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THE 1994 ERUPTION OF RABAUL VOLCANO A CASE STUDY IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT
BY HUGH DAVIES
Professor of Geology
University of Papua New Guinea
Prepared for the UNDP Office, Port Moresby, July 1995
F363.34950
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THE 1994 ERUPTION OF RABAUL VOLCANO A CASE STUDY IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT
BY HUGH DAVIES
Professor of Geology
University of Papua New Guinea
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; CALL No.
ACC. No.
<6
Prepared for the UNDP Office, Port Moresby, July 1995
Revised and re-issued by the University of Papua New Guinea
September 1995
INTRODUCTION
An eruption of Tavurvur and Vulcan vents in the Rabaul volcanic complex began on
19 September 1994. The eruption came on very rapidly, with only 12 hours warning.
It was of small to moderate size by world standards but caused considerable damage
to property, especially to structures within five km downwind of the two vents. Four
people were killed in Rabaul town. Total damage to property was estimated at
around K200 million.
Most damage was caused by accumulations of ash on roof tops. In addition, areas
within 2.5 km of Vulcan were affected by devastating pyroclastic flows. In the months
since the eruption abated, damage has been caused by flash-flooding and mudflows
emanating from ash-covered hillslopes during heavy rain. This hazard continues.
45 000 people were evacuated from the town area and nearby villages at the time of
the eruption. Through the first weeks of the eruption 105 000 displaced people
received food and shelter in care centres. By the end of the year numbers had
reduced to 45 000 and by mid-1995 all care centres were closed. The rehabilitation
and reconstruction of facilities in the Rabaul region will take some years. Restoration
of Government services alone is estimated to cost K100 million.
In hindsight, the Rabaul disaster was remarkable for the evacuation and re-location
of so many people in a short interval of time, and for the very small loss of life
despite the rapid onset of the eruption and the scale of subsequent devastation. The
foundation of this successful outcome lay in the emergency plans and the public
awareness campaigns developed and conducted in the preceding decade. When the
emergency developed, people recognised the signs and knew what to do and where
to go.
This is not to say that the plans were perfect nor that everything went as it should.
There were problems, notably in such areas as communications and in law and order.
Beyond this, the human tragedy is still with us. People who had invested in small
businesses in the devastated areas lost everything, and most residents of the
devastated areas lost all personal possessions. Most of the victims were without
insurance against volcanic hazard and had no recourse to any type of compensation.
THIS PAPER
This paper reviews the Rabaul 1994 eruption as a case study for disaster management
- what went right and what went wrong? The objects of the review are to record the
lessons that may be drawn from the Rabaul eruption for the purposes of planning for
future disasters; and to provide an overview that may be useful to other agencies that
are moving to develop disaster plans for volcanic or other emergencies.
Disaster management logically comprises three parts:
* planning before the disaster: development of a disaster plan;
* activities during the disaster: efforts to minimise the effect of the disaster;
* activities after the disaster: reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The paper deals with each of these parts in turn. Section A discusses activities before
the disaster, Section B the disaster itself, and Section C activities after the disaster. A
final section looks at the lessons that can be learned from the 1994 eruption.
Background for the paper is drawn from discussions with those involved in various
ways in the 1994 emergency, from the writer's experiences during parts of the 1983-5
Rabaul seismic crisis and the 1994 eruption, and from Tomblin and Chung (1995).
Much of the information was provided by members of the Provincial Disaster
Committee and, about the volcano, by staff of the Rabaul Volcanological Observatory.
It is difficult to give a fully-rounded account of such a multi-faceted event, and I
apologise for the shortcomings that I know must exist in the following.
THE STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF THE VOLCANO
In plan view (Fig. 1), the Rabaul volcano is a large structure, 20 x 25 km across, and
probably extends offshore as far as Watom Island in the NW and the Duke of York
Islands in the east. The centre of the volcano is occupied by Rabaul Harbour. The
detailed topographic map (Fig. 2) shows the location of the Rabaul town and business
district, the airport, and the two vents that erupted in 1937 and again in 1994:
Tavurvur on the east side of the harbour and Vulcan in the west.
The Rabaul volcano is of a type that is potentially very dangerous: a collapse caldera.
This type of volcano is prone to violent large-scale eruptions. During such major
eruptions, the rapid evacuation of a central magma chamber may cause the centre of
the volcano to collapse and may send clouds of hot ash across the land surface in all
directions. The result can be the development of a central depression or caldera. The
last such violent eruption was in about 600 AD. In this eruption, clouds of hot gas
and rock particles spilled across the neighbouring countryside to distances of up to
50 km from the volcano. The caldera that formed is what we now know as Rabaul
Harbour.
Similar large scale eruptions have occurred at least ten times in the half-million-year
life of the volcano, and at least five times in the last 18,000 years. The recent eruptive
history is summarised in a table by McKee (1993; Fig. 3).
RECENT HISTORY
Rabaul volcano has erupted at intervals of between 24 and 59 years through the time
of written historical records, and most recently in 1937. Following on the 1937
eruption a recommendation was made that the town should be relocated to a safer
area, but this was not acted upon. The attraction of Rabaul as a commercial centre is
that it is an all-weather deep-water port, and is conveniently situated with regard to
the highly productive Gazelle agricultural region.
A volcanological observatory was constructed on a ridge overlooking the town in the
late 1940s with the object of both (a) monitoring the activity of the volcano so as to
provide adequate warning of eruption, and (b) serving as a headquarters for volcano
surveillance throughout Papua New Guinea.
Figure 1: The Rabaul volcano may extend some kilometres offshore, as far NW as
Watom Island and as far E as the Duke of York Islands. Photocopy of part of the
published 1:250 000 geological map of the Gazelle Peninsula.
SIMPSON
HARBOUR
Figure 2: The Rabaul 1:100 000 topographic map shows the location of vents within
the caldera, the road network and population centres.
MAGMA
km 3
Tavurvur pyroclastic eruptions
A/D
0.05
Vulcan pyroclastic and cone-building eruptions
D/A
0.3
1878
Vulcan (submarine) and Tavurvur pyroclastic eruptions
D/A
0.3
1850?
Sulphur Creek pyroclastic eruptions, crater forming
A
0.1
1791
1767 (<250 yrs
by 14 Q
Tavurvur pyroclastic and lava eruptions, cone-building
Tavurvur? pyroclastic and lava eruptions, cone-building
A/D
A/D
0.1
<750 yrs
Rabalanakaia pyroclastic ar.d lava eruptions, cone-building
A
0.2
>750 yrs
7
Dawapia pyroclastic eruptions, cone-building
D
03
Sulphur Creek lavas and pyroclastics, cone-building
A
0.1
1,400 yr.
Rabaul Pyrociestics eruptions and caldera collapse
D
>10
AGE
1937-43
1937
EVENT
0.1
Figure 3: Reproduction of part of a table listing the eruptions of Rabaul Volcano,
from McKee (1993). D dacite; A andesite. Volumes of eruptive products are
estimates.
The build-up to the present eruption began in 1971. Through the succeeding 23 years
the volcano inflated and seismic activity continued at above normal level. A
prolonged seismic crisis in 1983-85 gave every indication that the volcano would
erupt (Fig. 4), and triggered the drafting and adoption of disaster control legislation
by the National Government, and the initiation of certain emergency measures,
including the resumption of land for an alternative airport at Tokua and the
construction of an alternative wharf at Kabakaul, near Kokopo. The total outlay by
Government was K4.5 million. The private sector spent an estimated K2 million,
mostly for alternative staff accommodation and storage facilities in safe areas.
A Provincial Disaster Plan was developed in 1983 with the assistance of consultant
Mr Brian Ward. This was revised in 1985 by Captain Dayne Hunt (RAN retired), and
further revised by the Provincial Disaster Committee in 1987. The key concern
addressed in these plans is the safety of the tens of thousands of people who live
within the caldera, in close proximity to the historically-active vents. Only one twolane road (Tunnel I lill Road) provides safe egress from the caldera in the event of an
eruption.
The actions taken when eruption was expected in 1983-85 proved their value when
I he eruption eventuated in 1994. For example, the movement of supplies and
personnel in and out of the disaster area in 1994 would have been extremely difficult
had Tokua airstrip not been available.
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Number of Earthquakes
Figure 4: Total number of earthquakes per month and uplift of a benchmark on
Matupit
Island,
1968-1994.
Unpublished
illustration
provided
by
Rabaul
Volcanological Observatory.
Pre-disaster activities included the development of a provincial disaster plan, a public
awareness campaign, disaster rehearsals, the enactment of disaster legislation at
national level, the upgrading of volcano surveillance, and the construction of an
alternative wharf and airstrip.
DISASTER LEGISLATION
Prompted by the indications of an impending eruption, the National Parliament
passed eight acts in the first two weeks of March 1984, as follows:
1
The Disaster Management Act
This act established a National Disaster Committee, comprising Secretary to the
Department of Prime Minister, Commander Defence Force, Commissioner of Police
and heads of departments responsible for financial, defence, works and supply,
health, foreign affairs and trade matters.
The Committee reports directly to the National Executive Committee. It is responsible
for preparedness for disasters, assignment of responsibilities, coordination of relief
actions, and advice to NEC regarding the need for international assistance. The
committee examines and approves any grants from national funds for emergency
relief, lays down guidelines for provincial disaster planning, fosters public awareness
of potential disasters, and advises NEC regarding the possible declaration of a
national emergency under the act.
The act also establishes provincial disaster committees for each province and sets out
the membership and functions of the committees. Financial responsibilities in any one
financial year are defined as follows: The first K15,000of disaster-related expenditure
is paid by the provincial government; expenditure between K15,000 and K100,000 is
shared between provincial and national government; and expenditure above K100,000
is met by the national government.
The Emergency (General Powers) Act
This act provides tor the appointment of a controller and deputy controller, in the
event of a national emergency, and gives them wide powers to requisition aircraft,
ships, installations; to regulate transport and the use of roads; to enter or search lands
and buildings by force if necessary; and to order persons to perform labour. In
addition, neither the controllers nor anyone authorised by them is liable for anything
done or omitted to be done.
Emergency (Defence Force) Act
Under the terms of this act the Defence Force can provide assistance to the civilian
authorities, subject to the orders of the controller. The assistance can be of a civilian
nature only. If assistance is required to help restore law and order, a separate call out
is necessary by the Head of State acting on the advice of the NEC under Section 204
of the Constitution.
Emergency (Registration of Evacuees) Act
Provides for a system of registration of evacuees, so that their whereabouts during
an emergency can be known. The act also details offences and penalties for persons
who fail to register under the act.
Emergency (Requisition) Act
Provides for the requisition of animals, aircraft, motor vehicles, ships, machinery,
installations, buildings, land, accommodation and goods.
Emergency (Requisition Compensation) Act
Sets out principles and rates of compensation for requisitioned items, e.g., motor
vehicle hire is set at K10 per day.
Emergency (Motor Vehicles Third Party Insurance) Act
Covers provision of third party insurance during a national emergency.
Emergency (Workers' Compensation) Act
Provides workers' compensation for authorised disaster and emergency workers.
PROVINCIAL DISASTER PLAN
The East New Britain Provincial Disaster Plan of 1983 was a two-and-a-half cm thick
A4 volume that included the basic central plan plus the detailed plans for each
government department. The size of the volume may have intimidated some potential
users. In contrast, the 1987 version of the disaster plan is a much slimmer volume of
only 36 pages.
The 1983 plan divided the town area and region into zones according to perceived
risk. The highest risk zones were close to the two most recently active vents,
Tavurvur and Vulcan, and least risk zone was the so-called Safe Area beyond the
caldera rim. The zoning scheme was retained in the 1987 plan.
The 1987 volume comprises ten pages of text that define the composition and
functions of the Provincial Disaster Committee and its Sub-Committees. This is
followed by 16 pages of checklists of action for each key person at the time of an
emergency, and by a further ten pages that include names and contact numbers of
members of the committee, definition of stages of alert, detailed plans of rescue
teams, and details of the emergency food plan.
The Provincial Disaster Committee (PDC) is chaired by the Head of the Department
of East New Britain and includes heads of police, works, community government,
health and finance and administration. At the onset of an emergency further members
are coopted: an executive officer, a public information officer, the Principal
Volcanologist and representatives of Non Government Organisations and the
Chamber of Commerce.
In addition, there are four Sub-Committees concerned with Rescue, Transport and
Requisition, Evacuation and Welfare Sub-Committee, and Command Control and
Communications.
Actions when an emergency is imminent.
At the first indication that an emergency may be imminent (declaration of Stage Two
Alert, see below for explanation of alert system):
* The provincial disaster centre in the National Works offices is opened and the
following staff deployed: Executive Officer (responsible for day-to-day running of the
disaster centre); Public Information Officer (consult with Rabaul Volcanological
Observatory; release information to public and media); Evacuation Planner; and
Clerical support
* The four sub-committees of the PDC are activated and take various actions, as
listed in the Plan.
The Disaster Plan goes on to give details of further actions that shall be taken as the
status of the alert changes.
STAGES OF ALERT
The Principal Volcanologist has the responsibility to recommend to the Provincial
Disaster Committee any change in the stage of alert. Upon receipt of a
recommendation for a change in the state of alert from Stage One to Stage Two, the
Provincial Disaster Committee will declare a Stage Two alert, advise the National
Disaster Committee accordingly, and request authorisation for the Chairman of PDC
to be appointed Deputy Controller, as designated in the Disaster Management Act.
The stages of alert are:
Stage 1.
No immediate cause for alarm.
Action: Review and update emergency plans
Stage_2
Increased risk; eruption possible within months or weeks.
Action: Preliminary deployment measures, entailing little expense, as per Disaster
Plan.
Stage 3
Serious risk; eruption possible within weeks or days.
Action: Major preparations by Government, as per Plan. Ensure fuel supplies at the
three major centres in the Safe Area; move bulk food supplies to seven major
evacuation centres in the Safe Area; establish Transit Centres; establish air traffic
control at Tokua; evacuate Nonga Hospital; evacuate familes of key personnel;
maintain a fleet of motor vehicles with drivers on standby for evacuation; establish
PDC operational headquarters at Vunadidir; relocate NBC radio and Public
Information Officer to Vunadidir; disseminate advice to public.
Stage 4
Eruption imminent (days or hours)
Action: Public announcement to the effect that public should immediately evacuate
the danger zones. Advice to National Disaster committee and request that the
National Executive Committee declare a State of National Emergency in East New
Britain.
SECTION B: THE DISASTER
THE 1994 ERUPTION - VOLCANOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The continuing inflation of the floor of Rabaul Harbour through the years 1973-94,
and the continuing anomalous level of seismic activity (Fig. 4), were a clear indication
that the volcano had embarked upon a path towards eventual eruption. On this basis,
the volcanologists predicted that an eruption would occur some time before the end
of the century. They also predicted that the eruption would be on a small-tointermediate scale, comparable with the scale of the 1937 eruption. This estimate was
based on the localised nature of the inflation of the harbour floor. At the same time
they were aware of the possibility that a small-scale eruption might destabilise the
caldera sufficiently to cause the development of a large-scale eruption some time
subsequently.
The fact that a centre of inflation could be defined beneath the harbour floor (SE of
Matupit Island) led to some concern that the volcano might develop a new vent, on
the harbour floor, rather than erupt through the historically-active vents.
The volcanologists remained reasonably confident that, with the improvements in
monitoring methods that had been put in place since the 1937 eruption, they would
detect any build-up to eruption sufficiently in advance to allow an orderly evacuation
of the threatened area. The improved monitoring included a circum-harbour network
of seismic stations, connected by telephone lines and telemetry to the Observatory,
and a program of repeat surveys of the margins of the Harbour to detect any
acceleration in the rates of uplift or any horizontal extension. A third method,
telemetered readings from tide gauges, had fallen into disuse early in 1994 because
of lack of funds for maintenance.
Precursor activity
At 2.51 am local time on Sunday 18 September, Rabaul town was shaken by two
sharp local earthquakes of magnitude 5.1. One earthquake focus was at shallow depth
1 km NW of Tavurvur, and was felt most strongly in the SE part of Rabaul town. The
other may have been near Vulcan. Through Sunday morning and afternoon
earthquake activity continued.
The question that the volcanologists faced was: Was this another seismic swarm, such
as had been encountered in 1984, or was it the build-up to an eruption. They looked
for any indication of unusual uplift around the harbour, and particularly in the
vicinity of the centre of inflation. It was known that visible uplift had preceded the
1937 eruption and might be expected as a precursor to any new eruption.
However, no indications of unusual uplift were seen. The routine accurate levelling
survey from Nonga to Matupit conducted earlier in the week had shown no change
in the rate of uplift of the benchmark at Matupit Island.
Earthquake activity continued into the evening. By 6 pm it was apparent that this was
more than a typical seismic swarm and the first alert was given to the PDC (see
under The 1994 Eruption - Human Response). Seismic activity declined after
midnight.
At some stage during the night there was significant uplift along the shoreline
immediately east of Vulcan and along the SE shoreline of Matupit Island. This was
not known until first light on Monday morning, at about 5.40 am, when portions of
muddy harbour floor could be seen. Total uplift of the shoreline near Vulcan was
about 6 m, and at Matupit Island, about 2 m.
The eruption
The first puffs of vapour emerged from Tavurvur crater at 6.07 am on Monday 19
September. The eruption of Tavurvur developed rapidly and by 6.17 am a dense
plume of ash was drifting towards Rabaul town, driven by the prevailing SE wind.
At 7.17 the eruption of Vulcan began, from a new vent on the NE flank of the 1937
cone, sending hot gas, pumice and dust northward across the surface of the harbour
towards The Beehives. At about 7.45 am Vulcan entered a vigorous Plininan phase,
sending a column of vapour, gas, dust and pumice to an elevation of about 20 km.
Pumice from the plume was caught by high-level winds and driven both to the SW,
where it reached Keravat and Vudal, and to the NE across the harbour. Simpson
Harbour, north of Vulcan, was covered by a raft of pumice fragments by mid
afternoon.
At the time of the initial earthquake (2.51 am Sunday), and again at the onset of
vigorous phase of eruption of Vulcan (7.47 am Monday), tsunamis developed and
swept the shores of the harbour, to heights of 1-2 m above normal sea level. There
were occasional further tsunamis through the day.
The tall eruptive column from Vulcan and the thick ash cloud from Tavurvur blotted
out the Sun and caused darkness over Rabaul town and northeastern coast, and the
escape routes to the west (North Coast Road) by about 8.30 am. This lasted until late
afternoon. The darkness was intense: people sheltering in the Kombiu villages on the
coast NE of Rabaul later told that visibility was less than a metre.
Vigorous eruption of both vents, and the accompanying sound effects and lightning,
continued through Monday. A second Plinian phase of Vulcan occurred on Monday
evening, and heavy ash fall and mud rain continued through the night and into
Tuesday.
By midnight on Tuesday 20 September the observatory instruments showed a
significant decline in earthquake activity. Heavy eruptive activity continued through
the week from both vents, but by Saturday morning 24 September the level of activity
at Vulcan had declined significantly, and had ceased altogether eight days later.
Tavurvur, although the less vigorous of the two, was the more persistent. Moderate
ash fall continued in Rabaul town area for several weeks, and activity at a reduced
level continued until 23 December, with intermittent bursts of activity subsequently.
Inflation of the harbour floor SE of Matupit Island declined after the first weeks of
the eruption. The benchmark settled quickly from the 2 m uplift of 19 September, and
dry tilt continued to decline over the succeeding weeks. The deflation was taken to
indicate that the high-level pool of magma that had caused the inflation in the first
place was now exhausted, or near-exhausted.
EFFECTS OF THE ERUPTION
Distribution of tephra
Tavurvur emitted mostly fine ash. This was distributed NNW of the vent by the
prevailing SE Trade wind. Falls near the vent exceeded 1.5 m in thickness. Falls in
Rabaul town area, as far north as the Market (5 km NNW of the vent), were of the
order of 40 cm (Fig. 5). Probably the greater part of this ash blanket accumulated in
the first 24-36 hours.
Vulcan emitted ash and pumice lapilli (fragments of pumice), both as airfall tephra
and in pyroclastic flows. The pyroclastic flows were confined to the slopes of Vulcan
and the adjacent land and sea surface to distances of 2.5 or 3 km from the vent. The
airfall tephra from the initial Plinian phase were carried by high-level winds NE and
SW of Vulcan. At the same time, and as the eruption progressed, tephra were carried
by lower level winds to the west and NW. The thickness of airfall tephra on the
caldera rim, 4 km NW of Vulcan, was greater than 50 cm (Fig. 6)
The combination of the two ash-thickness maps (Fig. 7) illustrates that the western
part of Rabaul town, along Malaguna Road and near the main wharves, was spared
from any heavy ashfall, as was the southern part of Matupit Island.
Pumice on the Harbour
Pumice that fell on the harbour, or was washed into the harbour by rainwater run­
off, formed a raft up to 50 cm thick that covered most of Simpson Harbour through
the first three weeks of the eruption. By the fourth week, an easing of the SE winds
and the effects of tides and loss of buoyancy had broken up the raft sufficiently for
ships to approach the main wharf.
Comparison with the 1937 Erpuption
A crude comparison with the ash thicknesses measured by Fisher (1939)
1937 eruption shows that the volume of ejecta emitted from Vulcan in 1994
similar to the volume erupted in 1937. In contrast the volume emitted from
in 1994 greatly exceeded the volume emitted from Tavurvur in 1937, by a
five times, or more (Fig. 8). The map also illustrates the point that ash from
was distributed in a more northerly direction in 1994 than in 1937.
after the
was very
Tavurvur
factor of
Tavurvur
Figure 5: Thickness of airfall tephra from Tavurvur. Unpublished illustration
provided by C O McKee and B Talai of the RVO.
15
f00mm. . . . ”
1
ash Oi/ckness
"Tavvurvw
BLASCHF.
GAZELLE
PEMNSUl.
Figure 5: Thickness of airfall tephra from Tavurvur. Unpublished illustration
provided by C O McKee and B Talai of the RVO.
*
Figure / : Thickness of airfall tephra from the two vents. Unpublished illustration
provided by C O McKee and B Talai of the RVO.
\
o
x \ :
10 k
Figure 8: Comparison of the thickness of airfall tephra from Tavurvur in 1994 with
the thickness of all tephra from Tavurvur in 1937. The latter information is from
Fisher (1939).
Damage
The most spectacular effects of the eruption were in the vicinity of Vulcan, w'here
pyroclastic flows and thick accumulation of airfall tephra created a moonscape of bare
ground broken only by blackened and broken tree trunks. Complete devastation
extended westward for several km to the caldera rim and northward for several km
to near Rapolo. The village of Tavana, immediately west of Vulcan, disappeared
entirely from view. Damage from pyroclastic flows extended through the coconut
plantation SW from Vulcan for a distance of about 1.5 km, beyond which point the
plantation was almost untouched.
From the caldera rim westward and northwestward, in the area north of the road
junction at Rakunai, heavy falls of ash and pumice caused defoliation of cocoa and
copra plantations and adjacent rainforest. Defoliation was complete within a km or
so of the caldera rim and less severe further to the W and NW. At distances greater
than 4 km from Vulcan some houses were not damaged and coconut palms were not
completely defoliated.
The several rivers that head in this area and flow to the north were destabilised by
the accumulation of tephra and loss of vegetation. Flooding, stream bank erosion and
road washouts resulted. The worst affected areas were at Vuvu Mission and at
Kurakakaul on the North Coast.
Other spectacular effects of the eruption were in the Rabaul town area. Most damage
resulted from the accumulation of airfall tephra, but mudflows from unstable
accumulations of ash on adjacent slopes also were a factor, especially in the low-lying
southern part of town (Malaytown). Worst hit was the airport and nearby Rapindik
and Malaytown. Severe damage also occurred in the main town area, extending
northwards to Namanula Hill and NNW to the top end of Mango Avenue and the
eastern end of Malaguna Road. Most damage was by roof collapse due to the
accumulation of ash on roof tops and, in the Malaytown area, by mudflows.
From Namanula to Matalau, Nodup and Baai, on the coast NE of Rabaul, roads were
cut by washouts emanating from unstable accumulations of ash on the N and NE
slopes of Mount Kombiu (The Mother). Similar hazard applied in most of the Rabaul
town area.
The danger of flash flooding and mudflows continues today, but is becoming less
with time, as accumulations of ash are eroded and vegetation is re-established.
Continuing Volcano Surveillance
It was particularly important to continue to monitor closely the state of the volcano
during the declining phase of the eruption. The key concern was to detect any
evidence of a resurgence of activity and, more importantly, any indication that the
caldera had been destabilised sufficiently to lead to a major catastrophic eruption.
Tide gauge and dry tilt measurements continued almost uninterrupted through this
time and showed encouraging signs of a return to normalcy, as was noted above.
However, the key surveillance tool of the RVO, the harbour network of seismic
stations, was in disarray. Stations near Vulcan and Tavurvur had been put out of
action when solar panels and wiring were buried under ash, and other key stations
at Tanaka, SW of Vulcan, and in the Duke of York Islands had been vandalised. No
seismic station was operating close to Vulcan or Tavurvur, with consequent loss of
detailed information in these key areas, and the loss of other stations made it difficult
to accurately determine location of earthquake focii. The Duke of Yorks station was
restored as soon as opportunity permitted, but the Tanaka station had been stripped
completely and could not be restored.
Help arrived at the end of the second week of the eruption in the form of a team of
three volcanologists from the Cascades Volcanological Observatory of the United
States Geological Survey, and $100 000 worth of equipment: seismographs, electronic
tiltmeters and computers to record signals from the field stations. The team worked
with RVO staff to establish temporary stations on Matupit Island and near Vulcan
and to link these by telemetry back to the computers at RVO. Other stations were
installed by RVO staff subsequently. The team returned to the United States after
about ten days. The equipment remained in place, a gift from the United States
government.
Currently the Australian government is preparing an aid package to restore the
Observatory to fully operational status. The package will include a differential GPS
(global positioning satellite) system so that ground deformation can be determined
more rapidly in future.
THE 1994 ERUPTION - HUMAN RESPONSE
Sunday night and the early hours of Monday morning.
The earthquakes were sufficiently frequent and vigorous by late afternoon on Sunday
18th that people started to move out of the caldera of their own accord, particularly
from the villages near Vulcan. By 6 pm the level of seismic activity was such that the
Principal Volcanologist, Chris McKee, recommended the declaration of a Stage Two
Alert. This was endorsed by the Provincial Disaster Committee (PDC) and proclaimed
at 6.17 pm.
By dusk people had started to move out of Matupit Island and the southern town
area. Those who did not have transport were advised to congregate at the Queen
Elizabeth Park sporting field in the Rabaul town area. Arc lights were turned on at
the Park.
At around midnight the volcanologists advised the PDC that the volcano was on
course to eruption and that they would be recommending the declaration of a Stage
Three Alert. By 2 am that recommendation had been faxed from RVO to the PDC and
to the National Disaster and Emergency Services (NDES) headquarters in Port
Moresby.
At around 11 pm the PDC started to organise the movement of the crowd of 5000
persons that had gathered at Queen Elizabeth Park. All available trucks and buses
and many private cars worked through the night to ferry people out of the caldera
to Vuvu and beyond. The trucks were mostly large capacity haulage trucks from
private sector road contractors. Most Government motor vehicles had been removed
from the Government transport pool, some without authorisation, earlier in the
evening. The evacuation from the Park continued until just after 3 am Monday, by
which time the Park had been cleared.
Small ships that had been at the Main Wharf earlier in the evening moved away from
the wharf before midnight and thus were not available to assist with the evacuation.
Following the advice from the RVO at midnight that eruption was inevitable,
members of the PDC gave advice to clubs, hotels, boarding schools and others that
people should move out from the caldera. This was done by telephone calls and by
police and Red Cross moving through the streets.
Airlines were contacted and advised that aircraft should be removed from Rabaul
airport. A number of aircraft took off at around 2 am. Rabaul has no night flying
facilities but, fortunately, there was a bright moon. Other aircraft remained on the
tarmac and subsequently became victims of the eruption. An exception was the Air
Niugini F28 which departed soon after 6 am, just as the eruption was beginning.
The local radio station, Radio East New Britain, a sub-station of the National
Broadcasting Commission, remained on the air until 12.30 am, and resumed
broadcasting at 5.30 am until the eruption began, soon after 6 am. The station
continued through this time to broadcast the message that Rabaul was on a Stage
Two Alert and to advise people to remain in their homes until further advice. A
revised warning, indicating a higher stage of alert, would have been issued by the
Disaster Committee soon after 6 am, but was pre-empted by the onset of the
eruption. The Disaster Committee had decided against issuing a public statement of
higher alert during the night hours because the evacuation was proceeding smoothly.
It was felt that announcement of a heightened state of alert might cause panic and
possible loss of life on the roads.
Re-establishing a Headquarters for the PDC
At 7 am Monday 19th the PDC declared simultaneously a Stage Three and Stage Four
Alert, and requested the declaration of a State of Emergency. The State of Emergency
was approved by the Prime Minister and declared by the Director NDES, Mr Leith
Anderson. Mr Anderson was appointed Controller of the Emergency and the
Chairman of PDC, Mr Ellison Kaivovo, Deputy Controller.
As was intended under the terms of the existing Disaster Plan, an attempt was made
at 7 am to establish a Headquarters for the PDC at the Administrative College at
Vunadidir, SW of Vulcan. However, golf-ball-size fragments of pumice fell at
Vunadidir at around 9 am, carried from the Plinian eruptive column of Vulcan. Post
and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) officials advised that the pumice fall was
likely to affect telephone communications at Vunadidir. Accordingly, the emergency
headquarters was moved from Vunadidir to Kokopo Post Office later that morning,
and to the nearby Ralum Club next day.
Communications
A new dimension was added to the emergency on the morning of Tuesday 20
September when the Rabaul Telephone Exchange failed, due to roof collapse. PTC
technicians installed temporary lines for the emergency centre at Ralum Club,
Kokopo and the RVO, but for the rest of Rabaul and, in fact, much of the Gazelle
Peninsula, communications were cut. This was a serious blow to the management of
the Emergency and to the flow of communication to and from the disaster area. The
handheld VHP radios of the PDC, augmented by VHP systems supplied by PTC and
the Police and Defence Force, became the only means of rapid communication
between key players in the Emergency Control centre, the RVO, and field teams of
police and defence personnel. (Defence Force teams arrived in the area on Friday
23rd.)
The Port Moresby headquarters of the National Broadcasting Commission assisted
by remaining on air 24 hours a day through the first week of the eruption. The
initiative was led by senior announcer Roger Hau'ofa, with the backing of NBC
Chairman Sir Alkan Tololo. Concerned relatives and friends telephoned and crowded
into the studio, desperate for news of loved ones in the Rabaul area.
By Thursday 22nd an emergency studio of Radio East New Britain had been
established at the Ralum Club, with the result that messages could be passed both
ways. It was through this network that people across Papua New Guinea heard what
were probably the first descriptions of the extent of the damage, from a member of
NBC technical staff, in réponse to questions on the morning of Thursday 22nd.
The Papua New Guinea media and Australian television provided clear and, for the
most part, accurate information on the progress of the eruption. There were confusing
reports as to how many vents were active. People watching from SW of Rabaul
reported confidently that Rabalanakaia had erupted and this was picked up by
Australian ABC television. This error perhaps arose because dust from Tavurvur that
had settled on the slopes of Rabalanakaia was swept up by the brisk SE breeze. There
was also an incorrect report that the harbour had been blocked by lava. Probably the
confusion arose because of the raft of pumice floating on the harbour.
Care Centres
18,000 people lived in the Rabaul town area, and a further 27,000 in the adjacent
villages that were affected by the eruption, including the villages on the NE coast
(Kombiu area). In addition, thousands of people who lived outside the caldera had
suffered damage to housing or to gardens and water supply, especially in the
Reimber, Balanamatan and northern Central areas, west and northwest of Vulcan.
In the first months 105,000 people were receiving support in care centres, established
at schools and in public areas such as the Kokopo Showground. The rapid onset of
the eruption had caught all unawares, including those charged with the management
of the emergency, with the result that shortages of food and drinking water were a
commonplace through the first weeks of the eruption. Water shortages continued into
the fourth week and beyond.
Emergency Supplies
On the second day of the eruption, the PDC dispatched a convoy of trucks into the
town. The convoy proceeded to Andersons Supermarket, near the limit of the area
of least damage. Food supplies were recovered and brought out to the main
distribution centre at Kokopo the following day, after an overnight delay caused by
flooding.
From the initial onset of the disaster, the Catholic and United Church missions
provided temporary shelter and food for displaced persons. This support was vital,
especially through the first days when food supplies were not readily available
through official channels.
Uplift of supplies from Port Moresby and Lae began on the second day by AusAlD,
using a C131 Hercules transport plane that was in country on a training exercise. The
United
States
Government
provided
aircraft
and
supplies
subsequently.
Schoolchildren and others were evacuated on the return flights.
Health Services
A skeleton staff remained at Nonga Base Hospital through the first five days of the
eruption. Patients were discharged, collected by relatives, or transported to Vunapope
hospital (as road conditions permitted), according to the seriousness of their
condition. Nonga medical staff were re-assigned to duty at Vunapope.
Education
All schools were closed and, over a period of time, students from outside the region
were repatriated to their home provinces. Some of the major schools were taken over
to serve as Care Centres, including the National High School at Keravat, and Kokopo
High School.
Business
Those Rabaul-based business houses that were able to do so, re-established their
operations from temporary facilities at Kokopo. The closure of the Rabaul branches
of the major banks resulted in a desperate cash shortage in the community. No
banking services were available during the first week of the eruption.
.looting
An aspect of the eruption that few had anticipated was the widespread looting of
business houses and private dwellings. Experience from similar disasters overseas
tells us that this is to be expected - is, in fact, a normal part of the disaster sequence.
In some cases looting included the wanton despoiling of personal possessions that
had no commercial value, such as books and family photgraphs.
Role of the National Disaster and Emergency Services (NDES)
The PDC and Rabaul Volcanological Observatory maintained telephone contact with
the Director of the NDES, Mr Leith Anderson, as the situation developed up to the
onset of the eruption. Notable contacts were from RVO soon after 6 pm Sunday, with
advice that a Stage Two Alert had been recommended, and from PDC at 12 minutes
after midnight to advise that eruption was likely. In the early hours of the morning
Mr Anderson alerted the Prime Minister to the situation, informed the media of the
likelihood of an eruption, informed the Civil Aviation Agency of possible hazard to
aircraft due to ash from the imminent eruption (a NOT AM was issued), and alerted
Air Niugini Operations to the risk for the F28 parked at Rabaul airstrip.
A fax from PDC at 6.08 am advised that Stage Three was to be declared. A further
fax at 6.45 am advised that the eruption had begun and requested the declaration of
a State of Emergency. Mr Anderson was appointed Controller of the Emergency, and
Mr Kaivovo (Chairman of PDC), Deputy Controller. The disaster management
exercise was given the name Operation Unity - presumably a play on the fact that
the Islands premiers had met in Rabaul one week earlier to discuss possible secession.
Six days later Brigadier-General Rokus Lokinap was appointed Controller and
Colonel Lima Dotaona was appointed to assist the Deputy Controller in the field.
The National Disaster Committee met three times during the first week of the
eruption.
NDES staff based in Rabaul assisted in the evacuation on Sunday evening and
Monday morning.
SECTION C - POST-ERUPTION
The post-eruption period may be said to begin at the end of the first week, on the
weekend of 24-25 September. By this time order had been established in the PDC
Headquarters at Ralum Club, Kokopo, and procedures were in place for the
distribution of food and water to the care centres, for convoys of private motor
vehicles to enter Rabaul town, for official requisition forms to be used for purchase
of supplies, and so on. Also by this time the eruption of Vulcan had eased
significantly. Within a few more days (around September 29) the eruption of
Tavurvur showed signs of waning. There was a palpable easing of the stress felt by
all. Now was the time to take a deep breath, recognise that the first phase of the
disaster was over, and start thinking about the future.
The post-eruption events logically comprise two parts: the immediate concerns of
human welfare and security; and the longer term concerns of rehabilitation and
construction.
Immediate Concerns
Immediate concerns in the post-eruption period were
* the welfare of the displaced people, including, conditions in care centres,
repatriation of those from other provinces, establishment of water supplies,
and continuation of food supplies
* dissemination of information
* control of looting
Care Centres
A first objective was to develop lists of occupants of each care centre. This basic step
would permit missing persons to be traced, and provide some control on food
distribution, etc. This took some time and the outcome was confused by people
moving from one care centre to another.
It quickly became clear that some of those receiving food in care centres were taking
advantage of the free handouts and, in fact, were not in need of food assistance.
These included plantation labourers from plantations in the safe area and villagers
from areas that had not been seriously affected by the eruption. Without any system
of identification it was virtually impossible to distinguish the genuinely needy from
the others. As controls were tightened, and as the less severely damaged gardens
recovered, the number of people in care centres declined rapidly, to 45 000 by the end
of the year, to 32 000 by February 1995, and to zero by June. Those that remained in
care centres in 1995 were the hard core of displaced persons who had no place to go,
their homes having been destroyed and re-settlement areas not yet available.
Repatriation
All schools were closed and schoolchildren from outside the province repatriated to
their home provinces. In addition, families from outside the Gazelle Peninsula, some
of whom had lived and worked in the Rabaul area for 30 and 40 years, were
encouraged by the authorities to leave. In some of these cases assistance was given
by the home province, in terms of ship charter or other support. Plantation labourers
recruited from other provinces took advantage of the opportunity to take a free ride
home, with the result that the labour force on many plantations was severely
depleted.
Reportedly 8000 people passed through Lae at this time, most arriving by ship.
Food
There were general shortages of food through the first ten days, and perhaps longer
in some areas. Fortunately the Catholic Mission and United Church were well placed
to provide emergency food supplies in the first week, until the PDC food distribution
system was put in place.
There were considerable reserves of basic foodstuffs in Rabaul and Kokopo, but the
problem was to coordinate distribution, and to ensure that the rations reached their
intended distribution point. Armed guards were placed on food trucks to reduce the
incidence of theft.
Nationwide Voluntary Support
The plight of the people of Rabaul triggered an immediate and heartwarming
response across the nation and overseas. Gifts of cash and kind to a value exceeding
hundreds of thousands of kina flooded in to spontaneous public appeals, and appeals
by concerned citizens and special interest groups, including the Tolai and New
Guinea Chinese communities.
Non Government Organisations
The missions, and in particular the Catholic Church, played a key role in providing
food and shelter in the first week of the eruption, and continued to provide shelter
and support through the following months. The Red Cross established lists of
displaced persons, traced missing persons, and helped re-unite familes that had
become separated during the initial emergency. The Salvation Army provided
valuable humanitarian support, after some initial confusion (see under Review and
Analysis).
Water Supply
Water was trucked from existing bores to the care centres. Resources were inadequate
and despite the best efforts of those concerned, shortage of water for drinking,
cooking and washing continued to be a problem through the first four weeks.
Electricity
Electrical power for the Rabaul region is generated at three points (Rabaul, Keravat,
Warangoi) linked by high-voltage lines. Because of this fortunate circumstance, the
supply of electrical power to locations outside the devastated area was not
interrupted, even though the Rabaul power station was temporarily shut down.
When the time came to re-connect supply to parts of the town area it was found that
transmission lines had survived, but accumulations of ash on insulators caused short
circuits.
Information
There was a desperate need for dissemination of information. This was met in some
part by broadcasts on Radio East New Britain, from the temporary studio in the
Ralum Club (starting Thursday 29 September), by posting notices outside Ralum Club
and in Care Centres, and later by an official newsheet Tephra Tok (7 October
onwards).
In the second week a small team comprising geologist David Lindley and provincial
government personnel started a series of visits to Care Centres to meet directly with
the displaced people, to give information on the progress of the eruption, and to hear
the concerns of those in the Care Centres. These presentations and exchanges were
attended by thousands of people and were invaluable in helping to defuse any
discontent and letting people feel that their concerns were being addressed. The most
common complaints were inadequate supplies of food and water, and the frustration
al not being able to return to the town area to search for personal possessions.
Security
Looting of abandoned homes and business houses began on the Sunday evening
preceding the eruption and continued through the first several weeks. During this
time the police presence was hindered by ash fall and rumours of further danger.
Private security operations were effective.
Access to the town area officially was restricted to those who had obtained a pass
from the PDC.
Looting continues to be a problem in the longer term and has been one of the factors
that has encouraged business people to re-occupy housing and business premises in
the town area.
Longer term concerns
Longer term concerns were
* re-instatement of government services
* resumption of commercial activities
* re-settlement of displaced persons
* reopening of schools
Government Services
The restoration of Government services required an assessment of the current state
of facilities, an estimate of costs to replace damaged facilities, a plan as to where the
new facilities should be located and funding.
The process was greatly advanced by the Needs Assessment Mission, an AusAIDsponsored party of three technical and planning experts which examined facilities,
talked with managers, and reported to the Provincial Disaster Committee. The team
presented an initial report on 31 October, and a final report in November. Part of the
report noted that most Government offices in Rabaul town had been damaged
beyond repair.
In early 1995 a decision was taken to re-locate most Government services to Kokopo
and first steps were taken to make land available for this purpose. Pre-requisites were
land mobilization and the development of an urban development plan
Funding of the initial stages of emergency relief had been provided by the National
Government through the office of the Controller. These arrangements ceased with the
termination of the State of Emergency on 10 April 1995. Expenditure under the Satae
of Emergency arrangements totalled K9 million.
Funding for re-habilitation was promised by the World Bank, by diversion of K25
million of funds that had been designated for other World Bank projects within PNG.
In addition, emergency aid of K4 million was promised by both the European Union
and the Australian government. In March 1995 the National Government established
the Gazelle Restoration Authority to manage the rehabilitation process and to control
expenditure. Funds were made available to such urgent projects as restoration of
telephone services. By June 1995 land was being cleared and construction of
Government facilities was proceeding.
Commercial Activities
The loss of the commercial heart of Rabaul was a severe blow not only to the nearby
communities and the East New Britain Province, but to communities further afield
that relied on Rabaul as a commercial centre, notably in central New Britain, southern
New Ireland, Buka and Bougainville.
The situation in mid-1995 is that much of the commercial activity will be restored.
Seventyfive percent of business houses have either re-opened or have indicated that
they will re-open in Rabaul. The keys to the resurgence were the re-opening of the
main wharf area; the relatively light damage to structures and housing in this part
of the town; the existence of bulk fuel storage nearby; and the re-opening of major
light industries including Coconut Products Limited (re-opened 14 November), Rice
Industries, and Rabaul Metal Industries, amongst others. In addition, two major
hotels, Kaivuna and Hamamas, have re-opened. At present it is intended that the area
south of the Kaivuna will not be re-developed. The area from Kaivuna northwards
still requires extensive clean-up and repair, and is still subject to damaging floods
from time to time.
Industries, wholesalers and retailers that return to Rabaul are likely to de-centralise
staff housing and bulk storage of commercial goods and products to locations outside
the caldera.
Re-settlement Schemes
Most people who were displaced form the devastated areas are now re-settled in the
region south and southeast of Kokopo. The re-settlement options include former
plantation land, and virgin forested areas near Warangoi. These people will continue
to need some degree of support until food crops are established.
Education
Education of schoolchildren had returned to near normal by the beginning of 1995,
but in some resettlement areas school buildings were still under construction.
SECTION D -
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
* The 1994 eruption was a small to intermediate scale eruption by world standards
but attracted world-wide attention because of the proximity of the erupting vents to
centres of population.
* The eruption was remarkable for the lack of premonitory phenomena and for its
rapid onset. Because the eruption developed with, effectively, only 12 hours' notice
it was impossible to put in place many of the pre-eruption safety measures, such as
the distribution of food to care centres, the orderly evacuation of Nonga Hospital, re­
location of disaster headquarters and radio station, etc.
* The evacuation of the threatened area was successful in that very few were killed
(a total of four persons were killed by direct volcanic effects and one by lightning).
The success of the evacuation was due primarily to the high level of awareness
within the community. People knew what to do and where to go, and were
sufficiently aware of the hazards as to be able to make up their own minds when to
leave town. Equally important were the efforts of the PDC and volunteers on Sunday
evening to warn people in the danger zones, and to provide road transport to beyond
the caldera rim.
* People who had lived through the 1937 eruption recognised the pattern of
seismicity and gave advice in their own communities that all should evacuate. The
result was the voluntary evacuation of Ma tu pit Island and settlements near Vulcan
on Sunday evening. There are written reports that people moved out because they
recognised a change in the gas odour from Tavurvur (from H 2 S to SO z ), but these
reports are unconfirmed. Eye witnesses report that the reason people evacuated
Matupit Island was because of the earthquakes.
* The extent of damage from the two eruptive centres was very much controlled by
the prevailing wind. Had the low-level wind varied from a brisk southeaster during
the first week of heavy emissions, a wider area may have been devastated.
* The vigorous initial plume above Vulcan intersected high-level winds that carried
pumice to the SW and NE and caused concern in areas such as Tomaringa,
Vunadidir, Keravat, Vudal and George Brown School - areas that had been
designated as safe refuges. This happened only on the first day of the eruption.
* Defoliation of vegetation and accumulation of ash on high ground led to flash
flooding and mud flows. These hazards continue.
* In hindsight, the 1983-85 seismic and inflation crisis was fortuitous in that it led to
the development of the alternative airstrip at Tokua, the wharf at Kabakaul, to
improvements in the Disaster Plan, and to a vigorous program of public education.
These steps significantly reduced the effects of the 1994 eruption.
* Disaster management in the Rabaul eruption was unusual to the extent that most
of the personnel involved in management of the disaster were themselves victims of
the disaster.
* Amongst the international volcanological community, the eruption was noteworthy
for two reasons:
(a) the successful evacuation of a large number of people from the caldera
and surrounds, at very short notice, apparently due to an effective public
awareness campaign; and
(b) the clear evidence that a caldera-collapse volcano can erupt with as little
as 27 hours of precursor activity.
The latter has implications worldwide for those charged with the monitoring of other
caldera volcanoes that are close to population centres, notably Long Valley caldera
in California and Campi Flegrei near Naples.
* Since written records were first kept (1767) there have been six eruptions of Rabaul
volcano at intervals of 24-59 years. Planning for future eruptions must take into
account the fact that we do not know when the next eruption will be, although we
now have a clearer idea on the types of activity (inflation, seismicity) that are likely
to precede the next eruption. It is not safe to assume that the next eruption is 50 years
hence - it could be sooner.
* Parts of town can be and are being re-opened. Decisions have been made as to
what parts of the devastated area should be reoccupied, and as to relocation of
government services.
* The re-settlement of displaced people is proceeding after some initial delays due
to land ownership disputes.
* The Provincial Disaster Plan was proven to be basically sound. Such problems as
arose were mostly due to the rapid onset of eruption - an eventuality that had not
been anticipated. The refinements suggested below are made with the benefit of
hindsight, and should not be seen as criticism of those involved in development and
implementation of the Disaster Plan.
1) The system of four stages of alert was too rigid and specific, and engendered a
false notion of predictability in the build-up to eruption. Current plans are to
reduce from four to three stages of alert, and to define the stages in terms of
increased or lessened risk, rather than in terms of likely time (weeks, days,
hours, etc.) to eruption.
2) The roles of RVO and PDC (respectively) with regard to declaration of stages of
alert probably need to be reviewed or re-defined in the Disaster Plan. The
present situation is that the RVO recommends and the PDC considers, decides
and declares, but this is not how it is spelled out in the Disaster Plan.
3) Communications systems proved inadequate. The failure of the Rabaul Telephone
Exchange on the second day of the eruption was a severe blow to the
emergency operations, and to communication with the outside world. Similarly
the closure of Radio East New Britain from Monday morning to Thursday
morning greatly limited the flow of information to the public at a most critical
time. The Volcanological Observatory, also, was out of communication for
more than 24 hours at the height of the eruption. Future disaster planning
must address the need to maintain communications.
4) Aircraft movements were not controlled until the fourth day. In the first days, the
situation at Tokua airstrip was chaotic. There was a need to establish a
ground-air radio link and some degree of control immediately after the
emergency developed. (The Disaster Plan calls for air traffic control to be
established at Tokua at Stage 3, but there was no time to do this.)
5) Representatives of the media reportedly were out of control in the first week of
the eruption, crowding the Control Centre at Ralum Club, using the few
telephones that were available, and listening in on discussions between
disaster management personnel. In addition, some expressed frustration at the
lack of official news releases. This illustrates the need for the PDC public
information officer to be in place as quickly as possible, before or at the time
of onset of the disaster.
6) Law and order problems developed very early in the piece, on the Sunday
evening before the eruption started. This type of behaviour must be
anticipated in future disasters, and measures taken to protect property. This
may require the dispatch of additional police and defence force personnel to
a disaster area before the onset of the disaster, rather than after. The safety of
families and possessions of key personnel (in particular) must be assured, so
that those personnel can focus on the job in hand.
7) In similar vein, there is a need for disaster control personnel to be given
emergency powers before the onset of the disaster, rather than after as is the
case under the terms of existing national disaster legislation. (The Provincial
Disaster Committee had previously made a case for emergency powers to be
given at Stage 3.)
8) Once evacuation is ordered, it should be compulsory for all persons to evacuate.
In the 1994 eruption a number of people elected to return to or remain in the
danger zone. Some of these were killed. Others were rescued subsequently, at
some risk to emergency personnel.
9) In the case of an emergency that continues for more than a few days, there is a
need to have in place a system of rostered relief for all key personnel.
Members of the Provincial Disaster Committee and RVO staff were working
16-18 hour days, seven days a week, for the first two weeks of the eruption,
and eased up only marginally in subsequent weeks. A corollary issue is how
to integrate relief personnel from outside the region into the management of
the disaster.
10) An obvious lesson from the ash damage in Rabaul town area is that future
construction guidelines must require that buildings have adequately supported
and steeply-pitched rooves, so that ash will not accumulate. The survival of
the Coivil Aviation building at Rabaul airport is a case in point.
11) A related lesson is that once ash accumulates on a roof, and once it is safe to re­
enter the area, the ash should be removed as quickly as possible. There were
instances in Rabaul where rooves remained secure through the initial heavy
ash falls but collapsed some weeks later. The corrosive effect of acid solutions
in wet ash also is a consideration.
12) Relief supplies. There may have been problems in identifying what relief supplies
were needed, in communicating these needs, and in developing and
coordinating requests to national and international agencies for assistance. Aid
agencies were left standing in the wings, waiting to be invited to contribute.
The issue needs to be addressed in the plan, and procedures established at
both provincial and national level (NDES, DFP, OIDA). The cooperation and
rapid response of both Department of Finance and Planning and Office of
International Development Assistance is essential.
The special role of the UNDP (on behalf of UNDHA), and of Australia and
New Zealand, as the aid donor countries that are nearest and can respond
most quickly, perhaps should be recognised by involving their representatives
in the development of logistic aspects of emergency plans.
13) There may have been problems in communication between PDC, the Operation
Unity Headquarters in Port Moresby, and NDES. For example, members of
PDC have suggested that the Controller of the Emergency should have been
based in the disaster area rather than in Port Moresby. Means of improving
communication and cooperation could be considered in any revision of the
plan.
Similarly, the roles of and interactions between the National Disaster
Committee, NDES and special operations units (such as Operation Unity
headquarters) at the time of an emergency perhaps need to be discussed and
defined.
14) There were problems in rapidly establishing the whereabouts of displaced people.
The revised disaster plan should spell out procedures for taking a census of
the occupants of care centres. One option that was mooted before the eruption
was to issue the population with Identity Cards. This would have done much
to reduce confusion and wastage in the Care Centres.
15) The post-disaster phase of disaster management has two parts:
a) coping with the effects of the disaster and
b) planning for rehabilitation and recovery.
The existing disaster plan did not address the second stage, nor was it
intended to. This is properly a topic for a second and separate planning
document. Such a document should be a part of any future disaster planning.
Based on models from other countries, it has been suggested that the position
of Recovery Coordinator or Recovery Controller should be separated from that
of Disaster Controller. This may or may not be practicable in a nation that has
a relatively small pool of suitably qualified manpower.
16) Composition of the Provincial Disaster Committee and involvement in rehearsals.
Some of those interviewed in Rabaul were concerned at the low level of
involvement of the missions and private sector in the development and
implementation of the provincial disaster plan, and in disaster rehearsals. Any
revision of the plan should consider this issue.
For example, the Catholic Mission has considerable resources of infrastructure,
supplies, personnel and expertise in the Rabaul-Kokopo area, and was able to
contribute significantly to the alleviation of distress, especially in the first days
of the eruption when alternative support schemes were not in place.
Another comment about the composition of the Provincial Disaster Committee
was that the Health and Education sectors should have been more directly
involved in planning and rehearsals.
17) There is a need to define in the Disaster Plan the roles and functions of the key
NGOs, such as Salvation Army and Red Cross, so as to avoid conflict or
misunderstandings between NGOs once the disaster develops.
18) There is a need to maintain public awareness even at times when there is no
indication of impending danger. A number of residents were of the opinion
that public awareness of emergency procedures in Rabaul had fallen off in the
years since the the 1983-85 emergency. Public noticeboards were no longer
maintained, and notices of emergency procedures that were once widely
distributed in homes and public buildings, were no longer to be seen. NonGazelle staff of business houses and government departments who were
transferred to Rabaul should have received instruction on volcano emergency
procedures as part of their induction into Rabaul. Generally this was not done.
19) In similar vein, there is a need to ensure that disaster rehearsals are effective
and that all key groups, including NDES, are committed and involved. This
may require the designation of a safety officer or group of officers whose
reponsibility is to ensure that public awareness and involvement in disaster
rehearsals are maintained at an adequate level.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This account of the Rabaul eruption was constructed from discussions and interviews
with many people, either in the course of our working together during the eruption
aftermath, or subsequently on fact-finding visits sponsored by the UNDP.
I am indebted to those who were at the forefront of the action during and after the
eruption, particularly the Chairman and members of the Provincial Disaster
Committee, the Principal Volcanologist and staff of the Rabaul Volcanological
Observatory, and those in the public service, disciplined forces, private sector, NGOs
and missions who worked to attend to the disadvantaged and to re-establish
normalcy after the eruption. It was a privilege to meet and work with you.
I thank the Director and staff, National Disaster and Emergency Services, the Resident
Representative of the UNDP in Port Moresby and his staff, the Minister Counsellor
AusAID in Port Moresby and his staff and the management of the University of
Papua New Guinea for support, and for providing the opportunity and stimulus for
this report to be prepared.
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