CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES AND PRECURSORS CLAN LABS & PRECURSORS CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES AND PRECURSORS KEY POINTS The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally has continued to decrease since 2011–12, with 667 detections in 2014–15. The majority of clandestine laboratories continue to be detected in residential areas, with increased detections in public places, rural and commercial/industrial locations in 2014–15. The proportion of addict-based clandestine laboratories detected in 2014–15 increased to 60.9 per cent. While the number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border decreased in 2014–15, the number and weight of MDMA precursor detections increased. The number of tablet presses detected at the Australian border increased in 2014–15, while the number of tablet presses seized nationally decreased. OTHER DRUGS Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors MAIN FORMS Clandestine laboratories, commonly known as ‘clan labs’, covertly manufacture illicit drugs and/or their precursors. These laboratories range in scale and capability from crude, makeshift operations using simple processes to highly sophisticated operations using advanced equipment and complex chemical techniques. Regardless of their size or level of sophistication, the corrosive and hazardous nature of chemicals used in clandestine laboratories pose significant risks to those operating the laboratories, properties in the vicinity and the wider community. Many of the chemicals used are extremely volatile and residual contaminants may remain on surfaces and in the air, soil or water supply for long periods of time (AFP 2012; AGD 2011). Drug manufacturing carried out in clandestine laboratories may involve any or all of the following processes. Extraction—the active chemical ingredients are extracted from a chemical preparation or plant, using a chemical solvent to produce a finished drug or a precursor chemical. Examples of extraction include the extraction of precursor chemicals from pharmaceutical preparations,1 or the extraction of morphine from opium. Conversion—a raw or unrefined drug product is changed into a more sought after product by altering the chemical form. Examples include converting cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride or methylamphetamine base into crystalline methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Synthesis—raw materials are combined and reacted under specific conditions to create the finished product through chemical reactions. Synthetic drugs such as methylamphetamine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) are created through this process. Tableting—the final product is converted into dosage units. An example is pressing MDMA powder into tablets. There are three types of substances used in illicit drug manufacture. Precursors—considered the starting materials for illicit drug manufacture. Through chemical reactions, the precursor’s molecular structure is modified to produce a specific illicit drug. For example, precursors such as ephedrine (Eph) and pseudoephedrine (PSE) are converted to methylamphetamine. ➐ Reagents—substances used to cause a chemical reaction that modify the precursor’s molecular structure. For example, when hydriodic acid and red phosphorous are mixed with the precursors Eph or PSE, the resulting compound is methylamphetamine. Solvents—added to the chemical mixture to ensure effective mixing by dissolving precursors and reagents, diluting the reaction mixtures, and separating and purifying other chemicals. For example, acetone and hydrochloric acid are used in LSD production (INCB 2014). 1 Such as pseudoephedrine from cold and flu products. 145 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Globally, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are the most common illicit drugs manufactured in clandestine laboratories. In Australia, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are the most common precursors used in the manufacture of methylamphetamine, with safrole, isosafrole and piperonal the principal precursors used in the manufacture of MDMA. However, new methods using a wide range of precursors and pre-precursors are constantly being developed in response to law enforcement attention and the reduced availability of required chemicals. As many chemicals have legitimate industrial application, an ongoing challenge for government and law enforcement exists in preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals to the illicit market, whilst maintaining access to these chemicals by legitimate industry (UNODC 2014). In 2007, the Australian Government funded the national rollout of Project STOP, an initiative aimed at reducing the diversion of pharmaceutical products containing pseudoephedrine to the illicit drug manufacturing market. As of 30 June 2015, 75.4 per cent of approved community pharmacies were registered with Project STOP, a decrease from 79.3 per cent at 30 June 2014. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Convention)2 aims to prevent the diversion of chemicals from licit market for use in the manufacture of illicit drugs. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) established the Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS) in 2012 to monitor non-scheduled chemicals and to prevent the diversion of those substances into the illicit drug market. As a real-time online communication tool, PICS shares intelligence and facilitates direct contact between national authorities to launch bilateral and regional investigations into chemical trafficking. The system includes non-scheduled chemicals such as pre-precursors, products containing the controlled precursors, derivatives and the illicit manufacture of new drugs (BINLEA 2015; INCB 2015). ➐ While many countries manufacture and trade in chemicals, the scale and range of chemicals vary. China and India remain significant global licit producers and exporters of precursor chemicals. There are approximately 400 000 precursor chemical suppliers and distributors in China, with locally produced precursor chemicals exported for industrial production and diverted for the illicit production of drugs in other countries. In Mexico and Central America, most of the precursor chemicals seized related to the production of methylamphetamine was sourced from China. In 2013, India was the largest global exporter of pseudoephedrine and the second largest exporter of ephedrine (BINLEA 2015). Methylamphetamine production continues to increase worldwide. Precursor chemicals used in methylamphetamine production include pseudoephedrine, ephedrine and P2P. As these precursors become more difficult to obtain, the use of non-controlled pre-precursor chemicals—such as alphaphenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)—has increased. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) reported that more than 48 000 kilograms of APAAN was seized in 2013 under national legislation, which had the potential to produce over 22 tonnes of amphetamine or methylamphetamine (BINLEA 2015; EMCDDA 2015). 2 146 The 1988 Convention sets out specific measures for the manufacture, distribution and international trade of a number of chemicals frequently used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. These are listed under two categories: Table I lists the more strictly controlled substances and Table II lists the relatively less controlled substances. Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors Major seizures of MDMA precursors indicate the return of large-scale ecstasy production in the European Union. In 2013, 5 061 kilograms of PMK (3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone) and 13 837 litres of safrole were seized, which together would be capable of producing an estimated 170 million MDMA tablets. In 2015, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported recent large seizures of MDMA chemical precursors in East and South-East Asia and Oceania (BINLEA 2015; UNODC 2015). The INCB has estimated that diversion of less than one percent of worldwide licit commercial use of potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride is required to produce the world’s supply of cocaine and heroin. Argentinean-produced precursors are reported to have been diverted for the processing of coca leaf and cocaine from Argentina’s chemical industry. In 2013, Colombian authorities destroyed 2 128 laboratories used to extract coca paste or cocaine base, as well as 208 cocaine hydrochloride laboratories (BINLEA 2015).3 According to the 2015 World Drug Report, 58 countries and territories reported the emergence of hundreds of products containing different synthetic cannabinoids to the UNODC advisory. Their clandestine manufacture and the serious risk they pose to public health and society challenge drug controls of the international community (UNODC 2015). DOMESTIC TRENDS AUSTRALIAN BORDER SITUATION In 2014–15, the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border decreased 40.1 per cent, from 1 035 in 2013–14 to 620 in 2014–15. The weight of precursors detected decreased 66.7 per cent, from 1 505.2 kilograms in 2013–14 to 500.8 kilograms in 2014–15 (see Figure 92). In this reporting period, 99 detections weighed more than 1 kilogram. Combined, these 99 detections account for 92.9 per cent of the weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor chemicals detected in 2014–15. FIGURE 92: Number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, 2005–06 to 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) 3 ➐ Chemicals used to refine and process plant-based drugs are referred to as ‘essential’ or ‘precursor’ chemicals and can be readily replaced by other chemicals with similar properties (BINLEA 2015). 147 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 In 2014–15, the number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border increased 325.0 per cent, from 4 in 2013–14 to a record 17 in 2014–15. The weight of precursors detected increased significantly, from 1.24 kilograms in 2013–14 to 288.0 kilograms in 2014–15 (see Figure 93). FIGURE 93: Number and weight/litresa of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, 2005–06 to 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) a. Significant detections of MDMA precursors occur in both litres and kilograms. As this figure reflects two units of measurement, it is necessary to refer to ‘Significant Border Detections’ for individual reporting periods to determine the related unit of measurement. SIGNIFICANT BORDER DETECTIONS Significant border detections of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors in 2014–15 include: 50.0 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected on 18 August 2014, concealed among cartons, via sea cargo from Thailand to Sydney ➐ 20.5 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected on 10 August 2014, impregnated within tea, via air cargo from Iran to Sydney 20.0 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 10 October 2014, concealed in power adaptors, via air cargo from Hong Kong to Sydney 12.0 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 18 February 2015, built into packaging for goods, via air cargo from China to Sydney 10.8 kilograms of ephedrine detected on 28 April 2015, concealed within foam inserts, via air cargo from Singapore to Sydney. These 5 detections have a combined weight of 113.3 kilograms and account for 22.6 per cent of the total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected at the Australian border in 2014–15. 148 Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors Significant border detections of MDMA precursors in 2014–15 include: 150.0 kilograms of safrole detected on 22 August 2015, concealed within essential oil, via air cargo from China to Sydney 60.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 4 May 2015, via air cargo from China to Sydney 50.0 kilograms of safrole detected on 21 September 2014, concealed within a metal drum, via air cargo from China to Sydney 8.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 12 September 2014, concealed within a plastic bottle, via air cargo from China to Sydney 7.0 kilograms of MDP2P detected on 11 December 2014, concealed within plastic bottles, via air cargo from an unknown country of embarkation to Sydney. These 5 detections have a combined weight of 275.0 kilograms and account for 95.5 per cent of the total weight of MDMA precursors detected at the Australian border in 2014–15. IMPORTATION METHODS In 2014–15, international mail (49.8 per cent) was the prominent importation stream, by number, for ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor importations detected at the Australian border, followed by air passenger/crew (23.7 per cent). In terms of weight, air cargo was the prominent importation stream (62.0 per cent) in 2014–15, followed by international mail (17.1 per cent; see Figures 94 and 95). FIGURE 94: Number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total detections, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) ➐ 149 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 FIGURE 95: Weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total weight, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) In 2014–15, air cargo accounted for 58.8 per cent of the number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, followed by air passenger/crew (35.3 per cent). By weight, air cargo was the predominant importation stream for MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border this reporting period (see Figures 96 and 97). FIGURE 96: Number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total detections, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) ➐ 150 Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors FIGURE 97: Weight of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total weight, by method of importation, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) EMBARKATION POINTS A total of 47 embarkation points for ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border were identified in 2014–15, an increase from 43 in 2013–14. The prominent embarkation point this reporting period was China (including Hong Kong), which accounted for 12.4 per cent of the number and 40.6 per cent of the weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected. China (including Hong Kong) was the prominent embarkation point for MDMA precursors detected at the Australian border in 2014–15. Other key embarkation points this reporting period include Indonesia, Argentina and Singapore. TABLET PRESS DETECTIONS The number of tablet press detections at the Australian border increased 70.0 per cent this reporting period, from 20 in 2013–14 to 34 in 2014–15. Air cargo and sea cargo accounted for 14 detections each, with 6 detections occurring in the international mail stream (see Figure 98). Embarkation points for tablet press detections in 2014–15 include China, the United States, Malaysia, Canada and the United Kingdom. ➐ FIGURE 98: Number of tablet press detections at the Australian border, 2014–15 (Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection) 151 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 DOMESTIC MARKET INDICATORS The number of clandestine laboratory detections is not indicative of production output, which is calculated using a number of variables including size of reaction vessels, amount and type of precursor chemicals used, the skill of people involved and the method of manufacture. Regardless of their size, the residual contamination arising from illicit drug manufacture presents a serious risk to humans and the environment. In 2011, the Australian Government launched the Clandestine Drug Laboratory Remediation Guidelines, in recognition of the hazardous nature of clandestine laboratories (AGD 2011). CLANDESTINE LABORATORY DETECTIONS Following increases in the number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally between 2007–08 and 2011–12, the number detected nationally has continued to decrease, from 744 in 2013–14 to 667 in 2014–15, the lowest number reported since 2008–09 (see Figure 99). FIGURE 99: National clandestine laboratory detections, 2005–06 to 2014–15 ➐ Queensland continues to account for the highest proportion of national clandestine laboratory detections, accounting for 35.4 per cent in 2014–15. Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory reported decreases in the number of clandestine laboratory detections this reporting period, with the number of detections in Tasmania remaining stable. New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory reported increases in the number of clandestine laboratories detected this reporting period. The 161 clandestine laboratory detections in Victoria in 2014–15 is the highest number reported for the state in the last decade, with the 99 detections reported in New South Wales in 2014–15 the second highest number of detections reported for the state in the last decade (see Table 38). 152 Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors TABLE 38: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by state and territory, 2005–06 to 2014–15 Year NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Total 2005–06 55 47 161 50 58 5 12 2 390 2006–07 49 72 132 51 37 9 1 5 356 2007–08 51 76 121 69 30 2 1 6 356 2008–09 67 84 148 65 78 0 7 0 449 2009–10 82 113 297 71 118 1 12 0 694 2010–11 87 63 293 75 171 11 2 1 703 2011–12 90 99 379 58 160 15 7 1 809 2012–13 105 113 330 56 136 9 8 0 757 2013–14 98 114 340 80 96 5 11 0 744 2014–15 99 161 236 71 84 5 10 1 667 SIZE AND PRODUCTION CAPACITY There is currently no recognised standard, either in Australia or internationally, for measuring the size or production capacity of clandestine laboratories. State and territory police services were asked to provide an indication of size and production capacity of detected laboratories, using categories provided by the UNODC. Full definitions for the four categories—addict-based, other small-scale, medium sized and industrial scale—are provided in the Statistics chapter of this report. 4 In 2014–15, clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based laboratories using basic equipment and simple procedures, manufacturing less than 50 grams per production cycle, through to industrial scale laboratories, equipped with purchased or custom-made industrial tools and which typically manufacture 50 kilograms or more per production cycle. During this reporting period, for those able to be categorised, the majority of detected clandestine laboratories were addict-based laboratories, the proportion of which increased from 51.6 per cent in 2013–14 to 60.9 per cent in 2014–15. The proportion of medium sized laboratories remained relatively stable at 12.9 per cent and the proportion of laboratories attributed to other small-scale and industrial scale laboratories decreased (from 26.0 and 10.1 per cent respectively; see Figure 100). FIGURE 100: Category of detected clandestine laboratories, by size and production capacity, 2014–15 4 ➐ This is the fourth time jurisdictions have provided an indication of the size and production capacity of detected laboratories. Figures were not available for all clandestine laboratories detected. 153 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 DRUG TYPES AND METHODS OF PRODUCTION Of those able to be identified, clandestine laboratories manufacturing ATS (excluding MDMA) continue to represent the majority of detections by drug production type in Australia, although the proportion decreased from 78.9 per cent in 2013–14 to 57.1 per cent in 2014–15 (see Table 39). Methylamphetamine remains the main drug produced in laboratories detected nationally. TABLE 39: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by drug production type and state and territory, 2014–15 ATS State/ (excluding Territory MDMA) Cannabis Homebake oil PSE a MDMA heroin extraction extraction GHB/ GBL Otherb Unknownc Totald NSW 75 10 0 0 0 1 11 1 98 Vic 92 4 1 2 0 5 5 49 158 Qld 103 2 1 0 0 3 17 112 238 SA 37 0 1 4 1 3 7 24 77 WA 66 0 11 4 0 0 6 2 89 Tas 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 NT 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 ACT 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 386 18 14 10 1 12 46 189 676 Total a.Pseudoephedrine. b. ‘Other’ refers to the detection of other illicit manufacture. c. ‘Unknown’ includes seized substances which were unable to be identified or are awaiting analysis. d. Total may exceed the number of clandestine laboratory detections due to multiple drug production types being identified in a single laboratory. ➐ The number of national ATS (excluding MDMA) laboratory detections decreased by 36.5 per cent this reporting period, from 608 in 2013–14 to 386 in 2014–15. Since 2000–01, Queensland has accounted for the greatest proportion of national ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory detections, accounting for 26.7 per cent in 2014–15, a decrease from 44.4 per cent in 2013–14. Although the number of MDMA laboratories detected nationally remains low, there was a sixfold increase in detections this reporting period, from 3 in 2013–14 to 18 in 2014–15. These laboratories were detected in New South Wales (10), Victoria (4), Queensland (2), the Northern Territory (1) and the Australian Capital Territory (1). The number of national homebake heroin laboratory detections almost tripled this reporting period, from 5 in 2013–14 to 14 in 2014–15. This reporting period there were detections in Western Australia (11), Victoria (1), Queensland (1) and South Australia (1). 154 Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors While cannabis oil extraction laboratories continue to be detected in Australia, numbers remain low. The number of cannabis oil extraction laboratories detected in Australia increased this reporting period, from 7 in 2013–14 to 10 in 2014–15. South Australia and Western Australia each reported 4 detections, with 2 reported in Victoria. The 10 laboratories detected in 2014–15 is the highest number on record since related reporting began in 2007–08. During this reporting period, 12 clandestine laboratories manufacturing gamma-hydroxybutyrate/ gamma-butyrolactone (GHB/GBL) were detected nationally, an increase from 11 laboratories in 2013–14. This reporting period laboratories were detected in Victoria (5), Queensland (3), South Australia (3) and New South Wales (1). The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally extracting pseudoephedrine continued to decrease this reporting period, from 6 in 2013–14 to 1 in 2014–15. Clandestine laboratories detected in Australia also manufacture a range of ‘other’ illicit drugs, precursors and pre-precursors. In 2014–15, these included dimethyltryptamine (DMT), paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), methcathinone, P2P and MDP2P. Despite a decrease this reporting period in the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) laboratories identified nationally using the hypophosphorous method of production—from 284 in 2013–14 to 225 in 2014–15—it remains the predominant method of production. This is followed by the Nazi/Birch method, with the number of related laboratories also decreasing this reporting period, from 95 in 2013–14 to 68 in 2014–15. Consistent with the previous reporting period, Queensland (31.6 per cent) accounted for the greatest proportion of national hypophosphorous laboratories, while Western Australia accounted for the greatest proportion of Nazi/Birch (85.3 per cent). National detections of laboratories using red phosphorous decreased this reporting period, from 32 in 2013–14 to 29 in 2014–15. The number of clandestine laboratories identified nationally using the P2P method of production also decreased, from 20 in 2013–14 to 12 in 2014–15 (see Table 40). TABLE 40: Method of ATS (excluding MDMA) production in clandestine laboratory detections, by state and territory, 2014–15 Nazi/Birch Phenyl-2Propanone (P2P) Othera Totalb 3 1 4 1 74 56 7 3 5 3 74 Qld 71 6 0 3 0 80 SA 25 3 2 0 1 31 WA 5 4 58 0 0 67 Tas 3 1 1 0 0 5 NT 0 5 3 0 1 9 ACT 0 0 0 0 0 0 225 29 68 12 6 340 State/ Territory Hypophosphorous Redphosphorus NSW 65 Vic Total ➐ a. ‘Other’ includes the detection of other ATS (excluding MDMA) production methodologies. b. Total may not equal the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory detections as the method of production may not be identified or the detection is awaiting analysis. 155 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 SIGNIFICANT PRECURSOR SEIZURES The following provides a national snapshot of the identification and/or seizure of some significant quantities of precursors/reagents this reporting period: 160 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in New South Wales 81 kilograms of pseudoephedrine in New South Wales 40 kilograms of iodine in New South Wales 38 litres of 1,4 Butanediol in Western Australia 20 litres of hypophosphorous acid in New South Wales 19 litres of helional in the Northern Territory 10 kilograms of ephedrine in New South Wales 2.25 litres of anethole in South Australia. LOCATION AND CATEGORY While residential areas remain the primary location for clandestine laboratory detections in Australia, detections in public places, rural and commercial/industrial locations increased this reporting period. The proportion of clandestine laboratory detections in residential areas remained relatively stable at 68.4 per cent in 2014–15. This was followed by detections in vehicles (9.9 per cent, a decrease from 12.2 per cent in 2013–14), public places (6.8 per cent, an increase from 3.9 per cent in 2013–14), rural areas (6.0 per cent, an increase from 3.5 per cent in 2013–14), commercial/industrial areas (4.2 per cent, an increase from 3.0 per cent in 2013–14 and other (4.7 per cent, a decrease from 9.6 per cent; see Figure 101). FIGURE 101: Location of clandestine laboratory detections, 2014–15 ➐ 156 Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 Clandestine Laboratories and Precursors There are four distinct categories of clandestine laboratories: Category A—active (chemicals and equipment in use) Category B—stored/used (equipment or chemicals)5 Category C—stored/unused (equipment or chemicals) Category D—historical site. Consistent with previous reporting periods, Category C (stored/unused) remains the most common category for clandestine laboratories detected nationally, accounting for 51.6 per cent of detected laboratories in 2014–15, a decrease from 55.6 per cent in 2013–14. This was followed by Category B (stored/used), accounting for 25.7 per cent of detected laboratories. The proportion of Category A (active sites) increased from 8.3 per cent in 2013–14 to 11.5 per cent in 2014–15. The proportion of Category D (historical sites) remained relatively stable at 11.2 per cent in 2014–15 (see Figure 102). FIGURE 102: Category of detected clandestine laboratories, 2014–15 NATIONAL TABLET PRESS SEIZURES ➐ There were 3 tablet presses6 seized nationally in 2014–15, compared with 7 in 2013–14 and 19 in 2012–13. The 3 seizures in 2014–15 is the lowest number reported since 2008–09. Seizures this reporting period occurred in the Northern Territory (2) and South Australia (1). In addition to tablet press seizures, South Australia reported the seizure of 2 encapsulators in 2014–15. NATIONAL IMPACT In 2014–15, the number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected at the Australian border decreased, while the number and weight of MDMA precursor detections increased. The number of tablet press detections at the Australian border increased this reporting period, while the number of tablet presses seized nationally further decreased. 5 6 Laboratories which are fully assembled but not active at the time of detection. Simple presses only. 157 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Illicit Drug Data Report 2014–15 The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally this reporting period continued to decrease, with the 667 laboratory detections in 2014–15 the lowest number reported since 2008–09. The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally producing MDMA, homebake heroin, GHB/GBL and undertaking cannabis oil extraction increased this reporting period, while those producing ATS (excluding MDMA) decreased. Despite a decrease in the number of hypophosphorous laboratories detected this reporting period, it remains the primary production method identified in detected laboratories in 2014–15. While Nazi/Birch continues to be the second most common method of production, the proportion of laboratories using this method also decreased in 2014–15. In 2014–15, clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based through to industrial scale laboratories. The proportion of small-scale and industrial scale laboratories decreased this reporting period, while the proportion of medium sized laboratories remained relatively stable. Of the laboratories able to be categorised, 60.9 per cent were addict-based, utilising basic equipment, simple procedures and manufacturing less than 50 grams of ATS (excluding MDMA) per cycle. The proportion of clandestine laboratories detected in residential areas remained relatively stable and continued to account for the greatest proportion of clandestine laboratory detections in 2014–15. While the number of laboratories located in vehicles decreased this reporting period, those detected in public places, rural and commercial/ industrial locations increased. ____________________________________ REFERENCES Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) 2011, Clandestine drug laboratory remediation guidelines, Commonwealth of Australia, Barton. Australian Federal Police (AFP) 2012, ACT Policing: Practical guide: Illicit clandestine drug laboratories (clanlabs), AFP, Canberra, viewed 12 August 2015, <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/~/media/afp/ pdf/ips-foi-documents/ips/publication-list/AG00067%20ACT%20Policing%20Practical%20Guide%20on%20 Illicit%20Clandestine%20Drug%20Laboratoires%20Clanlabs%2015JUNE2012.ashx>. ➐ Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) 2015, ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report’, Drug and Chemical Control, Volume 1, BINLEA, US Department of State, Washington D.C., viewed 27 October 2015, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239560.pdf>. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 2015, Amphetamine drug profile, viewed 27 October 2015, <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_239505_EN_ TDAT15001ENN.pdf>. International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 2014, ‘Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances’, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2013 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, INCB, United Nations, New York. International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 2015, ‘Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances’, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2014 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, INCB, United Nations, New York, viewed 26 October 2015, <https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2014/2014-PreAR_E.pdf.>. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2014, World Drug Report 2014, UNODC, Vienna. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2015, World Drug Report 2015, UNODC, Vienna, viewed 27 October 2015, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2015/World_Drug_Report_2015.pdf.>. 158
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