07 Clan Labs and Precursors - Australian Criminal Intelligence

CLANDESTINE
LABORATORIES AND
PRECURSORS
CLAN LABS &
PRECURSORS
CLANDESTINE
LABORATORIES AND
PRECURSORS
KEY POINTS
ƒƒ The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally has continued to decrease since
2011–12, with 667 detections in 2014–15.
ƒƒ The majority of clandestine laboratories continue to be detected in residential areas, with
increased detections in public places, rural and commercial/industrial locations in 2014–15.
ƒƒ The proportion of addict-based clandestine laboratories detected in 2014–15 increased to
60.9 per cent.
ƒƒ While the number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the
Australian border decreased in 2014–15, the number and weight of MDMA precursor
detections increased.
ƒƒ The number of tablet presses detected at the Australian border increased in
2014–15, while the number of tablet presses seized nationally decreased.
OTHER DRUGS
Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
MAIN FORMS
Clandestine laboratories, commonly known as ‘clan labs’, covertly manufacture illicit drugs
and/or their precursors. These laboratories range in scale and capability from crude, makeshift
operations using simple processes to highly sophisticated operations using advanced equipment
and complex chemical techniques. Regardless of their size or level of sophistication, the corrosive
and hazardous nature of chemicals used in clandestine laboratories pose significant risks to those
operating the laboratories, properties in the vicinity and the wider community. Many of the
chemicals used are extremely volatile and residual contaminants may remain on surfaces and in
the air, soil or water supply for long periods of time (AFP 2012; AGD 2011).
Drug manufacturing carried out in clandestine laboratories may involve any or all of the following
processes.
ƒƒ Extraction—the active chemical ingredients are extracted from a chemical preparation or
plant, using a chemical solvent to produce a finished drug or a precursor chemical. Examples of
extraction include the extraction of precursor chemicals from pharmaceutical preparations,1 or
the extraction of morphine from opium.
ƒƒ Conversion—a raw or unrefined drug product is changed into a more sought after product
by altering the chemical form. Examples include converting cocaine base into cocaine
hydrochloride or methylamphetamine base into crystalline methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
ƒƒ Synthesis—raw materials are combined and reacted under specific conditions to create the
finished product through chemical reactions. Synthetic drugs such as methylamphetamine,
3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) are
created through this process.
ƒƒ Tableting—the final product is converted into dosage units. An example is pressing MDMA
powder into tablets.
There are three types of substances used in illicit drug manufacture.
ƒƒ Precursors—considered the starting materials for illicit drug manufacture. Through chemical
reactions, the precursor’s molecular structure is modified to produce a specific illicit drug. For
example, precursors such as ephedrine (Eph) and pseudoephedrine (PSE) are converted to
methylamphetamine.
➐
ƒƒ Reagents—substances used to cause a chemical reaction that modify the precursor’s molecular
structure. For example, when hydriodic acid and red phosphorous are mixed with the
precursors Eph or PSE, the resulting compound is methylamphetamine.
ƒƒ Solvents—added to the chemical mixture to ensure effective mixing by dissolving precursors
and reagents, diluting the reaction mixtures, and separating and purifying other chemicals.
For example, acetone and hydrochloric acid are used in LSD production (INCB 2014).
1
Such as pseudoephedrine from cold and flu products.
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Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Globally, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are the most common illicit drugs manufactured
in clandestine laboratories. In Australia, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are the most common
precursors used in the manufacture of methylamphetamine, with safrole, isosafrole and piperonal
the principal precursors used in the manufacture of MDMA. However, new methods using a
wide range of precursors and pre-precursors are constantly being developed in response to law
enforcement attention and the reduced availability of required chemicals. As many chemicals have
legitimate industrial application, an ongoing challenge for government and law enforcement exists
in preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals to the illicit market, whilst maintaining access
to these chemicals by legitimate industry (UNODC 2014).
In 2007, the Australian Government funded the national rollout of Project STOP, an initiative
aimed at reducing the diversion of pharmaceutical products containing pseudoephedrine to the
illicit drug manufacturing market. As of 30 June 2015, 75.4 per cent of approved community
pharmacies were registered with Project STOP, a decrease from 79.3 per cent at 30 June 2014.
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988 Convention)2 aims to prevent the diversion of chemicals from licit market for use
in the manufacture of illicit drugs. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) established the
Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS) in 2012 to monitor non-scheduled chemicals
and to prevent the diversion of those substances into the illicit drug market. As a real-time online
communication tool, PICS shares intelligence and facilitates direct contact between national
authorities to launch bilateral and regional investigations into chemical trafficking. The system
includes non-scheduled chemicals such as pre-precursors, products containing the controlled
precursors, derivatives and the illicit manufacture of new drugs (BINLEA 2015; INCB 2015).
➐
While many countries manufacture and trade in chemicals, the scale and range of chemicals vary.
China and India remain significant global licit producers and exporters of precursor chemicals.
There are approximately 400 000 precursor chemical suppliers and distributors in China, with
locally produced precursor chemicals exported for industrial production and diverted for the illicit
production of drugs in other countries. In Mexico and Central America, most of the precursor
chemicals seized related to the production of methylamphetamine was sourced from China. In
2013, India was the largest global exporter of pseudoephedrine and the second largest exporter of
ephedrine (BINLEA 2015).
Methylamphetamine production continues to increase worldwide. Precursor chemicals used in
methylamphetamine production include pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and P2P. As these precursors
become more difficult to obtain, the use of non-controlled pre-precursor chemicals—such as alphaphenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)—has increased. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) reported that more than 48 000 kilograms of APAAN was seized in 2013
under national legislation, which had the potential to produce over 22 tonnes of amphetamine or
methylamphetamine (BINLEA 2015; EMCDDA 2015).
2
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The 1988 Convention sets out specific measures for the manufacture, distribution and international trade of a number of chemicals
frequently used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. These are listed under two categories: Table I lists the more strictly controlled
substances and Table II lists the relatively less controlled substances.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
Major seizures of MDMA precursors indicate the return of large-scale ecstasy production in the
European Union. In 2013, 5 061 kilograms of PMK (3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone) and
13 837 litres of safrole were seized, which together would be capable of producing an estimated
170 million MDMA tablets. In 2015, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
reported recent large seizures of MDMA chemical precursors in East and South-East Asia and
Oceania (BINLEA 2015; UNODC 2015).
The INCB has estimated that diversion of less than one percent of worldwide licit commercial
use of potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride is required to produce the world’s supply
of cocaine and heroin. Argentinean-produced precursors are reported to have been diverted for
the processing of coca leaf and cocaine from Argentina’s chemical industry. In 2013, Colombian
authorities destroyed 2 128 laboratories used to extract coca paste or cocaine base, as well as
208 cocaine hydrochloride laboratories (BINLEA 2015).3
According to the 2015 World Drug Report, 58 countries and territories reported the emergence of
hundreds of products containing different synthetic cannabinoids to the UNODC advisory. Their
clandestine manufacture and the serious risk they pose to public health and society challenge
drug controls of the international community (UNODC 2015).
DOMESTIC TRENDS
AUSTRALIAN BORDER SITUATION
In 2014–15, the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border
decreased 40.1 per cent, from 1 035 in 2013–14 to 620 in 2014–15. The weight of precursors
detected decreased 66.7 per cent, from 1 505.2 kilograms in 2013–14 to 500.8 kilograms in
2014–15 (see Figure 92). In this reporting period, 99 detections weighed more than 1 kilogram.
Combined, these 99 detections account for 92.9 per cent of the weight of ATS (excluding MDMA)
precursor chemicals detected in 2014–15.
FIGURE 92: Number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian
border, 2005–06 to 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection)
3
➐
Chemicals used to refine and process plant-based drugs are referred to as ‘essential’ or ‘precursor’ chemicals and can be readily
replaced by other chemicals with similar properties (BINLEA 2015).
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In 2014–15, the number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border increased
325.0 per cent, from 4 in 2013–14 to a record 17 in 2014–15. The weight of precursors
detected increased significantly, from 1.24 kilograms in 2013–14 to 288.0 kilograms in 2014–15
(see Figure 93).
FIGURE 93: Number and weight/litresa of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border,
2005–06 to 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection)
a. Significant detections of MDMA precursors occur in both litres and kilograms. As this figure reflects two units of measurement, it is
necessary to refer to ‘Significant Border Detections’ for individual reporting periods to determine the related unit of measurement.
SIGNIFICANT BORDER DETECTIONS
Significant border detections of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors in 2014–15 include:
ƒƒ 50.0 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected on 18 August 2014, concealed among cartons,
via sea cargo from Thailand to Sydney
➐
ƒƒ 20.5 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected on 10 August 2014, impregnated within tea,
via air cargo from Iran to Sydney
ƒƒ 20.0 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 10 October 2014, concealed in power adaptors,
via air cargo from Hong Kong to Sydney
ƒƒ 12.0 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 18 February 2015, built into packaging for goods,
via air cargo from China to Sydney
ƒƒ 10.8 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 28 April 2015, concealed within foam inserts,
via air cargo from Singapore to Sydney.
These 5 detections have a combined weight of 113.3 kilograms and account for 22.6 per cent of the
total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected at the Australian border in 2014–15.
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Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
Significant border detections of MDMA precursors in 2014–15 include:
ƒƒ 150.0 kilograms of safrole detected on 22 August 2015, concealed within essential oil,
via air cargo from China to Sydney
ƒƒ 60.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 4 May 2015, via air cargo from China to Sydney
ƒƒ 50.0 kilograms of safrole detected on 21 September 2014, concealed within a metal drum,
via air cargo from China to Sydney
ƒƒ 8.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 12 September 2014, concealed within a plastic bottle,
via air cargo from China to Sydney
ƒƒ 7.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 11 December 2014, concealed within plastic bottles,
via air cargo from an unknown country of embarkation to Sydney.
These 5 detections have a combined weight of 275.0 kilograms and account for 95.5 per cent of
the total weight of MDMA precursors detected at the Australian border in 2014–15.
IMPORTATION METHODS
In 2014–15, international mail (49.8 per cent) was the prominent importation stream, by number,
for ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor importations detected at the Australian border, followed by air
passenger/crew (23.7 per cent). In terms of weight, air cargo was the prominent importation stream
(62.0 per cent) in 2014–15, followed by international mail (17.1 per cent; see Figures 94 and 95).
FIGURE 94: Number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, as
a proportion of total detections, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of
Immigration and Border Protection)
➐
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
FIGURE 95: Weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border,
as a proportion of total weight, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of
Immigration and Border Protection)
In 2014–15, air cargo accounted for 58.8 per cent of the number of MDMA precursor detections
at the Australian border, followed by air passenger/crew (35.3 per cent). By weight, air cargo was
the predominant importation stream for MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border this
reporting period (see Figures 96 and 97).
FIGURE 96: Number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of
total detections, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and
Border Protection)
➐
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Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
FIGURE 97: Weight of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion
of total weight, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and
Border Protection)
EMBARKATION POINTS
A total of 47 embarkation points for ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian
border were identified in 2014–15, an increase from 43 in 2013–14. The prominent embarkation
point this reporting period was China (including Hong Kong), which accounted for 12.4 per cent of
the number and 40.6 per cent of the weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected.
China (including Hong Kong) was the prominent embarkation point for MDMA precursors detected
at the Australian border in 2014–15. Other key embarkation points this reporting period include
Indonesia, Argentina and Singapore.
TABLET PRESS DETECTIONS
The number of tablet press detections at the Australian border increased 70.0 per cent this
reporting period, from 20 in 2013–14 to 34 in 2014–15. Air cargo and sea cargo accounted for
14 detections each, with 6 detections occurring in the international mail stream (see Figure 98).
Embarkation points for tablet press detections in 2014–15 include China, the United States,
Malaysia, Canada and the United Kingdom.
➐
FIGURE 98: Number of tablet press detections at the Australian border, 2014–15
(Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection)
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Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
DOMESTIC MARKET INDICATORS
The number of clandestine laboratory detections is not indicative of production output, which
is calculated using a number of variables including size of reaction vessels, amount and type
of precursor chemicals used, the skill of people involved and the method of manufacture.
Regardless of their size, the residual contamination arising from illicit drug manufacture presents
a serious risk to humans and the environment. In 2011, the Australian Government launched the
Clandestine Drug Laboratory Remediation Guidelines, in recognition of the hazardous nature of
clandestine laboratories (AGD 2011).
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY DETECTIONS
Following increases in the number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally between
2007–08 and 2011–12, the number detected nationally has continued to decrease, from 744 in
2013–14 to 667 in 2014–15, the lowest number reported since 2008–09 (see Figure 99).
FIGURE 99: National clandestine laboratory detections, 2005–06 to 2014–15
➐
Queensland continues to account for the highest proportion of national clandestine laboratory
detections, accounting for 35.4 per cent in 2014–15. Queensland, South Australia, Western
Australia and the Northern Territory reported decreases in the number of clandestine laboratory
detections this reporting period, with the number of detections in Tasmania remaining stable.
New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory reported increases in the number
of clandestine laboratories detected this reporting period. The 161 clandestine laboratory
detections in Victoria in 2014–15 is the highest number reported for the state in the last decade,
with the 99 detections reported in New South Wales in 2014–15 the second highest number of
detections reported for the state in the last decade (see Table 38).
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Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
TABLE 38: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by state and territory, 2005–06 to 2014–15
Year
NSW
Vic
Qld
SA
WA
Tas
NT
ACT
Total
2005–06
55
47
161
50
58
5
12
2
390
2006–07
49
72
132
51
37
9
1
5
356
2007–08
51
76
121
69
30
2
1
6
356
2008–09
67
84
148
65
78
0
7
0
449
2009–10
82
113
297
71
118
1
12
0
694
2010–11
87
63
293
75
171
11
2
1
703
2011–12
90
99
379
58
160
15
7
1
809
2012–13
105
113
330
56
136
9
8
0
757
2013–14
98
114
340
80
96
5
11
0
744
2014–15
99
161
236
71
84
5
10
1
667
SIZE AND PRODUCTION CAPACITY
There is currently no recognised standard, either in Australia or internationally, for measuring the
size or production capacity of clandestine laboratories. State and territory police services were asked
to provide an indication of size and production capacity of detected laboratories, using categories
provided by the UNODC. Full definitions for the four categories—addict-based, other small-scale,
medium sized and industrial scale—are provided in the Statistics chapter of this report. 4
In 2014–15, clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based laboratories
using basic equipment and simple procedures, manufacturing less than 50 grams per production
cycle, through to industrial scale laboratories, equipped with purchased or custom-made industrial
tools and which typically manufacture 50 kilograms or more per production cycle. During this
reporting period, for those able to be categorised, the majority of detected clandestine laboratories
were addict-based laboratories, the proportion of which increased from 51.6 per cent in 2013–14 to
60.9 per cent in 2014–15. The proportion of medium sized laboratories remained relatively stable at
12.9 per cent and the proportion of laboratories attributed to other small-scale and industrial scale
laboratories decreased (from 26.0 and 10.1 per cent respectively; see Figure 100).
FIGURE 100: Category of detected clandestine laboratories, by size and production capacity, 2014–15
4
➐
This is the fourth time jurisdictions have provided an indication of the size and production capacity of detected laboratories.
Figures were not available for all clandestine laboratories detected.
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DRUG TYPES AND METHODS OF PRODUCTION
Of those able to be identified, clandestine laboratories manufacturing ATS (excluding MDMA)
continue to represent the majority of detections by drug production type in Australia, although the
proportion decreased from 78.9 per cent in 2013–14 to 57.1 per cent in 2014–15 (see Table 39).
Methylamphetamine remains the main drug produced in laboratories detected nationally.
TABLE 39: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by drug production type and state and
territory, 2014–15
ATS
State/
(excluding
Territory
MDMA)
Cannabis
Homebake
oil
PSE a
MDMA
heroin extraction extraction
GHB/
GBL
Otherb Unknownc
Totald
NSW
75
10
0
0
0
1
11
1
98
Vic
92
4
1
2
0
5
5
49
158
Qld
103
2
1
0
0
3
17
112
238
SA
37
0
1
4
1
3
7
24
77
WA
66
0
11
4
0
0
6
2
89
Tas
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
NT
8
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
10
ACT
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
386
18
14
10
1
12
46
189
676
Total
a.Pseudoephedrine.
b. ‘Other’ refers to the detection of other illicit manufacture.
c. ‘Unknown’ includes seized substances which were unable to be identified or are awaiting analysis.
d. Total may exceed the number of clandestine laboratory detections due to multiple drug production types being identified in a
single laboratory.
➐
The number of national ATS (excluding MDMA) laboratory detections decreased by 36.5 per cent
this reporting period, from 608 in 2013–14 to 386 in 2014–15. Since 2000–01, Queensland has
accounted for the greatest proportion of national ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory
detections, accounting for 26.7 per cent in 2014–15, a decrease from 44.4 per cent in 2013–14.
Although the number of MDMA laboratories detected nationally remains low, there was a
sixfold increase in detections this reporting period, from 3 in 2013–14 to 18 in 2014–15. These
laboratories were detected in New South Wales (10), Victoria (4), Queensland (2), the Northern
Territory (1) and the Australian Capital Territory (1).
The number of national homebake heroin laboratory detections almost tripled this reporting
period, from 5 in 2013–14 to 14 in 2014–15. This reporting period there were detections in
Western Australia (11), Victoria (1), Queensland (1) and South Australia (1).
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Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
While cannabis oil extraction laboratories continue to be detected in Australia, numbers remain
low. The number of cannabis oil extraction laboratories detected in Australia increased this
reporting period, from 7 in 2013–14 to 10 in 2014–15. South Australia and Western Australia each
reported 4 detections, with 2 reported in Victoria. The 10 laboratories detected in 2014–15 is the
highest number on record since related reporting began in 2007–08.
During this reporting period, 12 clandestine laboratories manufacturing gamma-hydroxybutyrate/
gamma-butyrolactone (GHB/GBL) were detected nationally, an increase from 11 laboratories
in 2013–14. This reporting period laboratories were detected in Victoria (5), Queensland (3),
South Australia (3) and New South Wales (1). The number of clandestine laboratories detected
nationally extracting pseudoephedrine continued to decrease this reporting period, from 6 in
2013–14 to 1 in 2014–15.
Clandestine laboratories detected in Australia also manufacture a range of ‘other’ illicit
drugs, precursors and pre-precursors. In 2014–15, these included dimethyltryptamine (DMT),
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), methcathinone, P2P and MDP2P.
Despite a decrease this reporting period in the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) laboratories
identified nationally using the hypophosphorous method of production—from 284 in 2013–14
to 225 in 2014–15—it remains the predominant method of production. This is followed by the
Nazi/Birch method, with the number of related laboratories also decreasing this reporting period,
from 95 in 2013–14 to 68 in 2014–15. Consistent with the previous reporting period, Queensland
(31.6 per cent) accounted for the greatest proportion of national hypophosphorous laboratories,
while Western Australia accounted for the greatest proportion of Nazi/Birch (85.3 per cent).
National detections of laboratories using red phosphorous decreased this reporting period, from
32 in 2013–14 to 29 in 2014–15. The number of clandestine laboratories identified nationally
using the P2P method of production also decreased, from 20 in 2013–14 to 12 in 2014–15
(see Table 40).
TABLE 40: Method of ATS (excluding MDMA) production in clandestine laboratory detections,
by state and territory, 2014–15
Nazi/Birch
Phenyl-2Propanone
(P2P)
Othera
Totalb
3
1
4
1
74
56
7
3
5
3
74
Qld
71
6
0
3
0
80
SA
25
3
2
0
1
31
WA
5
4
58
0
0
67
Tas
3
1
1
0
0
5
NT
0
5
3
0
1
9
ACT
0
0
0
0
0
0
225
29
68
12
6
340
State/
Territory
Hypophosphorous
Redphosphorus
NSW
65
Vic
Total
➐
a. ‘Other’ includes the detection of other ATS (excluding MDMA) production methodologies.
b. Total may not equal the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory detections as the method of production may not
be identified or the detection is awaiting analysis.
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SIGNIFICANT PRECURSOR SEIZURES
The following provides a national snapshot of the identification and/or seizure of some significant
quantities of precursors/reagents this reporting period:
ƒƒ 160 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in New South Wales
ƒƒ 81 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in New South Wales
ƒƒ 40 kilograms of iodine in New South Wales
ƒƒ 38 litres of 1,4 Butanediol in Western Australia
ƒƒ 20 litres of hypophosphorous acid in New South Wales
ƒƒ 19 litres of helional in the Northern Territory
ƒƒ 10 kilograms of ephedrine in New South Wales
ƒƒ 2.25 litres of anethole in South Australia.
LOCATION AND CATEGORY
While residential areas remain the primary location for clandestine laboratory detections in
Australia, detections in public places, rural and commercial/industrial locations increased this
reporting period. The proportion of clandestine laboratory detections in residential
areas remained relatively stable at 68.4 per cent in 2014–15. This was followed by detections in
vehicles (9.9 per cent, a decrease from 12.2 per cent in 2013–14), public places (6.8 per cent, an
increase from 3.9 per cent in 2013–14), rural areas (6.0 per cent, an increase from 3.5 per cent in
2013–14), commercial/industrial areas (4.2 per cent, an increase from 3.0 per cent in 2013–14 and
other (4.7 per cent, a decrease from 9.6 per cent; see Figure 101).
FIGURE 101: Location of clandestine laboratory detections, 2014–15
➐
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Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15
Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors
There are four distinct categories of clandestine laboratories:
ƒƒ Category A—active (chemicals and equipment in use)
ƒƒ Category B—stored/used (equipment or chemicals)5
ƒƒ Category C—stored/unused (equipment or chemicals)
ƒƒ Category D—historical site.
Consistent with previous reporting periods, Category C (stored/unused) remains the most
common category for clandestine laboratories detected nationally, accounting for 51.6 per cent of
detected laboratories in 2014–15, a decrease from 55.6 per cent in 2013–14. This was followed by
Category B (stored/used), accounting for 25.7 per cent of detected laboratories. The proportion of
Category A (active sites) increased from 8.3 per cent in 2013–14 to 11.5 per cent in 2014–15. The
proportion of Category D (historical sites) remained relatively stable at 11.2 per cent in 2014–15
(see Figure 102).
FIGURE 102: Category of detected clandestine laboratories, 2014–15
NATIONAL TABLET PRESS SEIZURES
➐
There were 3 tablet presses6 seized nationally in 2014–15, compared with 7 in 2013–14 and 19
in 2012–13. The 3 seizures in 2014–15 is the lowest number reported since 2008–09. Seizures
this reporting period occurred in the Northern Territory (2) and South Australia (1). In addition to
tablet press seizures, South Australia reported the seizure of 2 encapsulators in 2014–15.
NATIONAL IMPACT
In 2014–15, the number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected at the
Australian border decreased, while the number and weight of MDMA precursor detections
increased. The number of tablet press detections at the Australian border increased this reporting
period, while the number of tablet presses seized nationally further decreased.
5
6
Laboratories which are fully assembled but not active at the time of detection.
Simple presses only.
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The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally this reporting period continued to
decrease, with the 667 laboratory detections in 2014–15 the lowest number reported since
2008–09. The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally producing MDMA,
homebake heroin, GHB/GBL and undertaking cannabis oil extraction increased this reporting
period, while those producing ATS (excluding MDMA) decreased. Despite a decrease in the
number of hypophosphorous laboratories detected this reporting period, it remains the primary
production method identified in detected laboratories in 2014–15. While Nazi/Birch continues
to be the second most common method of production, the proportion of laboratories using this
method also decreased in 2014–15.
In 2014–15, clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based through
to industrial scale laboratories. The proportion of small-scale and industrial scale laboratories
decreased this reporting period, while the proportion of medium sized laboratories remained
relatively stable. Of the laboratories able to be categorised, 60.9 per cent were addict-based,
utilising basic equipment, simple procedures and manufacturing less than 50 grams of ATS
(excluding MDMA) per cycle. The proportion of clandestine laboratories detected in residential
areas remained relatively stable and continued to account for the greatest proportion of
clandestine laboratory detections in 2014–15. While the number of laboratories located in
vehicles decreased this reporting period, those detected in public places, rural and commercial/
industrial locations increased.
____________________________________
REFERENCES
Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) 2011, Clandestine drug laboratory remediation guidelines,
Commonwealth of Australia, Barton.
Australian Federal Police (AFP) 2012, ACT Policing: Practical guide: Illicit clandestine drug laboratories
(clanlabs), AFP, Canberra, viewed 12 August 2015, <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/~/media/afp/
pdf/ips-foi-documents/ips/publication-list/AG00067%20ACT%20Policing%20Practical%20Guide%20on%20
Illicit%20Clandestine%20Drug%20Laboratoires%20Clanlabs%2015JUNE2012.ashx>.
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Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) 2015, ‘International Narcotics
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