’altrocantoavvertirechelastessasoluzione
accoltadallaConvenzionediViennanonmancadiaprirequalchespiraglioallaricerca
dell’intenzionecomunedelleparti’).
(231 )IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),63at[47];TerritorialDispute
(Libya/Chad)(n86),21–2at[41].
(232)ILCYbk1966/II,218–19(myemphasis).
(233)ILCYbk1964/II,56andILCYbk1966/II,220,citing(1950)43Anndel’Inst199
(‘letextesignéest,saufderaresexceptions,laseuleetlaplusrécenteexpressiondela
volontécommunedesparties’).
(234)EBeckett(1964)43Anndel’Inst435,442.Also:GFitzmauriceandFAVallat,‘Sir
(William)EricBeckett,KCMG,QC(1896–1966):AnAppreciation’(1968)17ICLQ267,
307–8.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatLauterpachthadmadeofthewordingthepoint
ofdeparture:‘Larecherchedel’intentiondespartiesétantlebutprincipalde
l’interprétation,ilestlégitimeetdésirable,dansl’intérêtdelabonnefoietdelastabilité
destransactionsinternational,deprendrelesensnatureldestermescommepointde
départduprocessusd’interprétation’:Lauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(n
72),433.TheonlyrealdifferencebetweenLauterpacht’sapproachandWaldock’s
thereforeistheimportancegiventopreparatoryworks.
(235)Gaja,‘Trattatiinternazionali’(n8),355–6.Also:Capotorti,ConvenzionediViennasul
dirittodeitrattati(n230),36;REFife,‘Lestechniquesinterprétativesnon
juridictionnellesdelanormeinternationale’(2011)115RGDIP367,372;MFitzmaurice,
‘InterpretationofHumanRightsTreaties’inDShelton(ed),HandbookinInternational
HumanRightsLaw(OxfordUniversityPress,2014),745.
(236)InterpretationoftheAirTransportServicesAgreementbetweentheUnitedStates
ofAmericaandFrance(n37),229.Also:LighthousesCasebetweenFranceandGreece
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(n37),13and18;ReservationstotheConventiononGenocide(n37),23;Certain
NorwegianLoans(n37),23,27;Kasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),35
[53];DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),
237at[48];Argentina/ChileFrontierCase(Palena)(n36),89;Decisionregarding
delimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(n34),34at[3.4];Taxregime
governingpensionspaidtoretiredUNESCOOfficialsresidinginFrance(Francev
UNESCO),248;China—AudiovisualEntertainmentProducts,ReportoftheAppellate
BodyWT/DS363/AB/Rat[405];US—Gambling,ReportoftheAppellateBody
WT/DS363/AB/Rat[84];EC—ComputerEquipment,ReportoftheAppellateBody
WT/DS62/AB/R;WT/DS67/AB/R;WT/DS68/AB/Rat[84];AguasdelTunarivBoliviaICSID
CaseNoARB/02/03,21October2005at[91].
(237)Italy–UnitedStatesAirTransport,Arbitration(1965)45ILR393,409–10;
DissentingOpinionofJudgesAnzilottiandHuberinCaseoftheSS‘Wimbledon’(1923)
PCIJSeriesANo1,15,36.Also:Sørensen,Lessourcesdudroitinternational(n36),214
(‘Partantdelasuppositionquelesmotsd’unedispositionconventionnellen’ontdevaleur
qu’entantqu’expressionsdesintentionsquelespartiesentendaientréaliserparla
convention,touteinterprétationdevraitpoursuivreleseulbutdeconstaterces
intentions’).
(238)Affairedel’îledeTimor(Pays-BascPortugal)(1914)11RIAA481,497(the
referencehereandbelowistotheEnglishtranslationprovidedbythePermanentCourt
ofArbitration:BoundariesoftheIslandofTimor(NetherlandsvPortugal)awardof25
June1914).Also:RKolb,‘IsthereaSubject-MatterOntologyinInterpretationof
InternationalLegalNorms’inMAndenasandEBjorge(eds),AFarewellto
Fragmentation:ReassertionandConvergenceinInternationalLaw(Cambridge
UniversityPress,2015).
(239)Affairedel’îledeTimor(Pays-BascPortugal)(n238),496–7.
(240)Affairedel’îledeTimor(Pays-BascPortugal)(n238),496–7.Also:Affairedela
Dettepubliqueottomane(Bulgarie,Irak,Palestine,Transjordanie,Grèce,Italieet
Turquie)(1925)1RIAA529,548;Affairerelativeàlaconcessiondespharesdel’Empire
ottoman(GrècevFrance)(1956)12RIAA155,184;AffaireChevreau(Francev
Royaume-Uni)(1931)2RIAA1113;ArbitralAwardintheMatteroftheClaimof
MadameChevreauagainsttheUnitedKingdomprintedin(1933)27AJIL153;
Sarropoulosin(1927–28)AnnualDigestofPublicInternationalLawCasesCaseNo291;
PolyxenePlessavtheTurkishGovernmentin(1929)VIIIRecueildesdécisionsdes
tribunauxarbitrauxmixtes224;OttomanDebtArbitrationin(1925–26)AnnualDigestof
PublicInternationalLawCasesCaseNo270;LederervGermanStatein(1928)III
Recueildesdécisionsdestribunauxarbitrauxmixtes762–9;DivertedCargoesCase
(GreecevUnitedKingdom)(n90),70.SeeLauterpacht,TheDevelopmentof
InternationalLawbytheInternationalCourt(n171),56.
(241 )LighthousesCasebetweenFranceandGreece(n37),13and18.Also:Territorial
JurisdictionoftheInternationalCommissionoftheRiverOder(1929)PCIJSeriesANo
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
23,5,26;JurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(n139),17–18.
(242)MOHudson,ThePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice1920–1942(Macmillan,
1943),640–4;Gardiner,TreatyInterpretation(n11),59–60.
(243)Orakhelashvili,‘PrinciplesofTreatyInterpretation’(n166),117.
(244)Rivier,Principesdudroitdesgens(n80)at[157].
(245)Sørensen,Lessourcesdudroitinternational(n36),214(‘Partantdelasupposition
quelesmotslesmotsd’unedispositionconventionnellen’ontdevaleurqu’entant
qu’expressionsdesintentionsquelespartiesentendaientréaliserparlaconvention,
touteinterprétationdevraitpoursuivreleseulbutdeconstatercesintentions.’)
(246)DeVisscher,Problèmesd’interprétation(n219),18.
(247)CdeVisscher,Théoriesetréalitésendroitinternationalpublic(4thedn,Pedone,
1970),414.
(248)DeVisscher,Théoriesetréalitésendroitinternationalpublic(n247),413.
(249)DeVisscher,Problèmesd’interprétation(n219),12.
(250)JurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(n139),17–18.
(251 )SSchwebel,‘TheTreatmentofHumanRightsandofAliensintheInternational
CourtofJustice’inVLoweandMFitzmaurice,FiftyYearsoftheInternationalCourtof
Justice:EssaysinHonourofSirRobertJennings(CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),
327;SSchwebel,‘HumanRightsintheWorldCourt’(1991)24VandJTL945,955–6;
Lauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),174;Crawford,
InternationalLawasanOpenSystem(n174),27–8.
(252)DeVisscher,Théoriesetréalités(n247),415;Schwebel,‘HumanRightsinthe
WorldCourt’(n251),955.
(253)JurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanzig(n139),17.
(254)Lauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),175.
(255)SeeEBeckett,‘DecisionsofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeonPoints
ofLawandProcedureofGeneralApplication’(1930)11BYIL1,4(‘Applyingthegeneral
principlethatinternationallawonlycreatesrightsanddutiesasbetweenstates,the
Court,intheiradvisoryopinionrelatingtotheDanzigRailwayOfficials,saidtheposition
wasthesamewithregardtoagreementsbetweenstates’);EBeckett,‘DiplomaticClaims
inRespectofInjuriestoCompanies’(1931)17GST175,176(‘thePermanentCourt
havedecisivelyrejectedthisview,andadoptedthepositionthatStates,andStatesalone,
haverightsunderInternationalLaw’).SeethecriticismofBeckett’ssurprising,and
repeated,descriptionsofJurisdictionoftheCourtsofDanziginLauterpacht,The
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
DevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),175.
(256)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),366.
(257)Argentina/ChileFrontierCase(Palena)(n34),89.SeealsoMShaw,International
Law(6thedn,CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),496.
(258)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),185.
(259)AWatts,‘TheInternationalCourtandtheContinuingCustomaryInternationalLaw
ofTreaties’inNAndo,EMcWhinney,andRWolfrum(eds),LiberAmicorumJudge
ShireguOda(Kluwer,2002),251.
(260)Lauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogies(n199),187.
(261 )MHuber(1952)45Anndel’Inst199;ILCYbk1964/II.
(262)Brierly,TheLawofNations(n197),168.Also:Calvo,Dictionnaire(n28),400;A
Rivier,Principesdudroitdesgens(n80)at[157];JWestlake,InternationalLawI
(CambridgeUniversityPress,1904),282;Sørensen,Lessourcesdudroitinternational
(n36),214–15;Fitzmaurice,‘TreatyInterpretationandCertainotherTreatyPoints’(n
198),3;Lauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogies(n199),187;Lauterpacht,The
DevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),136;Huber(n261),200–1;deVisscher,
Problèmesd’interprétation(n219),18;deVisscher,Théoriesetréalités(n247),414;
McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),366.
(263)Brierly,TheLawofNations(n197),168–9.Also:ILCYbk1964/II,53;Westlake,
InternationalLawI(n262),282;EHambro,TheCaseLawoftheInternationalCourt:A
RepertoireoftheJudgments,AdvisoryOpinionsandOrdersoftheInternationalCourtof
JusticeIncludingDissentingandSeparateOpinionsIV–A1959–1963(AWSijthoff,1966)
133;Fitzmaurice,‘TreatyInterpretationandCertainotherTreatyPoints’(n198),3;
Thirlway,‘LawandProcedure1960–1989PartIII’(n64),19.Seenow,however,
Clapham,Brierly’sLawofNations(n102),352–3.
(264)Lauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(n72),366.
(265)Lauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(n72),433.
(266)Beckett(n234),434–4.
(267)Beckett(n234),438–40.Also:JiménezdeAréchagaattheFirstSessionofthe26
March–24May1968UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawofTreaties:
A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.31160.SeeFitzmauriceandVallat,‘Sir(William)EricBeckett,KCMG,
QC(1896–1966)’(n234),307.
(268)Thelistissurprisinglylong:the‘treaty’willonhisadmission‘includeeverythingthat
wassignedatthetimeeventhoughthisconsistsofamaindocument,calledthetreaty,
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
togetherwithawholelotofletters,protocolsandeven(probably)agreedminutes....In
additiontoeverythingwhichispublishedandregistered,theremayexistyetfurther
speciallyinitialledminuteswhichhavebeendeliberatelypreparedforthepurposesofits
interpretation...andfurther,withinthegeneralmassofthetravauxpréparatoiresthere
maybespecialreportsofaRapporteurwithregardtowhichitmaybedemonstrated
thatitfallsintoaspecialcategory,beingspeciallyadaptedasaguideforinterpretation’:
Beckett(n234),442.
(269)ILCYbk1966/II,220.
(270)Mortenson,‘TheTravauxofTravaux’(n36),820–1.
(271 )SeeegSorelandBoréEveno,‘Article31’(n9),817.
(272)ILCYBK1964/II,58.
(273)ILCYbk1964/II,220–1.
(274)SorelandEveno,‘Article31’(n9),804–37;Sinclair,TheViennaConvention(n9),
114–53;Jacobs,‘VarietiesofApproachtoTreatyInterpretation’(n9);Kolb,
Interprétationetcréationdudroitinternational(n9);McLachlan,‘SystemicIntegration’
(n9),291;Orakhelashvili,TheInterpretationofActsandRules(n9),285;Brownlie,
PrinciplesofInternationalLaw(n9),630–1.
(275)Gardiner,TreatyInterpretation(n11),6–7.
(276)HWaldock,UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawofTreaties:OfficialRecords,
FirstSession,Vienna,1968:SummaryRecords184at[70].
(277)Lauterpacht,‘Del’interprétationdestraités’(n72),433.
(278)Rivier,Principesdudroitdesgens(n80)at[157].
(279)TEHolland,StudiesinInternationalLawandDiplomacy(ClarendonPress,1898),
152.
(280)Lauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogies(n199),181–90.
(281 )DivertedCargoesCase(GreecevUnitedKingdom)(n90),70.
(282)Affairedel’îledeTimor(Pays-BascPortugal)(n238),497(thereferencehereand
aboveistotheEnglishtranslationprovidedbythePermanentCourtofArbitration:
BoundariesoftheIslandofTimor(NetherlandsvPortugal)awardof25June1914).
(283)PetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhofAbuDhabi(1952)1
ICLQ247,251.
(284)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(n186),35.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(285)SeeegMFabre-Magnan,Droitdesobligations:Contratetengagementunilatéral
(2ndedn,PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,2010),70(‘ilserajugédemauvaisefoi
d’essayerdes’échapperdelalettreducontratpourarguerdelavolontéréelledes
parties’)and502(wheretheexampleofShakespeare’sTheMerchantofVeniceactIV,
sceneoneisusedasanexampleofhow‘lalettreducontrat’iswhatismostimportantin
theEnglishapproachtocontractinterpretation).
(286)GMcMeel,TheConstructionofContracts:Interpretation,Implication,and
Rectification(2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2011),28.
(287)PetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhofAbuDhabi(n283),
251.
(288)SeeegABKeith,ElementsoftheLawofContracts(ClarendonPress,1931),77–9.
(289)Fabre-Magnan,Droitdesobligations(n285),484.
(290)UNIDROIT,PrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts1994.
(291 )UNIDROIT,PrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts2010(UNIDROIT
2010),137.
(292)Courdecassation,Com,20October1998,no96–10259.
(293)SeeegArt1163:‘Quelquegénéreuxquesoientlestermesdanslesquelsune
conventionestconçue,ellenecomprendqueleschosessurlesquellesilparaîtqueles
partiessesontproposédecontracter’andArt1164:‘Lorsquedansuncontratona
expriméuncaspourl’explicationdel’obligation,onn’estpascenséavoirvouluparlà
restreindrel’étenduequel’engagementreçoitdedroitauxcasnonexprimés’.
(294)FisheriesJurisdiction(SpainvCanada)JurisdictionoftheCourt(Judgment)[1998]
ICJRep432,455;DisputebetweenArgentinaandChileconcerningtheBeagleChannel
(1977)11RIAA53,231;CorfuChannel[1949]ICJRep4,24;Ambatieloscase
(Jurisdiction)(Judgment)[1952]ICJRep28,45.
(295)Courdecassation,Civ,30January1996,no93–20330;Courdecassation,Com,14
October2008,no07–18955;Fabre-Magnan,Droitdesobligations(n285),486–7.
(296)PDVMarsh,ComparativeContractLaw(Gower,1994),38–9.
(297)GAlpaandVZeno-Zencovich,ItalianPrivateLaw(Routledge-Cavendish,2007),
180;GAlpa,GFonsi,andGResta,L’interpretazionedelcontratto:orientamentie
technichedellagiurisprudenza(2ndedn,GiuffrèEditore,2001),10;GAlpa,Nuove
frontieredeldirittocontrattuale(EdizioniSeam,1998),7–30;GAlpa,Casidubbiin
materiadidirittocontrattuale(CasaeditricedottAntonioMilani,1998).
(298)TBingham,‘Foreword’inABurrowsandEPeel(eds),ContractTerms(Oxford
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
UniversityPress2007),v.
(299)InvestorsCompensationSchemeLtdvWestBromwichBuildingSociety[1998]1
WLR896.
(300)InvestorsCompensationSchemeLtdvWestBromwichBuildingSociety(n299),
912F–913G.
(301 )CMitchell,‘ObligationsinCommercialContracts:AMatterofLawor
Interpretation?’(2012)65CLP1,2.
(302)SeeegBankofCreditandCommerceInternationalSa(InLiquidation)vAli(No1)
[2001]UKHL8,[2002]1AC251;ChartbrookLtdvPersimmonHomesLtd[2009]UKHL
38,[2009]1AC1101at[21]–[26](LordHoffmann);PinkFloydMusicLtdvEMIRecords
Ltd[2010]EWCACiv1429,[2011]1WLR770at[17](LordNeubergerMR).
(303)RainySkySAandothersvKookminBank[2011]UKSC50,[2011]1WLR2900at
[14].
(304)Co-operativeWholesaleSocietyLtdvNationalWestminsterBankplc[1995]1
EGLR97,98;GlynnvMargetson&Co[1893]AC351,359(LordHalsburyLC);
HomburgHoutimportBVvAgrosinPrivateLtd:TheStarsin[2004]1AC715at[10]
(LordBingham).
(305)JSteyn,‘ContractLaw:FulfillingtheReasonableExpectationsofHonestMen’
(1997)113LQR433,441.
(306)SocietyofLloyd’svRobinson[1999]1AllER(Comm)545,551.SeealsoGan
InsuranceCoLtdvTaiPingInsuranceCo[2001]EWCACiv1047,[2001]2AllER
(Comm)299(ManceLJ);ArbuthnottvFagan[1995]CLC1396,1400(BinghamMR).
(307)KLewinson,TheInterpretationofContracts(5thedn,Sweet&Maxwell,2011),36.
(308)CMitchell,‘ObligationsinCommercialContracts:AMatterofLawor
Interpretation?’(n301),2.
(309)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),6.
(310)AzpetrolInternationalHoldingsBV,AzpetrolGroupBV,AzpetrolOilservicesGroup
BVvtheRepublicofAzerbaijan,ICSIDCaseNoARB/06/15,8September2009at[61].
ThearbitralTribunaladdstheprovisothatthisiswiththepossibleexceptionofhow,first,
Englishlawhastraditionallyprecludedreferencetothenegotiatinghistoryofan
agreementasanaidtointerpretation(PrennvSimmonds[1971]1WLR1381,1384–85),
and,secondly,howEnglishlawdoesnotnormallyadmitreferencetothesubsequent
conductofthepartiesasanaidtotheinterpretationofacontract(LSchulerAGv
WickmanMachineToolsSalesLtd[1974]AC235,252).TheTribunalnotes,however,
‘thattheviewthatthenegotiatinghistoryandthesubsequentpracticeofthepartiesare
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
notadmissibleasanaidtointerpretationinEnglishlawhasnotgoneunchallenged’([65]).
(311 )Brierly,TheLawofNations(n197),168.
(312)Clapham,Brierly’sLawofNations(n102),352;Gardiner,‘TheViennaConvention
Rules’(n119),476.
(313)Brierly,TheLawofNations(n197),168.
(314)AzpetrolInternationalHoldingsBV,AzpetrolGroupBV,AzpetrolOilServicesGroup
BVvtheRepublicofAzerbaijan(n310),at[62].
(315)TheChannelTunnelGroupLtdandFrance-MancheSAvUnitedKingdomand
France132(2007)ILR1,34at[92].SeeCrawford,Chance,Order,Change(n225),209.
(316)JCrawford,‘TreatyandContractinInvestmentArbitration’(2008)24ArbInt351,
373–4.
(317)Fitzmaurice,‘TreatyInterpretationandCertainotherTreatyPoints’(n198),3.
Also:Huber(n261),199.
(318)Westlake,InternationalLawI(n262),293–4;Clapham,Brierly’sLawofNations(n
102),349–51.
(319)JLHalpérin,LeTribunaldecassationetlespouvoirssouslaRévolution(1790–
1799)(LGDJ,1987);JLHalpérin,L’impossibleCodecivil(PressesUniversitairesde
France,1992).
(320)SeeegCourdecassation(1rechambrecivile)20October1982.
(321 )FTerré,Introductiongénéraleaudroit(9thedn,Dalloz,2012),472.
(322)KLarenzandCWCanaris,MethodenlehredesRechswissenschaft(Springer,1992);
SVogenauer,DieAuslegungvonGesetzeninEnglandundaufdemKontinent:Eine
VergleichendeUntersuchungderRechtsprechungundihrerhistorischenGrundlagenI
(MohrSiebeck,2001).
(323)BVerfGE2,280(401);BVerfGE3,407(422).Also:AVoßkuhle,‘Gibtesundwozu
nutzteineLehrevomVerfassungswandel?’(2004)43S450.
(324)SeeWNEskridge,DynamicStatutoryInterpretation(HarvardUniversityPress,
1994);LMBalkin,LivingOriginalism(HarvardUniversityPress,2011);LWLevy,
OriginalIntentandtheFramers’Constitution(Macmillan,1988);DAStrauss,TheLiving
Constitution(OxfordUniversityPress,2010);see,however,AScalia,‘Originalism:The
LesserEvil’(1989)57UCincLR849;AScalia,‘CommonLawCourtsinaCivilLaw
System:TheRoleofUnitedStatesFederalCourtsinInterpretingtheConstitutionand
Laws’inAGutmann(ed),AMatterofInterpretation:FederalCourtsandtheLaw
(PrincetonUniversityPress,1997).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(325)ConventionontheProtectionofSubmarineCables,14March1884,TS380.
(326)TheNetherlands(PTT)andthePostOffice(London)vNedlloyd(1977)74ILR212.
(327)NewZealandMaoriCouncilvAttorney-General[1987]1NZLR641.
(328)NewZealandMaoriCouncilvAttorney-General(n327),655–6and663.
(329)EdwardsvAttorney-GeneralofCanada[1930]AC124.
(330)NairnvUniversityofStAndrews[1909]1AC1.
(331 )SeeegBHale,‘CommonLawandtheConvention:TheLimitstoInterpretation’
[2011]EHRLR534,534–5.
(332)DisputeregardingNavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17).
(333)Also:HerronvRathminesandRathgarImprovementCommissioners[1892]AC498.
(334)EdwardsvAttorney-GeneralofCanada(n329),135(emphasisadded).
(335)EdwardsvAttorney-GeneralofCanada(n329),136.
(336)Hale,‘CommonLawandtheConvention’(n331).TheapproachiscriticizedbyR
Ekins,TheNatureofLegislativeIntent(OxfordUniversityPress,2012),Chs7–9.
(337)SeeJSCReid,‘TheJudgeasLawmaker’(1972)12JSPTL22.
(338)Hale,‘CommonLawandtheConvention’(n331),535–6.
(339)SeeegGrantvSouthwesternandCountyPropertiesLtd[1975]Ch185;Fitzpatrick
vSterlingHousingAssociationLtd[2001]1AC27;RvIreland[1998]AC147;Goodesv
EastSussexCountyCouncil[2000]UKHL34,[2000]1WLR1356;BirminghamCity
CouncilvOakley[2000]UKHL59,[2000]3WLR1936;RvBristolCityCouncil,exp
Everett[1999]EWCACiv869,[1999]1WLR1170;RoyalCollegeofNursingofthe
UnitedKingdomvDepartmentforHealthandSocialSecurity[1981]AC800;McCarten
TurkingtonBreen(AFirm)vTimesNewspapersLtd[2001]2AC277;RvR(Rape:
MaritalExemption)[1992]1AC599;RvSK[2011]2CrAppR34.
(340)Yemshaw(Appellant)vLondonBoroughofHounslow(Respondent)[2011]UKSC3,
[2011]1WLR433.
(341 )Yemshaw(n340),at[56].
(342)HThring,PracticalLegislation(JohnMurray,1902),83.Also:RCrossJBell,andG
Engle,Cross:StatutoryInterpretation(3rdedn,Butterworths,1995),51;JBell,
‘InterpretingStatutesoverTime’inFOstandMvanHoecke(eds),Tempsetdroit:le
droita-t-ilpourvocationdedurer?(Bruylant,1998).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(343)RvSecretaryofStateforHealth,expQuintavalle(onbehalfofPro-LifeAlliance)
[2003]2AC687.
(344)Quintavalle(n343)at[9]​.
(345)FBennion,BenniononStatutoryInterpretation(5thedn,LexisNexis,2008),288.
(346)RCross,JBell,andGEngle,Cross:StatutoryInterpretation(3rdedn,
Butterworths,1995),51–2;Bennion,StatutoryInterpretation(n345),288.
(347)JSteyn,DemocracythroughLaw:SelectedSpeechesandJudgments(Ashgate,
2004),62–3.
(348)DAkande,‘CantheICCProsecuteforUseofChemicalWeaponsinSyria?’(EJIL:
Talk!,23August2013)<http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemicalweapons-in-syria/>.Further:Akande,‘InternationalOrganizations’inMDEvans(ed),
InternationalLaw(4thedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2014),258–60.
(349)SorelandEveno,‘Article31’(n9),829.
(350)SorelandEveno,‘Article31’(n9),829.
(351 )TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad(n86),21–2at[41].
(352)CompetenceoftheGeneralAssemblyfortheAdmissionofaStatetotheUN
(AdvisoryOpinion)[1950]ICJRep4,8.
(353)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(n186),40.
(354)SeeegLegalityoftheUseofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrovBelgium)
(PreliminaryObjections)(Judgment)[2004]ICJRep279at[100];Genocide(Bosniaand
HerzegovinavSerbiaandMontenegro)[2007]ICJRep43,109–10;Maritime
DelimitationandTerritorialQuestionsbetweenQatarandBahraincase[1995]ICJRep
6,18at[33];PulauLigitan/Sipadan[2002]ICJRep625,645;AppellateBodyReport,
Japan—TaxesonAlcoholicBeverages,WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,WTDS11/AB/R(4
October1996)11;RhineChloridesArbitration(Netherlands/France)(n71),292–93at
[63].Also:Shaw,InternationalLaw(n273),935–6;Akande,‘InternationalOrganizations’
(n348),259;MFitzmaurice,‘ThePracticalWorkingoftheLawofTreaties’inMDEvans,
InternationalLaw(4thedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2014),179.
(355)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(n186),40.
(356)EdeVattel,LedroitdesgensII(1758),ChXVIIat[263].
(357)Lauterpacht,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLaw(n171),52.
(358)TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad(n86),21–2at[41].
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(359)TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad(n86),21–2at[41](myemphasis).
(360)RhineChloridesArbitration(Netherlands/France)(n71),292–3at[63].Also:P
Daillier,MForteau,andAPellet,Droitinternationalpublic(n47),284;MJCazala,‘Le
résultatmanifestementabsurdoudéraissonabledel’interprétationdansl’affairede
l’apurementdescomptes(Pays-Basc.France)’(2004)50AFDI624,629–36.
(361 )LegalityoftheUseofForce(SerbiaandMontenegrovBelgium)(Preliminary
Objections)(Judgment)[2004]ICJRep279,318at[100].
(362)TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad(n86),25at[51].Also:Dissenting
OpinionofJudgesAnzilottiandHuberinCaseoftheSS‘Wimbledon’(1923)PCIJSeries
ANo1,15,36;MSørensen,Lessourcesdudroitinternational(n36);Orakhelashvili,
TheInterpretationofActsandRules(n9),341–42and347.
(363)TerritorialDisputebetweenLibyaandChad(n86),25–6at[52].
(364)IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),65.Also:Fife,‘Lestechiniques
interprétatives’(n235),372.
(365)SeeQuestionsrelatingtotheObligationtoProsecuteorExtradite(Belgiumv
Senegal)(Judgment)[2012]ICJRep422,451at[74]and454at[86];Applicationofthe
InterimAccordof13September1995(theformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedoniav
Greece)(Judgment)[2011]ICJRep644,675at[97];PulpMillsontheRiverUruguay
(ArgentinavUruguay)(n18),14,48at[75],66at[143];CertainQuestionsofMutual
AsistanceinCriminalMatters(DjiboutivFrance)(Judgment)[2008]ICJRep177,218at
[109],232at[154];LegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupied
PalestinianTerritory(AdvisoryOpinion)[2004]ICJRep136,179at[109];LaGrand
(GermanyvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(n163),501–3at[99]–[104];Gabčíkovo–
NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(n16),78–9at[142];OilPlatforms(Islamic
RepublicofIranvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(n163),820at[52];South-WestAfrica
Cases(EthiopiaandLiberiavSouthAfrica)(PreliminaryObjections)[1962]ICJRep319,
335–6;ConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommitteeoftheInter-Governmental
MaritimeConsultativeOrganization(AdvisoryOpinion)[1960]ICJRep150,170–1;Case
ofCertainNorwegianLoans(Judgment)[1957]ICJRep9,23and27;Reservationsto
theConventiononGenocide(n37),23.Also:Affairerelativeàl’ordelaBanquenationale
d’Albanie(1953)12RIAA12,46;Italy–UnitedStatesAirTransportArbitration(1965)45
ILR393,409–14;PopeandTalbotvCanada(2001)122ILR293,383–84at[115]–[117];
CissévInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(2001)133ILR117,
124at[23];TheVolga(RussianFederationvAustralia)(2002)126ILR433,456at[77];
TheHoshinmaru(JapanvRussiaFederation)(2007)143ILR1,22at[80];Abyei
Arbitation(GovernmentofSudan/SudanPeople’sLiberationMovement/Army)(2009)144
ILR348,561–5at[583]–[596];IndusWatersKishengangaArbitration(PakistanvIndia)
(PartialAward)(2013)154ILR1,156–9at[410]–[418].
(366)DeVisscher,Problèmesd’interprétationjudiciaireendroitinternationalpublic(n
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
219),62;Kolb,Interprétationetcréationdudroitinternational(n9),532–3.
(367)MinoritySchoolsinAlbania(1935)PCIJSerA/B,No64,14,17.
(368)SovereigntyoverCertainFrontierLand[1959]ICJRep209,221;Questions
relatingtotheObligationtoProsecuteorExtradite(BelgiumvSenegal)(n365),449at
[68]and460at[115].Also:HICEEBVvTheSlovakRepublic(PermanentCourtof
Arbitration)CaseNo2009–11,23May2011at[116].
(369)GoldervUnitedKingdom(n180),216at[34].
(370)MEVilliger,Commentaryonthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties
(MartinusNijhoff,2009),428.
(371 )JCombacau,Ledroitdestraités(PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,1991),33.Also:
Jennings,‘Treaties’(n71),145;IBuffardandKZemanek,‘The“ObjectandPurpose”of
aTreaty:AnEnigma?’(1998)3ARIEL311,312–19;PReuter,‘Solidaritéetdivisibilité
desengagementsconventionnels’inYDinstein(ed),InternationalLawataTimeof
Perplexity:EssaysinHonourofShabtaiRosenne(MartinusNijhoff,1989),627–8;Gaja,
‘Trattatiinternazionali’(n8),356.
(372)Seebelowon‘genericterms’.
(373)DeVisscher,Théoriesetréalitésendroitinternationalpublic(n247),280.
(374)DeVisscher,Théoriesetréalitésendroitinternationalpublic(n247),415.
(375)RHiggins,‘Inter-TemporalRuleinInternationalLaw’(n42),181.Also:Fife,‘Les
techniquesinterprétatives’(n235),372.
(376)RHiggins,‘TimeandtheLaw’(1997)46ICLQ501,519.
(377)Guillaume,‘MethodsandPracticeofTreaty’(n13),468–9.
(378)Reuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(n10),24.
(379)Reuter,IntroductiontotheLawofTreaties(n10),30.
(380)SeeCh3.1.
(381 )Reuter,LaConventiondeViennedudroitdestraités(n3),17(‘laConvention
retientcommeunélémentdéterminant,ouaumoinsimportant,desolutiondes
problèmesqu’elleconsidère,l’objetetlebutdutraité;cen’estpasunedérogationau
principedel’autonomiedelavolonté,maisbienaucontrairesaconsolidationobjective:
l’objetetlebutdutraitésontlesélémentsessentielsquisontprisenconsidérationparla
volontédesparties,ondoitdonctoujourssupposerquelespartiessesont
mutuellementrefuséd’admettretoutesleslibertésquiporteraientatteinteàcebutetà
cetobjetqu’ellesontlibrementchoisicommeleurbiencommun’).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(382)Aust,ModernTreatyLawandPractice(n23),209.Also:Akande,‘International
Organizations’(n348),258–9.
(383)CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(384)Aust,ModernTreatyLawandPractice(n23),343.
(385)ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,9
December1948,78UNTS277.
(386)ReservationstotheConventiononGenocide(n37),23.Also:Ambatieloscase
(Jurisdiction)(Judgment)[1952]ICJRep28,45;NorwegianLoans(n37),23and27;
ConstitutionoftheMaritimeSafetyCommitteeoftheInter-GovernmentalMaritime
ConsultativeOrganization(AdvisoryOpinion)[1960]ICJRep150,170–1;Case
concerningUSDiplomaticandConsularStaffinTehran(USAvIran)[1980]ICJRep3at
[54];MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua[1986]ICJRep14at
[273];Kasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),1072at[43];Certain
QuestionsofMutualAsistanceinCriminalMatters(DjiboutivFrance)(Judgment)[2008]
ICJRep177,218at[109],232at[154].
(387)Gabčíkovo–NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(n16),79at[142].
(388)OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublicofIranvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Preliminary
Objection)(n163),820at[52].Further:Orakhelashvili,TheInterpretationofActsand
Rules(n9),349–50.
(389)OilPlatforms(IslamicRepublicofIranvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Preliminary
Objection)(n163),813at[27].
(390)ConventionAgainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreamentor
Punishment,10December1984,1465UNTS85.
(391 )QuestionsrelatingtotheObligationtoProsecuteorExtradite(BelgiumvSenegal)
(n365),460at[115].
(392)MAndenasandTWeatherall,‘InternationalCourtofJustice:Questionsrelatingto
theObligationtoProsecuteorExtradite(BelgiumvSenegal),Judgmentof20July2012’
(2013)62ICLQ753,769.
(393)SouthWestAfrica(SecondPhase)(n93),48at[91].
(394)LaGrand(GermanyvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(n163),501–3at[99]–[104].
(395)StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(396)Guillaume,‘MethodsandPracticeofTreatyInterpretation’(n13),469.
(397)LaGrand(GermanyvUnitedStatesofAmerica)(n163),503[102].
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(398)RightsofMinoritiesinUpperSilesia(MinoritySchools)(1928)PCIJSerA,No15,
33.
(399)Affairerelativeàl’ordelaBanquenationaled’Albanie(1953)12RIAA12,46.Also:
CRousseau,DroitinternationalpublicI(ÉditionsSirey,1971),282.
(400)ConventionontheSettlementofInvestmentDisputesbetweenStatesandNationals
ofOtherStates,18March1965,575UNTS159.
(401 )SeeMWaibel,‘InternationalInvestmentLawandTreatyInterpretation’inR
HofmannandCJTams,InternationalInvestmentLawandGeneralInternationalLaw:
FromClinicalIsolationtosystemicIntegration?(Nomos,2011),38–44;Waibel,
‘UniformityversusSpecialisation’(n225).
(402)HusseinNuamanSoufrakivUnitedArabEmirates,ICSIDCaseNoARB/02/7,
DecisionoftheadhocCommitteeontheApplicationforAnnulmentofMrSoufraki,5June
2007at[21]–[22].Also:KlöcknerIndustrie-AnlagenGmbHandothersvUnitedRepublic
ofCameroonandSociétéCamerounaisedesEngrais(KlöcknerI),ICSIDCaseNo
ARB/81/2,DecisionoftheadhocCommittee,3May1985at[3]​; MaritimeInternational
NomineesEstablishmentvRepublicofGuinea,ICSIDCaseNoARB/84/4,Decisiononthe
ApplicationbyGuineaforPartialAnnulmentoftheArbitralAwarddated6January1988,
22December1989at[4.05];AmcoAsiaCorporationandothersvRepublicofIndonesia
(AmcoII),ICSIDCaseNoARB/81/1,DecisionontheApplicationsbyIndonesiaandAmco
RespectivelyforAnnulmentandPartialAnnulment,17December1992at[1.17].
(403)JCrawford,‘SovereigntyasaLegalValue’inJCrawford,MKoskenniemi,andS
Ranganathan(eds),TheCambridgeCompaniontoInternationalLaw(Cambridge
UniversityPress,2011),123.
(404)AffairedesboutresdeMascate(FrancecGrande-Bretagne)(1905)11RIAAXI83.
Further:MBressonnet,‘L’arbitragefranco-anglaisdansl’affairedesboutresde
Mascate’(1906)13RGDIP145;JAllain,‘TheNineteenthCenturyLawoftheSeaandthe
BritishAbolitionoftheSlaveTrade’(2007)78BYIL342;PDaillier,MForteau,andA
Pellet,Droitinternationalpublic(n47),552–3.
(405)DeclarationoftheGeneralActoftheBrusselsConference,2July1890,173CTS
188.
(406)AffairedesboutresdeMascate(FrancecGrande-Bretagne)(n404),93–4.
(407)AffairedesboutresdeMascate(FrancecGrande-Bretagne)(n404),94.
(408)Huber(n261),200–1.Also:Gardiner,TreatyInterpretation(n11)141;Aguasdel
TunarivBolivia,ICSIDCaseNoARB/02/03,21October2005at[91].
(409)IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),65.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(410)IronRhine(BelgiumvNetherlands)(n4),73.
(411 )RBernhardt,‘EvolutiveTreatyInterpretation—EspeciallyoftheEuropean
ConventiononHumanRights’(1999)42GYIL11,16–17.
(412)RBernhardt,‘EvolutiveTreatyInterpretation’(n411),16–17.
(413)SeeJenningsandWatts,Oppenheim’sInternationalLaw(n182),1281–2.
(414)NationalityDecreesIssuedinTunisandMorocco(n133),24.
(415)CovenantoftheLeagueofNations,28June1919,225CTS195.
(416)SeeWSchückingandHWehberg,DieSatzungdesVölkerbundesI(3rdedn,Verlag
vonFranzVahlen,1931),56;WDKrause-Ablaß,IntertemporalesVölkerrecht
(ForschungsstellefürVölkerrechtundausländischesRechtderUniversitätHamburg,
1969),124–5.
(417)TreatyConcerningtheConstructionandOperationoftheGabčíkovo–Nagymaros
SystemofLocks,16September1977,1978UNTS236.
(418)Gabčíkovo–NagymarosProject(Hungary/Slovakia)(n16),67–8.
(419)McLachlan,‘SystemicIntegration’(n9),317;MPaparinskis,TheInternational
MinimumStandardandFairandEquitableTreatment(OxfordUniversityPress,2013),
123.
(420)WesternSahara(AdvisoryOpinion)[1975]ICJRep12,38–40.
(421 )Resolution3293(XXIX),13December1974.
(422)WesternSahara(n420),40.SeeJenningsandWatts,Oppenheim’sInternational
Law(n182),1282.
(423)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81).SeeCh
3.3.1.
(424)InternationalConventionfortheRegulationofWhaling,2December1946,161
UNTS72.
(425)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[45].
Further:SeparateOpinionofJudgeGreenwoodat[5]​; SeparateOpinionofJudge
Charlesworthadhocat[3];SeparateOpinionofJudgeCançadoTrindadeat[25]–[40].
(426)WhalingintheAntarctic(AustraliavJapan:NewZealandIntervening)(n81)at[56].
(427)Palchetti,‘Interpreting“GenericTerms”’(n166).Also:Bernhardt,‘EvolutiveTreaty
Interpretation’(n411),21;RBernhardt,‘ThoughtsontheInterpretationofHuman
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
RightsTreaties’inFMatscherandHPetzold(eds),ProtectingHumanRights:The
EuropeanDimension.StudiesinHonourofGérardJWiarda(CarlHeymann,1988),65;C
Brölmann,‘LimitsofthetreatyParadigm’inMCravenandMFitzmaurice(eds),
InterrogatingtheTreaty:EssaysintheContemporaryLawofTreaties(WolfLegal
Publishers,2005),28;CBrölmann,‘SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:
InternationalOrganizations’inDHollis(ed),OxfordGuidetoTreaties(OxfordUniversity
Press,2012),512;BCali,‘SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:HumanRights’inD
Hollis(ed),TheOxfordGuidetoTreaties(OxfordUniversityPress,2012),547;G
Letsas,‘Strasbourg’sInterpretiveEthic:LessonsfortheInternationalLawyer’(2010)21
EJIL509,527.
(428)CR2009/4,49–50(Pellet)(‘leprincipedebasequiconstituelatoiledefonddecette
opérationn’ariendemystérieuxetmeparaîtvraimentindiscutable;ilestcelui-làmême
quiinspireledroitdestraitésdanssonensemble:toutserapporteàl’intentiondes
Parties’).SeeDawidowicz,‘PassageofTime’(n229),213.
(429)Waldock,‘Effectiveness’(n50),3–4.
(430)Waldock,‘EvolutionofHumanRightsConcepts’(n116),536.
(431 )Yasseen,‘L’interprétationdestraités’(n64)(‘Celadépendànotreavisdeceque
lespartiesontvraimentvoulu’).
(432)Waldock,‘EvolutionofHumanRightsConcepts’(n116),536.
(433)LaBretagne(Canada/France)(n20),624.
(434)LaBretagne(Canada/France)(n20),659–60.Also:JCrawford,StateResponsibility:
TheGeneralPart(CambridgeUniversityPress,2013),247.
(435)DecisionregardingtheDelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(n
34),34at[3.4](invertedcommasdeleted).
(436)RhineChloridesArbitration(Netherlands/France)(n71),293at[62].
(437)SeeNolte,‘IntroductoryReport’(n36).
(438)DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),14.
(439)DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),17.
(440)DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),17–18.
(441 )DraftReportoftheInternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsSixty-Fifth
Session(n31),18.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(442)ILCYbk1966/II,218–19.
(443)Crawford,StateResponsibility:TheGeneralPart(n434),246.
(444)Crawford,StateResponsibility:TheGeneralPart(n434),247.
(445)Fitzmaurice,‘TreatyInterpretationandotherTreatyPoints’(n190),212.
(446)CaseconcerningRightsofNationalsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericainMorocco,(n
61).Also:SouthWestAfrica(SecondPhase)(n93),23at[16].
(447)BCheng,‘RightsofUnitedStatesNationalsintheFrenchZoneofMorocco’(1953)
2ICLQ354,355–6,and367.
(448)Nolte,‘IntroductoryReport’(n36),186.
(449)Lauterpacht,‘RestrictiveInterpretation’(n73),73.
(450)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25).
(451 )SeeegMcNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),467–8;RHiggins,‘Inter-Temporal
Rule’(n42),179–80;ILCYbk1964/II,9–10.
(452)TheNorthAtlanticCoastFisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomvUnitedStates)(1910)
11RIAA167.
(453)ArbitrationbetweenPetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhof
AbuDhabi(n283).Thequestionhasbeenraisedwhethertheinstrumentinissuewasa
treatyornot:Lalive,‘ContractsbetweenaStateorStateAgencyandaForeign
Company’(1964)13ICLQ991;CFAmerasinghe,PrinciplesoftheInstitutionalLawof
InternationalOrganizations(2ndedn,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),276.See,
generally,VCLTArt2(1)(a);Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw
(n186),369.
(454)TreatyofLondon20October1818,TS112;12Bevans57.
(455)TheNorthAtlanticCoastFisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomvUnitedStates)(n452),
195.
(456)ArbitrationbetweenPetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhof
AbuDhabi(n283).
(457)ArbitrationbetweenPetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhof
AbuDhabi(n283),253.
(458)TheNorthAtlanticCoastFisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomvUnitedStates)(n452).
(459)ArbitrationbetweenPetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhof
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
AbuDhabi(n283).
(460)LaBretagne(Canada/France)(n20).
(461 )AgreementbetweenCanadaandFranceontheirMutualFishingRelations,27
March1972,CTS1979No37.
(462)LaBretagne(Canada/France)(n20),619.
(463)ConventionconcerningEmploymentofWomenduringtheNightPCIJ(1932)Series
A/BNo50,377.
(464)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.
(465)RCAWhiteandCOvey,Jacobs,White,andOvey:TheEuropeanConventionon
HumanRights(5thedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2010),xvii.
(466)SeeMarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,15April
1994,1867UNTS187;(1994)33ILM1153.
(467)GeneralAgreementonTradeinServices,15April1994,1869UNTS183,(1994)33
ILM1167.
(468)UnitedStates—ImportProhibitionofCertainShrimpandShrimpProducts,
WB/DS58/AB/R,12October1998at[130];China—MeasuresAffectingTradingRights
andDistributionServicesforCertainPublicationsandAudiovisualEntertainment
Products,WT/DS363/AB/R,21December2009at[396].CfEuropeanCommunitiesandits
MemberStates—TariffTreatmentofCertainInformationTechnologyProducts(n173),
at[7.600].
(469)Waldock,‘TheEvolutionofHumanRightsConcepts’(n116),541.
(470)Waldock,‘TheEvolutionofHumanRightsConcepts’(n116),547.
(471 )TheNorthAtlanticCoastFisheriesCase(UnitedKingdomvUnitedStates)(n452).
(472)ArbitrationbetweenPetroleumDevelopment(TrucialCoast)LtdandtheSheikhof
AbuDhabi(n283).
(473)NavigationalandRelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),213at[63].
(474)DecisionregardingtheDelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(n
34).
(475)DecisionregardingtheDelimitationoftheborderbetweenEritreaandEthiopia(n
34),34at[3.4].Also:BoundaryDisputebetweenArgentinaandChileConcerningthe
DelimitationoftheFrontierLinebetweenBoundaryPost62andMountFitzroy(n94),76
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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at[157].
(476)LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria(CameroonvNigeria:
EquatorialGuineaintervening)(n14).
(477)Kasikili/SeduduIsland(Botswana/Namibia)(n42),1060–72at[20]–[41].
(478)LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeria(CameroonvNigeria:
EquatorialGuineaintervening)(n14),356at[59].
(479)WesternSahara(n420).Thequestionofintertemporalityinthiscasecomestothe
foreinaparticularformasthelegalinstrumenttobeinterpretedwasnotinitselfanold
one;thequestionwaswhetherthetermsoftheinstrument,thoughtheinstrumentwasa
newone,madereferencetothelawinforceatanearliertimeonlyorthelawinforceat
thetimeoftheadoptionoftheinstrumentaswell.
(480)SeeJenningsandWatts,Oppenheim’sInternationalLaw(n182),1281–2.
(481 )Resolution3293(XXIX),13December1974.
(482)WesternSahara(n420),38–9.
(483)WesternSahara(n420),40.
(484)WesternSahara(n420),67–8.
(485)Higgins,‘Inter-TemporalRule’(n42),181.
(486)Resolution1514(XV),14December1960.
(487)ILCYbk1964/I,34.
(488)Nolte,‘IntroductoryReport’(n36),186.
(489)Nolte,‘IntroductoryReport’(n36),186.
(490)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),467.
(491 )LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),16.
(492)CovenantoftheLeagueofNations,28June1919,225CTS195.
(493)CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(494)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.See,eg,TyrervUnited-Kingdom(n134),353;Aireyv
IrelandAppNo6289/73,judgment9October1979.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(495)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14).
(496)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),16,35at[53].CfSouthWestAfrica(SecondPhase)
(n93),23at[16].
(497)Dawidowicz,‘PassageofTime’(n229),214–15;HThirlway,‘LawandProcedure
1960–1989PartIII’(n64),136–7.
(498)Article22,CovenantoftheLeagueofNations,28June1919,225CTS195.
(499)AMcNair,‘Preface’inJStoyanovsky,TheMandateforPalestine:AContributionto
theTheoryandPracticeofInternationalMandates(HyperionPress,1928).
(500)DissentingOpinionofJudgeJessupinSouthWestAfrica(SecondPhase)(n93),373.
(501 )Waldock,‘TheEvolutionofHumanRightsConcepts’(n116),541.
(502)CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(503)Akande,‘InternationalOrganizations’(n348),259.Also:Arato,‘Treaty
InterpretationandConstitutionalChange’(n119),316–27;SKadelbach,‘The
InterpretationoftheCharter’inBSimmaetal(eds),TheCharteroftheUnitedNations:
ACommentary(3rdedn,OxfordUniversityPress,2012),86.
(504)ReparationforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations(Advisory
Opinion)[1949]ICJRep174,179.
(505)ReparationforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations(n504),184.
(506)EffectsofAwardsofCompensationmadebytheUNAdministrativeTribunal
(AdvisoryOpinion)[1954]ICJRep47,57.AccordingtotheOxfordEnglishDictionary
‘intendment’means‘thesenseinwhichthelawunderstandsorinterpretssomething,
suchasthetrueintentionofapieceoflegislation’.See,however,thediscussioninE
Lauterpacht,‘TheDevelopmentoftheLawofInternationalOrganizationsbythe
DecisionsofInternationalTribunals’(1976)152HaugeRecueil381,424–25.
(507)RosInvestCoUKLtdvRussianFederationSCCCaseNoArbV079/2005,Awardon
Jurisdictionat[39]–[40].
(508)RosInvestCoUKLtdvRussianFederation,(n507)at[40].
(509)ReparationforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations(n504).
(510)EffectsofAwardsofCompensationmadebytheUNAdministrativeTribunal(n
506).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(511 )TFranck,RecoursetoForce:StateActionagainstThreatsandArmedAttacks
(CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),30–1.Also:EHambro,LMGoodrich,andAP
Simons,CharteroftheUnitedNations:CommentaryandDocuments(3rdedn,Columbia
UniversityPress,1969),12–16.
(512)ReparationforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations(n504),182.
(513)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw(n186),187.
(514)DissentingOpinionofJudgeKrylovinReparationforInjuriesSufferedinthe
ServiceoftheUnitedNations(n504),217–19;DissentingOpinionofJudgeWiniarskiin
EffectsofAwardsofCompensationmadebytheUNAdministrativeTribunal(n506),64–
6;DissentingOpinionofJudgeWiniarskiinCertainExpensesoftheUnitedNations
(Article17,paragraph2oftheCharter)(AdvisoryOpinion)[1962]ICJRep151,230.
(515)CharteroftheUnitedNations,26June1945,892UNTS119.
(516)Hambro,Goodrich,andSimons,CharteroftheUnitedNations(n511),16.
(517)SeeegMByersandGNolte(eds),UnitedStatesHegemonyandtheFoundations
ofInternationalLaw(CambridgeUniversityPress,2003).
(518)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.
(519)AWBSimpson,‘HerschLauterpachtandtheGenesisoftheAgeofHumanRights’
(2004)120LQR49,78.
(520)TyrervUnited-Kingdom(n134),353.
(521 )AireyvIreland(n494)at[26].
(522)SeeJChristoffersen,‘TheImpactofHumanRightsLawonGeneralInternational
Law’inMTKammingaandMScheinin,TheImpactofHumanRightsLawinGeneral
InternationalLaw(OxfordUniversityPress,2009),47–8.
(523)Preamble,ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamental
Freedoms,4November1950,213UNTS222.
(524)AMcNair,TheRightsoftheEuropeanCitizen(DirectorateofInformationofthe
CouncilofEurope,1961),9–10.Also:HWaldock,‘TheEuropeanConventionforthe
ProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms’(1958)34BYIL356;H
Golsong,‘TheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsbeforeDomesticCourts’(1962)38
BYIL445.
(525)HLauterpacht,AnInternationalBilloftheRightsofMan(reissue,Oxford
UniversityPress,2013).
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(526)HLauterpacht,‘TheProposedEuropeanCourtofHumanRights’(1949)35GST25,
33–4.Also:PSands,‘Introduction’inHLauterpacht,AnInternationalBilloftheRightsof
Man(n525).
(527)JHBarrington,‘TheProposedEuropeanCourtofHumanRights’(1949)35GST41.
(528)Waldock,‘EvolutionofHumanRights’(n116),547.
(529)LoizidouvTurkey(PreliminaryObjections)(1995)103ILR622.
(530)BankovicvBelgium(2001)123ILR94.
(531 )SeeReservationstotheConventiononGenocide(n37);CertainNorwegianLoans
(n37);HLauterpacht,‘SomePossibleSolutionsoftheProblemofReservationsto
Treaties’(1953)39GST97.
(532)RHiggins,‘TheICJ,theECJ,andtheIntegrityofInternationalLaw’(2003)52ICLQ
1,18.
(533)ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,4
November1950,213UNTS222.
(534)SeethecriticismbyRJennings,‘TheProliferationofAdjudicatoryBodies’[1995]
ASILBulltetinno92,5–6.
(535)LoizidouvTurkey(n529),645.
(536)SeeAcquisitionofPolishNationalityPCIJ(1923)SeriesBNo7,20.
(537)BankovicvBelgium(n530),110–11at[64]–[65].
(538)Article1ECHRprovides:‘TheHighContractingPartiesshallsecuretoeveryone
withintheirjurisdictiontherightsandfreedomsdefinedinSectionIofthisConvention.’
(539)BankovicvBelgium(n530),111at[64].Also:Al-SkeiniandOthersvSecretaryof
StateforDefence[2007]UKHL26,[2008]1AC153,199at[69](LordRodger),214–15
at[128](LordBrown).
(540)TheGrandChambercitedasinstancesthereofDudgeonvUnitedKingdom22
October1981,SeriesANo45;X,Y,andZvUnitedKingdom22April1997Rep1997II;
VvUnitedKingdomAppNo24888/94ECHR1999IX;MatthewsvUnitedKingdomApp
No24833/94ECHR1999I.
(541 )LoizidouvTurkey(n529).SeeBankovicvBelgium(n530),110–11at[64]–[65].
(542)AegeanSeaContinentalShelf(n15),32at[77].Also:NavigationalandRelated
Rights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),242–44;NationalityDecreesIssuedinTunisand
Morocco(n133),23–4.
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
Parties
(543)Costa,LaCoureuropéennedesdroitsdel’homme(n184),43.
(544)BankovicvBelgium(n530),114at[75].
(545)Al-SkeinivUnitedKingdomAppNo55721/07at[137].
(546)Crawford,Brownlie’sPrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw(n186),653.
(547)BankovicvBelgium(n530),111at[64](myemphasis).
(548)ŠilihvSloveniaAppNo71463/01,judgment[GC]of9April2009at[1]​– [2].
(549)Thisevolutionhasonlybeenappliedtocertain(especiallyimportant)rightsofthe
Convention:JanowiecandOthersvRussiaAppNos55508/07and29520/09,judgment
[GC]of21October2013;LyubovEfimenkovUkraineAppNo75726/0125November
2010;FrandeşvRomaniaAppNo35802/05,judgment17May2011(whereArt2was
concerned);TunavTurkeyAppNo22339/03judgment19January2010;Stanimirovićv
SerbiaAppNo26088/0618October2011;PMvBulgariaAppNo49669/07,judgment
24January2012;YatsenkovUkraineAppNo75345/01,judgment16February2012
(whereArt3wasconcerned).
(550)ElectricityCompanyofSofiaandBulgaria(BelgiumvBulgaria)(1939)PCIJRep
SerA/BNo77,82;CaseconcerningRightofPassageoverIndianTerritory(Merits)
(Judgment)[1960]ICJRep6,35.Also:AKoroma,‘AssertionofJurisdictionbythe
InternationalCourtofJustice’inPCapps,MEvans,andSKonstadinidis(eds),Asserting
Jurisdiction:InternationalandEuropeanLegalPersprectives(Hart,2003),196;S
Rosenne,TheTimeFactorintheJurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJustice(AW
Sythoff,1960);WDKrause-Ablaß,IntertemporalesVölkerrecht(Forschungsstellefür
VölkerrechtundausländischesRechtderUniversitätHamburg,1969),29–30;P
Tavernier,Recherchessurl’applicationdansletempsdesactesetdesrèglesendroit
internationalpublic(LGDJ,1970),215–20;RHiggins,ThemesandTheories:Selected
Essays,Speeches,andWritingsinInternationalLaw,volII(OxfordUniversityPress,
2009),875–80.
(551 )InternationalCovenantonCivilandPolicialRights,16December1966,999UNTS
171.
(552)LegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinian
Territory(AdvisoryOpinion)[2004]ICJRep136,180at[111].
(553)ArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo(DRCvUganda)[2005]ICJRep168,
243at[216].
(554)InternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination,21
December1965,660UNTS195.
(555)ApplicationoftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofRacial
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The Means of Interpretation Admissible for the Establishment of the Intention of the
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Discrimination(GeorgiavRussianFederation)(ProvisionalMeasures)[2008]ICJRep
353,386at[109].
(556)RHiggins,‘ABabelofJudicialVoices?RuminationsfromtheBench’(2006)55ICLQ
791,795.Also:BSimpsonandLMoor,‘GhostsofColonialismintheEuropeanConvention
onHumanRights’(2005)76BYIL121,123;TMeron,‘ExtraterritorialityofHuman
RightsTreaties’(1995)89AJIL80–1.
(557)LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricain
Namibia(SouthWestAfrica)(n14),16.
(558)TyrervUnitedKingdom(n134)58ILR339.
(559)AireyvIreland(n494).
(560)RosInvestCoUKLtdvRussianFederation(n507),at[39].
(561 )RosInvestCoUKLtdvRussianFederation(n507),at[39]–[40].
(562)ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,23May1969,1155UNTS331,(1969)8
ILM679.
(563)BritishClaimsintheSpanishZoneofMorocco(1925)2RIAA722,725.
(564)McNair,TheLawofTreaties(n25),468.
(565)ConventionconcerningEmploymentofWomenduringtheNight(n463),377.
(566)EuropeanCommunitiesanditsMemberStates—TariffTreatmentofCertain
InformationTechnologyProducts(n167).
(567)EuropeanCommunitiesanditsMemberStates—TariffTreatmentofCertain
InformationTechnologyProducts(n167)at[7.597]–[7.599].
(568)EuropeanCommunitiesanditsMemberStates—TariffTreatmentofCertain
InformationTechnologyProducts(n167)at[7.600].CfChina—MeasuresAffecting
TradingRightsandDistributionServicesforCertainPublicationsandAudiovisual
EntertainmentProducts,WT/DS363/AB/R,21December2009at[47],[396].
(569)SeparateOpinionofJudgeadhocGuillaumeinDisputeregardingNavigationaland
RelatedRights(CostaRicavNicaragua)(n17),290,298.
(570)ConventionconcerningEmploymentofWomenduringtheNight(n463),377.
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