CHAPTER VI
ABHIDHA INVOLVED IN A
PROPOSITION
ABH1HITANVYAVADA AND ANVITABHIDHANAVADA
The n a tu re o f Abhidha b e i n g a s c e r t a i n e d , w e are c o n ­
f r o n t e d w ith a n o t h e r p e r t i n e n t q u e s t i o n as t o w h eth er t h i s
p rim a ry s i g n i f i c a t i v e p o t e n c y o f a word i s c o m p e te n t enough
to
b r i n g t h e meaning o f t h e s e n t e n c e i n t o l i g h t .
i n o t h e r w o r d s , th e q u e s t i o n i s ,
how a s e n t e n c e ,
n o t h in g b u t a c l u s t e r o f w o r d s , i s com p eten t t o
u n i t e d m eaning.
T h is v e r y p ro b le m i n f a c t ,
is
Ur t o put
which
is
con v ey th e
the problem
o f r e l a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l w ords and th e s e n t e n c e they c o n s ­
titu te .
Dr. K.K. R aja r e f e r s t o two a n c i e n t a u t h o r i t i e s ,
v i z . V ajapyayana and V yadi,w ho have e x p l a i n e d t h e problem
from two d i f f e r e n t a n g l e s . V ajap y a ya n a who u n d e r s t a n d s t h e
im p a rt o f a word a s J a t i o r U n i v e r s a l , m a in t a in s
' t h a t th e
im p o r t o f a s e n t e n c e i s Samsarga o r mutual a s s o c i a t i o n
t h e w o r d - m e a n i n g s '.
’ gauh s u k la h '
(The cow i s w h i t e ) ,
t h e two i d e a s , v i z .
1.
Thus he m a in t a i n s t h a t
of
th e sentence
conveys th e a s s o c i a t i o n oi
Gotva ( c o w n e s s ) and J3uklatve( w h it e n e s s ) .
j a t i v l d i n o v a ja p y a y a n a s y a mate tu sam sargo v e k y a rth a h .
H e l a r a j a o n V P,111, J a tisem u d d es'a , V.5
V ide ITM, p . 191
391
Thus in a sentence, words l o g ic a l l y connected with one
another form a syntactic unity.
ready to accept t h is view.
Vyadi, however,i s not
He asserts that the func­
tio n of a word in a sentence i s to distinguish the
object i t r e fe r s to from a l l other sim ilar o b j e c t s . Thus
Vyadi advocates the theory of Bheda (e x c lu sio n )
! or
explanation of the re la t io n between words and the
tence constituted by them.
According to Kaiyata,
however, these two th e o rie s 'a re not contradictory,
are mutually dependent.
sen­
but
A compromise between Bheda and
Samsarga i s best revealed in P a n in i's concept of
Simarthya (which i s said to be the r e q u is it e o f words to
form a compound) as understood
^
3
r e fe r r e d to by P a t a n j a li .
by some scholars and as
These concepts of Bheda and
Samsarga are found to be best u t i l i s e d by the subs^uu-nc
thinkers pertaining Mlmamsa, JNjyaya and Vyakarma, as f a r
as th eir theories of
verbal comprehension are concerned.
The Mimamsakas of both Bhatta and Prabhak^re
schools came to be occupied very much with t h is problem
concerning the comprehension of a sentence-meaning,
and
as an answer to the problem, the Bhattas propounded th eir
Abhihitanvaya theory, while the Prabhakaras advocated trie
2. Vide ITM,pp.. 192-193
3 . aoara aha bhedasamsargau va samarthyamiti. MB,i.p.jh<4
392
theory of Anvitabhidhana.
sponsore
The Maiyayikas also comp
a theory which appears to be d iffe re n t
both the aforesaid Mlmarasa th eo ries.
to
from
Of the Mimamsakas,
of
the Bhnttas examine the problem from the standpoint
the in dividual words and th eir is o la t e d meanings, wniie
the Prauhakaras look into i t from the viewpoint of
sentence as a w h o l e A
section of the Naiyayikas
came to support, although in th eir own
the
also
way,the Bhr-ttas
i n th is regard.
ABHIHITAMVAYAVADA
Kumerilabhatta and his fo llo w e rs maintain that
3
the meaning of a sentence i s the sum-total of the in d i­
vidual meanings conveyed by the constituent words.Every
word in a sentence has i t s own meaning which can be
understood separately.
On hearing a sentence, we f i r s t
grasp these in dividual meanings one a ft e r another.
Afterwords we put them in proper order on the basis
the three syntactic f a c t o r s , v i z . Akariksa, Yogyata
A s a t t i,
and consequently apprehend the u n ified
of
ana
meaning
/
of the sentence as a whole.
Sabarasvamin appears to
hold t h is view when he asserts that the words in a
b. yadi vakyasya vakyarthe vyutpattis tada anvitabhidhanam. padasya padarthe vyutpattau abhihitanvaya i t i .
fW, V o l . I , p. 3o b
5. Sa.djP . 153ff,
TB, p p .91-161
393
sentence express th e ir own meanings and stop with th at,
the meanings thus understood, s ig n ify the meaning
of
the sentence
According to Kumarila & sentence does not
p ossess i t s own meaning apart from the in d ivid u al word
-meanings.
The word-meanings by them selves,
are apprehended as unrelated con cepts.
however,
They must
be
mutually re la te d so that the sentence-meaning is
comprehended.
The three sy n ta ctic fa c to r s v iz . Akanksa
e t c . form the very basis o f the r e la t io n among the word
-meanings.'7 The sentence-meaning thus produced
is
v a rio u sly known as Vakyartha, Samsarga (mutual a s s o cia ­
t io n of word-meanings) and Tstparyartha (th e purport .
I t i s actu ally not the sum-total o f the word-meanings,
but i s something more than th a t.
As Mammata
observes,
when the in d ivid u a l meanings o f words in a p ro p o sitio n
are r e la te d with one another on the basis of
s y n ta ctic
expectancy and the l ik e , there a rise s an addition al
6 . padani h i svam svam artham abhidhaya n ivrttavyaoar i n i , athedanlm padartha avagatSh santo vakyartham
gamayanti.
SB under MS, 1.1.25
7. akanksa sannidhanance yogyata c e t i ca trayam /
sambandhakaranatvena klptam nanantaras'rutih / /
TV,
p. 455
meaning which p ertain s to the p ro p o s itio n i t s e l f
and
which i s d is t in c t from the t o t a l i t y o f the word-meanings.
8
I\©w the pertin en t question a rise s as to . hat
i s the fu n ction that brings the sentence-meaning in to
lig h t.
To t h is , Kumarila and his fo llo w e rs reply that
- 9 They
the sentence-meaning i s conveyed by Laksana.
contend that the in d ivid u a l words exhaust th e ir
luna­
tio n s a fte r conveying th e ir own is o la t e d meanings.
Hence they can not be regarded as capable o f d isch arg­
in g another fu n ctio n s, i . e . that o f conveying
th eir
mutual r e la t io n in the shape of the sentence- meaning
and t h is i s because o f the dictum ' sabdabuddhikarmanam
viramya vyaparabhavah*.
Nor can i t be regarded that
the words themselves bring th is mutual r e la t io n
in to
l ig h t , because there i s the interm ediatory stage, i . e .
comprehension of the word-meanings, between the compre­
hension o f th e words and th at o f the sentence-meaning.
Hence i t i s n ecessa rily the meanings o f the in d iv ilu a l
8 . akanksa............. tatparyartho visesavapur apadartho' pi
vakyarthe sam ullasatlty abhihitanvayavadinam matam.
KP, p . 26
9 . bhottapadaisca vakyahthasya sai votra laksanik?’ tvas-
v lk a r a t.
TP, p . 155.
595
words that convey the s e n t e n c e - m e a n i n g , ^ and the fuiclion
responsible for comprehension of this sentence-meaning
-
necessarily Laksana.
•
•
11
In order to justify their proposi-
tion that the sentence-meaning is apprehended
Laksana,
•
•
through
the Bhattas refer to the preconditions of Laksana',
9
4
•
viz. incompatibility of the pi'imary meaning etc.
here.
is
12
*
present
a
According to them, the isolated words in
sen­
tence signify their primary meanings only in the form
th e genus,
‘they are absolutely incapable of
giving e x jre s s-
sentence
i o n to the relational thought'.
But a
used to convey a unified meaning.
Hence the general
is
meanings of words signify the particular meaning in
of
'mutual syntactic relation',
oi.
and this they do
al ways
the
form
through
the
secondary significative function.
The Bhattas while cherishing such a view, however,do
*
0
not deny the role of the individual words in conveying
sentence-meaning.
the
Thus Kumarila maintains that though
letters denote the meanings of
individual words only,
the
they
do not stop with that, the meanings of individual w r-u have
10. padarthaih padavijnatairvakyarthah pratipadyate
i'/,.
al so,
viriabhidheyasmeranamenvayapratipattiteh /
tattatpadarthasmrtayastesamanvay abodhika//Citsukt)l ,p .14y
11 . ata eve vakyartho laksanika iti mlmamsakah.
*
9
NRJ', |. .. c‘.>
*
also±
vakyartho laksyamano hi sarvatrniva hi nah s t i i i i i h
Kumarila quoted in IB,
12. Vide IfM, p.2lu
13. Vide 1CA1, p.216
j
.133
396
no use nt a l l .
Hence fo r ' '
bringing about the compre­
hension o f the sentence-meaning, the conveying of
the
individual meanings by words i s indispensable, ju st as
fo r the purpose of cooking, production of f ir e by
i s indispensable. 14
fu e l
.but the Naiyayikas who also advocate the theory
o f Abhihitanvaya in th eir own way, maintain that the
sentence-meaning i s only the mutual r e la tio n of tne word
-meanings, and the same i s not conveyed by
Laksana.
It
may be noted that the Abhihitanvsyavsda i s not the mono­
poly of the Bhatta Mlmamspkas only, some Naiyayikas and a
section of Vaiyakaranas also came to propund such a theoxy.
Of the Naiyayikas, Jayantabhatta c r i t i c i s e s various
th e o ries of verbal comprehension including the ones
advocated by the two schools o f Fllmamsa, and fin a lly
advances a modified form of Abhihitanveyavada which accepts
Tatparya as a separate s ig n ific a t iv e function.T his function
does not belong to an individual word, but to a l l words in
14. saksad yadyapi kurvanti padarthapratipadanam /
verixas tathapi naitasmin paryavasanti nisphele /
vakyarthamiteye tesam pravrttau narit ariyakam /
pake jvaleva kasthanam padarthapratipadanam / /
SV, V aky a , 342-343
397
common and i t remains operative t i l l the whole serttence-meaning is cognised.
Thus according to Jayenta, the
function of Abhidha brings about the cognition of in d iv i­
dual word-meanings, while Tatparyavrtti conveys the
sentence-meaning in the form of mutual re latio n among the
15
individual concepts. Thus while the Bhattas
resort to
• •
Laksana for obtaining the sentence-meanings, Jayant a
postulates the function of Tatparya for the cognition
of
the same.
As we have e a r l i e r pointed out, Visvariathe
Kaviraja r e fe r s to the Tatparyavrtti as being admitted by
the Abhihitanvayavadins.^
But as has been rightly
pointed out by Dr. R. Mukherji
17
and Dr. K.K. Raja,
I Q
this
i s exclusively the view of scholars including the Neiyayike
Jayantebhatta and the Alamkarika Abhinavagupta.
As we have
e a r lie r pointed out, among the Alemkarikas, Bhoja accepts
Tatparya fo r conveying the syntactic re la tio n of wore
meanings.
19
Like Jayanta, Bhoja also re je c ts both
15. abhidhatrmata saktih padanam svarthanisthata /
tesam titparyas'aktistu samsargavagamavadhih//
16.
17.
18.
19.
MM
Vide SDK, p.16
LCA1, p.224
ITM, p p .220-221
Vide our’ discussion om Tatparya In chapter 11
present woi'k.
i
’ f
o!
gy 1
hie
398
Abhitenvayevade
and Anvitabhidhanavada of the [•?Imemr.pk*r
and maintains that words signify the unified import of
a
proposition by their cumulative eff ect or r-amhntyaxai it?
which Jayanta attributes to the Tatparyas^kti recognised
by him.
20
—
/
According to Dr. K.K. Raja, this fatparyasakti
of Jayanta i s same as the Samsergamaryads of the
Logicians lik e G a d a d h a r a H e
also maintains
modern
that
the
Association theory or Samsargavada recognised by the
ancient. Grammarian Vajapyayana i s only a kind of Abhihita_
22
iivayavada.
The Abhihifanvaya theory advocated by the hhpttas,
however, i s strongly controverted by the Prabhakerar,
»s
according to them, the theory i s viti ate d by the serious
f a u l t of p r o l i x i t y .
Thus i t i s pointed out that tne
Bhattas' view postulates three different sign if ica tiv e
functions.
In the f i r s t place, the theory holds timi the
words have the function to signify th ei r individual
unrelated meanings.
Secondly, i t maintains that
these
meanirgs too possess a function to convey the syntactic
r e l a t i o n between them.
Thirdly, i t assumes that the words
2U. Dr. V. daghavan, SRP, Second ed., p. 21, AM, p. 371
21. c f. VUV, p . l , vide ITM, p. 221
22. il'M, p. 22.0
399
are endowed with an additional capacity to generate
cognition of the final relation judgement'
because of involvement of 'a superflous
.
the
Thus
assumption
of
these.three capacities', the Prebhakaras reject the
theory of the Bhattas and come to advocate a theory
u:
their own known as AnvitabhidKansvada keeping in view the
law of parsimony.
ANVITABHIDHANAVADAi
Prabhakara and his followers assert that too
sentence alone has the real significance.
The individi;!
words by themselves are of no use at all, they are useful
in so far as they are integral parts of a sentence.Although
the word-meanings are only concepts in their essence, they
are cognised never in isolation, but with reference to
some relation.
Thus whenever the word Ghata is uttered,
the word Asti would be dragged in through the proces~
of
Adhyah’are or importation so as to make the meaning of
the
term Ghata a related (Anvita) one, i.e. related with
the
idea of Astitva (existence) in the present instance.
ir
fact, an individual meaning is never understood apart from
its relation to other meanings in a sentence.This relation
2 3 . saktitrayam prakalpyam syat padanam arthagocere
arthpriam anvite saktis tadadhayakatvat pade
Vide NRM, p.l8
Vide also PWM, p. 179
Also Vide LCAI, p p . 218-219
//
'
400
forms an in te g r a l part of the meanings.
Thus according
t o the Prabhllkaras, words can convey the sentence­
meaning only when they are s y n ta c tic a lly re la te d (A nvi te).
Hence th is theory of th e ir s i s known as Anvitabhidhnnavada.
PrabhBkara h im self a sserts that a word can convey i t s
24
meaning only when the utterance o f a l l words i s completed.
According t o t h is theory, the r e la te d meanings of
words are cognised through Vrddhavyavehara, the v^r>
natural p rocess of learn in g a language.
O R
in this pic e s s ,
as we have noted e a r lie r , a ch ild ( i . e . the le a r n e r ; under­
stands the sig n ifica n ce of words in such sentences or ' p'am
anaya’ (Bring the cow) by observing usage and subsequent
a c t i v i t i e s of the e ld e r s .
The meaning thus apprehended i s
always understood as being connected ^Anvita) eith er
some a ction or o b je ct or something e l s e .
with
Thus from the
utterance o f the sentence ’ gam anaya’ the ch ild understands
the meaning ’ cow’ as being connected
with the action
’ brin gin g’ and the la t t e r as connected with the ’ cow'
24. c f . tasmad yatra semudayah prayuktah ta tra iv a
. padartham avagamayati.
BR, p . 258
as
padam
25. yadyapi vrddhavyavaharapurvikaiva sarva s'abdovyutprttih
vakyaireva vyavahlirah...............
V uncer VM, K.6
401
i t s o b je ct.
Thus the ch ild comes to understand, the meaning
of th e utterance ( i . e .
sentence) as a whole.
Subsequently
by a close observation of other units of expression and the
follow -up a c t iv it ie s on the part of
the delders,he car:
fin d the corresponding v a r ie t ie s of sign ifica n ce in respect
of the sentences.
Thus the meaning o f the component words
come to be ascertained by observing the in se rtio n (Avapn or
Anvaya) and extraction (Udvapa or V yatireka) of the w urds^
According to the Bhattas, the sentence-meaning
is
something more than the sum-total of the is o la te d concepts
and the same cannot
be conveyed by Abhidha whose functi on
gets exhausted a fte r conveying the in d iv id u a l concepts.
Hence the function of Laksana i s to be assumed fo r unders­
tanding the u n ified sentence-meaning which embodies the
re la tio n among the
word-meanings.
But the Prabhakarss main­
ta in that as the r e la t io n i t s e l f enters in to the c o n s t i t u t i o n
of the concepts conveyed by the in d iv id u a l terms, i t i s use­
le s s to assume the additional function. Laksana fo r comnrehension of the u n ified idea when Abhidha alone is competent to
26. c f . ib id .
27.
vyavaharesu vrddhariam vakyasravanabhavisu /
avapoddharabh.jdena padariarh s'aktinis'cayah //
Also
Vide BR, p. 254
402
bring the same in to l ig h t .
As Salikanatha. a sse rts,
the
words themselves ere endowed with the, cap acity ( i . e .
Abhidha) to convey the re la te d word-meanings as w ell
the meaning o f the sentence as a whole.
as
The Prabhakaras,
however, r e s o r t to Laksana when the expressed meaning
of
a word i s in co n siste n t with the sentence-meaning.
As we have e a r lie r seen, th is Abhidha of Prabhakaras
which i s competent to bring in to lig h t both Padartha
and
Vakyartha as w ell, i s described by Ab'hinava as dlrghadirghatara
vyap"ara.
The advocates of Dhvani theory have re.i->rred
to th is view fo r r e fu ta tio n , in th eir strong bid to
e sta b lish Vyarfjana as a separate fu n ction of words.
The Prabhakaras w hile advocating such a theory,
however, do not deny the existen ce of in d ivid u a l words
and
th e ir is o la te d meanings, what they want to emphasise i s that
i t i s not p o ssib le to understand the is o la te d meaning
word apart from i t s r e la t io n to the sen ten ce.
of
a
Thus the
words themselves s ig n ify th e ir meanings as mutually rela ted
on the basis o f the three sy n ta ctic c o n d itio n s, v ii . 4>canksa,
2 8 . prathamy'adabhidhatrtvat
catparyopaggmadapi /
padariameva sa s'aktir varamabhyupagamyotFm / /
VM, K.1 l .
403
- and Sannidhi. 29 Thus words themselves are respon­
Yogyata
sible for bringing the sentence-meaning into lig h t .
In view of the foregoing discussions, the
difference
main
maintained by the theories of Abhihitanvaya and
Anvitabhidhana may be summed up as follow s;
i ) The Abhihitanvayavada holds that the expressed
meanings of words signify the sentence-meaning through
Laksana, while the Anvit'abhidh'anavada maintains that
»
*
the
words (which are already mutually related) themselves
>■ve
the sentence-meaning through the function of Abhidha i t s e l l
Thus while according to the former view, Abhidha i s not
competent to bring in the sentence-meaning, according to
the la tter i t i s .
i i ) In Abhihitanvayavada denotation (Abhidhanp)
precedes syntactic rela tion (Anvaya), while in Anvitabhidh'ana, syntactic relation precedes denotation.
According to Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, the difference
between these two theories lie s in their conception of the
2 9 . akanksa-sannidhipraptayogyarthantarasamgatan /
svarthanahuh padanTti vyutpattih sams'rita may a
VM, p. 5
404
medium of syntactical relation.
The Prabhakaras as the
followers of Anvitabhidhana make the Padas and the
Bhattas as the followers of Abhihifanvaya, make the
Padarthas as the medium.
As
far as the relative
merits of these two theories are concerned, we
find
number of modern scholars maintaining their views
favour of the former.
Thus, to quote again Dr.
a
in
Sastri,
he finds in the Anvitabhidhanavada, the merit of satis­
fying the law of economy, inasmuch as this theory asserts
that a word denotes a related meaning.
31
Dr. K.K. Ha,;a
also maintains that the Anvitabhidhana theory seems
o
be an advance of the Abhihitanvaya theory of the bhattas.
Prof. S.C. Chat ter jee on the other hand, goes to the
extent of describing the Anvitabhidhana as the best among
the various views concerning the meaning of a sentence. v
SAMUCCAYAVADA:
Some later thinker's in India, instead of accenting
the aforesaid two extreme theories of Mlmamsakas,tried
reconcile them both.
Among the Mimamsakas themselves,
Vacaspatimis'ra appears to take a middle path between
30. PWM, p. 235
31. ibid, p. 179
32. I ™ . P* 212
3 3 . NTK, p .344
to
the
405
two Mimamsa doctrines of ve rba l comprehension.In
the
c i r c l e of Alamkarikas also, Mukula favours a reconci­
l i a t i o n of Abhihitanvayavada and AnvitaDhidhanavada.
Mukula examines the status of Laksana
not only
•
•
(rom
the viewpoints of the two Mimamsa theories,
from
but
the angles of Akhandavakyasphotavada and Samuccayavada
also.
34
In that context, he maintains that both the
Abhihitanvay a and Anvitabhidh'ana theories contain only
p a r t i a l tru th.
Because, considered from the viewpoint
of the individual words, the Abhihitanvayav'ada seems to
be p r e f e r a b l e , while looked at from the angle
of
the
sentence, the Anvitabhidhlfnavada seems to be accept? Je.
In f a c t ,
neither of these theories taken singularly can
explain the problem of ve rba l comprehension,
So fukul a
recommends a combination of the two theories and r e f e r s
—
35
to this view as Samuccayavada.
Regarding the operation
34. idanimabhihitanvayo' nvitabhidhanam, tatsamuccayah
—
/
*
_
^
*
tadubhayabhavascetyeve.m ye catvarah p ak sas ...........
AVM, p.42
35- anyesam tu mate padariam tattatsamanyabhuto v a c y o ' r thah, vakyapeksaya tu parasparanitah padartha
iti
padapeksaya abhihitanvay ah, vakyapeksaya- tu
anvitabhidhanam, evam ca etayor abhit anvayarv it ^bl■; dhlanayoh samuccaya i t i .
i b i d . , p.*r5
^06
of Abhidha and Laksana in a verbal judgement,
Mukula's
contention is this: when the emphasis is laid on the
individual words, in that event the function of Abhidha
precedes that of Laksana, but when the emphasis is laid
on the sentence, in that case operation of Laksani
precedes that of A b h i d h a . B u t it may
be
noted that
even when Laksana is said to precede Abhidha,
in
case also a prior operation of Abhidha function
that
stands
indispensable.
AKHAMDAVAKYASPHOTAVADA:
< I
9
Bhartrhari
finds none of the above theories as an
I
answer to the problem.
According to him, a
sentence is
an indivisible unit of language and its meaning
an
instantaneous ’flash of insight’
intuition, which is partless.
is also
(Pratibha),^
or
The division of a sentence
into words and of words into various parts like roots and
suffixes made by the Grammarians is only
easy study of the language.
to
facilitate
In fact, these divisions are
3 6 ........ samuccaye tu purvoditanyayadvitayasamkalanaya
padapeksaya vacyatvottarakalabhavini
laksana
bhavati, (vakyapeksaya ca) vakyarthottarakalam tasyah
(vacyatvit) purvam avasthanam.
37.
ibid,, p.47
sphotatmake vakye pratibhalaksane vakyarthe........
Punyaraja on VP, II.2
4u 7
not found in a sentence, inasmuch as we are concerned with
the tota l utterance which alone is useful.
Thus
although
Bhartrhari c la s s ifie s Sphota into three types, v iz .
Varnasphota, Padasphota and Vakyasphota, he considers
Vakyasphota alone as the real unit of speech.
The
the
other
divisions o f Sphota are real in so far as they are
conducive to the building up a higher unit o f sp e e ch ,i.e .,
the Vakya-sphota.
According to Bhartrhari,the meaning of a sentence
is not understood stage by stage on the basis o f word
-meanings, but is comprehended instantaneously in the form
of Pratibha which is partless.
This Pratibha
in d iv isib le but is inexplicable a lso.
is not only
Bhartrhari
id e n tifie s this Pratibha with the in stin ctive
urge
in
animals which prompts them to a ct. Thus he says that i t is
this urge that teaches the cuckoo to sing
the birds to build their nests.
38
in
spring
and
The meaning of a
sentence belongs to this kind of urge.
It is
because
of
repeated usage that a sentence can generate such an urge in
the mind o f the lis t e n e r .^
Thus according to Bhartrhari, words are
nor do they denote
any external ob jects.
not real,
The purpose
3 8 . VP, II, 151-152
3 9 . abhyasat pratibhahetuh s'abdah
sarvo'paraih smrtan /
i b i d .,
I I . 119
of
408
language consists in producing an urge for some
action
and this function can be discharged by the sentence when
taken in its totality.
Now it may be noted that the Sphota in all
its
forms is generally referred to as Vacaka or- Abhidhpyaka
by the Grammarians.^
Hence when a sentence is coi ceived
as Akhanda
Vakyasphota, it must involve the function
• •
of
*
Abhidha.
Bhartrhari while advocating such a view, rejects
the Mlmamsakas1 theories of Abhihitanvaya end Anitabhidhana in both of which only the meanings of words are said
to have an absolute reality.
The Mim’amsakas and
oth^r
schools of thought have, however, subjected the th eory of
Bhartrhari to severe criticism.
But in the context of
a
true and unbiased perusal of the whole language-situation,
Bhartrhari's sphota theory and for that matter, his Akhandavakyasphota theory of verbal comprehension has
great
significance and as such it can not be dispensed witn.
40. c f .
ITM, p. 139
409
CONCLUDING REMARKS:
From a ca re fu l examination o f the nature end con­
cept of Abhidha fu n ction , we can s a fe ly a sse rt that o f a ll
verbal fu n ctio n s, Abhidha stands out as the forem ost
one
and as such, i t s scope i s much more wider then that of
the other fu n ction s.
T his p ro p o sitio n i s warranted
by
the fo llow in g few fa c t s ;
(1 ) In the context of a verbal judgement,we f i r s t
take recou rse to Abhidha f o r the understanding
in d iv id u a l word-meanings in volved .
of
Laksana and
thr
yynnja.ria
are assumed only when the meaning brought by AbhidhTT
becomes incom patible or th e same demands an additional
meaning in the con text.
Sabarasvamin maintains repeatedly
th a t Laksana
should be resorted to only when the
•
•
d ir e ct
meaning i s c le a r ly incom patible in the c o n t e x t .^
lie is
stron gly of the opinion that whenever there arises a con­
f l i c t between the d ir e c t statement and the secondary mean­
in g , p referen ce should be given to the form er,
in i a c t , i n
the domain of Grammar and philosophy a ls o , i t i s th
expressed meaning that we usually understand.
(2 ) In our p r a c t ic a l l i f e a ls o , we are mostly
concerned with the meaning conveyed by Abhidha".
denet r l i y
we do not want any ambiguity in meaning in our no cirr i
con versation or communication with our fe llo w -b e in g s .
41. Vide SB under MS, 1 .4 .2 ; SB under MS, V i. 1.51
410
During our various business hours o f d a ily l i f e , only
the
expressed meaning comes to be u sefu l and so we often
con su lt a le x ic o n or Grammar in order to understand
meaning.
Thus there i s le s s scope of Laksana or Vyanjeni•
h ere.
th is
♦
Asadharebhatta c a te g o r ic a lly sta te s that while
the
laymen understand a meaning through Abhidha, the in t e llig e n t
ones apprehend the meaning through Laksana and the
_
connoiseurs do the same through Vyenjana.
(3 )
L lO
The scope of Abhidha ih comparison to that o f
Laksana i s much more w ider. Each and every word coming
to
the p rocess o f our verbal comprehension s ig n ifie s i t s normal
primary meaning through Abhidha fu n c tio n .
has a very lim ited scope.
In ta c t,
LaKsana
In th is con tex t, certa in obser­
v a tion s of Dr. Raja deserve to be noted.
we hear a word i t i s only the
He s a y s ,’ whenever
well-known primary meaning
th at we recogn ise immediately. ^
Then we fin d that i t i s
not compatible with the context and so we know that the word
has been used fig u r a tiv e ly on the b a sis of the s im ila ri ty
between the primary and the actual r e f e r e n t s .'
42. saktim bhajanti sarala laksanam catura norah /
vyanjariam narmamarmajnah kavayah kamano ja.nah /
Trivenika, p . 33
Also Vide Asadharabhatta, p . 56
43. Purvanubhuta evarthah smaryete prathamem padrt.
TV, p. 358
411
(4) Anandavardhana with whom Dhvani occupier the
foremost position in Kavya, does not deny the presence of
the Vacya sense c-ven when the suggested meaning is revea­
led.
Thus he explains the relationship between the
expressed sense and the suggested content.with the analogy
of a jar being revealed by the lamp (i.e. ghatapradlpanyaya).
The lamp which illumines
other
objects shines itself. So
also the denoted meaning makes itself known while revealing
ZiZi
the suggested idea.
The final aim of a poet,undoubtedly
is to convey the suggested meaning.
But this he does
by
conveying the denoted meaning first, and it is the denutative word that he primarily uses.
45
(5) The Dhvani theorists in general and Anrndrvcrdhana in particular recognise Vyanjana as a separate
function of word as prompted by the argument that 'it is n. t
possible to
discard the usefulness of detailed definitions
of particulars simply because general definitions are
already there.
ZjA
This argument is perhaps sufficient
to
44. na hi vyarigye pratlyamane vacyabuddhirduribheveti . .
ghatapradlpanyayastayoh .
DL,111, p. 4^0
45. ibid, I. p. 108
46. na hi samanyamatralaksanenopyogivisesalaksananam
pratiksepah sakyah kartum.
DL, p.
412
warrant the general contention of the linguists,philoso­
phers and the poeticians that Abhidha cannot be th
sole
function of words and that other functions like Lekserfe,
Vyanjana and fatparya are to be recognised on the
same
par with Abhidha for a proper appreciation of Indian
epistemology end a better understanding of Poetry.
But
at all events, Abhidha stands admitted as the f o r e m o s t o f
these functions.